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
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NAVAL INVESTIGATION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

IN TWO VOLUMES

Vol. 1

For the use of the Committee on Naval Affairs



WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1921

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II

1705

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

VOLUME I OF THE TESTIMONY.

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Statement by Senator Frederick Hale, chairman..... | |
| 1. William S. Sims, United States Navy..... | |
| 2. Herbert Hoover..... | |
| 3. William S. Sims, United States Navy (resumed)..... | |
| 4. James United States Navy..... | |
| 5. James United States Navy..... | |
| 6. James United States Navy..... | |
| 7. H. H. Hunkett, United States Navy..... | |
| 8. C. W. Grant, United States Navy..... | |
| 9. H. T. Mayo, United States Navy..... | |
| 10. Bradley A. Fiske, United States Navy..... | |
| 11. W. F. Fullam, United States Navy..... | |
| 12. Hugh Rodman, United States Navy..... | |
| 13. Henry B. Wilson, United States Navy..... | |
| 14. J. F. Fletcher, United States Navy..... | |
| 15. Thomas Washington, United States Navy..... | |
| 16. J. F. Fletcher, United States Navy (resumed)..... | |
| 17. Henry B. Wilson, United States Navy (resumed)..... | |
| 18. John A. Black, United States Navy..... | |
| 19. James Strauss, United States Navy..... | |
| 20. James J. Badger, United States Navy..... | |
| 21. James J. Badger, United States Navy..... | |
| 22. James S. McKean, United States Navy..... | |
| 23. See Volume II..... | |

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS Washington,

Committee met pursuant to the call of the chair
at 2 p. m. in room 235, Senate Office Building,
Chairman presiding.

Senators Hale (chairman), McCormick, Pittman

SENATOR HALE. The committee will come to order. On
opening of this committee which was being held
in the Navy, a letter was read from
Senator Sime to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Jan
without objection, that letter will be inserted
at present time.

As referred to is here printed in the record as follows

JANUARY

to William S. Sime, United States Navy.

Secretary of the Navy

Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir: In the event of a war in which large naval forces have been
engaged, time has elapsed to permit of a careful estimate of the
war was conducted. It is of the first importance that the lessons
of experience be recorded in order that they may serve as a

guide in the event of a naval war of such a peculiar character that
there was of little assistance in determining the proper poli-
tical tactics that were rendered necessary by the num-
ber of countries involved, and by the enemy
who attacked merchant shipping in disregard of the tenets of
humanity.

It is particularly important that a just estimate be made
of the strategy and administration that were committed

to me; that I submit the following account of what appears
to be the errors, and the circumstances that led up to them
and the lessons to be derived therefrom.

My report is solely from the viewpoint of the commander of
the fleet in Europe, but specifically as a result of the e-
xtraordinary unusual and very responsible position of the
commander in the naval council of the Allies, where on
all matters could be continuously discussed, and where on
all matters both current and general, was at all times avail-
able. On March 1917, in response to a request from the
British Government, expressing the desire of the British Gov-
ernment of high rank be sent to secure the closer cooperati-
on had suggested, I was ordered abroad on purely

My report was delivered to me verbally in Washington. No f-
ormal report of the Navy Department's plans or policy
was made, though I received the following explicit ad-
vice from the British: "British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our
business out of the fire. We would as soon fight the f-

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS
Washington

Committee met pursuant to the call of the chairman at 10 a. m. in room 235, Senate Office Building for the purpose of providing.

Senators Hale (chairman), McCormick, Pittman

CLERK. The committee will come to order. On the opening of this committee which was being held in the Navy, a letter was read from the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 1, 1917, without objection, that letter will be inserted in the present time.

As referred to is here printed in the record as follows:

JANUARY

William S. Sims, United States Navy.

Secretary of the Navy.

Dear Sir: In view of the Great War.

It is a war in which large naval forces have been engaged. It is time has elapsed to permit of a careful estimate of the results of the war. It is of the first importance that the lessons of the experience be recorded in order that they may serve as

examples for a naval war of such a peculiar character that it was a little assistance in determining the proper policy and tactics that were rendered necessary by the nature of the war, the character of the countries involved, and by the enemy's policy of merchant shipping in disregard of the tenets of humanity.

It is particularly important that a just estimate be made of the strategy, and administration, that were committed

to the fact that I submit the following account of what appears to be the errors and the circumstances that led up to their defeat, and the lessons to be derived therefrom.

Presented solely from the viewpoint of the commander of the fleet in Europe, but specifically as a result of the position of the unusual and very responsible position of the commander in the naval council of the Allies, where a policy could be continuously discussed, and where a policy of both current and general, was at all times available. In March, 1917, in response to a request from the British Government, expressing the desire of the British Government that high rank be sent to secure the closer cooperation had suggested, I was ordered abroad on barely

and were delivered to me verbally in Washington. No statement of the Navy Department's plans or policy was made, though I received the following explicit statement: "British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business out of the fire. We would as soon fight the

8. I assumed that my mission was to confer with the heads of navies to learn the actual situation and to discuss means for naval action in case the United States declared war against the Central Powers. My assistant commander accompanied me as aid. We were directed not to take to travel under assumed names, I expected to return and supplement my reporting the situation in person. I had no idea that I would be directed to command the naval forces in Europe in case of war.

9. I arrived in Liverpool on April 9, and in London on April 10, 1917, immediately to the admiralty, where the naval situation was fully explained to responsible officials. This explanation showed that the Navy Department did not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation; that its information was incomplete and inaccurate. This was due to the insufficient scope of its service, very few naval officers having been sent to Europe for information when we entered the war.

10. A review of the cables sent to the department in April, 1917, showed the situation was very serious and that the enemy was rapidly winning the destruction of merchant shipping. Throughout the following year numerous cables and letters of the most urgent possible character were sent with the object of impressing upon the department the vital necessity of our maximum effort being made in the European waters with the least possible delay, but without producing desired results.

11. Attention was frequently invited to the fact that shipping was being sunk faster than it was being built, and that it was a matter of simple arithmetic to determine when the Allies would have to sue for peace if the war continued.

12. It may be well to state here that the delays in taking action, and lack of support, involving the efficiency of the United States naval assistance in Europe can be fully understood only through an examination of the communications between the department and the naval headquarters abroad.

13. For some reason which has never been explained, the Navy Department during at least the first six months of the war, failed to put into actual practice a hearted policy of cooperation with the Allies—the policy required for winning the war with the least possible delay.

14. The headquarters in Europe was not infrequently left in ignorance of the department's policies, plans for operation of United States forces, and its action upon my many dispatches. Not until July 10, 1917, did the Navy Department outline a policy as regards naval cooperation with the Allies—in a cable letter to the State Department.

15. As usual in such cases, the policy thus set forth was academically sound, but that it was not carried out, or was not understood by the department, is shown by the fact that for 10 months after its receipt I was still urgently recommending the use of forces—still trying to convince the department that the war was in the Atlantic; that the United States naval "front" was off the European coast off the United States coast; that it was there only that the naval enemy was to be met; that it was there only that United States shipping, let alone allied shipping, was to be protected with the maximum efficiency.

16. A review of the dispatches makes it apparent that the department did not accept my reports and recommendations with the seriousness that the critics demanded. There are many instances that illustrate this. One that may be mentioned is the case of our battleships that were requested as reinforcement of the Grand Fleet.

17. Following a conference with Admiral Jellicoe, then first sea lord, of the British Admiralty, and Admiral Beatty, the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, it was strongly recommended, on July 21, 1917, that four of our coal-burning battleships be sent at once. There was great delay, but there was even an acknowledgment of this request. This naturally subjected me to much embarrassment. The request, though repeated, was finally refused.

18. In the following November the chief of naval operations arrived in London with the Col. House mission. After discussing this question of the necessity of sending our battleships, with the same officials with whom I had discussed it, he was once recommending that they be sent. The result was that it was over four months after the original request (Nov. 28), that the four ships sailed from the United States.

19. This is but one of a number of examples of a similar kind and strikingly illustrates the nature of the delays caused by the department's insistence upon its own way of understanding the intricate details of rapidly changing conditions 3,000 miles away. As it was, of course, a physical impossibility to keep the department fully and accurately informed, and as the department insisted upon making decisions upon the basis of both the disposition and the actual operations of the European forces, the inevitable result was unsound decisions, and in some cases long delays before the situation could be met.

to accept the original recommendations that were based upon the actual conditions with the heads of the allied navies. The actions that were finally taken, after extensive cabled and written communications, and consequently long delays, it is apparent that if I could have been in Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and the conferences upon which they were based, they would have been carried out from two to six months earlier. The point is that I considered that there was anyone in Washington more competent than I, and he should have been sent to Europe for that purpose; but, the recommendations of the Navy Department's representative, based upon the views of the allied commanders, should have been accepted and implemented. The action of the department in this respect was a violation of a principle of warfare—see Mahan, or any authority—and it was a great delay and reluctance in accepting the indisputable fact, which was apparent to anyone, that the critical sea area was in the so-called submarine war zone; that the submarine campaign would affect the ultimate decision of the war only in that area. The delay in Washington greatly slowed the sending of the necessary orders, which resulted in prolonging the war.

It is self-evident that the department could not possibly have been kept informed in detail, by cable code messages, of the actual situation, and, particularly, of the rapidly changing conditions during the war in the summer of 1917.

It is a fact that this was a physical impossibility during all of that period. The work of collecting the necessary information, or the manual work of transcribing it, would have been away from the capacity of one man assisted by the one aid I was allowed. The best that could possibly be done was to keep the department by cable in a general way of the conclusions reached by me with the allied commanders at the "front," and of the

the department declined to approve such decisions, the only way to explain by letter, as fully as time and insufficient assistance permitted. The result was, of course, long, embarrassing, and dangerous delays. Had the department promptly accepted the recommendations made, beginning from the arrival abroad, and continuing for some months, and had sent the necessary orders and other craft which were finally sent in the next four or five months, that the United States naval intervention would have been

it is difficult at the present time to believe that any policy involving such delays had been persisted in, particularly when combined with a constant stream of requests for additional staff officers to assist my one aide; the dispatches and letters exchanged with the department during this period of the war will show that the department insisted upon full and detailed substantiation of every proposition concerning the disposition and handling of the naval forces with the enemy.

In the above-mentioned statement of policy, from the Navy to the Admiralty, of which was sent me, it is clearly set forth that readiness to send our light forces abroad was dependent upon the department's keeping the department fully informed through me of

while the department's first statement of policy (which was issued three months after we entered the war) was what I had recommended, it nevertheless withheld putting it into effect, apparently because the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of their plans. The matter was that nothing was being withheld, and that the orders which were in writing, which were actually of an official character, in any way affected United States naval cooperation, had been sent to the department as completely as long distance communication—coded

as suggestions were made by the British Admiralty as to uses of our forces. For example, in April, 1917, there was anxiety lest the enemy would land in the Channel with a heavy force and get away before he could be met by a force from the Grand Fleet, the nearest base of which was at Edinburgh. Accordingly, the Admiralty suggested that a squadron of ships be based on Brest or in the Channel. No reply was made to this

gestion. Also, the value of submarines in the campaign was first explained in April, 1917. None were sent until October, 1917, when five arrived in Ireland by seven more in January and February, 1918.

32. In spite of the numerous messages sent in April, the only information up to April 27, 1917, was that six destroyers only would be sent. The situation was then so very critical that I appealed to the American ambassador in London and sent a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 1917, the information was received of the department's intention to send more destroyers—that ultimately 36 and two repair ships would be sent.

33. Most earnest requests were made for tugs because of the urgent need in the submarine zone. These requests fully explained how many torpedoes could have been beached and salvaged if these tugs had been available. It has been shown that such vessels could be repaired and put in service again in a very short time compared to that required to build new ships—thus resulting in a great saving of tonnage.

34. A year after we entered the war but four tugs had been sent, and only two were specifically allocated to Italy by the department. Nine more were sent at various times, but none before April 23, 1918.

35. The department caused serious embarrassment and delays in putting into effect the convoy system which was the most important of all the measures for defeating the submarine war against allied shipping.

36. The department was repeatedly assured that the Allies at all times had reliable and accurate information as to the movement of submarines, and that it was practically certain that they could not reach our coast, or even leave Europe without advance information being supplied. Subsequent events proved this assurance to be correct.

37. No submarines visited our coast until May, 1918, and the department was in all cases informed when they started across, and often as to their exact destination and where they were to lay mines, etc.

38. My dispatches show that with all possible emphasis I tried to induce the department to view the campaign as a whole; to consider our naval forces as a relatively small item of an allied naval team; that our mission was the protection of all allied lines of communication and not the United States lines of communication alone; that, particularly in the early part of our campaign, the strictly United States lines of communication, as compared to allied lines, were inconsiderable; and that it was quite possible to give our relatively small commerce quite superior protection at the expense of losing the war by denying essential protection to the vast allied commerce upon which the success of our common cause chiefly depended.

39. There was naturally a strong inclination on the part of the various governments, including the United States, to resist this policy in favor of a disposition of forces which would afford superior protection to their respective commercial vessels.

40. War is always a dangerous game. Military operations conducted by the allied powers should never be based upon a policy of "safety first" as regards the interests of any particular ally. This is especially true where success depends upon the maximum possible protection being given to the allied commerce as a whole.

41. As the possession of adequate shipping was an imperative requirement in the war, it follows that the essential policy was to pool all antisubmarine forces and to use them to the best possible advantage for the protection of all shipping, regardless of flag that it happened to be under. As the winning of the war was the primary object, and as our antisubmarine forces and those of the Allies were always in the water, and as it was consequently impossible to prevent a certain amount of loss, it followed that the game was to reduce the combined loss of allied shipping below a point which would defeat the objective of the enemy and thus insure victory of the allied cause as a whole.

42. It was repeatedly explained that if we could actually entice the enemy by shifting his submarines to our coast it would be greatly to the advantage of the allied cause, even granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely from the chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to the United States coast without our having advance knowledge, while remote, was a fully justified risk, and therefore that such considerations should not deter us in any way from putting every possible bit of naval strength into the fight on the actual "front"; that the "war zone" in European waters. Moreover, that the risk was slight, that the submarines could be sent back, if necessary, before submarines could reach our coast and do much damage. In making long passages submarines necessarily steam at slow speed—from 5 to 6 knots.

43. Submarines attacked almost exclusively merchant vessels, thus cutting off supplies essential to the armies. This was their correct mission, and the

of naval vessels. It was, therefore, our mission to adopt measures to put our marines into contact with the Allies' military vessels, and to protect shipping. This meant antisubmarine craft in such numbers that they could not reach their prey without encountering them. I was continuously urged that everything be sent, not only the best antisubmarine craft, but also yachts, gunboats, and other craft that could steam across the ocean or be towed across. There were many naval activities outside of the eastern Atlantic, North Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters. But, at the time in question we were losing the war and our naval forces were of little importance—practically none as compared with the great deal of unnecessary effort was expended in these waters. I felt that we could afford to lose some antisubmarine craft, but not the loss of merchantmen at the rate then being

incurred. I felt that if a considerable number of antisubmarine vessels were lost, there would be risk of public criticism which, in time of war, is a serious matter. I strongly advised that this risk be accepted; that we should take war measures by the possibility of such adverse criticism; that it was imperative that every possible means be used to win the war, regardless of other considerations, and thus

the situation disclosed by the correspondence with the Allies during the most critical period—the first four months after the war began, and that for more than the first year I had a

very possible it was explained, in numerous cables and letters, the absolute necessity of further assistance in the war, but only to receive always the same answer, "Not available."

My only aid was unable longer to support the continuous work, including the very anxious task of planning for the future, then arriving. And it was only after this fact had been explained, though the department still declined to grant that had been requested, with full explanations of the types of work necessary for each. I urged the department to give me at least a flotilla of destroyers would have in time of

the war that support in this matter need not be expected by detaching officers from some of the ships. As many of the ships were at that time short of officers; the whole force becoming ineffective through the administrative work getting beyond the capacity of the force. This force consisted of about 60 regular and 140 irregular men and clerical force for the administration, and dispersed forces of about 370 ships of all classes, 5,000 men. It was finally, I believe, tacitly recognized by the department at the end of the war, when a few officers were sent from the beginning, as well as the necessity of the force. There can be no doubt that the end of the war had reached—of thousands of tons of shipping and many

men to understand what I and my single aid were up to in dealing with such a difficult and complicated situation. I

was in the position of the various phases of the naval campaign during the last two years.

The developments which were rapidly changing almost

the day in applying and operating the entire force.

As with that of the allies.

The task not only involved attempting to survey the disposition of all allied forces operating in the North Sea, Atlantic, and other waters, but also necessary to keep track of the results of the naval operations from the side of the Allies and from that of the enemy, and to supply, repairs, etc., which would affect any United

States naval forces that might be sent abroad. The above, to say nothing to solve problems relating to the entirely new forces introduced into the war as aviation—a tremendous problem in itself.

52. It would take many pages to set forth all the activities and information were to be studied and reports of which, of course, could have been turned to the department if the staff had been adequate.

53. If the department realized these conditions, it is made clear by the fact that it was not influenced by them. The correspondence shows that I wanted to get the department to understand that I was confronted with an impossibility that it was actually physically impossible for me and one aide to carry out the necessary operations of the forces, let alone comply with the department for the details of information concerning all the various plans of the Allies of all methods and appliances used, etc. All this not to mention the details concerning new construction, new types of vessels, new methods of gunfire.

54. In a word, it would hardly be possible to conceive of a more complete understanding by the department of the actual situation that confronted me on the side, particularly during the critical period of the war.

55. On a number of occasions I invited the department's attention to the fact that it was impossible intelligently to direct the operation of our forces from V that if we were to cooperate with the allied navies, which was the only method of participating in the war, it was essential that we keep in close personal contact with the heads of the allied navies in the war area.

56. To this end it was pointed out that our organization abroad should be as the department's advance headquarters in the field, similar to the general headquarters of the Army in the field; that the personnel of the organization's advance headquarters should be more than adequate rather than inadequate to avoid the great danger of basing the Navy's part in the war upon incompleteness of information.

57. When Gen. Pershing arrived in Europe in May, 1917, he was accompanied by a nucleus staff, consisting of 5 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 16 majors, 14 captains, and 8 lieutenants, or 53 commissioned officers in all, besides many writers and clerical employees. Ultimately this staff was expanded to about 1,500 commissioned officers.

58. As was repeatedly pointed out, such was the necessity for an adequate organization abroad that the term "not available" should have been applied to the activities of vastly less importance; that the headquarters organization in the field as well as that in Washington, should be adequate, even if it meant laying up of old ships, especially those of a class which could not possibly be used in the war.

59. The policy indicated by the dispatches in question may be summed up in the statement that ships as well as troops in the field, no matter what their individual skill, would be very heavily handicapped if their combined efforts were not coordinated and directed from the most central source of all available information.

60. The department frequently omitted to keep its naval representatives in the field informed of its plans, intentions, and sometimes even the movements of its forces in the European area, and there was at times embarrassment caused by lack of information concerning the Navy's activities in other areas, such as the South Pacific, etc. As foreign forces and shipping were also operating in those areas, it was embarrassing not to be able to answer in conference with the Allies all questions concerning our actual naval activities as well as prospective plans, the consequences of which would necessarily influence allied plans.

61. It requires little imagination to understand the great embarrassment in this position. It was, of course, impossible even to attempt any explanation of the evident fact that the Allies were not receiving the easily possible naval assistance from our ships and that I was not receiving adequate assistance in personnel.

62. Apart from the resulting lack of coordination, it was very difficult, and sometimes impossible—to avoid the impression conveyed thereby to the Allied navies that I was not being supported or was not in the confidence of the department.

63. Delays and confusion were caused by the department's dealing directly with European naval officials in Europe without using its own representatives there to investigate conditions at the "front," discuss all details with the Allied navies, and thus coordinate effort.

64. For example, on May 8, without previous explanation, the department announced its intention to establish naval bases at Bordeaux and Brest, although on May 5, it had been informed of the results of a conference with the French authorities and their agreement that our forces should remain concentrated in the area of greatest enemy activity.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

and confusion were also caused by dealing with representatives stationed in America, who made independent and statements, and other supplies, etc., without reference to the department. The department thus ignored its own representatives for the paramount purpose of investigating the details and determining, after conferences with the allied navies, the particularly their relation to the necessities of the antisubmarine war. It is true that a correct policy would have placed a heavy burden on it as it was impossible to decide such questions efficiently on the basis of all the information, and without opportunity to consider the policy should have been adopted or else the personnel assumed to be competent to decide such matters from the information transferred permanently to headquarters in Europe. The available information, and continuous conferences with

...early to understand the vital importance of con-
...the allied navies and Governments who w
...should be neglected to render decisions sound.

... The almost inevitable result in such cases would be to limit their participation at the conferences.

was insisted by the department upon finding new navy tactics such as blocking the enemy in his ports. The reason was that the situation was critical and their preparation was with all available forces. This insistence assumed that the department was more competent to decide upon practicable tactics in continuous conference with the leaders of the navy who had nearly three years' experience. This attitude was maintained by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and the Chief of the United States Navy and learned something of the situation. For the first year of the war the department refused to permit the use of capable Americans who had special knowledge and experience. Many of these men possessed special European experience and were stationed at home. Some of them felt so impelled to do the work that they returned to the United States in order that they might

...the war the department refused to trust to my discretion the officers both for gallantry in action with the enemy. Many of these officers were performing services to all proportion to the rank they held, and were far junior to the officers with whom they necessarily worked. It was not only a grave injustice to these fine men, but the policy of increasing the morale of my forces by promoting them to assume the attitude of indifference to their duties was thereby decreasing their morale.

...the most part did not care for the increase of pay, as well as an embarrassment, not to have the insignia corresponding to the services they were actually performing. The foreign officers with whom they were officially dealing during the war was I permitted to select my subordinates from a very few of my other subordinates.

It was depends so much upon complete mutual confidence and their superiors, that it seems hardly at least have been consulted as to these important and responsible for the results attained.

...and above, particularly in respect of the lack of adequate medical supplies abroad, became known in Washington. This was the following cable messages.

DECEMBER

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Vice Admiral Sims, London.

1732. At House committee hearing of conduct of Navy, Representative said "I would like to have copy of complaints which have come from A on the other side." If you desire to make statement of action of reference to sending and supplying force under your command since please send in code.

DECEMBER

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Vice Admiral Sims, London.

Effort being made to credit impression you have been hampered by Navy Department to meet your request for various things, particularly I feel that a strong positive statement on this subject from you is highly

77. I was thus confronted with a situation, not uncommon in war, which demanded a decision that no military commander should hesitate to make such a decision as would be most likely, while avoiding conflict, to aid common cause through the loyal support of superior authority by making of existing conditions, no matter how unsatisfactory. As the subject was public discussion of which in Congress would have supplied valuable information to the enemy, not to mention increasing his morale and decreasing that of our fighting forces, it was manifestly desirable that it should be discouraged, particularly that no information should be supplied that would render the situation inevitable. The following cablegram was therefore designed to accomplish this purpose:

DECEMBER 2

From: Vice Admiral Sims.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

2366. Your 1732. I strongly deprecate any effort to create an impression that our naval forces in European waters have been avoidably hampered by the Navy Department to comply with my recommendations for various things, particularly personnel.

It is of course well known that the antisubmarine campaign and the protection of allied shipping have been and still are hampered to a considerable extent by the insufficient numbers of certain types of vessels, especially destroyers, and by certain deficiencies of personnel, and I have repeatedly made recommendations in accordance with the requirements on this situation. To these recommendations the Navy Department has always responded with the assurance that reinforcements of both vessels and personnel were being sent to the maximum extent consistent with the many other requirements of the department in these respects.

The decision as to the relative importance of the employment of our naval vessels and personnel in the theater of actual war operations in European waters must necessarily rest with the department, and I consider it the first duty of the commander at the front loyally to accept such decisions and to make the best of conditions which are at present admittedly unsatisfactory and must so remain until the reinforcements now being taken to increase our antisubmarine forces produce the desired results.

78. The above brief account of the manner in which our naval operations have been conducted clearly shows that the following grave errors were committed in violation of fundamental military principles; and it is manifestly desirable that such errors should be avoided in future:

(1) Although war with Germany had been imminent for many months prior to our declaration there were nevertheless no mature plans developed or naval policy formulated in preparation for war, in so far as its commander in Europe was informed.

(2) The Navy Department did not announce a policy until three months after war was declared—at least, not to its representative and the commander of its forces in Europe.

(3) The Navy Department did not enter whole-heartedly into the campaign from the first many months after we declared war, thus putting a great strain upon the morale of the fighting forces in the war area by decreasing their confidence in their leadership.

(4) The outbreak of hostilities found many important naval units widely scattered and in need of repairs before they could be sent to the critical area.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... in the war zone had been cruising extensively off our shores and when war was declared were rushed through a ... for distant service.

... critical months of the enemy submarine campaign a ... the department violated the fundamental ... of maximum force in the critical area of the con ... representative with the allied admiralties was not ... months of the war, either by the adequate person ... could have been supplied.

... Commander in the critical area of hostilities was nev ... and was not even consulted as to their a ... of the art of command is here involved.

... made and acted upon decisions concerning ... 300 miles away, when the conditions were ... not have been in its possession, thus violating a ... and decisions necessarily depend upon complete in ... upon the judgment of those who had had actual w ... warfare, the Navy Department, though lacking not ... adequate information concerning it, insiste ... could not be carried out.

... department's actions so strongly implied a conviction t ... to make decisions concerning operations in the war ... that it lacked confidence in the judgment of ... of the Allies and its responsible commander in th ... principle that every action on the part of superior ... in subordinates. If such confidence is lacking, ... by ruthlessly changing the subordinate.

... with the commander in the field or afloat is one of ... the Government and is generally disastrous "—

... History Mahan ... did not resist this temptation, and its frequent v ... dangerous error committed during the naval wa

Wm. .

... At the conclusion of the reading of the abo ... there were certain matters contained in th ... Sims had read at my request, with the con ... familiar, I should ask the chairman of the fu ... at a meeting to be held, to determine whe ... should take in regard to this letter.

... Affairs Committee met on the following Mon ... resolution was passed:

... heretofore appointed to investigate the matter ... distinguished and heroic services he, and ... making his report on the matter referred to, to i ... referred to in the letter of Admiral Sims to the Na ... touching operations during the war, introdu

... made its report on the matter of awa ... ahead with the letter of Admiral Sims of Ja ... report of the subcommittee on the qu ... the committee is not here to determine ... officers of the Navy or between officer ... of the Navy Department. In this case ... the matters contained in Admiral Sims's

... will now take the stand.

... the custom of the subcommittee in the case of ca ... to submit the testimony to the witness for ... in the case of every witness. Witnesses have made ... allowing these corrections, the subcommittee feels th ... be agreed to by the full subcommittee. The volume of

is very great and owing to the pressure of work in the last days of the has been so little time in which to go over the correction of the testimony the subcommittee has decided to make up the reports of the hearing in print without correction, with the understanding that at a later period the corrections will be made and the records put in permanent form. These records appear are a verbatim copy of the evidence as published by the stenographers necessarily are subject to errors both on the part of the stenographer and the stenographers, errors which will be corrected in the finished report.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS, UNITED STATES NAVY.

Senator McCORMICK. Mr. Chairman, I wish to remark that I would like to proceed with the hearing that I believe it will occur to the committee, who are present, that approbation or disapprobation directly or indirectly should not be indicated at the hearing of a judicial character, and if there are other manifestations of applause or disapproval, I shall ask that the room be cleared.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the Senator's request is reasonable, and I hope that the audience will not make demonstrations.

Senator PITTMAN. I want to suggest that, at least for today, we adjourn when the Senate convenes. The reason for that is quite obvious. There is going to be some very important business to take place in which each Senator is interested, and I therefore move that we adjourn at noon to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Nevada moves that we adjourn at 12 o'clock to-day until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. Does any member object? No objection that will be done.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to make this suggestion for the consideration of the committee, that each witness be permitted to finish his direct testimony before any cross-examination or anything in the nature of cross-examination, and that any member of the committee be permitted to cross-examine the witness after that his cross-examination be finished before being interrogated by any other member of the committee, so as to have an order of examination. That is a suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection. Does that appear to Senator McCormick?

Senator McCORMICK. I am satisfied.

Senator TRAMMELL. It is agreeable to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the witnesses be allowed to finish their direct testimony before being questioned, if they so desire.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, will you hold up your right hand and swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Admiral SIMS. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any statement to make in regard to your letter of January 7 to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir. I am particularly glad that the testimony will be allowed to complete his entire testimony before there is any cross-examination.

The preliminary statement I have prepared is as follows:

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

2. REASONS FOR THIS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

With the permission of the committee, I deem it important to make a preliminary statement before proceeding with my substantiation of my letter of January 7, 1920, which is the basis of the investigation by the committee.

Such a statement is important and necessary, because of attempting, in the very beginning, to clearly state the issues of misinterpretation, the real issues which are the nature of my letter and, in my opinion,

which in its national aspect, will be jeopardized if we allow tracks, if, for example, personalities, having no bearing on the subject in hand, are allowed to confuse the issue.

I am gentlemen, that any subject worthy of the attention of the committee is a large one, involving solely national issues and such only, is the subject-matter of my letter. The issues therein are far above personalities or local control of naval service. Such questions have not been in my mind. I initiate them voluntarily. It must be recognized that I was not prepared for the consideration of this

which was prepared for the sole consideration of naval matters. As to their training and their knowledge of the intricacies of the war, their familiarity with the sequence of events, the great mass of relevant facts upon which the question for their true evaluation, are in a better position to determine the merits of the case.

It is extremely difficult for me to convey the comprehensive nature of the case as necessary as a background to the points I am making in my letter.

Difficulties have been increased by numerous fundamental errors which have been indicated, either by direct communication, in testimony presented to this committee, or by naval awards, and by numerous statements in the present investigation.

Therefore I would invite attention to what appears to be a deliberate propaganda (at least, so it is believed) aimed at prejudicing this case by wholly ignoring the facts of the investigation by this committee.

For example. In the testimony before this committee it was seen fit to introduce personal correspondence which is quite remote from that issue, and, further, to give it the publicity which would attend it. Its introduction was camouflaged under the implication that the questions on awards were to be in some way invalid. It was to who should have been the commander of the ship at that time, or, in fact, my differences with Admiral V. Their individual merit, had the most remote, bearing on the case or this.

Methods of making awards did not affect the morale of the service certainly was calculated to do so. Not only the publicity which was sure to follow in the press, and to be entirely worse, it was also broadcasted by the Navy through high-powered wireless stations to every ship and station in the service.

Imagine the effect upon discipline of the fleet when this mental wireless announcement was posted on every bulletin for the information of every man, from officers to the last boy, this information—whether true or not—casting reflection upon the ability of their leader, the commander in chief of the fleet, and the information which through its method of dissemination actually made invidious comparisons between many higher officers of the fleet.

This was a manifest outrage against the efficiency of the fleet, against Admiral Wilson himself, as well as against the propagation of the important issues of national safety before the committee.

It is for the above reasons that I find it necessary, solely in view of facilitating the task of this committee in reaching conclusions, to present this statement prior to my testimony.

II. NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLICITY.

My position has been embarrassed in the first instance by the various accusations of impropriety and insubordination and by the belated impugning of my motives.

I think it is hardly necessary for me to comment at length upon the impression that has been given that I was responsible for the publicity of the letter here under investigation. It appears from the press that a resolution has actually been introduced into the House censuring my action in making this letter public. As I have stated before, no copies of this letter were at any time out of my possession until it was called for by this committee. Presumably the letter was called for because the department had published the fact of its existence and general nature.

I understand that it is my duty to reply to queries of the committee and that I am not justified in withholding any knowledge from my own which they request. I do not see how I can in any way be held responsible for any publicity of testimony which the committee calls upon me to offer.

III. PROPRIETY OF SUBMITTING THE LETTER.

I wish also to establish very clearly that there is no question ever as to the propriety of my submitting this letter to the committee and, furthermore, as to my duty to do so.

(1) *In accordance with Naval Regulations and custom.*—Such action is not only in accordance with Naval Regulations, article 100, but is in accordance with a recent general order of the Navy Department accentuating these regulations.

(2) *Duty to submit the letter.*—As to the question of my writing such a letter, the fact will be established, I believe, to the entire satisfaction of this committee that throughout the war I was in every sense of the word an integral part of the departmental organization. My original mission assigned by the department was to act as its representative abroad, and this remained my primary mission throughout the war.

Throughout the war I was just as much a member of the mental organization, whose errors I now consider it a duty to publish, as any official with a desk and a chair in the Navy Department Building in Washington. The testimony will leave no doubt in *anyone's* mind upon that point.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

action and responsibilities in the war explained.—

It has been conveyed that my official position abroad was one and at least implying that our naval participation was in nowise dependent either upon my recommendation or being kept informed of departmental general policy. This is entirely erroneous, as I will make clear to you the conclusion of my testimony.

As to my power, to myself, as well as to the insurance of proper action by this committee, it seems necessary to make a few statements on this subject.

It is necessary to point out that success on the sea as well as on land is wholly dependent upon teamwork between the allied navies, a phrase, upon unity of command. All allied navies except the United States, were in constant personal contact, by personal conferences, by telephone, and through the agency of officers who could move back and forth between the navies.

Such were the means of obtaining teamwork between the allied navies. Our department, on the contrary, was isolated. It was, therefore, my principal mission to represent our department in these allied councils with the sole object of obtaining teamwork. It was not my mission merely to obtain information from allied leaders and from the departmental staff. A clerk could have been picked up who could have done the task as efficiently as I could. On the contrary, it was my duty to speak for the department and to keep in daily touch with the allied leaders, and, with the knowledge which I was supposed to have of the state of readiness of our service and our plans, to give the department the benefit of conclusions therefrom.

The necessity of coordination—of teamwork—between nations is a fact. Nations, more than individuals, are prone to be selfish. Each individual national interests ahead of the interests of the world.

As I have remarked to me during the war that his experience had greatly diminished his admiration for Napoleon. He said so because Napoleon had never had anyone opposed to him.

At the beginning of the war, the impoverishment of all of the allied nations from the effects of the war and of our relatively enormous untouched strength, it was natural and to be expected that, within a short time, all allied nations should commence to flood our government with requests for cooperation and assistance. Many of these requests were of great consideration to the "cause" as a whole. It was, therefore, my duty to attempt to bring these requests and actual presence on the scene, to establish a balance between the various individual requests, with a view to our cooperation as effective as possible.

Another part of my mission was that of attempting on the part of the United States to break the previous three years' war experience of the world. At that period a most effective wall of secrecy had been erected around the activities of the allied navies. We had a general policy, in fact, our entire service was then at home, and it was of the utmost importance to the efficiency of our service that we should accumulate and digest in the quick

possible time all of these previous actual war experiences to find out how to do it but, what was equally important find out how not to do it. This involves a long story, upon which I could spend many days. It started with big questions of strategy and tactics and went clear down into the most minute of questions; as to the efficiency of weapons, and even to such details as to methods of clothing and feeding and caring for men, as under real war conditions.

Operations in the south Atlantic, Pacific—everywhere—for their effectiveness in insuring victory, upon teamwork, the simple requirement that all hands should work for a common end, that there should not be the slightest duplication of effort, that not a single ship or man should be unnecessarily sacrificed, and that not a single dollar or life needlessly sacrificed. As I repeated this over and over to the department, the greatest efficiency would be attained if we had bodily moved the planning and directing of our Navy Department over to Paris or London, leaving in Washington only the organization for insuring support and coordination of home material effort. All departments of our government vainly attempted to bridge over this gap by sending missions abroad at intervals of many months, and only history tells how much the war was thereby prolonged, and what needless sacrifices of life and of national wealth were thereby involved. Delays in understanding the necessity for various measures resulting in inevitable misunderstandings and misdirecting. All of these efforts, regardless of their individual excellence, were delayed, or failed in complete effectiveness, simply because they were either nullified or diminished in efficiency by not being coordinated with the efforts of other members of the team.

Herein, therefore, lay my major and paramount mission in connection with my original orders and continuing to the end. It was mine of trying to be the connecting link between our directing organization—the Navy Department at home—and our fellow team workers; of trying to convey, over a 3,000 mile cable, the experience, efforts, and aims of our Allies from day to day. In other words, trying to keep the department in Washington informed of the situation as fully as if it were on the scene where the “up to date” information was available, and was under discussion.

About six weeks after undertaking this task, with the assistance of one aide, I was given the additional task of being responsible for the actual operation of our first real contribution to the allied team, namely, six destroyers. This added responsibility grew (very gradually, as will be shown) until, at the end of the war, it involved a responsibility for the operations of 80,000 officers and men, and over 300 ships, whose activities were scattered in 47 different localities, extending from the Arctic all the way around to the Black Sea. But even apart from this additional responsibility, there were a multitude of others, the number of which all governmental war services can attest. The Navy performed many services yet to be disclosed. I would not venture at this time an estimate of how much the Shipping Board, the petroleum, food, grain, and other governmental commissions, and the relief organizations, all of which contributed their share to the war effort, are indebted to the Navy for valuable and essential assistance.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

grave and additional responsibility which developed for the safety of our troops on the high seas. The war zone was every American troop ship, every United States ship of any description, naval as well as merchant, which permitted the certain joining up of our despatch zone with all of these ships, all without exception, our naval headquarters abroad. Not one of these originated in any other place. Anyone, from the least who crossed the ocean during the war, can testify of thanksgiving when these destroyers turned up. I am now merely stating facts, in order that the public may know the true conditions of the war, and the responsibility justified, but in duty bound to comment on the war which should govern us in the future.

As to the responsibility for the safety of our troops in the war zone there can be no question whatever. It would have been justly cut if any of these ships had been down, or plans for destroyer meetings, had resorted to. As I have repeatedly reiterated, this was the work of the destroyers. To them belongs the credit. But it was all my work and I necessarily bore the responsibility.

As to Atlantic Fleet at home.—For some reason not known to me, a statement has been made that, on paper at least, I was the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and that the forces under my command were at all times a part of the Atlantic Fleet. I would not have brought this point up myself, but I touch upon it now for fear of my remarks being taken as a reflection upon the fleet at home and its work in the prosecution of the war.

It is true that throughout the war the forces in Europe were attached, on paper, as a part of the Atlantic Fleet in

which, it is unnecessary to discuss at this time, it was the policy of the department a wise course to maintain at all times the command of our entire Navy upon which we could fall back. Fortunately, such a contingency never arose, but if it ever goes, it should be sufficient to set forth the facts which I am certain the commander in chief would have known.

During the war did I receive any order from the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet at home affecting a disposition of forces, or plans for the forces under my command in European waters.

As to the orders of the Navy Department, all orders were made direct to the department, and all orders were direct from the department. It is therefore apparent that I had the actual command of all of the forces abroad, and that I was responsible to the Navy Department for their success.

It is true that, if anyone be so included, the fact is that the exact letter of my specific orders did not comprehensively specify the functions which I was to perform abroad. It is for this reason that I saw fit to state in my letter of January 7, 1920, how vague and unsatisfactory

were my original instructions. I am confident, however, my testimony is completed, there will be no question in the minds of the committee as to the spirit of my instructions as to what the department expected of me, and, there what was my real mission in the war.

I might refer here to one more point in this connection is that from the very moment we declared war there was central allied direction whose function it was to attempt team work between the different navies. During the early part of our participation in the war, this organization was not given a definite name, although it existed and functioned consistently. It consisted of the Secretaries of the Navies and Chiefs of Nations of the different allied navies, and formal meetings between them occurred throughout the war practically monthly. Soon after 1917 it was thought wise to give this organization a definite name and draw up something in the nature of a constitution. The name selected was "The Allied Naval Council," and the constitution required that the members should be, as stated above, the Secretaries and Chiefs of Naval Operations of the various Navies. On my arrival at a great distance away from our Navy Department, I received definite specific orders to serve as a member of this Allied Naval Council, representing our own Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Nations. I had, of course, been so serving from the very moment of my arrival in Europe, and I continued so to serve until the signing of the armistice.

I trust that I have made it clear that my position abroad was far from being a local one. I was in every sense of the word a representative official of the Navy Department organization. My status responded closely in nature to that of Gen. Pershing and General G. combined, although naturally the aggregate of their duties was of far greater magnitude than mine. It was a mere incident—a very unfortunate one for the efficiency of our naval part in the war—that my office was located over 3,000 miles away from the Navy Department, instead of a few city blocks or flights of stairs.

(6) *As to accusations of failure to recognize mission of troops.*—I can not pass by the implication which has been given that I failed at the proper time to recognize that the primary mission of the Navy's task was the safe transport of troops abroad. As stated above, the troop movements during the period covered by my letter were very small.

And incidentally let me state right here, with all possible emphasis, that my entire letter of January 7, 1920, refers to this early part of the war. Practically all of it refers to the first six months. Very little of it refers to anything out of the first year, 1917. It has practically nothing to do with the efficiency of the Navy and the Navy Department in 1918.

I expect, during the course of my testimony, to make this statement a number of times, because I want it to be definitely understood that my criticism has nothing to do whatever with the very high efficiency that the Navy Department exhibited and that it exhibited in the latter part of the war, after they really got into it.

I have stated that the troop movements during the period covered by my letter were very small. There can be no argument on that point. The facts speak for themselves. Our troops always received

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

of protection than any of the allied troops on the high seas to ten times as much protection as merchant ships were transported to the war area, in so far as our own ships were without any loss from enemy action.

My statement in this preliminary statement to counter the statement that was given out semiofficially at least, that the main concern abroad was the protection of merchant ships was not true. That is the way the issue that is now before the public has been camouflaged.

It must be pointed out that, although the safety of our troops was the main concern, nevertheless there was another concern which was in a second place, could never be disregarded.

Whether we liked it or not, we were confronted with the fact, briefly stated, was that we ran the danger of being caught with a larger army, either at home or abroad, and that to have any effect in obtaining victory.

It led me to go into a long explanation as to the dependence of the Army abroad on food, ammunition, and a myriad of other things.

We were at all times confronted with the danger of firing an Army abroad which could not be supplied. In the early days of the war those cargo ships, regardless of the flag, were carrying the stuff necessary to keep the Allies going.

It was a matter of getting that stuff across. Throughout the entire war, the Army was moving, as the Army authorities will attest, with the gravest anxiety as to whether we could get the stuff to supply the Army after it got over there.

It was a matter of the street, we had to beware of having an Army abroad with no place to go.

It was the United States shipping upon which the outcome of the war depended during that first critical year, but allied shipping was our fate. As I will show you in the testimony, the danger of enemy success before American military aid was brought to bear at all; and, as I will further show, in those early days, the American cargo carried the main part of the available shipping, allied and neutral, necessary to prevent the enemy from winning.

TO AMERICAN INTERESTS AND TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

My statement of being pro-British and sacrificing identity of

I can not avoid reference to repeated assertions that I am not a natural-born American, or that my allegiance is in the slightest degree divided. My father was an American.

My family has been continuously resident in the United States since before the Revolution. I chanced to have been born in the United States.

My mother was, at the time of my birth, on a ship which was a Canadian. I notice, of course, also that I was not a natural-born American.

I notice, of course, also that I was not a natural-born American. I would not stoop to answer a question which is not that they bring up a very important question with this investigation.

In reply to a letter from a man who wrote to warn me of accusations of being pro-British, I suggested that he ask his informants what sort of a man I was as a representative in the council of the United States.

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and I said that if pro-British and pro-French proclivities were desirable, why not send over a pro-German with a trunk full of German. Strangely, I have apparently never been accused of being pro-German, although, as a matter of fact, I speak the French language better than I have ever been able to master the British, and, in any case, I believe that my relations on the whole were more cordial and harmonious with the French than they were with the British. Perhaps this was due to the greater similarity of our methods to those of the British. Possibly we knew each other better. Once the war was on, it was the duty of every public man, and particularly those of the military services, to do his duty, and to subordinate all local and selfish interests to the one great duty before them—that of defeating a common enemy. We were confronted with an enemy acting under the most perfect unity of command. The requirements to obtain victory on our part were summed up in the one word “teamwork.” It was absolutely essential to naval efficiency and victory that all naval services of the Allies be merged into one team, with one mission—defeating the common enemy.

There was no danger whatever of our losing our identity as a nation, one who took part in the war, which involved joining with the other navies, can testify to the fact that our identity was accentuated by day, and never diminished. If there was no other reason for making us out, I would say that the principal one was our undeviating determination to promote team work. It was the talk of all the services in Europe. It attracted more attention perhaps than any other part we played in the war.

In a great and complicated game, such as that of the joint action of four navies, it was to be expected that all sorts of so-called friction would arise. Each service was proud of its own independent methods, which it had developed at the cost of long and serious study in time of peace. If everybody had refused to play unless their own methods were adopted, or had pursued their methods in the same way as the different methods of the forces with which they were opposed, there would have been nothing but confusion, and that would have been a direct contribution to the enemy campaign. It was no easy task to attempt to reconcile these conditions. As far as our own forces were concerned, I preached, from the very beginning, the doctrine that the one test to be applied, whenever any difficulty arose, was how we could best “get on with the war;” what would eliminate friction and speed up the day of victory. I gave up the doctrine that, as a general rule, the minority should give way to the majority, and that if we believed our methods to be the best as they were in many cases, the best course was not to be satisfied and insist upon their immediate adoption by men who had been using different methods for three years, but to prove their efficiency to other fellows in such a way as not to interfere with the operations in hand. This in itself is a long story, but I am safe in asserting that whether the score as to who gave way the most is on our side or not, all allied services will admit that we led in setting an example of subordinating everything to “getting on with the war.” And, moreover, that all allied services to-day will agree that they learned as much from us as we did from them.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... the department, and lack of departmental confidence. The imputation that I was not duly obedient to the commands and intentions, which are accusations that have been made time to time, during the progress of the war, I leave to the committee's own judgment, after the facts to which I will proceed to submit. After the Secretary of the Navy for allied team work had been obtained, the Secretary of the Navy said, in his annual report, dated Dec 1917:

"The Navy has given a demonstration which can be characterized as its readiness to join with our associates in teamwork and in common good."

There were the fundamental military principle that I have set down as up. Confidence can not be onesided. There is no question of justice to me. The fact that as long as I was left in the position assigned to me in every phase of our naval activities with which I was entrusted and endangered by any lack of confidence should be ruthlessly eliminated from war. The department lacked the slightest confidence in me. It did not to have summarily replaced me with someone else who had confidence.

During the period - as will be covered in the testimony - I was embarrassed by lack of departmental confidence. I repeatedly pointed out in personal correspondence to the department that if I had lost the confidence of the department in any way I hoped no hesitancy would be shown in replacing me.

To contrast the practice of the Navy Department and its general relations with its commander in chief with the practice of our War Department. The following is an extract from the last report of the Secretary of War to the President of the United States:

"The confidence in Gen. Pershing and the War Department was of course absolute. It dealt, however, with details of men and equipment, and not with the general character of his orders (which clearly could not be in any particular in doubt or diminished), and the fact that the orders as to the character of American participation in the war were in your direction to the end. Gen. Pershing left the War Department that of the War Department. Throughout the entire period of our participation, this confidence support was maintained. When he returned to America it was to close a great military campaign. No misunderstanding had arisen between him and the War Department. The theory of these orders of course was that our commander in chief was a great distance from Washington that he could not make accurate judgments of the varying incidents in the war. Therefore, the tremendous responsibility for the success of the campaign we could not do less than give him full authority to act. He was not to be informed with knowledge of the situation which he was to be informed with knowledge of the situation when the plans reached him."

It has been practiced by the Navy Department. The war would have been greatly furthered. The British. Let me clear up another point which has been subject to considerable misunderstanding. Pronounced criticism has appeared recently

because of the fact that an admiral of the British Navy directed the operations of American destroyers at Queenstown. I will now state very briefly what this particular situation was. That admiral, at Queenstown not only commanded the local forces based at that port, but also the British naval station located there, and exercised British and, in fact, allied naval command of the seas approaching Great Britain, both to the southward and the northward of Ireland. Other forces stationed in the north of Ireland were also under his general direction. His control of our forces was limited to their actual operations at sea, in which they were employed in conjunction with British forces. The administration of this force, its wants and needs, its discipline, was exercised by me through my local representative, Capt. Pringle. The same principle was adopted by our Army in France, where American brigades, or other units served under the operational control of British or French general officers. Furthermore, this principle was generally and properly followed throughout the allied navies irrespective of nationality. Frequently in Irish waters alone, British and American vessels acted under American command. In the mine-laying operations in the North Sea, British destroyers furnished the support. On the French coast, French vessels frequently served under the immediate command of our own officers. In the Mediterranean, the French admiral exercised control over all allied forces, and otherwise. Again, in the North Sea our division of battle-cruisers, under Admiral Rodman, frequently engaged in operations with British forces of light cruisers and destroyers under his command. Moreover, in this case, as Admiral Rodman was given a rank commensurate with his duty, it was necessary in such cases for military precedent to be disregarded, and by mutual gentleman's agreement upon the part of the British, British ships were in command of these forces assigned for operations under Admiral Rodman actually accepted his command, although they were not subject to him.

I will not take the time to explain the system by which orders were originated and transmitted to our forces whether under allied or national command or our own. Suffice it to say that such orders did not issue directly from our own naval headquarters, were prepared in conference with representatives of those headquarters, and were based upon definite plans which those representatives had taken part in preparing.

Copies of every order issued to our forces, no matter how tentative or detailed, were immediately and automatically forwarded to our headquarters for information, and complete and detailed summaries of them were furnished weekly to the Navy Department. No such system was too small to be followed up by our own organizations of communication.

(4) *Undue British dominance in naval war.*—It has frequently been asserted that the British exercised an undue control and influence upon the naval operations of the war. Even granting that to be true, or whether they did or not, such a course should be expected and considered that they outnumbered any other naval forces in the world about 10 to 1, in anything you wish to consider—guns, men, ships, shore stations, etc. The French, Italian, Japanese, and our own forces abroad were small in comparison. The departmental announced official policy of July 10, 1917, acknowledged this

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THE following is a quotation from the Navy Department's in-

statement in all offensive preparations must perforce belongs to the Navy Department; it announces as its policy that in general it is willing to do whatever the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate needs. Owing to the strategic situation of England, an island nation, her maritime interests prior to the war, she was, in fact, a center of information of the world. All the war lines were led there, and it was only there that the most reliable information concerning operations of the war and men of the world was available. It was therefore, as I have expected, that the British voice in naval affairs should be the other voices of the team, just as the French voice greatly the operations of all land forces.

There are ample safeguards against undue British domination, furnished by the principles of command previously mentioned, and further by the fact that all big questions of strategy were decided by the Allied Naval Council, in which the United States had an equal vote, and in which unanimity was required.

As I am attacked.—I find that I am being represented as initiating an attack upon the part that the Navy has taken in the war, or, stated more briefly, that my object is to attack the Navy in the war. Therefore, let me state a few salient facts:

There is no question whatever as to the efficiency of the Navy in the war, when viewed in their entirety, and in relation to the time element.

Speaking of the Navy itself—that is, its personnel and the organization which directed it—I am in sympathy with the country in being unable adequately to express its appreciation of its work. That work will grow larger and larger as the facts slowly come out. I am proud of the Navy, and of the machinery which controlled and directed it, in all traditions of the past, but as a matter of fact, I am not proud of its traditions. Without any disparagement of a great past, I believe that its greatest accomplishment was the spirit which it infused into the naval operations of Americanism; for example, in its irrepressible initiative and versatility, its ability to talk by obstacles, real or imaginary, its refusal to be deterred, and, above all, in its absolute confidence.

THE SCOPE OF THE WAR COVERED BY THIS LETTER.

There is a very essential feature of my letter which is being clearly recognized and understood. It is important. An examination of the letter will show that it covers is almost wholly concerned with the period immediately preceding our entry into the war, the first year or less of our participation. In considering the case, therefore, the case must not be confused with the case as a whole.

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-- it was imperative that every possib
-- or salvage work be dispatched for
-- to the area of submarine operations.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

our failure to meet this emergency, with the principle, which I once more appeal to the Navy Department to act promptly in the

fact, almost daily, during April and May 1917, the essential facts to the department in length and in the most emphatic language of which I was capable. The department then believed that the allied officers were exaggerating the gravity of the situation. Not until the Chief of Naval Operations, about six months later, and the department seem to be convinced that we should adopt policies and plans previously recommended to engage in the war wholeheartedly. It was not until that our failure to give adequate support to the Allies during these first six months seriously jeopardized the outcome of the whole war. This failure directly resulted in lengthening the war by six months, the increased losses in merchant ships, and the increased cost. I believe that this failure, combined with our neglecting to prepare adequately during the first few months subsequent to the declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months. The loss of life per day was about 3,000 and the cost was \$100,000,000. It can be appreciated by the public how serious was any failure in prolonging hostilities.

It is clearly to emphasize that it is this early period principally refers.

MOTIVE FOR LETTER.

• I want in the simplest and clearest possible
 • motive upon which my letter was based
 • of a great war. The war was won, thanks to
 • instances which it would be entirely un-
 • upon in the future. From the United States
 • prosecution of the war involved numerous
 • and fundamental military principles with
 • naval warfare is familiar.
 • they were
 • redness, in spite of the fact that war has
 • at least two years and was, in fact, immen-
 • before its declaration.
 • we entered it with no well-considered policy
 • on the sea not in the highest state of im-
 • wing to the above conditions and to the
 • of our Navy Department, and perhaps
 • I am not familiar, we failed, for at least six
 • weight against the enemy; that during the
 • of vacillation, or, in simpler words, a
 • attempting to formulate our plans from da-
 • incorrect appreciation of the situation.
 • War lasted 1,500 days. Five million lives we
 • daily. This, to say nothing of wealth and

If my assertions of vacillating policy and unnecessary delay were true, I indeed had a compelling motive in taking steps to prevent their recurrence in the future.

I believed, therefore, in view of the unusual position which I occupied during the war, as an integral part of our departmental organization, that it was my duty to point out at least some of the reasons for the fundamental errors which were committed.

My sole object in submitting my letter to the department was to demonstrate who was right and who was wrong, but to insure so thorough an appreciation of our errors, before they were obscured by time, that the chances of repeating them would be minimized, if not eliminated, in the future.

In other words, gentlemen, let me state, as forcibly as I can, in this entire question I have no object other than that of the efficiency of the naval services and the safety of the country at the end of my career. I have everything to lose and no gain. There is no possible question of my having a grievance. There is absolutely no question of personalities. I have no ambitions whatever. When this inquiry is over I return to the simple duties of my profession, to finish out the very short remaining time before my retirement.

Reference to my letter of January 7, 1920, will indicate that its object is, first and last, constructive. This object is possible of accomplishment without a consideration of such mistakes as may have been committed.

The subject is one which vitally affects the future efficiency of the Navy; it must always be our first line of national defense, the Navy; and a great danger is that because of our ultimate success in this war we may fail to realize that we very narrowly escaped defeat on that account that our state of preparedness when we entered the war was obviously inadequate, and that our administrative methods, especially during the early stages of our participation, were seriously defective. Such defects, in a war in which the enemy is not already so severely occupied at sea as he was in this war, must inevitably jeopardize gravely our national security.

Under these circumstances, expressions of opinion concerning naval matters were in no sense an attack, and it is most deplorable that they should have been made so to appear. They were, on the contrary, impersonal, official representations submitted for the consideration of the Navy Department in preparation for future campaigns. They were actuated by motives of duty; they were constructive. I believe them to be entirely in accord with the teachings of naval authorities on the art of war. Should this discussion unfortunately assume the character of personal recrimination or political controversy, the effect may well be so to obscure the issue that no good will result. On the other hand, if these opinions are given full and careful consideration in connection with the preparation of plans for future wars, by the officers detailed to these duties, as was in the past and as would ordinarily have been done, very great benefit will accrue to the Navy.

It is nothing but self-evident camouflage to convey the impression in these modern days that such an issue as this one raised by my attack on civilian control of our naval service. A civilian control of the military branch of a democratic government is essential.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

greatest danger of militarism in this country. The Navy are servants of the public and as such the Navy claims to be as representative a body as the Congress itself. It is for this very reason that I have the temerity to risk my personal fortunes at the very hands of the responsible heads of the Navy in the name of their own conduct of the public's interest in the public presentation of this case, which has been on my part. I am perhaps handicapped by lack of familiarity with the press or experience in manipulation of public opinion.

I present my case in the vocabulary of my profession, trusting that the members of this committee to perceive the only explanation, namely, a just appraisal of those questions which bear upon the public interest.

VII. SUMMARY.

In the briefest possible manner, I hope that this summary testimony which will be introduced, will establish the following salient points which were raised in my letter addressed to the Navy Department on January 1, 1918: that there was no impropriety whatever in submitting my testimony; that the preparation and submission was in accordance with the regulations; and that I am in no wise responsible for the manner in which it has received.

That the submission of the letter was a duty imposed upon me, because of the unusual and very responsible position during the war, and because our victory seemed to demand that we should review the mistakes we committed and the lessons we learned from them.

That my position was in no sense a local one; that it was that of any other naval official outside of the United States; that it was twofold in nature. My first and principal duty was that of acting as the department's accredited representative to the naval council of the Allies. In other words, I was in every sense of the word an integral part of the Allied organization. Secondly, my duties included the direct command of all of our naval forces in the Atlantic, with the additional responsibility of insuring the safe passage of our shipping through the war zone.

That the period of the war covered by my letter, which I estimate by my present testimony, is encompassed by the first six or eight months thereof, during which we were barely escaped defeat.

That during this early period the department violated the recognized and fundamental principles of war, and that the full effect of our naval participation was delayed, and that this delay is susceptible of conversion into unnecessary losses of national wealth and lives. That to state the case in its briefest form, the only point to be made is that, in the interests of national defense, it is clear those lessons of the war which we dare not forget, which must govern our future naval policy if the security of the country against future disaster is to be provided.

Seventh. That the policies and plans adopted by the department and their activity, in the last half of our participation in the war, were identical in substance, and generally in letter, to recommendations which they had disregarded or failed to act upon in the early months.

Eighth. That the main issue is not the determination of personal responsibilities, but the recognition of the delays and unsound methods incidental to the adoption and execution of our war policies and plans, in order that the fundamental causes thereof may be removed.

Ninth. That if I am wrong, and we were prepared, and if we had plans before and at the beginning of the war similar to those announced on paper some time after we declared war, and if such plans were in accordance with the policy which was actively and actually pursued at the end of the first six or eight months of the war, then is it not a grave error that all the forces of men and ships which were actively engaged in the war zone at the end of this six months' delay, were not there at the end of the first month?

Tenth. Granting that the work of our Navy was necessary, and was based on sound policy and military principles, it is indisputable that if any delay occurred in putting that policy into effect, the war was thereby prolonged, and as a consequence lives and resources needlessly sacrificed.

If such is not the case, that is, if the work of our Navy was not necessary, then our naval contribution did not amount to much.

It did amount to a great deal, as everyone agrees, and hence it is the motive of my letter to show that unsound methods caused such delays, and that they should be recognized to such an extent as to make them impossible of recurrence in the future.

The issue is that of national safety.

Eleventh. And, finally, may I be permitted to add the following: It is not an easy or an enviable task for an officer to expose the fundamental errors of his own service, particularly after a war that has been won.

It was of course to be expected that, if such exposures were given publicity, a storm of criticism would descend upon me, including accusations of belittling the services of our gallant naval men who have made so many sacrifices.

It is submitted, however, to the judgment of this committee that if any one of my assertions are true, I would have betrayed the trust imposed upon me if I had allowed any considerations, personal or otherwise, to have deterred me from submitting my criticism officially to the Navy Department.

Mr. Chairman, I am ready at any time to go ahead with my attempt to substantiate the allegations made in my letter of January 7, 1920.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that it is nearly 1 o'clock, and you have finished your preliminary statement, the committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 10, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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discussing it with such a body as this committee. It was addressed officially to the Navy Department, which has all the facts and their relative sequence and importance in mind.

It follows that, in order to make these matters clear to this committee, it will be necessary to make certain explanations and give certain details that would not be necessary in considering such questions before a body of naval officers.

The first part of the testimony is intended to explain the seriousness of the military situation at the time that this country declared war; to clearly show that the situation was not only critical, but that the Allies were at that time in fact losing the war; that the Navy Department was furnished with complete information concerning this critical situation; and that I put forth every possible effort to acquaint them with all the facts concerning the situation; that, in accordance with the mission assigned to me, and based upon constant conference with the heads of the allied naval services, I set forth the specific nature of the part which we should have taken; that I was wholly unable to get satisfactory replies from the department and, further, that if the department appreciated and understood the situation, they failed to take action commensurate therewith.

I wish here to state that there is no issue whatever as to whether the information I sent and the recommendations I made were accurate or exaggerated, no issue as to whether I was right and everybody else in the Navy at home wrong, as will be shown later in the testimony. It will be clearly established that by the end, say, of six months, the department accepted and adopted the policies and recommendations that I had made from the very beginning, and hence that there is no disagreement whatever between me and other naval officials as to the United States naval policy in the war, provided the time element is not considered; that is, provided we disregard the first four to six critical months of war, the occurrences during which are, almost exclusively, the issues I have seen fit to raise.

I will adhere in my testimony to the different subjects as they are raised in my letter of January 7, 1920. This will result in not following the chronological order, because as each new subject is taken up I will have to step back to the beginning and sketch what occurred in connection therewith.

In beginning, I wish to read in full my first two reports submitted to the department—one a cable sent four days after my arrival abroad and the other a letter submitted five days later.

Although these two documents will touch on various subjects, it is necessary to read them in full, simply to establish the fact that all of the communications which followed during the next six or eight months were mere elaborations and reiterations thereof, that these two reports were very comprehensive, and that, as a matter of fact, there was no time up to the signing of the armistice when any cause arose for changing any of these original recommendations as made therein.

The cooperation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost dispatch in order to break enemy submarine morale and accelerate the accomplishment of the chief American objective.

It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine laying raids on our coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and keep our forces from the critical area in the eastern Atlantic through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the focusing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have been anchored as deep as 90 fathoms but majority at not over 15 fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth until from 24 to 48 hours after they have been laid.

So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight of landmarks or lights on account of the danger to themselves if location is not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and antisubmarine work where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.

Mr. Hoover informs me that there is only sufficient grain supply in this country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores. In a few days Hoover will sail for the United States.

That is the end of that telegram. That was a plan proposed or policy proposed, and it was adhered to throughout the war, that is, to send all possible antisubmarine craft immediately to the place where the fighting was going on. Five days later I amplified this with the following letter:

LONDON, ENGLAND, April 19, 1917.

From: Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams concerning war situation and recommendations for United States naval cooperation.

1. *Reception.*—My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and significant of the seriousness of present situation and importance to be attached to the United States entry into the war.

I was met at Liverpool by Rear Admiral Hope, R. N., a member of Admiral Jellicoe's staff, and the admiral of the port, the former having been sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival in London I was received by the first sea lord (Admiral Jellicoe) and his principal assistants in a special conference.

2. *Conferences.*—More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctancy against appearing to seek assistance and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy morale.

I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a part of the Admiralty organization and that it was essential to safe and efficient cooperation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of the exact situation.

They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping.

I have had daily conferences with the first sea lord (Admiral Jellicoe) both at his office and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty and access to all Government officials. I have freely consulted with such officials as the following: Prime minister, first lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson); ministers of munitions, shipping, trade, and other cabinet officials; first sea lord and his assistants; chief of naval staff; directors (corresponding to our chiefs of bureaus) of intelligence, antisubmarine operations, torpedoes, mines, mining, etc.

3. *General statement of the situation.*—Since the last declaration of the enemy government, which from intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war, and, stated briefly, the allied Governments have not been able to and are not now effectively meeting the situation presented.

4. As stated in my first dispatch the communications and supplies to all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the "command of the sea" is actually at stake.

5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as probably those of the department also, had been largely based upon press reports and reports of our attachés

Seventh. That the policies and plans adopted by the de and their activity, in the last half of our participation in were identical in substance, and generally in letter, to reco tions which they had disregarded or failed to act upon in months.

Eighth. That the main issue is not the determination of responsibilities, but the recognition of the delays and methods incidental to the adoption and-execution of our wa and plans, in order that the fundamental causes thereof m moved.

Ninth. That if I am wrong, and we were prepared, and i plans before and at the beginning of the war similar to t nounced on paper some time after we declared war, and if su were in accordance with the policy which was actively and pursued at the end of the first six or eight months of the wa it not a grave error that all the forces of men and ships wh actively engaged in the war zone at the end of this six month were not there at the end of the first month?

Tenth. Granting that the work of our Navy was necessa was based on sound policy and military principles, it is indi that if any delay occurred in putting that policy into effect, was thereby prolonged, and as a consequence lives and r needlessly sacrificed.

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Mr. Chairman, I am ready at any time to go ahead with my to substantiate the allegations made in my letter of January

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that it is nearly 1 o'clock you have finished your preliminary statement, the commit now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, V day, March 10, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS
Washington,

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10
a. m. 225. Senate Office Building, Senator Frederic
M. Hale (chairman), McCormick, and Tranter
present. Senator Poindexter, having resigned as a
member of the committee, Senator Page has appointed in his
place Senator Ball. I offer for the record Senator Poindexter's
resignation and the letter of Senator Page to me in
reference to the appointment of Senator Ball.
(The papers referred to are as follows:)

MARCH 10, 1920.

SENATOR POINDEXTER,
Committee on Naval Affairs,
United States Senate.

SIR: I have found it necessary to be absent from the city
and therefore unable to give consideration to the investigation
of the operations of Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy,
and his criticism of its operations during the war.
In view of the importance of the work assigned to the subcommittee, I
trust that Senator Page will be appointed in my place, as a member of
the subcommittee, and I tender my resignation to take effect to-day.

MILES POINDEXTER

MARCH 10, 1920.

SENATOR POINDEXTER,
United States Senate.

SIR: Senator Poindexter, of the subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs, having to do with the "investigation of the operations of Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy, to determine the merits of his actions touching operation during the war," I trust that Senator Page will be appointed in my place, as a member of the subcommittee, and therefore tenders his resignation to take effect to-day. I have appointed you to fill the vacancy in the subcommittee created by Senator Poindexter's resignation.

I trust it is convenient to serve as a member of the subcommittee, and I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
Chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Hale, of your
very truly,
CARROLL S. PAGE

CARROLL S. PAGE

Admiral Sims, will you proceed?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS, UNITED STATES NAVY.
Resumed.

ADMIRAL SIMS. In presenting the following testimony it is my intention to make a clear and understandable presentation of the sequence of my letter of January 7. I have no intention whatever in going outside in any way of the letter. The letter was not prepared with a

discussing it with such a body as this committee. It was officially to the Navy Department, which has all the facts relative sequence and importance in mind.

It follows that, in order to make these matters clear to committee, it will be necessary to make certain explanations certain details that would not be necessary in considering questions before a body of naval officers.

The first part of the testimony is intended to explain the nature of the military situation at the time that this country was at war; to clearly show that the situation was not only critical but that the Allies were at that time in fact losing the war; that the Navy Department was furnished with complete information concerning this critical situation; and that I put forth every effort to acquaint them with all the facts concerning the situation; that, in accordance with the mission assigned to me, and upon constant conference with the heads of the allied naval forces, I set forth the specific nature of the part which we should take; that I was wholly unable to get satisfactory replies from the department and, further, that if the department appreciated the situation, they failed to take action commensurate therewith.

I wish here to state that there is no issue whatever as to the information I sent and the recommendations I made were not exaggerated, no issue as to whether I was right and even if I was wrong in the Navy at home or abroad, as will be shown later in my testimony. It will be clearly established that by the end, say six months, the department accepted and adopted the policy recommendations that I had made from the very beginning; hence that there is no disagreement whatever between me and other naval officials as to the United States naval policy in the war, provided the time element is not considered; that is, provided we disregard the first four to six critical months of war, the occurrence of which are, almost exclusively, the issues I have seen and have raised.

I will adhere in my testimony to the different subjects as they were raised in my letter of January 7, 1920. This will result in not following the chronological order, because as each new subject is taken up I have to step back to the beginning and sketch what occurred in connection therewith.

In beginning, I wish to read in full my first two reports submitted to the department—one a cable sent four days after my departure abroad and the other a letter submitted five days later.

Although these two documents will touch on various subjects, it is necessary to read them in full, simply to establish the facts of the communications which followed during the next six months were mere elaborations and reiterations thereof, that the two reports were very comprehensive, and that, as a matter of fact, there was no time up to the signing of the armistice when an opportunity arose for changing any of these original recommendations set forth therein.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

the Navy, through State Department.

A 227.

emphasize that fact particularly. This reply also the policy suggested and the plan for the submarine campaign, which was the whole issue of the Navy was concerned. This was the first cable.

as follows

is very much more serious than people realize in terms of submarine operations and the rapidity of construction of the war.

the enemy submarine is not broken, only about 54 are known sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. This is greatly in error. Reports recently circulated concerning enemy morale and results are very satisfactory.

"satisfactory" appears in the cable, but it was "unsatisfactory." That should

"unsatisfactory" appears in the cable, but it was a mistranslation of "unsatisfactory." That should read:

circulated concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate the very unsatisfactory.

estimations of forces on all fronts, including the Russian side of the sea actually imperiled.

operations are constantly extending their operations further afield and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian situation is very serious. 45 admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and a large number of sailors.

British neutral and allied shipping lost in February was 100,000 tons, and in the first 10 days of April, 205,000 tons and better weather losses are increasing.

attention to the fact there that in April the loss was 100,000 tons.

could not effectively prevent the escape of some raiders but the chances are better now.

is pointed that the chances are that hospital ships will come to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines in this way causing a demand for large convoy for hospital ships and also partially immobilizing the main fleet.

the immense theaters and length and number of kinds of operations deterioration resulting from three years' continuous operations with inadequate base facilities the strength of the naval forces. This applies to all of the sea forces outside the Grand Fleet and of small submarine mine layers, the latter carry no torpedoes and guns. All classes submarines for actual combat approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure immediate active cooperation absolutely necessary. It will inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of communication. Atlantic therefore I very urgently recommend the following:

destroyers to be sent accompanied by small anti-aircraft ships designated high sea area westward of Ireland based on the coast at Hantre Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol for the coast should be of light draft with as high speed as possible. Repair ships and staff for base. (b) and docks available for the supply of fuel. German main fleet must be kept in the observation of the British main fleet. South of Scotland is the force.

ships can serve no useful purpose in this area except that might be based on Brest for moral effect against an enemy. Ships in the channel out of reach of British main fleet and urgent practical cooperation is merchant tonnage and a large amount of antiaircraft craft to reinforce our advanced force of the latter craft. For towing the present large amount of prize ships and going tugs would be of great use.

The cooperation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost order to break enemy submarine morale and accelerate the accomplishment of the chief American objective.

It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine laying raids on in the Caribbean to divert attention and keep our forces from the critical eastern Atlantic through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of submarine bases and the focusing of shipping on this side will restrict such to minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines anchored as deep as 90 fathoms but majority at not over 15 fathoms. They rise from the bottom to set depth until from 24 to 48 hours after they have

So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight of marks or lights on account of the danger to themselves if location is not known. The augmentation of merchant tonnage and antisubmarine work where necessary constitute the paramount immediate necessity.

Mr. Hoover informs me that there is only sufficient grain supply in this country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores. In a few days we will sail for the United States.

That is the end of that telegram. That was a plan and policy proposed, and it was adhered to throughout the war. We were to send all possible antisubmarine craft immediately to the place where the fighting was going on. Five days later I amplified with the following letter:

LONDON, ENGLAND, April

From: Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams concerning war and recommendations for United States naval cooperation.

1. *Reception.*—My reception in this country has been exceptionally convincing of the seriousness of present situation and importance to be attached to United States entry into the war.

I was met at Liverpool by Rear Admiral Hope, R. N., a member of Admiralty staff, and the admiral of the port, the former having been sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was provided which made a record within a few hours after arrival in London I was received by the first sea lord (Admiral Jellicoe) and his principal assistants in a special conference.

2. *Conferences.*—More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a statement of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account of nervousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing to seek assistance. There was hesitancy in taking chances of allowing information indirectly to reach the enemy and thereby improve enemy morale.

I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a part of the Admiralty organization and that it was essential to safe and efficient cooperation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of the exact situation.

They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War Council, exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the military situation and the destruction of merchant shipping.

I have had daily conferences with the first sea lord (Admiral Jellicoe) both in his office and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty access to all Government officials. I have freely consulted with such officials as follow: Prime minister; first lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson); ministers of munitions, shipping, trade, and other cabinet officials; first sea lord and his staff; chief of naval staff; directors (corresponding to our chiefs of bureaus) of intelligence, antisubmarine operations, torpedoes, mines, mining, etc.

3. *General statement of the situation.*—Since the last declaration of the enemy, which from intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine war against merchant shipping of all nations has resolved itself into the real war, and, stated briefly, the allied Governments have not been able to do anything now effectively meeting the situation presented.

4. As stated in my first dispatch the communications and supplies to all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the "command of the sea" is at stake.

5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine war have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as probably those of the department also, had been largely based upon press reports and reports of our

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... the Americans who have been abroad during the war. A ... either rigidly censored or else has been given out in a ... minimum assistance to enemy morale.

... which the British Government has experien ... in London, and even in the Admiralty itself, i ... remarkable and unexpected leakages of information ... neutral legations of smaller countries are now und

... the submarine campaign is being waged is in itself ... had to it by the enemy, and of the degree ... counting upon it.

... has reliable information (as reliable as can ... that the Allies would be defeated in two months

... weather and the shorter nights now coming on, we ma ...

... of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conferen ... extent destroyers and auxiliaries of the fleet ... its power in the remote possibility of anot

... seems to be that the latter will not occur, but the ... belief, and of course, in any case, the possibility ... guarded against.

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SITUATION.

... my first report of the situation with a view of ... consistent with the importance of the time ele ... by a natural reluctance to alter so radically my ... to the situation

... prove that, regardless of any enemy diversions ... where the critical area in which the war's decisio ... at the focus of all lines of communications

... enemy submarines and their rate of construction, ... information, renders it inevitable that the main at ... concentrated in the above critical area

... area it is manifest that the field is relatively large ... submarines which the enemy can maintain in it. For ... explained below they are forced to cov

... between the north of Scotland and Ushant.

... of the above and all other essential information a ... could not disperse his main submarine camp

... without diminishing results in this and all areas to ... the mission of the submarine c ... than a final decision of the war

... has been, and still is, concentrated upon the A ... steps and for failing to produce more subeta

... principal demands is for convoys of merchant ... protection within the war zone.

... is not publicly known is simply that the ... further that those which are available are suffe ... and conservice

... was asked by myself why shipping is not di ... rendezvous and from those convoyed through ... the same the area is too large the necessary v

... consulting with the director of shipping as to the ... attempting some approach to such a plan in case th ... tonnage to warrant it

... of controlling shipping the Admiralty now ... dispersion. They use about six relatively large ... United Kingdom and Channel, changing their ... demands

... to the north of Scotland another to the north o ... covering the Irish Sea and Channel. Individu

... areas of approach are instructed, generally before a ... at certain and different latitudes and thence

...

At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate shipping invariably the enemy has become aware of the course pursued.

18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is commensurate with the shipping itself and full cooperation by the merchant personnel. If a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The men being continually changed and at all times it can not be counted upon for the night. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping ships in touch with changes is apparent.

19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant captains taking into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for instructions. The American liner *New York*, upon which I took passage, is a typical example. She was advised to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she did not, thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous area.

20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with merchant masters for their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "give us a gun and let us defend ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant ships to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to the difficulty in controlling their speed or to the inexperience of their subordinates. With this view I do not personally agree, but believe that with a little more training merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formation.

I might state in this connection that my opinion as to the ability of merchant seamen to handle their ships in convoy came from the fact that I had been associated at one time for three years in training young men in navigation and merchant seamanship and I therefore knew those men better than the average officer has an opportunity to know them. At any rate, that opinion turned out, in the event, to be correct. Merchant skippers found no difficulty, with the guidance of a convoy commander, in handling their ships in close formation to the number of 40, in close formation, 500 yards apart, 1,000 yards between the lines, or maneuvering those ships simultaneously as a school of fish, zigzagging back and forth, in order to get out of the way of submarines. [Continuing reading:]

21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of shipping, merchant as well as naval, is speed and zigzagging, not more than 15 minutes or so. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on the contrary there is absolutely unanimous opinion.

22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly destroyers, and if enemy submarine morale is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity—increased speed of merchant bottoms, preferably small.

"More ships! More ships! More ships!" is heard on every hand.

23. It is also significant that until very recently the admiralty have been unable to convince some members of the cabinet that the submarine is a deciding factor in the war. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to face unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical warfare.

24. The prime minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely sealing up all the world's submarines from their own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. Finally convinced the prime minister of the fallacy of such propositions by pointing out the situation into which we would be led, namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them until finally the majority if not all of our forces would be forced into danger where they would be subject to continual torpedo and other attacks, in a position most favorable to the enemy.

25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does and always can find a way and thereby nullify the close blockage, the weather is a serious added factor. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could benefit from assistance; i. e., in supply of moorings and buoys.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

the coast now, and never has been, completely sealed against the vast areas of escape to the north. Submarines have succeeded in unknown ways in evading all such attempts.

Our submarines heavy forces are free to raid and in fact at any time when the enemy decides that the necessity has arisen the suggestion that two divisions of our fast dreadnaughts be sent primarily for the resulting moral effect against suc-

cessful by an important Admiralty official that while he thought it was through the channel by heavy enemy forces our submarines (Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless they were steadily thwarted on moral grounds; that is, the uncertainties which would be encountered. He agreed with me that the addition of some of our heavy forces to the channel approaches by the French and British vessels to the possibility of such raids.

It has been found necessary to accept no reports of a submarine unless survivors are captured or the submarine is sighted. No dependence even is placed upon evidence that a submarine has been attacked and forced down as there is no way of knowing if the submarine dives to escape gunfire she is not for the purpose of conveying the impression that she is not for further pursuit.

That the amount of damage a submarine can stand is not known until after the experience of the war.

A submarine was mistaken for an enemy and thought to be sunk and escaped to port.

These are certain since the outbreak of war are as follows:

1. Between 30 and 40 submarines operate at a time in the North Sea and French coast. At least one is now known to be in the North Sea.

2. The "Best antisubmarine weapons." The suggestions in this letter cover purely technical matters. In discussion of the committee, I will not read into the record.

In connection with the last statement that I have made that the submarines were operating to the westward, that was at that time the belief being based upon the fact that it turned out later that that was a very large number. There were seldom more than 10 away from the base at any one time, and 10 submarines that operated to the west of the base. I have known it to be as high as 15, 20, or 30. The reason that false evidence is given by anybody in any navy in the world is because they are going to be able to do. Admiral von Goetz said that they had to carry out very careful operations that the submarine could stay out for 10 or 15 days, that they would be able to stay out 30 days, and that they would be able to stay out 30 days in our Navy or any other navy. A

3. The subject of the preceding letter, not read by Admiral von Goetz, is the record as follows:

4. One of the most efficient weapons now known for use against submarines is the so-called "depth charge" which have been forwarded by our naval attaché to the Admiralty. They are designed to explode at a certain depth, for example, 100 feet. They are dropped overboard where a submarine is suspected to be and are counted upon to badly shake up and destroy the submarine.

Howitzers and bomb throwers of large caliber are under construction to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000 yards. Data forwarded.

30. *Torpedo protection.*—This subject may be summed up by the statement of a British dreadnought captain who said in effect that after a year's experience he did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several torpedoes, the anticipated damage to shafts or rudder thus necessitating towing. Ships have often been struck and been able to reach port. Vital water-tight doors are continuously closed at sea.

Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be explained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have their storage spaces covered or filled with wood or other water excluding material; and that, when at anchor, they quarter their crews in barracks and when leaving for a cruise carry a large amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not generally known.

On the contrary, all vessels of the British fleet must be kept fully supplied at all times for extended cruising. This is particularly true of battle cruisers.

31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced that ships have no unusual methods of protection or in fact any surprises or ordnance fighting equipment.

32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is speed and maneuver.

33. It is a common experience of the naval as well as merchant service that many wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are received of torpedoes missing ships. This was true in the Jutland battle. The captain of the ship said that he received numerous reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and nearly all of which he had reason to believe did not exist.

Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily mistaken for wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is present. This accounts for reports by passengers on liners and other merchant craft of seeing man-o'-war just miss their mark.

34. *Submarine versus submarines.*—There has always been opposition to submarines against submarines principally on the grounds that the possibilities of accomplishment would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk involved in taken identity and resulting damage to friends.

The director of antisubmarine warfare believes, however, that such a plan will promise well and the experiment is now being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy submarines have been detected by this method, usually torpedoed. One valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always safe in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty is maintained, the enemy will be forced to keep down more and to take much greater care against detection. This is an advantage of no small amount.

In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable information regarding the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels under the actual conditions of the areas in which they operate. Without this knowledge based on actual experience, too much is left to conjecture, which is liable to lead to a great deal of wasted effort.

WM

Before reading selections from my reports to the Navy Department during the first four months of our participation in the war, it was necessary that I should stop here and present a few facts and figures which will establish the critical tonnage situation which existed at the time we entered the war. These statistics are susceptible of substantiation in the archives of numerous Government departments in Washington, and if there is any inclination to question them, they can be further substantiated by a long train of witnesses of high Government officials.

In my letter of January 7, paragraphs 38, 41, 20, 21, referred to the tonnage situation which I am about to explain.

I submit here certain charts showing the situation, whether included or not. There are certain curves which show

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

at that time and the result of a summary which

you do understand that you wish to have a record?

I think those had better appear in the record so that everybody can see what the situation is. This is an example of the tonnage situation was at the time of the Reading.]

of delays in getting the United States Navy

1914 American tonnage not included).....
 1914 not including imports of Russia and
 imports.....

TONNAGE LOSSES.

1914, to Jan. 1, 1917.....
 after 1917.....
 required by Europe (annually).....
 imports.....
 military and naval use (in addition to tonnage
 necessary to allied cause.....
 Jan. 1, 1917.....
 May 1, 1917.....
 damage or repairs.....
 May 1, 1917.....
 losses Feb. 1, 1917, to Aug. 1, 1917.....
 losses Aug. 1, 1917, to Feb. 1, 1918.....
 losses Feb. 1, 1918, to Nov. 11, 1918.....

will give you a general summary

I am submitting to the committee an available of the losses caused the Allies the delays in getting American naval forces and my submarines.

I have before me show clearly that in April 1917 the Allies were doomed on account of the losses of tonnage. At the end of the year there had been a net loss of 7 per cent of the total allied and neutral tonnage. The losses had been increasing every month. At the end of the year the net loss amounted to 800,000 tons, and the whole period of the war before January 1, 1917, these losses, if continued, would soon reach an extent that military requirements, and the population of the allied countries, could not be maintained. The imports had already been reduced by 40 per cent. They could not be reduced further. The population of the allied countries at the rate then existing would have been unable to transport an American army or to maintain

the adoption of the convoy system, and the anti-submarine warfare by the Allies with our assistance in

losses were gradually reduced until in October, 1918, they came down to only 100,000 tons. The period between the beginning of our unrestricted submarine campaign and the armistice is divided into three phases so far as losses of merchant tonnage concerned:

First. The period from February 1, 1917, to the end of July 1917, when American aid was lacking and when shipping was not convoyed. Average losses, 640,000 tons per month.

Second. The period of August 1, 1917, to February 1, 1918, when there was a partial employment of the convoy system and no assistance from America. Losses, 390,000 tons per month.

Third. The period from February 1, 1918, to the armistice, when full cooperation was given by America, and consequently a full use could be made of the convoy system. Losses, 250,000 tons per month.

As will be noted, each of these successive phases of the unrestricted submarine campaign is marked by the degree of naval cooperation received from America. An analysis of the situation, therefore, shows that if the United States Navy had been prepared for war when the war began, and if a whole-hearted policy of cooperation with the Allies had been followed from the beginning, the first period mentioned above would have come to an end within a month after we entered the war; that is, by May 1, 1917. The second period would probably have ended by August 1, as by that time the full weight of our naval action would probably have been felt. An estimate of the additional tonnage that would have been saved by prompt action on our part shows, therefore, that, if the first period had ended on May 1, 1917, the second period on August 1, 1917, a million and a half tons of shipping would have been saved to the Allies in 1917. Similarly, a million and a half tons would have been saved in 1918.

It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the cause as a whole 2,500,000 tons of shipping sunk unnecessarily. While this is of course an estimate only, it is based upon results obtained when our help became effective, and there is no reason to doubt that it is a conservative estimate.

The loss of this amount of shipping can also be translated into a definite prolongation of the war and unnecessary sacrifice of men and treasure in accomplishing the victory. As Gen. Pershing clearly shows in his report to the Secretary of War, the principal consideration limiting the number of American troops that could be sent to France was that of tonnage. The tonnage losses caused made it impossible at the time to transport any considerable American Army and, at the same time, continue the absolutely essential military supplies and food for the civil populations of the Allied countries. It therefore became necessary to limit the number of American troops that could be sent abroad during the first year of the war to an average of approximately 25,000 men per month. If the additional million and a half tons sunk unnecessarily in 1917 had been saved by prompt cooperation of our Navy, the number of American soldiers sent to France could have been doubled or trebled. If the tonnage had been available and the additional American troops had been sent to France, and the new drafts called more promptly from this country, America could have had a million men in France in March, 1918, instead of 300,000.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

of the various books by military experts and of the various reports concerning the German campaign of 1918, the defeat of the submarine campaign would have been greatly shortening the war. The German command had to hope until the beginning of 1918, that it could force the Allies to peace. The offensive campaign was projected and undertaken when the German command believed the submarine could not bring them victory. If, however, losses had been so reduced by August, 1917, the submarine campaign could have been accomplished with a doubt, have reacted upon the morale of the German command at that time as it did actually in 1918, and the German command would then have been forced into its decision earlier than March, 1918, when the offensive was launched against the Allies, or would have been forced into a serious assault of the Allies in the early spring of 1918, instead of the losses suffered in the first months of 1918. And because of the delay in getting American forces into the war, actually did not begin until the fall of 1917. In either of these cases, the presence of a fleet of submarines on March 1, and the arrival of another fleet of submarines three months later, would undoubtedly have brought about a different result if one may judge from what actually happened. American forces did become available, and thus turned the tide in favor of the Allies.

Necessarily of the two and a half million tons of shipping, all probability postponed the end of the war. The average loss of life per day to the war was 3,000 men. This prolongation of the war, cost a million lives. Similarly, as the war cost the United States on the average, this prolongation resulted in an expenditure of \$15,000,000,000, of which at least \$10,000,000,000 was paid by the United States directly or loaned.

This statement not because I assume or pretend that in order to present to you some estimate of the cost of the Navy Department in the first six months of such delays and military errors as those committed by the Navy Department in this same time cost the Nation a great deal. I wish to call your attention as vividly as possible to the questions under discussion are not purely academic. The consequences that must inevitably be suffered if such mistakes are committed in time of war, and which cost the cause for which we were fighting fifteen billions of dollars, and two and a half million lives.

I read to the committee selections from my various reports during the first four months, together with certain other important Government officials, for the purpose of showing that the department was fully informed of the serious and critical nature of the war situation at the time I decided to enter.

I wish to point out that the official documents I am about to present are but a few of those which I sent and which are available records. An attempt has been made merely to select typical messages. These messages which I shall now read you are in addition to paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 26, and 27 of my letter, the subject of this inquiry.

I would like to say in connection with these dispatches in order to take a certain subject and discuss it if it is necessary, or to introduce the dispatches which substantiate the statement. If all of those dispatches contain remarks on different subjects and I include and read the whole dispatch would unnecessarily lengthen the record and would be very boring.

It is also my intention to include only any portion of a dispatch which bears on the subject in hand, but if, after I finish my testimony the committee desires to have a complete file of these dispatches that they can read any dispatch in its entirety, I can submit them. That will add considerably to the length of the record, but they can be submitted if desired.

The CHAIRMAN. We can determine that afterwards.

Admiral SIMS. Yes. To give you an idea of the magnitude of the job, I may say that I do not know how many dispatches there are but they are in the hundreds of thousands. I asked my statistician some time ago how many there were, and he said that if the dispatches were piled up in boards and set on a shelf that shelf would have to be 140 feet long in order to contain them. Of course, the committee does not want them all.

Senator TRAMMELL. They are all dispatches that are on file in the department?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, they are all on file in the department.

Senator TRAMMELL. And your references will refer to the paragraph numbers, so that they can be found?

Admiral SIMS. Out of those miles of dispatches I am only selecting representative ones, and out of those representative ones I am selecting those that illustrate the point in question; and of all of the dispatches, of which there are probably 200,000, I am only selecting a certain number, and those can be included; and if, after my testimony is concluded, you decide that it would be advisable, you can put them in in full; but in the meantime there are only extracts from these dispatches.

Senator TRAMMELL. Will you refer to them under the file numbers so that they can be identified?

Admiral SIMS. I will refer to them by dates, and will give you the file numbers also, if you need them, and by numbers also.

On the same day that I sent my first dispatch to the department covering the whole situation, I also sent a second dispatch to emphasize the exactness of the information and the importance of the recommendations given in the first cable. This second dispatch is as follows:

[Cable to Department, April 14, 1917.]

The dispatch referred to gives the exact truth of the situation, and the information given is not even known to the majority of British officials. I have absolutely no doubt upon the importance of a complete and accurate statement of the true situation, and the authorities have finally given their consent, but only after reference to the

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... the manifest advantage to enemy morale if the
... with all possible urgency your immediate consi-

... reference to the importance of keeping you
... the enemy, that I read a dispatch in the p
... officials in Berlin read aloud the acc
... Admiral Jellicoe, and the statement in a mi
... situation was, and they listened to this la

... to rest.
... this disptach, I learned by accident on the fol
... Admiral Jellicoe's office, that the Navy Departme
... as I will point out later in my testimony
... of the British and French Navies in
... to the extent of American naval cooperat
... in the department any information concerni
... point out later in my testimony. At thi
... emphasize the fact that one clause in the agre
... Admiral Jellicoe was to the effect that the Navy I
... a division of destroyers to base either upon a
... I thereupon sent to the department on the
... message:

APRIL 16- 11

... Washington

... destroyer or other patrol forces sent this side d
... westward as practicable, preferably south coast
... designated high-sea area in zone to westward and
... area

... on April 18, in replying to a suggestion
... as to the feasibility of blocking the G
... bases, which will also be taken up later, I
... importance of immediate naval cooperation.

... gram to Navy Department, April 18, 1917)

... result to be to a great degree the most efficacious
... measures. All possible means are taken by th
... other duty, even to sink ships on hospital
... minimum number required by the Grand Fleet,
... all destroyers are now so used. These ve
... as possible, but their number is quite
... marine crisis, particularly as it affects merchan
... situation I urgently repeat the recomme
... destroyer that can reach Ireland as well as all li
... to perform any patrol service

... of about this same time, on April 15,
... called attention to my early recommend
... for forces.

... I received from the Navy Department a r
... information, at the end of which was t

... April will be given earnest and serious attention.
... assurance from the department, the only me
... concerning the sending of forces abroad in

were the two messages which I shall now read you, w both received on April 22:

From: Operations.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received April 22, 1917.

Six destroyers are ready to sail immediately upon receiving inform desired port and best route to follow as they approach the Irish coast information.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral W. S. Sims.
Cablegram received: April 22, 1917.

The United States has been requested by the Russian Government to patrol vessels and four destroyers to the Arctic coast for the defense of It is understood that assistance is urgently required at the earliest possible Please confer with the British authorities as to the situation and wire advise.

DANIELS, *Secretary*

It is to be seen from the second of these messages how little tance the department had apparently given to my recommendation. In my first dispatch and in later dispatches I had emphasized absolute necessity of concentrating all available American marine craft in the critical area of the submarine zone south of Yet the department entertained the possibility of sending stroyers and four patrol vessels to the Arctic coast at a time so far as I knew, they were intending to send only one destroyer to the critical zone.

I immediately replied to this message with my dispatch of April 24, 10 a. m.

Sent April 24, 10 a. m.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

Strictly confidential. Replying to department's April 22. Have considered Admiralty. Conclusion reached is that our destroyers and patrol forces should be concentrated in same area, based on Bantry Bay, with all possible repair and facilities. Effort would be diminished by separation and necessary establishment of additional bases. If this is done, Admiralty can augment submarine defense of coast from their present bases. Submarines and decoy vessels already sent to Situation continues critical. Nine vessels sunk yesterday. Recommend destroyers now available be sent earliest possible date, if necessary in advance of repair and supply vessels. Admiralty can supply and repair temporarily.

On April 26 I received a message announcing the sailing of destroyers from Boston on April 24, but containing no further information with regard to other forces.

My despair can be imagined.

I felt there was no way to explain the situation any more than I had already done in dispatches to the department. Nevertheless, I did send one more message, which follows:

[Cable to department.]

Sent April 27, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

The information which follows must be guarded with the greatest secrecy in spite of the effort of all destroyers and patrol vessels which are available, the situation is increasingly critical. Eighty-eight ships, amounting to 237,000 tons (not into account the fishing vessels), of British, Allied, and neutral nationality were sunk during the week ending April 22. There is a greatly increased number of ships are unsuccessfully attacked by enemy submarines. This indicates that there is a correspondingly increased number of submarines operating.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... however, to believe that this one addition
... action necessary. But something had
... stake were too great for me to be satisfied

... seemed to be open. My representative c
... asked me under the ambassador. Through
... ways considered it a duty to keep the St
... representative generally informed of the military sit
... make an urgent appeal to the ambassador,
... an attempt to get our Government to
... situation. I submitted a memorandum
... which I might read the following extracts:

... Page. April 27, 1917.

... April 22—88 ships, 240,000 tonnage, lost; number o
... marked increase in number of submarines of
... and other suitable vessel now employed, even to
... British Grand Fleet over enemy Grand Fleet. Allie
... transport of troops and supplies strained to utmost, an

... of cooperation by United States in future, in
... reinforcement of armies in field, it is imperative
... to date all destroyers and other craft suitable for
... this side. Opportunity presented for Unite
... in war by immediate maximum cooperation in sup

... on April 27—the ambassador sent t
... the State Department:

... Secretary and President. There is reason for the
... war caused by the increasing success of the Germ
... official sources that during the week ending Apri
... and neutral, were lost. The number of vessel
... a great increase in the number of submarines in
... lost every month till the shorter days of
... will be about clear of shipping. Most of the s
... of Ireland. The British have in that ar
... but their force is so insufficient that they ha
... The British transport of troops and supplies is
... the maintenance of the armies in the field is thre
... last the civil population not more than six v

... States may render at any time in the future o
... now more seriously needed in this submarine
... than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else
... with the prime minister and other member
... from most strongly recommending the im
... and all other craft that can be of antisubmar
... crisis of the war and the most dangerous situ
... could arise. If enough submarines can be destr
... the war will be won, and if we can contribute
... won directly by our aid. I can not exaggerate th
... of this situation. Thirty or more destroyers and ot
... would very likely be decisive. There is

... followed this up on the next day by sending
... another long dispatch covering the whole
... again the urgent necessity of immediate

Owing to the gravity of the submarine situation, although I am unsatisfied as regards our forces available and their material condition, I am urging the importance of the time element, and the fact that the pressing moment is numbers of vessels in the danger area. We can not send too many. If the rate of losses given last week is continued, any other form of cooperation including shipping may be too late. The intensity of the campaign shows now, and within the next two months, is the critical time. My opinion all points to the breaking of enemy submarine morale as the main mission. Since the British are concentrating more forces in the critical area, I do not exaggerate the importance of our force being immediately followed by facilities for supply and repair, especially for all needs and for all species. At Queenstown and the neighboring bases because of the volume of work and labor, facilities will be greatly overstrained.

With regard to submarines entering and leaving their bases and their approximate whereabouts while operating, the admiralty is able to maintain information fairly exact.

Of the 34 mine U-boats, two for some days were not located, and the admiralty was on the point of informing us of the probability of their being en route to the United States when their whereabouts were discovered. It is the Admiralty's opinion that at present none are likely to be sent over and that the present effort to keep a submarine which is successful will be kept up off the channel entrance. The destroyers which can be freed from duty with the fleet are being employed in the area. It has been shown by experience that 50 per cent of the destroyers can be maintained on patrol. The area covered by destroyers is practically untenable by submarines, but this area is ineffective as it is too small. Yesterday the war council and the Admiralty decided that cooperation of twenty-odd American destroyers with bases at Queenstown would no doubt put down the present submarine activity which is increasing and keep it down.

That, of course, refers to that particular area.

The crisis will be passed if the enemy can be forced to disperse his forces from this crucial zone.

I believe our Navy has an opportunity for glorious distinction and I recommend that there be sent at once maximum possible number of destroyers to the area and all supplies necessary will be furnished the six destroyers now there and there will be assigned to the staff of our senior officer an expert destroyer officer.

A little bit later I was able to inform the department that I would give them more accurate information about the movements of the submarines, and when we come to consider the question of the defense of our coast, I think I can show you some of the most remarkable examples of secret intelligence work that have ever been recorded in any military history. I will explain to you to a certain extent, how it was that I was able to assure the department that no submarine would leave the other side without the department being warned; and it turned out to be so. No submarine left the other side without the Navy Department having at least a few weeks warning, and being told where she was at least every three days, and being told what her name was, what her number was, and in one case what the name of her commanding officer was, where she was going and what she was going to do; and it all turned out to be perfectly correct.

On the following day I received orders placing me in command of the forces which were being sent, namely, six destroyers, in addition to my other duties as the department's representative abroad.

On May 3, a whole month after we declared war, apparently as a result of the dispatches sent on April 27 and 28, the department sent me the first message giving me any intimation as to the extent of the forces they intended to send. This message was as follows:

This dispatch is as follows:

[Cable sent Navy Department, May 5, 1917.]

Relations with the French Navy Department very satisfactory. Conference with French minister and chief of staff and French attaché London and attaché Paris. Sea Lord resulted in unanimous agreement that our destroyer force should be concentrated and should attack the enemy submarines in whatever area they are operating in the greatest numbers. Probably principally in the area from the West Northwest of Fastnet.

The next intimation which I received from the department concerning their probable plans was in a dispatch of May 8:

Cablegram, from Secretary of the Navy.

To: Rear Admiral Sims.

Received May 8, 1917.

The French have requested the United States Navy Department consider establishing temporary bases at Bordeaux and Brest, with one line office officer and one engineer officer. You are requested to advise on this and it is that your reply be expedited.

I

I replied to this on the same day.

Sent May 8, 1917.

To: Secretary of State, Washington.

Through: State Department.

Following from the Admiral to Navy Department:

Establishment of temporary bases Brest and Bordeaux very desirable but not divert in any way necessary repair supply and fuel vessels from mobile base. Urgent that destroyer force remain concentrated with mobile base follow any movement of main submarine activity on high sea trade routes.

Throughout the remainder of the month of May, and for the first three weeks of June, I continued to send, at frequent intervals, cables reiterating recommendations made from the time of the first cable, but received no further reply from the Navy Department regarding their plans and policies and forces to be sent abroad. On June 20, although throughout this period I was in daily communication with the heads of the allied navies. You can imagine my embarrassment in all discussions, owing to my inability to make any definite statement whatever as to what the United States Navy proposed to do; and, as I will point out at a later time, in dealing with the department's direct negotiations with allies during this period. I was receiving most of my information with regard to American plans and the disposition of American naval forces accidentally through information seen in the Admiralty or related to me by my armed guard officers.

In this series of messages which I now propose to read, in order not to confuse the situation, I will adhere to the point of discussion. There are a great many very important things which I will take up later, for example, the convoy system, which during this period was pressing hard, but I wish now to deal only with the question of reinforcements.

From among the many messages sent during May and June, in which I was pointing out the increasingly critical character of the situation and repeated my recommendations for the sending of submarine craft, I will read portions of my dispatches of May 31, June 7, June 14, and June 20:

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

...ations of these dispatches in order (1) to save space and avoid confusion. Many dispatches refer to the subject now under consideration. I can, therefore, submit a separate list of all dispatches from which these extracts were taken. Of course, these are only a few representative ones to give an idea of the material. It would take literally hundreds of cables alone would occupy about 100 letters each.

* This sent Department May 14, 1917.]

... to increase the British patrols. The measure
... in view of the critical degree
... the general allied military and political situation
... The need is for destroyers, antisubmarine
... in the greatest possible numbers. The British Government
... of America's desire to assist in putting down

... can be considered as only as instance of
... because they are thanking us for ser
... date.

...in numbers of patrol craft, and as previously reported, the urgency of reinforcing the allied antisubmarine hunt.

~~extracts from a few of these cables.~~

* Able sent to Department May 31, 1917.]

With the available antisubmarine craft, the enemy is being driven out of gun fire, and this results in shorter cruises and increased difficulty in maintaining definite periods of contact from now on alternative periods of greater contact are expected to report officially that the United States Navy's approach has been rendering most efficient and

1. To the Department June 7, 1917)

The great necessity is numbers of antisubmarine aircraft to support the offensive campaign. Also require a policy concerning fleet and other service aircraft as regards their use this side, but would not see future development of emergencies should

... State Chief of Naval Operations from Vice Adm
... and prospects for immediate future very grave
... from assistance which we can render is entirely
... passage through dangerous submarine areas this
... future and available vessels for escort duty i
... er is done to meet the situation must be done im
... needed. The difficulties confronting the entire co
... primarily depend upon the question of escorts through

zones. There are not now sufficient vessels available for escort of all vital supplies and also prospective movements of our troops. As our troops and their supplies will approach European coast by shipping and shipping convoys it is mandatory that information as to the probable numbers and times of sailing of all Army ships for three months as on this depends the programme of merchant shipping be arranged some time ahead. The approach of our first Army convoys will embarrass the shipping situation as it will require all destroyers to be thus necessitating entire suspension of patrol and escort duty in the area and lay too much stress upon the urgent necessity of increasing the patrol forces here with utmost despatch. Can not other craft be sent armed which can make above 12 knots and keep the sea will remain. Our shipping and our coast is better protected in the field of enemy than any other place.

Urgently request answer in next 24 hours if possible as to prospective all Army shipping in next two or three months. This information is of great importance. Also request information as to probable additions to the fleet in these waters. The Admiralty informs me that present prospect is that the food supplies can not be. I again urgently recommend that the food supplies that can be brought to the coast of Ireland be sent at once.

Sent: June 20, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
(Through Admiralty.)

The immediate dispatch to this area of all possible destroyers and other craft of any description is mandatory if the submarine issue is to be dealt with. During absence of destroyers for escort duty with troops transport ships the area reduced to only 10 destroyers and 10 sloops, only 6 of each in the area. This requires five days at sea with two days in port, which can not be relied upon for reliability. Other areas are similarly short of sufficient forces to deal with. Yesterday the majority of these forces were engaged in escorting bound valuable ships, thereby leaving all shipping following. Ships sunk yesterday as far west as 17:30. It will seem suicidal if as proposed by the British Admiralty is not put into immediate operation to all shipping, thus forcing submarines to encounter antisubmarine attack shipping. It is impossible to carry on partial convoy and patrol. Both can not be done. The former much better than present system. Urgently request information of department's action and upon previous similar dispatches. A decision is necessary before any action can be taken on this side.

That refers largely to the convoys. I will show you how to take up the convoys as a separate subject, the operation of the United States to the introduction of the convoy system.

In reply to the increasingly urgent series of messages I have finally received a message from the department, on June 19th I will now read to you:

Received: June 20, 1917, via Admiralty.

To: Commander in Chief; Queenstown.
Following for Admiral Sims:

Begins. There will be no additional movements before August 1st. We will be furnished fully with information as to sailing of Army supply ships as possible in advance, and the actual sailing intended route and arrival will be reported. We hope to sail four Army supply ships about 10 days' time. The 32 destroyers, which are all that are available, 110-foot chasers, which are to be sent to France, should begin to sail in August. Fishing vessels, 12 in number, will sail in August for France. The craft available at present, although work on yachts is being pushed forward. In regard to convoy, I consider that American ships should be sent out in convoys when sailing independently.

It is useless for us to manufacture, grow, and build munitions, foods, and assemble and train soldiery, unless at the same time, and in time, we also take steps to insure that such measures will safely reach the points where to defeat the enemy. If we attempt to furnish this help in a larger degree, the enemy can sink it, we might perhaps eventually accomplish our purpose, but the grave danger is that the Allies will be brought to terms before such a plan can be carried out.

It remains a fact that at present the enemy is succeeding and we are failing. Ships are being sunk faster than they can be replaced by the building facilities of the world. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war. There is no doubt about that. The submarines are rapidly cutting the Allies' lines of communication. When they are cut, or sufficiently interfered with, we must accept the enemy's terms.

It is a poor plan, indeed, that does not involve attacking the enemy or forcing them to attack ours. Stated briefly, the unsuccessful plan now being pursued is about as follows:

(a) Allowing the enemy to concentrate his efforts exclusively against inadequately protected shipping (our necessary lines of communication) through which our supplies now pass and must continue to pass.

(b) Maintaining a relatively large number of our available antisubmarine forces along the great stretch of American coast lines which lie over 3,000 miles away from the theatre of war, which the enemy not only is not operating, but can not profitably operate against.

The enemy is perfectly content to have us protect our great stretch of coast lines as long as he will never have to, and in fact could not afford to do so, these distant lines in order to defeat us.

Mr. Lloyd George was perfectly right in saying that what we needed were ships, ships, and more ships, but he didn't explain that those ships needed were of two kinds, namely:

First. Ships to oppose the enemy's war vessels.

Second. Ships to carry the supplies we must have.

The necessity for both in adequate numbers is vital, but either one alone is of little avail.

The fact must be thoroughly realized that the war is being, and must continue to be fought exclusively on this side of the Atlantic, and that it will be won by us within the next few months.

It can not be won by any accumulation of naval forces on our coast line or in other areas except those in which the war is being fought, and must continue to be fought.

It must be lost, or very unsatisfactorily terminated, if there is not an immediate accumulation of antisubmarine forces here in the critical areas. The simple reason that, if the shipping losses continue at the present rate—we can not win.

I feel that I would fail in my duty if I did not continue to keep you informed of the situation.

Practically the same information as was given the ambassador in this letter was transmitted to the department in two cables, one on June 28, and in the further cable of June 29, which are as follows:
Sent June 28, 1917:

To Secretary of Navy, through Admiralty.

Protection of all allied shipping in time—I repeat in time—is present. Whatever efforts we can exert must be put into operation at once if they are to be effective. Reliable submarines would be of great use to strengthen British patrols and also as scouts ahead of convoys. All submarines we send to the theatre of war in time will therefore be invaluable in insuring success of convoy system. Success of war, provided these submarines are supplied from America and not from their own mother ships.

Sent June 28, 1917:

To Secretary of the Navy, through Admiralty, from Queenstown.

I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by new measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of the Allies' avoidance of antisubmarine craft.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant ships which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the

by expert naval crews with much previous experience with submarine recently been torpedoed without warning. Another case within the month a merchant ship engaging submarine with gunfire at 6,000 yards, but submarine evaded and approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heavy batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by Admiralty's policy of always sending destroyers to escort their men-of-war. The comparative small number of American ships, especially liners, is believed to be due to the enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. There is no record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous positions against armed ships without ship being able to see submarine.

I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of ships and avoidance of antisubmarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using for approach an auxiliary periscope less than 2 inches in diameter. This is a recent acquisition. All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our policy on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now decided the adoption to the maximum practicable extent convoys from 16 to 20 ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines as the latter will be subjected to attack of our antisubmarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing range of convoyed merchantmen. Moreover, it permits of concentrated attack by our forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various approaches.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign must easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. It is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and weather of autumn, that is in next three months. Heaviest effort may be expected in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coast lines and shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Operations in home waters should take precedence over or be allowed to diminish maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must be carried out in order to succeed.

Similar cables to those just read were sent on June 30, July 1, and July 2. The following message was then received from the Admiralty. Only that part of the message dealing with the reinforcements is here quoted:

Cablegram May 1.
From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Alusna, London.
For: Vice Admiral Sims. No. 44.
Received: July 2, 1917.

With reference to your previous cables, the Navy Department is fully aware of the urgency of sending all possible antisubmarine craft to European waters, and is doing its utmost to meet demands. Five destroyers will sail about the 1st of August for Asiatic waters, whence they have been ordered to duty in European waters. Navy Department will assign seven cruisers for convoy duty in accordance with Admiralty's request.

There is little to comment on this message. I still was unable to believe that the department could possibly be aware of the gravity of the situation and still take no more action than was taken. The fact that five old destroyers would start a long cruise for Asiatic station about a month hence was little satisfaction. When it was brought out later, the statement that seven cruisers were assigned to convoy duty was the first intimation of cooperation in this work, the necessity of which had been impressed upon the department for more than two months previously. In fact, the convoy system had been in operation at this time for over a year to the extent that British cruisers were available.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

again pointed out in a message of July 3 that the craft would be suitable for antisubmarine consideration was that of time. [Read

the Navy

If enemy submarine pressure anticipated in July, the necessity for additional craft immediate. The craft are needed not only for actual offensive operations and other convoys. Can not all destroyers Atlantic? Are there no armed tugs available? Even help. I fully realize the pressure on department Mediterranean and other localities, but am particularly concerned that our effort should have maximum effect in meeting the approach routes to channel and Irish Sea are at Harwich and Melville at Queenstown and our personnel familiar with situation, methods of operation, and administrative and methods of communication, it will be considered effectiveness of new forces joining to concentrate United States forces together.

messages could be quoted among those which August, dealing with the same subject in but it is believed that it would be merely up to the time of the committee to read them. The message from the Navy Department, on July were at last beginning to perceive that there European waters. This message of July

[Cablegram]

the Navy

Capt. Fletcher due to arrive French coast 5th July to join them. Five coal-burning destroyers to base temporarily on Azores. Several British merchant convoy operations from the advance as possible of dates of departure of transport and one yacht under Capt. Magruder will be sent. Department is strongly impressed by submarine patrol in and off entrance to Gibraltar. Since, Sacramento, Yankton, Marhion, Castine, available to send across if considered that they could render valuable service to warrant send. What duty would they perform? Would the Government be prepared to supply two or four 14-inch guns per Admiralty's request. Guns can be sent. Information as to any definite plans for future operations requests made and our efforts to respond in consideration be submitted for our study.

As read, the letter sent to the Secretary concerning proposed for the suppression of the submarine remained the same throughout the war. It is made in this telegram that they do not are, is, to say the least, extraordinary. After this message was received, on July 10, 1917 the Navy sent me in a cable dispatch the first fu

ment of the Navy Department policy which had been. This message was as follows:

From: Secretary of Navy.

To: Vice Admiral Sims, U. S. S. *Melville*.

Received: July 10, 1917.

The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for information and guidance as an index of the policy of the department in cooperation of our naval forces with those of our allies: "After careful consideration of the present naval situation, taken in connection with possible future developments which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy so far as it relates to the Allies: First, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters. Second, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war with the realization that while a successful termination of the present war must be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by the disintegration of our main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the main military role of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the communications of the Allies.

In pursuing this aim there will be generally speaking two classes of vessels, gaged, minor craft and major craft, and two rôles of action, first offensive and second defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph 4 the department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But as the primary rôle of the offensive preparations must perforce belong to the allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general position, the following: "One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, consisting of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries in any number compatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the allied admiralities which would not involve a violation of our present Statute. Two, its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from the fleet for service abroad although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet to act as a united, but cooperating unit when after joint consultations of all the allies concerned the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension upon the line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in the waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to discuss fully plans for joint operations."

JOSEPHUS D.

I will discuss this message more fully later, and then will give my reply when the general question of policy is taken up. I will here merely to state that the policy, as herein stated, is only to be judged by actual results in carrying it out and they speak for themselves. I particularly wish to stress the point that this first statement of policy was received on July 10, a few days over two months after we had declared war, as stated in my original message of January 7. The astounding features of this policy, however, were that, while it stated our intention to cooperate to the fullest degree, still such cooperation was conditioned upon, first, an adequate defense of our own waters; and, second, the future position of the United States after this war was finished. I am wholly unable to conceive of any war policy, particularly in a world war of this nature, which was certain to exhaust all participants, with the possible exception of ourselves, being based upon the requirements of any possible future war.

As an illustration of the fact that the department was kept informed at all times of the progress of the submarine war I will read you one cable, that of July 5, which is typical of the con-

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

which were sent with regard to the actual circumstances and the losses of merchant ships.

to the Navy

allied and neutral week ending July, 128,500 tons. A summary has been out, but so far impossible to draw conclusions as to activity. Isolated cases are reported of ships attacked by submarine mine layers not very active. Seventy-seven which is way below weekly average. Fifteen reported submarines in British waters, two by destroyers, three by auxiliary patrol, one by seaplane.

that a similar telegram was sent ever since I have quoted only from my cables to the Navy with the exception of the first letter of April 19, which shows completely the situation was covered in the beginning. Because of the delays inevitable in lettering important matters had been dealt with through the dispatches, during these first critical months the department were, therefore, only confirmatory messages, often give a better general résumé of the situation than a cable. I propose now to read you parts of my reports during this same period to the department.

Before, if after the conclusion of my testimony I shall like to have complete copies of all the records of their paragraphs, I will be prepared to give

my letter to the Secretary of the Navy, on the 10th of May. I gave an account of the conferences held in Paris in the first week of that month. I will read you the paragraphs, the remainder being messages already read:

MAY

Ever since I arrived here I have been very busy in carrying out certain details of my duties on this mission. I have been most strenuously occupied, both in carrying out my unavoidable official functions, which are, however, in constant contact with those who have access to various

the situation created by the submarine campaign, and I have taken pains that these conditions be as possible. I believe there is little to add to the report. The prime minister has visited Paris, the 10th. He was accompanied by Lord Robert Cecil, First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Jellicoe, and a

that there is a great anxiety as to the final outcome of the war, by the present success of the German submarine campaign, all other difficulties will be put down or diminished.

can be done only by an increase in the number of vessels. Great Britain is turning out destroyers and anti-submarine vessels at maximum capacity, and also building 1,000 bomb-throwing vessels, but these will take some time to complete.

am glad to know that my visit to Paris was very successful, and that a complete agreement between the French and British Navies

ment as to the manner in which our destroyers and other forces should be in the campaign against the enemy. Our force and its supply train shot unit in the area of the greatest activity of the submarines.

Very sincerely, yours,

Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,

Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

In my letter of April 27 I had pointed out:

The military situation almost daily grows more critical, as is indicated by cabled reports of merchant tonnage lost. The critical area continues to move eastward and westward of Ireland.

Similarly, there are certain paragraphs in my letter of May 1 of interest in this connection:

12. I have considered it vitally important, and in this decision am in agreement with both the French and British Admiralties that our destroyers should not only remain concentrated and operate together but, what is more important, that they should remain essentially mobile. The destroyer is by far the most effective enemy of the submarine; and I am particularly anxious that our forces should be so placed as to have the greatest possible effect in assisting in putting down the enemy submarine campaign. I am prompted in this decision not only because it is manifestly the most effective assistance which we can render at this time to the common cause but also the secondary reason that such a course is certain to be productive of the greatest distinction for the United States naval service.

It is therefore my aim, as reported to the department, to keep our force at the extreme possible degree, independent of any shore station, in order that the force with its mobile base can be moved at will and follow the center of enemy submarine pressure.

13. As reported by cable dispatch, the situation remains critical, owing to the enemy submarine campaign. The question at issue is, and must remain, the control of our lines of communication. It is of course true that the primary mission should always be the destruction of the enemy's fleet, but this must not blind us to the fact that its destructions may often not be an effective form of assistance in itself, but merely a means to an end.

The only apparent solution to the submarine issue lies in numbers of antisubmarine craft with a view to sufficiently dispersing the enemy submarine effort so that the resulting losses will be reduced below the critical point.

And again I said:

29. It is in view of the above and of the large amount of supporting effort required that I have so urgently recommended that our primary military effort be concentrated in getting the maximum number of antisubmarine craft of all types into the enemy's main area of activity.

In my general reports of June 1 and 15, I again especially emphasized the importance of immediate full cooperation with our Allies in meeting the submarine menace. I will read you a few paragraphs of interest in this connection. [Reading:]

It is gratifying to be able to report that the operations of our forces in these waters have proved not only very satisfactory but also of marked value to the Allies in meeting the submarine menace. The equipment and construction of our destroyers have proved adequate and efficient, and the personnel has shown an unusually high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope with the situation presented. It is hoped that the destroyer force operating in these waters can be greatly increased in the near future as this will unquestionably prove to be the most effective assistance which we can afford to the allied cause at the present time. As previously reported, it is of the utmost importance to the success of the operations of our forces that they be concentrated. The material difficulties and resulting interference with our operations which would be involved if they were concentrated beyond their own floating bases would seriously impair their military efficiency.

During three years of war the other allies have gradually established bases suited to their requirements, and hence they are in a better position to operate over widely dispersed areas. By keeping our forces concentrated with a view to being self-sustaining to the maximum degree, they will not only be able to render the greatest possible assistance to the allied cause, but also the future distinction to our service of such special work as they may perform will be better assured.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... return continue operations as previously reported
... covered to five days out and three days in, which will
... efficiency and hence greater reliability of service.

... of the time on duty is now spent in escorting the most
... Prior to the arrival of our forces, it was impossible
... defensive campaign against submarines, and also
... The larger the force, the more the valuable cargoes

... continued in relays, as previously reported, the
... patrol craft. Valuable cargoes are escorted by
... valuable ones require two and sometimes three es
... difficult to handle such escorting duty and mai
... carried

... of June 8, 15, and 20, I will be found to
... paragraphs, with the exception of their possib
... I believe it to be unnecessary to read
... are a repetition of the dispatches or letters

... June 29, however, I made a complete review
... time, with the Allies rapidly losing the v
... money with which I was recommending the
... in the war zone. I will therefore read th

London, June 2

... United States naval forces operating in European waters
... Naval Operations.

... concerning military situation

... add to my recent cable despatches which, in v
... have been made full and detailed.

... briefly, I would repeat that I consider that th
... on account of the success of the enemy

... continue as they have during the past four months.
... will be forced to dire straits indeed, if they will no
... satisfactory peace

... tion is very much greater than the rate of build
... already so great that the efficiency of the nava
... Orders have just been given to use three-fif
... This simply means that the enemy is wi

... insistent in my cable despatches have been t
... of cooperation which we may take will be inc
... operation immediately—that is, within a month

... to believe that the maximum enemy submarine
... the 1st of November (1917), reaching its height
... July, if not earlier

... sovereign solution for the submarine mena
... methods of warfare based upon fundamental mili

... the cardinal military principle of concentration
... by the enemy and not by the Allies

... while the enemy is concentrating his. Th
... and must continue to be the destruction of merchant

... and the distances over which they must opera
... of naval forces, that is, antisubmarine craft. The

... antisubmarine craft with guns they must use torpedoes
... to a considerable extent their limited supply would great
... away from base and the number of merchantmen t

... to avoid contact with antisubmarine craft. This
... the submarine can see the surface craft at many times th
... a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in

... greatly fears the antisubmarine craft because of
... charges. Our tactics should therefore be such as to forc
... danger in order to get within range of merchantmen.

7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be purely an offensive because if we concentrate our shipping into convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the enemy in order to carry out his mission to expose his naval forces, which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are in danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting single ships, which can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek and offensively engage submarines whose object is to avoid such encounters.

With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed. Although the enemy can easily know when our convoys sail, he can never know the course they take or the route of approach to their destinations. Our escorting forces will be able to work on a deliberate, prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and strength while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a word, the handicap we now labor under will be shifted to the enemy; we will have the essential principle of concentration while the enemy will lose it.

8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under the present system owing to lack of adequate number of antisubmarine craft, they nevertheless will be critical as they are at present.

9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a whole, there is no necessity for any high-sea protection on our own coast. The submarine of war vessel possesses no unusual characteristics different than those of surface craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as it is for surface craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far as surface craft are concerned there can be no fear of the enemy establishing submarine bases in the West Indies.

10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be led or forced into directing part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, or to any other area from the critical area surrounding the coast of France and the United Kingdom, the antisubmarine campaign would at once be won. The enemy labors under great difficulties in carrying out his campaign even in this restricted area, owing to material limitations and the distances they must operate from their bases in extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United States coast line and the distances between its principal commercial ports, preclude the possibility of a submarine effort in that part of the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital action.

11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties of obtaining a cooperation and coordination between Allied Governments.

As reported by cable dispatch, the British Government has definitely reached a decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and Scandinavian countries are already ready in operation. Convoys from New York will be put in operation as soon as they are available. The British Navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and we therefore urgently recommend that we cooperate at least to the extent of handling convoys from New York.

12. The dangers to convoys from high-sea raiders is remote, but, of course, provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, for antisubmarine craft in the submarine zone.

13. As stated in my dispatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a solution to the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of forcing the submarine to proceed instead of guns and bombs. The facts that men-of-war can not proceed at sea without escort, and that in the Queenstown area of approach alone in the last six weeks there have been 30 armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen a submarine at all before the attack, seems to be conclusive evidence. A great deal of other evidence and war experience could be collected in support of the above.

14. The week ending June 19 has been one of great submarine activity. It indicates that 15 to 19 of the largest and latest submarines have been operating, of which 10 to 13 were operating in the critical area to the west and southwest of the British Isles. The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type submarines and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are working

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the week was the
Three merchant ship convoys are enroute from
consisting of 18 ships, having sailed on the 19th of Ju
mines have been swept up during the week.
encounters with enemy submarines in waters su
been reported during the week three by destr
ships one by French gunboat, three by su
one by sea plane and one by merchant ves
of report of operations by antisubmarinecraft

Wm. S

a sample of similar letters that were sent in.
throughout the rest of the war, co
a full statement of the military situati
the campaign against submarines; these bu
the points already emphasized. I, therefo
from only one or two more letters, deali
the situation.
July 7 emphasized the fact that the war wa

1917
cable dispatches concerning the general military
that at the present moment we are losing the war
the enemy submarine campaign, the demands which
forces in the protection of essential lines of comm
number of forces of all descriptions both to
at the same time to insure readiness for any other uni
to fulfill our obligation to the allied cause, we sho
to placing in the critical areas, the maximum n
to be assembled

July 1 attended a conference of the heads
in Paris, at the time of the meeting of the S
the Allies, attended by the premiers of the
and heads of their respective armies. My
brings out some significant features of the
which was then not being given by the
cause as a whole.

July 30

Paris
conferences at Paris, July 24 to 27.
French and British Admiralties, I attended certa
Paris between July 24 and 27.
in general discussion and exchange of inf
of the allied antisubmarine campaign.
conferences, the French minister of marine, th
other leading officials of the French Admiralty,
the British Admiralty, an Italian admiral v
in chief of staff and the chief of the Italian na
the Japanese naval attaché, Paris
the naval conference was a revision of the ag
held at Corfu. At that conference it wa
assigned certain zones in the Mediterranean, t
in each zone
campaign has shown the necessity for a mor
and hence the proposal at this conference was mad
that all antisubmarine operations should be put t
the British vice admiral commanding at Malta. The
interfere with the various allied commands, partic

heavy forces. The proposal submitted was merely that one officer should charge of the antisubmarine operations and that all other allied flag of the Mediterranean should cooperate with him and furnish him all assistance. The area under discussion did not include Gibraltar, which is under a British command who commands the waters in that neighborhood.

This suggestion of the French minister of marine received unanimous approval.

As both France and England felt that the forces of Italy available for antisubmarine work were not being employed to the best advantage, this point was taken up for discussion. That is, particularly as to whether Italy could not employ her forces to antisubmarine work.

It was recognized that all submarines operating in the Mediterranean were based at Pola or Cattaro at the head of the Adriatic, and that hence every effort should be made forth toward preventing their egress from, and ingress into, that sea. The fact that over 100 drifters operating at the mouth of the Adriatic attempting to establish what might be called a mobile barrage. That is, they constantly sweep the Otranto Straits using their nets for the purpose of intercepting submarines. The work of these drifters is of concern to the enemy has been proven by the work made upon them by Austrian cruiser forces. The primary demand is for more destroyers and similar craft to protect the drifter service.

All French destroyers in the Mediterranean which can possibly be spared from their vital escort duty are entirely available for duty with the Otranto barrage.

The demand for British destroyers in the North Sea and on the approaches to France and the United Kingdom was so great that it is impossible to allocate any British destroyers to Adriatic duty in spite of the fact that British lines of communication in the Mediterranean are constantly menaced by enemy submarines operating from the Adriatic.

Out of 100 British destroyers, which is the maximum number which is considered as available for the British Grand Fleet in case of a general action, 85 are on constant patrol duty in the North Sea, an average of 15 are at all times under way leaving but 30 in what might be called a constant state of readiness with the Grand Fleet, though some of these on patrol duty could join the fleet before an action takes place, though not with full supply of fuel oil.

Against this number the German High Sea Fleet probably has not less than 100 destroyers available for a high sea action. It has been necessary in the last few months to withdraw destroyers from the Grand Fleet to protect new mine barrages near Ostend and Zeebrugge for the purpose of protecting the monitors and other forces which are assisting in the general combined military and naval attack upon the above mentioned German bases.

A general discussion occurred as to a permanent material barrage to be established across the Straits of Otranto but it was unanimously agreed that such a barrage would be wholly ineffective if it could not be adequately protected by surface craft.

The Italian admiral stated definitely that he could not allocate any destroyers to this service on account of the danger of a high sea action between the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets. For this reason he dared not risk a single destroyer, and he must keep them in the highest state of readiness at all times for fleet action. He said he realized fully the pressing need for antisubmarine operations, but he was forced to view the other considerations as paramount.

In the general discussion it developed, and in fact the Italian admiral stated that he was prompted in his naval policy primarily by the political pressure which is constantly brought to bear upon him in his own country. The fact was pointed out upon him that destroyers on duty in protecting the barrage would be immobilized for duty in case of an action with the Austrian fleet, and that the simple reason that they would be at all times between the enemy and their own fleet. It was also pointed out that the Italian admiral in his discussion had not taken into consideration the French destroyers who were always available for any fleet action.

As stated above, however, it was apparent that the principal consideration in the Italian admiral's statement was the political pressure under which he had to operate.

The effect of raids on the eastern Italian coast, and the effect on public opinion in case even a single vessel should be lost, were considerations, which, in the view of the conditions existing in his country were paramount.

It was finally agreed, however, that the British admiral from Malta, who was present at this conference—would, after consultation with the French admiral in the Mediterranean and other allied flag officers afloat in that area, proceed to attempt to reach an agreement as to the employment of such forces as were

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

admiral suggested the desirability of an offensive against the enemy at Catarrro. He agreed that the waters in that region were the relative strength of heavy forces available with the effort to warrant sacrifices in a purely naval attack. He stated that he thought the attack would be primarily in the nature of a surprise, depends entirely upon the number of available forces available.

He also intended to make attacks on Catarrro from the air, the number of craft available will never result in effective results. It seems to be one of considering her own forces as well as the other allied forces available, particularly the fact, for the Italian fleet is, in effect, an allied scouting force for the Italian fleet. A material barrage across the Straits of Otranto depends upon the availability and transport of material. Even if the material is available it would take at least 40 weeks to transport it to the Straits.

He also showed an inclination to view destroyers as a type of warship that is being hounded. They could not be considered as warships if they were kept constantly under overhaul and repair. He stated that while this was to a certain extent a view held by the admirals of the war had shown the view to be unsound. The destroyers being performed by American destroyers (which were used in the cruise across the Atlantic) and stated that in spite of the fact that they were at sea, I nevertheless considered them available for the work which they were primarily created; that is, offensive operations.

He also may state that having the expression of professional opinion, I took no part in the discussion of the political or military operations of the various antisubmarine forces.

He also stated that he did not obtain any promises at all from the Italian admiral concerning the holding of them in reserve in case of a high sea attack. As stated above, that the primary consideration was of a political nature.

He also stated that it was brought out in the conference that the Italian fleet was at Brindisi for extended periods during the month of May. The only definite decision reached by the conference was that the Italian fleet would take over the direction of the antisubmarine operations in the Mediterranean, subject to general approval of, and coordination with the other allied forces in those waters.

He also stated that the relative allied situation as regards destroyer forces is approximately as follows: 34 Italian, 10 French, 10 British. With this situation, in case of unexpected high sea attacks, the British could probably not count upon more than 50 destroyers. England has already sent to Italy two new destroyers and a large quantity of aviation material.

He also stated that the first point considered was the problem presented by the large type submarines of the nature of the *Deutschland* type, and a large number of torpedoes, perhaps 30. It was also stated that four are under construction and that four will be completed. As reported to the department, one vessel, as reported, was in the general vicinity of the Azores for some time, and was being used as a floating base. It is also stated that a move on the part of the enemy (which could be a move on the part of the enemy) is the convey system of escorting each convoy by the use of the above type of submarine from using their guns, at least to do with torpedoes only.

He also stated that the allied powers are wholly insufficient to attack the enemy's work than that now, or soon to be, in operation. The fact that is being carried on now greatly restricts all contact with the enemy. That is, against submarines themselves at, or near, the point of immediate protection of trade.

He also stated that, as regards the type of submarine, we only need consider their operations which are now commonly termed the submarine zone, and that the destroyer escorts will prove effective, providing the escorts are in full operation.

The relatively small numbers of the new type and the large areas over which they must operate outside of the submarine zone, will greatly restrict the number of submarines they will present.

If shipping is concentrated in convoys, the routes of which, the submarines can determine only by scouting, it is believed that success on their part will be limited to isolated instances, and, in the presence of a cruiser (which will prevent the submarine's guns) it is not believed that the losses they can inflict will be great. For example, a submarine of this nature might be able to approach a convoy at daylight and fire two or three torpedoes, but the cruiser which would be expected to proceed in that direction on a widely zigzagging course, would prevent further attacks in the same arc of approach. At night fall, if the cruiser has the submarine under in the direction of its approach and if the convoy makes a change of course for some hours, it is doubted whether a second torpedo attack can be carried out the same day or night.

England has sent a mystery ship and two submarines to the Azores, and it is believed that the United States will also send two submarines and a mystery ship to that locality at least for the time being.

The advisability of the United States sending one of her older battleships or perhaps one or two small auxiliary craft to the Azores to prevent the use of the islands as a base during the coming winter should be considered. The situation in more vital areas however should be given full weight.

It is believed that no destroyers should be kept in the Azores as their operations are much more seriously needed closer to the European coast from whence they can be sent out for important escort duty.

England has at present four convoys every eight days across the Atlantic and to cover all trade it will require at least eight convoys each eight days, but this tension can not be realized for some time. There is no prospect in sight of increasing the number of convoy outgoing ships.

It was stated that the Gulf of Helgoland is sufficiently mined to leave the entrance open but two safe channels of access—that is, close to the shores principally in shallow waters. An attempt is being made to stop the ingress and egress of enemy submarines in these two channels with England submarines, but the numbers available are inadequate.

The question of mining territorial waters is a very serious one involving the interests of all Allies, and is of such a nature that a decision must necessarily be based upon political and military as well as upon naval considerations. This subject has been under consideration for some time, but I am not able to report anything definite as to its present status.

Considerable discussion occurred as to whether any nation had developed means other than the use of surface craft for protecting mine fields from enemy operations. Nothing of an effective nature has been developed to date.

The question of mine fields which would be dangerous to submarines but merged but safe for surface craft was discussed. No entirely satisfactory design has been developed to date. England is attempting to modify some of her mines so that they will be dangerous below a depth of 45 feet from the surface, but they will arm themselves in case they drag or in any other way rise above 45 feet in water.

Both England and France are attempting to develop a design of mine of this type. The French stated that they were manufacturing some small floating mines which could be carried by merchant ships when being pursued by a submarine. They were designed to float for one hour and then sink.

The British have considered various designs of such mines, but none of a type which would be developed.

The use of kite balloons were discussed. The British have had some success in using these balloons with a small group of destroyers on the outgoing route to protect submarines. The use of kite balloons for merchant convoys was considered, as they might attract submarines which otherwise would not sight them. If kite balloons can be provided and handled by merchant convoys, their use is worth serious consideration. It is probable that they will be tried.

The naval conference was requested to meet on one day with the military for a general discussion of the shipping situation, particularly as it affects the situation in the field.

I might say there that from time to time the prime ministers of the various countries got together for a discussion of the situation and they always asked the military and naval people to get their views on the subject also. Upon this occasion it was evident that there was not a close cooperation between the military and naval people, so that G

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

raised naval council to meet with the all the discussion, and that is referred to in this letter.

The conference was led by the French military chief of staff. The French are very much concerned as to the new situation from the United States. Their urgent need. Their need of definite assurances, particularly as to the size and their time of availability, is extremely deep. It is nothing else.

State here that I am not butting in at all in the same down later to a question of shipping, cooperate with the Allies. [Continuing reading:

There seems to be definite knowledge of military support, as to whether there is full realization of the demand for communication in maintaining over-seas. There is no doubt but that the United States is planning that there seems to be considerable concern as to the extent of the supply system which armies of the United States that it is not only necessary for them to have definite plans in order that their military plans may be going forward to meet the demands which our troops may have. It is over and above the supplies which will be sent from the United States.

State there that there are but few people, I understand of what it means to supply a large army. It requires 50,000 tons of sea-borne shipping.

There is fear that the shipping which will be taken for the United States will seriously affect, either directly or indirectly, the ability to maintain the allied forces. For example Both British and French ships from the nearest ports and there is probably some from the United States which has been brought by the United States and other countries. There therefore is a possibility of our withdrawing a considerable amount of shipping for troops and troop supply uses which will be a serious loss to British and French shipping.

In my telegram of yesterday, the British appeared before the combined conference at London concerning the shipping situation from the United States to be noted particularly that in all of his remarks he has not taken into account generally the situation of the United States will probably render. This is definite information as to America's plans. America was on foot to withdraw about 80 ships from the western front to increase the shipping construction in England, and that he stated that by November, 1918, England's capacity to commence to yield about 3,000,000 tons of material that time the present entirely essential together with the present support which she is probably be met. He stated clearly, he did not exceed at all the support she is now getting. His estimates would also involve considerable loss to the United Kingdom than were now being received. The United Kingdom were dependent upon the supply of the United States material. In other words, it is hoped that by October, 1918 the continually

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... suffice for imperative needs, that is, shipping does not increase above it 100,000 tons per month. At present 100 tons of British shipping is all that is necessary, and also large amounts for the European allies.

... however that the situation can only be counted upon to 1918, and that there are many important considerations for the Allies to tide over the present crisis.

... statement that closer coordination of effort should be maintained between the United States and the Allies. All military and naval action is dependent upon America's action. Although America's action is nevertheless absolutely necessary that such coordination is essential upon the allied shipping situation considered in the general campaign against the enemy, both military and naval campaign, "is really dependent upon the efficient prosecution of the war requires a close coordination between the United States and the European Allies than now exists. The various Councils, both military and in other fields, should be kept supplied with more definite information. All experience clearly shows that this is essential. It can be done efficiently only by the United States to Europe for consultation. The various branches of war activity should be coordinated as we send abroad should be formed into one organization. It is essential that such an organization after their return should return to the United States to visit in order that their information may be made entirely upon cabled communication. It is essential that the combined naval and military conference in the United States would be fully represented at the approaching council to be held in

... by the way. [Continuing reading:]

... said that the conferences in Paris both naval and military were of all of the dispatches which I have sent to the United States. I was present at all of these conferences and I am sure that no modification in any way of record was made.

... might to say that there were no plans made in a military sense or in a shipping sense. On August 20, I pointed out that, while it may be won on the sea, it might very easily be lost up to this time, was being lost:

August 2

... available destroyers are even now very difficult to be given to troop ships and troop ships. The demand for destroyer escort for such shipping is the safety of mercantile shipping which is essential. It is thereby involved which may easily do more harm at home.

... depends upon maintaining the lines of communication. It is of great importance, therefore, that the shipping which is essential to increase with the transport and supply of United States is considered in connection with other essential

... way on the sea, though it may very easily be lost there. It is of great importance, therefore, that the shipping which is essential to increase with the transport and supply of United States is considered in connection with other essential

either at its base or en route to or from its base. Second, the coordination of allied shipping and shipping construction to meet the submarine's mission, granting that it can not be confined to the high sea.

In an campaign based on the first course, it is vital that every effort be made to insure the success of the latter course mentioned.

A sufficient number of antisubmarine vessels were available, possible even a partial convoying of shipping, the tonnage began immediately to decrease in the month commented on this in my letter of the 15th of Sep-

November 11, 1917. General:

In the anti-submarine campaign, generally speaking, the losses since the beginning of the year, on the contrary, appear to be on the decrease. This, however, does not mean that the number of submarines operating has, if anything, decreased. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the reason for this. The most reasonable opinion as to decrease in submarine losses is the greatest degree of unanimity is as follows:

1. Extension of the convoys system, together with increasing experience in fast shipping and escorting craft.

2. Increased antisubmarine craft and constant increase of experience thereof, and more extensive use of the depth charge.

3. Increased submarine morale from the above, and particularly from the use of depth charges. It is wholly impossible to estimate the number of submarines lost by depth charges, but the fact that depth charges are used whenever a submarine is encountered unquestionably has a marked effect.

The enemy must be experiencing in maintaining an adequate supply of submarines.

Throughout the remaining months of 1917, and, in fact, up to the time of the armistice, to point out that the number of submarines available was still insufficient to meet the requirements of the campaign. Thus, for example, in the concluding paragraph of my report of December 31, 1917, I said:

January 1, 1918. General:

At the beginning of the campaign, it must be recognized that the situation is very critical. The force commander feels that his dispatches, including the one sent four days after his arrival in Europe, were influenced by subsequent events. Of course, with the losses being sustained when the force commander arrived, the situation looked even more critical. If the enemy could have maintained the losses inflicted during that month, the consequences would have been disastrous.

The situation has been made public, and has also been disseminated by the enemy, to show the enemy submarine effort on American troop movements. It is to be noted that the enemy have not succeeded in increasing the number of their submarines actually operating at sea. It is probable that they will materially increase them, owing to many conditions outstanding in the construction. There can be no question but that the Allies are on our side, and ultimate victory is therefore merely a question of time. Troops can be made available and transported. If the enemy makes an effort to troop movements, he can only do it at the cost of his supply lines of communication.

It may safely be said that the enemy's best chance of making a successful attack, the deciding feature, is to concentrate it on these supply lines. To keep our troop movements well clear of the supply lines, the enemy must divide his effort in case he wishes to concentrate on troop

to take up the convoy, and so forth, I will explain it, and I think you will find it very interesting to see just how little the danger was that troop convoys were in

The need for additional vessels was again pointed out in report of January 8, 1918:

Letter 6044, January 8, 1918. Need for additional vessels—

The need for additional destroyers and antisubmarine craft is just as as described in all the Force Commander's dispatches beginning from his arrival in Europe.

The force commander believes still that the demands of the comm against the enemy warrants sending all antisubmarine craft which can coast either under their own power or in tow.

It has been the policy for some time to send to the French coast every ship. The last 10 destroyers that were added to the forces have been sent to Brest. The number is wholly inadequate. The U. S. S. *May* has been sent from Brest, and all yachts now en route will be diverted to the French coast. Unless these yachts will add little to the efficiency of the coast, because they come up with the convoys and hence must be restricted to special uses. The *Alvin* is now en route and on her arrival another destroyer will be added to the force on Brest. It is evident that the most important part of our work in Europe is on the French coast, and steps are under way to provide adequate oil and repair facilities on that coast. Additional destroyers are badly needed to provide proper protection to our transports and storeships. Every new destroyer arriving from the United States will be sent to Queenstown, and a reliable ship sent immediately from Queenstown to Brest. This plan has many advantages, the principal of which are:

1. The destroyers sent to the French coast will be the most reliable ones, and require the fewest repairs.

2. New destroyers can better learn methods in Queenstown than at Brest. Defects developing in new destroyers can be better handled at Queenstown than at Brest. What is urgently needed is six or eight destroyers for the French coast.

I might say incidentally, there, that Brest was strategically a poor place to base destroyers, but unfortunately it had but a tiny navy yard and a capacity of only 7,000 tons of oil. We increased it to 28,000 tons, and we had plans on hand to make it 50,000 tons. That is the reason that they were not sent there earlier.

On the same day I had cabled to the department, in my letter of January 8, 1918:

Need for destroyers in all areas is as critical as in past. Can additional be furnished, and if so, request prospective dates of arrival.

That is, even in the middle of January, nine months after we entered the war, I had still received no definite information from the department as to the probable increases in the forces abroad, or as to the program upon which the department was working in such forces abroad.

As a matter of fact, however, because the contracts for the destroyer program were not made until about six months after we entered the war, the new vessels were not available in any quantity until the submarine campaign was practically over. The promises of the department to supply additional forces at various times were not kept, and I often found myself seriously embarrassed in dealing with the Allies because, acting upon the information furnished by the department, arrangements had been made for the disposition of these new forces, which involved rearranging the Allied forces, and these could not be made because of the delay in the new forces to arrive. This I pointed out to the department in my letter of the 23d of April, 1918. The official statistics mentioned in the letter I am about to read were brought over and furnished to my staff, as well as to Allied Admiralties, by the Chief of Operations himself, at the time of his visit in November, 1918. In numerous cases it was the Chief of Operations himself, or me, who made promises, or at least afforded the Allied Ad-

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

stand them as promises, but which un-

Arrival of new forces.

European waters has been very disappointing. have been added to the force up to May. The difficulties which have been at home are realized, but it is hoped that what has been thought possible can be put into effect.

Official figures obtained from the completion of the repair as far back as November, 1917, the French prospective additions to forces in Europe (aircraft, aviation material, and Ford and other motor cars) to take up for discussion and begin preparation and overhaul of the additional vessels and personnel, etc. Although it is realized that the situation still it has been very embarrassing that various conditions.

in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but the commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing changes in operation under way and as suggested by our Planning Section, as the number of our own forces engaged had reac-

were made to the Navy Department in September 19, 1918:

Need for and enquiries for destroyers.

to European forces of new destroyers is an increased number of destroyers on the surface from study of the reports from the command of the submarine situation, and particularly. It will also be of the utmost importance that to a point of practical use by destroyers, to take advantage thereof. This requires and experimenting which can only be obtained. Unfortunately, it is impossible, except at very great cost for this purpose. The importance of the anti-submarine campaign, the moment it can be estimated. The force commander is keenly interested in the first in the field with such a radical campaign.

there that what we wanted to do, as you were using devices on this side to be used in the large, we wanted to put those into operation. I subsequently informed that I bore the sole responsibility for troop transports over and getting them out of the danger zone safely; and also that I bore the responsibility for merchant ships through the danger zone, and for destroyers from the transport of troops. That shows you why it was so necessary to have them there. [Reading]

Disposition of forces.

Increasing the escort force, based on Brest as reported. As the harbor facilities on the French coast increased movement of the ships on the Army's line, for even greater increase of escort force will be required and to reduce submarine activity in the waters on this side to come clear inshore as is recommended that the maximum number of escort ships be maintained.

An increase in the number of tugs and barges is required by cable.

The need for additional vessels was again pointed out in a report of January 8, 1918:

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It has been the policy for some time to send to the French coast every ship. The last 10 destroyers that were added to the forces have been sent to Brest. The number is wholly inadequate. The U. S. S. *May* has been sent from Gibraltar, and all yachts now en route will be diverted to the French coast. Unfortunately these yachts will add little to the efficiency of the coast, because they can operate up with the convoys and hence must be restricted to special uses. The *Alwin* is now en route and on her arrival another destroyer will be added to the force on Brest. It is evident that the most important part of our work in Europe is on the French coast, and steps are under way to provide adequate oil supply and repair facilities on that coast. Additional destroyers are badly needed to provide proper protection to our transports and storeships. Every new ship arriving from the United States will be sent to Queenstown, and a reliable ship sent immediately from Queenstown to Brest. This plan has many advantages, the principal of which are:

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On the same day I had cabled to the department, in my No. 1000:

Need for destroyers in all areas is as critical as in past. Can additional be furnished, and if so, request prospective dates of arrival.

That is, even in the middle of January, nine months after we entered the war, I had still received no definite information from the department as to the probable increases in the forces abroad, or to the program upon which the department was working in respect to such forces abroad.

As a matter of fact, however, because the contracts for the destroyer program were not made until about six months after we had entered the war, the new vessels were not available in any number until the submarine campaign was practically over. The repeated promises of the department to supply additional forces at different times were not kept, and I often found myself seriously embarrassed in dealing with the Allies because, acting upon the information furnished by the department, arrangements had been made for the disposition of these new forces, which involved rearranging the Allied forces, and these could not be made because of the failure of the new forces to arrive. This I pointed out to the department in my letter of the 23d of April, 1918. The official statistics mentioned in the letter I am about to read were brought over and furnished to my staff, as well as to Allied Admiralties, by the Chief of Operations himself, at the time of his visit in November, 1917. In numerous cases it was the Chief of Operations himself, and not me, who made promises, or at least afforded the Allied Admiralties

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

considered them as promises, but which unfortunately failed.

20 April 1918. Arrival of new forces.

The force in European waters has been very disappointing. Forces have been added to the force up to May 1, 1918, but the results have been disappointing. The difficulties which have been experienced at home are realized, but it is hoped that the difficulties heretofore been thought possible can be put forward as a new destroyer.

21 April 1918. Official figures obtained from the completion lists of the fleet. Repair, as far back as November, 1917, the French and British forces of prospective additions to forces in European waters. The difficulties which have been experienced at home are realized, but it is hoped that the difficulties heretofore been thought possible can be put forward as a new destroyer.

22 April 1918. The force in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but merely a statement of the force commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing and in advancing changes in operation under way and proposed operations, as suggested by our Planning Section, and from the number of our own forces engaged had reached 1

23 April 1918. Reports were made to the Navy Department in the month of September 19, 1918:

24 April 1918. Need for and enquiries for destroyers.

25 April 1918. The force in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but merely a statement of the force commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing and in advancing changes in operation under way and proposed operations, as suggested by our Planning Section, and from the number of our own forces engaged had reached 1

26 April 1918. The force in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but merely a statement of the force commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing and in advancing changes in operation under way and proposed operations, as suggested by our Planning Section, and from the number of our own forces engaged had reached 1

27 April 1918. Disposition of forces.

28 April 1918. The force in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but merely a statement of the force commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing and in advancing changes in operation under way and proposed operations, as suggested by our Planning Section, and from the number of our own forces engaged had reached 1

29 April 1918. The force in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but merely a statement of the force commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing and in advancing changes in operation under way and proposed operations, as suggested by our Planning Section, and from the number of our own forces engaged had reached 1

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

In repeated cables to the department, in the spring and summer of 1918, it was continually pointed out that all arrangements for the protection of American troop convoys on the coast of France were absolutely dependent upon an increase in the number of destroyers available for this escort duty. This was made necessary by the increased number of troop convoys which had to be escorted, and the increased number of troop movements from the United States was increased from an average of about 25,000 a month, for the month of March, 1918, to an average of nearly 300,000 a month, for the month of April on. Thus, in a cable to the Navy Department of March 18 (my 5976), I pointed out that "the increased demand for destroyers, due to the increased number of troop transports, requires it is necessary to coordinate sailings, but priority is given to transports and troops. Every possible effort should be made to expedite the procurement of additional destroyers."

When the submarines began operating on the Atlantic coast, the number of destroyers, which had been designated for service in the Atlantic, were held on the coast for escort duty from Atlantic ports, and the progress of arrivals in Europe was therefore further delayed. I am at this point introducing testimony so far into 1918 to show the game merely to clearly bring out the accumulated effect of having thrown our utmost into the war at the very beginning. The inevitable consequence of a sort of hand-to-mouth policy, of meeting the situations piecemeal as they arose, was that it afforded the enemy to take advantage of such opportunities to produce such diversions as those on our own coast.

I would also like to add here a point which will be covered more fully later on, namely, that it would be impressive, indeed, if before the committee in any comprehensive, and at the same time, condensed form, the nature of the requests that poured in from my various subordinate commanders for additional destroyers. Admiral Wilson at Brest, Admiral Niblack at Gibraltar, and such an outlying force as that of the Azores, never failed in any point out the crying necessity for increase of their forces. Although each of them did his best with the forces he had, still I have no doubt that, at the same time, each of them felt that if no more destroyers could be sent from home, other areas should be reduced to meet the demands. The situation was such that, as a general rule, about all that I could do was to pass on the appeals of these various commanders to the department, and back them up with urgent recommendations of my own, having already made a distribution of the available forces to meet the situation as a whole, as fully as circumstances permitted.

Incidentally I might say that I once asked Admiral Jellicoe what his trouble he had in that respect, and he told me that his difficulties were entirely similar, and that he had recently compiled the requirements from their various stations where destroyers were based, and that there was a loud outcry from each one of them for more destroyers. I had that he made a compilation of that and sent it to each of the stations so that they could see what his difficulties were.

To sum up, that is to say, to sum up this particular section, that I have fully substantiated those portions of my letter of November 1917 (1) the seriousness of the war situation at the time; (2) the manifest and crying necessity for our cooperation.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

and completeness with which it was presented and the department's hesitating methods in meeting the situation thus so clearly presented. I have demonstrated a point which will be brought to the testimony, still to be introduced, as to the nature and the fact that I put forth every effort with the personnel and means available to deal with the situation was so serious, and the consequences so terrible, that I went beyond the channels which the government had established and enlisted the services of such men as Amos

and this country can yet realize the great part which he played in the war, but I hope that I have to-day indicated to you some of his varied and important activities, showing that on every occasion arose, he was willing to join with the government in its work, provided it would help allay the

anxiety of a proper realization of the extreme crisis which the country as a whole in the spring of 1917 is so vital to all of us. The committee of the issues that I have raised this morning should hear, from other independent sources, evidence on this point.

From this standpoint the greater part of the criticisms of the department's conduct of the war are based upon its failure to take decisive action in the first few months, and I am sure that the only way to their failure to realize the seriousness of the situation is to accept the testimony of their own accredited

and I am sure that men who could speak with intimate knowledge of the situation in Europe in 1917 there is one at present in Washington. I arrived in London, one of my first realizations of the situation of the Allies in a short time. He pointed out to me the fact which I am emphasizing, that is that the situation was such that it would soon be impossible for the Allies to continue their military supplies and the food to keep the war effort could become effective. The one man who has been familiar with the world's food and supply situation for the last five years, and who administered the food and supply situation during the war, is obviously in a position to state what the situation was in this respect in April, 1917. I would like the committee to call Mr. Hoover at this time so that there may be no doubt in my mind that the part of my letter in which I describe the grave situation we faced in 1917, and pointed out how necessary it was for action by the department at that time. I am indeed, barely escaped a peace without victory. I am sure that Mr. Hoover this morning that he will be in the room today and will be willing to appear before the committee as desired. It is immaterial to me as to whether or not he does, but I would suggest that as he is an extreme

opponent. Without objection, we will ask Mr. Hoover to appear before the committee on Saturday, and you will suspend the hearing while we hear from him.

Admiral Sims. Yes, sir.

Now, I should like to take up the question of the lack of arguments, and to state specific instances.

It has thus far been established:

1. That the Allies were losing the war at the time the United States entered as a result of mercantile tonnage losses, as this amounted to cutting the allied lines of communications.

2. That the department was fully informed of the fact that a vital issue to be faced was this submarine campaign.

3. That whatever plans the department or the Government may have had in mind in future operations, it was pointed out at the time, and subsequent events established the fact, that the execution of any other plans depended absolutely upon first, the submarine menace.

4. That at the present time there is no issue whatever as to the correctness or soundness of my recommendations during this period. There is no truth whatever in the assertion that I was claiming that I was right and everyone else was wrong. This is amply demonstrated by the extent to which my recommendations, particularly in the matters of dispatch and employment of submarine forces, were ultimately adopted by the department. It shall show later on, certain recommendations made by me were adopted, but, with one or two possible exceptions, every plan and employment of our forces in the war zone which was finally adopted was in accord with my recommendations.

5. That the primary fault of the department was the initial delay in putting into effect measures which they later adopted, and this delay resulted in the prolongation of the war and in the unnecessary expenditure of at least half a million lives and \$15,000,000,000.

Thus far I have dealt more particularly with my requests for the sending and employment of antisubmarine forces. I now desire to consider in a general way the action taken upon various recommendations, some covering the dispatch of antisubmarine forces, but principally relating to other subjects, in order to show that these recommendations were either disregarded altogether, were adopted with a delay of some months, or were accepted only when recommended by Admiral Mayo and Admiral Benson during their visits abroad in August and November of 1917, respectively.

I will also introduce testimony to show that, as a result of a wrong estimate of the situation upon which the Navy Department acted, and, incidentally, as a result of its failure to adopt the recommendations made by its representatives abroad, after a full and intimate study of the situation, the department concentrated its efforts upon plans which were either of minor importance or impossible of fulfillment in view of the time element, or were completely and entirely impracticable.

I want to bring this point out to show the great evil and the danger of trying to manage the military operations of war by remote control from a distance of 3,000 miles.

To take up, for a moment, the question of the department's regard of specific recommendations, it is only necessary to refer to the cases which I instanced in my letter of January 7. As I pointed out in paragraph 31 of that letter, I suggested in my second cable and in my first letter, which I have read to you, that Am

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

It would be very useful, if based on Brest, in meeting German battleships or battle cruisers in the Channel, such raids by the mere moral effect of their presence, be known to the enemy. Thus, in 1912

Battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area except perhaps might be based on Brest for moral effect against German ships in the channel, out of reach of British main fleet.

On 14 April, I said:

Our submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in fact at any time when the enemy decides that the necessity arises. Hence the suggestion that two divisions of our fleet be based upon Brest primarily for the resulting moral effect.

It was pointed out by an important admiralty official that while he did not think it was probable that heavy enemy forces (from North of Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless the suggestion was thwarted on moral grounds; that is, the uncertainty which would be encountered. He agreed with me, however, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to the Channel approaches by the French and British would remove the possibility of such raids.

It was never received from the department to the Admiralty, although as I had specifically stated it had been requested by the Allies. As will be seen, this is but one of a series of obstacles which were caused by the action of the department in carrying out my mission assigned by the Admiralty. It was not until the action of the department in carrying out their plans, if they had any, or at least in carrying out the various recommendations which were made.

In dealing with the question of the use of the fleet, I will also take up the case of those battleships which got into the war zone, and which attracted attention by the excellent work they performed. I might here that while some people think, unfortunately, never had a real opportunity to come to grips with the extent of the cooperation of those five battleships. Admiral Rodman was one of the best pieces of equipment ever seen. It was a question of cooperation of adopting the system which was being used by the fleet. Perhaps it is difficult for a civilian to understand the value of four battleships to a fleet that is already a fleet weaker than it actually was before they arrived. They did not cooperate together, and new arrivals

It is that they have got to learn the method of cooperation, and actually, after that fleet arrived, we sent our books and our flags, down in the hold, we sent them to sea with the fleet, and in a little while they went to sea with the fleet, and in a little while they went to sea with the fleet, and in a little while they went to sea with the fleet. It was one of the finest cooperation with them. It has been reported to me in fact I remember I visited the fleet on one occasion Admiral

said, at his mess table, "In all the time that I have been here I have received a single order from you as to how I was to handle the fleet. That is giving the initiative to the other man. Of course that is the reason I did not give him any orders was that he would not obey them if I had; but that was just a mild joke.

While I had not specifically recommended the sending of our battleships as a reinforcement to the Grand Fleet on July 21, I had repeatedly recommended in letters to the department in accordance with the policy of regarding the whole of our forces as a reinforcement to the combined allied naval force. A battle fleet should be kept prepared for distant service at a moment's notice in order that, to quote from my letter of May 11, "if the opportunity should occur will not be in any way delayed."

In my letter of June 15, I again recommended the maintenance of our fleet in readiness for action in the following paragraph:

Except in one of my first cablegrams, I have not mentioned the above recommendations in dispatches or reports, because, as stated above, they have not been officially approved; and as the submarine campaign is at present the vital issue, and I am not aware of the department's policy or plans regarding any forces now under my command, I have not thought proper to discuss such subjects under my own responsibility. The fact can not be overlooked, however, that some of our forces call for the concentration of our maximum forces as close as practicable to the probable theater of war, provided they can be supplied there without requiring the services of tonnage now vitally necessary.

Again in my letter of July 7, I said:

Letter to department No. 18, July 7, 1917.

11. I would also urge that all coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in a state of readiness for dispatch to European waters, purely as a measure of readiness. There are no definite plans in view involving such forces, but the uncertainties of the present situation are tremendous, and hence my recommendation.

The oil situation in Europe is now so critical that it would be impossible to keep coal-burning battleships, even if sufficient oil carriers should be available to supply the necessary oil, it would be impossible to insure adequate and safe destruction through the submarine zones.

It was at about this time that the question of reinforcing the Grand Fleet, with a division of our coal-burning battleships, was taken up with me by Admiral Jellicoe. At his request, I went with him to the Grand Fleet on July 19 for a conference with Admiral Beatty. As a result of this conference I sent the following cablegram to the Navy Department:

Cablegram sent July 21, 1917:

To Secretary of the Navy (operations). Serial No. 120.

No. 120. Visited Grand Fleet on July 19 with Admiral Jellicoe for consultation as commander in chief. The result is that admiralty request that the four coal-burning battleships with six destroyers be sent to join Grand Fleet now in the North Sea. Also that our submarines could be very usefully employed in antisubmarine campaign.

The reasons for this request is that five *King Edward* class must be placed on special mission and their place taken by four dreadnaughts to provide officers and crews and torpedo rating for light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc., to be coming to the fleet. Shortage of officers will be found 100 after advancing reserve officers from mobilization etc. to fleet. Our oil-burning battleships could not be supplied, and more so would unduly increase burden on coal supply and would necessitate a large number of screening vessels not now available.

The conference agreed that moral effect would be very great, also mutual exchange of ideas and methods. The intelligence service thereby created by the two fleets would be superior to any service which exists or could be established. Carefully selected expert staff should be sent. Also recommend temporary representative of our commander in chief on Admiral Beatty's staff.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

was received to this message. After waiting long that an answer to such an important recommendation come. I finally sent a second message, on August 19th.

{Sims, Admiral United States,

August

1917. Need becoming urgent for the four coal-burning destroyers. Shortage of personnel has necessitated putting them out of commission. One goes out next month and five by end of month. Replacements are requested; these vessels must be replaced from Grand Fleet. Request information as to details.

Need a little explanation as to why they would have more than one. This *King Edward* was a battleship. They had to keep a certain number in the neighborhood of the Humber to guard against raids, and if a commission they would have to be replaced from the Grand Fleet. That is why.

The Navy Department cabled me on August 20th in reply to this recommendation. Their dispatch was as follows:

August

21st.
Operations.

The United States believes that the strategic situation requires a force concentrated (that is our battleship force), and the suggestion of sending a part of it across. The logical result is the entire force going over, except in case of extraordinary emergency. You discuss situation with Admiral.

ADMIRAL

On September 1 to Admiral Benson I again sent a message:

Admiral Benson, September 1, 1917.

Personal file.

What is at which I am really anxious, and that is as to the Department in sending to this side the battleship force. The Grand Fleet requires. As you know, I do not want by the disintegration of our fleet. I do not want it to engage in a combined operation, as a unit. For example, in all of the schemes that I have seen against the enemy, the naval forces of the Allies have been divided. The scheme proposed by Winston Churchill is to have two fleets, each composed of certain types of British ships. Another proposal for blocking the enemy fleet in the North Sea is to use certain of the older battleships and cruisers of all the Allies leading to German ports. In my cables and letters why it is that the British Fleet is composed of our dreadnoughts. I can not see that the sending of our dreadnoughts would be any disintegration of our fleet, but merely a concentration between us and the enemy fleet.

What will be the outcome of this war will be determined by the outcome proves to be, we must at the end of the war have history record that the Allies asked and that we declined to send them?

Benson replied on the 24th of September. I extract of his letter with regard to the battleships:

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

the effective of all means of attacking and destroying submarines. I have explained that in the articles referred to at this time that such use of our submarines was necessary, not only in attacking the enemy submarine but also in obtaining reliable information as to the operating conditions of the enemy, through the experience of our own vessels.

It is that it is the best means of destroying submarines. The difficulty that I have spoken of before, that the submarine can see a surface vessel miles away and avoid her, but not a submarine to hunt submarines, the advantage of the submarine is that they are both operating on the surface—or submarine—but as a German submarine has to stay on the surface except when he dives for business, because his batteries are fully charged, it follows that our submarines remain under the surface all the time, showing his periscope in a while for 10 or 15 seconds; and that give us the advantage and our submarines can do that because the enemy submarines on the surface that they are afraid of, and that is that in proportion to the number of submarines operating, the submarines destroyed from this type are many enemy submarines as any other type.

On June 25 I specifically recommended that all submarines should be sent. My message was as follows:

June 1917:

Navy

It is Allied shipping in time—I repeat in time—is present and we can exert must be put into operation at once if they are not. Submarines would be of great use to strengthen British submarine operations ahead of convoys. All submarines we send to Irish coast would be invaluable in insuring success of convoy system, and we should send these submarines are supplied from America and base at home.

We have a submarine on anything but its own merits. It is different.

On July 14 I again emphasized the value of the anti-submarine craft.

July 14 July, 1917:

It is not only that submarines themselves will prove of the greatest value. They constitute the one type of ship that can be used as the submarine can see them, and hence their use as scout ships and as weapons in which the enemy submarine must approach if a successful attack is to be made.

On July 13, referring to the submarine operations, I transmitted to the department a request for the sending of some of our submarines to the Irish coast. I received no reply to any of these requests.

General Mayo arrived in England in August, 1917, the subject of some submarines was taken up with him, and heabled the Navy Department recommending that

marines be sent. Almost immediately, on August 24, the reply was received from the department:

AUGUST

For: Admiral Sims.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

Opnav. 228. It is possible that about middle of October five submarines will arrive England followed about two weeks later by five of the L class accompany. What will be their prospective duties and where based? 17

ADMIRAL

After discussion with the various Allies represented at the conference in London in September, it was agreed that a division of these submarines should be based on the Azores for operation against enemy submarines in that area, and that the second division composed of the L submarines, should base on Berehaven.

At the end of October the K boats arrived at the Azores, nearly six months after I had first called the attention of the department to the value of submarines as antisubmarine craft. The L submarines did not arrive at Berehaven until the end of January, six months after I had specifically recommended in July that they be sent.

I might add here, as a mere matter of information for the committee, that not only do the final records show that in proportion to the numbers engaged, submarines were the most effective antisubmarine craft, but also, as was pointed out in many letters and dispatches which I have not read, they had a very marked strategic and moral effect on the submarine campaign. Before they were used in waters frequented by the enemy, the enemy submarines always had an easy mind as long as no surface ships were in the area. On the contrary, when the allied submarines were put in the game, and every now and then the enemy was attacked by an allied submarine, it is easy to see that his nerves were bound to be upset. This was the principal reason for recommending submarines in the region. We would have made it a point to allow the enemy to feel the effect of their presence at once.

Much the same fate met my recommendations with regard to the sending of tugs as in the cases I have just referred to. Thus in my letter of January 7, paragraphs 33 and 34, I pointed out that from the beginning I had specifically recommended the sending of tugs, and that none were actually sent until nearly a year after we entered the war.

America is, I believe, the country of tugs.

The only reason, to my knowledge, that was ever advanced for not sending tugs was that in some way there was a legal technicality in the laws, which were passed for commandeering privately owned craft, which prevented the department from securing tugs. The comment that I have to make on that point is that, in view of the other feats of this country in the war, and of the previously surmountable obstacles which were overcome, it is hard for me to accept the explanation that a small technicality in the law have prevented us from rendering this extremely important service to the Allies.

In my first cable, that of April 14, I had informed the department that "for towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous areas, seagoing tugs would be of great value."

On May 8 I sent the following dispatch:

MA

To: Secretary of State, Washington
(Through State Department).

6166.

May 8, 2 p. m. Following to be transmitted confidentially to Secretary Begin. Situation continues critical. Total loss last week 113 vessels of 2 including 15 vessels of 28,000 tons, of week before not previously reported steamers and sailing vessels being lost which would be saved if tugs were and strategically located. Therefore urgently recommend that as many tugs as possible, at least 10 immediately, be added to our naval forces and should be commissioned and armed.

All the figures with reference to the loss of tonnage which in my testimony are taken from the official records. Those which were published from time to time during the war, and many of those which have been published since, have been from newspaper file records and are not correct.

This request was repeated in other dispatches sent on May 24, June 20, and June 21, and in my letters of June 1, July 14, and August 9.

In my cable of May 24, I said:

Cable sent May 24, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

All Navy tugs, or commercial seagoing tugs, with naval officer in command could be sent would be of incalculable value in rescuing torpedoed and mined. The salvage and rescue work being done in this area by the limited number of trawlers and cruisers from antisubmarine work is astounding. The number of torpedoed and mined ships which these vessels have beached or brought ashore is surprising. Derelicts are a most constant source of danger to both shipping and naval vessels. Numerous lumber vessels are adrift bottom up. All vessels employed are necessarily diverted from antisubmarine work, and hence all tugs which could be sent for this work will amount to an actual increase of marine forces.

No answer was received to any of these cables.

On April 27, the naval attaché in London had sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence a long and detailed statement of the situation that tugs were needed in the war zone, and the duties which they could perform. This letter also forwarded detailed plans for the employment of tugs, which clearly set forth the manner in which all tugs would be employed. But the only reply received was in a letter from the Director of Naval Intelligence, dated April 22, of two brief paragraphs, stating simply that the department was prepared to cooperate with the Admiralty authorities to the fullest extent possible; that they were experiencing difficulty in securing tugs and in building new ones, and also, the rather remarkable statement, in view of our lack of cooperation, to the effect that American sailing vessels would be advised to accept a tow in the war zone.

One point about the necessity for tugs was this, that so many damaged vessels went down at the end of a certain number of days, or sometimes at the end of a certain number of days, which could have been brought in and in a very short time could have been repaired and put back in service; a short time compared with the amount of time it takes to build a new ship.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

who has visited our Atlantic ports, to say or who has cruised up and down our coast to understand the fact that, in such a crisis as we were confronted at the time here under discussion, Government was unable to produce for a more than four tugs.

On August 8, 1917, the following dispatch was received from the Navy Department:

NAVY DEPT.

Re: Naval Operations.

1000

It is the department's intention to take over 12 seagoing tugs and fit them for distant service. They will not be ready for service until approximately two months' period. Should they be fitted with mines, they should be 15 to 18 feet. 13108.

ADMIRAL BE

The following reply was sent:

Letter to Opnav 192, mine sweeping gear not desired. Received after arrival this side.

It was heard from the department about these tugs again on December 18, requesting the probable number 12 tugs. To this message I received no response. I had, in letters and cables, continually pressing need for such craft, as, for example, in my letter of 17, 1917, when I said:

144 December 19, 1917:

Re: 12 tugs

As pointed out in previous correspondence and cables, the urgent need exists. A great deal of shipping could be saved if tugs were available. It would be important and invaluable if a sea-going tug service could be organized. If all convoys through the danger zone, the tug service would be in use for towing.

Need of salvage tugs and equipment and personnel.

Salvage tugs in England were badly broken up in the early part of the war and craft being absorbed into the naval service and so the need for their services has developed and every effort has been made to develop them for salvage work, and there is a large and useful fleet of tugs which could come from the United States under either Government.

There is a need at all of our bases for the services of tugs. It is made to increase the amount of time that our destroyers can keep the sea and hence it is important that when they enter port they be allowed to let fires die down and repair. This creates the necessity for tugs about the harbor and alongside the docks.

At one of the naval conferences in London in September, 1917, representatives had requested that two tugs be loaned to the Italian Government for use on the Italian coast. In October, 1917, announced that these tugs were finally arrived at Genoa at the end of Feb

That the department realized the value of tugs for anti-work is fully shown by a letter sent by the Chief of Naval C to the Shipping Board on December 5, 1917:

DECEMBER

Op-28.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Chairman of Shipping Board.

Subject: Tugs—steam trawlers—fishing craft.

1. The great demands that have been made upon this country, and co naval notice, to furnish tugs and trawlers to be used in the following gen

(a) For general naval and military service abroad.

(b) For strictly naval service at home in coast defense—patrol and swee

(c) For general service at home—coast towing—harbor towing, fish trade led this office to consider the probable future necessity for an adequate su type of useful small craft.

2. No other types, save, perhaps, destroyers, submarines, and high-cla troopships are quite so useful now, and it is a type which this country w to need in the future.

3. For the above reasons this matter is brought to your attention. T attempting to meet its own needs in the matter of tugs, but even with thos and planned for, the demand will greatly exceed the supply.

4. There is inclosed a copy of letter containing a few characteristics of a Great Britain is finding useful. Also inclosed is a letter from Mr. Hoov Department, on subject of vessels for fish trade.

W. V. PRATT

A copy of that letter was supplied to me by the Navy De when I was over on the other side.

It is a rather curious commentary upon the department's toward supplying recognized needs, that this letter is dated I and not April, 1917.

On receiving the letter from the department, inclosing a this letter to the Shipping Board, I sent, on January 12, 1 following cable, again emphasizing the urgency of the need:

JANUARY 1

Paraphrase.

From: Sims.

To: Opnav.

Your 1693 and general subject tugs. Admiralty letter of January 12 portance tugs in connection naval work these waters. Letter says now ver to obtain tugs, and as large force American vessels now operating Europe and increasing number United States transports using European ports, corr increase number tugs available is necessary. Admiralty letter further st possible that a considerable number of large seagoing tugs might be construc United States, and I am to ask whether any help could be given toward the of additional tugs in European waters by the building of tugs in United I have in reply given all the information in my possession regarding tugs, a again to urge on department the very great importance of sending all avail to these waters. As the number of tugs now in existence is probably insuf the war needs, the question of constructing additional tugs warrants ser sideration.

In reply to this message, I received the following cablegra the Navy Department:

Copy of cable sent Shipping Board with letter. Matter was taken up, December, of advisability of the inclusion of an extensive tug program in the ing program.

And this was on the 18th of January, 1918. In my let December 31, January 8, January 14, and in many later let continued to emphasize the need for tugs.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Memorandum furnished to me, dated Jan. 2, 1918, showing tugs were then available, none of which were available when war was declared, and hence all of which were available from the beginning of our entry into the war.

Submarine force, 1 with submarines, 2 bound for Gibraltar for the Italian Government, 2 escorting submarine chasers from New York. 1 en route to Hampton Roads from New York for submarine chaser escort duty, 9 with submarines in navy yards, but noted suitable for high-sea service and in the St. Lawrence River.

Admiral: It is nearly 12 o'clock now, Admiral, and I think the committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow.

Admiral: Yes, sir.

At 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned (March 12, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D

Committee met pursuant to adjournment at 10 o
Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick

Senator Hale (chairman), Ball, and Trammell.

Chairman. The committee will be in order. Admiral

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumes

Admiral. In going over my testimony of yesterday, I
may have been susceptible of misinterpretation
of some of communications of our naval headqu
to all official communications for the per
which I am now introducing selections in subs
of January 7. My only object in makin
a further attempt to give the committee an ic
and complicated background of the issues now
of the great difficulty confronting me in pres
form to a body which was not in a position
a background.

armed United States merchantmen sunk s
among the first ships to be sunk, after we enter
which were well armed. I have not the recor
whether they were sunk on their first or second vo
is that their armament was not and coul
safeguard against submarine attack without wa
Committee adjourned yesterday, I had just fi
from the Navy Department, saying:

Shipping Board with letter. Matter was taken up, e
of inclusion of an extensive tug program in their b

18th of January, 1918. In my letters of D
January 14, and in many later letters, I
size the need for tugs. I then mentioned th
memorandum had been furnished to me,
giving a list of the tugs available, and I pre
record.

say nothing of the multitude of tugs which w
on our coast lines.

In my cable No. 4137, of February 19, 1918, in reply to from the department, I made specific recommendations tugs required.

Cablegram sent February 19, 1918:

Prep. by Cs. NCT. 25 ADR.

4137. Your 2873, tugs desired for duty as follows:

British waters, 12; French waters, 6; Azores, 2; Mediterranean, 16, of Italy. Number of tugs that could be used advantageously is not less than numbers specified, but these are very much needed under present conditions and would be constantly employed to advantage if now available. This is not to be construed as changing my previous recommendation made in January 18 regarding convoying and towing submarine chasers.

Many other similar dispatches and letters could be quoted, but it is believed that enough has been said to show that in the case where recommendation was made for the sending of tugs, it was urgently needed—a need which the department themselves recognized, as is shown by their letter to the Shipping Board—except the two assigned to the Italian Government actually in European waters for duty until April, 1918—that is, one year after war was declared. Up to the time of the armistice the Navy had less than a dozen tugs in European waters.

Apart from the tremendous value of tugs as an auxiliary marine craft (through their ability to thwart submarine attacks and towing ships in before sinking), we had to have them for many essential purposes—for example, moving our naval ships in and out of harbors, handling barges, assisting the Army in discharging ordnance in harbors without docks, etc.

The supply was always less than the demand. I have stated that the Allies were woefully short of such craft. I could take the time to paint the picture of how our officers in England and France for any old harbor tugs or barges which were repaired and pressed into this service. It was from such sources that our essential tug assistance came during the early months of the war. Such tugs worked constantly in support of our naval operations and transports on the French coast.

At sea we were largely dependent upon British tugs. It was British tugs who first reached and towed in the large transport *Cornwall* which was torpedoed off the French coast; also the *Westbridge* and other States Army supply ships.

If this was naval preparation or naval cooperation from a country with such great resources as ours, I do not know the meaning of the words.

As the department not only failed to approve my recommendations, but did not even inform me of their disapproval and in suspense all the time, I naturally assumed that they were proceeding to carry out the recommendations, but had merely failed to inform me.

In a way these last two cases that I have given may be considered details; and so they were, but they were details which show more strikingly the relations which existed between the Navy and their representative in the councils of the Allies.

A case, however, infinitely more serious in its consequences was the delay of the department in accepting the recommendations for the convoy system, in delaying its establishment for some months.

on this side will be met by destroyers and escorted into port. Hampton, New York have been proposed as assembly ports for east bound vessels of the Atlantic and Gulf, with convoys sailing every fourth day. Plan decided on after consideration by admiralty and war council, and is considered absolutely feasible. It will strain British resources of personnel and ships to the limit and will be carried out by taking one route, at least, if the plan is to be carried out. Admiralty has been informed whether we can provide escorts for convoys sailing from the route proposed for New York. British estimate about 14 ships will be required for New York and larger numbers for other routes, including Mediterranean and South Atlantic. Escorts should have sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots and 6-inch guns. I urgently recommend favorable action. Through British naval representative in Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary.

At the same time the British naval officers who had accompanied Mr. Balfour on his trip to America, had endeavored to secure the approval of the Navy Department to the convoy plan. As informed by Admiral Jellicoe, a complete and definite proposal for convoying all Atlantic shipping was given to the Navy Department by these officers on the 5th of May.

I received no answer to the message I had sent on the 1st of May, and, in fact, no communication whatsoever from the Navy Department with regard to the convoy proposal until June 20, nearly two months later.

In the meantime I learned from the Admiralty, some time later, that the Navy Department were formulating a plan of their own for handling shipping from American ports, and were building up an independent organization for the routing of American shipping. Realizing the importance of securing immediate action I called on the naval attaché in London while I was at Queen's Hotel at the end of May, to inquire of the department what action had been taken.

He cabled on May 25 as follows:

Sent: May 25, 1917.

To: Nav. Intel., Cl.

The principle of convoying merchant ships in accordance with general policy is approved by the Admiralty. The British would like to know if we could provide cruisers for all convoys leaving New York Harbor. They are willing to consider ships from Hampton Roads. Be so good as to reply to this cable.

MacDougal

No reply was received from the department.

On May 31 I again cabled, urging an early reply. This cable is as follows:

Sent: 31st May, 1917.

To: Secretary, Naval Operations, through State Department.

With reference my two previous dispatches concerning convoy system of merchant shipping. Scandinavian and North Sea convoys now in force over the Atlantic have proved very successful. First ocean convoy from Gibraltar arrived on May 20. Second ocean convoy from Hampton Roads of 12 merchant ships escorted by British cruiser sailed May 24. They will be met outside and escorted through submarine danger zone. The department's cooperation with the plan set forth in my dispatch of May 1 is urgently recommended. Early reply important in order that Admiralty plans may be governed accordingly.

In all the cables and letters which I have read to you here and which were sent at the end of May and throughout June I continually emphasized the vital importance of adopting immediately the convoy system, in order to save enough shipping to make possible the continuation of the war.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

on June 13 I outlined the method of handling
war, which was ultimately adopted by the depa
rning and technical, as it deals with the detailed
g convoys, and I will therefore not read it, un
committee desires it, read.

Admiral. I think it would be well to put that lette

Admiral. Very well.

OFFICE VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING
U. S. DESTROYER FORCES, EUROPEAN WATE
London, June 1.

Admiral William S. Sims.
Department of the Navy (Operations).
Operations in submarine danger zone.
Department's cable 21009.

Reference to the department's cablegram 21009, concerning m
the convoys of troops or supplies for our Army and Navy for
danger zone.

Regarding considerations in the question of escorting through the s

information concerning enemy activity.

Admiral. I do not entirely abandoning our own offensive campaign i

Admiral. The number of craft available for such duty and their di
the enemy activity is concentrated to the westward of Ire
coming in well to the southward of this area, it manifestly is i
a defensive campaign in the area in which the enemy can
be used.

Admiral. The number of types of ships to be diverted from
convoy is always given, of course, to convoys carrying troop
material whether it be munitions, animals, or food supplies are
convoyed, but such escorting duty is not allowed materially to
the campaign in operation at the time in question.

Admiral. The ships which are constantly being covered by destroyers or of
the kind as above (specially built antisubmarine vessels, ab
solutely made to avoid taking such vessels out of their designat
ed area, the vessels which first picks up a valuable cargo escort i
the patrol vessel on the next square inshore, and turn
the meeting of the ships is effected. If by reason of thick
weather the convoying vessel continues on the next squa
the ship will be followed by our troop and supply ships b
the ship staying outside of the main areas of submarine acti
the area continuously patrolled by destroyers and other
the ship a short distance off the west coast of France.

Admiral. The handling such convoys and also the merchant ships
the ship's operation from Hampton Roads to the Mediterran
the ship established for convenience in their own administration
the ship's rendezvous well out to sea, and encircling the Bri
the ship's fleet. Also a comparatively large number of location
the ship's French coast have been given designating figures or sym
the ship's practice each time that one of their convoys sails from
the ship's rendezvous which they are to pass through and a point
the ship's rendezvous for after passing through the rendezvous.

Admiral. The ship's operation well in advance giving as closely as possible the t
the ship's rendezvous points designated. Escorting d
the ship's intercept the convoys at some point on the route bet
the ship's point designated on the coast, the position of interception
the ship's enemy activities at the time. It manifestly must also be
the ship's together with convoys at sea and divert them from one re
the ship's rendezvous.

Admiral. The lettering and numbering of rendezvous and point
the ship's primarily for convenience of reference in administrati

The significance of such symbols if circulated even to our own allied officers must necessarily be limited to the maximum extent in order to preclude possibility of the enemy becoming aware of them.

6. If the greatest possible degree of safety for convoys is to be insured, it is necessary that their movements should be under control of one source, and as all enemy activity is concentrated on this side of the Atlantic and his must necessarily remain in its present zone, it follows that selection of routes and other directions in regard to movements of convoys should be and directed from this side; that is, in the Admiralty itself. It is for this the Admiralty has requested, and I strongly recommend, the immediate competent and tactful officer whose duties in the Admiralty under my general direction will be confined to those above indicated.

7. The following procedure in regard to convoys is therefore recommended:

(1) Early advance information regarding prospective sailing of convoys character.

(2) Immediate information as soon as definite hours of sailings can be fore-

As soon as this information is received, and after consultation with the Admiralty, a rendezvous and route to be included in sailing orders will be selected. Definite information should then be given when convoy sails, as to its position, speed and time of passing through rendezvous designated.

8. It is urgently requested that only British Admiralty codes be used for communications, addressed to the Admiralty, the first word of the message being "Admiralty".

9. Under no circumstances, if convoys are divided into groups, should they use the same rendezvous and the same routes after reaching the danger zone. In such a case if the enemy should become aware of their movements he would be able to concentrate for successive attacks.

10. Ships of convoys should zigzag together from two to four points irregularly. Organized irregularity is one of the principal requirements in opposing submarine attack.

11. Escorting destroyers should be allowed the maximum independence of movement and the exercise of initiative. They should not be held to strict formal reference to bearings and distances from the convoy. This procedure is necessary in order that full advantage may be taken of their experience in operating against submarines and their later information in regard to enemy methods, which are constantly changing.

12. It is mandatory that the wireless should be used as little as possible. If it would be better not to use it at all, except for important directions which must be sent from shore as to changes of routes. Evidence indicates that the enemy has been successful in the use of radio direction finders, particularly in locating large ships or radio work of an unusual or distinctive character.

13. It is apparent that once a convoy enters the danger zone an escorting force of little or no protection against submarines, and virtually becomes one of the danger zone itself, also requiring protection.

14. Up to April 1 there is no evidence to indicate that any German submarine carried beam tubes, and this is one of the principal reasons why they have attempted attacking a formation from ahead—that is, approaching from ahead and firing as they pass through the formation. With bow tubes they would be forced to use the helm before reaching the formation, with considerable danger to themselves which they seldom if ever incur. Hence the principal arc for destroyer protection is the bows and wings of formations.

15. The two principal requirements of formations of a considerable number for defensive purposes against submarines, are:

(1) Minimum depth of formation—that is, minimum length of formation in direction of course. This in order to reduce the arcs on the bows and beams which must be protected by destroyers.

(2) The second consideration is to concentrate the formation as much as possible, that is, it is also necessary to reduce the dimension of the formation at right angles to the course.

This not only reduces the range of visibility of the force, but also restricts the tactical positions of attack which the submarine desires to attain.

It is for the above reasons that line of divisions formation is generally adopted, and the distance between columns as small as consistent with zigzagging evolution.

I cite that merely to point out that, as in all other cases, I put my utmost endeavor to keep the department fully informed. Allied war experience, and that, in the particular case under discussion,

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

the convoy question, they had the fullest view of every phase of the problem.

On June 14, 15, and 17, 1917, I repeated my recommendations to convoy. My message of June 15 will show the urgency of these recommendations:

United States Navy

Washington

Subject: Our putting convoy system into effect immediately at New York, and North Atlantic ports as previously proposed to assemble Canadian convoys to join ours. Consideration. At present our fuel is being expended and our ships are being exposed to an enemy whose primary object must be to avoid our ships. We are also necessarily attempting to combine our offensive operations, escorting such individual ships as our limited number of vessels permit.

If we adopt in convoys, we would thereby force the enemy to abandon the necessity of dispersing his forces in order to obtain the benefits of the principle of concentrated attack. The history of the convoy system shows that, even if a few ships are lost, the loss would be much less than at present. The enemy's distance from bases, and limited ammunition, make it manifest that the enemy can not afford to expend his submarine force. Experience indicates that submarine attack in numbers, owing to difficulty of coordination. Such attacks, if attempted, would facilitate our destroying destroyers.

On June 20 I said, in substance: The objective of the enemy campaign is to disrupt shipping. It is our duty to consult with British commanders in charge of the Atlantic. If the plan proposed is to be adopted at all, it must be adopted without delay, and while the campaign is in progress. It is our duty to department's action. A convoy may be composed of a number of ships the better, escorted by cruiser or destroyer, with naval officers and signalmen on each ship.

On June 21 of May, and it was not until the latter part of May that the last sentence of the reply was this: "I consider that merchant vessels having armed themselves are not dependent."

It is supposed that anyone who had even casual knowledge of the situation would have known that the arming of merchant vessels would have just the opposite result, as it would make them a target for attack without warning instead of sinking them without warning.

On June 20 I said, in substance: It will seem that the system is not put into immediate operation. Shipping, thus forcing submarines to encourage them in order to attack shipping. It is imperative that we adopt a convoy and partial patrol system. Both are much better than present system, which is a very poor one. I request information of department and upon previous similar dispatches. A decision can be taken on this subject. I have explained further along that until a decision is reached on the American side, it was extremely difficult for the British side to put a convoy system into operation.

With regard to the arming of merchant ships, I replied to the Secretary's assertion in my dispatch of June 21. This is from Queenstown. [Reading:]

Cable sent June 21, 1917.

I trust I have made the critical nature of the military situation and I consider it my duty to report that if we can not offer more immediate assistance, even to the extent of sending the majority of the vessels patrolling the coast lines, which can not materially affect the general situation, we can render the service to the allied cause which future history will show to be necessary.

My recommendations concerning the convoy system were not based upon the vessels, but upon all allied shipping, for it is upon the preservation of the continuity of this shipping that our success against the enemy is entirely dependent. It is assumed here that the comparative immunity of American shipping from attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the propaganda in America. This is apparently clearly shown by the German propaganda and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect them from attack, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thereby forcing her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise. Armed merchantmen are sunk daily off this port.

That is, Queenstown.

The success of the convoys, so far brought in shows that the system will defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time. The system merely requires that it obliges the submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchant ships. The present campaign is not succeeding. The necessity is again presented for all destroyers, tugs, yachts, and other craft which can reach the critical points themselves or towed part way by reserve battleships or any naval vessel. The situation is not made clear, I hope the department will indicate the further action desired. Time is a vital element in any measures taken.

Again, on June 22, I urgently advised the supply by the United States of necessary convoy escorts for the convoys from New York and explained the arrangements made by the British: If a man has had the curiosity to read Admiral von Tirpitz's book, he will find in there that everything I had to say or will have to say about the convoy system or the patrol system is entirely sustained by the opinion of that admiral. [Reading:]

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Sent: June 22.

The British Admiralty have now adopted the convoy system and will put it in full effect as fast as ships can be obtained for high sea convoy against raiding destroyers for escort duty in submarine zone. As previously reported, convoys are in successful operation from Mediterranean and Hampton Roads. Plans are made for total of eight convoys a week as follows: Two from Gibraltar, two from Hampton Roads, two or three from New York, one from Canada—the latter preferably combined with the New York convoys. One a week from New York will be put in operation as soon as possible with British cruisers, in absence of our support. I urgently advise our full support, assisting and cooperating in assembly of convoys and furnishing one cruiser or reserve battleship a week for high sea escort. Battleships are admirably suited for this duty, which will not interfere with their training, for which I understand they are now being used.

In reply to these cables a message was received from the Admiralty on June 24, which has been previously read. [Reading:]

[Cablegram.]

From: Secretary of Navy.

To: Alusna, London.

For: Vice Admiral Sims, No. 37.

Received: June 24, 1917.

This is a reply to your various letters and cables.

Another thing that the department recognizes is the necessity of sending *submarine* craft which can be spared from the home waters into active

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

As such craft become available will send them. In making
such requests, the department requests and will be g
should be given after consultation with the various ac
of requirements.

...strongly of the opinion—based on recent experiences—
...adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships
...to be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid
...is believed to constitute one of the most effective

exactly the same thing as was said in the cable from the Navy. There was the opinion formed in America that the information that should have been connected with it, which was holding up a convoy system for two or three months, and which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and some [redacted]

• However, as its policy, its willingness to cooperate in every question of supplying additional naval forces of type and class whenever the advisability of so doing is justified.

• Considering the outline of a scheme which it is hoped will be a cooperation and ability to supply escort to vessels through the waters of the United States, other duties as much as does the present method of escorting United States ports. Details when prevented (per-

DANIELS, Secretary

...scheme that is proposed in the last paragraph
...royal road to victory scheme, which was never
...as I know.

stated that in this cable the department reiterated
 by the Secretary, four days before, that the
 fast ships constituted one of the most effective de-
 fensive measures, and implying thereby that it was
 better than the convoy system, or, at least, that
 it was unnecessary to take the convoy system
 In any case it is difficult to construe these
 statements, to my specific and urgent recommendation
 of the convoy system, as anything less than what the
 cable substitutes for the convoy system. The con-
 sideration of my state of mind when confronted with
 it was impossible for me, 3,000 miles away, assist-
 ing a junior officer, to know just what was in the
 minds of the committee. I could assume nothing less than that they fa-
 vored the issue which I had attempted to present. I
 did not more attempt to put forth the case of the
 following dispatch sent from Queenstown on J-
 1916, to the committee's particular attention?

RESEARCH

Department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the effect that trained crews constitute one of the most effective means of defense. I again submit with all possible stress the following: that war experience. The measures demanded, if enemy attacks are not defensive, but offensive-defensive. The merchant ship is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defense without warning, which is necessarily the enemy method of attack. In this area alone, during the last six weeks, 30 are

were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although three escorted each by a single destroyer. The result would have been, of course, no matter how many guns these ships carried or what their caliber. These ships, heavily armed, manned by expert naval crews, with much previous experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without warning in a case within the month of mystery ship engaging submarine with gun yards, but submarine submerged and approached unseen and torpedoed at range. The ineffectiveness of heaviest batteries against submarine is conclusively shown by Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to men-of-war.

The comparative immunity of the relatively small number American merchant liners, is believed here to be due to the enemy hopes that the pacification will succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful gun attacks at advantageous sun position, against armed ships, without ship being able to detect submarine. I submit that, if submarine campaign is to be defeated, it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of ships and avoidance of antisubmarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using, for approach, an auxiliary periscope less than 2 inches in diameter. This is just acquired. All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base operations on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, convoys for all merchant ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines, as the latter will be forced to the attack of our antisubmarine craft whenever they come within a certain distance of convoyed merchantmen. Moreover, it permits of concentration of our forces, and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various approaches.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign can easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long night weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be expected in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coast lines and shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence operations in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, operations in maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must be carried out in order to succeed.

All of this time I was keeping in close touch with the officers of the French navy department, and hence it came to my notice that the department was calling upon the French, by direct communication, for their opinion concerning the convoy system, and so without my knowledge. This was, of course, quite within the province of the department, but I mention the fact merely to show the confusing situation created by such methods.

The French reply, of which I here have a copy, shows complete agreement with all that I had been recommending:

From: French naval general staff, first section, Paris.

Date: June 26, 1917.

To: French naval attaché, Washington.

[Translation.]

Replying to your telegram, at the request of Admiral Benson, we have decided in concert with the British Admiralty, before the entrance of the United States into the war, the principle of the grouping in convoys of merchant ships across the Atlantic with protection by cruisers.

The cruisers are intended to protect the ships against pirates and the submarines. They shall conduct the convoys to the approach entries, where they will assure the escort to the port of discharge. Admiral Grasset has received instructions to make arrangements with the British admiral at the Bermudas for these cruisers to perform escort duty.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... consider, in concert with the American Admiralty, a
... for the protection of merchant ships and trans
... to Capt Jackson all the information we poss

... was my representative in Paris.

... I am sure, to point out to the committee
... is but one of many similar incidents, der
... self which existed between the methods the N
... and that which we all understand by the p

... in the meantime was apparently still working
... plan for the control and routing of shipping
... accidentally in May.

... the department (in reply to a numbe
... control of American merchantmen), recommen
... should be coordinated with those of the A
... shipping. My message was as follows:

...
...
... notification of sailings of American merchantmer
... to be afforded American as other allied merchant
... handled in same manner. Therefore coordination
... New York is necessary. Communications with London
... and protection in dangerous zones would be simpl
... all communications were made in same codes and
... and other allied shipping. Separate communication
... confusion and are not safe. The essential informat
... sailings, times of arrival at the rendezvous, and call le
... that there are not sufficient ships available in subm
... of even all specially valuable cargoes, not to me
... their cargoes.

81

... was received to my recommendation, but on
... obtained a complete plan of their own in the

... Navy, Washington.

... Department is inaugurating shipping intelligence offices
... in United States ports, where British admiralty
... Department desires to cooperate with British and
... intelligence service along following lines. United
... United States ports, British in British ports, Fren
... Foreign assignments in United States officers wel
... to cooperate. Navy Department will keep cooper
... dangerous routes, rendezvous, and regulations
... United States ports, and will expect similar confid
... abroad. Routes rendezvous and convoys in d
... to directions of admiralties responsible for
... arrange details. Department will approve if
... 1940.

DANIEL, Secretary N

... I replied as follows:

... No 42. In view of present critical stage of war,
... developments in next few months, which will be en
... of shipping, I submit that it would be a fundam
... any way to change present established administ
... communication in connection with control of shipping

...

Undoubtedly the most serious military handicap of this war, as of all, has been difficulty in coordination between allies. It would manifestly be the safest military policy to allow any one ally to control and direct all operations, as this can not be done, we should certainly subordinate every interest to such an end. To attempt at this time to establish new shipping offices, new personnel, introducing necessity for increased number and different methods of communication, would certainly involve delays, misunderstandings, and confusion which would be direct assistance to enemy.

If success is to be assured and accelerated, there should be no lines of demarcation or introduction of complication. The shipping to be controlled is all of the neutral shipping, which should be treated as a whole. It needs protection from the field of enemy's campaign. We may, and should, assist by adding extra to present established system of control, but under no circumstances should we attempt to supplant or take over any shipping offices now in efficient operation. I submit that central control for all shipping should be concentrated here in the center of war area, where all information of enemy methods is constantly being received and from whence daily control of naval forces should originate. British Government has been consulted and is in complete agreement with this dispatch. It is proposed to adequately present this case by cable, and it is therefore hoped that they will accept these recommendations, based on one consideration only, national interests in the one cause against common enemy.

I am going into this thing at some length because it is the most important measure that was taken during the war, and consequently the continuous resistance for a number of months to the introduction of that convoy system by the Navy Department is the most serious error that was committed.

For the information of the committee, I should perhaps briefly explain what the point at issue here really is. The routes followed by convoys which were vital and which in the greatest danger, were in the so-called submarine zone; that is, the coasts of France, Great Britain, and Ireland. In this area no other were convoys confronted with the danger of submarine attack. What in the minds at least of merchant captains was considered an even greater danger was that of collision with other convoys. All ships were running without lights. It must be remembered that convoys were not only coming from Canada, New York, and Hampton Roads, but also from the Mediterranean and from Africa—the latter being ships from Australia and other localities. To add to this congestion, we always had the outgoing convoys to consider. The routes followed by convoys outside of the submarine zone were, of course, not of particular consequence, as the abundance of sea room there caused little fear of collisions.

It was for this simple reason, together with the fact that the latest information as to submarine whereabouts was available in London, that it was essential—in fact absolutely necessary—that the routings and control of convoys in the submarine zone be handled from one source and not from many.

The plan proposed by the department, to suddenly displace the extensive system of offices which the Allies had built up in order to supply shipping with its routings, war warnings, and secret intelligence, was apparently based largely upon sentiment. I submit without fear of contradiction, the assertion that no reason whatever except that of increasing efficiency, could warrant, in the very midst of a war of this nature—a period in which victory was doubtful and defeat quite possible—the throwing out of gear of an extensive organization which was working and upon which the safe shipping depended. It must be noted, too, that this system,

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... the British, was an allied system for the ... and had been perfected, and was in st ... months before the United States entered th ... recommendations, the fact remains that ... the British offices going throughout th ... set up an independent duplicate org ... ports of the United States, thereby wastin ... Many American officers who came a ... captains, described the ridiculous pro ... through with in New York, traveling abo ... building to get their instructions.

... the point that there is now no question ... routing system then in force, because it ... throughout the war in handling all shi ... or convoys. In spite of this fact, howev ... upon changing the plans, which co ... produce confusion. For example, on Ju ... message from the department, which ... reply:

... The following method for routing m ... suggested for discussion with the Admiralty. T ... ahead, and nominate the days on which it w ... That Admiralty select rendezvous at which it w ... That their instructions be cabled to their agen ... working in connection with British agen ... shipping to rendezvous set by Admiralty ... dates prescribed by Admiralty. That the mak ... be arranged for by classifying ships accor ... to be plainly marked on the sides of the ... some other system of speed classification, if th ... to the enemy. That the United States ... vessels to United States ports, in case t ... in these waters a necessity. It is b ... showing up the flow of merchant tonnage ac ... against raiders, it meets most of the requi ... other advantage of making fewer demands ... waters. [1901]

DAN

... following day, July 3. [Reading]

... Have fully discussed with Ad ... system now in operation. The depart ... study and partial trial ... First, great difficulty, and in fact impres ... at distant rendezvous on the lig ... before departure, and are operating on ... arrival at a rendezvous can not surely be pr ... the necessity for excessive amount of ... assembling convoys. This feature alone ... handling convoys information which have ... The cruiser escort, in addition to protection ... of convoys, drilling them from day of de ... necessary if attacked. All merchants wireless co ... that escorting cruisers should handle all con ... and that merchant ships should not use wireless

It should be possible to divert convoys, if necessary, before escorting join.

This is now accomplished by broadcasting from Poldhu, on high power who don't reply, and in fact even beyond wireless sending range of cruises. Convoys from Hampton Roads have arrived safely 350,000 tons. Convoys being loaded and grouped according to European destination.

Not speed.

For instance, all cargoes bound for eastern British ports are grouped in convoys. Convoys from Hampton Roads include cargoes from Chili, Panama, Gulf of Mexico, and Philadelphia. Two convoys a week are now being started from Hampton Roads and one from Cape Breton, Canada.

In view of information available here, and present stage of development of the system, I strongly recommend that we cooperate to the maximum extent of time at least. Can our escorting cruisers leave convoys outside of submarine zone and return without refueling? The plan is to escort outgoing empty ships outside submarine zone and then disperse them. It is undesirable to add the ships to the convoy in submarine zone, if it can be avoided. Admiralty desires information immediately as to whether first convoy can be started from New York on July 1. I urgently recommend that carefully selected commander be sent immediately under me in British Admiralty in connection with convoys. Admiralty desires this.

The only explanation I can give—the only guess I can give for the proposal put forth in the cablegram, for the handling of the shipping, is that it was done by some one who had never been to sea.

In the cables and letters which I have been reading to you, I should be emphasized that, from the 1st of May, I had endeavored to convince the department of the necessity of assigning a sufficient number of cruisers for convoy escort duty to provide for the multiple convoys from New York. On May 1, in my cable, I had estimated that 14 would be necessary for this duty. The first information I had from the department that they intended to take any action on this recommendation was on the 2d of July when, in its cable 44, the department stated that they would assign seven cruisers to convoy duty, in accordance with the Admiralty's request.

There was a delay from the 2d of May to the 1st of July, which time they resisted helping out to the extent that they did in the convoy system.

This was confirmed by their dispatch of July 5, in which they stated that seven vessels of the *Denver* class would be detached to assist in convoy operations. As I have previously pointed out, the Admiralty had been using the convoy system for six weeks, at a time when this first assurance from the department was received by me. As I had pointed out to the department in the letters and cables that I read you, it was practically impossible to attempt to handle commercial merchant shipping partially by convoys and partially by independent sailings, in view of the number of ships to be escorted, and the lack of antisubmarine craft.

It was absolutely necessary that so far as possible all important shipping should be immediately placed in convoy. Yet at the end of six weeks after the first convoy had successfully arrived, the Admiralty had yet no information to the effect that the United States was willing to cooperate in this matter, and the cables received from the department indicated that they were considering many plans to avoid adopting the convoy system, but had not decided to cooperate fully with the Allies in convoys. Sometimes the distress and confusion resulting from this attitude of the

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

inferred from the following letter, which I received on the 11th of July. [Reading:]

"I am pressed about the convoy question. As you know, we are not doing it, but it is quite impossible to organize the system unless the whole system of sailings from ports is organized some way ahead, and by some way at least a fortnight before ships requiring escort leave, so that convoys have to be arranged about

we have arranged four distinct convoys, namely, the first every eight days, one from Canadian waters every eight days, and the other every eight days.

"The ships are escorted through the submarine zone by the United States Navy. They are absolutely dependent upon United States destroyers. Therefore, we must be certain of having them on duty. Do you think you can guarantee that, and that you can inform your Government that you

"The necessary will be to make it perfectly clear to the Government that we must give a fortnight's notice before it is proposed to send anything but the smallest numbers. We have, for instance, the last few days of troops being sent over in two Whalers, one coming over in another vessel, and of four ships with a destroyer escort, and we received the notice as the ships were already on their way. I have troop convoys arriving at about the same time, and I am sure in providing adequate escort, if a little notice were given, we could suggest the sailing of some of the ships, perhaps for a few days, when they arrived.

"It is important that I would suggest to you the desirability of it being essential that you should be given notice immediately on the next fortnight. Otherwise I fear that we shall be in a position where we know that we are pretty clear for about a fortnight, but we do not definitely whether the four destroyers could be sent to you, this morning.

J. R. Je

"He refers to there was a proposal to send four destroyers to the Channel for certain operations with the British patrol service. It was my opinion that the continuous service of our destroyers escorting convoys would get on their nerves, and it might be a change, so that it was proposed to move some of our destroyers into the channel, and that they be replaced by British destroyers.

"I am, in succession, an opportunity to see that that is one of the things in which I was not to get stale on the job at all, all during the time I had been receiving occasional announcements of the sailings of Army supply ships and of American troops, all of which required a fortnight's notice, and it became necessary to protect shipping and provide escort for the ships. On the 12th of July I therefore sent

"I am sure that ample warning be given of prospective sailings, and particularly groups of ships with troops or supplies, and that the outside of usual merchant routes, similar to the

ported yesterday as having sailed on July 11. Every possible effort is to put convoy system into full operation, and its success is dependent on destroyers in addition to British destroyers and patrol ships. At prospect of severe congestion of convoys in submarine zones latter part only to United Kingdom, but also to France and from Russia.

Please cable to-day concerning any further prospective sailings of supply ships before August 1. In case of such sailings, it will be necessary merchant convoy sailing from New York on July 14. Without advance of at least 15 days before sailings, there is grave danger of coincidence of a submarine zone, with necessity of inadequate protection for some convoys, possibility of disaster. I again urge the importance of our not attending independently, or of replacing present established British shipping officers, but that we solely cooperate in regard to all shipping, American, British and other allied shipping. Sailings of all British or American special escort should be arranged in cooperation with British shipping officers, rendezvous and time. Communications should be made in accordance with usual procedure, notifying me for information if desired. I recommend in future, Army supply ships join merchant convoys, in order to increase the strain on limited number of escort vessels available, and permit plans for adequate protection. This subject is of the utmost importance to us against enemy submarine campaign, and prevention of serious losses.

On the 11th of July I had received from the department asking what steps were necessary in order to insure safe transport of troops and troop supplies. To this I replied in my message of July 14, again emphasizing the importance of coordinating Army supply transports with the merchant convoys. The following follows:

Sent: July 14, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Unnumbered. It is impossible for me to guarantee safe escort protection of a submarine zone for troops, troop supplies, and valuable Government cargo unless the following conditions are fulfilled:

First. A schedule of prospective sailings, giving at least two weeks advance of all sailings.

Second. That such shipping be concentrated in convoys, even if delay is caused.

There are not sufficient destroyers to meet demands imposed by independent sailings and insufficient warnings.

Sending troops by individual ships at brief intervals requires nearly as many number of destroyers that would be required if grouped in convoys.

All supply ships should sail with merchant convoys.

Third. It is essential to safety that my staff be increased, as previously. Without this assistance there is grave danger of mistakes which may involve serious losses.

I will take up especially, by and by, that question of transport assistance. In all the stuff I have been reading you since I came here, three days ago, I was assisted by only one man in my staff, and such assistance as I could get from outside, from my attache, and patriotic Americans who came in and went out, was nothing.

The situation, as it then existed, was fully explained in my message of July 14 to the Navy Department:

11. Convoys and valuable merchant shipping. The problem of escort for merchant ships, either singly or in convoy, is a very complicated one. Convoys are now coming from the Mediterranean, from Russia, and from other places of origin besides America; and in view of the inadequate number of vessels available for escort duty, it is absolutely essential that this complex vital question of destroyer escort be coordinated in some central place.

The shipping to which I refer is not American shipping or British shipping, but other allied or neutral shipping alone, but solely the combined allied and valuable shipping which is essential to combined allied military and naval operations.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... convey in my dispatches the idea that I consider shipping as the best. Improvements are doubtless possible at the cost of lack of cooperation and hence not to be afforded.

... attempt to point out the entire necessity for

... in handling shipping arises from the necessity of the longer of the enemy thus obtaining vital information. The principal requirement is to reduce the number of people handling the work and to adopt and be a central source. There has been cause for serious consideration to establish separate shipping offices and this would mean an extra system of communication, a system through which information must pass, and hence would

... the greatest urgency that we first merely put the British shipping offices to cooperate with the systems and procedure and lines of communication. At the beginning we could gradually introduce such changes as are considered advisable, and perhaps in the course of time in our own ports.

... importance for the safety of shipping, and here a course should be adopted gradually, and to centralize the central control here in London, where a representative should be issued to the escort. I will be only too glad to accept a representative from the appropriate share of responsibility, in the Administration of the past.

... arrangement has been experienced in the last few months from the United States of the sailing of hospital units on the *Mongolia* and the *Albatross*. It happened that the prospective arrival of the merchant convoys from Russia, from Hampton Roads, and from New York.

... definitely whether the ships referred to were to be. In the case of the *Mongolia* no rendezvous was made. Advance information of at least two weeks is essential. Without such advance information there is the submarine zone and the possibility of being attacked. Such a course might easily result in disaster to the ships.

... anticipated United States destroyers escorting of the supply ships and the New York merchant ships on patrol duties in Queenstown area, which might be independently.

... there has been grave danger of oversight of all dispatches received. The responsibilities involved of the duties required, are considered to be a sacrifice of other important demands upon the staff. It has been explained in full in various cables.

... that is that God was good to us that we suffered serious losses, with all that confusion.

... in accordance with the department's request, a full and detailed report of troop convoys.

... received a cable from the department, in which the instructions for convoy, contained in this letter, were a part of the department's action.

... though it referred only to troop convoys, was identical with the general plan for handling the subject that it involved control of the convoy, the source, and that source in London. As a matter of fact, in the case of troop convoys, their routings were

exclusively from my own office, but the officer who handled of course, in the Admiralty convoy section daily, and was in his daily work by the merchant convoy system. This is absolutely essential. The two were interdependent.

I will refer to this question of handling troop convoys by adding at this time that the reason for holding the troop routings strictly in my own organization was merely that of greater secrecy in this all-important measure, upon which the safety of all of our troops fundamentally depended.

It was not until even later that, in the case of troop transport department finally accepted my recommendations as to the routing of Army and Navy supply ships. In the case of those sailing abroad in July, so much confusion attended the plans for the routing and for their escort through the war zone, that it was apparent that the only way to handle them would be to sail them with the merchant convoys that were being organized to sail weekly, from New York and Hampton Roads. I could send dozens of messages here, dealing with the confusion and error occasioned by sailing these ships independently, without reference to other convoys; and in each case with the definite instruction from the department to me that I should, in each case, supply ships, whether sailing singly or in groups, with danger-zone escort.

What they wanted me to do in that respect was simply a physical impossibility.

In my cable of July 31, I therefore recommended that a policy be adopted for handling these supply ships. My message was as follows:

Sent: July 31.

To: Opnav, Washington.

No. 172. I strongly recommend that for all Government supply ships, Navy, one of the following courses be pursued: First, that such ships be grouped in separate convoys of 12 or more, the sailings coordinated with other sailings, or second, that as fast as such ships are ready they be consolidated with merchant convoys from New York and Hampton Roads, which will be through danger zone, and a detachment of destroyers will take over the escort when convoy separates. Either of these plans will increase safety by permitting better concentration of protection, considering the inadequate number of destroyers available. Escort will be thereby greatly facilitated, with better steaming and better state of readiness of destroyers.

The department on August 1 replied as follows:

SIMSADUS, London.

Opnav 73. Referring to your 172: This office concurs in expression of policy in your cable referring to the proper methods of routing cargo supply ships to Army and Navy.

ADMIRAL B

You note the same experience; first, proposal of impracticable plans, a long discussion by cable, etc.; and a final acceptance of simple, ordinary plans which had been suggested.

An excellent illustration of the attitude of the department toward convoy and shipping control at this time, is afforded by their reply of August 10:

AUGUST 10

Origin: Admiral Benson.

Vice Admiral Sims, London.

Opnav 116. Your 197: The following is the situation in regard to American shipping. A few vessels route in the established convoys. More sail direct. I will confer with British shipping offices to get the latest information and report.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... and American ships to take advantage of
... it possible to compel this except in Govt
... the Government takes over the control of all sh
... on the subject, this office is of the opi
... after departure, names, dates of sail
... ships only. Those American cargo ships sa
... In the case of all ships carrying
... supply ships you wish the information forward
... you instruct otherwise. All other rep
... reports through you, will cease. 1908.

ADMIN

... a most discouraging message. For
... exhausting my vocabulary in attempt
... to explain this convoy system. I fe
... to go any further in explaining it t
... read the previous cables. For ex
... late date, that a few vessels were l
... that most ships confer with Brit
... latest information and routes. Hea
... hundreds of words in attempting to c
... what they should do, as that was the
... were obtainable. Note also the stat
... "an effort" was being made to induc
... advantage of the protection offered by c
... possible to compel them to do so.

... evident to the Allies, at this stage of the
... evident to the Navy Department, that
... was to save shipping, whether shipping w

It made no difference whether the sh
... or Government controlled; our fate wa
... It was the issue of the war at that mom
... war had demonstrated that almost ar
... this small problem, any shipping mai
... many means for its quick and radic
... the effect on shipping if they ha
... protection whatever would be given t
... not accept Governmental instructio
... been to issue a Governmental war
... the insurance on every ship lost.
... what the Allies did. Sometimes I
... marvelled that thing there did not kno
... at all

... question as to the soundness of the
... I have been explaining. I would invit
... of this cable, which states that, as I
... reports of sailings, except through
... and thereafter cease.

... the question of this convoy system, I w
... which seems to have gotten abro
... are concerned with the safety of forei
... of our own. What I was after was
... have clearly shown above, during the p
... question was wholly bound up in th
... was not American shipping, or British
... shipping, but it was allied shipping.
... of the team which was lined up against the

exclusively from my own office, but the officer was of course, in the Admiralty convoy section daily in his daily work by the merchant convoy system, absolutely essential. The two were interdependent.

I will refer to this question of handling troop additions at this time that the reason for holding routings strictly in my own organization was more greater secrecy in this all-important measure, upon which all of our troops fundamentally depended.

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What they wanted me to do in that respect was impossible.

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Sent: July 31.

To: Opnav, Washington.

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The department on August 1 replied as follows:

SIMSADUS. *London.*

Opnav 73. Referring to your 172: This office concurs in expressing its opinion in your cable referring to the proper methods of routing cargo ships for the Army and Navy.

Ad

You note the same experience: first, proposal of plans, a long discussion by cable, etc.; and a final acceptance of simple, ordinary plans which had been suggested.

An excellent illustration of the attitude of the department toward the convoy and shipping control at this time, is afforded by the cable of August 10:

AU.

Origin: Admiral Benson.

Vice Admiral Sims, *London.*

Opnav 116. Your 197: The following is the situation in regard to the routing of cargo ships. A few vessels route in the established convoys. More sail direct. Please confer with British shipping offices to get the latest information and

Abstract

[The page contains several lines of extremely faint, illegible text.]

[illegible]

lies, at this stage of the war Navy Department, that the thing, whether shipping was interference whether the ship controlled our fate was of the war at that moment illustrated that almost any form, any shipping means for its quick and reliable shipping if they took whatever would be given to Governmental in the form of a fast runner in the water on it.

When the ...
... there ...

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153 154 155

Figure 1

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P = 0.000

1. **Introduction**

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1

As a matter of fact, United States shipping was a proportion of the whole in those critical days. For July, 1917, there were a maximum of about 160 arrivals per month, in the war zone, of American-owned ships. Consider this number against over 3,000 arrivals and departures of British vessels alone. Even such a comparison does not show a large number of British and French vessels which were moving in the war zone, practically all of their time. Most vessels were on the high seas a good share of their time, and the submarine zone. The traffic up and down the French coast carrying many supplies upon which the French armies were absolutely dependent, and our armies also, was never out of the zone at all. I think it would be a safe estimate that, during the critical months, not more than 5 per cent of the arrivals and departures in the war zone were American ships.

I have before me figures showing that as late as 15 months after we entered the war, American shipping was less than 12 per cent of the total making up the allied lines of communication.

It is very difficult for me now to convey to you the atmosphere which existed at that time, and the real state of despair which I found myself almost daily, during those early months of the war. It should be noted that the cause of this was not a matter, such as the failure to act upon my convoy recommendations, but that in a dozen different matters, at the same time, I was with the same situation, always hoping from day to day that the department would finally realize the situation, and either accept the recommendations, or send over somebody in whose judgment they could trust. And I again wish to reiterate that the question as to whether these recommendations were right or not, in fact remains that they were virtually all adopted by the department in the end.

I could read you, for the next week, copies of letters and reports sent by me in regard to the inauguration and control of the convoy system, but that would hardly contribute further to an understanding of this matter. I think that enough had been said to show what I wrote in my letter of January 7, 1920, was a very real statement of the serious embarrassments and delays and difficulties in putting into effect the convoy system, which was the most important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine campaign against allied shipping. Paragraph 35 of letter is the one here in question.

NAVY DEPARTMENT MISCONCEIVED PROBLEM OF DEFENDING HOME COAST.

It became evident, in the early part of my mission abroad, among the reasons which were keeping the department from giving hearty and vigorous cooperation in the war was a misconception of the problem of the defense of our own home coast. As I already pointed out, in a cable of June 24, the department had

Another thing the department recognizes is the necessity of sending all our naval craft which can be spared from the home waters into active European waters when such craft become available will send them.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

The department's cable of July 10, in which they stated it was again specifically stated that the department

cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine threat in those waters compatible with an adequate defense of our

Since my arrival abroad I had continuously poured cables and letters, that full information was available concerning submarine movements. Throughout the first few months of 1918 I informed the department that no submarine operations should be expected on the coast, except as a possible diversion for political reasons have already been fully described. I mentioned in my first letter written on April 19. The whole I summed up therein, and all my numerous letters after were mere repetition.

I particularly emphasize that fact, that in the very first nine days after I arrived in London, the whole recommended throughout the war was contained in the first few long, trying periods of resistance by the enemy. These things were all accepted.

On the night of April 14 I had said:

April 14, 1917

The enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our coast to divert attention and keep our forces from the critical area in the Atlantic. The difficulty of maintaining the free use of shipping on this side will restrict such operations although they should be effectively opposed principally by minesweeping on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have been laid in the Atlantic but majority at not over 50 fathoms. Mines do not explode until from 24 to 48 hours after they have been laid. The danger to themselves if location is not known. Maximum damage and antisubmarine work where most effective is in the immediate vicinity.

In my letter of April 19 I explained why the submarines should not operate on the American coast:

April 19, 1917

It is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions, such as the laying of mines, the critical area, in which the war's decision will be made, is the Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications. The enemy submarines and their rate of construction, allow the enemy to concentrate in the above critical area.

Necessary to take up your time by reading many of my letters. It should be borne in mind, however, that the department usually more often during those first six months of the war, or these same recommendations, were being made. On June 20, in my letter report I stated:

June 20, 1917:

In the whole dispatch, it would seem that the maximum protection should be concentrated in the area in which the enemy is most likely to operate or fail.

And in fact it has been a source of surprise that it has not occurred. The enemy will send one, or perhaps two or three submarines to operate in the Atlantic for the more purpose of agitating public opinion and to cause losses in home waters. All evidence indicates clearly, that the enemy would be primarily a diversion and a temporary one.

From cable to department, June 28, 1914:

I again submit that protection of our coast lines and of allied shipping necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity, if it is to be effective. The Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence, no operations in waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, the maximum force can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate to succeed.

Letter, June 29, 1917:

I again submit that, if the allied campaign is to be viewed as a whole, the necessity for any high-sea protection on our own coast. The submarine war vessel possesses no unusual characteristics different than those of other craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea, as far as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.

It should not be considered that I overlooked or minimized the importance of the defense of home waters, but, as I clearly pointed out, such defense in the first year, if not throughout the war, was best carried out in the submarine zone, where the major activities of the enemy were concentrated. It is an old and time-worn principle that the best defense is a vigorous offense. This principle is applicable to dog fights and street brawls as to military operations. There was every reason to believe, and events proved the case, that the only submarine operations which might occur on our coast would be sporadic and intended, as repeatedly stated in cables, merely diversions which, if met with anything in excess of the minimum force required, would merely play into the hands of the enemy and accomplish the very enemy object of such diversions. In fact, from 1917 on, I submitted to the department suggestions and recommendations as to the best means of meeting such activity as might actually occur.

Actual experience had shown that we could depend upon our ability to keep reasonably accurate track of all submarines at sea.

Incidentally, while not so important, that is one of the most interesting incidents that happened during the war—the extraordinary efficiency of the allied secret service. We hardly ever lost track of a submarine; and you will see presently we never failed to give adequate warning of when they left, when they would arrive here, and what they would do after they got here.

I do not mean here to convey that we knew where they were with sufficient accuracy to go out and sink them, but merely that we could at all times keep general track of comparatively restricted areas which they were occupying from time to time. Apart from secret service information, intercepted radio, and plotting by bearings, it is evident that the submarine could not accomplish his work at all without disclosing his presence; for example, if he showed up here [indicating] or if he were sighted there, knowing his average speed and having followed his operations previously, we could draw circles on the chart and be assured that for various periods he would be somewhere within those circles. This means that as long as the submarines were not too numerous in any one area, and as long as that area did not have to be traversed by ships, we could provide for safety by routing the ships around the circles. In the matter of fact, I am certain that history will show, when all the

more shipping was saved through thus keeping the routes and routing ships clear of them than by any other measure. That was the constant work of the staff in London throughout the war. As stated elsewhere, every route, every course followed by every naval, merchant, or troop carrier, was furnished with diversions of routings made while the ships were likewise directed and controlled by the staff. However, that I wish to bring out here is that, as far as we would never have to deal with but one or two submarines on our own coast, it was possible to do a great deal for the safety of shipping in our home waters without any antisubmarine craft at all.

SHIPPING IN AMERICAN WATERS WAS GIVEN CONSTANT CONSIDERATION.

The safety of shipping in our own home waters was always a matter that I gave it full consideration in all the records made could be easily substantiated by a long series of facts I might quote. For example, I discovered about the 1st of September, ten months after we had entered the war, that apparently done in the way of establishing and controlling shipping in our own home waters. This information was furnished by many officers coming abroad, and also by visitors who visited our headquarters. I shall read an official letter sent to the department under date September 17. [Reading]

SEPTEMBER 4, 1917.

My dear Sir:

Operations.

Atlantic coast ports.

It is made that German submarines may operate off the main coast of the Panama Canal. In addition to torpedoing ships, the submarines may be planting mines in localities not far from our ports. If discovered off any of our harbors, there would result a closing of the ports and allied ships bound from Europe would be in need of information as to how to be routed to America.

As this has already been taken up, I recommend that the department handle the submarine situation by having lines of approach planned and by having well defined channels of entrance through constant sweeping, if necessary. The office in New York, full information, with charts, etc., of the situation is handled in European waters. It is made that submarines can not operate advantageously on our coast for any great length of time, but it is quite possible that our and this office would be immediately flooded with information as to what instructions they should give the submarines to enter American ports without danger.

It is in the German interest to create abroad the impression that they were about to undertake submarine attack on our coast, and it is to be noted that such rumors were circulated by German agents in Europe and America for the purpose of influencing the Navy Department on the American side. This enemy policy was very much pursued by them in other fields throughout the war.

For example, the bombardments of a port in Liberia by a submarine had no bearing whatever upon the outcome of the war except in so far as the Allies allowed it to cause them to divert some of their forces from the central strategical area where the enemy was trying to win. Throughout the war there were frequent cruises by enemy submarines in the vicinity of the Azores and elsewhere far afield all for this same purpose.

The fact that such propaganda was not without effect upon the Navy Department was illustrated by the fact that I received numerous cables throughout 1917 and the early months of 1918 from the department mentioning these reports of probable submarine activities on the Atlantic coast. In my letter of October 9, 1917, I referred to this enemy propaganda and again repeated my recommendations, as follows:

REPORTS OF SUBMARINE ACTIVITY IN WESTERN ATLANTIC.

Letter No. 1254; October 9 1917:

With reference to the information which has reached the department from various sources concerning the possibility of a force of large enemy submarines operating off the Atlantic coast or in the West Indies, the force commander has given practically all information available here. The force commander is strongly of the personal opinion that no extensive oversea campaign of this kind will be initiated by the enemy. He is further of the personal opinion that such a campaign is a practical impossibility.

No evidence gathered during the war indicates that enemy submarines are more free from material casualties and the general restrictions which obtain with respect to surface craft than surface craft themselves; in fact, it is considered that submarines are much more restricted in their operations than surface craft. Submarines require frequent docking, and hence it is not believed that even an efficient submarine—should such a ship be available and if it were possible to maintain her in distant fields—would be able to furnish the facilities that the submarines on our coast would demand.

It is always, of course, quite possible that the enemy may send a small number of submarines to operate temporarily on our coast or in distant fields, with the object of affecting the disposition of our forces. It would be greatly to the interest of the enemy to force the removal of our antisubmarine force from the critical areas near to the enemy bases and in the local areas of allied trade, upon which the success of the war is largely dependent.

It has been a source of more or less surprise that such an operation as this has not been undertaken before, and the only theory offered to explain the fact that it has not been undertaken has been that the enemy apparently did not consider it of sufficient interest to arouse the American public unnecessarily.

It has been believed that the enemy hopes that peace will arrive before the pressure of the United States has become at all serious. The population of the enemy countries, now in the fourth year of the war, has reached what might be called a "bitter stage," which will react upon the enemy following the war during the reconstruction period. The theory is therefore advanced that it will be greatly to the enemy's advantage during the reconstruction period if the American public has not been given any cause to reach the so-called "bitter stage."

On the other hand, it may be urged that a few submarines sent to operate temporarily on the American coast, or on the trade routes from South America, particularly in the vicinity of the canal, might result in sufficient popular agitation to force the department into withdrawing either all or part of its forces from European waters. The possibility of this contingency must therefore, of course, receive serious consideration.

The fact was that the enemy was about as short of submarines as we were of surface craft for accomplishing his purpose as we were of surface craft for thwarting him. It was for this reason that we always were perfectly safe in assuming that these various far-flung operations, aimed at leading us to believe that our forces were in danger, could never be performed except by one or two submarines—this for the simple reason that, if at any time they

submarines out of the only area in which they could operate. The campaign would then have ceased immediately.

After cases of recommendations made from the department, after some months, recognized the soundness of adopting it. (I do not know that that is very true.)

And I think I am safe in saying that by about 1917 it was their well-established and adopted policy.

They could not go into European waters; but during the war the policy had not been followed, and many vessels were lost.

Atlantic home waters which would have been a great loss, and these vessels at the same time had been lost.

And hence, when the policy was finally adopted, it was a move which involved further delay.

The necessity for complying with the recommendation of the maximum number of craft into the war zone at this time at home, is shown in a report of the Secretary of the Navy, in February, 1918, on the defense of home waters, and whose conclusion was accepted by the department.

The board, under the heading "General policy," stated that the United States is to send the maximum possible for the active theater of the war. This policy the board decided to the end that there might be no weakening of it.

The board, as a means of defending shipping on the Atlantic, recommended the establishment of shipping control and of a system of Atlantic ports, which should be put into effect.

Submarines operating off Atlantic harbors. It should be noted that the recommendations of the board, which are to be made, was substantially of the same character as my letter of September 1, which I have already mentioned.

It was to be supplemented by various auxiliary measures and aircraft patrols. The board decided that the submarines would be sufficient craft to keep the coast clear, and they found that it would be possible to do so by utilizing new destroyers and new submarines.

They found that it would be possible to do so by utilizing new destroyers and new submarines. They found that it would be possible to do so by utilizing new destroyers and new submarines.

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American coast. In my letter of April 30, 1918 (No. 16406) I furnished the information contained in this cable.

This is what I referred to as the interesting movement of submarines.

INFORMATION OF MOVEMENTS OF ENEMY SUBMARINES

The best proof of the fact that I had available at all times information concerning submarine movements sufficiently accurate to warn the department in advance of submarine movements off the American coast is well demonstrated by what actually happened when submarines did arrive off the American coast in the summer of 1918. In my cable of April 28, 1917, I had said:

April 28, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Through: State Department.

With regard to submarines entering and leaving their bases and their approximate whereabouts while operating, the Admiralty is able to maintain information fairly exact.

Of the 34 mine U-boats, 2 for some days were not located, and the Admiralty at the point of informing us of the probability of their being en route to the United States when their whereabouts were discovered. It is the Admiralty's belief at present none are likely to be sent over and that the present effort of the Admiralty, which is successful, will be kept up off the channel entrance.

And these assurances I repeated many times in letters and before I cabled the information that a German submarine was en route for the United States coast, fully a year later. At the end of April, 1918, I learned that one of the submarines of the Deutschland type (U-151) had left Germany prepared for a long cruise, and information indicated that her destination was the American coast.

The department was promptly informed, and further received numerous messages during the slow progress of this submarine en route to the Azores region across the Atlantic. As I have repeatedly stated elsewhere in this testimony the department was not only given advance warning of the sailings of all submarines for our home waters but further was given follow-up and confirmatory information together with details, as regards the character of the submarines, their habits and methods, and even in many cases the names of the commanding officers, with their previous records. I have before me a rather large batch of messages, all of this nature, which I will not take time to read, but I am sure that the committee would find them very interesting, and further that they would prove rather astonishing, in view of the remarkably accurate and detailed information we had of submarine movements.

I will read complete or in part one group of messages concerning the first submarine, merely as typical messages.

[Dispatch sent 16-15-26. EJ134.]

Date May 1, 1918.

To Opnav.

Prepared by CS. Approved NCT. Code 34 ADR. No. 7289.

Highly secret. To Department May 1.

7289. Admiralty informs me that information from reliable agents states that a submarine of *Deutschland* type left Germany about April 19 to attack either American troop transports or ships carrying material from the States.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

on the German formed conclusions that:
the transports sail from New York via Nantucket Sh
and direct to Europe.

the transports go from Newport News to a p
and then to Azores and thence to destination.

It is incidentally there that while a great deal of
is wrong. I am trying to bring out the point that
that the captains of German submarines did have we
being.

that the submarine is taking a northern route across Atlantic, av

It is important in this connection now
the information as to the starting of the subma
there was plenty of time to send all the destroy
out them in dock, and paint their bottoms, and
before the submarine got over there. [Reading

the existing submarines ready for service.

the type of submarine, similar to the *Deutschland* that they
primary purpose.

with *Deutschland* class establishes following conclusion
operate a long distance from shore, and seldom in less than

are very vulnerable to depth charge attack.

the submerged

the instance of attack against convoy, and but two of tor
were successful, one being unsuccessful. They attack by gun fire at

the type to oppose them is the submarine.

the covering area as soon as presence of submarine is discovered.

Admiral Grant be given copy of this cablegram. 26001.

Sm

the admiral in command in America, h

[Dispatch sent 16-15-26. J13.]

the received Code B4Ar No. 7997.

May 15

Information contained in this cable is given me by the Br
somewhat paraphrased for transmission, but I
is authentic. There appears to be a reasonable probab
(referred to in cablegram just read) may arrive of
time after May 20, and that she will carry mines.

fact, we had exact information as to what she
paraphrased it in the cable, and did not give it,
get hold of it. [Continuing reading]

the favorite spot for laying mines to be the por
step to pick up pilots. For instance, for Delaware
are picked up south of the Five Fathom Bank Light V
the most likely spots for a submarine to lay mines

fact, we had the exact information that that
to lay mines, but, for the reasons given, we
(Continuing reading:)

the pressure put on subject of antisubmarine p
neutral sources information that a patrol is maintain
C. 2-4

most of the harbors, and especially off Chesapeake Bay. A neutral has the patrol extends as far as Cape Skerry. (sic.)

It should be noted that, except for mine laying, submarines of this work in deep water, and that the Germans have laid mines in water in 70 fathoms. So far as is known, there is no reason why they should not depths up to 90 fathoms.

The foregoing completes the information furnished by British Admiralty. The following is added by me.

There are circumstances which I can not explain more fully, which render it important that nothing whatever should be given out which would lead even to surmise that we had had any advance information concerning this, even in the event of our sinking her, and that such measures as are taken by the department be taken secretly as possible, and without public disclosure of reasons.

It seems, as I remember, that the department was criticised for letting the public know that the submarine was coming over about to arrive, but it was absolutely essential that they should give that information out. [Continuing reading:]

I venture to remind the department in this connection that the employment of surface vessels to patrol against this submarine would probably result, merely driving her from one area to another, whereas the employment of submarines against her might lead to her destruction. It is suggested that, having established the most probable areas of operation, submarines be employed in a patrol as stationary as may be, some of them covering the point south of Five Fathom Light Vessels, remaining submerged during the day with periscopes only. Of five submarines certainly destroyed in four days, three were torpedoed. 7997. 22215.

[Continuing reading:]

I may say that the indications given in that cablegram as to whether she would probably lay mines turned out to be entirely correct. She did lay mines there, and those mines were responsible for the sinking of the steamship *Pratt*, sunk at the entrance to the Delaware water, and also the steamship *Scapia*, and also the United States ship *Minnesota* struck a mine there, but did not sink. [Continuing reading:]

[Confidential.]

From: Department, June 4.
Simsadus.

6800. Enemy submarine commenced operation 60 miles southeast Barnegat Bay 3 p. m.; sunk by bomb schooner *Edward H. Cole*; sunk by method not yet known; Jacob Haskell; U. S. S. *Preble*, reports now engaging submarine. Captain reports sighting periscope of second submarine.

B1

That is the message of the department to me. I replied as follows:

[Confidential.]

To: Department, June 4.

9029. Your 6800. It is practically certain that there is but one submarine operating on the Atlantic coast of United States, which is probably *U-151*. 9029.

I did not want to say that it was entirely certain, because I did not want to paraphrase those things. Then here is a cablegram received from the Navy Department, June 5, 1918. [Reading:]

SIMSADUS.

6852. Enemy submarine operating this coast, identified as *U-151*, has crew 75, commanding officer formerly employed Hamburg-American Line, has been operating on this coast. About 22 May, mine located off Overfalls Lightship; presence of more than one submarine not definitely established.

B1

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

that I not only gave information that the submarine reported on the 19th of April to go to the American coast, given the probable area in which the submarine would operate on the American coast; and these were the areas. It is to be noted also that this submarine began operations on June 2, 32 days after I had informed the Navy of the exact area and of the approximate time of its operations as quoted. I gave additional information of the submarine, and the areas in which it would operate, and sent them a full description of this submarine as sent from the department, giving even the name of the submarine. I believe at this time the American public is not ignorant of submarines, or certainly more than it was at the coast.

department in advance of prospective movement of submarines which operated on the American coast. Thus on June 2 and July 5, 1918, I informed the department:

JUNE 29, 1918

(Highly secret.)

Submarine at sea. At present off west coast of Ireland. Submarine cannot reach longitude of Nantucket before. Submarine informed

Sm

Submarine outward bound, reported July 4 at 10:00 a.m. Submarine bound

Sm

These messages by numerous other dispatches with accurate information of her progress and position. July 6 I informed the department that a third submarine was at sea, probably proceeding to the American coast. This information was also confirmed in a series of messages. I informed the department that precautions against probable bombardments of certain points along the Atlantic coast. This was in my dispatch of July 1, 1918. I reported that a fourth submarine, of the same type, was on its way to the Atlantic coast. No further information was received until at least three weeks after the first dispatch concerning them. I have before me a number of messages which are but a few samples of the many messages concerning enemy operations on our own coast, which I have sent to the department at all times.

Let me read you a couple of paragraphs from a message to Admiral Benson on May 17, 1918, summarizing the matter:

MAY 17, 1918

The question of enemy submarines—which is never absent from the mind—quite clear that it very rarely happens that the position of a submarine is known, almost certainly that the exit and entry of each submarine is known, and

her track is known with sufficient accuracy from the time she leaves and gets back.

I tell you this so that you may have no apprehension that you will get a warning of the approach of any submarines that may start for America. You will always be safe in assuming that there are no submarines there that have been warned about. I have no idea at all that Germany will do more than she is now doing; that is, send an isolated submarine to the other side for the purpose they believe it will have on our people. To put the extreme case, if she sent all of her submarines to the other side, the antisubmarine campaign would be successful.

(At this point at 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned to-morrow, Saturday, March 13, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Met pursuant to adjournment at 10 o'clock in the Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick I.

Wheeler Hale (chairman) and Trammell.

THE committee will be in order and Admiral S.

REPORT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

The largest number of submarines that ever operated on the coast of the United States was the number was only one. This was in entire accordance with what was expected, and I mention it merely to show what was to meet such operations. Quite apart from the measures taken against them, it was a comparatively easy matter to keep our important shipping clear of them. They were kept track of from day to day. We were bothered by them, but that was merely part of our struggle. These losses were not serious in the aggregate, and they influenced whatever upon the outcome of the war as they influenced the department to become the strategic center of operations. The Secretary of the Navy in his report for 1918, stated,

"The attacks of the German submarines against our coast caused the most serious incidents of the war."

The subject of the department's lack of information and its activities and imperfect coordination.

As far submitted, I have pointed out specific instances in which the department either disregarded my recommendations or failed to act upon them. The recommendations, at all times be remembered, were all based upon a complete discussion with allied leaders and were issued under which my duties were

The subject discussed in paragraphs 60 to 65 of my report of July 7, 1920. In these paragraphs it was pointed out that the ignorance of many of the departmental plans and important dispositions and movements of force and of delays caused by the department failing to use

her track is known with sufficient accuracy from the time she leaves port until she gets back.

I tell you this so that you may have no apprehension that you will not receive warning of the approach of any submarines that may start for America. I think you will always be safe in assuming that there are no submarines there that you have not been warned about. I have no idea at all that Germany will do more than she is now doing; that is, send an isolated submarine to the other side for the effect which they believe it will have on our people. To put the extreme case, if she should send all of her submarines to the other side, the antisubmarine campaign would at once be successful.

(At this point at 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, March 13, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

matter before the responsible allied naval leaders—and before the allied naval council, before that body—action in all its phases, in the light of the fullest and most candid cable the result to the Navy Department and so on. This procedure insured, so far as was humanly possible, consideration would be given to the cause of the matter rather than to the often conflicting interests of the parties concerned.

Q. Now for the Italian Navy Department and the French Navy Department and the British Admiralty, to continue to communicate their attaches in Washington, as they had done during the three years of the war. In fact, a great many such communications were automatic and were made without the direct intervention of the leaders themselves, although actually made in their name. For instance, one section of the British Admiralty, acting in America, would drive through a message to the British Embassy in Washington in the name of the head of the Admiralty, not taking into account, of course, the fact that the message might be sent in at the same time from the French Navy Department.

A. Not to a certain extent before the end of the war.

Q. Admiral Sims, Mr. Hoover is here now, and if you have a while, we will hear from him.

A. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF MR. HERBERT HOOVER.

(—was sworn by the chairman.)

Q. Mr. Hoover, in his testimony of March 12 Admiral Sims gave you well-known intimate knowledge of food conditions in Europe in 1917, and he suggested that he was willing to appear before the committee and give testimony on this matter. The committee will be very glad to hear what you will give us some information about general food conditions in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917, and also about shipping conditions during that time.

A. My contact in the matter arises over a request that I be sent to the government in Washington to make some investigation of the shipping situation in the month of April, 1917, and to carry through officials of the French, Italian, and British governments, and at that time I came into contact with Admiral Sims, and we naturally discussed the position with him.

Q. It was that owing to the intensity of the submarine warfare, the government was a great deal embarrassed over their food situation, because the submarine sinkings had reached about such a point that they were at the rate, I suppose, of some-thing in the neighborhood of 600,000 to 700,000 tons of shipping a month. The food situation in the three countries might be such that the breadstuff supply, which was the most critical, did not exceed three to four weeks' reserve stocks. Is that so? We usually refer to the stocks outside of those that are in process of distribution, such as marketing, wholesale dealing, and so forth.

The situation of France and Italy was rather more acute than the situation in England, and the result was, of course, to produce the utmost anxiety on all sides as to the situation as a whole.

The shipping position was, roughly, that at that rate of sinkings the war was at a measurable end, and that, as we subsequently the rate of sinking was greatly diminished, the shipping produced, and we managed to struggle through.

One of the alarming features of that situation was that the shipping were largely loaded vessels. They were large cargoes. So that, with the loss of that quantity of shipping, it represented a very large monthly loss of food supplies, and the situation had naturally diminished the existing stocks. That, I may say, the position so far as I could describe it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is true that there was just about enough shipping available in April, 1917, to supply the absolute needs of the Allies at that time?

Mr. HOOVER. The problem is one of a great deal of complexity because, as desperation drives, resources were discovered that were not originally contemplated. For instance, it was found from experience that shipping could be withdrawn from routes and localities that were considered impossible, and ships were applied to special services that had not been adapted to it.

We directed the shipping onto the North American market, instead of to the Canadian and American market—as being the shortest route, and threw the large load of food supply onto the North American States, instead of relying on the Argentine and elsewhere, where the transportation required two or three times the amount of shipping and by devices of that kind what might have been mathematically a desperate situation was ameliorated by degrees.

As I recollect, the total available mercantile tonnage for the transportation of supplies was somewhere in the neighborhood of 40,000,000 tons. I have not the accurate figures with me, but, as I recollect, something like 10,000,000 tons in naval and military tonnage, leaving somewhere about 30,000,000 tons for transportation of supplies and food supplies. That amount of tonnage would be sufficient on the reduced supplies that resulted from the transportation of the allied countries and the diversion of that tonnage to North America to the shortest route, provided that there were no continuous losses. It is very difficult to outline, in round figures, the situation that looms up ahead in any given emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was a fact, was it not, that if the supplies had been cut off and the submarine blockade had been successful, in the end the Allies would have had to give in?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, it is obvious that the war would have ended almost in a moment if the supplies had been cut off. The most desperate period, I might say, was between April and the end of September. With September arrives the continental harvest, and that harvest supplied an available amount of food supplies for the allied countries. The French would have eight months', the Italians six months', and the British four months' food supplies. So that, at that time, it was possible to get by until the harvest came in, then to have a period of possible relaxation.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims has testified that in the month of April, 1917, 800,000 tons of shipping were destroyed by the

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Q Nowhere near that rate, would it have been possible of the Allies and the taking care of the army? Well, just my own personal opinion would be that it was not; but, again, I would want to make a reservation—one can not tell how far a population may it stand and stricter and stricter rationing, more or less deprivation of that sort. The allied countries were in the final stage of privation during the war.

Q But they were on the border line at that time? They were in a very serious condition, not only during the following winter.

Q Again in the following winter?

A Yes.

Q And you were looking at the feeding of the allied armies as one of the critical things in the war? Certainly. I have always felt that it was one of the things that the American people furnished that served to win the war; not at any one special effort of the American people, but the entire success; but certainly it was one of the big factors.

Q And nothing that the American people could have done of more advantage than to destroy this? As far as it lay in their power to do so; and even though we have been made to prosecute this campaign very hard.

Q Most certainly; but I would not want to be taken into account were not made, simply because I know nothing of policy or procedure.

Q You are not familiar with that?

A No, sir.

Q You returned to America in the latter part of 1918?

A I arrived here the 2d of May, I believe.

Q Did you report on conditions to the Navy Department in this country, or soon thereafter?

A I do not think I ever made any special report. I did report to, I think it was, the Committee, and I reported to the President.

Q And to the President?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you spoke to them about the important submarine menace?

Q Yes, that was uppermost, I think, in every mind. The submarine menace at that time looked to me as the question with which we were confronted. If we had had available destroyers and submarines to fight the submarines, do you think it would have shortened the war if we had used them for that purpose?

Q Well, I hardly know how to answer a theoretical question. I assume that if we had had a great surplus of that sort and could have applied it directly, it would certainly have helped.

Q If we could have applied it, you think it would have shortened the war?

Mr. HOOVER. I would not want to go so far as that. The question of the length of the war is one of the most complicated that one can go into, as it embraces the whole plan of land and the economic collapse internally in Germany, and all the factors that may have been predominant in bringing the war to end, even the propaganda that broke down the morale of the German armies. That is, I do not refer to allied propaganda but to German propaganda. So that I feel that is a problem that I would not want to express an opinion upon. It seems to me that that can only be determined by history itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes. The questions of the character of the war are rather hypothetical, Mr. Hoover. I would like to know, as a matter of fact, did not those who were in charge, even though the situation was very acute and very alarming, meet the situation by supplying food supplies?

Mr. HOOVER. So far as my department was concerned—that was my concern—I honestly believe that we made every endeavor possible to meet the situation.

Senator TRAMMELL. You know of no great losses or interference with the progress so far as the supplying of food was concerned?

Mr. HOOVER. No; except the enormous destruction of shipping that was sunk in progress.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is all that I have to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of your department. Do you know the conditions in Belgium at that time?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I was referring to food problems, although the Food Administration was not created until 1917, but it did serve as the medium of furthering the food supplies of our country on behalf of our Government, by request of the President.

The CHAIRMAN. And while there was no failure to send food over, you have already stated that the condition was very critical and that the food supply was practically on the border line, and had been cut off it would have done great damage?

Mr. HOOVER. The situation was dangerous almost beyond description, and the anxiety in the whole of that period was terrific. I do not overemphasize the critical character of that position or the dangers in which the whole allied cause rested.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. The conditions were very critical, and there was impending danger, but those conditions were met, so that we did not suffer the disaster that was impending?

Mr. HOOVER. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is not that true?

Mr. HOOVER. It is manifest that the war was won and even if it had not been, it was kept alive. That is the answer to that.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Mr. Hoover; and the committee is very much obliged to you.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, Admiral Sims.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

STORY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resume

1. I have previously stated that some days after reports from London I learned, quite by accident, the disposition of our naval forces in the war that had been made between the Navy Department and French naval representatives in Washington as

2. Admiral Jellicoe had directed the British command North American station to proceed to Washington after declaration of war and to lose no time in cooperation, at least in areas outside the

3. reached were set forth in a dispatch from the chief, which I will quote in part:

APRIL 13,

4. W. S. I., via ambassador, Washington.

5. Agreement have been arrived at with United States Navy sending telegram to Paris. Questions raised by

6. The plan is to proceed from North Atlantic port of departure. Operations of ships of this squadron will be limited to the area of operations from the parallel of 40° W., thence south to the parallel of 20° N.

7. On the east coast of South America will be provided for the area of operations from Brazilian coast of 20° W., thence south to 15° S., then parallel with the coast along that parallel to the coast.

8. will be sent over in the immediate future. These operations will be considered most necessary.

9. will look after west coast of North America from California.

10. The excellent United States armed Government will be in service for the present, which will be utilized for the present.

11. The squadron will be maintained for the present in the Gulf of Mexico and Central America, West Point and Jamaica, along north coast of Virgin Islands, thence north to the southeastern

12. If submarines appear they will attempt to attack the coast, but this only possible if a parent force is provided.

13. French minister of marine

14. Vessels for French coast not yet possible on the coast. When available, however, they will be sent to the coast, if necessary. Every possible effort will be made. Too much reliance should not be

15. Naval transports for carrying (2) railway in the immediate, a second and third as soon as possible.

16. At the agreements, except as to the third agreement, employment of forces elsewhere than in the

17. I learned of this agreement by accident.

18. Any conference had been held. I learned of this by accident.

19. I did not regard the agreement as embodying cooperation needed from the American Navy.

20. That the specific arrangements provided were intended to cover only the situation of the marine zone. How it was regarded in Washi

It very early became apparent to the other naval officers in Europe, that nothing but confusion could result, if each allied Governments were to go independently to the Navy Department with every request that they had to make for force and assistance. Thus, for example, the American naval attaché, Commander W. R. Sayles, came to London to see me in at the end of April, 1917, with regard to requests being made by the French, and I found that he was in entire accord with the view that immediate concerted action was necessary to combat the submarine menace, and that the military necessity of the situation demanded the immediate centralization of all recommendations of policy, made to the Navy Department by the European Governments. He cabled this recommendation to the department on April 27, and, throughout the next three months, worked in complete cooperation with me in an endeavor to coordinate our relations with the British and French navies.

I will say throughout the first three months, because at that time I had a special representative there, who took up these duties.

In order to show clearly what confusion resulted from the independent action followed by the department, of acting upon recommendations received from many different quarters, it is only necessary to review the cases of the establishment of naval bases in France, and the sending of a patrol force, and our first aviation unit, to France. Those referred to in paragraph 64 of the letter which is under investigation before the committee.

As I had learned from Commander Sayles, the French naval attaché in Washington had requested the department to send vessels to France, and to establish bases on the French coast. I learned of this during my visit to Paris in the first week in May. At the end of these conferences that were held at that time, I cabled to the Navy Department on May 5 the following dispatch:

From: R. Admiral Sims to Navy Department. Sent from Paris, May 5, 1917.

Relations with the French Navy Department very satisfactory. Conference of British minister and chief of staff and French attaché, London, and British attaché and first sea lord resulted in unanimous agreement that our destroyers should remain concentrated, and should attack the enemy submarines in whatever area they may be operating in greatest numbers. Probably principally in the area south to the west-northwest of Fastnet.

Fastnet being the south point of Ireland.

As will be noted, the French navy department was in complete agreement as to the necessity for concentrating all of our forces in one area. I learned later in the month, from the naval attaché in Paris, that the Navy Department intended to send patrol vessels to the French coast. I had received no information, direct or indirectly, from the department of this intention. It should be understood that I am criticising the department for sending vessels to the French coast, or acting with the French naval attaché in making that decision, but there were many preliminary arrangements to be made for the handling of any forces to be sent to the coast, which required definite information. On May 15 the French attaché in Paris cabled the Secretary of the Navy as follows:

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Ministry of marine has asked for information to be furnished, giving the characteristics of patrol vessels of the United States and inquires also if they are to be accompanied by the copy of this cablegram to Admiral Sims for his information.

The department replied to the naval attaché:

MAY 21,

As regards the French commission, the department will be in a position to give definite information in regard to supplying with coal the French Atlantic or channel ports. 14020.

DAN

and of this only through receiving a copy from the French attaché.

On May 23, informed the department that the French attaché would require their own colliers and supply ships to be self-supporting.

Thus far received from the Navy Department to enable any plans to be made for receiving the French fleet to the French coast. In a cable of May 14 saying among other things:

in work here if department could send information regarding the prospective plans affecting United States forces in Europe, particularly needed as to following: Number and character of vessels which are available, or may possibly be sent this summer to patrol vessels to be sent to France.

was received to this cablegram. After further discussion Commander Sayles cabled the Secretary on the following similar information, as follows:

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Paris, June 1, 1917.

French ministry of marine we are in accord in our desire to give information regarding naval and military units en route to France for their protection off French coast, and the Navy require that ministry of marine would receive information of forces, intended employment, what bases to be used, on account of possibility of enemy having my information sent through French naval attaché in Washington. The campaign demands that French ministry of marine information possible. 12001.

SAY

In my letters about this time, I repeated my request for these forces. On June 7 I cabled again asking for any further addition to our forces, here or in France.

The attaché, it appears, nor I, received any reply to these messages. In a message which I received from the French attaché on June 20, in reply to my many cables in May and June, was made to forces to be sent to France, except fishing vessels would sail in August for France. It is clear at this point that, when I first went abroad, my paramount duty was to act as the representative of the United States. On April 28, 1917, I was designated as the United States destroyers operating from British waters. On June 14, 1917, that I received the title of comm

of all the United States naval forces in European waters. On that date, then, June 14, 1917, I was in command of all of our vessels in European waters: still the department continued on negotiations direct with French representatives and our naval attaché in Paris, thereby tending to diminish my authority and hence weaken the efficiency of our naval participation in the war.

On July 3 I received a message from Brest to the effect that the *Corsair* and *Aphrodite* had arrived there, and that eight others were all under the command of Capt. W. B. Fletcher, were due to join him. On July 5, in a dispatch from the department, I was informed that "eight patrol boats under Capt. Fletcher due to arrive French coast July 5. Ten more yachts will sail about July 15 to join him." It is, is, the yachts had arrived at Brest three days before the first message I had received from the department concerning them. It is true that the naval attaché in Paris had been informed by the department of the sailing of the yachts under Capt. Fletcher, but no information had been given concerning their orders, or the respective plans of the department for their operations. The result was that when they arrived, the French had made no plans for their reception; neither the French nor our naval attaché in Paris had received any information as to the character of their operations, so that it had been impossible to make any arrangements for caring for the ships, or utilizing them immediately in the campaign against the German submarines, and it was nearly two weeks after their arrival before they were actually employed.

Much the same situation arose in connection with the establishment of our naval bases at Brest and Bordeaux. I received information of the plans of the department in this connection on the 8th of May, in the following dispatch:

[Cablegram.]

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received: May 8, 1917.

The French have requested, and United States Navy Department consent to, establishing temporary bases at Bordeaux and Brest, with one line officer, one deck officer, and one engineer officer. You are requested to advise on this, and requested that your reply be expedited.

DA

To this I replied:

[Cable sent department May 8, 1917.]

The establishment of temporary bases at Brest and Bordeaux are very desirable, but should not divert in any way the necessary repair, supply, and fuel vessels from our mobile destroyer base. It is urgent that the destroyer force remain concentrated with mobile base ready to follow any movement of main submarine activity and to guard sea trade routes.

In later dispatches, I requested further information with reference to the plans for the establishment of these bases, and requested that experienced line officers, with a knowledge of French, should be detailed to this duty. The specific recommendations that I made were disapproved by the department. Plans were drawn up in June by the French ministry of marine for the establishment of a shore base at Bordeaux for the American Navy. Copies of these plans were transmitted to Washington, with a request for approval, but no information was received by me or the French from

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

what their plans were or their action on the F
I was informed that two retired officer
command the bases at Brest and Bord
that they would be accompanied by a paym
for each. In spite of repeated requests, I rec
information concerning the plans for these bases
was later, and then only in a personal letter,
New York, from the engineer officer detailed for
This letter is very illuminating as showing the
It is as follows:

New York, July 13.

I am writing advising you of a situation that
I am to be assigned to duty in connection with th
done over there is very indefinite, and no one in an
has any definite idea of what is expected of the
and what should be sent over there. From the
sent over I think a fairly well-equipped base
Department as near as I can gather, has the idea th
work that will develop. This I doubt, as they pr
their own work
In my opinion, I think we ought to have a considerable n
a thoroughly planned base organization provided;
for special use to supply the base
tentative order inclosed be issued to cover the sit
this will be done, and a watchful-waiting policy may

that if you will ask for adequate facilities attention
much planning ahead in the department and there is
; anxious for such things as base facilities and mainte
but no information or instructions as to what I will
with. I can promise that a lot will be required, prep
immediately, but some authority to start must be g
to have Commander Baldwin report what is neede
full information of the number of craft that are to l
is concerned. I can't get that completely either.
equipment that can be made available can b
have too much than too little. So if you would b
the need of repair facilities, preparatory action mi
be saved. I don't think there will be much prep
make your wants well known in advance. I
what is needed in the shape of material upkeep and
light of experience covering similar situations I
that will not be seriously needed within four m
the war is at an end then.
and upkeep will check any proposed military
material facilities will enable much to be done; ha
We have Gallipoli and the Mesopotamia e

at earliest possible date and when I get ov
of the situation so that other wants may be pr
probable demand for base facilities would also assis
provision

BASE PROPOSITION.

the requirements of 20 to 40 yachts, 20 destroyers
a considerable number of submarine chasers. Th
like that which was demanded of Cavite during the
number of vessels will probably be increased.
will have to supply everything for its vessels except p
Too much rather than too limited facilities sho
will be
such as are required for operation and repair.

A United States repair force familiar with United States machinery. Such machine tools as can be found and supplied.

Hand tools in considerable quantity; drills, files, tap and dies, etc.; pipe cutting outfits, welding outfits, etc. These are also needed to replenish the vessels.

4. The quickest way to be started is to have some vessel assigned as base. Such vessel should have a naval crew, and should collect at Norfolk and yards such material, supplies, and personnel as can be made ready immediately for base purposes. This should include building material for base storehouse and quarters for personnel.

5. As soon as a load of material is prepared send vessel across. Vessel to have mechanical personnel till such times as facilities are prepared on shore, then return and go back for such additional supplies, tools, facilities, etc., as may be assembled in the meantime. This vessel could keep the base supplied with the things it will be used for and any available cargo space could be used for other freight. If needs become greater, more than one vessel might be assigned to the work.

6. Immediate authority is required—

(1) To have a suitable vessel assigned.

(2) To recruit a repair force, allowing navy-yard employees to volunteer at their rate of pay plus subsistence, and including naval reserves in Regatta having mechanical training, and such men as can be collected from available receiving stations and districts. About 100 should be taken to begin with, to be added as needs indicate.

(3) Give base commander authority to spend money as needed in France, and matters as can be procured there.

(4) Bureau of Construction and Repair, Ordnance and Steam Engine, authorize Supplies and Accounts procure and prepare for shipment such materials and supplies as may be deemed required in the near future for such vessels to be based abroad outside of facilities to tenders.

(5) Vessel assigned as base supply vessel to be routed as required by base commander, subject to superior authority as necessary.

7. As soon as base commander reports prospective needs, all available materials and facilities should be prepared for shipment from the several navy yards.

There is attached to that letter a paper mentioned in the letter plan. This paper contains a remarkably accurate forecast of what was found ultimately necessary at Brest and what was established in the course of our occupancy of that base, and I suggest that that be included along with the letter. This is added on August 10, from Bordeaux, France, to the headquarters in London. It is as follows:

BORDEAUX, FRANCE, August 10,

The situation in France is not quite clear to me. I suppose the trouble is we have too few officers to attend to matters. It occurs to me to tell you of this at Bordeaux, so that you will know just where I need to be enlightened.

About June 1 Admiral Palmer gave me preliminary orders to go to Bordeaux in command of the American naval base. I asked him what the duties were, and he said he knew nothing about it. I asked the same question and got the same answer from all the other heads in the Navy Department. I knew there was no base at Bordeaux, not even a French naval base; and something would have to be done, and I applied for an Engineer officer and a paymaster and several yeomen. After waiting about four weeks I got orders to proceed with the following party, but no instructions. Paymaster Colby, with two assistant paymasters, N. R.; Bernier, N. R., engineer officer; Asst. Surg. Stevens, N. R.; and three yeomen. We all had orders to report to me at the naval base, Bordeaux. We arrived here July 1.

I have made contracts for the land and rented some buildings and contracted the commercial wharf for handling of coal. We have 1,800 tons of coal left here on the steamship *Sioux*. I find it embarrassing to deal with the people here unless I have definite instructions about what we are going to do. If necessary Paymaster can go to London to close contracts for material ordered in England, but I would like to do it by mail if possible.

To this letter the following reply was sent, pointing out the delay and the difficulty which was being experienced in getting action from the department.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Extract from the letter is pertinent. The letter is
[Reading:]

The matter of the base at Bordeaux is not yet settled, owing to the
reporting to a cablegram sent a week ago setting forth the situation
to expend about \$100,000 for the purpose of establishing
base. Paymaster Colby was here at the time the cablegram was
sent and has probably informed you of the contents before now
to the effect, and we are to-day sending a follow-up message asking
in considerable delay the department disapproved the expenditure

of the situation existing at Bordeaux was sent
to me. From this I will read you just a few paragraphs
which resulted from the action of the
and its failure to coordinate this action with
to keep their representative in Europe, and
informed of what they were doing. [Reading]

AMERICAN NAVAL BASE
Bordeaux, France, September 19,

Dear Sir:

United States Navy.

Conditions in Bordeaux.

The department in regard to Bordeaux is not very clear
to throw some light on the subject. About June 1 the Com-
mander gave me preliminary orders to proceed to Bordeaux and
to establish a naval base. I asked for several assistants, which re-
sulted in my being able to report to me at Bordeaux: One paymaster
and one assistant surgeon, one lieutenant (engineer), and

one inquiry in the department as to their plans for Bordeaux
at New York. I have taken the matter up and wrote me at New York
to learn of no plans, and that I would have to come over
to do so.

The naval attaché in Washington told me that our Navy Department
was in France.

It was stated in a lengthy article in the New York Times in June
that we had two bases in France.

The Navy Directory of June 1 mentioned the American naval base
at Bordeaux.

The Director, who recently arrived at Brest, told me that
the department would not establish any extensive

base. He was ordered to report to me as liaison of the French
commission to Washington. He gave me to
understand that the Navy Department expected that our Navy would im-
mediately furnish coal supplies and repairs for a few patrol
ships, and that the French began building a new wharf for our

situation arose in connection with the first avia-
tion. I learned from Commander Sayles, who
told me that American naval personnel was to be
sent to the department for training in French aviation se-
retary. The naval attaché in Paris had received any o-
ther information. On May 14 the naval attaché in
Paris reported to the department as follows:

Paris

The naval attaché in Washington reported that Admiral Chou-
ville had designated for aviation training in
France. He has requested me to ask for detailed information
as to what grades, what previous experience in aviation.

Sa

2-2-19

Nothing further was heard from the department with reference to this detachment, except a brief message to the effect that the aviation unit was sailing on the colliers *Neptune* and *Jupiter* for France. When the unit arrived in France they found that no definite arrangements had been made for their training, as the information concerning the number and composition had been insufficient, if possible. I will read you, from the report of the commanding officer of this detachment, the results of this situation:

It being necessary to confer with the French marine relative to disposition of men, I departed with Paymaster Conger for Paris on June 12. On the morning of June 13 and that day made the following calls: On the ambassador; the naval attaché; the French minister of marine; Admiral, chief of the general staff; Admiral de Von, the chief of the aeronautic section; Capitaine de Fregate Cazenove; and the paymaster in chief of the French Navy.

A conference was immediately begun as to the disposition of our forces, representing the French marine in this conference being Capitaine de Laborde.

It developed that there was practically no understanding as to the arrangements made in the United States whereby this detachment had been sent to France. They explained that the French authorities in the United States had stated that we had no trained aviators, student aviators and mechanics would be a weakness and could be very quickly trained in France so as to be speedily available in the war against the Germans, in which they could be of the utmost service. The French expressed their gratitude and bade us welcome in an enthusiastic manner.

They explained that the detachment of 122 men, comprising 65 student aviators and mechanics—the others being yeomen, hospital corps men, cooks, messengers, servants—was entirely unbalanced and that for each pilot aviator there are required at least 10 men; that in addition to the pilot aviators there are required observers who are men specially trained to observe, drop bombs, operate machine guns, etc.; that there are schools in which such training is given; that in addition to pilot and observer aviators and mechanics there are required helpers, fabricators, joiners, chauffeurs, motor-boat coxswains and engineers.

It is to be noted that the commanding officer of this detachment had no orders to report to me, and that much embarrassment was occasioned when the unit arrived, as can be inferred from the report that I have read you.

These cases are typical of the obstacles which I found in the first few months, through lack of information concerning the department's plans and activities. As I have repeatedly stated, much information concerning the activities of the Navy Department at that time concerning the movements of our own naval forces I received only accidentally, by learning of them from allied navy departments who had been informed by their attachés in Washington. While in Paris, on May 6, I learned from the French minister of marine the following five items, of which I had no information at the Navy Department at that time:

First. That the second group of six destroyers, commanded by Commander Courtney, had sailed from Boston. I did not receive confirmation from the Navy Department until May 9, three days later.

Second. That a hundred cannon were being sent to France on the colliers *Jupiter* and *Neptune*. I had received no information at that time and, in fact, received none whatsoever until toward the middle of June, concerning the sailing of these two colliers for France.

Third. That an American aviation unit was to be sent abroad. This I have already referred to.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

The two naval officers were to be sent to establish bases at Brest and Bordeaux. It was not until two weeks later that bases were to be established at

as a rigorous campaign was being waged in the past by more energetic warfare against submarines. The point I will deal with later in discussing the department.

I learned from the French naval attaché in London that the patrol vessels for the French coast would be delayed "by the question" of these 25 patrol vessels would probably leave on May 5 and 30, and 25 more the beginning of June at Brest and Bordeaux, and that these forces and were my command. Needless to say, I never did receive this information, and it was many months later that the Navy Department was arranging for French minesweepers, the first of which would be received

I was constantly receiving information from the Admiralty concerning movements of our own forces, concerning the British assumed information. Thus on a single day, May 10, the fifth destroyer division had sailed from St. John's.

Four additional destroyers had been ordered to sail on May 23.

The collier *Jupiter* had sailed from New York on May 10 and the *Neptune* would sail from Norfolk on May 12, each would have a convoy of two destroyer escorts at Queenstown after arrival in France.

I pointed out to the department how necessary it was to have full information of the department's movements of forces abroad, and of knowing what was going on. I have already read you my message of May 10, and in another message of May 16 I emphasized it was that my activities, and that they should be coordinated, and I urgently requested information desired, and "of the situation at home and my duties of cooperation here." I pointed out, and in a letter of the same date, how important it was that the Navy Department should profit by the lessons of the war; and how it was to be done by sending over trained officers who could be sent and transmit it rapidly to the department, in order that the department might prepare our forces for any future emergency. No reply was received to any of these requests.

On May 31 I emphasized again the same point, and the difficulties of my position. Some idea of what

really was can be gathered from my letter to the department of June 8. I will read you, for example, paragraph 10 of that letter.

[Letter to department, June 8, 1917.]

At times I have been in ignorance, or in doubt, as to the proposed movements of our forces, and also as to their actual movements, until information was furnished from the British Admiralty.

I wish to make it quite clear that there is no possible objection to timely and complete information being sent in this manner; but the point is that I have received my first knowledge of important information from a cablegram sent in a British cablegram upon another subject. The assumption of the person who sent the cablegram (usually Admiral De Chair or Capt. Gaunt) has appeared that I had full information and had communicated the same to the British Admiralty. Such incidents are not only somewhat embarrassing, but necessarily create a favorable impression which is not removed by subsequent information.

Examples in point are as follows:

Department's notification of sailing of *Cushing* division received three days before the vessels had sailed from Halifax, information of their sailing from the United States having been learned in the Admiralty. Information was received from the Admiralty that sailing of the "fourth flotilla" had been postponed indefinitely, but no confirmation of this fact to date.

On May 29 received department's cable that *Patterson* division had sailed from Johns on May 26, having seen a previous Admiralty dispatch from British Admiralty of this sailing.

I was sent for by French chief of staff to arrange for escort of *Neptune* and *Zeus* through danger zone. At that time I had no information of the movements of these ships. Informed later by Admiralty that destroyers were accompanying them and *Jupiter*, and were to join Queenstown forces later, but have no confirmation of this fact to date.

I have received repeated inquiries concerning the number and character of the craft to be sent to France which I was unable to answer.

Another striking case of the failure of the department to furnish adequate and timely information concerning their activities is illustrated by the case of the *Dixie*.

I may say that the *Dixie* was one of the mother ships of the fleet that was coming over.

I had been notified early in May that the *Dixie* could be needed, and had cabled back urgently requesting her service to be added to the repair facilities at the destroyer base. I received no further information concerning her sailing in spite of my request. On June 10 I received a dispatch for retransmittal to the department concerning pay accounts. A few hours after this dispatch arrived the *Dixie* herself appeared off Queenstown, and as it so happened sailed right through the middle of a mine field laid by submarines several days before. I learned later that the department had cabled her on the day of her sailing, but the message, for some reason, was never explained, was addressed to me at Petrograd instead of London, and consequently did not reach me. This serves to illustrate the consequences of failing to give sufficient advance notice of such sailing.

Similar difficulty arose concerning the arrival of the oiler *Kanawau* at the end of June, and in the case of the destroyers which accompanied the first troop convoys abroad. I had had no information concerning the number of destroyers until they actually arrived at St. Nazaire, nor did I know, for over a month after the *Kanawau* sailed from New York, the orders under which she was operating. These illustrations should be sufficient to indicate what I meant in my letter of January 7, when I stated that the department frequently omitted to keep its naval representative abroad informed of its

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

At times, moreover, the movement of force

to the real need for such information I quote from July 14, 1917, to the Navy Department:

... that I should have advance information of movement which they are operating. In the case of fuel ships, in European waters, I must arrange for their being sent to the large their cargoes. In fact, if the *Kanawha* arrives she will either have to be escorted to another port, or to make room in the Queenstown tanks to take her cargo. I have been filled by British fuel ships.

... that I should have a general idea in advance of the supply ship, such as the *Celtic*. Our parent ships are to be as much as possible, reserving the cargoes in the event that they make room in their cold storage for the ships in order that the supply ships may not be

... going through this morning in Navy Secret Code conference. This will be too late to serve the purpose for which it was intended in the course of the next few days. I assume from the received that the *Celtic* will have supplies for the yacht *Melville* and *Dirie*, and have taken steps to

DISPOSITION OF FORCES.

The matters in which I found great embarrassment was the department failing to keep me informed of the disposition of forces. It is unnecessary to read again from my early cables and letters emphasizing the importance of keeping the American Navy as a combined unit against the submarine greatest activity. I had also repeatedly pointed out the fact that a general view of the situation only abroad, where, through personal contacts of the allied navies, all needs could be considered for the most effective use of such reinforcements States Navy could afford. I had thus from all of our destroyers be concentrated in the Atlantic south of Ireland, where shipping routes were those destroyers to be based on our own Irish port. Later on I repeatedly asked for assignment of any new ships, to consider I was making. All the Allies were making requests of the Navy Department. I have already received from the British, French, and Russian Governments assistance. Such requests were being made of the department.

The department assured me, on more than one occasion, their message of June 24.

... abroad of forces the department requests a which should be given after consultation with the as to the priority of requirements.

Recommendations from the time of my first cable with these fundamental instructions from

Let us see in what way the department was guided by me. I had repeatedly requested the immediate increase of our marine forces and the concentration of these forces in the crisis.

On June 29 I recommended the immediate sending of gunboats in addition to destroyers, tugs, and yachts.

I was not consulted by the department with regard to the number and character of the vessels sent to France in June, or later, and, similarly, the first indication that I had that the department intended to send forces to Gibraltar was in a message of July 1, which they said:

Department is strongly impressed with the necessity for adequate anti-submarine patrol in and off entrance to Gibraltar. Ten vessels are available to send, considered that they can be of value.

The point to be emphasized here is the fact that such a general policy as to disposition of forces in European waters, was made by the department without reference to their representative abroad. I was in a position to thoroughly underrun all individual allied requests for assistance, and determine priority in accordance with general mental instructions and the needs of the situation.

I replied to this, after consultation with the Admiralty, that the vessels of the gunboat class, named by the department, were very useful for antisubmarine work at Gibraltar. I realized that this was a digression from the policy which I had been insisting upon from the start, of concentrating all reinforcements in the critical areas. However, I felt that I could not possibly explain the necessity therefor any more fully or clearly, and it seemed now to me that I should grasp any opportunity of getting forces across the Atlantic. Their subsequent disposition could be determined later. It was quite true that forces were needed urgently in all areas. The communications to the armies in the near and far East were being hard hit at this time by submarine operations in the Mediterranean. It was simply a case of accepting the best that could be obtained.

I was accordingly informed by the department on July 1 that 11 vessels, which had been named in previous messages, included gunboats and light cruisers, had been directed to proceed for distant service under the command of Admiral Wilson, and to sail for Gibraltar at the earliest possible date.

An even more striking illustration of the manner in which the department failed to carry out its policy announced in its cable of June 24, which I have read you, is to be found in the case of the forces sent to the Azores.

The Germans had fitted out the big submarine *Deutschland* to assist in the submarine campaign, and this ship began her operations in the summer of 1917 in the vicinity of the Azores.

It was obviously a diversion on the part of the Germans of the character already described. It was therefore no surprise to learn on July 5 that this submarine had actually bombarded a port in the Azores. This, of course, could have no effect upon the progress of the campaign other than a moral one. No damage which could be inflicted in the Azores could appreciably affect the issue. After consultation with the Admiralty as to what action should be taken to meet such diversions it was decided, and I stated in a cable of July 13 to the Navy Department, that two submarines, with a

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

profitably be sent to the Azores for operations against submarines, as such craft had the best opportunity of attacking this class of submarine.

I might here state that the object of sending them there was from using the inlets and bays of the island. It had been discovered earlier in the war that submarines would put in to uninhabited islands and make certain repairs and rest their crews.

In fact, one of these submarines was torpedoed by a British submarine. I heard nothing from this recommendation. The first information that these were being sent to the Azores was received through the Admiralty that four destroyers had arrived in Bermuda en route, apparently having received no information from the department and I had become thoroughly accustomed not to do so, and therefore assumed that these forces were for some station in Europe. Accordingly I went on July 21 and 22, again pointing out the need in the critical area and asking that these coal-burners together with all other destroyers available July 21, for example, I said:

JULY 21

to Washington.

The Admiralty to-day results in recommendation that destroyers while situation remains as at present. Also that these have been on French coast, probably Brest, because of coal and superior facilities Brest, and less steaming necessary for effect on French. *Panther* also urgently needed.

The destroyers mentioned there as going from the Azores were too small and had too little radius of action for the North, off the coast of Ireland were only 420 tons instead of 1,000 tons.

I received a message from Ponta del Gada, Azores, and on cabling for a repetition, or a following message:

AUGUST 1

Ponta del Gada

14027 We have reported to you the arrival of the *Lampro* (00026) Ponta Delgada Azores, in accordance with orders and have registered a cable address, Senafloat, Ponta Delgada, for information with regard to German submarine operations around all the islands, return Ponta Delgada.

Signature to that. I do not know what "T

message it appeared that it was clearly the department's vessels should remain at the Azores, and as the vessels had reported to me in accordance with orders. I had still heard nothing whatsoever.

the department. Accordingly, on August 2, I sent to the of the Navy the following message:

Cablegram sent August 2.

To: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

108. *Smith* and *Lamson* have reported to me their arrival Azores. The information there regarding submarines since July 22, and have cruised islands and returned to Ponta Delgada, where they are now apparently awaiting. Request authority to order this division and *Panther* to join destroyer force temporarily, until they can be instructed in methods and means of communication in force. Will probably then wish to base them on Brest, particularly for escort of troop ships.

To this message I received only a brief statement that the department, for special reasons, desired these forces to continue to remain in the Azores. But they did not state their request.

Nothing was stated with regard to their orders, nor was there in my own mind as to whether they were actually under my orders. I received nothing further from the department concerning them. On the 18th of August, I learned, again through the admiralty, that eight United States destroyers had arrived at Bermuda, *North Carolina* and three further destroyers at St. Johns, the admiralty being under the impression that they were all bound for the war zone, as in the case of the four which had proceeded to the Azores. As the situation was becoming increasingly confused, I sent the following message:

Cablegram sent August 18, 1917.

To: Opnav, Washington.

Simsadus 295.

Request information as to final destination of United States forces recently at Bermuda and St. Johns, and orders under which force based on Azores is operating. Two allied countries have forces operating in same area, and this information required in order to coordinate their activities. 18218.

I might say right there that the reason was, seriously, that I have previously explained how dangerous it is for submarines of different allies to be operating in the same neighborhood. I knew that allied forces had submarines operating in the vicinity of the Azores, and it was necessary that I should see them every day so that I could coordinate what they were doing and keep my forces under command so as to keep them from bombarding the other fellow's, lest they might come in contact if they were not under my orders.

This is perhaps a detail, but it is nevertheless a very significant one, as illustrating the extent to which, in so far as our own Department at least was concerned, we had at that time approached to what might be called "unity of command." The department replied as follows on August 23:

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

For: Admiral Sims, London.

Received: August 24, 1917.

Opnav 221. 18218. Destroyers recently arrived at Bermuda Islands with this coast. Yachts sailing from St. Johns, Newfoundland, are attached to force duty coast of France, under Capt. Fletcher, United States Navy. The Islands force is at present operating under orders to patrol in vicinity of these islands. 12023.

ADMIRAL BE

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

return back to America.

It is noted that this message did not state that the Atlantic was under my command, nor did it give any information concerning their future employment. I had been content not to go beyond the instructions from the department, but only, as I understood, to mind my own local business, and I had followed the same principle, they were in the air, trying to get detailed instructions from Washington. In passing, it should be noted that it was of great difficulty at the Azores, because preparations had been made for their cooperation in difficulty with the Portuguese officials, I was much surprised by their arrival as I had not expected that they could purchase stores.

At the time here I will ask the press not to mention the international aspect, but the fact remains that they actually viewed the presence of these ships as the failure to prepare the way for their cooperation. It is rather unfortunate, as well as in some cases to the local experiences which resulted. There is no need, however, to bring out such details in this inquiry.

On the day to the department of August 20, I summed

up

August 20, 1

It should be kept generally informed of orders under which the Atlantic are operating, for example: I am not aware of the destroyers at the Azores are operating. A number of them from that force which were unsigned and which were not.

The British Marine and the British Admiralty have inquired of the Azores how long they intended to remain in the Azores of their operations. A British submarine and a patrol boat from the Azores during the last week, and Portugal is manifestly important that allied operations should

be kept in my activity in all areas in the eastern portion of the Atlantic. Information available in France or England, should be utilized in the Azores. This information will, of course, be as fast as it becomes available, but it can be handled. Information is available as to the orders under which

the British Admiralty that eight United States destroyers have arrived at Bermuda and that the *North* has arrived at St. Johns. The British Admiralty is also aware of the service and other channels, of the movements of the ships. It proved embarrassing to me to receive information from the Admiralty.

Admiral Mayo had arrived in London. The position of these forces at the Azores was that on August 29 he sent the following message to

the

August 29, 1

Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Beatty and Vice Admiral Jellicoe division submarines operate against enemy submarines. The tender, *base* *Fayal*, where monitors' guns furnish should be prepared lay net in Horta Harbor entrance

breakwater end. Following 20-fathom curve towards signal station, submarine tender should be attached to naval forces in European waters.

After arrival submarines, Azores destroyer division one proceed operations Brest, stopping Queenstown en route for instruction. *Panther* also proceed Brest, where can assist in yacht upkeep, provided another destroyer tender for upkeep destroyers home waters 15429.

In reply, the department cabled Admiral Mayo, on September 4, in their 298, that his recommendation would be carried out. It is rather significant to note that, here again, the recommendation referred to was the same one that I had made in July—that the submarines should be sent to the Azores to operate against German submarines, and that our destroyers should be brought into the critical area. This message of the department to Admiral Mayo was confirmed in two dispatches sent to me four days later, September 5:

SEPTEMBER 5

Opnav 328. In about two weeks, and upon arrival of *Truxton* and Azores Islands, *Panther* and division one destroyer force will be directed to European waters to be disposed of as per cable 396 from Admiral Mayo.

From: Chief Naval Operations.
To: Commander naval forces European waters.
Cablegram received September 5, 1917.

Opnav 340. Our 328 by 2d of October Azores Islands force should consist of division of submarines, U. S. S. *Tonopah*, yacht *Atlantic*, U. S. S. *Whipple*, and *Truxton*. Radius of action will extend to Canary Islands. All forces will follow your general instructions, but we do not wish U. S. S. *Whipple*, U. S. S. *Atlantic* moved from this general area.

Issue instructions in keeping with above and you 396, so that U. S. S. *Panther* division our destroyer force may sail shortly after arrival of U. S. S. *Truxton*. 10006.

ADMIRAL MAYO

It is to be noted in these messages that in the first message the department indicated its intention of sending two more destroyers to replace those at the Azores, and that in the second message, announcing the addition of a division of submarines, specifically stated that, while these forces were under my directions, the ships should not be moved from this area. The situation with regard to these forces and their command was unsatisfactory that, on November 5, in my letter report, I reverted to the matter in the paragraph which I will quote you.

Letter 7305 November 5, 1917. Azores forces:

The force at present at the Azores consists of the U. S. S. *Wheeling*, *Truxton*, and four submarines of the K class. These forces are apparently under the command of Commander H. W. Osterhaus, United States Navy, commanding officer of the *Wheeling*, in his capacity of senior naval officer present.

I should consider it desirable, however, to bring to the attention of the department the somewhat unsatisfactory situation from the military point of view that exists with respect to this force.

On August 29, Admiral Mayo cabled to the department concerning the Azores (cable No. 396), stating in part as follows:

"Submarine and tender should be attached to naval forces in European waters."

The department, on the 31st of August (cable No. 298), stated:

"The disposition recommended in your cable No. 396 approved."

It was understood by both Admiral Mayo and myself that the department intended to place the Azores force under my command.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

The Department (cable No. 340) stated the proposed commander and stated:

"Under your general instructions, but do not wish U. S. S. *Walrus* moved from this general area."

The Department sent cable No. 799 to me, and to the *Wheeling* and the marine force, giving certain information regarding conditions as follows:

"You will be based at Ponta Delgada and operated along such line as the senior naval officer present there will be informed of any submarine force in case any are contemplated."

I am in great doubt as to the exact desires of the department command. I sent the following cable on October 23:

"Message relative to operations not clear. I assume all forces will be under my orders; that Capt. Robison will remain and operate all forces under my direction, subject to direct orders."

The Department replied as follows:

"Capt. S. S. Robison has planned for operation of his force. The commander will naturally keep you informed, and will be in the Azores force is within limit of your command, and will be under your general directions. Very probably, in the near future assigned to troop convoy work may be based on the Azores. Intended additions to Azores force as soon as addition to keep Capt. Robison permanently at Azores, but his rank will be ordered, probably a rear admiral, as base of operations of the detail when it is made."

In consideration of the foregoing correspondence, the Department admits of my command, that it is under my general direction. The commander will keep me informed regarding the plans made by Capt. S. S. Robison; that he will be guided by the Department of suitable rank, probably a rear admiral, will eventually be based at base commander.

The Department that the situation thus created is not a military point of view, and that it should be corrected by placing under my orders without reservation or restriction. The Department presume that I will not hamper the senior submarine officer who would check his initiative and reduce his area of discretion.

Of course, that this is rather tedious work, but of the most complete examples that I have ever known. Even intimate details of a campaign from a distance of miles, it is necessary to go into it to prove it better.

In my and dispatches I again emphasized the embarrassment which had arisen as a result of sending this information without having arranged ahead of time for their reception without having undertaking the necessary diplomatic cooperation on the part of the Portuguese. In my letters of September 7, 1917, November 11, 1918. I will read short extracts from the same.

6. AZORES DETACHMENT

September 1917

The Azores detachment has reported to me a number of difficulties arisen with the Portuguese authorities, for example: (1) Fuel purchased by our forces and harbor dues are charged (2) Under way for patrol duty. I have taken up this matter with the Portuguese and requested that the embassy in Lisbon be asked to (3) It is possible to remove these minor difficulties which, incidentally, as they are not applied to British naval forces operating in the Azores.

7. FORCES BASED ON AZORES.

Letter 2629, November 15, 1917:

Copy of a report dated October 10, submitted by the senior officer at the Azores direct to the department, has been received.

It is considered very necessary that the negotiations with the Portuguese Government should be prosecuted with a view to improving the cooperation between our forces and the local Portuguese authorities. It is noted, in the report from the Azores, that Portuguese authorities do not cooperate freely with our forces; and, in fact, withhold military information from them. Further, that great difficulty is experienced in arranging for stowage on shore for necessary supplies and an entirely unnecessary amount of red tape is involved in handling and actually obtaining the supplies for use. It is noted that before gasoline could be landed the local authorities considered it necessary to communicate with Lisbon. These are intolerable conditions. The question of military control should be definitely cleared up. It is also noted that our senior officer at the Azores has been informed by the local authorities that the Portuguese themselves are planning to protect the harbor with nets.

8. AZORES.

Letter 8749, February 11, 1918:

Referring to the inclosed report, from Commander Osterhaus, on the fortifications at Ponta Delgada, the question arose recently in one of the daily conferences of the admiralty staff, as to the extent to which the United States would contribute to the defenses which are obviously inefficient.

The force commander has been informed by the department of the dispatch of two 7-inch guns and a company of marines to Ponta Delgada, but was not advised as to the arrangements that had been made with the Portuguese Government regarding the manning of these guns. A cable inquiry addressed to Rear Admiral Dunn brought the reply that one gun was being mounted near the radio station, and one at Ponta Delgada, that the work was being pushed as rapidly as possible, and that the Portuguese had insisted on manning the guns. This, Admiral Dunn stated, had been promised them when they had been sufficiently instructed and had become proficient.

It is very earnestly recommended that our Government come to an understanding with the Portuguese Government, if it is at all possible to do so, by which the manning of these guns shall be entirely in our own hands.

I think this case well illustrates the manner in which the department acted upon various information, received by it in Washington, independently of my recommendations, and how my recommendations were put into effect only after they had been later reiterated by Admiral Mayo. It demonstrated how effective the German propaganda was, that the bombardment of an outlying port in the Azores could induce the department to divert forces of exactly the character which the Germans desired and intended by such a diversion. I remember following the German press at a later period, when Monrovia in Liberia was similarly bombarded, the general theme being to demonstrate how Germany was actually controlling the sea with her submarines, pointing out that they were proceeding where they pleased, bombarding ports, and that the Allies were powerless to prevent them.

To take an extreme case, for the sake of illustration, if every time the enemy detached a single submarine and sent it off into some remote locality to shoot up an undefended beach, we made a reposition of our forces, or detached a comparatively large force to proceed there in reply thereto, the submarine campaign would have been still more threatening.

I am citing these cases merely to show the repeated violation of fundamental principles of warfare; for one of the most universally accepted principles of strategy is involved, namely, that of concentration. Many other cases could be brought in to show that.

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To take an extreme case, for the sake of illustration, if every time the enemy detached a single submarine and sent it off into some remote locality to shoot up an undefended beach, we made a change in the position of our forces, or detached a comparatively large force to proceed there in reply thereto, the submarine campaign would be even more threatening.

I am citing these cases merely to show the repeated violation of fundamental principles of warfare; for one of the most universally accepted principles of strategy is involved, namely, that of concentration. Many other cases could be brought in to show

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Department agreed in theory to the policy which I especially that of the concentration of forces, I well into 1918, many similar proposals for forces, to meet sporadic submarine activities, a that is, to force us away from the principle of This was the point referred to in No. 5, of my summary in the letter which has led to this investigation.

For more instance of this attitude on the part of On the 13th of February, 1918, I received from a despatch (their No. 2977) calling my attention to the German submarines had recently been active in the Canary Islands, and suggesting that we send force to establish a patrol of the waters about these islands. I matter with the representatives of the Allies, my instructions, and on the 15th of February message to the Navy Department:

VERY SECRET.

... agreement with French Ministry, when our forces were to avoid waters south of 30° and east of 20°, since the Canary Islands. British submarines have recently activity of the Canaries, in consequence of enemy activities.

... explained, it is extremely dangerous to put different nationalities in the same area without orders. [Continuing reading:]

... with the limited number of units at my disposal, any effort and vicinity can be established, and that to establish a waste of effort. Furthermore, if forces are drawn away from the region, the enemy would doubtless transfer his activity. I therefore recommend no change from present disposition activities in vicinity of Canaries.

81

... Admiral Benson, on February 18, I wrote.

FEBRUARY 18, 1

... telegram concerning the advisability of sending the ... to suppress the activity of the cruiser submarines ... subject was discussed at length at the usual morning ... came to the unanimous conclusion which was end

... from this cable, not only was such a dispersio ... advisable, from a military point of view, I ... cause Allied forces, already operating in ... previously established, were ample to meet ... by these islands to enemy submarines as he ... making minor repairs and so forth. In ... tion, I find that six weeks later the depart ... the establishment of bases, and the send ... to the Canary Islands, but to Madeira and t ... further afield. Their message was as follows

April 2, 1918

Ref. No. 1487.

... 20000 cruiser submarines around Canary Islands and Cape ... in the estimate by your planning section, coupled with

requests to run sailing vessels to African coast, through the zone for lun department to look with favor upon the establishment minor bases Madeira Islands and Cape Verde. As bases from which a few of our sub operate, assisted by heavily armed cruising craft of the P or Q type, the to present possibilities. Matter has been taken up with Portuguese through our State Department, but has not progressed to a decision. V of Admiralty as regards feasibility of such a scheme, and, if considered pressure can Admiralty bring to bear to further it, provided United S furnish operating craft, and to make scheme merely an extension of Islands operations. 22001/4487.

(At this point, at 12 o'clock M., the subcommittee adjourned.
Monday, Mar. 15, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

Senator Hale (chairman) and Trammell.

TEST OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

When the hearing ended Saturday I was discussing
the Navy Department in sending reinforcements to
the Azores and Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands, and
the Pacific, and there is a little more I have to say on

was so insistent upon instituting operations in
I further took up the question with the Allies and,
to meet the department's wishes, I sent a further mes-
sage reporting that I was considering the plan outlined by
and on April 10 I sent the following message, giving

VERY SECRET.

Mr. Sims. Madeira appears to offer no facilities as a base for
the Cape Verde Islands harbors are poor, but probably Porto Grande
is not regarded as feasible to base submarines in a locality
harbor, as is the case at Madeira and Cape Verde Islands.
The department consider basing submarines at Dakar, where excellent
French already exist. I am not convinced that sub-
marines at the three places mentioned would be better employed
where defensive operations may be required against cruising

SIMS.

that I again expressed my doubt of the advisa-
bility of our submarines, stating that they would be
the submarine raids on the American coast,
it was considered would not be long delayed.
I added that I always encountered a tendency on the
to avoid disagreements with our Navy Department.
they should show a desire to acquiesce in depart-
ment as far as possible, or at least not to be found at all
to them.

To show that I had tried to state fully the situation in this ouring area, I will quote the following from a letter of December 19, 1917:

10. SITUATION AZORES.

The situation at the Azores remains unchanged. One large enemy submarine is operating in the general vicinity, and another is probably at sea en route. Two submarines are believed to be the U-152 and U-157.

The large areas involved, and the large cruising radius of these submarines always render any patrol system entirely out of the question.

The danger in these waters is so slight, compared to that in the vicinity of the British and French coasts, that it is urgently recommended that the force at the Azores be kept at a minimum, unless very marked changes in the enemy submarine campaign occur. It is considered that the Azores forces can not be expected to more than deny these islands as an enemy base, and to hold themselves in a constant state of readiness to proceed on independent operations whenever a submarine is known to be within close enough proximity.

It is desired to point out that the Azores can never be considered as an effective base for antisubmarine craft without a dry dock.

Destroyers are constantly laid up, owing to bent propellers, and if we attempt to base destroyers at the Azores, the necessity would constantly arise of sending vessels to Gibraltar or Queenstown for docking.

If the department intends to prepare the Azores as a possible future base, immediately steps should be taken to provide a floating dry dock. So long as shipping is kept away from the Azores, it is most unlikely that submarines will appear in the area.

As a matter of fact, the department's action, in allowing antisubmarine craft to be wasted, for the periods above mentioned, in such areas as the Azores, is susceptible of being converted in terms of actual unnecessary loss of life and wealth.

While some of the incidents narrated occurred considerably more than six months after our entry into the war most of them occurred during the first six months--the period to which my letter of January 7, 1920, principally related.

On October 2, 1917, I received the following cablegram from the Chief of Naval Operations:

SIMSADUS:

571. You are authorized to redistribute the naval forces under your command to meet such changes as may arise in European waters. Every redistribution of your command shall be made with a view not only to meeting the military situation but also with a view to foster feelings of harmony among the Allies concerned. Evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of one or more of the Allies with a proposed redistribution shall operate to prevent such redistribution until you have adjusted the matter to the satisfaction of all concerned. In case not yielding to adjustment submit your plan your views and the views of the Allies concerned to department and decision. No redistribution of forces shall be directed against the forces of any other power than Germany. 10001.

That last proviso was on account of our not being at war with Turkey.

Of course, we all know that history is full to overflowing of explanations of failures in military operations, owing to exactly identical cases to those I have described, namely, violations of such fundamental principles as decentralization of command, which affords commanders in the field the wildest possible area of discretion, and above all the fundamental principle of concentration. As for the question of unity of command, I will leave that to the committee's own conclusions. The facts speak for themselves. I would merely add one point, and that is that it is quite possible to point out in extenuation or explanation of our own departmental errors, similar instances in the case of the Allied Governments.

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It is this that allied operations are not here under discussion. My aim throughout the war to insure not only profit from allied successes and experience, but also important that we should profit from their errors. Learning how not to do it as well as how to do it. In dealing with the question of cooperation with regard to aviation, in a message which I sent to the President on the 21st of April, 1917:

After consultation with aircraft commission. We are anxious to give us anything and help development in any way. Design and construction, as well as operation, has been bitter and tears. We should profit by their mistakes and not repeat

Our national defense are so well understood and their value appreciated abroad that a premium is placed upon criticism, which can be found not only in the press but heard on the floor of their congresses day after day. A distance which I could cite, or which could be the object of justifying our own errors, I could find in the press and find dozens of similar cases. I doubt that any navy department have escaped free and open discussion of phase or possible error of the war. As witness the discussions of the Battle of Jutland, in which the commander in chief, have been the subject of violent criticism and condemnation which has been a committee.

PLANS OF THE DEPARTMENT BASED ON INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

Going back again to the summary of conclusions in my report of 1920, I would again invite attention to my point

Plans made and acted upon decisions concerning operations at distances of 1,000 miles away, when the conditions were such that full information had not been in its possession, thus violating an essential precept of naval operations necessarily depend upon complete information.

Some striking illustrations of this point, and a case in point of the department might have had the most disastrous result in the case of the first convoy of troops sent to Europe in 1917. Since the early part of May, 1917, I had received confidential information, in personal letters from officers of the department, from armed guard officers, from Army and Navy officers, to the effect that a convoy of American troops was to be sent to Europe. I of course requested that the department would give me full and complete information concerning any plans for troop convoy, and would, in the plans for the transport of these troops, utilize all the experience in the transport of troops overseas which had been acquired after nearly three years of such operations. I requested from the department for information as to how the convoy would be protected in the war zone, reached me until the convoy was completely completed in Washington for the sailing

As an illustration of how completely I was in the dark as to the probable movement of these troops and the method to be followed in handling them, I may say that I received information from British and French naval authorities concerning the convoys. I was officially informed of it by the department. Furthermore, tentative regulations providing for all the details of the handling of troop convoys, including their protection in the war zone, were agreed upon by the War and Navy Departments on the 15th of May, 1917, signed by Gen. Bliss and Admiral Benson and approved by Secretaries Baker and Daniels, and further approved by the President on May 27, 1917, were not known to me, nor did I receive a copy from the department until the 30th of October, 1917, five months later. I submit a set of these regulations for the record, but consider it unnecessary to quote them here.

(The regulations submitted by Admiral Sims are here printed in full record, as follows:)

[Received by Admiral Sims, Oct. 30, 1917.]

TENTATIVE REGULATIONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS TO EUROPE

1. The following rules supersede for the time being all previous regulations of the government of the naval convoy of military expeditions to Europe.

2. All matters relating to the purchase, charter, fitting out, equipping, maintenance of transports, engaging their officers and crews, and providing rules of government and their interior disciplinary administration shall be controlled by the Army, except that all regulations concerning the security and defense of the transports and the safety of all persons on board, both at sea and in port, shall be controlled by the Navy.

3. All matters relating to the loading of troops, animals, or stores upon the transports and the quota of cargo to be assigned to each such vessel shall be under the control of the Army.

4. When an overseas expedition requiring naval convoy has been decided upon, a naval officer of suitable rank shall be appointed as convoy commander. He shall be furnished full information concerning the strength of the expedition and its proposed objective. The Army authorities shall afford him adequate facilities for inspecting the transports as they assemble for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are properly armed and equipped for defense, fitted with ground tackle, life rafts, life preservers, lines, and all equipment necessary for the proper management and control while in transit or while disembarking men and animals, under conditions which will be probably met. The convoy commander shall call the attention of the Army commander to defects or deficiencies with respect to such matters. The Army commander shall use every effort to remedy such defects or deficiencies in accordance with the judgment of the naval convoy commander. The naval commander shall render all possible assistance with the resources at his disposal. In the event that it be found impracticable to remedy the defects or to supply deficiencies, which, in the opinion of the naval convoy commander will, if continued, threaten the safety of the convoy or jeopardize the safety of the expedition, the matter shall be reported immediately to their respective departments. The Army commander and the Navy convoy commander.

5. The naval escort for each group of transports shall consist of not less than one cruiser throughout the entire voyage. The escort shall be augmented in special cases so that the naval force available shall render the maximum protection to the transports throughout the voyage.

6. Each transport shall be armed by the Navy with the minimum of four guns, not less than 3-inch caliber, and shall be equipped with an efficient fire control lookout system, including suitable glasses for lookouts.

7. An officer not below the rank of lieutenant commander in the Navy, and other experienced officers together with a suitable number of quartermaster and stowmen, radio operators, and a full gun's crew for each gun, shall be detailed to each transport by the Navy Department. The means for making flag, semaphore, and wig-wag signals by day and by night shall be provided by the Navy Department.

8. (a) The order as to destination of the convoy and time of sailing shall be given by the naval convoy commander after the Army commanding officer, under authority of the War Department, has stated that he is ready to sail. The orders of the

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

may be immediately communicated to the Army command-
ing officer, which render a change
desirable, which change is not practicable to refer
to the commander shall, after consultation with the
commander change

The commander shall have control of all movements and
orders of sailing and formation. He shall make
an attack by an enemy, or a dispersion of the

The commander shall assure himself that his subordi-
nates are familiar with dispositions and plans
and be separated from the convoying vessels by a
distance of one or two miles and on duty shall take charge of the
convoy in accordance with the plans of the convoy com-
mander. The officer attached to the transport shall at all times
be under the command of the transport in all matters
relating to the cargo, and the defense of the vessel. He
shall be subject to the orders issued to him by the naval commander
and the commanding officer of troops for officers and men for
the defense of the vessel or her personnel.

The commanding officer and men in the numbers requi-
red shall perform the duties for which their servi-
ce is required of the senior naval officer on board

The radio shall be under the complete control of

The commanding officer shall be responsible for the exercise
of the transport at fire quarters and abandon ship

The commanding officer of the vessel shall perform their navigation du-
ring the voyage under the direction of her senior naval officer
and shall not be subject to or interference with his authority in
the commanding officer of troops on board, who shall then
be subject to his command, as may be necessary to enforce the
orders issued to the vessel

The senior naval officer on board shall be limited
in his authority

The order of landing shall be determined by the naval com-
mander. The Army commanding officer. The order of lan-
ding shall be determined by the Army commanding officer, after consultation with
the naval commander. The order of landing has been known to him,
the naval commander shall control the disembarkation of men and materia-
l. The Army commanding officer if conven-
ient shall be near the flag ship of the naval convoy commander. If not
convenient the transport shall be near the flag ship of the naval
convoy commander. Communication between them may be re-
quired. The senior naval officer assigned to transpo-
rt shall be subject to the Army commanding officer

W. S. BEXSON,
Admiral, U. S. N.
Chief of Naval Operations
Tasker H. Bliss,
Major General, U. S. A.
Acting Chief

JOSEPH S. I.
BAKER,

Woodrow

The first information that I received re-
garding these first troop convoys was by
a message sent but three days before the

Very confidential

Navy Washington

The troops to France will sail about the 9th of this
month. I dispatch four convoys, in groups of three or four

under separate escort. The first three groups have troops, and sail at an hourly interval. The first groups are of faster speed. The fourth group, consisting of animals, will sail last, and may be delayed. All of the groups sail for a meeting place at sea, location of which you will be informed of later. The meeting place will be reached, by the first group, about one week after sailing. The other three groups in about nine days. I will advise you later of the dates of sailing, and of arrival at the meeting place.

I hereby instruct you to furnish escorts, to consist of one division of ships for each convoy group, from the point of meeting to the port of debarkation. When this escort duty is finished those detailed to this service will be returned to their present service. Rear Admiral Gleaves will accompany the first group, and will have command of all operations of convoy.

DANIELS, *Secretary*

It would be impossible to find a more striking example of the department's insistence upon making decisions based upon incomplete information than is provided by this message. The scheme of troop convoy outlined in this message showed a complete ignorance and disregard of convoy methods and of war experience in the submarine danger zone. The action of the department in giving me definite and detailed orders from Washington as to how the convoy should be handled in the danger zone and as to the escort each group should have exhibits a disregard of the fundamental military principle of command which requires that subordinate commanders shall be allowed to exercise their initiative in their own discretion in carrying out the mission assigned to them. The department has only assigned me a mission, but, as will be noted in this cable, has dictately dictated the orders which I should issue to the vessels of my command. This I pointed out to the department in my message of June 8, 1917, in reply to the message I have just read you. My message was as follows:

[Cable Dispatch.]

Sent: June 8, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Through: State Department.

11. Escort and convoy duty within danger zones is performed in accordance with past experience, and each case is dependent upon disposition of allied forces at the time of latest information concerning enemy activities. Generally speaking, duty is performed out in relays, ships escorting only in their assigned areas and passing on to ships of next area on the route of the convoy. As our destroyers generally operate farthest to westward, we participate in majority of escort duty. In view of this, I suggest that in future the number and nationality of ships to be detailed to escort duty be not specifically ordered by the department, but be determined hereafter, dependent upon the disposition of allied forces and circumstances at the time of an appointed rendezvous. Such a course will not only facilitate convoy duty, but will also facilitate other military operations of submarine campaign.

The department, in reply to my dispatch which I have just read you, cabled me as follows, on June 10, 1917:

Received: June 10, 1917.

To: Alusna, London.

Department considers it essential, on account of the present sensitive public opinion, that the escort orders for the first convoy, already issued, be executed by destroyers. The soundness of your recommendations are recognized by the department. For subsequent convoys, not more than three transports in one group, and an escort of not less than one cruiser and three destroyers per group is the present policy of the department. Please write giving outline plan for handling the Euphrates of the escort duty for further convoys and mention the numbers and types of ships likely to be assigned to escort each group of transports throughout each section of the danger zone. 21009.

DANIELS, *Secretary of*

... in this message that the department, although ... address of my recommendations, still persists in ... in its previous cable. I was now asked for ... the department outlining a plan for handling ... of the escort duty for further convoys. That is, ... were sought with regard to this very essential ... as commander of our forces abroad only a week ... the first convoy. On June 12, 1917, I replied to ... department with the following:

(Cable dispatch.)

... Navy.

... next mail. Necessary for safety that, for future troop con- ... designated and controlled from here based upon latest ... Initial orders, on sailing, should be subject to change ... Troop ships should zigzag together, two to four point changes, ... should zigzag independently, avoiding regularity of position ... In accordance with British experience, when escorting ... submarine zone, she is of practically no protection to convoy, ... of convoy. It is necessary in danger zone that radio be ... important messages. Evidence indicates that radio direction ... locate large forces if radio work of distinctive nature. While ... that convoy commander should leave maximum initia- ... to senior destroyer commander, in view of his recent ... knowledge of methods. Enemy submarines do not have beam ... this word should probably have been "division") recom- ... as much as consistent with zigzagging, this to reduce ... facilitate offensive operations of destroyers. It is now prac- ... of one destroyer for single troop transport, three for two ... or four transports, and one destroyer per transport when ...

Sims.

... day, June 13, 1917, I sent to the department the ... the cable, outlining for the department the war ... transports, and making definite recommendations ... troops should be transported and protected in ... will. I think, be unnecessary to read you this ... of it before me, which with your permission I ... to show that the department, in this case as ... in which it called upon me for recommenda- ... with all the information available; and the rec- ... were drawn up only after a conference with the ...

... is as follows:

Letter No. 1.

OFFICE VICE ADMIRAL, COMMANDING,
UNITED STATES DESTROYER FORCES,
EUROPEAN WATERS,
London, June 13, 1917.

... S. Sims.

... Navy Operations.

... in submarine danger zone.

... cable 21009.

... the department's cablegram 21009, concerning methods of ... of troops or supplies for our Army and Navy forces while in ...

... in the question of escorting through the submarine ... concerning enemy activity.

(2) The question of not entirely abandoning our own offensive campaign escorting duty, and

(3) The question of the number of craft available for such duty and their

If, for example, enemy activity is concentrated to the westward of Ireland, convoys are coming in well to the southward of this area, it manifestly is impossible to concentrate our offensive campaign in the area in which the enemy can be most easily attacked.

In deciding as to the number of types of ships to be diverted from offensive duty, preference is always given, of course, to convoys carrying troops. Convoy material, whether it be munitions, animals or food supplies are escorted when necessary; but such escorting duty is not allowed materially to interfere with our offensive campaign in operation at the time in question.

3. In those areas which are constantly being covered by destroyers and submarine craft, such as sloops (specially built antisubmarine vessels, about 1,000 tons), the attempt is made to avoid taking such vessels out of their designated posts. The vessel, or vessels, which first picks up a valuable cargo escort it through the area, notifying the patrol vessel on the next square, inshore, and turning over to it as the meeting of the ships is effected. If by reason of thick weather, etc., the meeting is not made, the convoying vessel continues on the next square.

4. The routes which will be followed by our troops and supply ships bound for the coast are, generally speaking, outside of the main areas of submarine activity, and outside of the areas continuously patrolled by destroyers and other antisubmarine craft, except for a short distance off the west coast of France.

5. For the purpose of handling such convoys, and also the merchant ships, the Admiralty have established, for convenience to their own administration, a comparatively large number of rendezvous well out at sea, and encircling the British west coast of France. Also a comparatively large number of locations on the English, and French coasts have been given designating figures or symbols, and it is therefore the practice each time that one of their convoys sails from a port to designate a rendezvous which they are to pass through, and a point on the coast to which they should steer for after passing through the rendezvous.

This requires a notification well in advance giving as closely as possible the route the convoys will pass through the rendezvous points designated. Escorting ships will then be able to intercept the convoys at some point on the route between the rendezvous and the point designated on the coast, the position of interception depending primarily upon enemy activities at the time. It manifestly must be possible to communicate in cipher with convoys at sea and divert them from one rendezvous to another, if occasion demands.

The above-mentioned lettering and numbering of rendezvous and points on the coast are, as stated, primarily for convenience of reference in administrative matters in the Admiralty itself.

The significance of such symbols if circulated even to our own allied officers must necessarily be limited to the maximum extent in order to preclude any possibility of the enemy becoming aware of them.

6. If the greatest possible degree of safety for convoys is to be insured, it is necessary that their movements should be under control of one source, and as all enemy activity is concentrated on this side of the Atlantic, and his movements must necessarily remain in its present zone, it follows that selection of routes and other directions in regard to movements of convoys should be decided and directed from this side, that is, in the Admiralty itself. It is for this reason that the Admiralty has requested, and I strongly recommend, the immediate appointment of a competent and tactful officer whose duties in the Admiralty under my direction will be confined to those above indicated.

7. The following procedure in regard to convoys is therefore recommended:

(1) Early advance information regarding prospective sailing of convoys and their character.

(2) Immediate information as soon as definite hours of sailing can be forecast.

As soon as this information is received, and after consultation with the Admiralty, a rendezvous and route to be included in sailing orders will be selected and announced. Definite information should then be given when convoys sail, as to its projected speed and time of passing through rendezvous designated.

8. It is urgently requested that only British Admiralty codes be used in all communications, addressed to the Admiralty, the first word of the message being "Sims."

9. Under no circumstances, if convoys are divided into groups, should they use the same rendezvous and the same routes after reaching the danger zone. In such a case if the enemy should become aware of their movements he would be able to concentrate for successive attacks.

ships should zigzag together from two to four points irregularly. This is one of the principal requirements in opposing submarine

attacks. They should be allowed the maximum independence of movement and initiative. They should not be held to strict formations in position and distances from the convoy. This procedure is necessary because of the information that may be taken of their experience in operating against submarines and the later information in regard to enemy methods, which are con-

stantly changing. The wireless shall be used as little as possible. In fact, it should not be used at all, except for important directions which may have to be given in case of changes of route. Evidence indicates that the enemy is using the use of radio direction finders, particularly in locating large formations of an unusual or distinctive character.

When a convoy enters the danger zone an escorting cruiser should be used against submarines, and virtually becomes one of the main elements of protection.

There is no evidence to indicate that any German submarine has ever attacked a formation from ahead—that is, approaching from ahead and attacking the formation. With bow tubes they would be forced to break the formation, with considerable danger to themselves, and to the convoy. Hence the principal reason for destroyer protection is the attack on formations.

The requirements of formations of a considerable number of ships against submarines are:

1. Minimum length of formation in the direction of travel. This is in order to reduce the arcs on the bows and beams, which are the most vulnerable points.

2. Minimum width of formation. This is to concentrate the formation as much as possible—thus reducing the dimension of the formation at right angles to the direction of travel.

3. Minimum range of visibility of the force, but it also restricts the range of attack which the submarine desires to attain.

4. Minimum line of divisions formation is generally adopted, with divisions as small as consistent with zigzagging evolutions.

W. S. Sims.

On June 14, 1917, I again called the attention of the Admiralty to the embarrassment caused by the plan, which was being carried out, for the handling of this first convoy. The telegrams of this message are the following.

"I am glad to get through, that it was one of the most important operations we had to conduct during the war, and God be praised we did not lose any of those ships. [Reading:]

"The Admiralty vessels available for escort duty to insure safety of our troops and their supplies. The approach of our troops and their supplies will approach European coast outside of zones used for the convoys, it is mandatory that information be given immediately to the Admiralty of the dates and times of sailing of all Army shipping in next few days. This is the program of merchant ship convoys, which must be maintained. The approach of our first Army convoys will seriously affect the situation as it will require all destroyers based on Queenstown, and the suspension of patrol and escort duty in that area. I can not overstate the urgent necessity of increasing the destroyer and cruiser force with utmost dispatch. * * * Urgently request answer to the Admiralty as to prospective movements of all Army shipping in next few days. This information is of vital importance. Also request information to antisubmarine forces these waters. The Admiralty is of the opinion that if oil supplies are protected food supplies will be protected. I recommend that all destroyers that can be brought to the front be sent at once.

The same information was also conveyed to the department by my letters of June 15 and 20, which I have read in another connection and which it is hardly necessary to repeat here.

I wish here to make one point perfectly clear, as it will be to later. There is no question, in these messages, nor was the question at the time, as to whether troops should be given protection, should get the very best protection that was available. They always did throughout the war; and it may be interesting to the committee to know that throughout the war American troops received more protection than the Allies were able to give to their troops on the high seas. The point I was trying to make is that it was absolutely necessary that, in moving our troops, in mind, at all times, the great importance of the saving of tonnage upon which the operations of these troops depended after they went abroad. I have fully covered this question of available tonnage in my previous testimony. To save time, I will state an extreme case merely for the purpose of illustrating the point at issue. If we had gone ahead and moved troops abroad as fast as ships could be found to carry them, and had done this with no regard to merchant tonnage, we might easily have found ourselves in the position of having a large army marooned abroad, but helpless through lack of support, or, on the other hand, as I hope I have clearly shown, we might easily have lost the war, in the meantime, on the score alone of the loss of our available allied merchant tonnage, in spite of the fact that we had more troops in the field. Another point, which should probably be stated at this time is that, contrary to impressions which have been given in the press, there was never any issue between me and the department as to the fact that the primary mission of American naval forces was the protection of the necessary army, and the supply movements.

Such a statement goes without question. It is very easy to confuse the issue in a case like this, in discussing it a long time after it happened; to disregard the time element and to confuse the issue merely omitting reference to them. The heavy movement of troops, in fact, what is now justly regarded as one of the wonders of the war, namely, the remarkable transport of American troops overseas, did not occur in the period we are here discussing. On the contrary, it was nearly a year later, as will be seen by reference to the Government statistics. The curve of the movement of troops was very low during these early months and did not commence to rise until April, 1918.

On June 17, 1917, I received a detailed message announcing the sailing from New York on June 15 of three troop convoys, and gave me detailed instructions as to their movements on the high seas. I will include this message in the record, but will not read it on account of its technical nature.

(The message referred to is here printed as follows:)

Received: June 17, 1917.
To: Vice Admiral Sims.
No. 20.

The convoys are arranged in groups.

Three groups sailed June 15 from New York.

Group one will arrive at 6 a. m., June 23, at first rendezvous, latitude 48-51 north, longitude 24.20.

Group 2 will arrive at 4 p. m., June 23, at first rendezvous, latitude 48-10 north, longitude 25.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

June 23, at first rendezvous, latitude 46-48, 1

will designate second rendezvous and forward same to es
sent by you to first rendezvous.

12016

12016

12016

12016 will be communicated later.

12016 will be sent most confidentially and immediately to 1

12016 of this message for Vice Admiral Sims. 12016.

DANIELS, Secretary Na

that two convoys would pass designated rendezv
June and the third convoy on the 25th. It fur
French Admiralty would designate the sec
and would forward the same to the convoys, via
I was to send to meet the convoys at the
It would be hard to imagine an arrangement n
create confusion, or to disseminate more widely
the movements of these convoys, thereby expo
necessary dangers. It meant that information conc
had been cabled to me in London, in a c
told the department was unsafe; and, furt
same information had been cabled to Paris, appare
numerous hands in Washington; and that it
the second rendezvous, communicate it to
to be passed along to Queenstown, and given
and carried by them to sea, for further transmis
I will not tire the committee with a lengthy desc
possible this plan was.

that the safety of the convoys, once they got
dependent upon the latest information of the ene
At the time in question, I was in Queenstown, in t
of the British station at that point. I leave yo
in trying to coordinate the plans for t
messages over the cables to Paris, London,
It was difficult to know just who was in charge,
It was very easy to have a misunderstanding
the time how many forces the French could se
to send, to sea to meet these first convoys; I
know what information the French had concern
times of sailing, and number of destroyer
from home waters. I was unaware of the fo
sent from home with these convoys. I could
sat tight, carried out only the specific
that is, of sending the destroyers which had t
I think it will be recognized that nothing co
ing everything in my power to straighten out
movement of these convoys was involved.
there was no time to be lost. In fact, before I e
department, the convoys had actually sailed
seas. There was the possibility, in fact the p
destroyers would not be able to find the conv
able to reach the first rendezvous by the time
This would leave the convoys in a quandar
to where to go next.

I therefore drove through a brief message as follows:

June

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Number 20 acknowledged. Please direct convoys to proceed from first on course east, in absence of other instructions and until escort joins. Use 600 meter wave length, and will receive instructions concerning enemy, from Queenstown via Valencia, call sign G C K, or via our de Sigcode Cypher.

The reason for directing them to proceed due east from rendezvous was simply to avoid their arriving there without instructions as to where to go, and in order to make sure of the finding them. Their subsequent movements, after the had joined, I hoped to be able to straighten out before arrived.

I should also state, at this point, that war experience proved that it was impossible for forces, destroyers or other meet on the high seas at specific points. The explanation is a long story. It is involved in the inevitable inaccuracies of navigation, particularly of the types of ships we were using, delays, due to casualties to machinery and weather conditions were always involved, etc.

On June 19, right in the midst of the trying hours we went through, I received the announcement of the sailing of the group in the following message:

Received: June 19, 1917.

To: Alusna.

For: Vice Admiral Sims. No. 21.

Convoy group No. 4, U. S. S. *Hancock* flagship, sailed June 17. Will rendezvous, with United States destroyers, latitude 47-40 north, longitude 6 a. m. June 28. Communicate this in most confidential manner to naval Paris. 14018.

The last sentence of this message was confusing, because I was in doubt as to whether the French were depending solely on the information or were getting independent information from the department. I was further confused as to whether the department expected me to provide the destroyer escort for this last or whether such escort was in the accompanying convoy. Previous messages had directed me to furnish escort. I therefore immediately cabled asking for this information.

In the meantime this convoy group was at sea, and it was halfway across the Atlantic before I received from the department information as to whether or not I should furnish destroyer escort for it. On June 22, 1917, I received the following message from the department:

June 22.

To: Alusna.

From: Secretary of Navy.

For: Vice Admiral Sims 28.

Your 120. You are to supply destroyer escort for Army convoy groups 1 and 2. Please inform the naval attaché at Paris 19021.

No point would be served in going further with the messages which were exchanged between London, Paris, Queenstown and Brest concerning the movements of these convoys but

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

could be an impressive demonstration of how
operation really was.

my official letter of July 6:

the an incident illustrating the great danger of attempt
more than one headquarters. Although every measure had
and safe passage of convoy group No. 1 to the submarine
had been issued, with the full cognizance of the French
a dispatch in the French, Russian, English war merchant
the *Seattle* and *Brest*. Not only was this dispatch set
very unreliable, but it was either coded very poorly
and for these reasons, and the nature of the dispatch
was undoubtedly necessary. The dispatch
would join the first group. This was entirely unnecessary
made concerning the question had been made
the French torpedo boats failed to join before the
inadvisable to attempt to communicate with the French
with an unsafe code. The convoy group was under
more than is usually assigned troop convoys of such

17. I received the following report from St. Nazaire
of this first convoy group, and of a supposed attack

JUNE 29, 1917

Force * * * arrived on June 26, at midnight
and escorted by United States destroyers and two
with group 2. * * * Group 1 was attacked
on June 22, 45 miles from the first rendezvous
passed close to *Harcannah*, two passed close to *Dan*
under her stern as she turned away, one torpedo
were no hits.

SAY

is a paragraph of a quotation signed "Gleaves.")

17. I received the following message from the S

...

General Sims,

wishes to express its satisfaction at the very effective
evaded ships has been accomplished. Josephus D.

DANI

perfectly clear that I make no criticism whatever
of the troop convoys. Such confusion and
due to the orders and plans given to him

at this time to quote from an illuminating
report submitted by the naval attaché in
period.

from the report of the naval attaché in Paris

armed military secrets were kept in the United States
the first knowledge I received that the first convoy had
of a social conversation with a woman. Colonel
personal and confidential aid, was present. As soon
together, I never will forget the words he first said.
Undoubtedly, the women's husband's business friend
the news in some sort of a business code. I never perceived
But if one realizes that, at that time, the security in France
was in the hands of M. Malvy, minister of the interior
criminal neglect of duty, and that the then head of the
assistant to the prefect of police, are both now serving ja

tences for intercourse with the enemy, the necessity for more than one such a secret will be apparent. Due primarily to inexperience, and secondly the fact that three different general staffs were attempting to fix a rendezvous before the first convoy was due, there was still considerable confusion, in the Ministry of Marine, as to just what was to happen, and where it was to happen, as our ships approach the coast.

The admiral in command of the troop convoy, had been told in Washington that he would be met by French destroyers, etc., and, as a matter of fact, they were. Like a great many other matters, it seemed impossible to make the Navy in Washington believe to what desperate straits the French naval force was reduced. They had only five destroyers on the west coast, and on the night of May 1917, I had personally seen four of them put out of action, for weeks or months, in a destroyer fight off Dunkirk.

Now that it is all over, and we have won, and so many big historical events have happened since: we are prone to forget the importance and what was at stake in the successful outcome of this expedition. If even one transport had been sunk, it would have resulted in disaster to the Allied cause.

It is not yet understood generally what Admiral Gleaves and his officers accomplished; it will be years before what it meant psychologically to the allies will be fully appreciated.

To return to the general question of the unsound military nature of the plans for these first convoys, and to the danger and confusion which resulted, I exchanged numerous messages with the department in the next few days—that is, the first part of July, attempting to point out to them the principal errors which had been committed, with a view to preventing them in the future.

In referring to this subject, on July 7, 1917, in my letter I said:

I feel reasonably certain that, if information reached the enemy as to the nature of the troop convoys, which it appears to have done, it was due to the method of communication in what is undoubtedly a wholly unreliable code. There is no evidence here to support reports which I have made, to the effect that all codes of a simple character are dangerous, and that any code can not be considered safe unless it is frequently changed. It is for the above reasons that I have so urgently recommended the exclusive use of British Admiralty codes until such times as our codes based on war experience are available.

I mentioned the other day that in using those codes we were using our own keys, which we changed frequently, so that they could not be read.

In other latter reports to the department, I pointed out the inclination to trust their information and judgment alone as the cause of very grave danger to our forces. As a matter of fact, it was only a matter of luck that we did not lose a number of transports not only from the troop convoys, but also from the various convoys of destroyers which had arrived in May. In the case of the destroyer they were saved only by the thoroughness of the precautionary measures by the commander in chief at Queenstown to meet them. It is hard to believe otherwise than that the enemy knew all about the movements of these forces, from the day cables began to be sent about them.

In fact, the announcement of the sailing of the first destroyer was published in the Berlin papers four days before they arrived at Queenstown. The suspicion that the Germans were aware of our troops movements was therefore strengthened. As will be noted, I had recommended to the department, beginning early in May, that important and highly secret information should not be sent to our own Navy codes, as I considered them unsafe. I had pointed out that the British codes had been tested and proved safe by war experience and were constantly being changed to prevent the

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

and them. I had, therefore, implored the department to send any messages concerning this troop convoy in the British Admiralty's war codes, and yet a message still continued to be sent in the Navy secret code which we had been using in peace times for years. As to the technicality of this business of codes, changing the code, that refers to changing the cipher which are in keys which are changed, you can give it a try, and it does not do any harm, provided it is done properly enough.

As to me, and something quite outside of my jurisdiction, I see the extent to which the allies were broken. The problems of codes and their fallibility would make a story in itself and would be interesting material for the committee, as well as the sufficient to say that one of the many means which the Allies to have such complete information of the German marine movement was their ability to break the messages exchanged between submarines and their base.

These days to go into this question thoroughly necessary, it was sufficient to me to know the enemy was doing to do but to assume that the enemy was breaking our codes. As a matter of fact, I knew that the enemy was not so clever, and that, fortunately for us, they were not aware of the extent to which the Allies were breaking their codes. It seems that they did not change their codes often as the Allies did. They were, of course, on the other hand, our Navy Department had been in use in times of peace for years. As I can safely say, therefore, that if the Germans had attacked this first convoy, the action taken would have been the method which it covered, providing the opportunity to obtain information as to the composition of the convoy. As I pointed out to the department concerning correspondence, the fact that the convoy was broken was a measure to good luck.

The department itself realized the impracticality of carrying out further transport movements and the fact that governed the first groups is best shown by the fact that the convoy sailed the department had required regulations as to how troop convoys should be handled. I have already read the answer which I received in receipt of my reports concerning the composition of the arrival of the first groups, the department's recommendations in the following message:

Department for Admiral Sims

Concerning safe transportation of our troops to France for operations of future. For this purpose every guarantee must be made that every effort will be made by the Navy Department to insure the crossing. From the interned German ships, the best will be commissioned under complete naval escort. It is of the utmost importance these ships be protected, the passage in, and owing to the valuable nature

ships and difficulty of obtaining others in their place if lost, it is desirable to have them on passage in Atlantic. Will you therefore submit an outline of what you consider the best method of carrying out such operations after you have consulted the authorities, especially the French? About 4,000 troops will be dispatched on each ship. Do you think that they should sail in company or singly?

I would not have believed it possible that that question should be asked at that stage of the game, how we should put the question and when we had put it in. [Continuing reading:]

During the voyage in, what protection can they expect from our fleet? What from the French? Also, on the voyage out, what protection can be given by French, or do you contemplate providing that from our forces? In connection with sending you all the information in advance possible, should we require you a rendezvous for each ship, or group of ships, leaving here and a course to follow there, or will you in advance set out a course, both of which will be unchangeable until you change the same? Should the Army supply ships, large and small, of which will be of moderate speeds, sail together in groups, or singly, so that security may be given them in that part of voyage when it is the most dangerous? Even if these points have been discussed by you, it is desirable to have them indicated, so that greatest efficiency and cooperation may be obtained by combined efforts.

I do not think it would be possible for me to convey to you the discouragement of receiving at that date, after the miles of cables and letters I had sent in, there on the 9th of July exhibiting the crassest ignorance of the elements of the whole problem.

In view of the extensive communications which I had sent to the department concerning these convoys previous to this dispatch, I think it requires no explanation on my part to convince the committee of my feelings upon receiving such a message as this. It was question after question asking about handling convoys which I had explained over and over again.

Some days before I had sent, by an armed guard officer, the information which they requested. I therefore replied to the committee as follows:

Sent: July 11, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

No. 95. Replying to your dispatch concerning troop convoys. I fully appreciate the importance of matters set forth therein. It is considered of vital importance to reduce cable communication on this subject to minimum. A comprehensive report was forwarded via Lieut. Herbster on *St. Louis*, and another will be sent by steamer.

As the plans contained in this letter were approved, and were adopted by the department in their entirety, without change, and continued thereafter to govern the movements of our transport operations throughout the rest of the war, I would make a few brief comments before proceeding further. This report of July 6, 1917, is perhaps too technical to read to the committee. It is, however, a very important document and is included in the record.

Those letters are long and very technical, and I think it would do no good at all to read them to you, but they should be submitted to the record so that they can be examined.

(The documents referred to are here printed in the record as follows:)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

[Letter No. 17.]

OFFICE VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING
UNITED STATES DESTROYER FORCES, EUROPEAN WATERS,
London, July 6, 1917

Mr. William S. Sims.

Dear Sir:

Concerning protection of Army convoys in trans-Atlantic passage, the responsibility for the safe passage of troop convoys should be placed upon the commander of the escort force. As I have the latest information as to enemy movements, I herewith state as to the procedure which I consider necessary.

These instructions are based upon actual experience with the four convoys made passage and after a thorough consideration of the experience in connection with such convoys.

The chief danger in connection with troop convoys lies in the possibility of interception by radio and wireless communications in connection therewith. The procedure is therefore based primarily on this consideration against any information reaching the enemy as to movements of convoys in time to be of any use to him. It is therefore necessary to intercept all wireless communication between ship and shore and the shore except in cases of extreme necessity.

It is therefore necessary that I have definite information as to the movements of convoys in time to be of any use to him.

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"Convoy group No. 1 latitude 49 N. 10 a. m., August 21."

I will understand this message to mean that convoy group No. 1 (as reported) sailed on the date of this dispatch, and that it will cross the meridian (the thirtieth) in latitude 46 (49 minus 3) at 10 a. m., July 21.

On this information I will be enabled to prepare in adequate time the orders for the escorting destroyers and issue the necessary instructions to them in readiness for the duty in question.

In the case here used for illustration I would understand that the convoy, passing through latitude 46 N., longitude 30 W., on August 21, would proceed on its course at its average sea speed direct for its destination.

The escorting destroyers will receive orders to intercept the convoy group line, and well to the westward of the dangerous submarine zone. And they will have orders as to any necessary diversion from the direct route on the way to their destination. They will also be kept informed of the latest news at all times from Queenstown as to enemy movements.

Fourth. The destroyers, after joining with the convoy group, will inform the French by a special secret code of the approximate time and latitude in which they will cross a certain meridian—usually the tenth.

This information will reach me through Queenstown station, and will enable me to notify the French ministry of marine in order that any necessary measures may be done, and that French torpedo boats may be on hand off the port to receive the necessary instructions as to the method of approaching the port.

5. To sum up, two dispatches only would be sent to me from the depot. The depot would send nothing in return except acknowledgments.

The first of the two dispatches should be sent as far in advance of sailing as possible to anticipate approximately the time. This dispatch is particularly important, because if I should find that the prospective arrival in the submarine zone of troop convoy should coincide with the arrival of a merchant convoy it would be necessary to request a delay of one or the other.

The second dispatch, which states only latitude, date, and time of crossing a standard meridian, gives no information of essential value to the enemy, because the standard meridian is not mentioned in any dispatch.

6. I would strongly recommend that no other cable or wireless communication be sent except in case of extreme necessity; and further that the convoy should be directed to carefully avoid wireless communication except such as may be necessary at very low power for communication with destroyers when they reach a relatively close position.

7. The convoy commander should be directed to accept the advice of the destroyer commander as to courses and speed and formation after escorting destroyers have joined. They will have the latest information as regards enemy movements, and it will also be possible, if necessity arises, to communicate with them from the headquarters at Queenstown, where the latest developments are always known.

8. I would strongly recommend that no communication be made with the shore. It is very unwise, as long as sufficient escorting destroyers are at Queenstown, for French men-of-war to attempt to meet and escort our convoys except when they arrive near their destination, to give them information through radio channels, etc. Such a course necessitates radio communication in a code which is now well known to be compromised. There is also great danger of misunderstanding on account of differences of language.

I have thanked the French ministry of marine for the courtesy extended to our convoys by the French vessels which were sent to meet our first convoys. They were sent primarily as a courtesy in view of the historical significance of the occasion. I am in constant touch with the French ministry of marine and there will be no misunderstandings. I think it very undesirable to send communications concerning the movements of the convoys to the French ministry of marine as to me. I will keep them fully informed to such extent as may be necessary in arranging for arrival of the convoys.

9. One of the first essentials in the movements of shipping in the war zone is that it should never stop or even slow down, but should proceed to destination at maximum speed, regardless of circumstances. If, for example, in heavy weather the escorting destroyers should not be able to join, the convoy should disperse and proceed independently at maximum speed, and zigzagging. This is the practice in the British service. There is little danger of submarine attack in such heavy weather.

Likewise, in case of fog or other unusual conditions, if the convoy should become separated, it is much the wiser course for each ship to proceed independently than to attempt to reassemble by changing course, slowing down, and sending out wireless communications.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

and merchant codes are unreliable. There is good reason to believe that the enemy. It is therefore entirely essential that communications, when necessary, be confined to the latest Unbreakable code with ciphers. Our destroyers are equipped at all times for necessary communications while en route which can not be made preferably by destroyers, which have the code, to "keep me fully informed from Queenstown."

When the convoys have reached the submarine zone they should be under the escorting destroyers, subject to orders of the command under which they are operating. They are fully informed at all times as to all duty being performed and accept full responsibility for all orders which emanate from the destroyers. They are thoroughly familiar with the policies in use in Queenstown area, and it is highly desirable that they operate under the same policies and methods as those with which they are working in the war zone.

An incident illustrating the great danger of attempting to communicate with headquarters. Although every measure had been taken to insure the safe passage of convoy group No. 1 through the submarine zone, it had been issued with the full cognizance of French and British naval forces in the "French, Russian, English" code was intercepted by the enemy.

The dispatch sent in a code which is considered very unreliable, and was very poorly or garbled in transmission, and for this reason the dispatch itself, further radio communication was undisturbed.

The dispatch asked where French men of war would join the convoy. This was unnecessary, as all arrangements that could be made had been made in advance. Even in case the French torpedo boats joined the group reached the coast, it was very inadvisable to communicate with the French Admiralty, particularly with an unknown group was under escort of six destroyers, which is more than the usual convoys of such a size.

The department will see fit to adopt the recommendations contained in the report which will involve placing full responsibility on me for handling the convoys in the high seas. I am convinced that the principal danger to the convoys is the enemy from intercepting cable dispatches as to the location of the high seas. Hence the necessity for a minimum amount of communication and the undecidability of selecting a series of rendezvous points. Refer to them in dispatches between the department and my stations in France and between the various stations involved in England. That the method suggested is "iron clad" in this respect, namely, that the messages indicated were intercepted and translated by the enemy, and that they would enable them to intercept a convoy. The standard meridian is not mentioned and three is added.

The method involves the inconvenience of having the convoy rendezvous at a prescribed time; but we can always be sure that it will be there at that time, and if it is somewhat late this means only that we must wait for it. But even this inconvenience can be avoided in certain circumstances, by allowing a sufficient margin between the time of departure and that necessary to reach the standard meridian at the time of rendezvous.

It is reported, a convoy of eight transports with an escort of more than two convoys of four transports, each escorted by a destroyer, departed on June 14, 1917.

These convoys are each other at intervals of less than one week, but in the event of a succession they will require the absence of a great number of destroyers at the same time.

The convoys afford no protection against the attack of submarines, and the United States as soon as the destroyers join the convoy, they are able to do so. In the case of British convoys, the cruisers join the destroyers join it, and proceeds to port (for coal, etc.)

It is essential that the convoy commander should always be on a transport or merchant vessel. This because both the cruiser and the transport are free at all times to maneuver separately, the former to maneuver against a raider and the latter to maneuver to avoid the enemy.

In accordance with the plans proposed therein, all the our expeditionary Army overseas, which was transported in troopships, was safely carried eastward through the war zone without any loss whatever from any enemy action.

It is, of course, true that we had some losses of troopships and allied transports, which were handled in accordance with the plan, but, in justice to the Allies, it should be pointed out that the transports landed in British ports, and were therefore not carried through the same areas as the majority of merchant ships. It was in this area, as I have repeatedly pointed out, that the enemy very wisely, and of necessity, concentrated his submarine efforts.

In view of certain slurring remarks made before this in its previous inquiry, concerning the officers of my staff, I wish to emphasize the importance of these plans, and also the strain under which they labored, assisted by but one resource at this time, in preparing them, not to mention all of the demands made upon us.

I wish clearly to establish the fact that the responsibility for the safe passage of our troops out the war, for the safety of our troops in the war zone, rests primarily upon me. If there is any question as to this, the documents which I am submitting should clear it up. It is certain, and that is that there can be no question as to what would have come off if the plans had not worked out satisfactorily, or even if our troopships had not been joined at the proper time by their destroyer escorts in the war zone. I would like to quote two paragraphs only from this letter of July 6, 1917, which embodied the plans in question:

As it is apparent that the responsibility for the safe passage of troop convoys through the submarine area should be placed upon the commander of escorting force in that area, who has the latest information as to enemy movements, I herewith make the following recommendations as to the procedure which I consider necessary for the future troop convoys. These recommendations are based upon actual experience with the four convoy groups which have already made passage, and after consideration of all British Admiralty war experience in connection with such convoys.

* * * I trust that the department will see fit to adopt the recommendations contained in this letter, which will involve placing full responsibility on me for all convoys while in dangerous waters.

Upon the receipt of this letter in the department in Washington, I received the following message:

[Cablegram received July 22, 1917.]

Origin: Washington.

To: Admiral Sims. Secret 56.

Your letter No. 17. Rules for convoy therein accepted and will govern.

The subject of the assistance which was afforded me during the war period will be taken up later; but the committee can perhaps better appreciate the task which confronted me at this time, in handling all the subjects which you have heard about in previous testimony, at the same time digging out and digesting previous allied experience with troop convoys, in order to prepare this plan. From this experience, upon which we based the plan, we found out just about how not to do it as about how to do it. We went on a detailed history of convoy after convoy, and studied all the difficulties which arose, both before the convoy sailed and while it

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Throughout the war the routes followed by all our troops, also by all United States Government vessels, were furnished from my headquarters in London. Detailed plans were prepared and issued to insure getting up with the convoys on the high seas to clear the dangerous areas.

From the establishment of the convoy system I remained at the end of July and in August, 1917, by the recommendations which I made at this time for Army and Navy supply ships. It will, therefore, come to me to read again my cables of July 12, 14, 28, 31 and 1 August which I have already either read, or referred to in the report of the convoy system, and in all of which I urged that it be coordinated in such a way that ample protection be given not only to troops but to Army and Navy supply and mercantile shipping as well. The department agreed and it was followed throughout the war, with the exception of a few cases, from London, to assign routes to all convoys and to provide the necessary escort for the danger zone.

The effectiveness of the plans recommended is to be found in the fact that the convoy system thus established for the transport of troops and Army supplies were transported with safety from submarine attack.

From these communications and the department's action it developed that our troubles in handling troops overseas began about this time, that is, during July, as a matter of fact, that the authorities at home started in the summer of 1917 to transport troops overseas in allied passenger liners and in other cases the allies were not consulted at all, and a decision was done was to go to the office of the shipping controller, filling it up with troops. I distinctly remember the embarrassment which was caused to the allies by the fact that after the ships were on the high seas, that they were not consulted. I remember that the question arose as to whether a ship was a troop ship and what did not. As repeatedly stated, we were fully short of escorting and protecting craft and were unable to suffer. It was a heartrending task to tell the allies that they were justified in drawing the line. Various schemes were proposed for the attempt to divide shipping according to the outcome of the war. In all such classifications, "valuable" always came first, and then followed such designations as "valuable," "valuable," and so forth. It was a matter of passenger vessels with wholly inadequate escort at all. And then the question would arise whether a vessel was a troop ship, whether she had on board troops.

In these matters, the method of communication was badly confused. All experience during the war showed that no action could be too great to restrict the number of persons entrusted with essential information upon which the safety of the fleet at sea might depend. I learned during these months that the question concerning troop sailings continued to be raised among various allied officers.

I did everything I could to get all communication concerning movements on the high seas narrowed down to one-line. For I sent the following cable on July 24:

To: Secnav.

One hundred and twenty-nine. In order to insure safety of troop consider it essential that no cables concerning movements, times of arrival, by Army or others, but all information should be sent through Navy Department, and I will notify all concerned, including French ministry of marine.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the substance of my recommendation had been made many times before.

On July 25 the department cabled me that they had accepted my suggestion.

On July 28, 1917, I cabled the department again, concerning many sources from which information concerning these ships was reaching Europe. My cable was as follows:

JULY 28

To. Secretary of Navy.

One hundred and forty-five. Information concerning proposed and actual movements of troops and troop supplies reaches France in various direct and indirect ways. For example, from War Department to its various representatives abroad, from French military and naval attachés, and from the various French missions in America. Information concerning troop movements has even been heard in social circles. The greatest danger of such information reaching the enemy lies in methods of collection and codes used, in multiplicity of official, or other communications channels. All experience of war, in handling valuable Government shipping, and all service experience, points to necessity for restricting communications to a minimum and reducing personnel who are to be trusted with vital information in this connection. I therefore submit that the most important measure that can be taken to insure a degree of safety for troop and troop supply shipping, and in fact to provide against disaster, is to require that all information concerning movements of such ships, proposed or actual, should be transmitted safely through the Navy Department, holding me responsible for informing all parties concerned on this side, in due time. French ministry of marine and Gen. Pershing are in full accord with these recommendations. The French Government is taking steps to stop future communications by their representatives in America. But it is necessary to also take effect to insure that no information concerning the above is sent out of Washington by officials of any government, or our own, except through Navy Department. Navy Department alone can be responsible for safety at sea.

This message was accompanied by another message of the same date, sent by Gen. Lassiter, the War Department's representative in Great Britain, to the War Department, indorsing my recommendations, and urging that all such information should be sent through me. This message I will not read, but will merely mention for the record:

The message referred to is as follows:

[Cablegram sent July 28, 1917.]

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Serial No. 155.

No. 155.

For: War Department.

"With regard to the movement of United States troops to France via England, it is necessary to know two weeks before the arrival of the troops in England—

"First. The exact composition of the party, i. e., the number of officers, men, nurses, civilians.

"Second. The amount and character of baggage with party.

"Third. The purpose for which the party is coming, i. e., to serve with American, British, or French forces.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

information should be furnished with regard to all parties coming on board small their size. Thus, if staff officers are coming on a ship, the effect should be given. Moreover, if any parties of a certain kind or other organizations having a distinctive uniform should be given. On receipt of this information in London it will be transmitted at once to the war office and to the War Office in France. Lawler."

8

Message of July 28, 1917 (my No. 150), I again called the department to the importance of keeping secret my letter No. 17, concerning the plans for handling troop convoys. This message was as follows:

JULY 28, 1917

My dear Sir, and my letter regarding troop convoys. Please note that the procedure contained in my letter be restricted to troop-supply ships bound for France, and not including small units and bound for England or other countries. The system recommended by British shipping officers, the same as for all other ships, should be used. The system I recommended should not be used at various ports, but should be confined solely to the system. A message was received by Admiralty concerning the system recommended for troop convoys, but not understood. If cables are to be exchanged with the Admiralty, the system, its primary object of secrecy will be destroyed.

8

The following reply from the department:

My dear Sir,

My letter No. 17, regarding troop convoys, known only to two of the staff, have been used only for convoys bound for France. As you request in your 150. Commercial ships bound for France. We have not understood your wishes in this regard. The Admiralty message about naval vessel Philadelphia. We are communicating directly with you. 18001

BEN

7. I was informed by the department that arrangements for handling all communications with respect to troops and Army supplies in the manner that I later on I received a copy of a memorandum from the Chief of Staff at this time to The Adjutant General. It would be of interest to read this memorandum, and I request that it be inserted in the record.

The submitted is here printed, as follows:

Recommendations of Admiral Sims the War and Navy Department concerning movements of troops should be kept in London. The following memorandum covering the Chief of Staff of the Army on August 2.

AUGUST 2, 1917

Confidential.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

The following are given under which the military attachés in Washington have been furnished with advance information concerning organizations for service abroad are revoked. The Adjutant General of the Army has been sending notices to all Army personnel to Gen. Pershing are hereby revoked. All actual or prospective, will be sent to The Adjutant General by confidential messenger from the ports of embarkation, and will be furnished by confidential messenger a commissioned

of The Adjutant General's Office—to an authorized officer of the Bureau of the Navy. It is then the exclusive business of the Navy to convey the information to the senior naval commander abroad, who is charged with the further distribution to Gen. Pershing and our attaché in London of such sailings.

The chief of the embarkation service will govern the communications with the Navy by the same rule of confidential messenger service. The purpose of these rulings is to prohibit all bureaus and agencies of the War Department from transmitting information relative to the sailing of our personnel or our cargo ships for the purpose to confine the transmission of such information to one channel only, the Navy. This prohibition extends to the giving out of such information from this country which either in the course of duty or by accident may come to the knowledge of any officer.

TASKER H. B. BAKER
Major General, Acting Chief of Staff

On August 10, 1917, I received a message from the department announcing that the methods I had proposed in my letter of August 1 had been accepted and would begin with group 7. This was merely a further elucidation and confirmation of the original letter proposing the plans for handling our troops at sea.

The department's message was as follows:

SIMSADUS, London:

Opnav, 124. Reply your letter 31. Troop convoy system satisfactory with group 7. Acknowledge. 2009.

ADMIRAL B. H. BAKER

All the recommendations that I had made in regard to reducing communications to one channel, had been fully discussed and approved during the naval conference there at the end of July, 1917, and the recommendations were made only after a full discussion with Gen. Pershing, and with the chief of staff of the French Navy, who agreed with me absolutely, and the British authorities were in complete accord.

Gen. Pershing assured me that he would cable the War Department that all communications concerning troop movements should be sent only through the Navy, and the French and British chiefs of staff also assured me that they would instruct their officials in America to discontinue sending any information about troop movements. I might add that one cause of great concern about this matter was the fact that I was horrified to find during my trip to Paris, that information about these convoys coming over was known in official and social circles, even before Gen. Pershing had said about it himself. It appears that the various allied naval attachés and missions in America had been picking up all kinds of information here and there, telegraphing it to their Governments. The same thing had been true of the War Department. After my recommendations were put into effect, the leakage of information ceased, and it became possible to handle the great volume of Army shipments with comparative secrecy.

While discussing this question of the protection of American troops while they were being transported across the eastern Atlantic, I should perhaps be emphasized again that I fully realized that the responsibility for their safety rested upon me, and upon me alone. I realized, too, from the first, that this, of course, was the primary mission which the American naval forces in Europe had to perform. However, during the period in which our troops were crossing in very limited numbers, and especially in the first months of the war when practically no troops were being sent over, I regarded

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Our antisubmarine craft should be used to victory in defeating the campaign of the submarine shipping, and thereby saving the tonnage so valuable as a whole as well as for the support of Gen. Pershing telling me at this time, the 12th 1917, that an army of a million men on the west coast would require 50,000 tons of freight a day. In other words a total of five 10,000-ton cargo ships arriving every month. It would have required a tonnage of shipping to have kept this army constantly supplied with necessary equipment, food, munitions, artillery clear from the first, as I have already pointed out. If shipping could be saved at this time, it would have been for America ever to support an army in France completely in accord with the Secretary of the Navy set forth in the following cablegram, which I received:

JULY 28, 1917

Washington
to London

Primary duty of the destroyers in European waters is principally to protect transports with American troops. Be certain to detail destroyers accordingly, and in making the detail bear always in mind the necessity of having a sufficient number to insure protection to American transports.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy

That in order properly to protect American transports it was necessary to protect and to save enough of the shipping to keep this army in France. The Navy Department realized this but did not appear to give it due weight. It was required for all the messages that were exchanged between my headquarters and the Navy Department that the question of the transport of troops abroad was particularly profitable to go any further into detail. That enough evidence has been introduced to show that in attempting to direct the whole voyage of transports from America, committed a very dangerous error, as they could not possibly possess the knowledge of the war zone which the orders for the protection of the war zone should be based. I have also shown that the department themselves recognized this error, by their recommendations, based upon an examination of the experience of the Allies; that when these recommendations were adopted, and submitted to the whole of our Atlantic transport of troops, the responsibility for the safety of these troops was placed upon me, in so far as their passage through the war zone was concerned, that their routing was done from my headquarters, that their escorts were arranged by the forces under my command. The best proof of the effectiveness of this protection of the troop transport bound for France with American troops was the sinking by a German submarine.

That of how close and cordial were the relations between the Navy and that of Gen. Pershing, and of how complete

we were in agreement, it may be interesting to refer to a cable I sent Gen. Pershing on January 4, 1918, in reply to a request from him with regard to the routing and handling of army supplies. My message of January 4, 1918, was as follows:

[Cablegram sent Jan. 4, 1918.]

To: Gen. Pershing.

Urgent. For Gen. Pershing.

All the forces under my command are disposed with the primary purpose in the safe and prompt dispatch of troops and supplies to France, and out of France.

Regardless of original destinations, I shall at any time, at your request, divert cargo vessels, fuel ships, animal transports, or mechanical transports to any port you desire. This diversion can be made at your convenience, at any time the vessels are en route, or after arrival on this side. Our plans provide for the transfer of vessels from one port to another, at any time, to facilitate your operations.

You will appreciate that, with troop transports, the utmost safety must be combined with secrecy of movements. There are many considerations to be placed before you in a cable. For this reason I directed Commandant Smith, on January 2, to proceed from London to your Paris headquarters, to present these considerations. If the result of this conference was unsatisfactory, I request you to do me the honor of sending an officer to London to present your further views on this matter.

I fully appreciate the urgency of the situation, my dear General, and am doing nothing undone to assist your operations in every way. 12004.

It will be noted that there never was any question of a lack of recognition that the primary mission of the forces under my command was the protection of American troops and supplies.

It would be possible to take up many other subjects and discuss them, but how, in other cases, the department similarly insisted upon its views from Washington, upon the incomplete information which was available there, and how thereby mistakes were made, and impracticable plans proposed. I have already shown you how, in the case of convoys, for example, because of a wrong estimate of the situation, the department delayed putting into effect the convoy system, and strove, as an alternative measure, to carry out other schemes, such as the arming of merchantmen, which were certainly, but of minor importance, or such as the establishment of a completely new system of handling merchant shipping, which, because of the critical situation, was thoroughly impracticable.

I wish now to discuss only three or four other similar cases, for example, as the plan which the department insisted upon for meeting a possible raid against convoys, by enemy battle ships in the Atlantic, and, finally, the plans proposed by the department with the object of finding a royal road to victory, by blockading German ports, or similar measures.

The question of a possible use by the Germans of raiders against convoys, and perhaps even of the employment of battle cruisers for this purpose, had, of course, been under consideration by the staffs of the Allies, practically from the time at which the use of the convoy system was begun. It had been fully recognized, certainly, that a heavily armed, fast ship could probably destroy a convoy with extreme ease, if such a raider ever got loose in the Atlantic on the convoy routes. I pointed this out repeatedly to the department in the summer of 1917, as, for example, in my official report No. 864, of September 15, 1917. At that time I pointed out that it was important to have plans prepared, and kept current up to date, at all times, in the event of such raider activity.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

course, be possible to abandon the convoy system to a plan of dispersed shipping, but seem a sound one, and that greater protection by keeping the shipping in convoys, as convoys with escorts of sufficient gunpower to meet an extract from this letter in the record.

[Letter 864.]

SEPTEMBER

One move would be to use the relatively smaller number of routes, relatively close to the American shores and tracking convoys passing the information along and in reserve nearer to the European coast.

It is important to have plans prepared and kept constantly revised if the necessity should arise of initiating an extreme, actually individual escort of troop and other important vessels at any time if a serious menace should be encountered. It is not intended to abandon the convoy system and revert to a plan, strongly believed, however, that such a course would not be a protection will always be afforded by holding the ships of sufficient power.

It is also possible, if the occasion demanded, be dispersed and all ships of convoys are given orders as to routes.

The system of independent sailing such as existed before the war would again return us to a situation in which the small craft operating as patrol craft would be wholly inadequate and would be entirely out of the question.

Conversations are now under way with the Japanese regarding their battle cruisers and perhaps some of their large cruisers as a measure of preparedness against high-sea raiding.

In my report of October 23, 1917, I referred again to the activity of enemy raiders, again emphasizing that it was one which required the most thorough study of the situation, which could not be completed at that time. As I will point out in a moment, it is to obtain from the department a sufficient study of the war situation, and the force which would be required to meet such a situation. The possibility of the operations of enemy raiders. In this letter of October 23, I discussed the operations which had escaped, and the possibilities of operations, pointing out again that the solution was the assignment to each commander of the force which could be expected of the raid. I record an extract from this letter. [Rea-

Letter Oct. 23, 1917.]

The activity of enemy raiders, particularly during the recent months, has grave possibilities. The subject is one which requires a complete estimate of the situation, which can not be completed at this time. Some of the general considerations involved in the subject are:

1. The British and allied fleets to prevent escape of raiders from the North Sea. The question of whether raiders have been seen in the waters of Norway for escape.

2. The convoy system and provision for escorting all convoys to withstand the attack of raiders carrying at

3. Shipping in remote areas such as the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, whether escorted or not, in order that they may

diverted the moment any news of a raider is obtained. As long as shipping is in convoy, it is a most difficult, if not impossible, problem to attempt to control its routing, particularly shipping which is under way on the sea.

(e) The broad question of whether the enemy may consider it as worth while to jeopardise the chances of success in possible future fleet actions in favor of his entire light cruiser force, and possible battle cruisers, in addition to merchant raiders, in serious attempts at high-sea raiding.

Action against enemy raiders is to be considered from two points of view: first, operations to intercept them before they reach the open sea; second, arrangements to protect shipping if the first can not be made effective.

As long as Norway remains neutral, we must certainly expect that her neutral waters will be utilized by raiders, particularly on the long dark nights of winter, and if it is permitted it is practically impossible in view of the large sea areas to the north and even around the north of Iceland, to prevent the escape of raiders.

In addition to the recent very successful attack by the new very fast enemy cruisers on a Norwegian convoy in the North Sea (as reported by cable) we have ample evidence of what a few raiders even of the converted merchant type, may accomplish. Evidence indicates that the *Mowe* probably left Germany during the first half of November, 1916, and, after sinking 112,000 tons of British shipping alone, carried many valuable cargoes, she succeeded in returning to Germany in safety.

The *Wold* apparently left Germany during the first half of March, 1917, with a large number of mines with which she succeeded in accounting for at least 90,000 tons of shipping alone in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The danger from mines in the track of shipping well outside of what might be considered the war areas, is illustrated by the sinking of the *Cumberland* off the coast of South Africa in over 75 fathoms of water. Also the sinking of two large ships in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope over six months after the first merchant ship had been mined in the same vicinity.

As no evidence of the *Wolf* has been obtained since about the 1st of March, 1917, it has either returned to a home port or come to grief elsewhere.

The *Seeadler* left Germany in the middle of December, 1916, and accounted for at least 10,000 tons of shipping in the South Atlantic before she was finally run aground on one of the South Sea Islands within the last few months.

The tonnage figures mentioned for the above vessels are minimum figures. It is definitely known concerning British vessels. In addition, the ships in the South Atlantic undoubtedly accounted for considerable allied and neutral tonnage, and there are also other ships still long overdue which may have been sunk.

The fact that the amount of tonnage sunk by enemy submarines has not increased in spite of an increase in the number of submarines operating, and the fact of the United States coming into the war with the effort that she is putting forward in the way of anti-submarine warfare alone to ultimately defeat the submarine campaign, would seem to be in itself a sufficient reason to expect very determined efforts by the enemy to add to the efforts of the submarines the efforts of high-sea raiders.

From the general survey of the situation it is considered very impracticable to prevent the escape of raiders during winter months. During these months there is over 20 hours of darkness in northern waters which would be used for escape.

The only apparent effective solution would seem to be the consignment with a strong convoy of a force superior to that which may be expected on raiders.

I was so seriously impressed with this possibility that, even with the insufficient staff that I had, I made a special study of this question, in 1917, and submitted on November 2, 1917, a letter in regard to the protection of troop convoys, in which I specifically discussed the possibility of enemy raiders operating against them. This letter is too long to read, but as it covers the whole situation it will perhaps be interesting to insert it in the record:

TROOP TRANSPORT SPECIAL LETTERS.

NOVEMBER 3, 1917

From: Force commander.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Protection for troop convoys.

1. The three things that endanger our troops transports are:

(a) Submarines and mines encountered in the zone.

(b) Raiders on the high seas.

(c) Large submarines operating outside the zone.

There can be no question that the maximum danger is occasioned by the approaching winter nights. I think the next greatest danger is from submarines, particularly if ships are sent without ocean cruiser escort, and the danger from mines.

Dealing with the danger from submarines and mines in the North Atlantic, to protect our transports, although it must always be recognized that the protection given, a chance shot from a submarine at long distance may sink a vessel, a drifting mine torn up by a ship's propeller, or mines not encountered by the sweepers may be dangerous.

It is true that a battle cruiser on the high seas would easily deal with submarines, and again our protection is only partial.

There is the new problem of large submarines operating outside the regular submarine area. Thus far there has been one or two vessels operating outside the regular submarine area. One of these vessels has been to the southward of the Azores, and one is operating along the West African coast.

The losses occasioned by these submarines have been by gunfire, and they are difficult to maneuver under water, and never will be the smaller type. Like other vessels of small freeboard, they are confined to areas where good weather prevails. It is not likely that a submarine of large type will cross the North Atlantic or a large vessel, considering the approaching winter gales, the whole problem. There is always the question of strain on personnel and the necessity to remain at sea for several weeks. I consider it probable that most of these submarines will be confined to areas where

they could operate in such areas as the islands off Africa, off the Azores, therefore, that there is little chance of encounter in the North Atlantic during the winter, but that there is more danger elsewhere.

Our vessels making upward of 20 knots, and a 17-knot ship like the *Kaiser Wilhelm*, would fall an easy prey to a submarine. The reason that I do not recommend routing our large transports is true that the *Olympic* was routed independently for a short period when only small, slow raiders were sent out by the enemy. A system has been established, resulting in a partial solution, but it is still unlikely that the enemy may meet this situation. The number of raiders of greater speed and power. This is a problem that is being considered.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for our destroyers to stand up to submarines during the winter. There is no doubt that the destroyers will make little progress into them. Furthermore these submarines will attack the vessels and result in laying them up. I have carried out a plan of giving to our transports destroyer escort during the winter. In fact there may be times when our destroyers, on this side, and may have to travel a considerable distance through the zone with destroyer escort. The British have had some times in handling troop transports. Within the last year a large troop ship was broken up by storms to the westward of Ireland, and the other troop ships, the *Paragon*, and this vessel was sent out of the zone without escort, as it was too rough for the destroyers. These are risks that may be expected.

It is not recommended that our transports be routed to the southward in order to avoid the zone. Bad weather will be encountered to the southward where good weather prevails, this is precisely the situation most likely to be found. I should recommend that

our destroyers and destroyers to escort our convoys all the way from the Azores to the Azores. However, destroyers based in the Azores will be of the capacity of a repair ship or the like, and the scheme is hardly practicable during winter months.

There are these:

1. Destroyers be retained in the United States for escorting our transports to protect them against any large submarine that may be encountered.

2. The route may be varied so as to deny the enemy information of

(c) That an ocean escort be provided sufficient to withstand any raider to sea. This will mean a dreadnaught in the event that we get information of escape of enemy battle cruisers or else sailings will have to be temporarily suspended.

(d) That all escorting vessels should have guns superior to 6-inch.

(e) That all convoys be routed through the North Atlantic, as before.

(f) That any destroyers be released that can be spared for operations on the coast so that greater protection can be given in the area where the danger is greatest.

13. It is unfortunate that at the very time that our larger transports come to the attention the number of men that Field Marshal Haig wishes to send on leave has increased. We have, as the department knows, a limit now of 600 arrivals in England, or 5,000 a week. If we can provide from the United States some fast draft transports of 18 knots or upward for cross-channel service, we can materially to relieve the congestion.

14. The British war office are striving to comply with Sir Douglas Haig's wishes and to increase the number of men on leave. If the leave requirements are met, it will mean that practically none of our troops can be handled into England unless we can provide some fast steamers for cross-channel service. I consider this a matter a very urgent one. An inquiry has already been sent by cable indicating the types of ships needed. I think perhaps both the *Harvard* and the *Yale* could be used and perhaps some others of a similar type could be found.

15. Aside from the question of handling our large transports, there are a number of British liners crossing that can be utilized for carrying our troops. This is a saving in tonnage to us and a great convenience to land troops in England. French ports are very poorly developed, and all the assistance we get from the French ports is helpful. I have repeatedly pointed out, however, the desirability of no freight via England, only troops and kit; but despite my recommendation freight still rolls in, embarrassing the situation more than ever. I had hoped that for our first lot of large transports to come direct to England; but I find that the addition of troops and kit these vessels contain some 4,000 tons of freight for France. The department will understand that this additional amount of work thrown on the cross-channel service is most serious and can not be handled at present. As a result, no vessels could not be received in England. As a compromise I have suggested to the department the desirability of lending these ships with freight for England, the amount to be determined by Mr. Guthrie, the allied shipping representative in London. It is possible that wheat or some nonexplosive freight could be carried on the large ships and these vessels routed direct to Liverpool; but this is contingent on our help in furnishing steamers for cross-channel service.

16. I consider Liverpool the safest port of entry in the submarine area. At the present, however, I think we shall have to send our large ships to Brest and then, when they are unloaded, escort them into England to be coaled.

17. I have previously reported against using the *Vaterland* for the present until we have a little more experience in handling the other large transports. The *Vaterland* is of course a much longer target, and injury to her would be a serious affair, assuming too that all of the troops that we have to transport for the next few months can be accommodated in other transports, assisted by British liners. When the situation becomes pressing I presume we shall have to use the *Vaterland* and take the additional risk.

18. British destroyers would escort all our troops sent in British liners. Queenstown destroyers (our own) escort all our troops in regular convoys and also escort to all supply ships in convoys sailing from Hampton Roads or Sydney. British destroyers escort to a position near Brest all our store ships in New York convoys.

19. Forces based on Brest escort into France to storeships in New York convoys that are carried by British destroyers to a rendezvous near Brest. The British destroyers also distribute our storeships to their destination along the French coast, and also out of French convoys of empty vessels. It will be noted that the great bulk of the work is done by our Queenstown destroyers, and that the forces based on Brest are principally coasting work, and for escorting out our empty vessels.

20. At the present time, as we have things organized, we can handle one large convoy every eight days. If six or eight vessels are sent in a convoy averaging 10,000 troops per convoy, this would mean approximately 60,000 troops a month direct to France with the addition of some 15,000 or 20,000 troops a month through England in British liners under the present arrangement.

21. To bring the troops in at a faster rate will require more destroyers on the coast and any considerable increase in storeships will also require more destroyers.

22. With reference to the use of submarine versus submarines, this matter has been given more attention since the establishment of convoys. Formerly the system was patrol surface craft of sea routes. With this system it was rather difficult to detect submarines except in limited areas. Now that a large part of the patrols have

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

to provide escort for convoys, there is considerable anxiety as to the system of attack against submarines. I believe the system of attack as the attacking submarine must rely on torpedo attack, coming into position to attack the enemy submarine which is now being built in England, of which Lieut. ... provide for the use of guns against enemy submarines. The attacking enemy submarines will give much better than the presence in waters of our submarines makes them feel the enemy and already a number of German submarines are being sunk. The presence of our submarines in the ... of keeping enemy submarines away from that

POSSIBLE BATTLE CRUISER RAIDS.

There is no further doubt in any one's mind as to the importance of war plans from a distance of 3,000 miles. The case that I am now going to take up should make clear that, in so far as a statement of the committee by the Secretary of the Navy can be made, my position abroad was a purely local one, and policies were not any of my business, the same

In the case now to be considered, I am sure the committee is impressed with the extent to which the executive plans were required of me, whether I originally had a matter of fact, as I have stated repeatedly that my principal mission throughout the war was in connection with plans and policies. As you have seen, I was called upon for advice and directed specifically to advise the Allied leaders this and that question of policy

of 1918, as the losses of merchant tonnage were falling off month by month and it was clear that the submarine campaign against ship convoys had become a last venture, send out the battle cruisers in the hope of meeting and completely destroying the convoys, or of compelling the abandonment of the campaign. I say that it was a surprise to the Allies that this was done this long before, if only for the consideration of the Allies and the disturbance in the ... that would inevitably have resulted.

The section of my staff in London, which had been recommended and after approval given by me during my visit to London in November, 1917, had the probable conditions of such a raid and had, in the plans division of the British Admiralty, drawn up a plan. A copy of this plan was forwarded to the ... 1918.

On ... I received the following dispatch from

As last hope, German battle cruisers may be used against our large troop convoys. We depend upon your action on this point and Grand Fleet to take necessary action. 11001. Simben 3.

I would like to explain right here—I think I have not explanation before—that any message that is marked “Simben” was sent with an agreement which I understood to be that the message would be delivered directly to Admiral Benson and nobody else and any messages coming to me on the other side that were marked to “Simben,” that meant that they had been sent by Admiral Benson and not necessarily anybody else.

I would like to add in further explanation about “Simben” messages that they were sent in a separate code. There was an officer in the Navy Department who had that code and could translate it, and there was only one officer in my quarters who could similarly translate messages coming the other way. That was to secure extra secrecy to the important messages sent in that code.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that code changed from time to time?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; that code was changed from time to time so that only those two people knew it.

To this dispatch I replied as follows on July 2:

Simben 11. Referring to your Simben 3. All possible measures will be taken to gain information of prospective and actual movements of enemy vessels. Fleet and other British vessels and United States vessels in these waters will be prepared to act within the limits of their capabilities. Notwithstanding all that can be done, it is impossible to guarantee that enemy battle cruisers will not appear on the high seas, and it is therefore apparent that battle ship escorts for convoys are their only real safeguard. Attention invited to planning section memorandum 26, forwarded with letter No. 21969, June 20, 1902.

By this time the department was evidently becoming alarmed. This is indicated by the following message received about a month later, namely, July 28:

Simben.
Simsadus.

No. 7. Department feels very apprehensive of at least one enemy battle cruiser getting out as forlorn hope and attacking United States naval vessel convoy proposed to send three oil-burning dreadnaughts to Berehaven or Queenstown in a position to protect convoys, depending upon British to give us information immediately of the exit of cruisers from German waters. Comment and recommendation requested as to the better of the two places to send them and have adequate protection against submarines. What do you think of our mine force extending at least one line of mines all the way across to Norway? 24027, No. 7.

I replied immediately by stating that Berehaven seemed the best base for the dreadnaughts which the department proposed to send.

Replying to this on July 30 the department outlined a new complete plan of their own for the protection of shipping against a battle-cruiser raid. I insert the dispatch in full, but as it is long and technical I will not read it, but will refer to and explain certain of the defects of the plans proposed. The dispatch is as follows:

[Highly secret.]

Simsadus.

Simben 8. Reference planning section memorandum 26, battle-cruiser raid. The department is of opinion that raid by a battle cruiser against the supply lines to European ports, particularly against troop convoys, is a possibility, and that even if the chance is remote it should be guarded against. The department further notes the decision arrived at as modified, by the action actually contemplated by the Admiralty, while safeguarding ships leaving port after notice of the escape of a battle cruiser has been promulgated, is in the nature of a negative decision and only partial relief to ships then in transit between United States and European ports. The department further proposes the following definite plan for consideration:

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

to be applicable to United States troop convoys and convoys carrying United States troops. Approved advisable by Admiralty. Plan drawn for North Sea around north end Scotland. Applicable also to enemy battle cruiser escaping from range of enemy should be given to all for Island lines or has gotten clear of Aegean and westbound ships. Specific details: The State Department to request of Japan that with the Atlantic Fleet at Hampton Roads. First, west Atlantic, longitude 40° west to longitude 20° west to longitude 45° west Atlantic destination. The United States Navy, U. S. S. Nevada, U. S. S. Oklahoma, U. S. S. Tennessee, to act as raider group in Atlantic and east section. To hold the Fifth Fleet, U. S. S. Mississippi, U. S. S. New Mexico, U. S. S. Texas, to proceed where necessary. The Navy is detailed to work with our forces, for the purpose of intercepting. All convoys between longitude 45° west and Canadian port, there to await the arrival of escorts for each convoy carrying troops. The same escort to cargo convoys, and when necessary, to cargo convoys, all convoys proceed to destination at top speed, convoys between longitude 45° west diverting immediately to Azores Islands under Island San Miguel; convoys between longitude 45° west to San Miguel or proceed to destination depending upon estimated position of enemy and speed of convoys. Westbound shipping: Ships from European ports return to port to await adequate escorts depending upon submarine situation and longitude 45° west divert to Azores Islands Canadian port, depending upon their proximity to longitude 45° west route to destination or to nearest port. U. S. S. North Dakota with Division 3, Division 4, to protect troop convoys; utilize cruiser force to escort convoys with one destroyer division instantly. U. S. S. with two destroyer divisions in European waters under Island San Miguel. Use Japanese battle cruiser detailed to cooperate with United States forces. Above plan to become effective immediately upon receipt of broadcast radio and upon escape from North Sea. The department of the Navy and all in European waters and Azores Islands. Division 6. This above plan is suggested for battle cruiser or small force of enemy ships attempting to raid our lanes of communication between the Atlantic and other seas. The force for raiding force escaping from Adriatic Sea between meridian longitude 20° and 40° west to destination or the nearest port at 10 knots.

The department's plan provided that one division was to be stationed at Queenstown, to cover the western Atlantic. Another division was to be stationed at Halifax, to cover the western Atlantic. A division of the United States Navy was requested to base on a United States ship for search operations. Upon the warning of a submarine in certain general sea areas, were in the United States or Canadian port. All ships of the Atlantic were to proceed to destination. The mid-Atlantic were to be diverted immediately westbound shipping about the same

versed, was to apply. After the battle cruiser was out, in fact, the trouble was on, another division of battleships was to be sent to escort any troop convoys which were then to move. The plan was to become effective only after receipt of information from the battle cruiser had, in fact, escaped from the North Sea.

The plan was impracticable for numerous reasons, and was eventually abandoned with the full concurrence of the Navy Department and before any necessity for its application arose; for it was substituted a plan substantially the same as that previously recommended by the planning section.

I will explain briefly some of the undesirable features of the department's plan:

(a) Most serious of all, it was not a joint plan—that is, it was for American troops and shipping only—a small portion of the whole—and could not be made applicable to all allied shipping. One can imagine the confusion in the Atlantic of attempting to coordinate allied convoys and shipping with conflicting wireless instructions other than a joint plan.

(b) It upset the whole delicate allied machinery for providing a destroyer escort through the submarine zone. That is, in attempting to guard against an enemy battle-cruiser raid it subjected allied shipping to added and unnecessary risk of destruction by submarines. It was quite impossible for the department to know of the extent of the delicately adjusted system in London for providing protection against submarines for all allied shipping. The system was constantly changing as new forces or additional convoys were added.

(c) It was based on an erroneous premise, namely, that we could be sure of counting on advance knowledge of the escape of a battle cruiser. I had repeatedly reported that the Allies could not guarantee any such information. While we could and did track the progress of submarines quite accurately, a battle cruiser at full speed could make its escape from the North Sea in one night, to the advantage of fog or heavy weather, with small chance of being detected.

(d) If a false alarm of the escape of a raider were given, and the case actually occurred after the latter plan had been adopted, the system of controlling shipping would be so deranged that it could not be put back into normal operation for some time. Consequently there would be increased opportunities for submarines to attack unescorted convoys and shipping as well as unnecessary delay of shipping.

I would like to invite attention at that point to one of the greatest dangers that can be inflicted upon the people who are doing the fighting, by the people at headquarters; that is, that they at headquarters should, in the pride of intellect, draw up a plan to be executed by the people at the front, and thereby incur the danger of drawing up that plan on a false premise. That was done twice during the war. In one case it is my conviction that it cost us at least a million tons of shipping. It was the premise which enabled them to draw up the perfectly erroneous estimate of the situation that the best thing to do was to depend upon arming merchant shipping; and it was that which caused the delay of the convoy system for approximately three months. The false premise in this case, and it was exceedingly dangerous—was that we would be sure

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

When the battle cruiser went out of the North Sea, we never were sure, the premise was wholly false; the estimate of the situation was wholly false; the department's plan was wholly impracticable. Out of all this trouble and expense we have got nothing that will be of value to the United States Government in the future.

The department's dispatch as follows:

1. 1. 1.

[Simben.]

Your Simben 8. I believe it extremely dangerous to rely on that information of enemy's escape will be obtained, or that they will attack. There is certainly a small chance that this is possible, and, in long nights of winter, chances will be very small. I believe safety requires plan should be based on the fact that more battle cruisers will be at large in Atlantic, with a position to attack convoys, before we have any knowledge of their movements. Only possible protection against this danger is by a plan inaugurated before the danger arises. This would subject the convoys to a small risk of being torpedoed, as compared with the risk of many thousand troops being destroyed by the enemy's attack. I have consistently advocated this plan, and no other can offer the same certainty of protection to the convoys. The following comments are submitted on the department's dispatch.

The number of merchant ships at Azores dangerous, because of the extraordinary marine risks due to assembly so near the enemy's principle of action should be to keep all convoys moving. To turn back shipping, or to deflect it toward other points, would make antisubmarine escort impossible in many cases, and create difficulties that would tie up many vessels until they were no longer available.

The Irish port as proposed, would be available to escort to the convoys as might be in danger area when alarm was given. It is better than to have such convoys proceed to destination and then proceed to Azores. If department should decide to add a fleet of ships to the Azores to furnish escort to shipping as proposed, that the Tagus River would be a better base than an anchorage at the Azores.

On the general principle of plan, I will take up with the Admiralty. Final plan must be a joint plan, taking into account the views of both sides.

SIN

In explanation of the sending of a vast number of destroyers to Azores, and the plan of sending a dozen destroyers to protect them, if there had been ten or one hundred of destroyers sent to protect them, everybody that had anything to do with this war ago would have known that no possible number of destroyers could protect a vessel that is standing still, at anchor.

The British vessel *Justicia* illustrated that perfectly. She was not sunk, and they had 5 tugs and 17 destroyers sent out of the channel from the North Sea when she was in the neighborhood circling around her, and they were making depth charges, and so forth, and yet they could not prevent her from being torpedoed, because she was not moving more than a mile and a half an hour.

The department, however, replied with a long message upon their original plan. I insert the message in full, not read it:

Origin: Opnav, Washington. Ser. No. Simben 11.

Date: August 7, 1918.

[Highly secret.]

Simsadus.

Simben 11. Your 21. Our 8. The details of the plan drawn by the were laid down to accord in general with the decision of your planning revised by the Admiralty planning department. As to your first point safety requires plan should be based on assumption that one or more battleships will be at large in Atlantic with ample fuel supply and in position to attack before we have any knowledge of their exit from home port, this statement is in contradiction to statement in F. D. O. 80, paragraph 5, and opposed to information which you have from time to time furnished us. It is, however, an important point that a direct statement should be had from (?) the Admiralty as to their ability to provide the necessary information. You will notice in our plan it is department's intention to furnish old battleship escort to number of the important convoy when necessity arises, but there have been many reasons why we did not wish to do this in advance of the necessity, one being that we did not wish to give advance information to the enemy, as to one of the most important points of the plan, and thus give him the opportunity to plan an answer. In this regard you should get a direct statement from the Admiralty, as to the advisability of using our dreadnaughts for escort and when the operations in their opinion go into effect. With regard to the rest of our plan and your comment on it, when battleship escort is provided this in itself on account of its fixed character is only a partial answer and can be countered by the enemy by an increase in his raiding force. It therefore becomes necessary to provide for further contingencies and this the plan submitted attempts to do.

It differs only from the decision of your planning section in introducing the element of premeditated diversion. In general on account of the few dreadnaughts and their slower speed than that of battle cruisers, the number of convoys to be escorted and the great area over which (?) these convoys operated, it seemed first necessary to divert according to a plan which might at same time get our dreadnaughts with battle cruisers and afford greatest protection with minimum number of ships. Second, nothing in the above prevents department from immediately proceeding on the plan of evasion by warnings either before or after the premeditated plan is operative; and, lastly, as a final resort, it is always in the province of the commander to scatter his convoy. Therefore the department still adheres to its original plan, introducing the element of evasion by warnings; and, lastly, providing the movement to scatter be left in escort commander's hands, as last resort. The department prefers to base division 6 many points of view. U. S. S. *Oklahoma* and U. S. S. *Nevada* will sail in a few days. The plan above outlined will apply to troop convoys to France and to the direct cargo convoys to French bay ports. It is desired that this plan be taken up immediately with Admiralty to get their reference as to HJ and HC convoys carrying our troops, or for such modification of the plan as they suggest. 18006. Simben 11.

B

N. B.—The words evidently omitted in coding, as blank spaces indicate.

The gist of the reply was that it was apparently hard for them to believe the specific statement that the Allies could not guarantee the escape of a raider from the Atlantic Sea. That, to us, was one of the most astonishing things during the war, the conclusions drawn in that way. Frequently we have encountered civilians who would say to me, "It does not seem to me that you would have much trouble in blocking up the Atlantic Sea." I would say, "How wide do you suppose it is up to the Atlantic Sea?" They would make a guess, anywhere from 15 to 50 miles. My mental picture of the thing was a little map in the geography book they studied in school, and when you told them that it was 3,000 miles across and 900 feet deep, then they began to think about

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

they asked me to confirm the statement about the advance information of the escape of the raider.

They stated that there were many reasons why they did not send battleships with convoys, in advance of the necessity. They did not desire to give advance information to the most important elements in the plan. The recommendation was to put the battleships with the convoys, but this would be put a partial answer, and would be a simple expedient of increasing the power of the fleet. It may be well to state that the main thing we were concerned with was the escape of a single raider, which would run down the battle-cruiser force, it would play directly into the hands of the British Grand Fleet, to say nothing of our own fleet. The number of United States ships were very small indeed, compared to the number of British ships.

According to me that the department would consider the number of ships to the Azores, where there was a danger they would practically have to anchor in the Azores. The complications which would be involved in sending many other ships to supply the convoys before they could continue their voyage, and the number of destroyers from the Azores, through the submarine destinations.

It is enough to send destroyers out from the coast of England, 200, 300, or 400 miles, to meet convoys. To send destroyers from Queenstown and other ports required refueling there before they could be sent. It would double the number of destroyers before they could be sent.

The matter was summed up in a personal letter to Admiral Benson, of which I will read you the following:

August 10, 1914

I have just received your second cable about the meeting of the battle-cruisers. I will take this up at once. I will of course telegraph the answers to the question.

There is only one vital decision to make in solving this problem. It should be based upon the assumption we will get the information or as to whether we will not get the information. The planning section's estimate to which you refer will be based upon the assumption that we would probably not get the information. It seems to me that any problem of this kind, should be based upon the worst that the enemy can do.

It is very probable that the German battle-cruisers would be sent out. I do not think it would pay them, as I have a feeling that they will lose. They would want to be in possession of the ships as possible when they come to the peace negotiations.

There is a possibility that all through Admiral Von Tirpitz's plan, that scheme, that the prime minister at that

insisted upon having the fleet preserved, while he wanted
[Continuing reading:]

This statement about preserving the fleet until the end of the war was made two weeks after the war was declared, in 1914. It may not have been authentic but it was made by the officials of the German Embassy, who were at Newport at that time, and was promptly reported in Newport by one of the retainers.

As to whether we would be likely to get warning of the exit of a battle cruiser, we have often talked over this with the officials of the Admiralty, and it was recently at one of the morning conferences. It was agreed then that the probability is that a battle cruiser could get out without being detected; also that if detected she would not continue on the way out, though we would not be sure, and of course the proposed plan would have to be carried out.

Considering the distance across the North Sea, the position of the German fleet on the western shores of the North Sea, the proportion of bad weather and fog, and limitations as to the use of oil, it does not seem to me at all likely that the exit of a battle cruiser would be discovered. It therefore seems to me that it is the only ordinary prudence to base any plan for the protection of our troops upon the assumption that we will not know of the exit of the cruiser until it has been made.

Some of the people in the Admiralty have expressed the opinion that a battle cruiser coming out for this purpose could not remain out long and would almost certainly be detected upon attempting to return. I have always dissented from this, and in our last discussion of the subject it was apparent that the Admiralty now think it more than likely that the battle cruisers would not go out without a certain amount of coal in vessels that had been dispatched for that purpose.

It has always seemed to me that by the expenditure of a sufficient amount of coal could be cleared from almost any country for perfectly innocent port arrangements made to divert the cargo and anchor it in many places where it could be used and where there would be very small chance of its detection. I should like to see a battle cruiser, once out, to have facilities for recoaling at least for a considerable time. This would, of course, be a serious matter—so serious that it would be the basis of the plan would be based upon this assumption.

Of course, if a battle cruiser did go out and we had no warning of her, the chance of her finding a convoy out in the Atlantic would be small. It is assumed that she would not search for a convoy close to the European coast, where convoys are sent toward their ports. This would be too dangerous a proceeding, as she could be detected in these waters without being detected, and in that case she would be in danger of being run down by British battle cruisers, particularly if one of our destroyers got contact with her and kept contact.

It is therefore assumed that she would take to mid-Atlantic or appear off some point where there are no battle cruisers. The chance of encountering a convoy in the Atlantic would, of course, be small. If we knew she had just left the North Sea we could take measures to protect the convoys, but if we did not get this warning we would probably lose some one or more convoys before the necessary measures could be taken.

It is for this reason that I have always advocated our battleships being used as ocean escorts of our troop convoys. While I have never been particularly apprehensive as to the battle cruisers coming out, I was always apprehensive that they might come out carrying one or more guns heavier than those of our cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, I have certain matters that I wish to attend to before the Senate meets, and the committee will therefore have to adjourn now until to-morrow morning.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, March 16, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
in Room 225, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick F.

Senator Hale (chairman) and Trammell.

Chairman: The committee will come to order. Admiral
Sims proceed.

HEARING OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral: I was explaining yesterday that I had always
thought battleships being used for ocean escort of our trans-
port. While I had never been particularly apprehensive as
to our coming out, I was always apprehensive that
they would come out carrying one or more guns heavier than the
transport.

On August 17, 1918, I sent the following dispatch to the dep-

[Sims:]

On September 13, Matter was referred officially to Admiralty Au-
thorities, but received but from discussion with Admiralty staff I
do not believe that their information service is such as to make
it possible to secure information of the exit of an enemy raider from
the Atlantic. I can say that the Admiralty opinion is that battleship es-
cort is required for convoys whenever there is thought to be possibility of
attack and that the provision of such escort should not be deferred
until it is too late.

SIN

The department continued to insist upon the plan which I
had suggested.

In view of the probability of a German battle cruise
at the end of August, 1918, when information
was received from a variety of sources that two heavy
battleships might soon attempt to enter the Atlantic to at-
tack our convoys. In the face of this we had no plan, altho
we had been urged since September, 1917. The departme-
nt's situation was to adopt my repeated recom-
mendation of battleship escort to convoys, together with
their own plan concerning convoy routes. They
put their own complete plan into operation until a
better one was available.

This is indicated by their message to me of 31 of August follows:

[Highly Secret.]

824. Plan outlined our Simben 8 and 11 for protection against battle cruisers and instructions one of Commander Force European waters, will become operative upon receipt of this cable so far as plan for diversion of routes is concerned. With September 9, battleship escort will be given to the HX, HC and United States troop convoys, in order of importance named. Until system of battleship escort is thoroughly in hand, it is probably that some convoys will sail without battleship escort. You will be informed when this happens. To put the plan into active operation if it is so desired, when information is gained of the location of a raider, the following radio or cable will be sent by Sims and by Opanav, "Raider raid plan operative." 14030. 724.

6.52 a. m., August 31, 1918.

The mixture of plans, the inevitable difficulties of coordination to be expected from the department policy of divided control and responsibility, was immediately apparent.

I have before me and insert in the record a long message from the department, of September 4, pointing out the confusion which has resulted.

The message referred to is as follows:

Origin: Opanav, Washington.

Ser. No. 857.

Date, September 4.

31 ADR.

Simsadus.

[Secret.]

857. Your 3959, 3947 and 3937. The disinclination of the admiralty to protect HX and HC convoys in accordance with our plan naturally weakens it. Protection must be afforded HX and HC convoys as they carry our troops you use division 6 for the protection of HX and HC convoys as indicated in 3947 but the United States troop convoys diverted to Azores Islands according to plans must receive the protection of at least one of our dreadnaughts from division 6. Therefore until joint agreement is reached we will expect the United States troop convoys and the HB to be diverted and the HX and HC to proceed. If division 6 finds according to this arrangement which scatters our force we will be unable to adequately protect all the troop convoys it may be necessary to urge upon the department the advisability of discontinuing sending troops in the HC convoys until a joint agreement has been reached convoys at sea are not familiar with our plan. United States convoys must be given diverting instructions, but on receipt of these issue instructions to all transports.

United States men of war and escort ships in European waters make the plan familiar with necessary details. Also furnish all American merchant vessels with sealed order to be broken in case of receipt of operating signal as prescribed, so that westbound ships may avail themselves of protection if desired. The operating signal will be sent in a United States code to American ships only. Beginning with September 9 it is department's plan to furnish predreadnought escort to the HX and HC convoys, whose captain will be familiar with our plan, but will not use the Admiralty so desires. Commander cruiser force will issue similar instructions to ships on this coast. Finally, this plan is only a temporary expedient and does not solve the problem of continued activity of an enemy battle cruiser in the Atlantic. Escort by battleships will protect troop convoys against the enemy raiders, but the cargo convoys will still be lightly protected. Our dreadnaughts are too slow for an efficient pursuit division, and no answer has been received from the Admiralty on our request that they send four battle cruisers to base with our fleet. The department desires to know what will be the Admiralty policy as to the use of the battle cruisers for pursuit in case of the escape of an enemy battle cruiser 18503. 82

B2

September 4, 1918, 12.06 p. m.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... example of the deplorable absence of
... was, a measure which the Allies finally ad-
... made victory possible. The message is too
... statements as the following: "As no joint
... reached, convoys at sea are not familiar v
... is only a temporary expedient and does n
... continued activity of an enemy battle cruise
... No answer has been received from the Jap
... to know Admiralty policy as to use

... to be gained by examining this situation
... who was right or who was responsible for
... is that it was wholly impossible even to
... and execution of extensive and complicate
... makers, the members of the team, separ
... of ocean, and the discussions carried out
... cable. It was attempting the impossible.
... experiences in the war, a few hours of joint
... the parties concerned would have resulted
... But the issues at stake were so serious tha
... done, no matter how impossible it seem
... tangle.

... the situation with the heads of the
... that my staff get together with the
... regardless of difficulties, produce, in the
... simplest possible joint plan, which they l
... able to our department. (These planning
... ating since May.)
... before me and insert it in the record.

...

[Highly Secret.]

... to United States merchant vessels and to Unit
... as directed. Admiralty propose to use th
... of enemy raiders, and do not propose to use them f
...
... of the following joint plan which has been
... Admiralty Plans Division, and has the approv
... govern all vessels and convoys at sea after they have

PLAN.

... not be sent out without mutual consent of Navy
... evidence is conclusive that raider is out.
... and supporting force will be handled by radio from t
...
... continue all voyages and to provide all convoys th
... by sending battleships from Halifax and B
... not already escorted by battleships, and by c
... speed
... will leave eastbound convoys and join westbound
... getting all their fuel in American ports
... west of longitude 40 shall be controlled by
... with British C in C North Atlantic and Wei
... Longitude 10 shall be controlled by the admiral
... commander, United States naval forces, Europe, with
... received and orders issued.

6. The ordinary machinery for routing shall continue in operation and orders to convoys and escorts at sea to avoid raiders shall be sent direct to the Navy Department and the admiralty to save time. Base commanders shall be informed of orders issued.

7. Special rendezvous routes to be used in the case of a raid in the absence of instructions will be given each convoy unescorted by battleships before departure and battleships will be sent out from Berehaven to join the convoys.

8. Commanders of battleships at Halifax and at Berehaven, and all commanders of convoys and commanders of escorts, shall be given the routes of convoys about to sail, together with the latest information on the submarine and raider situation.

9. Destroyer escorts will accompany Berehaven battleships when practicable.

CONVOY INSTRUCTIONS.

1. Raider warnings and all subsequent communications will be made in cipher. Reports of enemy position will be broadcasted by shore stations.

2. Convoys shall listen in for radio instructions, but in their absence on receipt of a warning the following shall govern:

(a) Notwithstanding these general instructions, special vessels and commanders shall be given full discretion as to action taken to evade the enemy, when danger is imminent.

(b) When practicable convoys should seek to escape in the general direction of their destination.

(c) As a final resort convoy commanders when insufficiently protected may order the dispersal of their convoys.

(d) Maintain radio silence except that senior officers' ship shall:

(1) Report position and movement of raiding force if sighted.

(2) Relay to shore stations such reports if deemed necessary.

(3) Communicate rendezvous signals unless safety of convoy is thereby endangered.

EASTBOUND CONVOYS.

(e) Convoys escorted by battleships will continue their route.

(f) Convoys unescorted by battleships in the absence of radio instructions shall proceed on rendezvous routes and follow them.

(g) Battleships will be dispatched from Berehaven to join convoys unescorted by battleships.

(h) Convoys for which no battleships escorts are available may be ordered to join escorted convoys.

(i) A separate rendezvous route will be assigned for convoys bound to:

(1) French ports.

(2) English and St. Georges Channels.

(3) North Channel.

WESTBOUND CONVOYS.

(j) Convoys will, if practicable continue their voyage.

(k) Westbound battleships will give such protection as practicable.

SOUTHERN CONVOYS.

(l) Should proceed on their voyage unless ordered to port.

4523.

This plan was simple, and, in substance, was identical with previous recommendations.

Briefly stated it was, that the moment any possibility of a raid was developed, the battleships at both ends of the line would put to sea and pick up and escort the nearest convoys believed to be in danger. That, as far as possible, and in order to make up for the lack of ships, an attempt would be made to combine convoys. The Navy Department would control all shipping in the western Atlantic and the British Admiralty all in the eastern Atlantic, by direct communication with the convoys and battleships.

That the battleship escorts would not attempt the complete protection of convoys but those in the eastern area, after reaching a central point, pick up an eastbound convoy and return. It contained many

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

of routing, control, and communication. However, all convoys were to keep going except to Azores was abandoned.

Department finally recognized the impossibility of carrying out the plan for on September 21, 1918, I received a dispatch that they had accepted the plan that I had previously just explained. The dispatch was as follows:

(Secret.)

Washington Series No. 1869.

Plan for meeting raider menace approved, and present plan. For the present, our division 8 will remain at Hampton Roads, though later some may move at Halifax. Issue necessary instructions to put the shipping department with rendezvous route. Directions in chief, and commander cruiser force, to issue instructions plan into effect immediately after. Though plan of shipping proceeding independently, department infers from first sentence, your cable 4523, will hold, and that, if shipping will be guided by warning received, and by any other instructions, is this correct? 21020 1869.

Re:

Office of 6974.

The enemy never attempted a battle cruiser. All familiar with the case, it is, to put it mildly, to contemplate the confusion of all Atlantic shipping, merchant, stoop carriers and all, which would have occurred during those long-drawn-out negotiations, Washington and London, in an attempt to reach as to joint action.

September, 1917, the danger had been pointed out for plans stressed. Ten months later, all proposed, when the danger was thought to be imminent, the department acknowledged that it had no alternative but that it depended upon the European force, the Grand Fleet, to stand off the danger until the time after the department had been aroused. The plan, and had put forward one which was impracticable and was wholly impracticable, it took nearly a year to solve a problem which was easily susceptible of a few hours of personal conference.

The headquarters Planning Section had, in cooperation with the British, prepared a definite plan. This was submitted in June. About September 1, a plan had submitted its impracticable plan, and which was not agreed to by either the British Planning Sections in London. It insisted that it be put into effect, notwithstanding the fact that the shipping involved was not United States shipping, and other forces than our own were required to put it into effect.

had only known. All he need have done was to make a series of bluffs, involving himself, and we would have done the rest. Shipping paralyzed.

In conclusion I wish to reiterate the salient point in this presenting. It is not that Foreign Navy Department officers than ours, nor that the officers of my London were abler than their brother officers in Washington, but that the Department violated sound military principles in attempting a joint campaign over a 3,000 mile cable. This, notwithstanding that the department had in London an organization established for the express purpose of preparing joint plans coordinating with the Allies, all of whom maintained similar organizations in London to facilitate unity of command.

I have necessarily condensed this case, as it would take to cover all of the details connected with it.

I feel that I have presented enough to give a true picture of the committee, and thereby to establish in this case alone the truth of my letter under investigation.

DEPARTMENTAL PLANS.

Thus far in my testimony I have been considering only the recommendations made to the department, after consulting the Allies, and the action, or lack of action, of the department on those recommendations.

I now propose to take up for discussion certain plans proposed by the department at different stages of the war, to show how certain of these plans were impracticable of execution, and how I was compelled to recommend against their adoption.

In paragraph 69 of my letter of January 7, 1920, I stated as

69. * * * The objection to radically new plans was that the situation and their preparation would delay striking quickly with all available force. Insistence assumed that the department, incompletely informed as it necessarily was and without previous experience in the war, was more competent to discuss impracticable plans than their own representative in continuous conference with the leaders of the allied navies who had had nearly three years experience. *

The war, at the time of our entry into it, had been going on for nearly three years. The United States Navy had, during that time, few, if any, representatives abroad other than the regular attachés, whose facilities for collecting information are much reduced in war time. Consequently the Navy Department was much better informed than the general public of actual conditions in the belligerent countries, and had but little trustworthy information in such matters as submarine losses, shipping losses, anti-submarine measures that had been tried and found effective, or the results on the other matters concerning which complete knowledge was essential to the development of effective plans for combating the submarine menace.

After my arrival in England, where I was given access to the department, it was wholly impossible, with the meager staff at my disposal, to place the department at once in possession of all the information that I acquired or was in position to acquire.

I shall take up in succession each of the following plans proposed by the department:

1. A protected land through the danger zone.
2. Blocking German ports.
3. Mine barriers of net and mines of standard types.
4. Mine barrier of mines of new type.

PLAN FOR PROTECTED LANE.

I received the following message from the Navy Depart-

ment of the Navy.
U. S. S. Melville.

to thoroughly patrol a single lane through the danger zone, with a number of antisubmarine vessels constantly passing back and forth in a constant stream of vessels through the lane. 22006.

It is unnecessary to comment on this message, other than the reply sent on July 11, which was as follows:

the Navy.

Message 22006 concerning patrolling a single lane through danger zone. Melville July 10. The plan has been fully considered in the Admiralty, but not adopted for primary reason that the number of vessels have been, and will continue to be, inadequate. Another matter is how much or how often the lane can be shifted, its position always be clearly defined. Submarines have operated to a maximum distance of 400 miles, and sinkings are frequent up to 200 miles. They did not attempt to attack through the patrol lines themselves, but to the westward, and the patrol line would afford excellent targets for attack. As experience shows that a vessel, accompanied by a single zig-zagging destroyer close ahead, is difficult to attack, it is apparent that, unless such a proposed patrol lane the submarine could undoubtedly attack successfully at any point other than one lane would have to be established, and as at least one vessel would always be resting, refueling or repairing, it seems the number of ships required for such a plan would never be available.

SIMS.

It is one of the very numerous recommendations that the Navy Department which exhibited a hardly understanding of the very elements of the submarine campaign.

BLOCKING GERMAN PORTS.

Of German submarines in the early stages of the war, the Navy Department, and the apparent inefficacy of the measures taken against them, led many of our naval officers to the conclusion that the measure that would prove really effective would be to block their exit from home ports, either by blocking the entrance or by mining them in.

It is known that the President himself gave voice to this idea. It is known that the best way to fight hornets is to block their nest, not to chase them individually after they are out. The strategical idea involved was unquestionably sound, and it is unquestionably sound that it should have been patent to all that there must have been compelling reasons, tactical or political, which prevented its adoption by the Allies long before the war.

It is known that in the early months of my mission abroad that the Navy Department was insistent upon development of some such solar weapon which would immediately defeat the submarine. It is known that officers in the department indicated clearly that the failure to realize the desperately critical nature of

situation, they were allowing themselves to be drawn into fast speculation, in the effort to devise some such new and radical plan. In fact, this was clearly revealed to me, a few days after my arrival in London, when I received from the department the following dispatch, on the 17th of April:

Is it not practicable to blockade German coast efficiently and completely, making practically impossible the egress and ingress of submarines? Any attempts or accomplishments in this direction are to be reported at once. The noon 14th April will be given earnest and immediate attention.

DANIEL
Secretary of the Admiralty

After consultation with the allied naval authorities, I replied to this cable in a dispatch of April 18, as follows:

To absolutely blockade the German and Belgian coast against the entrance and departure of submarines has been found quite unfeasible. Attempts have been made with all possible means to stop egress and to prevent nets and mines being laid out. Many nets and mine fields have been, and continue to be, laid—destroying submarines, and other vessels have been used. Of course, for craft operating against enemy bases, the danger is great and the result has been that several have been sunk and torpedoed. Even to keep up an effective patrol against submarines along the coast between Norway and Scotland has been found quite unfeasible; far too many vessels were attacked. On lines between Iceland and Scotland, and between Scotland and Greenland, ice floes as well as enemy craft must be guarded against on line patrol is now kept up. It is necessary to move these lines after each enemy sighting in order to maintain them and to prevent torpedoing, as there are no available vessels to protect the cruisers from attack by submarines. The destroyer has shown to be to a great degree the most efficacious enemy of the submarines attacking commerce. All possible means are taken by the enemy to force their being assigned to other duty, even to sinking ships on hospital service. With the exception of a minimum number required by the Grand fleet, for carrying troops and their supplies, all destroyers are now so used. These vessels are being constructed as expeditiously as possible, but their number is quite insufficient to meet the existing submarine crisis, particularly as it affects merchantmen.

In my letter-report of April 19 I further discussed this problem, pointing out the impossibility of such operations as the one proposed by the department. The letter is as follows:

22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly destroyers, and until enemy submarine morale is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue, upon which there is also complete unanimity—increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.

More ships! More ships! More ships! is heard on every hand.

23. It is also significant that, until very recently, the Admiralty have been unable to completely convince some members of the Cabinet that the submarine issue is a deciding factor in the war. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.

24. The prime minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion that it would be possible to find physical means of absolutely sealing up all escape of submarines from their own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions) inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance of our own naval forces, is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced the prime minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the situation which we would be led to, namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we should have to match the forces the enemy brought against them, until finally the majority, if not all, of our forces would be forced into dangerous areas, where they would be subject to continual torpedo and other attack, in fact, in a position most favorable to the enemy.

25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, force the blockade and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chase through. In this respect we could be of no assistance, i. e. in supply of moorings and buoys.

now, and never has been, completely sealed against submarine escape to the north. Submarines have succeeded in unknown ways in evading and cutting through the blockade.

The idea of a close blockade of German ports was not entirely new to the department, is evidenced by the fact that when the British came to Europe in September, 1917, this whole scheme of blockade was taken up by him with the allied powers at the request of the Navy Department.

It is interesting to review, for a moment, what happened at the time, to show how impossible such a scheme was, and to point out how difficult it was to convince the department why a scheme so simple had not long since been carried into effect. There was some other reason besides its mere impracticability which prevented the Allies from carrying out such an operation. As I will point out in a moment, I had received repeated communications from the department, between April and August, concerning future operations, desiring to know whether or not, in the near future, the Allies were considering any new offensive operations. I had replied to these at the time, pointing out that the only offensive operations had been outlined in my messages to the department. The military issue at the time depended upon the submarine menace, and it was, therefore, a military matter. All plans for immediate operations should have as their basis the defeat of the submarine campaign, and the recommendations I had sent to the department since April, 1917, had been directed to meet this end.

When Mr. Mayo arrived in London in August, 1917, it was for the purpose of the naval conferences to be held in September. The first question for discussion should be, at the request of the Navy Department, "the question of offensive operations against enemy submarines." The second, "the manner in which United States Navy can cooperate with the Allies for successful prosecution of war." fifth, "the question of offensive operations against enemy submarines."

At the close of this session, plans for such a close offensive blockade of the Heligoland Bight were discussed. In my report to the Navy Department, reported on the examination of such operations, he was convinced that it was impossible, without the sacrifice of a very large number of ships. In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy, on September 17, 1917, he stated that the only scheme which might be practicable would be the use of 40 old battleships and 43 old cruisers, to be sunk in the Heligoland Bight by the allied powers, as merchant ships could not be used for the purpose. The primary object of this scheme was to block submarines in by blocking up the German North Sea. The old battleships and cruisers referred to had been filled with cement, and sunk in the entrance of the Heligoland Bight in the same way as was later done at Zeebrugge.

The details of the discussions at this conference were reported to the Navy Department, the magnitude and impracticability of the scheme of close blockade was at last recognized, and on October 21, 1917 - that is, seven months after the first time the scheme was proposed, they cabled:

No. 775. Department considers close offensive involving sinking of old ships and cruisers to block German channels impracticable.

I might add there that it was also the opinion of the committee that even if the channels should be successfully blocked, a ship could be dug around the blockading ships in a very short time.

Even in the case of similar operations, undertaken by the British against Ostend and Zeebrugge in the spring of 1918, it should be remembered that even the partial closing of these two ports was accomplished by that splendid naval feat, required in the preparation which was going on for eight months before the operation was actually carried out. The gentlemen of the committee will, therefore, perhaps be able to imagine the length of time and the amount of material that would have been required to carry out a scheme such as that proposed by the department in April, 1917, but it is needless to discuss this further, for, as I have already said to you, the department itself, after it had received Admiral Jellicoe's confirmation of my recommendations, announced that such a scheme was impracticable.

NET AND MINE BARRIERS.

The idea of blocking the German ports was only one phase of the idea which the department seems to have had in mind at that time, that is, in the early months of 1917, to do away with the submarine menace by some new and radical plan of offensive operations. The personal letters which I received from officers in the department at that time contained practically nothing else than long discussions of various projects which might be carried out to accomplish the purpose, all of these requiring a tremendous amount of material, and a great deal of time, which necessarily reduced them to subsidiary operations to be carried out when time and material might be available, rather than as the main operations which the United States Navy should undertake.

Another proposal of this sort was made to me by the Navy Department on May 11, 1917. This was as follows:

[Cablegram.]

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received May 11, 1917.

Much opinion here is in favor of concerted efforts by the Allies to establish a complete barrier across the North Sea, Norway, and Scotland, either direct, or through the Shetlands, to prevent the egress of German submarines. This plan would involve the use of various forms of mines, nets, patrols, and the release for this purpose of ships upon American coast patrols, as well as many vessels of the Allies now employed elsewhere. The plan also involves regulations for the commerce of Holland and Scandinavian neutrals to pass barriers and defined control gates. It also includes the use of Norway's territorial waters. The difficulty and size of the problem is recognized, but, if it is possible of accomplishment, the situation would warrant the effort. If the plan is not feasible, could not the same plan be carried out between Denmark and Norway, across the Skaggerack. Make full report.

One or two comments should be made before I read you my report. It should be noted that the department specifically stated that the plan would involve the use of various forms of mines, nets, and patrols, and the diversion to this project of many vessels of the Allies now employed elsewhere. This feature at a time when, as I was informed by the department several times weekly, the war might be lost in a few months, made the scheme quite impracticable, unless we could

with a diminishing of tonnage losses that the war could reach a successful conclusion, and that the material required could be transported overseas.

with my dispatch of May 14, 1917, which was as

(Cable dispatch.)

Navy.

My cable of May 11, concerning net and other barrages for preventing submarines. The general situation is as follows, based upon the British Admiralty. According to their experience, all barrages, nets, or both, are not an absolute solution, for the following reasons. Nets do not stop submarines. Mine barriers can not be wholly maintained by patrol at all points. Few of the 30,000 mines can be watched, but, even if all could be patrolled, it would be because the necessarily locally weak dispersed line of patrols would be concentrated attacks at any point, and as often as may be dragged out, thus releasing submarines. A barrage that can be subjected to concentrated attack, is ineffective. This subject was fully discussed May 11, now on the way. For special purposes of embarrassing the expected barrages of mines have always been, and now are in certain areas. Bitter and extensive experience has forced the attempt at blockading such passages as Scotland to Norway, Skaggerack. The one place that serious attempt at blockading is the Heligoland Bight. Over 30,000 mines are now there, and there are replaced as fast as possible, about 3,000 a

and probably never can, be absolutely effective, for reasons. Submarines can always find passages around, and through, and through island passages and gaps dragged in mine fields. Mines, however, the greater degree of embarrassment to submarines we can send the better, and there is no limit to number. Mine area much too extensive for all to be patrolled, hence the number of submarines destroyed or damaged by mines. The primary immediate necessity in numbers of patrol craft, too much stress can not be laid upon the urgency of submarine forces to the extreme possible limit. Defensive measures in any other locality, and in fact, all defensive considerations related to the offensive against the submarines where they are. Submarines appear on our own coast, their operations can be hindered, owing to the manifest limitations of distance from their base. In fact if some of the submarine efforts could be taken than the focus of all lines of communications, the critical situation would undoubtedly be diminished. It is the firm belief of officials concerned in this problem that the most effective measure is numbers of antisubmarine craft strategically disposed, deterring the enemy submarine efforts from the critical areas and operating over such widely separated areas that their successes would be most below the critical point. Every effort is being made to patrol. The measures we take must be carried out with utmost care of the critical degree of enemy submarine success and the general situation.

is all important. The need is for destroyers antisubmarine in the greatest possible numbers. The British Government appreciate the evidence of America's desire to assist in putting

Sims.

It is at this point that the scheme here proposed, of a character, and designed to be carried out in the northern mine barrage which will be discussed under the same plan later carried into effect in laying. The thing which made possible the northern barrage is a certain type of mine known as the antenna mine.

because of its technical features which had not been in the time this dispatch was sent to the department.

For a month I had been cabling full details as to the outlining the offensive plan against submarines, which involve use of all available antisubmarine craft, and the adoption of a convoy system, in order to insure the protection of sufficient merchant tonnage to enable the war to be carried on. As I have pointed out, I had received few replies to my recommendations from the department.

In my letter of May 11 to the department, dealing with the subject, I said:

15. Numerous propositions are made to the British Admiralty that have for object the closing of the North Sea, or the German ports, against the ingress of submarines. These are presented by all classes of people, including the House of Parliament.

They are, generally speaking, of two classes, namely, mines or nets, or both. I have gone over this whole matter with the first sea lord, and those members of the staff who are specially charged with the practical details of such matters.

16. As may well be imagined, this whole subject has been given the most careful consideration, as it is of course realized that if submarines could be kept from coming out, the whole problem would at once be solved.

17. As a result of this consideration many schemes have been tried. The following is a brief summary of those tried and the difficulties encountered:

18. It has been found that no net will stop a submarine if it is securely anchored at each end. The submarines are fitted with net cutters on the bow and sides, and periscopes, and strong steel guys from the bow to the tower.

19. But even those not so fitted can steam through a net, unless one end is held by a trawler, fitted with a winch for slacking off the anchor line.

20. Nets have been fitted with numerous small mines which will blow a hole in a submarine's side, but as soon as the nature and location of such nets were known, the submarine made a practice of approaching with the periscope out until the buoys were sighted, then rising to the surface, running over the buoys, and immediately diving again. An attempt is being made to so fit the buoys that contact with them will explode the mines immediately below.

21. There has been great difficulty in maintaining nets and mines in place, and frequently sweep out both, and the enemy mine sweepers are constantly destroying them.

22. In some places neither mines nor nets are effective on account of the tides. This is particularly the case between the Orkney and Shetland Islands.

23. Mines and nets are very extensively used in the attempt to prevent the ingress and egress of submarines from German ports, and to embarrass their movements also in attempting to prevent their passage through the Channel. I have been over the working charts and have had the various efforts explained to me by Jellicoe.

24. Generally speaking, the area inclosed within a line running first north-north-east, then north, from Texel Island, thence in a curve to the eastward to a point near Horn Reef, contains numerous lines and fields of mines. Within this area there are at least 30,000 mines, and additional ones are being laid at the rate of 3,000 per week. The field is now being extended to the westward and northward from Texel Island to the Broken Bank. (See chart of the British Islands and North Sea.) Some submarines are known to have been destroyed in the Channel; but the difficulty of the task will be recognized from the fact that the comparatively narrow Dover Straits are now completely closed to the passage of submarines.

25. This latter illustrates the difficulty of closing such a wide gap as the entrance to the North Sea from Kinnard Head to Norway. On this line of 100 miles there is 30 to over 100 fathoms of water. The number of patrol boats required to watch these nets would be very great.

26. As for protecting such a long line, or any line of considerable length, it is a course physically impossible to do so effectively, and this for the fundamental reason that the defense is stretched out in a long and locally weak line, while the enemy can concentrate an attack at any point of it, destroy the patrol vessel, and drag away sections of the mines or net, thus permitting the passage of any number of submarines.

27. This can be done in as many places as desired and as often as may be necessary, whether the barrier is nets or mines, and it is because of this fundamental principle that a concentrated attack against a point of a necessarily dispersed force has

is sufficiently effective to prevent the passage of all the submarines out.

In regard to the whole matter, the physical impossibility of a dispersed attack, requiring a locally concentrated attack.

That of considerable gun power can make a hole in any patrol of a

submarine must retire before such a force, thus permitting a section of the patrol to be cut out and thus defeating the object of the barrier.

It has been proposed to guard a barrier with heavy vessels. This is what Britain will do, thus exposing them to torpedo attack and a long and attrition to be carried out. The British vessels would also be attacked, but the British can not successfully compete with Germany, particularly near the bases of the latter.

It strongly emphasize the fact that during nearly three years of warfare this whole question has been the most serious consideration by the British Admiralty, and that many of the nature of those in question have been thoroughly considered practicable—those which do not violate fundamental principle—have been or are now being tried but the point is that no barrier can be completely effective. Unfortunately, a barrier or system of barriers such as needs only to be slightly ineffective to permit passage without much loss of submarines.

From the above and of the large amount of supporting evidence obtained it is recommended that our primary military effort should be directed to the maximum number of antisubmarine craft of all descriptions in the main area of activity.

Such and similar methods can never be entirely effective relative. The submarines must always be opposed in action and the most effective opposition discovered to the use of antisubmarine craft.

At present is the lack of such craft.

THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.

It is pointed out, in the discussion of the plans for netting, that the barrage proposed by the department involved the use of various kinds of mines, nets, and other devices which rendered any such plan impracticable of execution. With the invention in the United States of a new type of mine the project was put in an entirely new light and after careful consideration. The Bureau of Ordnance and the department was quick to grasp the possibilities offered and to outline a plan for its use.

From my first arrival in Great Britain I had taken up the improvement and development of our mines. In the other demands upon my time, the failure of the department to provide me a staff and the difficulties which I had to overcome myself, I yet considered this subject sufficient to make a special effort to keep the department advised of my experience.

On the 16th of April 1916, I informed the department:

1. The Elia mine as originally designed very unsatisfactory, and the improvements, since war began, are essential to efficiency. Particular improvements are:—

a. Depth taking and pistol. Distance weight now not released at water sink about 10 feet. New design pawl on mooring line.

and elimination shearing pins and modification firing pin sleeve release. Am sending drawings next day and British expert mine officer, as soon as possible. Admiralty now building mine similar Carbonnit, with changes (see Babcock intelligence reports, 1912). Please send me latest torpedo war nose and anticircular run device, both and sample. Advise sending McBride, also engineer and gunnery officer. Information now wide open.

I arranged as soon as possible with the Admiralty to have an expert sent to the department, with samples and designs of British mines, and at the end of April such an expert was sent to the department, with plans and samples of all British improved

In my letter of April 27, I referred to certain of the experiences during the war, with regard to the use of mines. It was reported that they were abandoning the type of mine that had been in use, in favor of one similar to the German type. In view of the fact that the British had found the type of mine, which they had been using previous to the war, sufficiently unsuitable for war purposes to induce them to change their own mining designs, it became apparent that our own existing types of mines, which were identical with the British mine were also antiquated and unsuitable for the type of work required and would not be of material assistance. This I pointed out to the department in my letter of May 31, 1917. [Reading:]

Sent: May 31, 1917.

To: Secretary of Navy, Operations.

Through: State Department.

With reference my previous dispatches concerning our supplying the British Admiralty have concentrated on mine construction to such an extent that they now expect the output by August, will reach 10,000 a month. Their facilities for laying mines are about 7,000 a month. From their previous experience with mines, similar to those which we now have on hand, they consider it an attempt to utilize our present available supply. In view of above, and as our supply of a different type of mine would not be available in sufficient time, they consider we can more profitably concentrate on other work.

It is, of course, unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the mine that I was referring to here was our supply of prewar designs, which the war had shown to be ineffective and not the mine which we now use and which at that time had not been perfected, or even, known, or knowledge, invented.

On June 23, 1917, I received another cable from the department with regard to mines. This was as follows:

Received: June 23, 1917.

To: Alusna, London.

For: Vice Admiral Sims. No. 31.

The Bureau of Ordnance is now in a position to manufacture latest type of Admiralty mine, or a superior type, at the rate of 4,000 per week beginning from now. It is the opinion of the Admiralty that possible future improvements make it desirable that we construct a surplus supply, for possible use in European waters; if so, how many do they suggest we ought to manufacture? Would the Admiralty like to have us manufacture nets for use over there? If so, send them at once. Has a mine, not effective against surface craft, but effective against submarines ever been under consideration? Are there any plans of future contemplated operations that we could be supplied with. 16022.

DAN

A point, which I should like to stress, is well illustrated by the above message. I still had but one aide, and yet the department expected me to find out the Admiralty opinion as to possible use of various

how many they should supply, whether the department manufacture nets, and, if so, I was to send all details. I was also to get all about mine developments among the Allies. I pointed out that at the time I received this message, I was in command of the Irish station. Nobody was in London, with the exception of one man who was in the Navy in 1914, and had been assisting me without pay since April, 1917. During this same week I was from the department for recommendations as to destroyers that should be built, as to the allied aircraft and what the effort of the United States in naval aviation with the Allies, should be. It was therefore, impossible for me to reply immediately, as the number of duties assigned, and the physical endurance of men is limited, I informed the department at the time.

I replied with the following message:

The Navy

via naval attaché, Washington.

Letter No. 31, all assistance which Bureau of Ordnance can furnish of efficient type of mines and depth charges will be invaluable. I am present in excess of available ships to handle, but numbers of mines can we furnish mine layers as well as mines. Admiralty is not necessary for abandoning entirely the Elia lever type, in favor of the type, with horns on bottom as well as top. Also necessity for depth charges. Latest type will have 500-pound buoyancy. For mining against submarines, they are now using fixed mines on the bottom, as one floating mine or mine near surface disposes of them. Many designs of mines effective against submarines, but no satisfactory type has been considered, but no satisfactory type has been considered. Admiralty would appreciate information if such a mine has been developed. Latest British mine of horn type forwarded June 28. The mine is generally available, to the extent to which they are necessary to reduce demands on shipping. Brazil is a great need for mines and, as I originally stated in a cable, we can meet her demands. Delay in answering this cable is due to keeping up the work here with present staff.

July 14 I plainly state my attitude with regard to the use of mines. The following are extracts

[Letter No. 29, July 14, 1917.]

There seems to have been a misunderstanding, probably owing to the lack of explanation, concerning our cooperation as regards mines. If such a misunderstanding, if it has occurred, should be due to lack of time on my part to follow all of the subjects clearly set them before the department.

There is a great need for mines and, as I originally stated in a cable, we can meet her demands.

However, the British output of mines has been equal to or in excess of the demand for laying them.

It has been made to impress certain auxiliary vessels into service for

the purpose of being experienced, due to the stress of other important war work, a mine of satisfactory design to meet the unusual conditions.

From the beginning with the Vickers Elia type, and, as the manufacturing facilities were equipped to build the Elia mine, it was the design, as experience from time to time indicated to be the methods of manufacture which were thereby imposed. It was decided to abandon this type of mine entirely in favor of a mine of the Elia type, modified in accordance with British experience. The designs of this type of mine which are now in the department do not show developments, which have occurred since they were prepared.

The mine question is a very serious one, and our cooperation can only be directed by having an expert representative of the Bureau of Ordnance at times.

9. At the present moment the enemy is making determined efforts to pass our channels through the mine fields in Helgoland Bight. The extent of the fields renders offensive operations against the enemy mine sweepers very difficult, particularly as they are aided by Zeppelin scouts.

In addition, mining activities are going on in other areas, particularly along the coast at the western end of the allied lines.

Recent evidence has indicated preparations on the part of the enemy for landing to the south of the allied lines, apparently with a view to outflanking us, as a result new mine fields are being laid by the British in that area.

Early in August, 1917, I received a number of letters from the Bureau of Ordnance referring to their plans for the production of mines and offering to provide the Admiralty with a supply of mines and depth charges.

In reply to these letters, I cabled on August 13, 1917, the following message:

To: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

No. 246. Admiralty very appreciative of department's willingness to undertake suggested program for manufacture mines and depth charges, and much impressed with magnitude of program. At present no United States representative here with bureau plans, and no British representative in Washington competent to represent Admiralty. Since program involves personnel and ships of both countries in view Admiralty's extensive war experience in these lines, recommend that, before undertaking manufacture in quantity, bureau send competent representative here with Admiral Mayo temporarily, for conference. Should be able to furnish data and samples if available.

In my letter report of the same date, August 13, 1917, I pointed out the confusion which was existing with regard to the subject, pointing out that this confusion and the misunderstanding which had arisen on both sides were undoubtedly due to the lack of coordination of effort which I had been recommending for several months—since April—and again urging that representative of the Bureau of Ordnance be sent to London. I had made this recommendation first on the 16th of April. I had repeated it throughout May, June, and July; and at this date was still without any technical assistants familiar with the plans of the Navy Department with regard to this very important question of mine manufacture. My letter of August 13 was as follows:

It is considered very important that closer cooperation should be established between the Bureau of Ordnance and the Admiralty concerning the general subject of mines and depth charges, their design, manufacture, and supply.

It is apparent that considerable confusion has occurred to date on this subject owing to the various means of communication which have been used and, with the difficulty of insuring clear understanding with long-distance communication by letter and cable. For example, it is found that communications have been exchanged via this office, via the naval attaché's office, London, and office of Naval Intelligence, and also by direct cablegrams between the Admiralty to the attaché in Washington. Owing to the stress of duties in all the above forces, considerable misunderstanding has evidently developed.

The Admiralty are very appreciative of the efforts being put forward by the Bureau of Ordnance in connection with the mines and depth charges and for the great assistance which the Navy Department is in a position to render to the common cause in this direction. They have at no time wished to convey the impression that they were reluctant to accept assistance, or that they were not perfectly willing to accept new designs developed in the Bureau of Ordnance. Their experience in developing new designs and arranging and conducting manufacture under the pressure of actual war conditions has been very disheartening, and they are therefore considerably concerned over the prospect of our introducing new designs which the personnel here will not be wholly familiar.

connection that all the Allies discovered that a good deal more of their war material which was tested in time of peace, failed to stand the tests that had been developed in time of peace. Putting perhaps a couple of dozen on a ship, the Allies having seen that they were all in application, decided in laying those mines at proper depths, to lay them in numbers of 300 or 400 from one end to the other, and then made an examination of the results. It was not effective. [Continuing reading:]

It was developed during the war which appeared entirely satisfactory and then after service test, but which developed defects when the finished weapon was used afloat, that it is now put forward now to adhere to any design which has been put forward in order that manufacturing can be facilitated, the result is a boat obtained, and the success of future operations. Some of the various considerations which complicate are facilities of depots, provision and supply of spare parts, the layers and mine transports, allocating the various resources and consumption, training of personnel, and many other things. He stated that their representative should in no case be connected with the training department of the Admiralty; his experience was with the Vickers Elia type of mines, which is the type of mine the Admiralty state that there is at present no one in the Admiralty sufficiently familiar with British designs and British methods to properly represent the Admiralty.

The department in this field is of such importance, and the importance of it is so strongly advise sending a thoroughly competent officer to London at the earliest possible moment to consult with the Admiralty mine officials, to get the mining situation, and then returning immediately to the United States should bring with him all drawings and specifications for the mine and in case of new developments such as are available.

It is also suggested that including drawings or even sketches of the mine as fast as they are developed in order that the war department should have at the bureau's disposal before manufacturing is begun.

It was stated that from the department of the discovery of a type of mine, such as would make possible the use of material and tonnage became available, was received from the department on the 18th of August, after the department had proposed their first mine across the North Sea. The message was as follows:

Washington Aug 18, 1917.

The United States has developed mine which is hoped may have been used against submarine. Utmost secrecy considered. The mine is being sent to the Admiralty, clothed with power to decide on the mine. It found satisfactory arrange for the mine.

It was stated in my dispatch 187 of August 22, stating that we were sending a special officer to inspect and test the mine, that if it was found "suitable for operations in the North Sea" arrangements for cooperation would be made.

It was stated that is, just after the middle of August - it arrived in London. He brought with him a mine

randum from the Bureau of Ordnance with regard to the mine and had been instructed by the department to discuss at the conference the possibility of offensive operations based on employment of this new mine.

In the agenda for the conference prepared by Admiral May, item 2 was that of a mine or net barrage, either in German waters or further afield. In his report of the conference, addressed to the Secretary of the Navy on September 8, Admiral Mayo said, in closing the discussion that took place:

The British Admiralty put forward as an alternative to a close offensive in German waters the suggestion that the activity of enemy submarines might be reduced by the laying of an effective mine field or mine net barrage. If such an operation were undertaken, it would appear that it would take the form of:

1. An efficient mine-field barrage, so as to completely shut in the North Sea. It was estimated to require about 100,000 mines, a number of which would not be available for some considerable time; or

2. A barrage of mine nets for the same purpose, which proposal was, from past experience to date, deemed impracticable. The conference after discussion decided that the distinct mine barrage could not well be undertaken until an adequate supply of mines of satisfactory type was assured and that until or unless such was assured the improvements and extension of the present system of mine laying were desirable, and further, that a barrage of mine nets was impracticable.

This was Admiral Mayo's report.

The same information was cabled to the department by Admiral Mayo in cables of September 5 and September 6, 1917.

It is apparent from the results of this conference that on the subject of the impracticability was clearly shown of any such scheme proposed by the department in its cable of May 11, which was based upon the assumption that a barrier of mine nets could be laid and maintained.

The description of the new mine brought over by Admiral Mayo gave an entirely new direction to the discussion, and before Admiral Mayo left he was provided with a plan drawn up in a conference of allied officers for a barrage of mines of this new type to be put in the North Sea.

On September 13 Admiral Mayo received a message from Admiral Benson emphasizing the great possibilities of the new mine, and the British officers sent over to the United States to examine it found it most satisfactory and urging that immediate action be taken. The result was a proposal by the Admiralty of a scheme for the northern mine barrage.

On October 21, after Admiral Mayo had returned to Washington and conferred with the department, the department cabled to the Admiralty their No. 772 as follows:

Sixth. Contract has been let for 100,000 mines of American type. The United States has offered to commandeer for British Admiralty three vessels suitable for mine laying, and in addition can probably commandeer two or three more vessels suitable for mine laying, to be manned by United States for employment in connection with British mine-laying force, in joint plan which may be finally agreed upon.

Seventh. Question of proposed mine barrage, Scotland to Norway, as proposed by the British Admiralty, the Navy Department is not definitely concurred in, but careful consideration is being given to this particular subject with a view to arrive at definite conclusion in regard to employment of the mine barrage, which measure is considered in principle to be of good results.

That is to say, the mine barrage of the North Sea, the plan of which was drawn up by the British Admiralty and which had been proposed by the British Admiralty and which was taken into

It was held up for discussion to see whether the American Department would agree to the laying of that barrage.

After consideration of the plans, the department decided to accept the Admiralty's proposal for a joint mine barrage in the North Sea. In a cable of November 2, 1917, I was informed of the decision on the project by the department in the following cable:

The department concurs in project for mine barriers. Scotland to take steps to fit out eight mine planters, to sail February 1; to commission 12 mine-sweeping tugs. Expect begin shipment of mines. Officers to confer and arrange details within a few days.

The losses of merchant tonnage through submarine action had reached one-half the April, 1917, figure, and this, combined with the increasing number of antisubmarine craft, the rising curve of tonnage production, and the extended employment of the Allies, had made it apparent that the Allies would be able to defeat the submarine, and to carry on the war as long as provided no increase in tonnage losses was expected.

and this situation alone, made it possible to divert military and industrial efforts from those antisubmarine measures which were producing immediate results to others, such as the proposed mine barrage, from which it would take longer to get results. Our primary mission continued of course to be the protection of shipping in convoys; but any undertaking which could be carried out in addition, such as the northern mine barrage, the promise of being of great value in helping to defeat the submarine and in depressing the morale of submarine com-

manders. I pointed out, however, the plan of the mine barrage, as a supplementary measure against submarines, was a different matter from the plans proposed by the department in April and May, 1917. These implied a complete neglect of the submarine, and a desire to undertake enormous projects which possibly have been carried out at the time, and in the meantime avail against the submarine campaign, unless, in the meantime, the measures which had been recommended to the Allies after full conference with the Allies, had been accepted and carried out. Considering the resources of the Allies at the time, it was a condition impossible to fulfill.

This is an illustration of the way in which, to quote from my report of January 7, 1920, paragraph 78:

The judgment of those who had actual war experience in this campaign, the Navy Department, though lacking not only this experience, but also the information concerning it, insisted upon a number of plans that were impracticable.

I want to point out again that I am not asking this committee to reject the plans of the department, cabled to me in April and May, 1917, as impracticable because I said so at the time, and because the department definitely stated later, as I stated to you, that upon receiving fuller information, they rejected the plans as impracticable or impossible of execution; and that before the department could be convinced that any plan for the defeat of the submarine was impracticable, they were delayed in making recommendations made by their representative at

after full consultation with the Allies, and thereby postpone so much the ultimate victory of the Allies.

To indicate to you further how impossible it would have been to undertake any such scheme as the northern barrage until it was certain that the submarine activity could be checked, and could be given to the development of other schemes like the southern barrage, let me review for a moment what had to be accomplished in developing the new mine, and preparing for the laying of the mine before it could even begin to be effective. The following problems had to be solved before this barrage could be put in effect:

1. The successful testing of the new mine at sea in the water in which it was to be placed.

2. The placing of the production on an adequate basis having a hundred thousand mines in time.

3. The commandeering of vessels and refitting them as mine layers.

4. The determination of the feasibility of fitting elevators to reduce the number required and thereby the amount of material necessary.

5. The determination of the durability of the antennae of the mine in rough sea.

6. The determination of how successfully the normal firing device would operate under actual conditions in the North Sea.

7. The problem of quantity production of the mine existing at the time of the necessity for assembling parts manufactured in many places throughout the country.

8. The commandeering of 24 mine cargo ships to carry the mines across the Atlantic at a time when all shipping was badly needed.

9. The necessity of establishing bases in Scotland for assembling the mines and loading them into the mine layers.

That question of bases alone, I may say incidentally, was a very large one; a tremendous installation with—I have forgotten to say how many—probably 3,000 men in all.

10. The necessity of arranging for adequate screening and protecting forces from the grand fleet for laying operations.

11. The planning of means of preventing sweeping operations by the enemy in a barrier 230 miles in length.

12. The solving of the problem of how Norwegian territory could be closed.

13. The difficulty of cooperating with the grand fleet and obtaining the consent of the commander of the fleet to laying mines with an untried electrical device in areas through which the grand fleet necessarily might operate.

I might say in that connection that the mine barrier of 100,000 mines got to the east of the anchorage of the grand fleet with the experience of all the Allies that many thousands of mines came adrift and drifted in shore, Admiral Beatty asked me for assurance I could give him that if our mines did drift—an considerable number of them did, drift—that they would be inoperative as soon as they got adrift; and it was only after I was able to satisfy him that there were three, and perhaps four—I cannot remember exactly—separate devices in each mine which would make it ineffective after it became adrift, that he was satisfied that that mine barrage ought to be laid.

problem of insuring the absolute secrecy upon which the operation depended.

problem of getting the adequate number of mines fabricated, assembled, and laid, within a time which was

exception of the first, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth, all of which would have been presented in case a barrier of nets and mines had been undertaken, and such a barrier presented these further problems:

requirement of about three times as many mines and with a corresponding increase in the times required for production and in the tonnage required for their transportation.

The barrier as finally laid took about 100,000 mines. Without any details, I will say that was rendered possible by a float projecting above the mine, which was so constructed that contact with any part of the mine or float would set it off. This enabled a barrage to be established with about 100,000 mines. Before the invention of that antennæ type, it would have taken about from three to four times as many mines; that is, 300,000 to 400,000, to make a barrier extending down

the coast of Norway as a haven for submarines and vessels or the employment on the patrol of large vessels to remain at sea a long time and in all weathers.

It was not until solutions of all these problems had been found that a decision could not be definitely decided upon, and the laying of mines could not be begun until the problems had been solved.

When the project was decided upon, its execution became one of the duties of the United States naval forces in European waters. It therefore was incumbent upon me to see that before giving my concurrence, not only that it was a feasible project but that it promised to be reasonably successful and be executed without serious detriment to the other antisubmarine measures which were already in progress.

The project was executed in a manner which reflects credit upon all the bureaus of the Navy Department that participated in it, and mining material and that fitted out the mines. The most suitable and efficient employed by any of the navies. The officers who trained the personnel in mine laying; the officers who controlled the actual operations; the officers who supervised the bases in Scotland; the officer who commanded the force engaged and was, in the first instance, responsible for the success of the whole operation; and the personnel, both officers and men, who worked out the project to a successful conclusion.

At the time at which the project was undertaken, it had my full approval as a subsidiary measure, designed to depress the morale of the enemy and to accomplish the destruction of a certain number of submarines.

It is perhaps unnecessary for me to make this statement of the position which has been made and widely circulated in the Department had proposed and had from the first for

this project and that I was about the only officer of the Navy who had ever opposed it.

That statement was made before a large assembly in New York in a very responsible manner, before an audience which was largely of our friends, the Irish, and my name was cordially mentioned. I have gone into this subject here at some length to show that the statement there made was wholly false.

It should be fully understood, as I will explain in detail hereafter, that I never opposed the Northern Mine Barrage, as a supplementary antisubmarine measure, when once the material and tonnage were available to make such a barrage possible. I make a distinction with regard to the mine barrage which has been in the sight of. As an achievement it stands as one of the wonders of the war. No such project in naval warfare had ever before been carried out more successfully. It is entirely beyond my power to give adequate expression to the admiration which I have for the action in the United States which produced the mines, mine laying material and sent them abroad, and for the brave and gallant officers and sailors who were instrumental in the laying of the mine barrage; but, as a matter of policy, there is a very great difference between a mine barrage carried out as a useful supplementary measure and the proposal to make such a barrage our principal activity in view of the fact that a year's preparation was necessary to carry out such a gigantic project could be carried into effect. The war would have been lost before we could have assembled the material for such a barrage or could have found the tonnage to carry this material to Europe.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, the time element is one of the deciding factors in warfare. At a time of great danger, such as existed in 1917, at the time of our entry into the war, any plan, however successful in its ultimate results might be, must be judged in the light of the situation existing at the time. It is not enough when a country is at war to prepare magnificent schemes of operation to be carried out at some future date. When the enemy was striking the Allies in 1917, and dealing blows that were rapidly cutting all lines of communication by destroying the tonnage upon which the Allies depended, no plan which we could have adopted would have had any use which did not provide the immediate necessary assistance to the Allies in meeting the immediate issue; that is, the submarine campaign as it was being waged in 1917.

This is a point so simple that it needs only to be stated for it to be clear. Numerous illustrations can be drawn from the history of warfare to show how disastrous have been the consequences of failing to enter immediately into a war and meet a situation created by the enemy's activities in the hope that later a royal road to victory could be found. The idea of making a grand stroke which would in one fell swoop reduce the enemy to confusion and force him to surrender, has been throughout history one of those fascinating and elusive fallacies which have cost many a defeat.

As I am about to begin a new subject, and I understand the gentleman wanted to stop a little early to-day, I might stop here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 11.50 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 17, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
in room 235. Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale
and Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, and Pittman.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral Sims. Before proceeding with the testimony to-day, I
wish to state that I have had printed each day the testimony
given before this committee, and I have in addition to giving
to the press, given copies of each day's hearing to all officers
in the Navy Department who wished them, so that they
have a complete record of all the documentary evidence and
they will thus be able to bring out all the facts in the

I also like to say that if any errors have been made in the
of the letters and cablegrams that have been submitted, I
am very glad to have them corrected by a comparison with
the original. There may be some mistakes of a typographical

and yesterday the consideration of the question of the North
Sea. In that statement I tried to make it entirely clear that
I at any time, opposed the barrage as now understood by
the committee and probably by the American people. It was only
a movable barrage that was proposed in the first place.

DEPARTMENT'S REQUESTS FOR PLANS.

During the months of June, July, and August, 1917, I con-
sidered, from the department, cables in which they indi-
cated desire for some new and radical policy, thus showing
the department could not have realized, at the time, the dan-
ger of the submarine warfare, and did not appreciate
the importance of the element of time.

A cable of June 23, 1917, with regard to the production of
the department cabled:

Plans for future contemplated operations that we could be supplied

was on June 23, 1917. For over two months I had been
in the department the plans for future operations

had been agreed upon by the heads of the allied navies required to meet the situation. This I continued to point out in other cables sent to the department.

In another cable of July 5, 1917, which I have already quoted, in connection with the disposition of forces, the department stated:

So far no information as to any definite plans for future operations of naval forces. In view of requests made, and our efforts to respond, must insist that any operations under consideration be submitted for our study.

Similarly, in its cable of July 10, 1917, with regard to the situation, the Navy Department, it was stated:

The department can not too strongly insist that, in its opinion, the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared, and that the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the allied navies. The Navy Department announces as its policy that, in general, it is willing to support any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate requirements. * * * The Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following: 1. Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations. 2. Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations. 3. Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations.

JOSEPHUS DANFORTH

It is apparent from these dispatches, first, that the Navy Department still believed that it was being kept in ignorance with respect to essential plans; second, that its estimate of the situation of the war zone was completely mistaken, as is clearly indicated by its refusal to recognize the plans for antisubmarine operations, and its refusal to recognize the convoy system as plans of operation against the enemy; third, that it still had in mind the royal road to victory.

As I pointed out in paragraph 20 of my letter of January 10, 1917:

Judging from the actions that were finally taken, after extensive cabled and personal communications, and consequent long delays, it is apparent that, if I could have appeared daily in Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and to discuss them before the conferences upon which they were based, they would undoubtedly have been carried out from two to six months earlier.

In paragraphs 28, 29, and 30 of this letter, I referred to the requests of the department for information concerning future operations, and pointed out:

In other words, while the department's first statement of policy was what was recommended since the beginning, it, nevertheless, withheld putting it into effect apparently because of the conviction that the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of their plans. The truth of the matter was that nothing was withheld, and that the policies and plans which were in writing, which were actually of an official character, and which in any way affected United States naval cooperation, had been transmitted to the department as completely as long distance communication—coded messages—permitted.

The review that I have thus far made of the attempts of the department to propose plans, and make decisions in Washington has been, I think, a sufficient one to show you that, in the course of the war, as I have mentioned, the department itself recognized in the end the impracticability of the plans they had themselves earlier proposed. As a corollary to this, in the case of all the essential recommendations made in consultation with the Allies, the best proof of their soundness is the fact that the department later admitted their soundness by adopting them and by carrying them out as the policy of the department throughout the rest of the war. Consequently there can now be no fundamental disagreement between myself and the department as to the policy and plans which were finally followed.

and that that policy was sound when it was adopted and followed. We are agreed also that the Navy in the war zone met its highest traditions, by the efficiency and devotion of the personnel carried out their mission, and made the life of American troops and reasonably safe for all allied forces of every effort of the German submarine.

which I again stress, and can not stress too much, is that six months of the war, the department failed to act. Later, the soundness of the recommendations which were made in accordance with the department's instructions, in proposing alternative schemes of its own, which the department six months later, recognized were impracticable or too costly. The delay was tremendously costly, resulting in unnecessary shipping and therefore the unnecessary prolongation of the war and its sacrifices.

INADEQUATE PERSONNEL FOR STAFF.

Now to a question which I have touched on frequently in my report, that is, to the point No. 6, of paragraph 78, of my report of January 7, 1920, in which I said:

"The representative with the allied admiralties was not supported throughout the war, either by the adequate personnel, or by the resources that could have been supplied.

"In paragraphs 27, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, I have pointed out the immense difficulty that I had in handling the enormous amount of detailed work, and in discharging the very great responsibilities which the department had intrusted to me, and in asking me the assistance of an adequate staff of trained officials. I have pointed out how I have assisted me from the beginning to make my work more efficient to the department to the maximum extent, enabling me to maintain constant and intimate relations with the various allied admiralties, and with all the multifarious activities of the various branches of the allied admiralties, and with the various activities of the various allied fleets, throughout the war as they were engaged. In order to handle the situation pointed out in paragraph 50 of my letter:

"I have had a staff capable of:
 1. To keep complete information of the various phases of the naval campaign, and to coordinate the operations for over two years.
 2. To keep abreast with the developments which were rapidly changing almost daily.
 3. To administer, supplying, and operating the entire force.
 4. To coordinate the work with that of the Allies.

"The testimony that I have thus far offered will, doubtless, have convinced you of the wide variety of subjects, and of the responsibility of the decisions, which the responsibilities of my position necessitate. It will only be necessary to review the memorandum that I sent to the department on this subject, dated April, 1917, and continuing throughout the ensuing war, to show you what difficulties I had to meet, because of the lack of a staff and properly equipped staff—a staff similar to that which any business organization would have been provided

Before proceeding with the testimony to substantiate this in my letter, I wish clearly to define, beyond possibility of misunderstanding, the sole point at issue. That point, simply stated, is that during the critical period of the war, the first half of the war, the department left its representative abroad with wholly inadequate assistance to carry out the mission which they had assigned. As I stated in my letter of January 7, the necessity for such assistance was finally recognized by the department, and in the last months of the war I was provided with an adequate staff. I have made this sufficiently clear, and that we will not be left in doubt from that point, namely, that the period in question is the first half and not the last half of the war.

It should also be pointed out that one of the chief reasons for the assignment of an adequate number of officers for duty abroad was not only to assist me in carrying out my duties, but also to assist the department by making it possible to supply full reports upon every aspect of the naval activity in the war zone. One of the great dangers in the military service is apt to be the instinct of overconservatism which clings to old teachings and traditions, without realizing the full changes brought in the crucial test of actual warfare, especially when, as in our case, we had been mere spectators for many years without receiving any very full or complete accounts of the developments and war experience of the allied powers. The fact that we did not realize how many things we had to learn was, in the first, one of the grave dangers in making decisions and drawing up plans in Washington, and it was for this reason that I insisted that the department should send over officers in whom I had confidence, representing each of the technical bureaus, whose function should be to acquire from the various allied services the best available kind of information which would be of help to our department, or, to put the case quite simply, that we might profit by the success and mistakes of our allies.

From the first week of my arrival in England I realized the necessity of this measure. The Admiralties of the allied Navy Departments from the time we declared war, offered us complete access to all information at their disposition and to all the experience they had acquired. It was, therefore, only a question of having a sufficient number of trained assistants to collect this information, to put it in proper form, and transmit it to Washington. It must be remembered that the responsibility for gathering this information rested mainly on me. I was aware of our own needs. Every man in the allied services was occupied with a real job. They had no time to worry about what we knew or didn't know. The naval attaché and his two assistants, one an officer of the Supply Corps, the other of the Medical Corps, had been fully occupied with the duties imposed on them by prewar conditions, and although they rendered such assistance as they could, they were not placed under any orders until the later period. The task of getting the information we required was a very difficult and tedious one. It meant digging through records and it meant following up sources of information, wherever they might lead, out into the fleet or elsewhere. From the present point of view it is almost impossible to conceive of the wall of secrecy that was necessarily maintained around allied war operations and the

I am sure every officer who had experience over when he stops to look back, that our ignorance of the war prior to our entry was indeed appalling.

In order properly to coordinate our own activities with the Allies, it was essential that we have available, in a sufficient number of capable officers who understood how to profit by their experiences and to keep our own in as possible harmony with them. The importance is generally recognized. We find, for example, in the Secretary of the Navy of the year 1918:

The accomplishment of the Navy abroad in this war, outside of rigorous in the danger zone, has been the character and degree of cooperation, for the time being, of our services with those services associated. The Navy, beginning with the arrival of the for unity of command, even this in some instances in something of our identity as an independent service. It is a statement that the degree of accomplishment of our service is a precedent in allied warfare.

establishes the thorough and complete approval of by the Navy Department. It remains to be the attitude taken by the department in 1917, in of the war, when I was requesting the assistance possible this accomplishment, and when I was the insistence at my command, that the department.

briefly, a few of the outstanding facts regarding given me by the Navy Department in this period.

I went abroad with one aid. When I arrived in in the naval attaché's office one line officer, the officer of the Supply Corps, and one officer of the

These officers had been for some time in London, was already fully occupied before I arrived with which precluded their giving me any great degree

They did everything in their power to assist me, as the paramount demands of their regular duties.

I found myself literally overwhelmed with the with every department of the British Admiralty

French Ministry of Marine, thrown open to us, and requests from many sections of the Navy Department

information of many descriptions. It was for me and my one aid merely to collect the

to say nothing of maintaining constant touch of the allied admiralties, and later directing the oper-

in Europe, looking out for their supplies, etc. still further, all communications had to be

code, which was a tremendous task in itself, of purely routine labor on the part of my aid,

staff of the naval attaché; and this purely me- added to the task of collecting, digesting, and

information to be sent to the Navy Department. It that, in cabling the department on April 16, a

arrival, I said:

My aide, also engineer and gunnery officer. All information

Again, in my letter of April 27, in referring to this recommendation, I wrote the department as follows:

APRIL

All essential information has been covered by cable dispatch. Up to my time has been too fully occupied in ascertaining and confirming information concerning the military situation to give much attention to questions of maintenance.

I strongly recommend that expert representatives of the Bureau of Construction, Repair, Ordnance and Steam Engineering, be sent here as early as possible, as channels of information are now open. Such representatives should be of the highest quality as practicable.

On April 29 I received from the department the announcement of my appointment to command the destroyers then on the coast of Europe.

On April 30 I therefore sent the following cable:

Sent: April 30, 1917.

I acknowledge receipt of orders to command destroyer forces in these waters. In consultations with Admiralty will frequently be required, it is essential that an experienced representative at base of our forces at all times. Therefore I have in immediate detail of staff as follows: Pratt, chief of staff, and Taylor, Evans, or Coffey as aid; and Tobey. It is essential that Tobey be assigned in addition to his present duties. Sims.

It will be noted that I pointed out the need for a staff, and specifically the appointment of Capt. Pratt to be my chief of staff, and asked for one aid out of three officers whom I named. I had every reason to believe that Capt. Pratt was available and was assigned. I was under the impression that he was on duty as a student at the Army War College in Washington. I believe some time after this that he was assigned to duty in Operations. It was considerably later that he was assigned as assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, on the death of Capt. Chase. Not receiving an answer, about eight days later I cabled and asked information concerning the assignment of Capt. Pratt and an additional aid, stating that their services were urgently required.

Lieut. Commander J. P. Daniels was ordered on April 30, to proceed to Europe and report to me. He arrived Queenstown on May 17, 1917, and was assigned to Queenstown base in connection with the destroyers.

On May 11, in another cable to the department, I said:

Capt. Pratt's services urgently needed, specially owing to his previous service with me and his experience and knowledge of destroyer operations.

Similar requests for the services of Capt. Pratt were cabled to the Navy Department on May 21 and May 23.

On May 25 I received the following message from the department:

Capt. W. V. Pratt is not available for duty as chief of staff.

DANIELS

Secretary of the

When I received this message of May 25, stating that Capt. Pratt was not available, but with no information as to what his duties were, or as to any other officers that might be available for this duty, I felt again the necessity of pointing out to the department the situation which led me to specifically request Capt. Pratt. This was in my cable of May 27, which I will read you. This was sent evidently from Queenstown. [Reading:]

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

U. S. Navy
Department.

leaving London to-morrow for conference with Chief of Staff, the particular importance that Capt. Pratt be sent at earliest moment. Situation is of such nature that success of operations and operations might be endangered by an officer of wrong temperament. From extended experience with Capt. Pratt, I know him to be adapted to requirements of this situation. In view of fact that weight and responsibility is heavy, I request that selection be made of my peculiar relations with officials of allied navy.

In answer to this cable, and throughout the remainder of June I continued to be without any information as to assistance was to be sent me, or as to whether staff or not.

Meanwhile I had endeavored to secure the service of officers who had come to Europe on armed guard of mail. For example, the steamship *New York* had been at Liverpool on my arrival at that port. It became known for her to remain some time at Liverpool for repairs. I learned that the *Minnesota* was tied up in Liverpool for some time. At my request, the naval attaché at the department, requesting that the armed mail steamers be assigned to temporary duty to help. The department approved this on April 28.

At the request of the department that these officers should be present only while their vessels were held for repairs.

On May 1, however, I requested their services for duty. The department disapproved by recommendation. The dispatch. I stated that there were petty officers on board competent to command the armed guard, and requested them to be assigned to duty with the destroyer force.

On May 14, I cabled as follows:

U. S. Navy
Department.

Concerning my request to retain Lieuts. Emmet and others, who are urgently needed. Former's engineering knowledge particularly and latter's knowledge of French renders him of great value. I am sending excellent petty officers capable of taking charge of their vessels. I am replying on Emmet, as *Minnesota* sails in few days.

At this time the armed guard officer of the *Philadelphia* arrived, and I learned from him that the department had given information along many different lines. In my cable of May 16, in which I said:

U. S. Navy
Department.

For officers arriving on armed liners that department desires have concerning military and material information. Urgently request in acquainting me with information desired, and all information at home as affects forces and duties of cooperation. I am sending former destroyer officers, particularly those who serve at present are now on duty elsewhere, be sent over, either on vessels or ships now here. Information urgently requested.

requests to retain Lieuts. Emmet and Van de Ver. Former sails in Lieut. King on *Philadelphia*, who speaks French and Italian fluently, great service as liaison officer in coordinating work here and on the Coast sails in three days. Services of such officers will greatly facilitate duty in obtaining all information desired. It is of vital importance that all information should be obtained and transmitted rapidly, in order to prepare for any future emergency. Services of Capt. Pratt as chief of staff are urgent.

The cable stating that Capt. Pratt was not available was received until nine days after that dispatch was sent. I want to invite attention here to that particular cable I have just sent, the necessity of being able to send in all possible information, and all possible details concerning the operations abroad.

In repeated cables I have assured the department that I have sent them all essential military information. That only covers the broad outlines of the situation. I wanted to be able to send in information on all the specialties on the other side, so that I would be as well informed as possible of the conditions under which the submarine campaign was being carried out. I could not do it. It was physically impossible to do it with only two or three officers. The consequence was, as you have seen by the testimony, I have been giving for the last half dozen days, that time and time again the department in its cables exhibited an astonishing ignorance of the very elements of the submarine campaign, and I wanted to prevent that thing in the early months of the war, so that that thing should not happen. But I did not succeed because they did not have the necessary personnel.

No reply was received for over two weeks. Lieut. Emmet, an armed guard officer of the *Minnesota*, was obliged to leave when his ship sailed on May 16.

In a cable of May 31, I again referred to these armed guard officers and requested authority to retain them for duty under my command.

When the *New York* was finally about ready to sail on her trip, on June 12, I cabled again to the department, with renewed my request for the services of the armed guard officer, but was informed by a dispatch of June 14 that the return of this officer to the United States was desired.

In the meantime I continued to have only the services of one officer together with that of an American in London who had resigned the naval service in 1914, but who volunteered for duty with me. He was given a provisional appointment as lieutenant, by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, on April 16.

On May 21, I pointed out to the department that the staff codes had been entirely inadequate to make possible the handling of the codes. I therefore, said:

In order that our staff officers here be available for important military duty, I urgently requested, as recommended in my previous dispatches, that the department's codes and staffs be utilized for all communications, except those of a secret nature.

On May 15 I learned that Commander Morton, who had been in command of the *Scorpion*, our station ship at Constantinople, had succeeded in reaching Paris. As I had no information concerning the sending of officers from America, and as at this time the department had informed me of its intention to establish bases on the coast, I cabled on May 15, requesting that Morton be assigned to duty in France, in accordance with his own request.

I received a message from the Secretary of the Navy, to return home on the first available steamer.

I cabled to the Secretary, pointing out that an urgent case was necessary to hold Morton for a few days, and requesting the department's orders be reconsidered.

The Secretary of the Navy replied that Morton could stay a few days, but should then carry out his previous orders.

After a conference with the French chief of staff, I pointed out that we have officers speaking French, and familiar with the conditions, for this duty, that I cabled to the department requesting the reconsideration of Morton's orders, and stated:

His experience urgently needed. Speaks French fluently and is qualified to assume command of one of the prospective French bases.

That as Capt. Morton had but recently escaped from the department, undoubtedly, was anxious to have his release. Therefore, stated in the cable that Morton was prepared to give all of the information which he had acquired in

that I received was a statement that Commander Morton carry out his original orders.

About two months after my arrival, the only additions made by the department were Lieut. Commander [name] were needed at Queenstown, and Surg. [name] to the naval attaché, concerning whom the naval department the following dispatch on May 26:

Placidwell, United States Navy, to report to Vice Admiral [name] Navy, for additional duty as medical aide.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

After conference with the French chief of naval staff, the French chief of naval staff had expressed the wish

that the Navy Department, not below the rank of captain, be assigned to the department. Although I am in touch with the French department by a representative here, and also by telephone and telegraph, and I have been in a short time, it is considered that the request should be granted for closer daily cooperation and coordination. It is also considered that an officer, preferably with knowledge of French, should be assigned to the department in France.

Having heard unofficially that it was intended to assign the officer of the Supply Corps on duty as assistant to the naval attaché and myself cabled the department that his

services were needed, both in an advisory capacity, as well as for his wide knowledge of the situation and methods pursued.

Remembered that I had requested on April 30 that Tobey be assigned to the department as aide to me. Up to this time, a month had elapsed with no reply from the department concerning this. Regarding the situation with regard to personnel at the end of the month from Queenstown, and especially after my conference with the French naval staff, and learning of the plans with

the department had for the establishment of bases and the movement of forces to France, I felt that the situation could not continue as it was, and I therefore sent the following message, attempting to point out to the Navy Department that the responsibility devolved upon me, and the necessity of getting for the department the benefit of allied war experience, made necessary the appointment of sufficient experienced representatives. My message was as follows:

To: Secretary of Navy, Operations.

Through: State Department.

Sent: May 31.

In the belief that the future security of the United States, or at least the accomplishment of our purpose in entering this war, will in a considerable degree be dependent upon the efficiency of the organization on this side, both afloat and ashore, it becomes my duty to specify the requirements, based on the situation here, which are necessary to the discharge of my full responsibility. Distance and lack of communication render it impracticable to convey to the department fully the character of the various situations that arise and the developments thereof. The situation which I have to make may be of such far-reaching effect that my duty imperatively appeals for the assistance and facilities which I believe the situation demands. I therefore urgently requested that the department approve a greatly enlarged organization, with a view to insuring that the department, fleet and the forces here be able to cooperate with the Allies to the maximum extent, and that they may be able to do so in the future, as well as the present, by all available war experience ashore and afloat, material and otherwise. The importance can not be overestimated of having sufficient and experienced representatives, of all branches of our shore and sea forces, in touch with the allied forces ashore and afloat, who are engaged in actual operations. These representatives should be in the grand fleet, in the submarines, the other services, gaining all possible experience and keeping in touch with the progress of all war activities. Experienced technical officers should be in London, in touch with all departments of the Admiralty. The Admiralty have suggested the advisability of our having a representative in the secret-service, but no officers are available. It is necessary that I have an adviser on the supply and accounting questions which have already arisen with the Admiralty. The supply officer of the *Melville* (which was at Queenstown) is already overworked with local work concerning the destroyers, and can not keep in touch with the necessary work in London.

The requirements of the situation set forth above had led to request details of Morton, Van de Veer, Emmet, Tobey, and authority to enroll any one qualified for the Naval Reserve Force. The organization requires greatly increased clerical funds and authority to authorize expenditures under war conditions, as free from detailed accounting as pursued in peace time. In view of the uncertainties of this position the department's early action is earnestly requested.

That was May 31, about 2 months after we had entered the war.

In another message of June 1 I referred also to the desirability of cooperating with the allied secret service, and urged that an officer be sent from the United States to coordinate our secret-service with that of the British.

In my letter to the department of June 1, 1917, I again emphasized the points which I have read you in my cable of May 31.

The cable of May 31 seems to have been sufficiently urgent in tone to call forth a response, for on June 5 I received the following dispatch:

Received: June 5, 1917.

This cablegram is for Sims.

Quote reply to your cable of June 1. Department will afford you every facility which material and personnel conditions Navy permit. Technical office material bureaus have been ordered or will be order(ed). You are authorized to call on Tobey. *Dixie* coming with full complement of officers. Department disapproves

arrangement has been made to keep United States Navy force(s) and spare parts existed repair. Authorize such as necessary to maintain your forces in efficient condition and therewith. No. 23004.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

Literal translation of the word as verified by repetition.

That in this reply, the first information which I received concerning personnel, it was stated that the department had every facility which the personnel conditions of the United States and that technical officers from material bureaus could be ordered. Up to this time I had received no information concerning these officers, and what is more, the officers themselves had not yet put in an appearance, except that of Lieut. G. L. Schuyler, who had been sent to the Navy Department for the purpose of inspecting the equipment being purchased from British firms not in the United States. He had reported in London to the naval attaché on orders to report to me as aid, and his time was occupied by the duties which the department had assigned during the first months.

In a letter to the department I again pointed out the need of coordinating our service with that of the Allies through the use of an adequate number of experienced officers. It is as follows:

JUNE 8, 1917.

That the primary purpose of the United States naval organization is to act as the coordinating link, on this side, between the department and French admiralties, or, in other words, between the United States and France in prosecution of the war. It is therefore a duty to meet and meet of any difficulties which may be encountered and to meet them as seen from the viewpoint here.

The difficulties so far involved have been due to the lack of an adequate staff, as mentioned in previous dispatches.

It is the efficiency of the organization that the department's policy, which should be known in a general way at all times. It is for this reason that I have requested a weekly information dispatch for the sole purpose of matters of policy and prospective plans, in order that the United States may be thoroughly coordinated with those of the department, so that our service may be at all times prepared for any emergency, and that its activities may be directed to an end which is the allied cause.

I received a cable from the Secretary of the Navy, that I was to inform Paymaster Tobey that he was to perform his duty as aid to my staff.

In passing that in spite of all the recommendations made, I had up to July 7, three months after my arrival received only three additions to my staff. One of these had been detailed to duty at Queenstown; the two assistants to the naval attaché, ordered to additional duty. In the meantime, after the convoy system was put into effect, our troops began to move on the high seas, and my duties were thereby greatly increased, almost daily it was necessary that I should have a competent officer for the

exclusive handling of these convoys. I therefore sent the department on June 11 the following message:

Sent: June 11, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Through: State Department.

18. Admiralty has requested, and I recommend, that a United States officer be assigned to me for exclusive duty in admiralty in connection with the selection of rendezvous and similar important duties concerning movements of Government ships as affected by submarine campaign. Officer should be selected as head of that admiralty department is a captain. Very important to be selected with view of insuring desirable cooperation and relations. With our military and naval forces in European waters, and their attending maintenance, the question of a convoy and routes will become increasingly and important.

This recommendation I repeated in my letter of June 22, and in my dispatches of July 1, July 3, July 5, July 9, and July 14, but never receiving an answer, and, therefore, finally I was compelled to order the commander of one of the Queenstown destroyers to be sent to London, in order to take charge of this important work, in which the lives of our troops, as well as losses of valuable property, was dependent.

I only wish that I were capable of describing the conditions existing in my office at this time. We were established in two rooms in the Embassy, which had been kindly given us by the ambassador, only at the expense of additional crowding of our officials. Dispatches were pouring in on us every day. The period when we got a business man, a former American naval officer, to come in and help us, and also got the assistance of some stenographers from American business firms in London.

Incidentally, that business man paid the salaries of these stenographers for some time.

I will not even attempt to describe this remarkable situation further than to say that the reason I became so insistent, was that we had reached the limit of the physical endurance of the personnel available.

There were simply not enough minutes in the day to accomplish the work that had to be accomplished—and with such important questions as troops moving on the high seas, dependent upon direction and control, it was quite within the range of possibility that a mistake might be made which would have resulted in disaster.

I fully explained the situation to the department, in my letters of about this time, as, for example, in my letter of July 14 to the department. [Reading:]

18. I wish again to urge the necessity for greatly increasing the staff under my command. It is wholly impossible for me to keep myself fully acquainted with the situation without an increased staff. The lack for an experienced Chief of Staff, whom I am thoroughly acquainted, suited to the peculiar existent conditions, has been a great embarrassment. The need for at least one experienced representative in the Operations Department of the Admiralty, has been pressing, and more important daily. The time and attention of all officers of the Admiralty are fully taken up with pressing daily war duties. They can not keep me fully advised of the problems which may affect me, both owing to the lack of time and lack of knowledge of what I need; my information is therefore, chiefly confined to the most important questions which require my action, and to that which I deliberately

point attention to the last sentence of that message, which was able to send in information which was confined to questions which required my action. I could not find in the information which the department should have sent it thoroughly acquainted with conditions of the war, and the result of that thing was, as you have seen from my testimony, a most amazing ignorance of the situation at the latter period of the war, as to what the whole thing was.

As already stated, I received no answers to any of my messages until the 7th of July. I had cabled again to the department on July 1

to the Navy.

I request the services of Capt. Pratt, and a commander, for duty in connection with convoys. If Capt. Pratt could come at once, his estimate of situation would undoubtedly be of great value and remove any misunderstanding of the situation which may

Sms.

I received a cable stating that Capt. Pratt was not available, and then what his duty was. I assumed that he was on duty at the Army War College.

I cabled to the Navy Department as follows:

I request that a carefully selected commander be sent to duty under me in British Admiralty in connection with convoys. I desire this. If Capt. Pratt can not be sent as chief of staff, is he available?

On July 3, of the death of Capt. Chase in Washington, and of the necessity for retaining Capt. Pratt in Naval Operations, I cabled again on July 4, as follows:

to the Navy. (Operations.)

to the department.

I request the services of Capt. Twining as chief of staff; also request services of Capt. Twining on my staff, or under my command.

Sms.

to the Navy, Washington.

to the department (enclaire).

I find it impossible to insure efficiency my duty, and safeguard the country's interests, without immediate increase of staff. My request for immediate dispatch, by first steamer sailing, of chief of staff and additional assistants, with war college experience. Request for Commander McNamee, and Lieut. Coffey.

Sms.

In this series of messages I received, on July 7, the dispatch from the department:

Capt. Twining as your chief of staff has been ordered.

And on the following day I received another message from the department confirming this and stating that a lieutenant had also been ordered for duty as aide.

The personnel situation which I had to face, at that time, is summed up in my letter of July 7, 1917, of which the paragraphs were as follows:

It is impossible this week to submit a full report of operations of our department, other developments of interest and value to the department.

This is on account of the unusual strain which has been placed upon the department here and the total inadequacy of the staff available to handle it.

It has now become physically impossible to carry on the work with the staff available. With all British officials individually engaged in the active work of the war, it is wholly impossible for them to furnish me or my staff with the information which I should have, and it is necessarily incumbent upon me to enter into British official activities and ascertain the majority of the information the department needs by actual contact and observation. Such a course is entirely dependent upon the size of my staff and the demands made upon it by myself and my staff.

As previously reported by letter and cable dispatch, the very minimum staff which is necessary is a chief of staff and three subordinate aids expert in their work.

As reported by dispatch, it is physically impossible for the organization of the command to accomplish the mission for which it is assigned without an increase of personnel.

In interviews with officers recently arrived from the department they have shown the possibility of a more or less fundamental misunderstanding between them and myself. The misunderstanding is probably due to various causes among which are -

- (a) Difference of point of view, each more or less unknown to the other.
- (b) Lack of full information on my part of the difficulties under which the department is working.
- (c) The inadequacy of both written and cable communication; that is, the impossibility of fully explaining the phases of the situation or circumstances reported, and the danger of misinterpretation of statements actually made.

I will, therefore, urgently recommend that from time to time an officer be sent from the department who is thoroughly in touch with the department's policies and sent on temporary duty to confer with me with a view to his returning immediately to the department.

REQUEST FOR LIAISON OFFICERS.

As I have already pointed out, I had been also repeatedly pointing out to the department the necessity for capable officers from Europe of a liaison character, in order that the war experience of the Allies might be made available for the department. I have referred to my cables in April and May on this subject. On May 15, 1917, I sent a letter to the Navy Department on this subject, pointing out how essential it was that competent American officers should be sent for duty in Europe with the various allied naval forces, in order that the department might be kept constantly informed of war events and new developments. I had received no reply from the department or any indication that they had received or considered my recommendations up to this time—that is, three months after my arrival in London. In the meantime I learned that the armed guard officers, arriving in English ports on passenger ships, had orders to proceed directly to London, on arriving in port, to obtain information for the department on special subjects. Thus, for example, on May 15, 1917, a lieutenant arrived in London and informed me that he had verbal orders from the Chief of Naval Operations "to get information as to the antisubmarine oper-

to ascertain if it would be practicable in any way to detect German submarines in the North Sea, and, in addition, to report which might be of value in connection with new construction of the United States."

to comment on that in this way: The Navy Department has an admiral abroad, who is there with certain assistants. He has been there three months. He has been in almost daily communication with the heads of the allied navies. He bears a tremendous responsibility for the safety of all those forces and the safety of our own, devoting all his energies to it. Still, the Department has sent a young, comparatively inexperienced lieutenant from the port of arrival in Great Britain to London, to obtain information he can, and go back and give it to the Department, with the avowed object of basing the action of the Department on the result. If anything could possibly be done in warfare than that, I do not know what it is.

Instead of depending upon the London headquarters to obtain information, which could easily have been done, if I had the assistance, because of the close relations which existed between various officials of the allied navies, the department expected to obtain this information by having an officer spend a week in London during the time before his return voyage to the United States. I have a letter from me by this lieutenant, covering the subject of the work done at the Admiralty, and the information which

it is too long to read here, but it would be interesting to have in the record as showing the variety of subjects on which information was obtained for the department, and in pointing out the inefficiency of this method, the department was necessarily forced to work by sending a number of different officers, at different times to the Admiralty to ask, from the same sections, for the same information. This happened so often in the latter part of 1917 that at the beginning of August I received from the Admiralty a polite request asking whether it would not be possible to have all requests for information come through one channel, and I had found that a number of officers had at different times obtained exactly the same information.

Q. Are you placing this letter from the lieutenant in the record?

A. Yes; I will do so.

Q. It should be placed in the record, I think.

A. Yes; it is in the record, but it is too long and too detailed for the committee, I think. It is there.

Q. The letter referred to is as follows:)

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

London, May 16, 1917.

Mr. H. C. Grady, United States Navy.

Mr. J. S. Sims, United States Navy.

Department of Operations.

Dear Sir: The Navy Department, Washington, I will make a report in

the near future, except for the casualties to the *Cunningham's* circulator and the condenser. The casualty to the condenser of the *Wainwright* is a necessary necessity of having two condensers.

At Queenstown and Fasnet there is an area of submarine activity important to joint safeguard shipping. There will be i

the report of the Queenstown area many minor bits of information, chiefly rather than instructive in character.

4. Before going to the Admiralty, I submitted an outline of my mission in a copy of which I will give to the Chief of Operations. This letter was presented to Admiral Jellicoe and sent by him to the division of antisubmarine affairs.

5. At the Admiralty in London an officer—Lieut. Commander Hitchens—signed to introduce me to various officers who could give me information. Mr. Hitchens also gave me information of a general character. I talked to Rear Admiral Alexander L. Duff, head of the division which deals with antisubmarine warfare with Admiral Edward S. Fitzherbert, Director of Torpedoes and Mining, and Capt. Spear, head of the Mine Division.

6. Some of the details of the nets I made notes on but as I learned later the details and drawings of all nets and mines were to be furnished or else had been furnished to the Navy Department, I kept no further notes. I also got information as to the probable routes the submarines take in leaving their bases at Bruges, Emden, and Wilhelmshaven through and around the area mined by the British.

7. The British have in general found it impracticable to maintain an active patrol in the North Sea which would seriously interfere with the passage of ships through the North Sea on account of the number of ships needed. Two nets or barrages which were established in the vicinity of Dover to prevent submarines from passing through were finally partially carried away by the tide and though parts of them are still in place no one doubts that some of the submarines pass over to Ireland by this channel.

8. Most of the German submarines and particularly the large ones after leaving the mine field off the German coast head directly for Fair Island between the Orkneys and the Shetland Islands and do not hesitate to pass through to the Atlantic. The British have found it wholly impracticable to net this passage. The submarines usually made a landfall at St. Kilda west of the Hebrides and thence down the vicinity of Fastnet and the Scillys. They are usually out 20 days, eight of which are required for the passage to and fro. Submarines usually spend two-fifths of their time away from their base. As the Admiralty believe that the Germans have 60 submarines there are 60 submarines always out. The Germans are turning over two submarines a week.

9. In connection with a scheme for effectively closing the North Sea by mines and nets in conjunction with the patrols, the officers of the Admiralty found it to be impracticable. The same thing was suggested several times by the officers but after consideration was disapproved. The objections are given as lack of necessary patrols, impossibility to maintain nets, impracticability of nets in water over 50 fathoms with anchored mines, and the undesirability of mines on account of possible danger to their fleet.

10. Patrols have been withdrawn from the North Sea except near the coast and near the channel. At present the general line of defense is the mined area in the English Channel Bight and the patrol of the areas of submarine operations.

11. The strategy regarding the Grand Fleet is still adhered to, with the view of meeting the German High Sea Fleet in the near future.

12. The patrols are no doubt as efficient as their numbers make it possible for them to be but on account of the need of certain flotillas being kept ready with the fleet the patrol is reduced so much in its effectiveness.

13. The Admiralty are somewhat reorganized and will no doubt result in improvements, as the heads are relieved of much routine and details.

14. I will state as my opinion that the present lines of effort are defective to some extent.

15. At present the policy of maintaining the fleet is of prime importance and coming the submarine menace is of secondary importance. This is wrong because it will be the submarine that will (if anything does) bring about the defeat of the British and not the German High Seas Fleet. As to secure control of the surface it is not possible to operate against the enemy on the surface, so to secure the control of the submarine it will be necessary to operate against the enemy in subsurface areas. Surface ships could carry out submarine operations by dropping mines and depth charges but they could not see the submarine. Not being able to see the submarine the only other way to gain control of the subsurface is to scatter mines everywhere in it so that a submarine can not operate in it. This, of course, can not be done over the entire ocean, but the North Sea presents an area which it is possible to control. Actual attempts to control there may prove it to be impossible, but it should at least be attempted. This will require the extensive use of mines and may interfere with the Grand Fleet and even so, the movements of the Grand Fleet should be subordinated to the antisubmarine measure to whatever extent necessary.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

... are just maintaining their own, and the German ...
... in a year it will be necessary to double the p
... my own opinion that every possible chart that can b
... submarine campaign be immediately sent over. I
... that there should be no chance for a complaint that the
... United States did not give adequate help in time; t
... be kept from getting stronger until more exten
... out. It will also recommend that the manufactu
... be pursued in case of any failure of the patro

... the armed guard officer of whom I have just
... others who came to London with similar ins
... Navy Department. I would like to include in the
... letter addressed by one of these armed guard of
... Naval Operations, after his arrival in Washingto
... pointing out the realization which he, like eve
... London, obtained of the problems we we
... actually to see them for himself and to visu

... his letter he emphasized the importance o
... abroad to collect information for the dep
... in the administration of our forces overseas, an
... of our work with the Allies.

... that letter also for the record, as it is long a
... letter is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTM
Washington, D. C., June

... M. Emmet, United States Navy.

... Operations.

... personnel and forces in Europe; liaison officers and oth
... Admiral Sims re information service, dated fro
... and his dispatches re additional personnel from time to t
... personnel and forces in European waters.

... abroad and discussion with officers of British N
... time department will have to face problem of finding
... for our forces operating in Europe.

... are

... are a development of this war. They were inaug
... recently adopted by British. They are used in both
... indispensable.

... staff

... the demands on Admiral Sims's time, brain, a
... were increasing by leaps and bounds. There was a
... efficient officers of an active turn of mind, had

... that both the importance of his mission and the widel
... together with the relatively weighty part it p
... demand that the admiral receive the most efficient

... purpose of this letter

... I desire to bring to the attention of Operations my
... importance of I, II, and III above.

... I became thoroughly imbued with the fact that this w
... waters washing the coasts of Great Britain and F
... Mediterranean, and nowhere else

... contact with the Navy Department I am fully alive
... trained officers.

... I am convinced that nothing should interfere with n
... waters at the maximum pitch of efficiency.

... great measure to consolidate the functions set forth in
... officers, which under the circumstances seems down
... additional personnel and forces, European waters.

... Admiral Sims, after consultation with far more authoritative
... those open to me, became keenly alive to the necessity
... destroyer force.

(b) His dispatches indicate it.

(c) I have heard him say time and again that we would find 50 per cent.

(d) The irreducible minimum be considered to be one-fifth, which 30 boats would mean 6 captains and a proportionate number of junior enlisted ratings.

(e) My personal conviction is that in the case of officers certainly, they will find it must provide nearer one-half than one-fifth.

(f) The service is trying. It is work and no play, with a constant tension.

(g) I am sure it is not the admiralty's intention to retain all our forces on their present service. It is drudgery. Undoubtedly, as time goes, our destroyers will be transferred to east coast immediately facing enemy; are bound to occur.

(h) Casualties are bound to occur on present stations. There the danger and wounds is not so imminent, but we will surely encounter cases which must be given a rest.

(i) If reliefs are available, a few weeks' or months' change of duty may be valuable man to his full efficiency, and in the interim he may perform well as a liaison officer or on admiral staff, temporarily in London.

(j) If reliefs are not available the loss of efficiency of the force may prove due to increased strain on officers remaining.

(k) There is also the danger that men will be overworked to the extent that services may be lost to the country for long periods of time, for the rest of their lives.

(l) The British have met this time and again. The whole policy of the Admiralty is to make life aboard seagoing ships as livable as possible, even to the extent of maintaining in some degree military efficiency.

(m) We were warned again and again it did not pay to strip ships to the bone; they did to their cost at beginning of war.

(n) I feel absolutely confident that unless this problem is met square on, it will be very much more embarrassing in the future.

VI. Discussing liaison officer.

(a) A number of officers have been sent abroad representing the various services. They will undoubtedly render valuable service.

(b) I think arrangements ought to be made to have part of them return from time to time and make their report personally. I believe if this was done the value of the information supplied department would be many times increased.

(c) Business by cable has its drawbacks. I have heard Admiral Sims discussing submarine situation, that Admiral Jellicoe had told him that we furnish too many mines; that a million was not too many.

(d) I have been informed since my return from abroad that the British did not want any mines from us. They must need them, and there must be a misunderstanding at long range.

(e) Officers in reserve for our destroyers can gain invaluable experience by being with British forces actually facing the enemy. They can be changed from time to time so that the whole force will be leavened with everything our Allies have learned in three years of war.

(f) Officers temporarily incapacitated can render valuable service in London as opportunity offers, can be sent home to bring the actual seat of operations to high command here in a way that can never be accomplished by correspondence by cable or by letter.

(g) I desire to invite attention to Admiral Sims's letter of May 14, 1917, on "Furnishing information and liaison service." The subject of liaison officers is discussed at length.

VII. Interchange of information with our allies.

(a) Admiral Sims was informed by the Board of Admiralty that they had issued orders to all departments of Admiralty that there was nothing confidential as between the two services; that they were willing and anxious to supply us with any information on any subject we might desire.

(b) I know I reflect Admiral Sims when I recommend that a similar policy of complete frankness be given serious consideration by us.

* * * * *

VIII. Need for destroyers.

(a) The Admiralty consider at the present time a destroyer to be literally weight in gold.

(b) Too many can't be built.

(c) In my association with the Office of the Engineer in Chief in the Admiralty with various engineering firms, I became keenly alive to the difficulties of suitable gearing for turbines of our new 35-knot destroyers.

... can be cut abroad there is always danger of loss in transit to this

... is paramount.

... if they had been able to force Germany's course of unrestricted

... they would have now 200 more than at present.

... that with 200 more they could surely control the submarines

...—that is, prevent them sinking more merchant tonnage than

... They admit to lack of vision.

... are splendid ships.

... about them.

... in the country is supplied with plans and patterns.

... in view of our past experience to turn out quickly many 33-

... the *Jouett* and *Beale*, which were unqualified successes.

... the *Beale*, with 4-inch guns instead of 3-inch, and, if you like, three

... twin torpedo tubes would give a good account of herself against

... the world.

... of antisubmarine warfare she would be fully as efficient as the

... of all, such boats can be turned out quickly.

... I felt impelled to submit this letter, as I felt in my seven weeks

... an exceptional opportunity to observe conditions affecting the

... of the war on the sea.

R. R. EMMET.

... difficulty was in getting the department itself to realize

... and it was many months before I received any indica-

... had come to this realization.

... for example, I sent the following dispatch:

[Cable dispatch.]

... Navy.

... Department (on clair).

... give priority.

... keep the department informed of the information which it requires,

... to efficiency of our cooperation in this war, I must have men of

... training, and ability. With my knowledge of situation here, I

... of at least three of following, in addition to chief of staff:

... McNamee, Cotten, King, Pye, Coffey. Chief of staff must be

... and continuous estimate of situation. In addition, I must have

... constantly on duty in admiralty in connection with convoy

... movements and operations of our forces, and at least two additional

... are required. Replies to department's cables are now being

... and other important military matters being postponed, owing to

... to keep up with current work. It therefore is my duty to urge

... be subordinated to the demands of the organization here, upon

... United States naval cooperation must necessarily primarily depend.

... of our ships, as well as efficiency of their operations, is dependent

... of adequate staff.

SIMS.

• TROOP CONVOYS ENDANGERED BY INADEQUATE STAFF.

... dispatches of July 14, 17, and 23, I again pointed out

... of all troop convoys was endangered by my lack of

... the necessary and rapidly increasing work in con-

... cooperation with the allies, with the operations of

... and of the obtaining of information for the department

... overwhelming myself, my aid, and such members of

... office as were able to devote time to assist me.

... when the department cabled me an announcement of

... July 10, I replied in a long letter, fully setting forth

... of the requirements of my position and of the

which seemed necessary to carry out this policy of the department so far as operations in European waters were concerned. It is interesting to read the paragraphs of this letter, dealing with these subjects. It will be noted that I fully stated to the department the necessity of having all plans for operations and the direction of actual military operations handled in the war zone, at a place where all information was available, and where cooperation and coordination with the allied military effort could be accomplished by personal conferences. I recommended this to avoid the inevitable misunderstandings, due to correspondence between men whose minds are running in different channels. My letter was as follows: I apologize for the length of this thing, but I think it is necessary to read it. [Reading:]

Letter No. 27, July 16, 1917:

14. The department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty cooperation to the allies and to discuss plans for joint operations, and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted by the joint allied admiralities.

15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this cooperation, to discuss plans with the various admiralities, except in one way, and that is to establish what is termed an advance headquarters in the war area, composed of departmental representatives, upon whose recommendations the department can depend.

I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the Army; the general headquarters in the field being the advance headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters must of necessity be left a certain discretion and freedom of action as concerns the details of the measures necessary by the military situations as they arise.

16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which can affect military warfare, and hence delays in communications by written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very difficult to discuss plans at length. The enemy secret service has proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency.

Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of military matters by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The opportunities for misunderstandings are great, and it is difficult to be sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing. Hence phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They can not speak for themselves.

17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps of all Alliances, has been the difficulty of coordination and cooperation in military effort. I have at my disposal a great mass of information in this connection which it is practically impossible to impart except by personal discussion.

It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if any one of our Allies—Italy, France, England, or the United States—were selected to direct the operations, the others merely keeping the one selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these resources.

18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary to determine to the best location in which to establish such advanced headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at the front; that is, an advanced headquarters upon whose advice and decisions the War Council itself largely depends.

I fully realize the pressure, and the influences, which must have been borne upon the department from all of the Allies, and from various, and perhaps conflicting, sources.

I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of the war. It should be necessary to state, however, that I have done everything within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint, with the above-stated mission constantly in mind.

19. From the naval point of view, it would seem evident that London is the best and most central location in the war area for what I have termed above the advance branch of our Naval War Council.

The British Navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of the naval operations, and hence all naval information concerning the war reaches and centers in London.

It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters' staff, or portions thereof, to visit Paris and other allied admiralities at any time.

It is clear that, up to date, it has been wholly impossible for me to perform all of the functions of such an advanced branch of the staff.

From dispatches, it has been evident for some time that I have been unable to handle the work which it would be physically impossible to handle the work of the staff.

The situation is such that it is quite within the range of possibility that some disaster may involve disaster to our ships, due to the physical impossibility of the administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is necessary.

The minimum staff which would be required is approximately 100. It should be well employed with resulting increase of efficiency. The staff should be free to carry on a continuous estimate of the situation and all necessary information. He would be given the freedom of the British and French admiralties.

The rank of commander, for duties in connection with the handling of all the numerous communications in relation to the shipping, particularly military shipping, and also other matters.

A lieutenant commander, for duties in connection with anti-air operations in order to insure perfect cooperation in that field of operations and other allied services.

An officer of all around ability and discretion, for duties in connection with intelligence. He should be in constant touch with the secret service of the admiralties, in order to insure that all military intelligence which reaches the Navy Department or our forces is properly and promptly handled.

Two lieutenants, or lieutenant commanders of the line, in my own office, to handle general administrative questions, in addition to the one now in the office. The necessity for these additional officers is imperative.

An officer to take general charge of codes and communications, at home, the allied admiralties, and with the various forces in the war area (at present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire and Paris).

An officer to have complete charge of all financial matters connected with the department abroad. This officer should be in addition to Paymaster and his necessary and invaluable service on my staff in connection with the department.

I remember the preparation of that dispatch, and the question as to whether we should state what we ought to get, or what we thought we ought to get. Anyone familiar with military procedure knows that what I got was not what I should have had; but as this was then the situation and we had not been able to get anything to speak of, I saw the utter impossibility of success in demanding an organization that I should have, and that I eventually got.

Some of the authorities in Washington visited the other side of the world or seventh month of the war, and saw the situation, the facts, and begin to give us the staff which was

the better-reports, written about the same time: that is, July 18. I again pointed out that it had become impossible to keep up with the necessarily increasing work of July 18 I said:

As to department's cables and adequate reports of operations. Although I have only asked for five additional staff officers, I am sure ample work for many more, and it would be in the interests of the department and our forces, if the staff were too large rather

At the end of July I also pointed out, in cables to the department, how essential it was, in order to insure quickness and certainty in our communications, that I should be sent capable officers, with cable communications, with code work, and with radio.

On July 23 I received a message from the department announcing the sailing of Capt. Twining as my chief of staff, two lieutenant commanders as aides, and also two lieutenants for communication and radio duty, for which I had specifically requested assistance.

In my letter No. 52, of July 30, I made the following comments with regard to the action of the department:

In closing, I wish again to call attention to the necessity for an adequate staff abroad. I have received the department's notification of certain young officers who are being sent, apparently for staff duty. I have tried to make it clear that the department's interests can not be efficiently served without an adequate staff of experienced men of adequate training.

The young officers who are being sent will, of course, be of assistance in routine administrative matters, but the urgent need is for men of much more experience, who will be capable of collecting all information which is available, of the general situation, and from it preparing estimates of the situation and of broad questions of policy, and plans of operations upon which the United States efforts may be safely based.

I fully realize the demands being made on the naval personnel at home, but the naval staff organization abroad is the one coordinating link between the current war situation abroad, and the department, I submit that its demands should have precedence over a large majority of other demands, made for training and other purposes at home. I feel and have tried to explain in my previous dispatches that if I could have here a council of perhaps four officers of experience of the type of Capts. Pratt, Schofield, or Commanders Knox, Stirling, Cotton, I could be more effectively accomplishing the mission which I am sure the department expects of me.

TECHNICAL OFFICERS NEEDED ON STAFF.

While I was assured by the department, four months after my arrival, that five officers would arrive for staff duty, I had yet received no reply to my repeated requests for the sending of technical officers to report to the different bureaus in the department, and to obtain for them the technical information and data available in the various navy departments, which it was essential the Navy Department should have for carrying out its own plans for the preparation of American naval forces for war.

It will be remembered that in April I had requested that Naval Constructor McBride be sent abroad for such duty. He arrived five months later, in August, and was the first of such technical officers to be sent in accordance with my recommendations.

On August 9 I wrote the following to the department concerning his services:

Naval Constructor McBride has reported for duty. He will be of great assistance not only in obtaining general information of value to the department and the navy but also for staff duty concerning his bureau in connection with the forces he will generally keep in touch with any unusual or extended repairs under the Bureau of Construction and Repair, advising me where my action is necessary, and generally acting as a representative of his bureau.

In a cable of August 13 I pointed out how confused the mine and depth-charge situation was, because there was no American officer in London familiar with the Navy Department's plans and policy, and no British officer in Washington at that time fully acquainted with all the British experience and developments; but no such

me by the department. Fortunately I was able to avail myself of the services of Lieut. Commander [redacted] who had been sent abroad by the Bureau of Ordnance to [redacted] being purchased by the bureau in Great Britain.

My report of September 7 I again pointed out the necessity of this liaison duty. I will read one paragraph of this

report. I would again renew my recommendations that carefully selected [redacted] be detailed for duty with the various units of the allied forces.

[redacted] extremely useful to me as well as to the department, for example, if [redacted] of general ability were assigned permanently to the main allied [redacted] forces which are not operating in direct conjunction with [redacted] — for example, the Harwich light cruiser and submarine force [redacted] submarine force in the North Sea. I consider that the assignment [redacted] French, Italian, and British main fleets would be productive of a [redacted] information to our service, as well as regards questions of policies [redacted] the department.

At the end of October, 1917, the only officers that I had received from the department for staff duty were the three previously mentioned — [redacted] sent in July, to whom I have referred, and Naval [redacted] McBridge, who arrived in August. I had been obliged to employ a number of officers from vessels operating in Europe in order to meet the constantly increasing burden of staff work. It would not have been possible to accomplish the work at that time if I had not been authorized (as I shall point out hereafter) by the Bureau of Navigation to enroll in London [redacted] Americans, many of whom had been Rhodes scholars or [redacted] of Mr. Hoover in the Belgian Relief Commission, who [redacted] their assistance and in some cases had been working [redacted] and without pay as civilians for a month or more. [redacted] permission was received from the Bureau of Navigation to [redacted] naval reserve officers. All of our communications with [redacted] and with the forces, including the coding and deciphering of dispatches, were handled by six of these young men, and I was thus relieved of mechanical routine work and performed other duties of a more strictly military character. [redacted] naval reserve officers similarly took over the routine [redacted] administration, secretarial work, etc., and thus further [redacted] regular officers of routine duties.

On August 23 to the department I pointed out the situation [redacted] and the necessity of increasing the number of [redacted] staff.

I pointed out that on October 1, 1917, there were in European waters [redacted] naval vessels and 15 shore stations, comprising 652 [redacted] men, and yet to administer these forces, to control [redacted] at the same time to keep in constant touch with the [redacted] and to acquire information for the department [redacted] war experience, I had available in London only six [redacted] sent abroad by the department for staff duty, and [redacted] I had ordered up from the forces afloat. In addition, [redacted] four officers in the naval attaché's office who were [redacted] duty on my staff. You may be able to under-

stand more completely this need for assistance if I read some from my letter of October 23, 1917. [Reading:]

OCTOBER

From: Force commander.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Need for an increased staff for the force commander.

1. As the war progresses and the activities of our own forces, increased addition of new units to the forces operating in European waters, and as new are added, as, for example, the matter of aviation of French and English purely administrative work at the headquarters of these forces has increased increasing, and may be expected to increase.

2. In addition to the administrative work, which must be disposed of every day, if the forces are to be kept in continuous and efficient operation, there is an urgent need for planning and deliberative work, if the operation of our forces be intelligently conducted, in full and efficient cooperation with those of our allies.

3. It is plain that the two classes of work can not be performed by one staff of officers, but should be entrusted to two separate staffs, one of which should be purely a deliberative and planning staff and the other purely an administrative staff.

4. I now have, aside from the naval attaché, 12 officers who are either attached to my staff in London or are assistants to the naval attaché and are on duty in connection with the administration of our naval forces in Europe. The inclosed office memorandum shows the distribution of duties among them. One of these officers, Lieut. Gillmore, is a reserve officer (formerly in the service) there are, in addition to the 12, a number of recently enrolled reserve officers performing the routine office duties indicated in the memorandum.

5. All of these officers are working to the utmost limit in keeping the administrative work up to date, and the number is still insufficient for present needs, and is still more inadequate as the activities increase.

6. The immediate needs for increase are as follows:

(a) An officer to relieve the chief of staff of the major portion of his administrative work and leave him free to fulfill his more important function of military staff chief of the planning staff.

(b) An officer to take charge of all aviation matters that must be handled in the office, and act as the liaison officer between myself and the British Admiralty on aviation matters.

(c) An additional assistant to the intelligence officer. A vast amount of information comes into the office, and much more could be secured, if my staff is large enough to permit of its being properly examined and digested.

(d) An officer to whom all personnel matters may be entrusted. Lieut. C. C. Ancrum has until the present time handled these matters, but owing to the necessity of furnishing an assistant to Commander Long (who was in charge of convoys) he has been detailed for that duty, and personnel matters turn over to Lieut. Gillmore, who owing to having been out of the service for some years is somewhat out of touch with service matters, and in any case, should be in a position to devote his whole time to his secretarial duties which are not light.

7. For the planning staff, I believe that it will be necessary that not less than five officers be made available in addition to the chief of staff, who should be the head of this organization. Such a staff could, and would, work in close cooperation with the recently established planning staff of the British Admiralty. By this cooperation between the two services could be secured, and facilities for the more impressing our views on the British Admiralty to a much greater extent than has been possible in the past.

10. I trust that the department will share my views as to the necessity and for increasing my staff in the manner, to the extent, and for the reasons, set forth above, and I request that the necessary additional officers be ordered to this duty as soon as practicable, since every day's delay increases the burden thrown upon my existing staff, and makes more urgent the necessity for additional officers.

WM. S.

P. S.—With reference to paragraph 7, I wish to make it quite clear that the object in establishing a planning staff is to insure that I may be in a position to give the best and most thoroughly considered advice to the department as to the operations of our naval forces abroad.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

It is especially noted, that, in making requests for officers for letters and cables, I distinctly specified the named officers by name, these names were given as the type of officers required, more than to indicate that I could not be suitable. In many letters requesting personnel pointed out that, with the exception of Capt. Pratt, especially desired because of our previous relations and understanding, the officers I had named were competent the type of officer. It is, of course, true that I preferred the officers that I named, but there were many in the service of similar qualities who would have been suitable for the work.

The lack of staff seriously embarrassed me and rendered me ineffective than it would otherwise have been, as I wrote of the Navy, in a personal letter of July 31, 1917:

LONDON, July 31, 1917

My SECRETARY: You may be sure that I have been doing my best in the performance of this rather delicate and difficult task. I have not been able to do so to anything like my own satisfaction as in the department. This has been due to the physical impossibility of doing so due to the fact that I have with me only one aid in my work. I hope the department will see its way clear to the efficient officers of such size as to enable me to send in a recommendation which became available immediately upon the outbreak

of the war.

Wm. S. Sims

JOHN DANIELS,

U. S. Navy

Department, Washington, D. C.

My official letter report to the department, of November 1917, the department of the continued necessity for action. (Reading:)

November 15, 1917

The necessity for an increased staff grows daily. As previously the entire time of the present staff is now taken up with the work which can not be avoided and for which the staff is inadequate. The department depends to a considerable extent upon this organization for complete information of the progress of the war upon which the basis of the plans is laid.

The department has been severely criticized for not having an efficient staff and for not having plans projected sufficiently into the future. Without going into the merits of these criticisms at all

from my point of view alone, the question is a serious one. It is our duty to secure our efficient participation in combined naval plans. It is the vital element of time, and the impossibility of efficient plans at long range, the most efficient course for us is to believe in the use of capable officers to actually participate with the coordination of all plans.

In the part in regard to all plans must of necessity remain in the Navy. The ultimate responsibility rests and where all information bearing on the plans is available.

It is desired to stress, however, is that with the present staff it is impossible to keep the department informed fully of the progress of the war and to assist it in the formulation of plans for the future.

My letter to Admiral Benson, of October 9, 1917, I found the same condition. (Reading:)

In the reports to be made by Admiral Mayo, the amount of information was able to dig out in a comparatively short space of time.

sort of work can be accomplished only by men who can devote their exclusive attention each to one specialty.

It was with the object of being able to do this that I was so insistent in asking for more assistance when I first came over here. I am glad to say that the officers and men who have been sent over eased up things very considerably, but I should know that conditions in this respect can not be satisfactory to the extent indicated above unless I have a sufficient personnel to be able to keep our officers continually at work in departments of the Admiralty. It is only through daily contact and association that we can keep thoroughly in touch with what is going on. The people of the Admiralty are working to the limit, and we must expect them to think of and supply us with the things which would be necessary for us.

As an example of what I mean, I may say that I had hoped that when the others arrived here they would be able to spend at least a considerable part of their time working with the people in the Admiralty. It was my intention that they should do so, but unfortunately the amount of work to be done is continually increasing and has increased to such an extent that this is now impossible.

You will realize, I am sure, that I am speaking in this respect only of a certain type of officer. The officer who is the ordinary run of the mine could not be so advantageously employed in this manner. It is as specialized and as important work as that which is being done by your able assistants. The type of man I refer to are as follows: Stirling, McNamee, Yarnell, Knox, Coffey, Cotton, etc. We should have five such officers if we are to carry on this work efficiently and be properly informed.

ARRIVAL OF ADMIRAL BENSON IN EUROPE.

When Admiral Benson finally arrived in England, in the middle of November, 1917, it took him only a few days to convince him of the necessity of establishing a real advanced headquarters in the Navy Department abroad, with an adequate staff to make full cooperation with the Admiralty, to prepare plans for operations, and adequately to cooperate with the Allies in coordinating all activities. I had been recommending such action for several months, and specifically in my letters of May 16, July 16, and October 23, had pointed out the necessity for the establishment of an advanced headquarters abroad. Similar recommendation had been contained in many of the cables, as you may remember, which I have read you in the last few minutes.

Then on November 17, 1917, the department sent the following dispatch to Admiral Benson, then in London:

Simsadus.

1160. For Benson. After thinking carefully subject feels that it would be a great advantage if we have a permanent War Staff in England, as a part of the plans developed by the Admiralty. If this meets your approval, additional officers will be sent to augment those already in England who are fitted for this work. 19016.

B.

As I have before explained "Benson" was a cable signature indicating that the message emanated from the office of Naval Operations, so there will be no confusion when you see a message sent from Washington and signed "Admiral Benson," although Admiral Benson is on the other side.

Admiral Benson replied as follows on the following day:

[Very secret.]

1530. Your 1160. Subject has been under discussion with Admiralty several times before receipt of your message. Definite plans submitted to Admiralty. Am waiting for decision. (Signed) Benson. 15118.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

and he sent a further cable, outlining fully his plan to carry out this plan. His cable was as follows:

[Very secret]

Subject:

State of the Navy.

I have discussed the situation fully with British Admiralty, and outlined our plans for future Naval Operations, but am convinced that we must offer definite plans of their own for our consideration. After careful consideration, I believe that such plans, as they can not be developed until we virtually establish the operations here, in order that the personnel thereof may be trained in British and other Allied information, and to urge, as we estimate and policies may indicate. This action appears to be considering the fact that any offensive operation which must be in conjunction with British forces, and must be from within British territorial waters.

For this duty should come here fully imbued with our naval ideas. Then, with the intimate knowledge they can acquire of the actual disposition of allies forces, reasons therefor, they can put up on British any plan that promises satisfactory results. Under this policy, I recommend that Capt. Schofield and Commandant be sent to Vice Admiral Sims and Admiral Jellicoe, first selected, then to be selected after my return.

Immediate action should be taken at once.

I am recommending for officers to fill vacancies in the Navy.

Signed Benson.

8

Admiral Benson replied immediately, on November 21, with the following:

[Very secret]

Your 1550 acknowledged: reply thereto Schofield and

BEN

The recommendation which I had been making for six months to effect until Admiral Benson, during his visit, advanced himself it was justified, and recommended the establishment of such a planning section for the Navy.

It is necessary to repeat that this is merely another instance of the department during all of those first critical years of the war. My recommendation for months were all ignored. The efficiency of our cooperation with the British was tested during this period by the failure to act on the recommendations made by their representative abroad, who, under departmental instructions, was fully cooperating with the British Admiralty, and made these recommendations in consultation with them.

The wisdom of the policy was again demonstrated by the fact that the department adopted it, and throughout the remainder of the war to recognize, though sometimes grudgingly, what had been continually recommended and was obvious from the very first.

For six months following Admiral Benson's visit I have been without an adequate number of assistants. I

pointed out in my letter-report of the 19th of December, which I said:

[Letter 4844, December 19, 1917.]

STAFF REQUIREMENTS.

The staff work required on shore, both in London and Paris, and at sea, is steadily increasing. In spite of the additional officers who have recently been added to this staff, the necessity for further increases is rapidly developing. This is due to the assistance with experience of allied Governments and armies. It has been very impressive to learn of the requirements of staff work in allied admiralties and in the field. It is, of course, manifest that all operations afloat or in the field are dependent for their efficiency upon planning and administrative staff work. This is a task which can not be dispensed with, and must be provided for even at the cost of additional batant personnel.

The planning staff which will be created here on the arrival of Commander Knox will soon be in need of assistance which can not be supplied with the available officers.

Similarly, in my letter of December 31, 1917, I said:

The demands upon the staff organization ashore upon which the efficiency of operations afloat are entirely dependent have grown steadily from the beginning and are still growing. In addition to the direction of the activities of the fleet afloat, and the administration work which is unavoidably involved, it is a heavy task to attempt to keep fully informed of all developments and conditions of the allied campaign which may affect our plans.

This same report was made to the department in many of my letters, as, for example, in my letter of January 8, 1918, in paragraph 10.

In my letter of March 23, 1918, No. 1223, I said:

The peculiar requirements of all staff duty performed abroad, in cooperation with allied services, makes the duty of a nature for which there was no precedent. It has been necessary to depart from all precedents, and to be governed by the exigencies of the war. The care in establishing and maintaining efficient relations between the services for the above reasons that the force commander has so many times in the past, has led for officers for staff duty, laid stress upon particular types and personal characteristics and upon the necessity of permanence of assignment.

VALUE OF PERSONAL TOUCH.

I had from the first been impressed with the importance of coordinating the work abroad with the work of the Navy Department. Many misunderstandings inevitably arose as a result of the lack of personal touch, on both sides of the ocean. I was very glad that they could see the situation for themselves, and be in a position on their return to inform the department of some of the problems to be faced in Europe. In repeated letters to the department, in personal letters as well as official letters, I had emphasized the importance of having officers frequently exchange between the Navy Department and Europe, in order that the Navy Department headquarters of the forces abroad could be brought into more intimate contact with each other, and thus obviate many of the difficulties which arose from inevitable misunderstandings.

These difficulties were increased by the tendency of the department to demand, and require, full and complete explanation of every request made to them, and of every detail of the operations of our forces before they would approve such requests or sanction such operations. I could mention many illustrations of the

made in this respect. Thus, for example, I have already mentioned a case of recommendations for an increase in the number of the adoption of the convoy system, for the sending of battleships to the grand fleet, for the sending of tugs and reinforcements, the department failed to act for me chiefly because they apparently did not consider the full information in Washington, although, as I pointed out, such full information could not be communicated under the conditions existing because of the necessity of secrecy, or lack of assistants to forward the information desired, and the necessary delays and misunderstanding attendant upon letter communications.

It will show the department's attitude. On May 18 I received from the department in which it was stated:

that the department be promptly and fully informed of all operations going on with the allied naval forces.

I assured them I had outlined the general operations of the fleet, had pointed out difficulties of communications, and that the department would be informed of all important prospective changes in general plans.

On July 5 the department stated:

our plans made and our efforts to respond, must insist that any plans for our consideration be submitted for our study.

On June 24, replying to various dispatches and letters received, the department again insisted that while it was cooperative in any way, it would only consider "the question of additional naval forces * * * whenever the adoption of doing is justified."

The department seemed disinclined to take any action or indorse recommendations, unless the fullest and most complete explanation was made, and this was extremely difficult, if indeed impossible. I was at that time working nearly alone, and the difficulties of communication made such full explanation impossible. In many cases it took weeks to get the department something which could have been dealt with if I could have gone to the Navy Department and the matter personally. As I have already pointed out, in the plans for protection of shipping against a battle it took nearly two months to obtain an agreement upon meeting these raids.

Probably have been settled in a few hours of conference. In complete accord and in constant consultation with the British. No recommendation was made to the Navy Department until it had been fully discussed and agreed upon. I might say that in those first few months it was in complete cooperation with the allied naval forces, in spite of all the difficulties which inevitably exist between allies than action from his own naval department.

On July 10, 1917, announcing its general policy the British, while announcing its willingness to cooperate with the Allies, yet insisted upon decisions being made by the British and insisted that the emergency warranting

action should be fully explained to the department. As already pointed out, and as the department later came to see, it was possible to cooperate with the Allies only by giving a commander abroad and the department's representative in contact with the Allies authority to discuss matters with them and to make decisions as to actual operations required by sound military considerations. Thus on October 13 I reported to the department that a special squadron of yachts had been organized on the French coast. On October 16 the department cabled:

Inform department reason for and mission of special squadron under Commander Freeman.

I replied in my cable of October 17:

[Cablegram sent Oct. 17, 1917.]

To: Opnav, Washington.

Via: N. C. B. 18bR.

Copies to: C. on S., J. V. B., B. A. L.

923. Opnav 594. Special division under Commander Freeman will consist of *Aphrodite*, *Corsair*, *Alcedo*, *Wakiva*, *Noma*, and *Kanawha* and will be used for escort of convoys. Other yachts not suitable for this duty. Reason for assigning yachts to divisions in accordance with speed, radius, and so forth will be submitted to the department for approval at an early date. 62017.

That is exactly parallel to what would have been the case if the Secretary of War had telegraphed to Gen. Pershing and asked him to report immediately why he had moved a brigade over 100 miles to the right.

Again in December, 1917, after the arrival of our battleships with the Grand Fleet, it was recommended, after a conference with Admiral Rodman and the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, that a fifth American battleship be sent abroad in order that one of the ships was under repair or docking, there would be a division of four ships ready to put to sea at any moment. This was essential, as the Grand Fleet was under four hours' notice to fight, and it was imperative that the fighting effectiveness of the squadrons should be at all times unimpaired.

The department, not understanding in detail the reasons for the request, cabled as follows on January 5:

[Very secret.]

Simsadus.

If the reason for asking for the U. S. S. *Texas* to be assigned to group 9 is to make a division of five ships, this reason the department does not consider as it breaks up and is counter to our battleship organization. If, however, a need exists for one more battleship, provision can be made to send one, though the department would prefer to send a division if the supply question will admit, rather than break its organization. 19005.

Ba

That is putting a paper organization against the necessities.

I replied in my cable of January 8, which is as follows:

[Very secret.]

2781. Your 2010. My 2286 did not state reason for asking for *Texas* was to make a division of five ships, but stated that in order to insure four ships continuing the battle line a fifth ship was necessary. A real need does exist for one more battleship and this should be the *Texas* in order that there may always be one ship and two with 14-inch guns at our end of the battle line. Need for another division of battleships not sufficient at present to justify additional strain on supply line.

there that our division was employed on one of the Grand Fleet, with a corresponding division of British on the other end, and it was very desirable to have the 14-inch

the department cabled me that the U. S. S. *Texas* was sent to this duty and would sail immediately.

illustrating the same hesitancy of the department to make decisions, until the whole matter was explained in detail by the plans proposed for establishing a docking system for battleships in European waters. In a letter of September 1, I had made full recommendations as to how our ships could be sent home and docked in rotation provided one ship could be supplied by the department.

There that the difficulty on the other side was in making facilities for our vessels in addition to those of the British, and the desirability of giving our people from time to time a rest. It was a frequent apprehension that the long stay on the Grand Fleet might eventually get on the men's nerves to a certain extent affect the morale; that was the experience of the war in the British Navy; and everybody was of the opinion that that opinion was not a sound one. But to suppose that men who stayed on board ship for months without ever being allowed to leave for more than a few days and during that period having twice to go to a shore to see whether a telephone message had not called them home would be liable to be affected. It would be liable to affect any man.

the department on September 6, 1918, asking early action. On September 12 the department replied that an additional battleship was available, but that the plan was approved, if it could be carried out without this additional battleship. It was, however, impracticable to carry out the plan unless the additional battleship could be supplied, as Admiral Rodman informed me on September 9, when he said:

The plan could be carried out with only five ships, as it would not be necessary to have one battleship for docking, out of the five available, but this would condition the division of four ships with the Grand Fleet.

I explained as fully as possible to the department the reasons for the cable. Then, on October 3, 1918, the department proposed a plan of its own. This plan involved a rotation between divisions 6 and 9, which were in European waters, comprising two oil-burning and one coal-burning ships. Division 6 had recently arrived at Berehaven for duty in the battle cruiser raid plan and divisions 7 and 8, which were in the United States. Due to various difficulties, however, no complete arrangement by cable, with the Admiralty on the one side and the Navy Department on the other, no definite decision had yet been made at the time of the armistice, four months after the plan had first been proposed by the department.

the record without reading some of the cables and without this subject to show the difficulties attaching to an intricate matter.

As a great many similar cases that could be cited.

[Cablegram sent Sept. 6, 1918.]

To: Opnav, Washington.

4232. My indorsement 29216, August 13. Early action by cable is required order that docking schedule on this side may be arranged. 4232.

[Confidential.]

SEPTEMBER

Simsadus.

1082. Reference letter, Division 9, file 7, of July 27, 1918. Your first indorsement 29216 of October 23. Procedure approved provided it can be carried out with ships now available. U. S. S. *Delaware* not available. 12106. 1082.

SEPTEMBER

Simsadus.

666. My file 7, Sept. 1. Docking arrangements with British authorities necessary to get an immediate reply to my letter file 7 of July 27, 1918. 17109.

[Confidential.]

SEPTEMBER

To: Fibatus, Admiralty, London.

939. Your 666. Cable just received from department approves procedure recommended in your letter of July 27, provided it can be carried out with five ships in the division. Department states *Delaware* not available. In this case it is impracticable to carry out the scheme. Request your opinion. 239.

[Secret.]

SEPTEMBER

Simsadus.

676. Your 939. My proposed plan can not be carried out with only five ships. I have arranged with commander in chief to adhere to original plan and ships on this side. 17109. 676.

OCTOBER

Simsadus.

2489. In order to carry out the desires of commander Division 9 as approved by you of sending one ship of that division home at regular intervals for overhaul at same time keeping up the strength of Division 9 and Division 6 to their quota, department suggests following plan for consideration: At stated interval replace one of the ships of Division 9 in rotation by one of the ships of Division 6 upon reporting of ship from Division 6 to commander Division 9 detach one ship from Division 9 to sail for home. One dreadnaught of battleship force 2 will sail to replace ship in Division 6. 1102. 2489.

BRI

[Secret.]

OCTOBER 15

From: Force commander.

To: Secretary of the Admiralty.

Subject: United States battleships in European waters.

1. In order to provide so far as possible for making repairs in the United States battleships detailed for service in European waters and for the purpose of affording to officers and men opportunities for leave at home, the Department has proposed the following plan for rotation of vessels composing ship Division 9 (sixth battle squadron, Grand Fleet) and battleship Division stationed at Berehaven, Ireland, as a raider guard.

2. It is proposed that on a given date one ship of Division 6 sail for the United States to join Division 9 and upon her reporting one of the ships of Division 9 shall sail for the United States.

On the date upon which the vessel sails from Division 9 for the United States an additional battleship shall sail from the United States to join Division 6.

The department has not stated how frequently such a change would be made but it is probable that allowing 10 days for the voyage each way across the Atlantic month overhaul period, and 10 days for contingencies, the cycle would be two months.

... pronounced satisfactory by the commanders of both battle-
... and the commander battleship Division 9 has stated that
... Grand Fleet, is in accord with the policy involved. The
... the premises are requested.
... particulars of the vessels involved are as follows:

| Name. | Fuel. | Battery. |
|-------|-----------|-------------|
| | Coal..... | 10 14-inch. |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | do..... | 12 12-inch. |
| | do..... | 10 12-inch. |
| | do..... | 12 12-inch. |
| | do..... | 10 12-inch. |
| | Oil..... | 10 14-inch. |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | Coal..... | 10 12-inch. |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | Oil..... | 12 14-inch. |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | do..... | Do. |

... no objection to the proposal in principal, the details can
... It seems important that so long as a raider guard is main-
... there should be at least two oil-burning vessels there, in order
... should the vessels return from a trip and be obliged to proceed
... another trip.
... the endeavor always to replace a 14-inch gun ship in the Grand
... ship, so as not to reduce the battery strength of the United States
... arrangements have already been made for the vessels with the Grand
... from October 21 to January 31, these arrangements would have
... the policy herein set forth is inaugurated, but this can doubtless
... dislocation of plans for British vessels.

Wm. S. Sims.

[Secret]

OCTOBER 27, 1918.

For Admiral Benson. Recommend battleship assignment to
... follows
... Arizona, 8 to 6.
... Nevada, 6 to 9.
... Wyoming, 9 to 7, and U. S. S. North Dakota, 7 to 6.
... Oklahoma, 6 to 9.
... Florida, 9 to 8, and U. S. S. Mississippi, 8 to 6.
... 6 to 9.
... 9 to 8, and U. S. S. New Mexico, 8 to 6.
... North Dakota, 6 to 9.
... Arkansas, 9 to 7, and U. S. S. Idaho, 7 to 6.
... greatly benefit personnel and return to home ports vessels
... 13126 3923

BENSON.

OCTOBER 27, 1918.

With reference to Opnav. 3923 retransmitted to you from
... made some time ago by the department for rotation of
... Division 6 and 9 is now under consideration by Admiralty
... Grand Fleet, as to its effect upon Grand Fleet and as to
... coal burning ships should be used in Division 9. Recommend
... matter be deferred until Admiralty's ideas have been made
... soon

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, it is almost 12 o'clock, and if it is a good place for you to stop, I think we had better suspend here.

Admiral SIMS. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, for the record, just before we adjourn: I have been necessarily absent from two or three hearings of this committee, and so that it may not appear that there was a discourtesy to the chairman, or neglect of my duty on this committee. I want to state that I have been attending hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee in a matter which was of considerable importance, and in view of the fact that we had agreed that the direct testimony here should be put in first without any interruptions, and in appearing that the direct testimony of Admiral Sims was all prepared in advance, I felt that I could be spared better from the subcommittee here than I could from the Foreign Relations Committee, at this time. I think that the various matters we have had under consideration in the Foreign Relations Committee are now terminated, and that is so, I expect to be in more active attendance at these hearings. I have been reading these hearings at night, and while I would have liked to have had an advance copy of this, because I could possibly have gone ahead faster, there are a great many questions that have suggested themselves to me which undoubtedly Admiral Sims can clear my mind on, and I assume that it will take to-morrow to complete the Admiral's testimony, at least.

Admiral SIMS. There will be only 10 or 15 pages more to-morrow, and I can finish them in about an hour or an hour and a quarter, or something like that.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to ask, then, that when the direct testimony is through to-morrow, we adjourn until the next day, by reason of the probability that to-day and to-morrow the most important phases of this treaty matter will be disposed of.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, after the hearing to-morrow it is suggested that we adjourn until Friday?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. That is only giving up half an hour, then?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn now until to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 11.50 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, March 18, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
Room 235. Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

When I concluded my testimony yesterday we were
subject of the negotiations that were being carried
the Navy Department and the Admiralty and the head-
lined with reference to the rotation of battleships, so that
they could come home for docking and recreation. Continuing
I have cited these cases at this time in order to show
the confusion caused by the department's failure to send
assistance, and to maintain a sound military policy with
the command and administration of the overseas forces.

When the officers were sent over for a planning section,
the early difficulties disappeared. This planning section
of great value to the allied cause. The allied naval
council was organized in December, 1917, and held its first
meeting in January, 1918. I was detailed by the department by cable
as its representative in this council, and in the great and
various of work which arose in connection with the con-
sideration of many plans for fuller cooperation between the Allies,
and the carrying out of new operations, the services of this planning
section were of the utmost importance.

I pointed out to the department how easily operation could
be carried out by the use of such a staff, in a letter of January 21,
1918. In that letter I said:

"The committee of the planning section, all questions concerning the
war which required prompt settlement have been taken up for discus-
sion and the exceptions have been settled. * * * In my dealings
with the committee on this matter of the northern barrage, I found that Admiral
Seymour had having his subordinates handle all matters of details,
and the completed solution of all problems presented, rather than to
bring them to a solution. I believe that the entrance of our planning section
will have a good effect in this respect.

Among the things this planning section drew up a study of the
military problems of the war, which was transmitted to
the council. As I stated in my letter of February 22
1918, No. 9489, "this was one of the first probl

I requested the planning section to take up after it was organized as I am of the opinion that at no time in the past has so much thought been given by the several admiralities to the general situation and to the relations that must exist between the naval and land strategy of the war."

In a letter of August 15, 1917, I discussed the services rendered by this planning section in the following paragraph:

AUGUST

The planning section which was formed in December, 1917, has been of great service to the force commander through its studies of important political and tactical questions, upon which it has submitted memoranda of great value not only as meeting existing situations but as forming matter of permanent connection with future operations.

Many of the suggestions and recommendations made by the planning section have been adopted, and much of the material prepared by it has been promulgated to the forces in Europe for their information and guidance.

The influence of the planning section upon the British Admiralty has been considerable as affecting the methods of work of the plans division of the Admiralty and in bringing the opinions of the Admiralty naval staff into line with the opinions of the planning section. Planning section memoranda which contained some recommendations capable of being construed as criticisms of Admiralty methods and performances, was given by me unofficially to one of the members of the naval staff, who I felt sure would take it as it was meant, to the study of the situation from the German point of view and in no sense a criticism of the Admiralty. Not only was this paper highly thought of by the officer in question but it has been most favorably commented upon by the first sea lord, who has ordered that a copy be sent to the commander in chief, grand fleet.

This is a good example of how constructive criticism should be received.

Great as has been the benefit to the force commander of the work of the planning section, I am disposed to believe that its chief value has been in its tendency to establish mutual understanding as to methods of thought on military questions between ourselves and the admiralty.

The number of problems that were studied, and the suggestions which were proposed, undoubtedly had a profound effect upon the general agreements and coordination of activities between the various allies. It should be borne in mind, however, that the planning section did not begin its work until the first week of January, 1918, nine months after we entered the war, although I had recommended such action in May, 1917, eight months previous. Consequently, effective as was its work after it was established, much valuable time was lost in those early critical months, in which there was not available in London such a group of our experienced and highly efficient officers, familiar with the major lessons of the war, to assist in planning our activities and coordinating them fully with those of the various allies.

DEPARTMENT REFUSED TO PERMIT ENROLLMENT OF AMERICAN OFFICERS IN THE NAVAL RESERVE.

In my letter of January 7, 1920, which is the basis of the testimony that I am presenting, I also pointed out in paragraphs 70, 71, and 73, that during the first year of the war the department refused to permit me to enroll in the Naval Reserve capable American officers who had special knowledge and who offered their services; that the department refused to trust to my discretion any promotion of these officers, thereby doing a serious injustice to the men themselves by failing to recognize really distinguished service; and also causing me great embarrassment.

perform important services, and were frequently of experience much greater than their rank indicated, and with allied officers of much higher rank. Practically from my arrival abroad, I recommended to the department authorized to enroll in the Naval Reserve for work suitable Americans who were at the time abroad. These Americans, because of years of residence in Europe, were with European customs and languages and persons in a position to render the greatest service to our naval force, especially in positions on shore, which required no knowledge of naval duties but required exactly those which these men possessed preeminently, and which it was very difficult to find among the naval reserve officers in the United States.

Lieut. Gillmore, an ex-naval officer of wide European experience in dealing with European admiralities in connection with appliances, volunteered his services, and on April 14 the Navy authorized his provisional appointment as a member of the naval reserve. Lieut. Gillmore provided me with a force, and equipment, including typewriter and books, and himself paid the salaries of the stenographers in the early critical days of my activities, as the authority for such expenditure had not been granted by the Navy Department. He was the only reserve officer whom the Navy Department authorized me to enroll during the first year of the war.

In 1917, the naval attaché requested authority to enroll a man to handle the confidential work in his office.

I cabled requesting "general authority to enroll similar candidates for naval reserve force as may be useful for notifying department in each case."

The naval attaché received a cable stating:

Naval attaché.

The Navy Department and particularly that of the chief of Naval Intelligence, are of the opinion that patriotic Americans abroad can be used to the best advantage, and it is considered that employing them is preferable to commissions in the Naval Service.

NAVINTEL.

In a cable to the department I requested information of the department's action on "my request for authority to enroll candidates in the naval reserve. The services of these are urgently needed both for staff work here and in the field for officers afloat."

The Secretary of the Navy informed me:

Do not authorize enrollment in the naval reserve at present.

A cable received June 5, the Secretary stated:

Approve of all enrollment of commissioned personnel. You may employ necessary clerical assistance.

These assistants were, by the nature of the situation, to handle most secret communications and matters, and regulations, can not pass out of the hands of commissioned officers. It was practically essential, if my work was to be without great embarrassment, that reserve officers should not handle this class of work.

The idea of having enrolled officers is that as soon as enrolled in the Navy he comes under naval regulations, and is subject to disciplinary measures, can be court-martialed for desertion and is therefore under more efficient control and distinct status.

In July and August, as the work rapidly increased, a number of young Americans volunteered their services and came in to me. Five of them took up work immediately, handling communications and doing the necessary communication work. Another was put in charge of the secretarial work.

In a cable of August 12, 1917, I referred to this fact and requested authority to enroll six men in the naval reserve, stating:

Unless this is done, the services of most of these men will be lost to me. They naturally do not wish to go through the war as civilian appointees, and not so, as one or two of them already have opportunities for obtaining commissions in the American Army in Europe.

Two days later I received a dispatch in reply stating:

Necessary steps have been taken. Armed guard officer will inform you upon arrival.

There was no other information but that "necessary steps have been taken. Armed guard officer will inform you upon arrival."

At the time this cryptic message was not understood, but when the armed guard officer arrived 10 days later it was found that he brought with him the necessary forms for the enrollment of 12 officers and the necessary authority from the Bureau of Naval Affairs. Immediately upon receiving this authority eight men were enrolled in the naval reserve in London, and later one additional man was enrolled in London and three in Paris, all being employed on duty at the Paris or London headquarters, and thereby making it necessary to employ regular line officers so badly needed for other duties. Repeatedly throughout the following year I requested authority to enroll further officers in the reserve as the requirements grew, but received no such authority until March, 1918, and then only for a few officers.

PROMOTION OF OFFICERS.

Similarly with regard to the promotion of these reserve officers, the regular method of promoting officers in the naval reserve for duty in European waters was established until late in the war. In the meantime many of these officers, especially those naval defense in class 4, for whom no promotion could be made except by special recommendations, were rendering most valuable services in positions normally held by officers of higher rank. For many of them I considered it in the interests of the services that they should be recognized and rewarded and that they be promoted not only for the sake of the morale of the service, but also as an incentive to help to me, because of the greater facility it would give them in their relations with Allied officers of higher rank with whom they were dealing. The situation was especially aggravated among the personnel on duty abroad as they began to discover that many of the men with whom they had served in the United States and who remained on duty in the United States in more or less routine duties were being regularly promoted, sometimes one grade, sometimes two, while for the arduous and important service in the war zone

persons at all were being made at this period among them. For example, many aviation officers who rendered distinguished service in actual flying were recommended by me and these recommendations disapproved, although they had remained at home, were promoted by the department when they came to Europe a few months later were sent to the pilots who had had many months' experience in rendered most distinguished service in the war zone. I wrote in a letter of April 28, 1918, but no action was

taken. I sent the following cable, concerning the Admiral Benson, but the action I recommended was not

[Dispatch to be sent. Simben.]

1918
1918-19

On April 1, 1918, recommended Ensigns J. R. Ives and MacNamara Reserve Force, for promotion to rank of lieutenant (junior grade) in recognition of conspicuous service rendered. Ensign MacNamara was officially credited with seriously damaged enemy submarine on March 21, and made a successful attack against enemy submarine, but his capture due to no fault of his own. On June 8 our cable No. 9234 recommended two ensigns for promotion together with 16 other deserving officers. Of those recommended the only one promoted was Lieut. (junior grade) Reserve Force, attached to my headquarters to the exclusion of Ensign Ives for gallant conduct in war zone.

On August 29 again recommended Ensign J. J. Schieffelen, for promotion to lieutenant (junior grade) in recognition of his having destroyed enemy submarine off east coast of England August 9.

The spirit de corps and high standard of efficiency of U. S. Naval Reserve Force, urgently request that my recommendations for promotion be given in the face of the enemy be accorded prompt recognition. The granting the rank of lieutenant (junior grade), from the United States, as mentioned above, can not fail to cause a spirit of dissatisfaction which will ultimately break down the excellent esprit de corps now existing. This is particularly true in the case of Ensigns Ives and MacNamara, who were promoted in recognition of their conduct in the face of the enemy. (043730)

Sims.

On August 30, 1918, to the Secretary of the Navy, I wrote to him also what injustices were being done by not promoting those brave and efficient officers in the reserve and the following letters. [Reading:]

1918-19

AUGUST 30, 1918.

Dear Secretary: I should like to invite your personal attention to a matter which very intimately concerns the efficiency of one of the branches of the Navy, namely, the Naval Aviation Service. The young men of this service are performing their duties in a manner of which the Navy Department should be proud. They are risking their lives every time they make a flight. They are being killed at the rate of about one per day. They have received very high honors from the Allies with whom they are serving.

They are the Allies' hope of the future in this service, as they come from the fresh enthusiasm of a country that has not been at war for a long time as these people over here have been. It seems to me that for such conspicuous acts of gallantry they should be promptly rewarded. Some such reward is necessary to keep up the admirable spirit of the service. I am afraid that the treatment they are now receiving

2-16

can not but affect their morale. For the most part, they are carrying on from isolated stations, and something is necessary to keep up their enthusiasm.

It is for this reason that I have recently recommended by cable certain officers the rank of ensign for promotion to the grade of junior lieutenant.

I understand that it is a regulation or a policy of the department that all promotions shall be made only upon the recommendation of a certain board in Washington. I may be misinformed upon this subject, but the point I wish to make is in order that these rewards should have the effect that I believe to be necessary, that upon the recommendations made from this side that these young men be promoted without the slightest delay.

It would not be unprecedented at all, to entrust me with this power in the case of young men who perform these gallant actions. It certainly would be unprecedented to trust my judgment in this matter and to immediately promote these officers upon my telegraphic recommendation. It seems to me in the interests of getting along with the war, an exception might be made in the case of the commander of the forces over on this side.

I beg you to believe that I do not make this recommendation with any other view than to increase the efficiency of our naval aviation forces.

I like to believe that you would have sufficient confidence in my judgment and integrity to be sure that a privilege of this kind would not be abused.

In my cable of August 29, 1918, I recommended Ensigns MacNamara and Smith of the reserve force for promotion to junior lieutenant, in recognition of the service they have rendered. Both of these officers were officially credited with having seriously damaged an enemy submarine. Subsequently I again recommended other officers for promotion together with a number of other deserving cases. Of these I recommended only one promoted to lieutenant (junior grade), namely, Ensign of the reserve force, who is attached to my headquarters. I also recommended Ensign Schieffelen for promotion in recognition of having seriously damaged an enemy submarine off the east coast of England.

It is more particularly to be regretted that these officers are not promoted. The fact that officers are arriving on this side holding the rank of lieutenant of course can not fail to cause a great spirit of dissatisfaction and discontent. It can not fail to lower the enthusiasm and the morale of these splendid young men who are doing such excellent war service.

Similarly, with regard to reserve officers who were doing important work in London and Paris, I repeatedly recommended their promotion. In the case of a number of officers in London headquarters I recommended promotions on March 31 on their fitness reports. I cabled on July 15, requesting to know what action had been taken. Again, on July 17. I received no reply from the department. On August 2, I will read. [Reading:]

N-32-R/CS. 871-172.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., July 2, 1918.

To: Force commander, United States naval forces operating in European waters.
Subject: Promotion of officers recommended in reference (a).

Reference: (a) Cablegram to Bureau of Navigation No. 9622. (b) Cablegram to Bureau of Navigation No. 1335.

1. Receipt of the cablegram, references (a) and (b) recommending certain officers for promotion is acknowledged. The board for the assignment of higher rank to officers in the United States Naval Reserve Force has not had an opportunity to act on these recommendations.

2. The importance of assigning higher rank to officers deserving promotion is realized by the bureau, but owing to the immense amount of extra work incidental to the war which has had to be accomplished by an untrained staff it is impossible to act upon such recommendations with the dispatch that is desired.

3. As it is inevitable under present conditions that considerable time must elapse between the receipt of these recommendations and the day they can be acted upon, it is suggested that in the future such recommendations be made through telegraph mail channels. It is also desirable that a separate letter be submitted on each recommendation.

If separate letters are submitted the individual cases
without loss of time and with much more convenience to the

L. C. PALMER,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy;
Chief of Bureau.

N-10-ED-P. 31-9-1.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 2, 1918.

commanding United States naval forces, operating in European
reserve force, class 4.

in classes 1 and 2 of the Naval Reserve Force is provided
assigning to such officers running mates of the Regular Navy.
have as many officers of class 4 qualify for duties in class 2
transfer such officers to that class, whereupon they will be assigned
attain their promotion automatically.

certain promotion of class 4 officers, subject to the follow-
who have attained the age of 24 years, performing shore duty
the rank of lieutenant (j. g.) after 12 months active duty as
Foreign doing duty afloat should be required to qualify for
transferred to that class. The length of service required for
only upon the officer's ability to attain the qualification,
months' duty afloat. No promotions will be made above
until officers have qualified for duties afloat and been

to itself the right to promote or not to promote in any indi-
upon the ability of the officer concerned, dependent upon his

L. C. PALMER,
Rear Admiral United States Navy,
Chief of Bureau.

by the department that before any promo-
complete fitness reports must be submitted, and
the bureau would have to be furnished evidence of
of qualifications for promotion before such pro-
made. It was not until after the armistice that I
to make the promotions which I had been recom-
cases for nearly a year, and then only a certain
I recommended were authorized.

October, 1918, an officer who had recently been on
of Navigation was available for temporary duty
headquarters. This officer had been ordered to
the forces, but with instructions to make a study
situation in the forces and to submit a report thereon
of Navigation before reporting to me for such duty as
In the course of his studies he visited all of the
by us in the British Isles and many of those in
acquired a very intimate knowledge of the situation
under which the forces were operating.

completed his study and submitted his report. I
make a particular study of the subject of reserve
prepare for me, for submittal to the department, a letter
with regard to promotion of United States Naval Re-
personnel serving in the war zone." His report
under date of September 11, 1918, and he handed it
remark that before beginning his work, he had been of
that promotions should not be made by me, but should

be made in accordance with the policy set forth in the Navigation's letter of August 2, 1918, which I have just read, in which the bureau stated that it reserved to itself "The right to promote or not to promote in any individual case, dependent upon the ability of the officer concerned, dependent upon his record," and in the course of his investigations he had entirely changed his mind and was convinced that it was essential that the power to promote should be placed in my hands, and that he had therefore been directed to prepare a letter recommending that policy.

This incident illustrates perfectly the fact that, generally speaking, sounder decisions can be reached by those living in the atmosphere of the war zone than those who are far removed therefrom. In other words, it is safest to entrust to the commander in the field all discretion and all powers which can legally be so entrusted, and to repose trust in him rather than to attempt to control his actions from a headquarters far removed from the scene of his activities.

This letter is entirely too long to read, but I will insert it in the record and will merely state, for the present information of the committee, that it recognized fully the difficulties with which the Bureau of Navigation and the Navy Department were confronted in administering the Naval Reserve Force, and that it concurred in nearly all of the rules and policies laid down by the Bureau of Navigation, governing the appointment and promotion of officers in the reserve force, pointing out, however, how, in certain particulars these rules and policies operated to the disadvantage of officers serving abroad as compared with those serving at home. The letter includes certain specific recommendations regarding the placing in the hands of the commander of the European force of the power of appointment, promotion, and demotion of reserves officers, the policy of the bureau being strictly followed. The letter referred to follows:

SEPTEMBER 1, 1918.

From: Force commander.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Bureau of Navigation).

Subject: Policies with regard to the promotion of U. S. N. R. F. officers serving in the war zone.

1. A careful study and analysis of all the letters, instructions, circulars, and orders issued since the inception of the Naval Reserve Force, with particular regard to the appointment, classification, precedence, and promotion of officers, has been made by the force commander. It is noted that the bureau has repeatedly invited suggestions and recommendations; this letter contains certain comments, conclusions, and recommendations based on giving due regard in every case to the following considerations:

- (a) A vigorous prosecution of the war.
- (b) Fairness and justice to the personnel.
- (c) The present necessary policies with regard to naval personnel as a whole.
- (d) The naval personnel situation after the war.

2. The force commander has been greatly impressed by the magnitude of the bureau's task, the farsightedness that is in evidence throughout the bureau's painstaking efforts to achieve fairness to all, and the consistent effort to build up the reserve force with seagoing qualifications. The bureau's very obvious efforts are thoroughly appreciated.

3. While the force commander is concerned first of all with the vigorous prosecution of the war by the forces under his command, he desires to emphasize the fact that, as far as the recommendations contained in this letter are concerned, he has given much thought in such case to the possibility that the policy which, at the moment, may best serve military ends, may be detrimental to best serving them later in the future as well as the present is, therefore, carefully taken into account. The viewpoint of the European forces' viewpoint is considered. The relation to influence and authority entirely beyond its control is considered.

20th August, 1916, as established the reserve forces on general terms, so that all provisions admitted of great latitude in instructions for the administration and organization of the forces. In promulgating the establishment of the reserve force the Bureau of Navigation in all matters. The organization of the practical requirements and the needs of the service, so that the various classes in effect to-day are only after the passage of the act which created the reserve force to carry out a continuous reconstruction of policies. These were widely different from the policies of January, 1916, because the bureau has had to meet changing conditions and organized quickly, for the personnel was needed. The policy, and naturally turned to the naval districts. The naval districts and gave it initial training; the bureau gave certificates to the forces afloat gave, and are giving, further practical training. The trained personnel is taking place continuously in the services. The success has been great, and has been a close cooperation between the Bureau of Navigation and the forces on

change the policies to meet the changing conditions; the naval districts and to vessels in home waters are the forces operating against the enemy. The bureau has taken into consideration, but it is the opinion of the bureau that variation from the general policy is necessary to fit the conditions. The centralization has extended, generally speaking, only to the supervisors representing the bureau. Meanwhile, the forces have reached to a point where both in officers and men they are the best of the entire Navy immediately prior to the war. The forces operating in European waters approximately 1,000. These figures include none of the trans-Atlantic forces. The personnel under the command of the United States Navy in European waters. Six months hence, the personnel will have increased 50 per cent. Of the total number of officers, approximately 1,000. The remaining 1,000 are regulars and temporary

absorbed the National Naval Volunteers into the newly created force, stating however, "That during the present war the precedence of all officers of the Naval Reserve Force shall be as that of the Navy." This authority may, of course, be deleted, as the rules are not mandatory. The bill further specifies that if any changes shall be effected, the force commander has received a memorandum of July 22, 1918 drawn up pursuant to

the preceding paragraph, and such parts of the bill which are assumed to include all the policies of the Naval Reserve officer personnel

will relate to the various classes of reserve officer personnel in general

of the forces regarding the precedence and promotion, and to fit the conditions in the forces in Europe

of the forces regarding the precedence and promotion of the National Naval Volunteers are considered to fit the conditions excellently

which will be transferred to class 1, and the precedence from the date of their designation as class 2 officers. That the time an officer enters a higher rank, in or transferred to class 2, his rank will be at the bottom of that rank and grade, and he will be considered as such

There will be numerous cases in which an officer will be transferred to class 2, and of transfer to class 2 will be considered as such

will operate against the officer, and the lower down the list the officer is, the lower down the list he will be. The officer in Chesapeake Bay will have the same precedence as the officer in the North Sea. Furthermore, any class

4 for-general-service officer who has been doing duty on shore in the United States, and who receives no credit for this service when finally designated as class 4 for 1, and then promoted to class 2, as the precedence and promotion rules do not take into account his service in class 4 for general-service employment. This will be decidedly discouraging to a large number of officers who have been performing excellent service in various stations, frequently in hazardous billets. It is considered that some distinction should be made between the employment on shore of class 4 for-general-service officers in the United States, and those on shore duty with the fighting forces. These are entirely different, and the duties differ widely. It is not maintained that shore service is more arduous or more important, but it is more trying in every sense, and they feel that it is more intimately connected with fighting the enemy.

13. *Class 3 officers.*—The rules and policies regarding the promotion of officers in this class are considered to fit the conditions in the forces in Europe except in the matter of precedence.

14. *Class 4 officers.*—The rules and policies for precedence of class 4 officers are considered entirely satisfactory. There is no necessity for their having authority outside of their own special assignment to duty, and the rules for them have none. Attention has been invited in paragraph 11 to the fact that the rules for precedence and promotion for class 2 officers who have been transferred from class 4 for 1 are apparently at variance, and to the fact that no account is taken of the service performed by the class 4 for 1 officer during the time that he was a shore duty officer. The class 4 officer takes precedence from the date of his previous assignment to shore duty or rank.

Let it be assumed that an ensign, class 4 (general service) was given his rank May 1, 1917. (There are many ensigns on this station who were assigned at approximately that time. His date of precedence is then May 1, 1917. On May 1, 1918, it has been found possible to release him from duty at Dunkirk and send him to sea for training to qualify for class 4 for 1. He immediately ranks with the ensigns in the Navy and all ensigns of class 1 and class 2. His precedence is lower and lower during his period of training, so far as it concerns officers of the three classes just mentioned. By January 1, 1919, it is decided to recommend that he be designated as class 4 for 1. The recommendation is forwarded to the proper authorities, and, while he is awaiting action on this recommendation, his precedence falls lower. After two months, he receives notice that he has been designated as class 4 for 1 and his transfer to class 2 follows. He now takes precedence from the date of his transfer to class 2. Thus after nearly two years' service in Europe he finds himself below all ensigns of the Navy and all class 1 and class 2 officers. His original precedence has fallen two years, because he has not had the good fortune to be at home where he could be trained and made an ensign (T), or to have been at sea for training. His duty on shore in Europe has been necessary to the conduct of active operations, and the force commander could not release him from shore duty without loss to the effectiveness of the prosecution of the war. The two years this officer has spent on shore duty before at last finding himself at the foot of the class 2 list of ensigns, and the fact that to all ensigns in the Navy have given him no official recognition whatsoever, are advantages that are those of having added to his experience by doing work in naval activity that was, unfortunately for him, not at sea.

15. Not let it be assumed that an effort was made to promote this ensign while he was still ashore, and serving as a class 4 for-general-service ensign. For a long time the only rules that applied to such a case are those found on page 12 (4) (a) of the Regulations Governing the Organization and Administration of the Naval Reserve Forces, 1917 (issued in May, 1918). Prior to receipt of these regulations there were various circulars, etc. bearing on the subject. It should be noted that in none of these instructions has mention ever been made of the numerous bases in Europe from which the forces operate against the enemy. Naturally enough, the bureau's principal concern was of the naval districts and other shore establishments which were and are the sources of supply of new personnel to meet the ever-increasing demands for personnel. To date not a single letter from the bureau pertaining to policies regarding the promotion of the United States Navy Reserve Forces has mentioned personnel doing duty on a numerous active basis on the front line. What then is the policy applying to the promotion of a class 4 officer in Europe? In the absence of any mention of this particular problem it may be assumed that the rules relating to class 4 officers in naval districts apply, but no notice to that effect has ever been given. The conditions in the United States naval district and those in a base in Europe, from which operations are conducted against the enemy, are by no means analogous. All forces are told to make their recommendations in the fitness reports on the officers whom it is proposed to recommend for promotion. The officers recommended expected to hear the results of their recommendation. The officers recommended expected to hear the results of their recommendation. Only those who were promoted, after considerable delay, received a

... be restricted to the use of the cable, and was requested
... recommending officers for promotion, by letter only, and
... individual letters in each case are desired.

... does not desire that the preceding paragraph be con-
... adverse criticism of the bureau. He feels that the bureau
... could have been done under all the circumstances, but
... not been conducive to the betterment of the morale of
... as may well be imagined.

... the pamphlet of Regulations was received, the bureau's
... was received. The latter qualifies the former exten-
... announced in it.

... May 25, 1918, makes no mention of class 4 serving in
... of all previous announcements, is based absolutely on the
... is invited to paragraph 5, which reads:

... general policy outlined above, recommendations and sugges-
... are, however, requested, in order that any future
... in all districts."

... class 4 officers in Europe are to be promoted as such accord-
... and the force commander has never been so informed)
... established in Europe? The bureau's policy, and right-
... organization. The bases in Europe are changing and
... naval bases and stations in Europe after the close of the
... the stations and bases in Europe be assigned class 4 com-
... and how will it be done? If it is not intended to do
... policy with regard to class 4 officers in Europe?

... class 4 officers in Europe be promoted to fill vacancies
... a plan to be absolutely impracticable. Shore com-
... be definitely and permanently established any more
... a line of trenches or an ammunition depot behind the lines.

... necessary and important to-day, may be unnecessary and
... The force commander alone will be able to estimate
... complements essential from day to day to carry on the
... In May 1917, the naval forces in Europe consisted of a
... men; to-day there are 3,700 officers and 55,000 men.

... that there is no policy in effect that is applicable
... class 4 officers in Europe, other than the bureau alone will
... recommended for promotion shall be promoted, and

The bureau's pamphlet states (see p. 12, (5) (a)):

... in each rank in class 5 shall be established by the
... higher ranks may be given to fill these vacancies as out-

... of May 25, 1918, states that, "as there is no Naval
... class 5 reservist can not be assigned a running mate in this
... war aviation duties will be performed almost entirely by
... complement in the various grades has been established.

... from time to time," etc. The bureau's memoran-
... it pertains to class 5 officers, is precisely the same as the
... It is safe to assure, then, that the actual effect upon
... class of officers by the act of July 1, 1918, consists only in
... promotion by selection to officers of and above the rank
... provisions apply to the whole reserve force.

... officers in Europe since May, 1917. The number is
... 1919, the number will be about 2,000, provided the
... greater than has been anticipated. Up to the present time,
... in the various grades to make up the class 5 com-
... Neither has any information been received as to
... complement will be established. A policy has been an-
... which it is to be operated in order to be in effect, as a
... known. Therefore, so far as the force commander and
... are aware, there is not yet any policy in operation, other
... will decide which class 5 officers recommended for pro-
... which shall not. To date, the class 5 officers in Europe
... of any class of reserves who are actually fighting the
... casualties in battle, sustained by this class of officers are
... casualties of the Navy and all other classes of reserve officers

The casualties will become greater and greater as the northern bombing gains full fighting strength, and as the seaplane stations get into full operation. The operating life of an officer pilot in Europe is three months.

24. Had the gallant work of the class 5 officers, who (unfortunately for publicity) have been compelled to fly foreign-made planes, received the publicity that it deserves, it is felt that the subject of their promotion would have received proportionately more prompt and serious consideration.

25. Page 12 (3) of the bureau's pamphlet states: "Officers in class 3 promoted in accordance with the position they held on a merchant ship or auxiliary (table Art. 207)." This excellent rule, by which promotion is based on the position which the officer holds in the organization of which he is a part, should be applied as far as possible to class 5 officers—personnel in Europe, within reason, of course. A ship requires an organization. The bureau never assigns a captain with the rank of ensign, and nine other ensigns, to the complement of a 10,000-ton transport. Yet there are fighting organizations in Europe of which the head and all his officers are ensigns. Numerous anomalies in the naval flying forces in Europe are not conducive to morale, good organization, discipline or fighting efficiency. The splendid work of class 5 officers has been due to their universally high intelligence, keenness in their work, and their courage. Meanwhile, on account of their low rank, the naval service, of which they are a part, is subjected to continuous harassment and humiliation. There are many ensigns who have been placed by the enemy in positions that are filled by captains and majors in the various air forces in conjunction with whom they are fighting. Flying organizations, both tactical and administrative—are instituted in precisely the same manner as military fighting organizations. The platoon, the company, and the battalion each has its counterpart in the flying services. A thoroughly established system of things exists in all the allied flying forces. They promote their officers in the same manner as the bureau promotes the class 3 officers "in accordance with the position they hold." They no more consider assigning a sublieutenant to a major's position in flying service than do they consider assigning a sublieutenant to command a battalion of infantry.

It would not be the part of wisdom to jump ensigns into the grades of lieutenant or commander, even though they satisfactorily fill a fighting position which entitles them to this rank. However, any system of promotion for class 5 officers in Europe that is not established along the same general lines as the class 3 rule will be unsatisfactory and unsound. The bureau will apply the present rule 3 to the 20,000 class 3 officers; it must provide in meeting the gigantic demand involved in the Navy's operation of the various transports now being projected. A similar system should be applied, and immediately, to the promotion of class 5 officers in Europe.

26. From the present methods of promotion as applied to class 5 officers there have resulted many unreasonable and unfortunate situations. For example, there has been invariably long delay in receiving the bureau's action on recommendations. Some of the officers were, in the meanwhile killed, interned or captured. Among a number (18) of officers recommended in the past were Ives and McNamara, both of whom had received letters of recommendation from the Secretary of the Navy for gallantry in action with the enemy. Up to October 3 but one of the 18 officers had received the promotion recommended. Unfortunately, this one officer was stationed at the Naval Headquarters, London. It is a mere coincidence that this particular officer received his promotion. It is natural that many class 5 officers ascribe his good fortune to the fact that he was on duty at headquarters. On September 4, following receipt of the force command dispatch on the subject, Ensigns Ives and McNamara and one other officer were promoted by the bureau's cable. The remaining 14 officers are as yet unpromoted. The promotion of Lieut. Fallon, during his presence in the United States, created false impressions among a number of class 5 officers. Lieut. Fallon was recommended following distinguished conduct in action, for promotion to lieutenant (junior grade). He not only received his promotion to which he was entitled, but an additional promotion while in the United States. Meanwhile, his former colleagues, officers at the same station in England, who have been fighting the enemy, have remained ensigns.

27. The beneficial and stimulating effect of the prompt recognition of meritorious or gallant conduct is lost if the promotion proposed as the recognition of demerit, ability, courage, and fitness for higher rank, is delayed.

28. Numerous awkward situations have arisen due to the fact that newly promoted class 5 officers, with the rank of lieutenant (junior grade) must necessarily be assigned as second pilots with ensigns who have been in active service in Europe for so

The reserve officers in Europe have done little commensurate with the fact when it is considered that they are new to the naval way of taking summary action on recommendations. They have had much to discourage them, yet their opinion is the opinion of the force commander that it is incumbent upon the command to the manner of dealing with reserve officers. After four years at the Naval Academy, and rightfully so, in informing them of what can be done for them and the commander realizes the many difficulties in the bureau's way of doing the square thing by the reserve officers, and to the naval service. A great number of them are prominent and incumbent upon all to insure a solid service loyalty on the part of the reserve. One of the best ways to accomplish this is to make their welfare is being intimately and carefully looked out for. The reserve officers are the inspiring example of patient, careful, and thorough in their personal affairs by the regular establishment that the reserve officers should have.

Under the existing conditions, to the minds of the reserve officers, the reserve officers involved in taking action on recommendations for their promotion regarding their appointment, classification, and promotion would be imagined, been most mystifying to the majority of the reserve officers. Instructions have been necessary in order that the reserve officers be kept up to the minute, and by the time many instructions are issued, they are not applicable, or further instructions are announced to complete indefinite features, or to qualify other instructions. It takes approximately six weeks to two months for the reserve officers to get to the department and receive a reply.

The reserve officers are on the front. Conditions on the front change rapidly. The reserve officers must meet the conditions and must meet them promptly. The details of policy can meet conditions on the front, and carrying them out on the front. Making the details of policy on the front, and carrying them out on the front. Operation policies on the front must be up to the minute. The Army has found it absolutely necessary to have the fighting is going on, and the authority

The Bureau of Navigation is just as desirous that the methods of the details pertaining to the promotion of reserve officers be up to the minute. The following is an extract from the Bureau of Navigation.

The higher rank to officers deserving promotion is fully justified. The immense amount of extra work in the bureau of the reserve officers had to be accomplished by an untrained force, it is necessary to have recommendations with the dispatch that is desirable. The present conditions that considerable time must elapse between the time of recommendations and the day they can be acted upon, it is necessary that such recommendations be made through the regular

It is to mention that while it is undoubtedly not feasible to have confirmation during the continuance of the war, it is necessary that a number of class 1 officers was not deferred during the war in order that the other classes of reserves might feel the same. It is not fair to the other classes of reserves to assume that the two months' retainer pay that goes with confirmation, is a selfishness in too many ways to warrant that assumption. The reserve officers can not be altered now, it is important to note that the reserve officers are familiar and one that inevitably appears in the confirmation although it is well known that discrimination is mentioned in order that the necessity for improving the reserve officers may be emphasized.

After giving the entire subject mature consideration, and after giving the relations of the personnel situation to the reserve officers, the following policies with regard to the reserve force officer-personnel in Europe are strongly recommended. It is urged that they be put into effect at the earliest

(a) Upon receipt of the new Bureau of Navigation's circular with re-pointment of reserve officers, appointment authority will be established and appointments consummated in Europe, the instructions contained in being followed exactly.

(b) Designation of reserve officers, as of class 4 for 1, and class 4 for 3 (as from time to time) will be made in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(c) The transfer of officers from class 4 to class 3, and from class 4 for 1 and from class 3 to class 2 (as necessary from time to time) will be effected following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(d) Appointment, promotion, and demotion of class 3 officers will be made in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(e) Promotion and demotion of class 4 officers will be done in Europe, following the policies and the spirit of the Bureau of Navigation's instructions.

(f) The promotion and demotion of class 1 officers and of such class 2 officers formerly National Naval Volunteers will be done only by the Bureau of Navigation.

(g) The promotion and demotion of class 2 officers, except those who were transferred to this class from National Naval Volunteer status, will be done in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(h) The promotion and demotion of class 5 officers will be done in Europe, following the spirit of the general policies with regard to reserve personnel, and upon the same basis, the complements to be established in Europe and varied from time as necessary, to meet the operating policies of the fighting forces.

(i) The promotion authority established in Europe will not extend beyond the rank of lieutenant commander, and promotion will always be made one rank at a time. In the staff corps, in which a grade may include more than one rank, promotion will be made so that one rank only will be the amount of the advance at any one time.

(j) Promotion will follow only in the cases in which all qualifications will be unquestionably established, and the promotion authority in Europe will be exercised conservatively.

(k) Every effort will be made in Europe gradually to replace class 4 officers serving afloat, by class 2 officers, and to send the class 4 officers—thus releasing them for training and ultimate transfer when qualified, to class 2.

(l) The administration of all personnel affairs of class 3 officers will be done in Europe.

(m) The Bureau of Navigation will be promptly notified of the appointment, promotion, demotion, and transfers between classes, of all officers.

(NOTE.—The foregoing policies relate only to United States Naval Reserve personnel under the command of the commander, United States naval forces, in Europe.)

34. There are no legal obstacles whatsoever in the way of the accomplishment of the foregoing proposed policies.

35. *Administrative machinery necessary to carrying out proposed policies.*—To carry out the foregoing proposed policies, the following would be necessary:

(a) Establish an appointment division in the personnel section of the United States naval headquarters in Europe.

The head of this division should be a lieutenant commander of either the Navy or Naval Reserve, class 1. He should have had some legal experience, be broad-minded, and should be tactful and patient in dealing with reserve personnel. He should be satisfactory to the Bureau of Navigation.

NOTE.—The force commander nominates Lieut. Donald Craig, U. S. Navy (class 1) for this duty. This officer is about to be advanced to the position of lieutenant commander.

(b) The head of the appointment division should have enrollment and record authority, and should have authority to sign appointments, promotions, etc., in the name of the Bureau of Navigation over the phrase "By direction." The same applies to all more assistants in the division.

(c) He should keep in close touch with the Bureau of Navigation (for the force commander), and should also keep in continuous touch with all conditions on this subject.

(d) All appointments, changes in classes, designations, etc., should be of the same nature as those used in the bureau.

(e) It is suggested that the bureau send an officer who has had experience in the reserve division (officers) for temporary duty at naval headquarters to assist in the appointment section in smooth running order.

(f) The bureau should be furnished a copy of every appointment, oath, and discharge, designation, etc., accomplished by the office here, to insure that its record is complete.

the staff of the flag officer commanding base 29 (Cardiff, Wales) and shall be the supervision of the personnel of the class 3 reserve on his station, his position and duties being analogous to those of a superintendent reserve.

The commander will establish a personnel board at his headquarters, and all appointments will be made except on the recommendation of this board, approved by the commander. The officers on the board (with the exception of the head of the board) will be of the Regular Navy.

Without the bureau's approval of the policies and practice proposed in this plan will be initiated and put into effect without the bureau's approval in each case.

As a telegraphic approval of the policies proposed is requested in order that the commander may proceed to carry out this plan at the earliest possible

WM. S. SIMS.

to say in connection with that subject that there was a personal in my request to be allowed either to enroll a number of reserve officers over there or to be allowed to procure certain limitations.

When on business with an admiralty abroad and with a number of business firms that we had to do business with, it was to have men who knew the ropes, who were accustomed to the thing, and the men referred to in my dispatches as business men who had been doing business on the coast for years, who had personal associations with the people we got in contact with, and who could have been of the greatest use to us: say men of 40 or 45 years of age; men who were worth from \$10,000 to \$20,000 and \$25,000 a year, who were willing to come into the office and give us the benefit of their experience and advice, and to work for us. The Navy Department would not allow these men to be enrolled, saying that we ought to get them in a civil capacity. Well, a red-blooded American would not do that sort of thing, and he simply promptly goes to the American Army and gets enrolled there. He wants to be a soldier and wants to it for his future, etc. That was all

the promotion of young reserves that we had over there doing more fighting than any other of the American forces on either side. Those were the aviation fellows. They were at an outlying station, 20 miles from the nearest village, and they were every day, having a loss on the average of 1 to 1½. These men were doing splendid stunts reported to us by the pilots with whom they were associated. All I wanted was to make that man immediately a lieutenant. But it could

That is an authority that is very commonly given to a man in the field. It is called promotion on the field of battle. When I refused permission to do it, but the people in Washington had not been to the front at all, had not risked their lives, and were promoted and came out there with superior equipment that I wanted to promote.

The reason why I wanted to employ those very experienced men in London in the naval service was to get them into a position that gives them a pass to all the activities of the admiralty, etc., that you could not expect to get a man in civilian clothes.

TOTAL PERSONNEL IN EUROPE.

Before concluding these remarks on the question of the personnel provided me by the department for the administration of our office and for the representation of our Navy Department with the Allies, I should like to invite your attention a moment to the actual number of officers that were on duty at different periods throughout the war, at the naval headquarters in Europe and in the European waters, and also to the amount of work that had to be accomplished. I have before me a table, which I will include in the record, which shows the approximate number of officers and men on duty in Europe and in European waters at different periods during the war, together with a statement of the number of vessels and shore stations which were under my command in European waters at these periods.

Table I shows the number of personnel at naval headquarters in London the first of each month during 1917 and at the beginning of each quarter during 1918. This table will show that, while late in the war the staff available became sufficient for handling the problems we had to face, the number was pitifully insufficient during the critical period in the first half of the war, when it was vitally necessary that our preparations should be pushed with the utmost energy and that we should coordinate at once our activities with those of the Allies. This table will also show the long delays in making the weight of the United States Navy felt in the war because of the department's inaction in those early months so far as cooperating with the Allies was concerned.

Several tables produced by Admiral Sims are here printed as follows:

Officer personnel on duty at United States Naval Headquarters, London, England, 1917-Nov. 11, 1918.

THE

¹ Office of naval attaché: 1 line officer, 1 pay officer, 1 medical officer.

² 2 armed guard officers on brief temporary duty.

³ 1 armed guard officer on temporary duty.

⁴ 1 armed guard officer on temporary duty.

⁵ Naval attaché's office increased by 1 naval constructor, and 1 officer on special ordnance inspection.

⁶ Increase due chiefly to transfer of aviation headquarters from Paris.

NOTE.—Following is explanation of meaning of figures in above columns: (1) Regular officers sent from United States by department for this duty; (2) reserve officers sent from United States by department for this duty; (3) regular officers ordered by Admiral Sims to this duty; (4) reserve officers enrolled in United States by department for this duty; (5) regular officers ordered by Admiral Sims from other forces for this duty.

Data not available for year 1918, but a small percentage of increases were ordered for specific at

TOTAL UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS IN EUROPE.

month by month for 1917 the number of vessels that were available and the same information quarter by quarter for 1918. This table shows that the weight was not really thrown into the war so far as the Navy was concerned in 1918. As I have already pointed out it was primarily the department's failure to have our forces prepared when war began that has delayed cooperation with the Allies during the six or eight months that the delay must be attributed.

Arrival of forces in European waters.

| Date | Headquarters | In force | Total |
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UNITED STATES NAVAL PERSONNEL IN EUROPE

Number of officers on my staff, the number of ships and stations under command, and the total number of naval personnel abroad in each quarter of 1917 and 1918.

Forces at headquarters compared with total number

| Date | Number of officers on staff | Number of ships and stations | | | Total of naval officers | | | Total enlisted personnel | | Total personnel | |
|------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|-------|-------------------------|--------|-------|--------------------------|--------|-----------------|--------|
| | | Ships | Shore stations | Total | Headquarters | Forces | Total | Headquarters | Forces | Headquarters | Forces |
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¹ Estimate

VOLUME OF CORRESPONDENCE CARRIED ON BY UNITED STATES HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE.

The rapid increase in the number of forces and in the administrative work thereby involved can well be imagined. I would submit for the record at this point a series of tables showing the growth in the volume of correspondence and cables handled monthly during 1917 and 1918. It will be noted from the tables that during the month of July, 1918, a total of 353 letters and 268 cables were sent and received from my headquarters. These figures increased greatly in the succeeding months, and by the time of the armistice we were handling daily over a thousand individual pieces of correspondence. Thus in the month of September, 1918, alone 19,275 cables passed through my headquarters. Nearly 8,000 letters were received and 7,000 letters sent, making over 30,000 communications that were handled during this one month.

GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORK AT NAVAL HEADQUARTERS.

The following tables have been prepared in order to show the rate of growth of the number of correspondence and dispatches passing through Admiral Sims's headquarters.

The number of papers handled monthly has grown from an average of 700 per month in the second quarter of 1917 to an average of nearly 15,000 per month in the second quarter of 1918.

In July, 1917, an average of 22 letters and 24 dispatches were received or sent daily. Three months later these averages had increased to 60 in the case of letters and 65 in the case of dispatches, making a total of 125 papers handled daily. In January the daily average had grown to 151 letters and 131 cables, or a total of 282; in July the numbers were 224 letters and 203 cables handled daily, and in July 353 letters and 268 cables daily.

The accompanying graphs will illustrate the rate of growth in months and quarters. In the first nine months that Admiral Sims worked in Europe a total of 25,160 papers passed through the headquarters. In July, 1918, alone 19,275 papers were received or sent, while on August 1 a total of approximately 125,000 papers in the form of

MEMORANDUM ON THE WORK OF THE FILES.

The following statistical data has been prepared to illustrate the work done by the central registry.

The first table shows the number of letters and cables handled by Vice Admiral Sims and his staff, month by month, from April 1917 to July 1918.

The second table shows the average number of papers handled daily during each month.

The third table gives data concerning the methods used in the handling of papers.

Number of papers handled monthly, 1917.

| Letters. | | | Dispatches. | | | Total. |
|----------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|--------|
| In. | Out. | Total. | In. | Out. | Total. | |
| 110 | 80 | 190 | 70 | 80 | 150 | 340 |
| 190 | 100 | 290 | 190 | 220 | 410 | 700 |
| 250 | 230 | 480 | 260 | 310 | 570 | 1,050 |
| 300 | 310 | 1,000 | 480 | 580 | 1,060 | 1,480 |
| 380 | 510 | 1,090 | 480 | 580 | 1,060 | 2,150 |
| 720 | 640 | 1,370 | 620 | 720 | 1,340 | 2,710 |
| 920 | 900 | 1,820 | 900 | 1,130 | 2,030 | 3,910 |
| 1,230 | 1,300 | 2,710 | 1,230 | 1,560 | 2,790 | 5,500 |
| 1,925 | 2,075 | 4,000 | 1,490 | 1,820 | 3,310 | 7,310 |
| 6,415 | 6,335 | 12,750 | 5,580 | 6,430 | 12,290 | 25,060 |

Number of papers handled monthly, 1918.

| Letters. | | | Dispatches. | | | Total. |
|----------|--------|--------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|
| In. | Out. | Total. | In. | Out. | Total. | |
| 2,320 | 2,370 | 4,700 | 1,860 | 2,210 | 4,070 | 8,770 |
| 2,530 | 2,250 | 4,800 | 2,010 | 2,420 | 4,430 | 9,230 |
| 2,745 | 3,020 | 5,765 | 3,354 | 3,766 | 7,120 | 12,885 |
| 3,572 | 3,150 | 6,722 | 2,840 | 3,252 | 6,092 | 12,814 |
| 3,528 | 3,381 | 6,909 | 3,150 | 3,363 | 6,513 | 13,422 |
| 4,437 | 4,275 | 8,712 | 3,958 | 4,664 | 8,622 | 17,334 |
| 5,863 | 5,097 | 10,960 | 3,867 | 4,447 | 8,314 | 19,274 |
| 25,025 | 23,543 | 48,568 | 21,039 | 24,122 | 45,161 | 93,729 |

Number of papers handled quarterly.

| Letters. | | | Dispatches. | | | Total. |
|----------|--------|--------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|
| In. | Out. | Total. | In. | Out. | Total. | |
| 530 | 470 | 1,020 | 520 | 610 | 1,130 | 2,150 |
| 1,470 | 1,470 | 3,140 | 1,440 | 1,710 | 3,150 | 6,290 |
| 4,195 | 4,395 | 8,590 | 3,620 | 4,510 | 8,130 | 16,720 |
| 6,415 | 6,335 | 12,750 | 5,580 | 6,830 | 12,410 | 25,160 |
| 7,625 | 7,640 | 15,265 | 7,224 | 8,396 | 15,620 | 30,885 |
| 11,537 | 10,816 | 22,343 | 9,948 | 11,279 | 21,227 | 43,570 |
| 5,863 | 5,097 | 10,960 | 3,867 | 4,447 | 8,314 | 19,274 |

Average daily number of papers handled, 1917.

| Letters. | | | Dispatches. | | | Total. |
|----------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|--------|
| In. | Out. | Total. | In. | Out. | Total. | |
| 5.5 | 4.0 | 9.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 17.0 |
| 6.1 | 5.1 | 11.2 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 13.2 | 24.2 |
| 9.3 | 7.7 | 16.0 | 8.7 | 10.3 | 19.0 | 35.0 |
| 11.6 | 10.4 | 22.0 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 24.3 | 47.3 |
| 18.7 | 16.5 | 35.2 | 15.5 | 18.7 | 33.2 | 69.4 |
| 24.3 | 21.3 | 45.6 | 20.6 | 24.0 | 44.6 | 90.2 |
| 29.7 | 31.0 | 60.7 | 29.0 | 36.5 | 65.5 | 126.2 |
| 45.0 | 45.3 | 90.3 | 41.0 | 52.0 | 93.0 | 183.3 |
| 62.0 | 67.0 | 129.0 | 48.0 | 58.7 | 106.7 | 235.7 |
| 211.2 | 208.3 | 419.5 | 163.4 | 224.6 | 408.0 | 827.5 |

Average daily number of papers handled, 1918.

| Month. | Letters. | | | Dispatches. | | |
|---------------|----------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|--------|
| | In. | Out. | Total. | In. | Out. | Total. |
| January..... | 75.2 | 76.4 | 151.6 | 60.0 | 71.4 | 131.4 |
| February..... | 91.0 | 80.0 | 171.0 | 71.7 | 86.3 | 158.0 |
| March..... | 88.5 | 97.4 | 185.0 | 108.6 | 121.4 | 230.0 |
| April..... | 119.0 | 105.0 | 224.0 | 94.6 | 108.4 | 203.0 |
| May..... | 113.8 | 109.0 | 222.8 | 101.6 | 108.4 | 210.0 |
| June..... | 147.9 | 142.5 | 290.4 | 131.9 | 155.4 | 287.3 |
| July..... | 189.1 | 164.4 | 353.5 | 124.7 | 143.0 | 267.7 |

Total number separate pieces of correspondence in files, 1917.

Mar. 1.....
Number of main groups of subjects.....
Subsubjects groups.....
Number of folders or subjects.....
Average number of papers to folder.....
Secret file:
 Number of folders.....
 Number of papers.....

Comprising correspondence and dispatches relating to: Ship movement operations, codes and call signs, northern mine barrage; question of policy program, fuel oil situation, interallied naval council, enemy intelligence, etc.

Total number of separate pieces of correspondence in files, 1918.

August 1.....
Number of main groups of subjects.....
Submarine subjects groups.....
Number of folders or subjects.....
Average number of papers to folders.....
Secret files:
 Number of folders.....
 Number of papers.....

Comprising correspondence and dispatches relating to: Ship movement operations, codes and call signs, northern mine barrage; questions of policy program, fuel oil situation, interallied naval council, enemy intelligence, etc.

ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMMAND.

As a further indication of the magnitude of the task imposed on these headquarters in Europe, I will present for the record a chart showing the organization of the forces in European waters. This will give an idea of the complexity and wide variety of questions involved in the command of these forces can be gathered merely by a glance at the chart.

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE.

For the information of the committee, I will also present for the record at this point a copy of a memorandum which was drafted in August, 1918, for the information of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives then making an inspection tour abroad, which explains the function of each section of the headquarters and covers the general operations of the forces under my command at that time.

medium referred to is as follows:)

PLAN OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN EUROPEAN WATERS, PLAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS' HEADQUARTERS.

Memorandum of Admiral Sims' staff, August 3, 1918. Prepared for Naval Committee of Congress on tour of inspection abroad.]

ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS.

The predominant naval effort in this war is British, due to the size and range of the British Navy, and since the British Navy is controlled from the Admiralty, Admiral Sims selected London as the location of his headquarters for directing the participation of the United States Navy in European waters.

In a belligerent country, it is but natural that the predominant national effort is centered in its armies; as a result the French Navy has undoubtedly not been able to expand to any considerable degree during the

war. Paris and Rome are the medium of communication between the ministries of marine in France and Italy, and they keep him in touch with the naval situation in these countries. The Admiral makes frequent trips to Paris and an occasional trip to Rome. Our naval attachés in Holland and Belgium keep Admiral Sims constantly in touch with all informa-

tion. Telephonic communication between the British and French Admiralties. The French Admiralty keeps an Admiral with a staff on duty in London in contact with our staff.

The British Admiralty includes a highly efficient intelligence department; all important naval information is made available to Admiral Sims. It is therefore unnecessary for Admiral Sims' organization to collect information; it must and does include a small intelligence department for collating, digesting, and disseminating information.

Due to the congested condition of the Admiralty offices it was decided to establish Admiral Sims' headquarters near the embassy.

The daily conferences of the naval staff at the Admiralty, and the Admiral's staff keeps in close touch with the corresponding staffs.

For communications between the Admiralty and the United States Navy, to establish a liaison service a British naval officer assigned to the Admiralty has an office at the Admiralty and a desk at Admiral Sims' headquarters. Officers of the Admiralty desiring any information from or consultation with Admiral Sims' staff are enabled to do this through this liaison officer. Officers of Admiral Sims' staff are enabled to quickly obtain information from the Admiralty.

Telegraph wires have been installed between the Admiralty and the United States Naval headquarters.

A committee consisting of the representatives of France, Great Britain, and the United States, meets frequently in London or Paris to discuss the progress of the naval campaign and particularly the disposition

of the naval service, which is a team by itself, is, of course, to coordinate the efforts of the various navies. Admiral Sims believed from the beginning, however, that the way to throw the weight of the United States Navy into the war was to use its available units to strengthen the weak spots in the Allied fleet and to conduct a more vigorous conduct of the war already so thoroughly

being conducted. Much wasted effort and time if any attempt had been made to operate it entirely with United States Naval forces. Various naval forces have been rendered available by the cooperation of the best location for them has been discussed with the other navies, and the disposition has been the result of

Admiral Sims may be considered the advanced headquarters of the United States Navy in the field. The Department deals only with Admiral Sims' headquarters. Admiral Sims in turn directs and coordinates the work of all of the United States Naval forces in the general command.

All groups, wherever located, report regularly to Admiral Sims concerning activities and operations, their condition as regards material, and supplies, needs, and their plans, together with recommendations or suggestions for plans or policies. Admiral Sims in turn keeps the Department informed by reports of the activities of all the forces under his command. Daily matters of importance or of current interest are handled by telegraph or cable.

UNITED STATES NAVAL HEADQUARTERS—EUROPE.

In order to carry out the organization and meet the demands outlined above, Admiral Sims' headquarters is divided into various sections. The following is a list of the sections with very brief outlines of their functions.

1. *Chief of Staff*.—The Chief of Staff handles only important questions of plans and policies and disposition of forces, and renders decisions on questions referred to the various sections of the Staff.

2. *Planning Section*.—The Planning Section is composed of three Captains and one Lieutenant Colonel of the Marines, all of War College training, who have administrative duties. It is their mission to keep themselves informed of the general situation, to carry on a constant study thereof, and to prepare and submit studies covering proposed future operations or changes in present operations and to recommend whenever in their opinion these are advisable.

Whenever new problems are encountered, the Planning Section is asked to make a comprehensive study of them before decisions are taken.

The Planning Section works in close cooperation with the corresponding Section of the Operations Division of the British Admiralty.

In addition to making studies of problems and preparing plans for future operations, the Planning Section also fulfills the function of a critic of the organization as it exists in effect in the forces.

3. *Operations Section*.—The Operations Section handles the convoying of the United States Navy and United States Army shipping, keeps track of the location of United States Naval and merchant ships and, in close cooperation with the British Admiralty, acts upon all cablegrams dealing with the routing of convoys and the assignment of escorts. The Operations Section prepares all orders to forces which are to be employed.

The Operations Section also has charge of the antisubmarine work and the coordination of submarine chasers.

4. *Material Section*.—The Material Section keeps itself informed of the requirements of all forces as regards supplies of all description, including money, fuel oil, food, and clothing, and repair materials.

It also supervises all financial dealings with foreign Governments in connection with expenditures for the Navy. Arrangements have been made with the allied Governments by which our ships can put in to any of their naval bases and obtain supplies just as if they belonged to the Navy of the country. Commanding officers of such vessels sign the necessary receipts covering the supplies they receive, which finally reach the Admiralty of the Ministry of Marine, as the case may be, or are referred to United States Naval Headquarters for auditing and reimbursement.

5. *Repair Section*.—The Repair Section keeps in touch with the needs of the forces in the matter of overhauling and repair, arranges with the different allied Governments for repair and docking facilities and keeps the department informed in regard to the material which must be provided from the United States.

6. *Ordnance Section*.—The Ordnance Section keeps in close touch with the requirements of all forces as regards guns, ammunition, depth charges, and ordnance of all kinds. It also follows closely mining operations and cooperates with the British Admiralty and with the Mine Force in carrying them out.

7. *Medical Section*.—The Medical Section has general supervision over the naval hospitals, keeps informed of the location of all sick and injured, and of the medical situation and arranges to have them cared for in allied hospitals wherever they may be treated in our own naval hospitals. There are at present three naval hospitals on commission in Europe; one at Strathpeffer, Scotland, one at Queenstown, Ireland, and one at Brest, France. In these, and in certain Red Cross hospitals devoted entirely to naval use, there are more than 3,000 beds.

8. *Aviation Section*.—Before the Naval Aviation Service could begin operations, it was necessary to establish aviation stations, to equip them, provide planes, and to train the personnel. This work was placed under the direction of Capt. H. I. Cone. Capt. Cone established headquarters at Paris and the aviation section of the Administrative Staff has had as its chief function the work of assisting Capt. Cone in every way, and particularly by establishing the closest cooperation with the British Naval Aviation Service.

ships that are being built and equipped are ready for operation under the command of the commanders in the different areas, who direct their operations with surface naval craft. There are at present 27 United States ships in England, Ireland, France, and Italy, with a total personnel of 10,000 men and other assistants.

Since the time of all officers of the various sections of the staff is taken up by their immediate duties and the current business, it is necessary for the single purpose of obtaining and furnishing information to affect the work of the various sections. For example, the Intelligence Section studies the movement of all enemy submarines, studies their operations, keeps the Operations Section informed of the latest information so that convoys may be safely routed and handled. The Intelligence Section call upon the Intelligence Section to collect and prepare information of subjects.

The subjects received are as follows:

1. The percentage of sinkings by submarines in the various areas.

2. The number of shipping passing into the English Channel to that

3. The information available as to engagements of United States naval forces and the results of these actions?

4. The Intelligence Section is constantly engaged in making summaries of information received and other data in convenient form for the information of the

5. The Intelligence Section also transmits all important information received and the results of investigations to the department, to Army Headquarters, and to the Navy Department in close cooperation with the Intelligence Division of the Army. An officer, who is especially detailed, spends a great part of his time in the Intelligence Division. In this way it is possible to obtain information available concerning enemy submarines and the methods of attack and operations of the enemy, and information which is obtained by the admiralty from prisoners or from other sources.

6. The Disbursing Section has general supervision over all the personnel, and those required for the administration of the Navy Department.

7. The Communication Section arranges all lines of radio, cable, and telegraph communication between the forces operating under Admiral Sims' command. The cable and telegraph office established at the Navy Department is operated by United States naval personnel. There are also cable and telegraph lines of communication throughout Europe. During the month of June the average traffic in received and transmitted letter code groups each 24 hours.

8. The Intelligence Section handles in Navy codes and ciphers.

9. The Intelligence Section also works in close cooperation with the Signal Division of the Army in the use of codes, ciphers, and radio communications of the Navy. Admiral Sims and looks after the distribution of codes and ciphers to the various radio stations in France and the United States are also in charge of dispatches, and a system is being perfected for the transmission of the breakdown or cutting of the trans-Atlantic radio receiving station is installed at headquarters, which is in communication with the United States, France, Germany, and Italy.

10. The Intelligence Section is a member of the Inter-Allied Signal Conference and of the Inter-Allied Signal Commission, which meet quarterly for the purpose of administering the signal service of all the allied forces.

11. The Intelligence Section is also in close touch with the admiralty and Royal Navy in the distribution and supervision of all radio material for naval vessels under Admiral Sims' command. Radio telephones and United States naval vessels are being established at convenient shipping points.

12. The Personnel Section. The Personnel Section, under the direction of the Intelligence Section, keeps a record of the location of all officers and men in Europe, and provides transportation for all officers and men.

13. The Intelligence Section has 1,000 enlisted men and 3,542 officers of the Navy serving in the Intelligence Section. There are now over 250 vessels, including destroyers, under Admiral Sims' command. Twenty-five other vessels are designated or en route.

This section also administers the handling of all correspondence and the mail service for the forces in European waters. A complete card index of men serving in European waters is maintained, and many thousands of letters are forwarded each week to the proper addresses. This section also supervises the clerical staff at headquarters, and administers the headquarters buildings.

13. *Administrative section.*—All correspondence and telegraphic communications pass through one office, whose function is the coordination of the work of the sections. This office, directed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, is thus able to make sure that the members of the staff do not work at cross purposes. When telegrams originating in one section affect other sections, they are referred to the proper section before being sent out.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS.

United States naval forces operating in European waters may be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) The force based on Queenstown handles certain merchant convoys to France and to the United Kingdom and also fast British liners carrying United States troops. This force is composed of 24 destroyers, 2 tenders, and 3 tugs. Two destroyers of this force are temporarily assigned to duty at Plymouth with marine chasers, and one is in the United States for the renewal of her boiler.

(b) The force based on the French coast escorts troop ships into the French ports and out to sea, assists the French in escorting coastal convoys up and down the coast and across the channel to England, and aids the French in keeping the channels clear of mines. This force consists of 33 destroyers, 16 yachts, 9 minesweepers, 5 tugs, 4 repair ships, 1 barrack ship, 2 barges, and 1 tug which is temporarily assigned to duty in the Azores.

(c) The force based on Gibraltar works with the British in escorting allied troops in and out of the Mediterranean. This force consists of 2 scout cruisers, 5 or 6 Coast Guard cutters, 5 gunboats, and 10 yachts. In addition 1 destroyer and 1 boat of this force are now in the United States for a general overhaul.

(d) At Plymouth, England, there are 41 submarine chasers with 2 destroyer tenders. These are engaged in hunting submarines in the entrance to the English channel. There is also 1 submarine from Berehaven at Plymouth on temporary duty.

(e) At Berehaven are six submarines with a submarine tender engaged in hunting enemy submarines off the entrance to the Irish Sea and the English Channel.

(f) At Corfu are 36 submarine chasers with a tender, which are engaged in hunting submarines in the Adriatic Sea.

(g) With the Grand Fleet are five battleships operating as a battle squadron.

(h) The mine force, based on Inverness and Invergordon, is working with the British in the laying of mines in the North Sea. This force is composed of 10 minesweepers, 1 repair ship, and 2 tugs.

(i) The force based on the Azores is engaged in patrolling in the vicinity of the Azores to keep the route clear in order that our submarine chasers and other ships may safely use the port for coaling and obtaining supplies while en route to Europe. This force is composed of four submarines, one gunboat, one monitor, two yachts, and a marine detachment on shore. There is also one tug from the Brest force on temporary duty at the Azores.

(j) There is a fleet of merchant ships engaged in carrying coal for the United States Army from England to France, which are under Admiral Sims's general command. Such ships have been commissioned or orders have been given for their commission.

(k) There are at Southampton four cross-channel transports engaged in carrying troops across the channel. These are commissioned ships under Admiral Sims's command.

(l) At Murmansk, Russia, there is one cruiser cooperating with the allied Russian Navy.

(m) At Genoa there are two tugs, which have been placed at the disposition of the Italian Government.

(n) At Liverpool there are two tankers.

While the United States Navy is doing its bit and doing it well, a sense of proportion must not be lost. Our effort is small compared with that of our Allies.

In this connection the following approximate percentages are of interest as a comparison between the naval effort of the allied powers. The percentage of various types of vessels engaged in the antisubmarine campaign in British and eastern Atlantic is about as follows:

| | Great Britain. | France. | United States. |
|----------|----------------|-----------|----------------|
| | Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. |
| | 80 | 6 | 14 |
| | 78 | 17 | 5 |
| in craft | 86 | 11 | 3 |

percentages give a similar comparison of the naval situation in the

| | Great Britain. | France. | Italy. | Japan. | United States. |
|----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|
| | Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. | Per cent. |
| | 27 | 38 | 26 | 7 | 2 |
| | 13 | 37 | 50 | | |
| in craft | 22 | 66 | 4 | | 8 |

the Fleet Great Britain has about 91 per cent of the major fighting forces
the United States 9 per cent.
number of all patrol craft operating against enemy submarines in British
water waters, the American patrol forces constitute less than 5 per cent
water. In the Mediterranean the United States supplies 5 per cent of
the
between the naval aviation effort of Great Britain and the United
wing data is of interest:
the had about four and one-half times as large a naval aviation personnel
force, and about three times as many naval aviation stations. Great
approximately fourteen times as many seaplanes as the United States, and
makes patrol eight times as many miles during the week as the Amer-

1914, it has been estimated that the British Navy has on active service
more approximately over three times as many officers and over four
and personnel of the American forces operating in European waters.
must be assumed as low because it does not include the hundreds of
hundreds of men the British have in their so-called auxiliary patrol

THE ATLANTIC CONVOY SYSTEM (AS REQUESTED BY THE HOUSE NAVAL
COMMITTEE).

excellent illustration of the relative parts being played by the United
and the allied navies is given by a study of the Atlantic convoy system
protection and escorting of American troop convoys to Europe.
consideration the whole Atlantic convoy system, that is, all shipping
whether French, Italian, American, British, or neutral shipping in
the United States troop transports and troop convoys bound for the
the shipping is protected by the naval vessels of the Allies in the
the
the per cent of all convoys.
the per cent of all convoys.
the per cent of all convoys.
the in the Atlantic are protected by cruisers so as to guard against
the The cruisers necessary for protecting the allied shipping
the way are provided as follows:
Per cent.
61
35
4
the has organized and arranged and provides the signal codes and instruc-
the convoy system; also commodores and signal men for the great
the
the system usually carries the shipping as far as the European coast, w
oriented on a coastal route as to its destination. This necess

great amount of coastal escorting. Great Britain provides coastal escort in the Irish Sea, English Channel, and North Sea, and, in general, throughout the waters of the United Kingdom.

Great Britain also provides destroyers for all Allied shipping across the English Channel for practically all shipping across the English Channel between England and France, and also keeps all channels in British waters clear of mines.

There is very little coastal escort required on the French Channel coast, which follows the English coast. On the French Atlantic coast, the United States furnishes three-eighths of the coastal escort and France furnishes the five-eighths. The United States also furnishes about one-third of the mine forces on the French Atlantic coast.

British destroyers are now rendering the following protection to United States shipping:

United States troops.—(a) British destroyers escort 52 per cent of the United States troops that come into England. (b) British destroyers escort all of our troops across the English Channel going to France. (c) British destroyers escort United States troop ships bound up or down the English Channel.

Army store ships.—(a) British destroyers bring into the English Channel all of the store ships that carry supplies for the United States Army. (b) British destroyers escort into Scottish ports all United States mine carriers bringing mine to the North Sea barrage.

United States merchant shipping.—(a) British destroyers provide the coast guard for United States ships along the south and east coast of England. (b) United States trade with Scandinavia is escorted by British destroyers. (c) United States trade with Holland is escorted by British destroyers. (d) All United States ships bound out of the English Channel from either French or British ports are escorted to the westward by British destroyers.

(Intelligence Section, United States Naval Headquarters, London, August 1918.)

NAVY'S SPLENDID ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WAR WERE IN THE PRESENCE OF DELAYS, INACTION, AND VIOLATION OF MILITARY PRINCIPLES BY THE HIGH COMMAND IN FIRST MONTHS OF WAR.

The statistical tables and the memorandums which I have referred to will give a sufficiently comprehensive idea of the value and importance to the Navy Department of their advanced operations in Europe after they had once adopted the policy which they announced in July, 1917, of cooperating wholeheartedly with the Allies. Of course, when once the available naval forces were put into operations afloat and a sufficient number of capable officers to administer these forces, to control their operations and to coordinate our activities with those of the Allies were available, there was no longer any question of the effectiveness of our help. The Navy has themselves have repeatedly assured us of the vital services rendered by our Navy to the allied cause, and we of the Navy can testify to the record that was achieved. Great as this record was, it has not yet said enough to convince you that it would have been more effective if the policies ultimately adopted by the Navy had been put into effect from the moment we entered the war instead of after dangerous delay of many months.

Furthermore, it seems to me that these achievements of the Navy should gain greater importance in the public mind when it is realized that, as has not been generally realized, outside of the service, the operations were accomplished not because of an equal amount of efficient action by the higher command which directed them, but rather in spite of long delays, inaction, and violations of fundamental military principles committed by the high command in the first months of the war. In other words, the personnel of our Navy afloat, in accom-

assigned them had to struggle with the enemy and also of an uncertain policy and of misdirection such as pointed out in the cases which I have reviewed.

In connection with this and other tables that I submit are compiled from the records that we have available.

It is possible that you might find that instead of six ships at a certain time, there might have been seven or might be. There may very probably be inaccuracies of that kind. These are presented as an illustration of the general facts to the other side, and the inaccuracies would not be the slightest with the impressions that they would

NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE NOT ALLOWED TO SELECT PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES.

In Nos. 74 and 75 of the letter which I addressed to the department on January 7, 1920, I called attention to the department of a fundamental principle of military command. In No. 7 of my summary of conclusions, I stated:

The commander in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his subordinates and was not even consulted as to their assignment. This principle of the art of command is here involved.

I may say that without exception the commanders of the forces operating in European waters under my command were selected by the department without previous reference to me, thus violating this principle of the art of command. Practically from the time of the sending of the first forces abroad, I endeavored to convince the department of the necessity of securing coordination and harmony in our forces abroad by the commanders subordinate to me who would be in line with my policies and that I should be at least consulted in connection with these selections. I am, of course, unaware as to the policy of the department in making these selections; but in every case the first intimation that I had of an officer assigned to a subordinate command was the information that he was to take up this command. Thus, the first official notification I received concerning the officer to command the first force was a dispatch I received from the department on August 1, 1914, that this officer would arrive on the coast of France. Similarly, with the commander of the first force sent to Gibraltar, the first intimation I had of the assignment of the commander was in the middle of July, two weeks after the department had informed me of their intention to send a force to Gibraltar.

I requested officers for definite subordinate commands based on my knowledge of the requirements, of the position, and of the needs. These recommendations disapproved by the department. It will hardly be necessary to go into details in this connection to substantiate this point, because it is a principle so elementary that it needs to be stated to be proved, and if I were to discuss this particular point it would inevitably

involve the discussion of personalities, which I consider apart from the purposes of this investigation. I have at no time during this investigation made any reflections upon any man in our service, and I have no intention to do so. It would serve no useful purpose and would not contribute to the good of the service, which is the one interest which actuates me.

In a personal letter addressed to Admiral Benson on August 1, I fully stated the reasons which had led me to request that he should be permitted to nominate for subordinate commands officers completely in sympathy with me and in whose ability and character I could have complete confidence. The paragraphs of this letter of interest are as follows:

(12) In case it should be your intention to send additional flag officers to the suggested places, or for others, I hope that you will give me a chance to suggest officers or at least to exercise choice within such limits as you may think proper to prescribe.

You know, of course, to what an extent personality counts for efficiency in the circumstances which now exist over here, and how highly important it is that we should have officers on duty in European waters in positions of responsibility who are not only willing to cooperate with our Allies here whole-heartedly, but who have the necessary tact and personality to render this cooperation effective.

Perhaps it is equally important that the officers indicated should be in sympathy with me and my methods. You know the difficulty that has arisen through the lack of sympathy of this kind. I feel that this particular point should be given special consideration, because not to do so might add very considerably to the difficulties which I necessarily have to bear.

In a cable sent on August 9 to Admiral Benson I nominated an officer for the command of the base at Cardiff, stating the reasons for making the request, but this officer was not chosen.

In later cables of the same month I made other suggestions for appointments abroad, with similar lack of result.

On September 30, in cabling to Admiral Benson, I there-

Simben 37. Referring to my letters explaining the regrettable difficulties resulting from the inefficiency caused by the assignment of officers to vitally important commands who have in the past been opposed to me in official matters and who are not in sympathy with my methods, I respectfully request that if none of the officers indicated in my cable number Simben 27 are available the department cable me the names of those who are available, so that I may recommend the officer who in my opinion is best qualified to successfully cooperate with me and the French and British in carrying out the increasingly complicated convoy system upon which the safe arrival of our troops and their supplies, and to enable me efficiently to discharge my responsibility to the department.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT.

I have now concluded my introduction of testimony and documentary evidence in substantiation of the statements made in my letter to the Navy Department, of January 7, 1920, regarding military errors committed by the Navy Department in the planning and conduct of the war. The official documentary evidence incorporated in the hearings establishes the following facts:

1. That, in spite of the fact that war had been going on for three years, and our entry into it had been imminent at least since February 2, 1917, the vessels of the Navy were not ready for service when the United States entered.

2. That the first few months after America entered the war were extremely critical ones for the whole allied cause, due to the lack of enemy submarines.

the critical situation was made clear to the Navy Department after America entered the war, and repeatedly there-
 by and letters, and supported by independent advices to
 ment from the American ambassador in London and by
 a person.

the Navy Department supplied me with no plans or policy
 participation in the war for three months after our entry

having information as to the critical situation of the
 Navy Department did not promptly assist them, and there-
 by the war by delaying the sending of antisubmarine ves-
 sels to Europe for nearly a month after war was declared,
 months elapsing before 30 vessels arrived.

the Navy Department failed to appreciate the military
 situation.

the Navy Department violated fundamental military
 principles attempting to formulate war plans of operation without
 correct knowledge of the whole situation.

the department's representative with the allied admiralities
 reported, during the most critical months of the war,
 no adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could
 be applied.

the Navy Department violated fundamental military prin-
 ciples dispersing forces away from the critical area in order to
 meet the needs of the enemy.

the Navy Department, in the first months of the war,
 the direction of details although 3,000 miles distant from
 the active operations, where the situation was changing from

the Navy Department, in not clearly defining the respon-
 sibility delegating authority to its representative in Europe
 and sound principles common alike to the business and
 military operations.

the Navy Department, by controlling the operations and
 the movement of certain forces within the war area, violated the funda-
 mental principle of unity of command.

the Navy Department failed to keep its representative
 completely informed as to its plans affecting dispatch and
 the movement of forces in the war zone, and frequently reached decisions
 based on information gained from sources other than
 the representative in the war zone.

in my testimony have I charged the responsibility for
 the failures enumerated against any person, but I have tried
 to show that the responsibility for these failures rests, in my
 opinion, on the Navy Department as an organization rather than
 on an individual. If any individual was responsible, wholly or
 partly for the failures I have pointed out, the fact would necessarily
 be developed by persons who were in a position to know the
 workings of the department during the period in question.

My knowledge extends only to the doors of the department
 and those who passed through them. The fact that numerous letters and cable
 messages which I have submitted in evidence bear the signature of
 a person, is not to be taken as an indication that I believe

the signer personally responsible for the action indicated, merely indicate that the letter or dispatch was official and with the authority of the Navy Department as an organization.

To point out violations of well known and generally accepted principles of warfare such as have been shown by my testimony in itself to suggest the remedy which is obviously to avoid such violations in the future. It not having been shown up to this point in the investigation whether these violations of principle were due to faulty organization of the Navy Department or to faults of personnel, I am not, at present, able to submit well-founded recommendations looking to the adoption of measures to insure us against such violations in the future.

My testimony has been devoted almost entirely to pointing out defects in the administration of the Navy in the first few months of the war. This does not mean that I have been insensible to the splendid work done by the Navy at large or by the bureaus and other offices of the Navy Department. I have, at different times, written letters to the chiefs of the bureaus of the Navy Department and to other officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations, expressing my personal satisfaction at the splendid way in which many of their requests had been met, particularly during the latter part of the war.

Taking the service as a whole, I have the most profound admiration for the manner in which the officers and men of the Navy, Naval Militia, and Reserve Force carried on their duties during this war, and have expressed this admiration in a series of letters now being published. Not only from the war zone, where I was constantly before me, but from home and remote areas, letters reached me which showed, beyond any doubt, what a magnificent body of officers and men we had in the Navy. You may be sure, gentlemen, that the Navy, if loyally and properly supported and directed, may be counted upon to maintain the finest traditions of the service.

It is a source of the greatest pleasure to testify to the profound gratitude I feel for the manner in which the Naval Militia and Reserves—in many instances at great personal sacrifices—cooperated with the aid and support of the regular Navy. Without their invaluable help much of the work done by the Navy in this war could not have been undertaken. It would require volumes to tell of the hundreds of ways in which their splendid services made success possible. One of the outstanding features of their service was the cheerful and loyal support which they gave to the regular Navy at all times and under all conditions. I can not commend too highly their services to the nation.

It is furthermore a great pleasure and satisfaction to me to be able to testify to the magnificent way in which the many enterprises were undertaken and pushed to a successful completion by the united efforts of the bureaus of the Navy Department, and the naval personnel engaged in the operations. I can not pretend to enumerate completely the operations of this nature which contributed to the winning of the war. I may mention, as typical examples, the northern barrage railway batteries, the transport of troops, and the training of officers and men in the ships of the Atlantic Fleet that remained in the waters.

to be expected in connection with an investigation particularly of a war which was won by great sacrifices and patriotic services of the entire Nation, that the first thing that occurs to mind is that hindsight is better than foresight. It is always easy, in the light of hindsight, to point out what was committed in any undertaking. I submit, however, that the matter here under investigation is one vitally affecting our national safety. We should not let such thoughts carry us and lead us to dangers which the lessons of the past have warned against. Hindsight must not be blindsight.

I want to repeat and to emphasize at this time that no claim is made by my recommendations or advice should have been made because they were mine, but they should have been heeded because of my position in continuous consultation with the allied navies. There should be no question as to whether I merited the confidence of my superiors. If I did not, an additional violation of a fundamental military and naval principle was committed in leaving me at my post. I should have been removed as soon as there was the slightest loss of confidence in me.

It is shown that there was a lack of conviction or clear understanding on the part of the Navy Department as to where its efforts should be directed. If I have shown that the Navy was hampered by indecision, by lack of essential plans, and by being held back by delay: if I have demonstrated that victory was won in spite of these errors but in spite of them, and that such errors were caused by a combination of circumstances which we can hardly indeed to count upon in the future—then I will have been fully justified in submitting my letter of resignation.

That is my statement, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. As Senator Pittman has asked that the cross-examination be put over until to-morrow, we will now stand adjourned until to-morrow morning.

At 11 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Friday, March 19, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
Room 235, Senate Office building, Senator Frederick Hale

Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and

Mr. The committee will come to order. Senator
has been obliged to retire from the subcommittee, and
has appointed Senator Keyes in his stead.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS —Resumed.

At the meeting on March 9 it was decided that
I be permitted to finish his direct testimony before any
cross-examination takes place, or anything in the nature of cross-
examination, and that thereafter any member of the committee be
permitted to cross-examine, and that his cross-examination be
not being interrupted by any other member of the com-
mittee. We shall have an orderly process of examination. We shall
follow that procedure unless it is found by the com-
mittee that it does not work satisfactorily.

In your letter to the Secretary of the Navy of
March 10, you stated:

"I am not a member of the Navy Department plans or policy
at that time, though I received the following explicit admonition:
'Do not pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pull-
ing the wool over the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans.'"

What I would like to know, Admiral Sims, who made that
statement, who were present at the time, and what were the
circumstances under which it was given,

Now, If the committee will permit, before answering
your question, I should like to make a short correction in the state-
ment at the last hearing. My attention has been invited to
a statement of my statement in the hearings, that the routes
of the United States convoys through the war zone were
determined by my headquarters in London. I intended to convey
that it was the European organization which did this routing
of the Navy Department itself. While the general plans
of the allied convoy system, a great amount of detailed
work was necessarily done, and very successfully done, by A.

Wilson, in command of all naval forces on the French coast, Admiral Niblack at Gibraltar, Admiral Dunn at the Azores, and other commanders.

This has been corrected in the hearings.

In reference to the question that you have asked me, I noticed that in all of my testimony I have avoided any references, and that I have not attempted in any case to place personal responsibility. I have tried to make it clear that criticisms referred to the organization known as the Navy Department and not to any individual; that my criticisms stopped at the doors of the department. I am not informed as to what took place completely, in the department during the war, and if the country wants to know that, it must be brought out by others.

I think that in answering the question I had better recite the circumstances under which it was given to me. I was telegraphed to at Newport to come to Washington. Everything was kept secret. Secrecy is one of the things that Government departments love. I was told not even to come to the Navy Department by telephone to the department, as I remember to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, for instructions, probably to arrange a personal view. I tried to do so and could get no reply at all from the department, so I went there and reported to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who was then Rear Admiral, now, Captain, L. C. Smith. He told me that I was to be sent abroad to confer with the other admiralties. He said that I was to go secretly, under an assumed name, and not even to take uniforms with me.

I was then taken in, or rather sent in, to see the Secretary of the Navy, as nobody went in with me and nobody was present at the interview. The interview was very brief. In substance the Secretary said that I was being sent abroad to confer with the admiralties on the other side, and to use the cable freely in advising them how best they could cooperate with the allied navies, in case we were unfortunately drawn into war. He also told me that the reason I was being sent over was because of a request from the then ambassador in London, Dr. Page; that an officer of high rank should be sent as officers of the rank of rear admiral were representing other countries. I believe the Navy Department had taken the initiative in suggesting that an officer be sent over to confer with the other admiralties.

He gave me a copy of the telegram from Ambassador Page. I will submit a copy of that if it is required. We have it.

In his testimony on the awards, the Secretary of the Navy said that he had reminded me of the indiscretion that I committed in the speech at the Guildhall. The Secretary's recollection of the point is thoroughly mistaken. No reference whatever was made in the Guildhall speech by anybody in the Navy Department on that occasion.

When I came out from the Secretary's room, or just before I came in—I can not remember now which—in somebody else's office, it was the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and my recollection is not clear on that, I think he was present at the events he told me that he was present; and it was there that the nomination in question was given to me by a certain official of the Navy Department. As I said before, I wanted to avoid all personal

Q. I much prefer now to relate the incident and explain why better, without referring to the name of the individual.

A. I think the name of the individual should be Admiral Sims, and the committee would like to have you

Q. The person who gave me the admonition was Admiral Chief of Naval Operations. I had no interview with him and no instructions from him. The remark was preceded and was followed by nothing. It was told to me in all and with bitterness, and I turned around and left the

A. Was anyone present in the room when he told it

Q. That is where my recollection of that particular is clear, but Admiral Palmer has told me that he was in the time, and that he remembers a remark of that character, although he is not able to recall exactly what

A. There was no one else present excepting Admiral

Q. As far as I can recollect; that was, as I remember in the afternoon of the day that I arrived in Washing-

A. I had to go to the Navy Department to get papers, leaving, and I met Admiral Benson again, not in his office, and there, in the presence of a number of other within their hearing or whether they heard or not, he repeated to me exactly the same remark, preceded and followed by nothing.

A. You do not remember who the other officers

Q. I do not know who they were, but I could probably about six months later in my office in Paris he made a statement, at least, to the effect that I was not to allow the wool over my eyes or to pull their chestnuts out of something to that effect. I will admit that I had forgotten the incident. It was recalled to my mind by my staff who was present, and who heard it. I think that I did not remember that distinctly was because as a personal idiosyncrasy of the admiral. I had general opinion that he was intensely anti-British, but it was particularly.

A. I think it should be made perfectly clear that in his second statement did not state to you that fight the British as the Germans.

Q. Not at all; no.

A. To be fair to Admiral Benson, that ought to be

Q. I want to make that very clear. He did not, of I have regarded this always as simply a personal may say, on the part of Admiral Benson.

A. I like to say that I have always had the best possible Admiral Benson. I regard him as an upstanding and who has exceedingly strong convictions, and who is

firm in adherence to these convictions. I believe everything done during the war has been done conscientiously, and to with the war. I believe that it is due to Admiral Benson I was given the opportunity to serve in this war as the co of the forces abroad. In fact, he told me that his insistence being put in command of those forces abroad had brought the enmity of pretty much all the senior officers of the N being due to the fact that when I was appointed I was the on the list of rear admirals in the Naval Register at that state this in order to make it clear that there is nothing personal about this.

Now, my reason for putting it in the letter may not be so civilian as it is to a military man, but the spiritual found every war is the will to victory, and if any man, no matter how honest, has an invincible prejudice against the people that he is fighting alongside of, it is very probable that it has an undue influence upon him; and that is the reason that in submitting this letter for the consideration of the Navy Department, I put there, as one of the most important things in the letter, that when we go into a war again we want to make sure that the foundation of our organization, the will to victory, is sound.

Now, I would like to touch on one other thing.

Senator PITTMAN. Is this in answer to the chairman's question?

Admiral SIMS. In answer to the chairman's question, it is related.

Senator PITTMAN. I think that I am at liberty to guard against any more letters coming in.

Admiral SIMS. Any more letters?

Senator PITTMAN. I think that I am at liberty now, in my prior experience, to guard against any extraneous matter coming into the record.

Admiral SIMS. This is not extraneous. It relates to the subject, and it is this, that in his testimony before this committee on the awards, Secretary Daniels, in reference to me and in reference to this particular incident, said, "as a naval officer, he has no business to think who was the enemy." That, to me, is a most astounding statement. I received no instructions; I received no expression of policy. Manifestly, no plan can be based upon anything except the knowledge of who your enemy is going to be. I had every possible business to think who my enemy was. That is all I have to say on that particular subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, you are still under direct examination. Have you any further matters that you wish to bring out?

Admiral SIMS. No; I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask of Admiral Sims? Senator Ball?

Senator BALL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask Admiral Sims? Senator Pittman?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Admiral Sims, this statement that you attribute to Secretary Daniels, that it was not your business

Q. whom you were going to war, or words to that effect made in his testimony here, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was not given you as a part of your instructions when you went to Europe?

A. No, sir; it was not.

Q. You state that Admiral Benson told you that it was his insistence that you were sent over on this mission and were sent?

A. I am not quite sure whether it was on his initiative or not, but I wanted to convey the impression that it was his insistence that I remained over there as the officer in command of the forces. I was sent there first as a liaison officer, and subsequently to that—we can give you the date if you wish. I was put in command of the forces that were going

Q. You have stated that Admiral Benson is pro-British; that he is prejudiced, you might say, pro-British. I do not remember your exact language, but I do not think that Admiral Benson desired you to go over there, thinking that you held the same sentiments,

A. Yes; I do, sir.

Q. That he thought you were antagonistic to the

A. No, sir; he did not think I was antagonistic to the British; that I was pro-British.

Q. Yes.

Q. But he had reasons for retaining me over there in

A. Then, as a matter of fact, if that be true, and if he desired you to go over there, he wanted some one who was pro-British, and with whom the British Government was in sympathy; is not that true?

A. I do not know, I am sure. He wanted somebody who he thought could hold down the job. There were a number of reasons, as I see it, why I should have been sent over there and why I should have been retained in command. The reasons are as follows: That I knew a great many of the leading officers of the British Navy as I had gone over there from 1900 to 1907 or 1908, in order to talk with the then leading officers of the British Navy about progress in gunnery, Admiral Scott, Admiral Fisher, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Admiral Jellicoe, and Admiral Madden, and men of that stamp; and I knew them all more or less intimately, had corresponded with them, and neither of us knew much about shooting.

Q. You were naval attaché in Paris from about the beginning of 1900, or nearly four years. I know those people. You were there in 1899 and spent a year in Paris for the object of obtaining facility in handling the language.

A. I was sent over there as a liaison officer, and for that purpose. I assume, I was retained there in command, it being the opinion of the British Government that a man who had these relations and acquaintances with these people, and who knew their methods and

of the Navy. Had the admiral sent his report to the public press or to any one the one person entitled to receive it—the Secretary of the Navy—he committed a serious breach of discipline. Had he even made public that such a paper existed he would have likewise been guilty of an impropriety. A man who took the reporters into his confidence, and is thus responsible for the publicity which has followed, was Secretary Daniels himself. The day the letter was received he informed the press that Admiral Sims had sent him a letter which was “critical” of the Navy Department in the World War.

Naturally public curiosity was vastly piqued. A few days afterwards Admiral Sims appeared before the Naval Committee of the United States Senate. The committee formally demanded that the admiral produce a copy of this letter. The Congress of the United States is a governmental body superior to Secretary Daniels himself and the Naval Committee of the Senate has the right to demand information on the conduct of the Navy Department. Neither could Admiral Sims have declined to furnish the report demanded. To have done so would have made him subject to contempt proceedings, but would have placed him in an unenviable position of insulting and defying the legislative powers of the United States. The letter, therefore, went upon the records and thus became public property. There is anything in the nature of a “scandal” —

The word “scandal” is in quotation marks—

or a “controversy” —

And the word “controversy” is in quotation marks—

or a “washing of dirty linen in public” —

And those words, “washing of dirty linen in public,” are in quotation marks—

Secretary Daniels is solely responsible; for, had he not made his public statement that the report existed, the Senate committee would not have demanded its presentation.

Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral SIMS. I do not agree with the statement, I do not intend to agree with it one way or another; but I want to say that I did not know anything about that until I saw it in the World. I did not know that it was projected, or anything about it, and I do not think there is anything in there that has not been published in other reviews and in newspapers, and so for all practical fact, the information there is simply a compilation of what is practically public property. I had nothing whatever to do with it at all, in any way.

Senator PITTMAN. Where do you suppose he got that expression, a “washing of dirty linen in public”?

Admiral SIMS. Out of the press. I have seen it a number of times.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you ever testify to that on the stand?

Admiral SIMS. Testify to what?

Senator PITTMAN. Use that expression in your testimony?

Admiral SIMS. I may have. I can not remember now.

Senator PITTMAN. I will tell you later.

Admiral SIMS. But I have seen it in the press hundreds and hundreds of times. In fact, there is a cartoon to that effect.

Senator PITTMAN. That was an expression used here by you, Admiral.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but if it was used by the people in the press it can have no significance so far as I am concerned.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Let us go on a little further. This report there says that this letter was not shown to anyone else until it was presented to this committee—shown by you. Is that a fact?

SMS. No.

FITZMAN. To whom did you show this letter?

SMS. I showed it to perhaps half a dozen of my people who were on my staff on the other side.

FITZMAN. I would like to know who they are.

SMS. We can give you the names of those. Capt. Cone, Capt. Knox, and Commander Babcock, and Capt. and Lieut. Kittredge.

FITZMAN. No.

SMS. You never saw it?

FITZMAN. No.

SMS. They were Capt. Cone, Capt. Pringle, Capt. Knox, Capt. Babcock, Capt. Chandler, and my aid, Lieut. Comstock. There is only one other person I showed that letter to; that was Mr. Davison, in New York. What are his

SMS. BABCOCK. H. P. Davison.

SMS. H. P. Davison. I was a guest in his house on going to attend a dinner given to Mrs. Whitelaw Reid, and I saw a copy of that letter on that occasion. To the best of my knowledge nobody else saw a copy of that letter at all. I did not keep it in my own files, but I kept a file copy myself, and I kept it in a pocket. I did not put it on my own files in Newport.

FITZMAN. And yet you have testified that this letter was a special document solely for the Secretary of the Navy, is not that true?

SMS. Yes, sir.

FITZMAN. Do you consider that it was proper, before sending it, to have submitted it to a civilian in New York City?

SMS. No. I do not think it. That was an indiscretion on my part. I should not have done so.

FITZMAN. That is the only indiscretion that you have

SMS. So far as I know.

FITZMAN. You stated in your testimony, presumably the department had published its existence, of a general

SMS. That is what I thought at the time, but I was

FITZMAN. Did that letter contain everything that is in the letter that you showed it to Mr. Davison?

SMS. Did it contain everything that is now in it?

FITZMAN. Yes.

SMS. Yes; the identical letter.

FITZMAN. The identical letter?

SMS. It was not changed in any respect; no.

FITZMAN. Upon what date did you show that to Mr.

SMS. I can find the date by looking back and seeing what dinner took place in New York; but along about the middle of January it was.

FITZMAN. About the middle of January?

SMS. I should think so; about there.

Senator PITTMAN. It was prior to the time you mailed Secretary, was it?

Admiral SIMS. Prior to the time?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. After the time.

Senator PITTMAN. After the time?

Admiral SIMS. After the time.

Senator PITTMAN. That you mailed it to the Secretary?

Admiral SIMS. I must have mailed it immediately after date, probably the 8th or 9th, or something like that.

Senator PITTMAN. At a dinner at Mr. Davison's house?

Admiral SIMS. No; in his private study. I was a guest house, and spent the night there.

Senator PITTMAN. Who else was there?

Admiral SIMS. There was another man in the house and his son, and so forth; but I can not remember anybody else. It was only shown to him.

Senator PITTMAN. You can fix that date, can you?

Admiral SIMS. I can fix the date, easily.

Senator PITTMAN. Will you fix the date before you leave here?

Admiral SIMS. I will try to. I can find out about it. I mean to write to Newport and get the correspondence; but it was about middle of January.

Senator PITTMAN. About the middle of January?

Admiral SIMS. My aid thinks it was the 14th, but I can not be sure. It is easily fixed because of the date of that dinner, you know.

Senator PITTMAN. On the 14th of January an article appeared in the Washington Post under the signature, or the name, rather, of Albert W. Fox, entitled "Sims attacks Daniels's policies. A medal inquiry by the House. Admiral again writes frankly to the Secretary. Sees Navy's morale hurt. Fearless exposure of what he believes blunders and mistakes. Expected to bare conditions."

Secretary Daniels has received another letter from Admiral William S. Sims. It will prove of great interest to the service and the country if the Secretary succeeds in suppressing it. It is a frank and fearless exposé of the hopeless maladministration, mistakes, and blunders into which the American Navy has fallen as a result of Mr. Daniels's policies, and it tells the Secretary things that have been known to the admiral during the war, and are even more evident now.

It is, in effect, an attempt by the officer who was commander in chief of the United States naval forces in European waters during the war and is perhaps foremost among the ranking officers in the service to rescue the morale of the United States Navy from the policy of Mr. Daniels by appealing directly to the men responsible for it all.

Admiral Sims is now president of the Naval War College at Newport, R. I. The letter was sent to Mr. Daniels from there.

* * * * *

If this officer, who is generally regarded here and abroad as one of the most competent naval authorities in the world, finds it necessary to expose Mr. Daniels's management of naval affairs and frankly and fearlessly undertakes the task, it is probable that senators will show lack of interest.

Every one admits that there is something vitally important to the Nation in naval efficiency or inefficiency and the big, broad question at issue is whether Daniels's policies are affecting the service.

That is on the 14th day of January. I will ask you if you saw any publication in regard to that testimony of yours prior to that date.

Admiral SIMS. I do not understand your question.

Senator PITTMAN. I ask you if you saw any publication intimating that there was such a letter as that, prior to the morning of the 14th day of January?

Q. Prior to that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Not that I recollect. I understand there was a paper; but I only found it out before I came down here.

A. I would be very glad if you would have some of them hunted up in regard to this matter.

Q. In regard to what?

A. In regard to this matter. This is the first mentioned of this—have been able to find.

Q. Probably that is the first. I think that is the first.

A. I would be very glad to have you pursue it in any way.

Q. I did not follow that carefully.

A. Because it would indicate great carelessness on

January 15 has something else about this; not by itself.

Q. Daniels' mum on Sims. Stopped reading letter just before 'critical.' "

A. He goes on:

He admitted yesterday that he had received a "critical" or "condemning" letter from Admiral Sims, but said he had not yet read all of it. He said that as it was becoming critical, he explained, and therefore could not charge against his management of naval affairs made by the

is something else down here in the same article:

NEW POINTS MAY BE DEVELOPED.

Admiral Sims's views on the actions of Secretary Daniels in the war, which the admiral has described as bringing condemnation on Mr. Daniels and the service and lowering the morale to the last point, the committee will develop points having an important bearing on the question of confusion and chaos in the Navy.

At some one was wise at that time.

There is an article from the New York World under date of Jan. 20, sent from Washington. The heading reads:

Letter to Daniels criticizing Navy. Communication discusses the Secretary has no comment.

A. He says:

He has been called to appear before the subcommittee of the Senate on Naval Affairs Friday in connection with the committee's investigation of decorations to officers and men of the Navy.

MAY CRITICIZE MISTAKES.

It is expected that Admiral Sims on that occasion may discuss the Navy in the war, causes for the present low state of morale,

and indicated to-day that he may have nothing to say regarding the communication until after the admiral has had an opportunity to lay before the committee, should he desire to do so.

The letter is "critical" of his policies and management of the Navy, and the portions he had read were rather critical.

As Sims has given it out as being critical, I suppose the letter is Daniels'.

• • • • •

Those portions of the letter which Mr. Daniels has read contain no mention of award of decorations which Admiral Sims criticized severely in a letter read by Mr. Daniels some time ago.

There is a similar statement in the New York Times.

So that the first intimation made public was in the article in the Fox in the Washington Post on the morning of January 14.

Admiral SIMS. Are you asking a question?

Senator PITTMAN. No; I am just stating a fact first, and then I wish to comment on it.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. The article purports to know the general contents of that letter. It suggests that that may be made public. Secretary Daniels suppresses it.

These other articles written by Washington newspaper men indicate that the Secretary was suppressing, and would not even read it. So much for the inference in this article, and also your testimony that the Secretary was responsible for you placing that letter before the public through the medium of this committee.

Now, as to the inference that you were forced to produce that letter by the committee——

Admiral SIMS. Yes; will you allow me to make some comment upon what you have just been reading? You did not ask a question about it.

Senator PITTMAN. No; because I want to connect it up with the hearings, and then let you answer it all at the same time, if you wish.

Admiral SIMS. Oh, that is all right.

Senator PITTMAN. It will be better, and it will be more interesting.

Admiral SIMS. That is all right, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, then, as to the reflection upon the committee, that this committee here forced the letter out into public view.

Admiral SIMS. Who made this reflection?

Senator PITTMAN. That reflection is carried in this article which you have read; and not only that, but I take it that it is carried in your testimony when you state here——

Admiral SIMS. I did not use any such expression as "forced," but I said that it was asked for by the committee.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Well, if you do not want to use that word, that you were compelled to present it, I am perfectly satisfied that you did not.

Admiral SIMS. Did I use it?

Senator PITTMAN. Well, were you compelled to present the letter by the committee?

Admiral SIMS. I was asked for it, and I presented it. I stand so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman, in quoting Admiral Sims you will stick to the record and quote him from the record and not what you think he said, you will have less trouble.

Senator PITTMAN. The Admiral is here, and he is just as good as the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody can remember what was said except the Admiral. You have the record before you to quote from.

Senator PITTMAN. Possibly no one but the Admiral can.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we need any discussion of this matter.

PITTMAN. No.

SEN. Nor will we have it.

PITTMAN. No; I do not intend to stand for it. I am conducting an examination.

SEN. And when it is not being properly conducted, you are right along.

PITTMAN. And I shall pay no attention to it.

SEN. We will not proceed.

PITTMAN. I realized this morning that you were going to break up this cross-examination.

SEN. There is no attempt in any way to break up the examination. Now, go on.

SEN. May I say now, in reference to this, that I welcome examination, because if you continue it through my testimony it will be the means of bringing out possibly information that I did not bring out. Naturally, I want to bring out what I can.

PITTMAN. I will help you, Admiral.

SEN. I am trying to help the department. I want it to be as I made this statement from day to day, I passed it on the other side, including the Secretary of the Navy, the whole thing to be brought out, and I am here to do it.

PITTMAN. Now I want to know whether or not you were to produce that letter by the committee.

SEN. I understand that a request made by a committee for testimony compels you to give it.

PITTMAN. Admiral, if there were a matter within your knowledge any letter that you had written that you would consider the publication of the same would be injurious to our country, would you publish that, simply upon the request of the committee, if you did not know its contents, without suggesting that it might be prejudicial to our government?

SEN. Certainly not; I would submit it to the committee behind closed doors. But when it is something that I know will be beneficial to the Government, I do not think that propriety is at all.

PITTMAN. I see. That answers my question exactly. Have you submitted it behind closed doors if you had not known that it was very beneficial; and therefore you did not submit it to the committee that they consider it behind closed doors?

SEN. I did not. It was not any of my business to.

PITTMAN. You made no intimation to the committee that there was a statement in there that might be offensive to another country?

SEN. No.

PITTMAN. Did any member of this committee know what was in that letter?

SEN. Nobody except the people you have mentioned. As far as my recollection, knew anything about the letter.

PITTMAN. Yes.

SEN. Or, certainly, not what was in it.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. You had the letter in your pocket at that time, did you not?

Admiral SIMS. I had carried it in my pocket ever since the letter was submitted. It never was out of my possession.

Senator PITTMAN. At the time this letter was presented, testifying in a proceeding dealing with naval awards, and the man stated to you this, and I call your particular attention to that you can determine whether he was referring to the letter in your pocket. I admit I did not know he was referring to the letter in your pocket. [Reading.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, I think in connection with this matter you had any further correspondence with the Secretary of the Navy about the matter of awards and their effect on the morale of the service, it would be well to give that correspondence to us at the present time.

Admiral SIMS. Will you read my reply?

Senator PITTMAN (reading).

Admiral SIMS. It does not bear particularly upon the question of the award, but it does bear upon the question of the morale of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I think it is decidedly germane to the issue.

Admiral SIMS. As I said before, the action of the Board in the awards was the last straw in this whole business.

Senator PITTMAN. May I finish this line of examination with regard to this particular subject?

The CHAIRMAN. If the admiral has expressed himself in regard to this, any letter that will throw light upon the subject, we should have it.

That subject was the subject of naval awards. [Continued reading.]

Senator McCORMICK. My sentiment is that we should give the admiral an opportunity to furnish us these letters before we get too far away from the subject which they refer.

Senator PITTMAN. It seems to me the admiral has had plenty of opportunity to put anything in this record he desired to insert. I am not making any objection to it, but I have started an inquiry right now with regard to the difference of opinion.

Then the chairman goes on again:

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Senator Pittman, with your permission we will proceed with the question I put to the admiral, if the admiral cares to proceed.

That is the history of the way this matter became public. This is the history of the way the committee is alleged to have found the letter from your possession.

One other question along this same line, and then I will answer it all, so as to connect it all up. Prior to January 1, 1900, you wrote a letter, and made it public, with regard to naval awards, did you not?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. You did write a letter with regard to criticism of the naval awards?

Admiral SIMS. But I did not make it public.

Senator PITTMAN. What date did you write that letter?

Admiral SIMS. It was dated the 17th of December. The date is in the record. Have you a copy of the printed hearings on the awards? You will find it in the record there.

Senator PITTMAN. I think that is near enough—the 17th of December?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

PITTMAN. That was written from Newport?

SMITH. Yes.

PITTMAN. Did you show that letter to anyone?

SMITH. Oh, yes; I consulted a good many people there because it concerned those officers there so intimately, because it concerned a certain number of officers who were concerned, and to officers that I had recommended for a certain decoration who had only got another one. I wanted those officers that I had done about it.

PITTMAN. You had that letter mimeographed?

SMITH. I had the letter mimeographed in order to send it to those concerned.

PITTMAN. There were quite a number of the officers that were concerned, I suppose?

SMITH. I sent out, I suppose, a couple of dozen copies.

PITTMAN. Then it found its way into the press?

SMITH. I do not know how it found its way into the press.

PITTMAN. It is just as much a mystery as how Fox got his information.

SMITH. I know how Fox got his knowledge about it, but he did not ask me any questions about that.

PITTMAN. I will ask you how Mr. Fox got the knowledge about it.

SMITH. I considered those letters you have read there from a very distinct tribute to the enterprise of the press in getting information.

PITTMAN. You said you knew who gave Mr. Fox the in-

SMITH. Do not be impatient, and I will tell you. I did not know who gave Mr. Fox the information, but I said that I would tell you how Mr. Fox got the information; and I have been told—I have not seen him at all since I have been in the Navy Department, but I have been told that Mr. Fox got the information in some way from the Navy Department. Now, let me—

PITTMAN. You have been told that?

SMITH. Yes; I have been told that.

PITTMAN. I wish you would tell me who told you that.

SMITH. I could not tell you who told me, but some one came in where we had a number of people and said that was the way, and you can easily ask Fox, if you want to.

PITTMAN. I probably will.

SMITH. Let me tell you something. I went into the Navy Department on the 17th of January and I found copies of that letter lying about now, of January 7, in the Navy Department. It was copied, and it was there. You can not recopy a thing without copying it. I know there were a number of copies that passed around the Navy Department. One minute; I know that a letter that comes into the Navy Department is read by a good many people before it is ever placed before the board have to consider it. The ordinary procedure is for it to go to the file room, and there it is read by a clerk who makes out a sufficient abstract so that you can recognize it, and gives it a number, etc., and puts it in the proper file, and it goes through. Anything that comes into the N—

Department is known to a number of people. If any one people wants to tell a newspaper man on the outside about it do it. He ought not to, but it is very frequently done, and stand that that is where this information came from—out of the Department, where a great deal of other information of a character does come out.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, you say——

Admiral SIMS. But let me make this statement first.

Senator PITTMAN. Certainly; go right ahead.

Admiral SIMS. But nothing that I did, nothing that any officers in my entourage in Newport did, had anything to do with the giving out of the fact that there was a letter, let alone giving out the contents of the letter itself.

Now, the game was played perfectly fairly and squarely. I was no spring chicken in this business, and I am not putting myself into a noose unnecessarily. I saw that the letter was confidential of course, and I took particular pains to see that it did not get to any of our own people, and I even carried the only copy in my own pocket, so that I would be able to say that it was always in my pocket and be sure that it was there; and I had it in my own pocket when I came down here.

Senator PITTMAN. When was it you say you were in the Department and saw a copy of that letter?

Admiral SIMS. The same day I read it to you.

Senator PITTMAN. Before or afterwards?

Admiral SIMS. Directly afterwards.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; I thought so.

Admiral SIMS. Directly after that.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; directly after that?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but it was only about two hours after. The morning of Saturday that I read that letter here, the 14th of January, I received a telephone message while I was in the Department here that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy wanted to see me in the afternoon at half past 2, and I went down there, and I knew he told me, that the letter had been copied and circulated, and he showed me one on his desk.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; he showed you one on his desk. To whom did you address that letter?

Admiral SIMS. To the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. The Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. That is, under the regulations, to address a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, and if it wants to go to a bureau, you put in parentheses "Bureau of Navigation," or "Bureau of Ordnance," or whatever bureau it may be.

Senator PITTMAN. And on the 14th Mr. Fox not only knows the existence of a letter of that kind, but he has given a very accurate description of the general subject matter.

Admiral SIMS. I noticed that; yes. Now, you are trying to fix it on me, as to my giving it out. I tell you I had absolutely nothing to do with that.

Senator PITTMAN. I am not trying to fix it on you as to giving it out.

Admiral SIMS. What are you trying to do, then?

PITTMAN. No, no, no; far be it from me to try to fix any-

SIX. Well, cheer up; I am glad to know that. Go on.

PITTMAN. But you, you see, got a little confused in your mind you testified so rashly here a while back with regard to this letter, and it now develops that you let Mr. New York, who was a civilian, read that letter before you read it.

SIX. Yes; that is right.

PITTMAN. Before you made it public.

SIX. No; I did not make it public. I showed it to Mr. Daniels all. He is an honorable man, and you can call him a committee and he will tell you that he did nothing with it as an indiscretion. I have said so. You do not need to say that. I acknowledge that thing.

PITTMAN. I am very glad you acknowledge that. Now something you were complaining that we are trying to pin it on you.

SIX. Oh, I was not complaining at all.

PITTMAN (continuing). You stated in your testimony pre-viously that the letter was called out because the department had published it of its existence and its general nature. Now, as a matter of fact, is there any evidence here that the department had published its existence and its general nature?

SIX. That is what I thought at the time; but I told you a long time ago that I was mistaken, and did not find that out until I read those articles. I do not take the Washington Post and never seen those articles you have read here, and I do not know about it; that is all. What I was referring to at the time was that I supposed that in the interview that takes place between the press and Mr. Daniels somebody on the press asked him about it. I have since been told, but I have not verified it, and therefore that thing there was a little squib in the newspaper that the letter had been received; but I did not know anything about it. I did not know it until I came down here this morning somebody told me about it. [Reading:]

The letter was called for because the department had published the letter of its existence and its general nature.

That preliminary statement. There was a published interview with Secretary Daniels, in which they asked him about it and he said, "Yes; there was a letter of a critical

PITTMAN. When was that?

SIX. I do not remember when it was.

PITTMAN. I have read when it was. It was subsequent to the leak.

SIX. That is an attack on the Secretary of the Navy. I have nothing to do with that.

PITTMAN. I say, the first notice of that was the Fox article. That is connected with the leak, all right.

SIX. That is something that concerns Mr. Fox and not me. I said you were not trying to pin it on me and it does not

Senator PITTMAN. It certainly, though, affects the Secret Navy.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. And by reason of the fact that you had given the testimony you did here, which is a direct reflection gave publicity to it.

Admiral SIMS. Why should they not give publicity to it?

Senator PITTMAN. For the simple reason that it contained that were offensive to a Government which we were at peace on friendly terms; because it contained a communication that was a voluntary statement that was confided to a high admiral, in confidence.

Admiral SIMS. It was not in strict confidence.

Senator PITTMAN. In such confidence that it was not even committed in writing.

Admiral SIMS. It was not in confidence. It was before officers.

Senator PITTMAN. Why Admiral, it was before the three who have charge of matters of that kind.

Admiral SIMS. Excuse me, sir; it was in an office where there was a number of people. The second day it was stated to me—

Senator PITTMAN. The second day it was before naval officers.

Admiral SIMS. It was.

Senator PITTMAN. Before naval officers, who are supposed to respect the confidence that is reposed in them by superior officers and who would hold sacred a secret of the navy that was essential to the protection of the Government.

Admiral SIMS. It was not told to me in that way, at all.

Senator PITTMAN. And you do not consider that the publication of such statements as that would be improper?

Admiral SIMS. For who to make it public?

Senator PITTMAN. Anyone.

Admiral SIMS. No; I do not.

Senator PITTMAN. You do not?

Admiral SIMS. No, I do not, where the interests of our country are at stake. We naval officers have made up our minds on this thing, and that is this, that we will never go into a war in the position in which we went into this. Do not make any mistake about that?

Senator PITTMAN. That statement is all right, and I accept that statement also with regard to what you consider the duty of a naval officer. That is all I have to ask you on that subject.

Admiral SIMS. Are you asking a question?

Senator PITTMAN. No, sir, I am through now on that. That is the end of that subject. There is another subject that I want to take up.

Now, Admiral, part of your criticism involved in this matter has been the lack of centralization of command in London.

Admiral SIMS. The lack of what, sir?

Senator PITTMAN. Of command.

Admiral SIMS. The lack of centralization, you said?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes, the lack of centralization of command in London. Is that not true?

Sims. No, I do not recall any such criticism. The command was centralized in London perfectly, with the initiative in the commanders. I think we may misunderstand about the significance or drift of that question. Perhaps clarify it a little.

Pittman. Yes; I probably will. Now in letter No. 27, of July 16, 1917, from Vice Admiral Sims to the Secretary of War, concerning policy of United States naval war and allied subjects, I read from paragraph 3:

"The point to me which naturally occurs to mind is that we should look at the combined allied service, of which the British Grand Fleet and all other allied naval forces disposed throughout the world are a part."

On July 15, 1917, in a communication to the Secretary of War, and called a general report, I read the following in paragraph 11:

"From a point of view it appears necessary to accept as a fact that an increased American tonnage must be contributed to support the Allies in the demands of our military and naval forces. If this is accepted, the extent of our military participation is only dependent upon the shipbuilding, and that our military participation must be viewed until the rate of production of new tonnage commences to exceed the even been suggested that in view of the present situation a good national army could perhaps be more efficiently utilized in production by actually utilizing it as labor in American shipyards."

In a communication from Admiral Sims to Admiral Bailey, London, January 24, 1918.

Sims. To whom?

Pittman. Admiral Sir Lewis Bailey, of the British

Sims. Yes.

Pittman. I may state that this letter comes from your office at London.

"I am glad to know that the question I mentioned to you about the employment of American man power of America on the western front is now up for very serious consideration. It has evidently been presented on the other side with very force. The chief of our war staff, who has recently passed through London as a member of the Allied War Council, is of the opinion that we should proceed in the way indicated in our discussion when I was at Queenstown, that if we persist in the original scheme of organizing a large force of troops, with adequate means of transportation, and so forth, that it will be made effective until 1919. The whole matter will come before the Council and be considered by the prime ministers of the countries concerned and doubtless a decision will be forthcoming before long. I don't believe it can be anything much different from what we believe it

"If the decision is made as indicated above, it will change to a question of the employment of our various groups of destroyers. According to the present plan it would be not to proceed with the development of the facilities on the west coast of France but to let them remain as they are and to use them for the supply of the troops already in there and for the supply of their equipment. To divert the tonnage which is now carrying in all equipment for the handling a big army to the bringing of troops in to the western front in order that they may be passed through the British camps

"If the decision is made as indicated above, it will mean that there will be few army convoys going into France, and consequently that there can be handled only by the ports on France with the possible addition of a certain number from

On the other hand, there would be more troop convoys coming in from the north or the south of Ireland, and provision would have to be made to handle additional convoys. However, this is a bridge that does not need to be crossed until we get to it.

Admiral SIMS. That is a dandy letter, all right. I am prepared to do that.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, I will ask you about that.

Admiral SIMS. I should like to explain that to you.

Senator PITTMAN. I will ask a few questions, and then you will explain all of it.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the question that you mentioned to him about the best way to utilize the man power of American troops on the western front?

Admiral SIMS. I was reporting to him what Gen. Bliss had said to me, and what he told me he was going to put up to our Government when he went back, that until we could get a large number of troops in there and until we could put them through a long series of training so that they would be capable of taking over a whole section of the western front themselves, what would help to win the war at that time would be to do what the British were doing with their own raw troops that they were putting in there, and what he had done with his troops throughout his whole career. That was, when he got a new contingent of raw recruits, instead of making an attempt to train them and putting them through from 6 to 8 or 10 months to fit them to go into battle by themselves, he put them in small groups, in among the veterans on each side of them, so that they could be guided by the veterans among whom they were placed, which would fit them for fighting inside of two months; and I am very glad to say that the ideas of Gen. Bliss on the subject were adopted, and that the American army did do that exact thing at the time he was talking about, and they put them on the western front alongside the British, who spoke the same language, and they were brigaded alongside the British, brigaded with them, as the expression is, a group of Americans with a group of British on each side, and they did most excellent service, and you probably remember that when they were put in under Gen. Haig to fight alongside the Australians, when somebody asked the Australians how the American troops did, the reply was that they did first rate, but they were a little bit rough.

Now, that was what Gen. Bliss had recommended, and that was what I was talking about there, and that was a wise thing to do. Gen. Bliss saw, and when he got back he proposed to our Government to that effect, and that is exactly what they did. Later on they had so many troops in there that they constituted an army, and after those fellows had gotten a good deal of experience, after they had fought under Gen. Haig, a certain number of them were withdrawn to form the nucleus of the army of the Argonne, and so forth. It all went forward as projected there.

Senator PITTMAN. So, on November 15 you were in favor of putting our soldiers to work in the navy yards as laborers, and on January 1 you were in favor of brigading our soldiers with other troops?

Admiral SIMS. At a certain time I was in favor of putting a certain number of them in the ship yards, in the same way as the British were doing in order to get the tonnage. We all realized, and Gen. Pershing

are ready to hear about that I will tell you what he said on the subject, that the tonnage question was the very business, and if that was not solved the war could not be won with the assistance of the American Army. It was necessary, not to take all the men who were enlisted and put them in the shipyards, but to take what were necessary to solve this tonnage situation. Great Britain did and did do it. She withdrew men from her veteran shipwrights and put them in her shipyards. That was simply to accentuate the fact that instead of the Army men who were shipwrights, who understood it was so essential at that time that we have ships for the Army over and to get the supplies over, that these men going into the Army, should have been employed in the Navy. That is only ordinary American common sense.

PRIMES. Was Gen. Pershing, on January 24, favoring a separate unit over there, or was he favoring your proposition of putting them under the British?

SEN. I do not know.

PRIMES. You really do not know that?

SEN. I do not know that. I do not know when he came out, but that he did come out and say, "I am willing to do it in any possible way." He said that at a certain time he had the original idea I do not know.

PRIMES. When did you come out openly for a separate unit over there?

SEN. I did not come out for it. It was none of my business. I did not come out for it, officially or in any other way.

I discussed it with Gen. Bliss when he came through there, and I brought him on the Allied War Council at Paris, naturally it was discussed with him, and he agreed that he would do it when he went back, and he told me that when he came back he did so advise our Government at that time. It was not a question of brigading our troops with foreign troops at all, but to get over an emergency. We would have to go on the basis of testimony in order to establish all the facts in a court of law, but what I was advocating, or talking about in my speech at Paris was what Gen. Bliss had told me was the decision of the Supreme War Council. That is to say, the Army people and the whole matter thought that it was necessary to put the troops in, and did put them in, and it succeeded.

PRIMES. Now I read another paper from your historical

SEN. Will you allow me to say also that in no case did I consider that I, a naval officer, attending to my own business, recommending anything at all. I wanted to know what was going to do, because it might have a marked influence on the way the war should be handled. If they should decide, as they did, to send a large body of troops through Great Britain, it was a question of the disposition of my forces, in order that those things might be properly transacted. In the later period of the war, when it was found that this advice about sending them through Great Britain was exceedingly important, and when the

rush came, after March 21, 1918, from that time on—I just rough guess that 50 per cent of the troops went into Greece and across the channel; so that all those things that I discussed with Gen. Bliss—not recommending them but trying to find out what they were—all done exactly as explained in that letter to the House by Bayly; and we, as two sailormen, were discussing what was the disposition of the forces that were escorting the troops that did come off. I am pleased to death with that letter and am glad I wrote it.

Senator PITTMAN. Here is another statement, Admiral, by your historical section in London at the same time as the letter, to the archives here:

There was a small dinner last night at which were present Balfour, Reading and the host, a very important person.

Admiral SIMS. Balfour, Cecil, Reading, and who else?

Senator PITTMAN. Balfour, Cecil, Reading, and the host, a very important person.

There was also present another man who holds somewhat radical views as to the most efficient way to employ America's man power on the western front, organizing a separate Army with its own lines of communication and supply.

The gentlemen above mentioned were greatly interested in the expression of views and highly approved of them and the discussion turned upon the means to be employed to realize them.

During the discussion the following facts were brought out:

First. This proposition was presented by the House mission upon its return.

Admiral SIMS. Gen. Bliss was with the House mission.

Senator PITTMAN. (reading):

Second. The President asked Pershing for his views as to the advisability of the scheme, and, in case he did not approve of it, to state why he did not approve.

Third. Gen. Robertson went to France to discuss the matter with Pershing and came back "much disappointed."

Manifestly, the pressure in favor of the scheme is increasing. It is apparent that the bulk of the tonnage assigned to transport the Army is being brought over the material to create the facilities for handling and supplying an army so large that it can probably never be landed in France—at least not to get into the game.

It is believed that the pressure is now, or soon will be, such as to end the positions of those who continue to oppose the scheme.

It is, of course, desirable to increase this pressure as soon and as much as possible.

The reasons in favor of the scheme are so plain and simple as to be readily understood by the man on the street.

The reasons opposed to it are purely sentimental—national and state pride and ambition for personal distinction. There is no sound military reason against it.

Therefore, it is of the first importance that this matter be clearly explained to the man on the street.

It is up to you and the men of your cloth.

Admiral SIMS. What is the date of that?

Senator PITTMAN. January 14, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. From whom?

Senator PITTMAN. It says, "Admiral Sims's personal file."

Admiral SIMS. Who wrote it?

Senator PITTMAN. I am asking you who wrote it.

Admiral SIMS. I am asking you who wrote it.

Senator PITTMAN. I have not the slightest idea. It is in your personal files.

Admiral SIMS. Then I have not anything to say about it. It may be a paper in my personal files, but if you want to question me about a paper that you read to me you must tell me who wrote it.

PITMAN. It came with the Bayly letter, which is dated 14 days after this memorandum.

SIMS. I can not comment on it. Is it a letter?

PITMAN. The Bayly letter is a letter. This is dated 14 days, and is marked "Admiral Sims's personal files."

SIMS. There were 50,000 papers in among those things, but I can not tell me what it is about I can not comment on it.

PITMAN. If you do not know what your historical section

SIMS. Of course I do not know. They sent over to me to send over all the stuff we got there, and it is up to them. I do not know what this is. That is not my Navy Department historical files.

PITMAN. Very well. I call your attention to the fact, —

SIMS. Evidently it is somebody writing to me his opinion.

PITMAN. No; Admiral —

SIMS. It is not mine, evidently.

PITMAN. It seems to be so in accord with your letter to —

SIMS. Oh; most people were in accord with me. That I go along so well. I did not write that, and I do not

PITMAN. I enjoy affording you amusement. I am going to — more amusement now. This letter of Bayly's—

SIMS. Let me state that—

PITMAN. Just a minute. I am asking you a question.

SIMS. I only want to say that the probability is that that memorandum sent me for my information by Dr. Page, the —

PITMAN. By Dr. Page?

SIMS. By Dr. Page, the American ambassador.

PITMAN. Did you discuss these matters with Dr. Page

SIMS. No; I saw him very rarely about those things. I saw him when I wanted help from him.

PITMAN. Do you mean to say Dr. Page would send you — of this kind in the nature of propaganda?

SIMS. Not in the nature of propaganda, but for my in-

PITMAN. Admiral, it is evident that this is intended as propaganda to be used against the effort of Gen. Pershing's separate army.

SIMS. Gen. Pershing at that time, or a little while after, — if in favor of brigading those troops in England, — was fixed up, and they did exactly what is recom-

PITMAN. You say on January 14 —

SIMS. No; I do not say on January 14, and I did not say — before I did not know what date it was, but I do know — crisis came he came out in the most splendid way and — willing to brigade my troops in any way that will help — cause."

Senator PITTMAN. This memorandum says, "The reasons to it are purely sentimental—national and State pride, and for personal distinction. There is no sound military reason for it." This is a propaganda against the establishing of a American unit. Whether it was written by you——

Admiral SIMS. It was not written by me.

Senator PITTMAN. Or by Dr. Page to you, do you think Senator Page would engage in such propaganda?

Admiral SIMS. I absolutely object to calling that propaganda. It is perfectly good, sound military sense that at the crisis those should be put in there. Of course, you had to put them in for personal ambition and all that sort of thing. It is exactly what was eventually done. It was a perfectly sound military reason. That was what Gen. Bliss recommended, and it is what Gen. Bliss eventually did when the crisis came. That is not propaganda. That is ordinary, plain, common military sense, that is all.

Senator PITTMAN. I am glad you view it in that light, but you will connect up your actions later on very admirably.

Admiral SIMS. I can tell you one thing. I do not know who wrote that paper, do not know anything about it at all, so what is the use of my trying to discuss a paper I do not know anything about?

Senator PITTMAN. I am very pleased to know that you are not of it.

Admiral SIMS. I did not say that I approved of it at all.

Senator PITTMAN. It is practically your point of view.

Admiral SIMS. Then I absolutely deny that I approved of it. I have not anything to say about that paper at all, except that it contradicts exactly what took place. It is not up to me as a sailor to approve of military procedure at all. All the expressions of opinion I made on the subject were repetitions of what had been said by Gen. Bliss, who was a soldier, and who had just come from consultation with Gen. Pershing and Foch, and so-and-so in the War Council, and I simply discussed this thing with Admiral Jellicoe, and Admiral Jellicoe, and so forth, to see what our disposition would be. That simply predicted what would have to take place in order to win the war, and it did take place, so what is the use fooling about it?

Senator PITTMAN. I am very glad to know you approve of the propaganda.

Admiral SIMS. You can keep on saying I approve of it, and you can keep on calling it propaganda, but that does not make it propaganda.

Senator PITTMAN. I simply accept your first testimony instead of your last, just as I have done several times.

Admiral SIMS. Oh, well——

Senator PITTMAN. Now, I want to insert in the record here what you read out again—and my purpose in inserting it is this——

Admiral SIMS. Before you leave that subject, Senator, I note in reading from the letter of November 15 you quoted a paragraph in which it is said, "If this is accepted, it appears that the effect of our military participation is wholly dependent on the rate of American shipbuilding, etc." I simply refer to that to identify the paragraph. That is taken out of the letter after the following paragraph:

It is difficult to obtain accurate figures of current production of new ships in the United States and England. It appears in round numbers that the United States is at a rate not far from double the rate of production. This rate of production continues the curve of available tonnage is on a dangerous angle, and the present estimate for future production in England indicates that, on the most optimistic basis, a rate of production will not be reached in less than a year and only then production in the United States can assist by supplying a portion of the necessary steel, etc. This indicates that until the United States production of new ships reaches the rate of 300,000 to 400,000 tons a month the existing tonnage is to decrease.

The tonnage situation was the gist of the whole thing. As stated in my testimony, the hope of victory on the part of the allied navies was to prevent that and to prevent the lines of communication, and Gen. Pershing understood perfectly. I would like to read this extract from Gen. Pershing to show how solicitous he was in that matter.

MILITARY SITUATION, 1915 (P. 7).

The British Fleet has established its superiority on the sea, yet the German U-boat had developed into a serious menace to allied shipping.

MILITARY SITUATION, SPRING OF 1917.

By the end of June 30 German submarines had accomplished the destruction of more than three and a quarter million tons of allied shipping. * * * The British Fleet held on foreign soil and she had withstood every allied attack by the German U-boats. It can not be said that the German hopes of final victory were either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of the problems of the Allies were difficult, supplies were becoming scarce, the armies had suffered tremendous losses. Discouragement existed among the civilian populations but throughout the armies as well. * * * The German U-boats during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks were made and their effect proved wholly insufficient against the German U-boats. The man power at home were low and there was little prospect of increasing their armed strength, even in the face of the probability of the military strength of the Central Powers against them in the spring

of the war of affairs that existed when we entered the war. While our U-boats were much encouragement, yet this was temporary, and a review of the situation made it apparent that America must make a supreme material contribution. After duly considering the tonnage possibilities, I cabled the following on July 6, 1917:

"I am contemplating sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May."

TONNAGE REQUIRED FOR UNITED STATES ARMY (P. 10).

The French life had enormously increased the tonnage of supplies required. Not only was it a question of providing food but enormous quantities of material were needed.

The American Expeditionary Forces were based on the Atlantic coast, thousands of miles of ocean to cross, with the growing submarine warfare, the quantity of ship tonnage that would be available for the maintenance of a line of communications by land 400 miles long from French front presented difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable for the Allies.

The available tonnage was inadequate to meet all initial demands, so the material for combat and instruction, as well as for supplies that could be obtained in Europe, must be established by those whose perspective included the whole who were familiar with general plans. (P. 12.)

MILITARY SITUATION IN 1917.

At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American Army. Marshall during his visit to America had made special request that a combat division be sent to Europe as visual evidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war. * * * (P. 18, Pershing's report.)

The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain elements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the first time French morale was stimulated. Still allied apprehensions were deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The following extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an allied conference held on July 26 with the French and Italian commanders and the British and French chiefs of staff.

That is referred to in my testimony at a conference that I attended.

General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive strategy on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front believed Allies could hold until Americans arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendancy.

The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With the approach of winter and the Russian collapse and the Italian crisis was deepened by the conviction that the Germans would undertake a decisive offensive in spring. * * * In view of this, it was represented to the War Department that the utmost importance that the allied preparations be expedited.

On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American troops in France and one division had appeared at the front.

That is, at the end of December, 1917, but one division had appeared at the front. [Continuing reading:]

Disappointment at the delay of the American effort soon began to be expressed. French and British authorities suggested the more rapid entry of our troops into the line. * * *

That was the reason that they did put them into the line. [Continuing reading:]

EXPEDITING SHIPMENT OF TROOPS (p. 23).

The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with replacement troops and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000. * * * While these numbers are short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 800,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the delay was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food.

On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department with the following recommendation—

That is, the following recommendation from Gen. Pershing:

In view of these conditions it is of the utmost importance that we move forward. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the Gens. Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum number that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of placing no higher because the limit of available transportation would not warrant it.

4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to transport over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than Army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needs must have to be rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by May in addition to the already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very weak and we must come to their rescue.

The war after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold out to give them a lot of support this year. It is therefore strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the plan of action as set forth above be regarded as immediate.

On December 20, 1917:

On December 20, 1917, and the First Corps is still incomplete by over 100,000 men and many corps troops. It cannot be too emphatically declared that we intend to take the field with at least four corps by June 30 (1918). With tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be able to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of the fact that the number of troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage is required for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipping tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage be obtained at once, as already recommended in my cables and by

THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARMY (P. 67, PERSHING'S REPORT).

In view of tonnage requirements, an officer was sent to Washington in March with a general statement of the shipping situation in France, as presented to the allied maritime transport council. In March, 1918, tonnage required for transport and maintenance of 900,000 men in France by June 30 was based upon which to calculate supply requisitions and the allocation

The allied maritime transport council showed that requirements for 1918 exceeded the available tonnage. Further revisions of the schedule were made at the Versailles agreement in May, under which American Infantry and Cavalry were to be transported in British shipping, and by the Versailles

As the tonnage developed as the allotment for August made the American tonnage by the shipping control committee was only 575,000 dead weight tons, whereas 803,000 tons (not including tonnage actually needed. It was strongly urged by me that more shipping tonnage be obtained and that a larger percentage of new shipping be placed in service.

It is important to show that Gen. Pershing was, of course, in agreement with the very serious situation as regards the necessity of giving the Allies early support.

SEN. Senator Pittman, will you have some further remarks from Admiral Sims?

PITTMAN. Yes.

SEN. The hour of 12 has arrived. Will you have some remarks from Trammell?

TRAMMELL. Yes; later on.

SEN. We will adjourn at this point, then, until tomorrow.

At 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, Mar. 23, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
in Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Tramm

CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Senator Pitt-
man had some further questions, I believe.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

SEN. PITTMAN. I have here what purports to be a letter
from you, Admiral, to Senator Carter Glass, under date of
March 19, 1920. [Reading:]

SENATOR GLASS. Referring to the testimony given by Representative
Carter Glass before the subcommittee of the Senate investigating awards,
I enclose with a copy of the letter I have just written to Senator Hale, with
reference to Mr. Martin Egan, concerning my alleged criticisms of the Army,
and of certain letters from Gen. Pershing showing my cooperation with
the Army and with the general.

I believe, show you how very unlikely it is that I could have held any
opinion as to the general's handling of the Army as was indicated by the
letters mentioned.

Very truly yours,

WM. S. SIMS,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy

SEN. GLASS.

Room 235, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

ADMIRAL SIMS. Will you read the inclosures?

SEN. PITTMAN. I have not the inclosures. You placed them in
the hearing, did you not?

ADMIRAL SIMS. I would like to have them read.

SEN. PITTMAN. I would like to read them myself.

ADMIRAL SIMS. They are in the hearing, there.

CHAIRMAN. Do you want to have them read or just have them
in the hearing?

ADMIRAL SIMS. I think they ought to be read in connection with

CHAIRMAN. Very well.

SEN. PITTMAN. I have them, I believe. They are found at page
23 of the hearings of the subcommittee on Naval Affairs, United

States Senate, second session, on Senate resolution 285, and the result as follows [Reading]:

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I., February 14, 1919

MY DEAR SENATOR HALE: When I appeared before your committee on Saturday, February 10, when an effort was made to convey the impression that my relations with the Army were strained, and that I was criticising the actions of the Army, I told you that my recollection was that I could produce evidence to show how cordial the relations in question were.

I find that on November 6, 1918, I wrote a letter to Mr. Martin Egan, who was in Paris, in which I referred to a story I had heard to the effect that I was not in complete sympathy with Gen. Pershing. I inclose you herewith a copy of this letter.

Subsequently, Mr. George Bar Baker, who is mentioned as Commander Baker in the first paragraph of the above letter, communicated to me the following extract from a letter he had received from Martin Egan:

"I never did believe the several reports from the Admiral, brought over the water by a lot of busybodies, and neither did the general. But it was fine to have his assurances, and when I talked to the general he said he never did believe any of them, and that he knew all the time that the admiral was playing the game loyal to every American effort in Europe. We have the satisfaction of clearing up the matter anyhow."

As further showing the cordial relations which have always existed between Gen. Pershing and myself, and all of his forces, I inclose copies of letters received from him dated April 1, 1919, April 21, 1919, and May 4, 1919. These letters will show that nothing could possibly have been more cordial than were our personal relations and cooperation throughout the war.

Very sincerely, yours,

WILLIAM S. SIMS

Senator FREDERICK HALE,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
France, April 1, 1919

Personal.

Admiral WILLIAM S. SIMS,
United States Navy, 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I received with a mixture of pleasure and regret your letter of March 21—pleasure at the kind words and cordial sentiments that you expressed, and regret that you were leaving England before I had an opportunity of seeing you and thanking you in person for the consistent and cordial cooperation that you have given to the American Expeditionary Forces. That there had been such good cooperation and such lack of friction between the land and the sea forces, I am well aware, due in the largest measure to your helpful attitude and big way of looking at things.

With heartiest congratulations for the splendid services that you have rendered to the Government during this war, and with kindest personal wishes for your health and continued success, I remain,

Sincerely, yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
France, April 21, 1919

Personal.

Admiral WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Care Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL SIMS: I have just received a printed copy of the proceedings at the luncheon tendered you by the American Luncheon Club on the occasion of your leaving London. I have read your remarks with a great deal of interest, and especially appreciate the very generous and kind things you said of the American Expeditionary Forces and of me personally.

to take the opportunity of again expressing to you my personal appreciation, and the feelings of the whole American Expeditionary Forces, of the successful cooperation of the American naval forces under your command in the war. We realize fully that, had it not been for the Navy, who kept us afloat night and day over our transport fleet, the American effort in France would have been unsuccessful. Had it not been for you but few troops would have been landed and these few could not have been supplied. The Navy's assistance was constant and arduous, and was always given in a most generous spirit of cooperation. With kindest wishes for your continued good health and success, I am, very respectfully, yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
(OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
France, May 4, 1919.

WILLIAM W. SIMS,

U. S. Government, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have just received a clipping from the New York Times of the 2nd of May on the Victory loan, in which you spoke very effectively and wisely about some things with reference to me and the job that I had. I can not tell you just how much what you say touches me, coming after two years of most loyal cooperation and support. I have often thought about what you did, but feel that I have never conveyed my thanks. Now, your speech arouses in me such a flood of sentiment that I cannot but to divine what I feel. I am sure you are enjoying a long-earned rest after your more than two years of service. Believe me, very truly,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
London, S. W. 1, November 6, 1918.

SIR: I have just had a chat with Commander Baker, and to my surprise he told me that you are under the impression that I am not in complete sympathy with Gen. Pershing. How such a rumor could possibly have arisen is a mystery to me.

Over the personal correspondence that I have had with the general, and the official letters I have had concerning the Navy's relations with the Army, your mind would be completely disabused of any such idea.

I have repeatedly stated to the general that my understanding of the war is that it is nothing to the world but the line of communications between the Allies. I believe I have explained that there is really no naval war going on. Our Marines are not fighting our military vessels, but are attacking the German Navy's munitions and food. In other words, that the German Navy is fighting against the armies of the Allies, and that our business as naval men is to insure this line of supply.

I have been in complete sympathy with Gen. Pershing but I have been puzzled over the way in which the biggest military stunt in all history has been handled. If I have not actually said it to the general, I have repeatedly said to him that I have little conception as to how such a problem could be handled. I have said that the Navy has to perform is, in comparison with the Army, a very simple thing, and I have always expressed my sincere sympathy with the Army as it has to encounter.

As you, as well as I do, that a war can not be conducted by a number of people, there being a certain amount of criticism in each country of all the Allies. We have, of course, not escaped such criticism. You will hear at times, both in London and in Paris, expressions of regret that things are not being done as well as could be expected with the American Army, or the British Army, or the French Army, as the case may be. Unfortunately, when such opinions are expressed, some people will try to bolster up their case by quoting the supposed opinion of people who are more or less in the public eye. It is possible that I have been quoted in this way, but I can assure you that it is wholly unjust.

Of course, I do not know what rumors and gossip you may have heard, but consider it a favor if you would write to me very frankly as one American to another and tell me what you know, so as to give me an opportunity to state my case.

Very sincerely, yours,

WILLIAM S. SIMS

M. EGAN, Esq., *Paris*.

Those were the letters, I assume, Admiral, that were inclosed with your letter to Senator Glass under date of February 15, which I have just read.

Admiral SIMS. Inclosed to Senator Hale. I sent copies to Senator Glass.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. I received a reply from Senator Carter Glass in which he does not agree with the sentiments that I expressed.

Senator PITTMAN. This is the letter of Senator Carter Glass in reply to your letter in which you inclosed copies of the letters I have just read. [Reading:]

FEBRUARY 17, 1919.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL SIMS: I have yours of February 15, inclosing your letter of February 14 to Senator Hale with certain letters attached, written by you on November 6, 1918, to Mr. Martin Egan, at Paris, and written to you at London on April 21, and at Washington on May 4, by Gen. Pershing. I note your suggestion that the letters should convince me of the unlikelihood of your having "held such opinions concerning Gen. Pershing's handling of the army" as was indicated by your testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee on February 10.

I disagree no less with your method of stating the case than with your deductions. In the first place, I gave no testimony touching your "opinions concerning Gen. Pershing's handling of the army." Inspection of the record will clearly demonstrate to you that I testified as a matter of fact and not as to any opinion of Gen. Pershing or expressed by you. Pointedly, I testified that, on October 30, 1918, in your presence at the Hotel Crillon, in Paris, in response to my statement that Gen. Pershing, ten days theretofore, had signified his opposition to an armistice with Germany, you explicitly said to Congressmen Whaley and Byrnes and me that we were not to grant an armistice because the communications of supply of the American army had broken down. Of that fact I have no more doubt than that I am writing at this moment, nor has either of my former colleagues any doubt of it. I might have added that, with a gesture, you precluded further talk on the subject by saying, "Oh, well, it will all come out in due course."

The fact that nearly seven months later you and Gen. Pershing exchanged personal letters can not alter the circumstances nor in any way affect my recollection of it. The further fact, as disclosed by your letter of November 6, that a week after our audience with you in Paris, and after your return to London, you found it necessary to write Mr. Egan to set him straight concerning your attitude toward Gen. Pershing and the American army, so far from altering my recollection, singularly accentuates the likelihood that, prior to the discovery of your misstatements, you had said to other persons substantially what you said to Congressmen Byrnes, Whaley and me on October 30, 1918, and which caused my two colleagues to travel 150 miles to Tours in an open automobile, in desperately chilly weather, for purpose of verification.

But, these things aside, I must decline to concede that anything could be said that would create one particle of doubt in my mind as to the absolute accuracy of my statement to the subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee as to what you said in Paris to my colleagues and me.

In this connection I shall take leave here to say something which I could not say on the 10th instant without appearing to break in rudely on your testimony before the committee. In this testimony you were at pains to include me in the suggestion that, if we believed you had made at Paris the statement ascribed to you, and subsequently had found out that it was not true, we had neglected our duty in "putting up a howl" to get you dismissed from the Navy. As it seems to me, your eagerness to make this superficial point, you failed utterly to realize the nature of the only presumption upon which it rationally could be based. In short, to sustain this contention, you must assume that I was wrong in my inference that your statement to me at the Crillon in Paris was the recital, in good faith, of something which

... a fact and which you had repeated to my colleagues and ... Apparently you think I should have regarded your statement as ascertained to be untrue, as a malignant invention of your own, with deliberate intent to defame the American Army; and your ... that, without troubling to consider how you came by the ... for an instant attributing to you an evil motive, I regarded ... and your honorable record as a naval officer a sufficient defense ... a mean action. I distinctly testified, not once but twice, that ... from our conversation that you intended to be critical ... in any way to disparage its officers; but from your testimony ... this equitable state of mind on my part, since you ... regarded you as a slanderer and "put up a howl" for your ... to divine how you may derive any satisfaction from such

CARTER GLASS.

... S. SIMS,
Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

... day of November, 1919, Admiral, you wrote a letter to ... Bayly, of the British Royal Navy. This was two ... armistice. I quote from that letter. [Reading:]

... that it would be impossible to force the enemy back through ... only on account of the great difficulty of the terrain but also ... in this area could be supplied only over one main-line ... thought possible that this road could carry supplies sufficient ... necessary. There is no doubt that the military opinion was ... that the attacking forces were not willing to make greater sacrifices ... called upon to bear. That these sacrifices were necessary is ... of course, I do not know much about details at present, but ... they were very severe. It turned out, as was to be expected, ... sufficient to supply all the needs of the troops. Horses had to ... the troops, notwithstanding the scarcity of horses at this ... is nothing succeeds like success, and the cutting of the im- ... has been accomplished.

... that I have on this line on this topic, Mr. Chairman.

... TRAMMELL. Admiral, just what time in 1917 was it that ... under orders of the Navy Department?

... SIMS. As I remember it, I left on the 31st of March, 1917.

... TRAMMELL. The conversation that took place between you ... person, then, when he warned you against Great Brit- ... to that date?

... SIMS. Just a few days before.

... TRAMMELL. Just a few days before?

... SIMS. Just a few days before.

... TRAMMELL. In other words, it was before the declaration

... SIMS. Yes, before the declaration of war, which was April 6.

... TRAMMELL. And after the declaration of war I believe you ... did not state to you that he would as soon fight Great ... Germany?

... SIMS. No, on the occasion of his visit to England in Octo- ... like that, all he said on that occasion was to express ... I should not let the British pull the wool over my ... expression similar to that. In my testimony yesterday ... to convey was that it was the expression that he ... that occasion that I did not remember. I saw in one ... this morning the statement that I had said I did not ... of those expressions having been used until somebe-

reminded me of it. Of course I remembered the one that was in Washington. I probably never will live long enough to forget it. It was graven on my memory, I can assure you; but I do not remember what he had said to me in London until my attention was called to it by one of my staff who was present and heard it. That is what I meant yesterday. Of course he did not say then that we would as soon fight Great Britain as Germany.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just want to get those dates fixed.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is, I wanted to get those dates in the record. I do not think they were put in the record yesterday. In your direct testimony you made this statement on the question of the losses of tonnage and so on:

It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the allied cause as a whole two and one-half millions of shipping sunk unnecessarily. While this is, of course, an estimate based upon actual results obtained when our help became effective, and the reason to doubt that it is a conservative estimate.

Here is a drawing that was transmitted with this letter of transmittal to the Navy Department from your headquarters.

Admiral SIMS. Shall I read this letter?

Senator TRAMMELL. No, you need not read it. I just exhibit the letter to you for the purpose of identification of the drawing here.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That drawing or schedule purports to be a statement of information as to the amount of available tonnage to the Allies, and the amount of submarines available to the Germans, as I understand from the letter of transmittal and the explanatory notes. That schedule shows the tonnage available to the Allies to June 1 or June 30, 1918, and the tonnage which, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. Now perhaps it will clear up that situation—I am just as anxious to clear it up as you are—if I may give you the data on which the statement in my direct testimony was based. I made out a full statement of it, but decided not to include an account of the number of pages and that sort of thing, and I summarized it in the statement that is there. The difference is that this includes American tonnage and the other does not.

Senator TRAMMELL. This one here does not include American tonnage?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, this one does include American tonnage.

Senator TRAMMELL. This includes American tonnage?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Does this chart show that there was more tonnage available during the spring of 1918 than during the spring and summer of 1917? Does it show more or less?

Admiral SIMS. Less. It shows less. It is coming downhill. Generally speaking, without looking up the actual details, the tonnage successively decreased with great rapidity in the spring of 1917, less rapidly in the summer, and with still less rapidity in the fall of 1917, and it was only much later that the two curves crossed each other. We kept that in my headquarters, a chart going, which showed the decrease in losses and the increase in building, and we worked out a curve to show when they crossed. You can see by glancing at the chart where they cross. It was for that reason that when

As the curves approaching, we could make an estimate of three months ahead as to when they would cross, remembering that I think it was to a party of American correspondents in London who came over there officially, that we estimated that the two curves would cross each other in a certain month, and remember whether it was June or July or something else, and remember that attracted a great deal of attention in the United States as to when they would cross, and the crossing was about that

time meant that the building on both sides, in America and in England, was a little bit greater than the losses by submarines and from that time on we were on the increase in building. It was well along in 1918, about the middle of March, that the building of merchant ships in America and in England crossed the curve and became a little greater than the sinkings at that time. The curve of the sinkings was going down and the building of ships was going up, so from that time on the Germans knew that they could not succeed in their submarine campaign. But the great period of danger was the summer and fall of 1917. As Mr. Hoover testified, it was excessive in April, May, June, and the summer of 1917, and continued to be very grave until the winter of 1917-18. Finally the situation of the tonnage.

Q. T. CUMMELL. According to the chart that was transmitted to the Department from your headquarters there was more tonnage available in 1917 than there was available up to June, 1918, was there?

A. T. CUMMELL. Yes, there was more tonnage available in 1917 than in 1918, because it was successively decreased during that year. That was what was the matter with the whole business. It was decreasing so rapidly, and that decrease had to be stopped, or we would not have won the war.

Q. T. CUMMELL. In the spring of 1918, with less tonnage than in the summer of 1917, was not the movement of American troops over the ocean increased?

A. T. CUMMELL. The movement of American troops was not largely increased. The crisis came in March; March 21 the great drive on the Western Front. Immediately after that the big movement came. In the first year of the war, we had from 250,000 to 300,000 troops taken over. The average per month was about 250,000. At that time on they saw the necessity of getting the shipping and they were enabled then to withdraw from a great part of their shipping which they would not have dared to do before. It had not been that our own shipping and the allied shipping was increasing and was greater than the destruction.

Q. T. CUMMELL. Mr. Hoover brought out also, and it is a very important point, that if we could have seen ahead a year, and could have seen that we were going to arrive at a position where the building of tonnage surpassed the destruction, we could have taken the action in 1917 which we did take in March or April and succeeding months, but which we would not have taken in 1918, and which it would not have been prudent to take in 1918. Do you know whether that is very clear or not.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think I understand your point, Admiral Sims. Of course, if we could have seen that we were going to have an increased supply of ships and a decrease of the submarine menace, we might have carried more troops in 1917.

Admiral SIMS. We would have dared to do it, but we did not want to do it until we were sure of that.

Senator TRAMMELL. Really, that is just about what I thought. If that is true, was not that one of the elements that caused the delay in the progress that was made in the war, instead of it being dependent upon the question of the Navy not entering the war whole-heartedly as you charge?

Admiral SIMS. The tonnage situation, of course, is what influenced it, but the trouble is that by our tardiness in entering the war we lost two and one-half million tons of shipping which we should not have lost. If we had butted in with all of our force in the very beginning instead of coming in whole-heartedly after six months or a year, we would have saved that tonnage and that situation would not have arisen. I do not know whether you know it or not, but up to the first year of the war we did not have much more than 100,000 tons of all classes on the other side, and there was not a single ship that was not available or could have been available to be over the top in the first 15 days of the war. Now, there is the whole point of my statement and all of my criticism. I have not got anything to say about anything else particularly, except that the Navy Department and the Government did not go into the war after they had declared it.

Now, I made a little statement at the end of this long statement about the shipping, which I did not include in the other, and I think probably the best way to clear that up, with your permission, is to read that statement. I think it will clear it. This is a review of the merchant ship tonnage situation. I did not include it in the other statement on account of its length. I warn you that this is a tedious and had figures in it and will require close attention.

A few facts and figures about the merchant tonnage situation in 1917, may help to an understanding of why the losses in the submarine campaign were so dangerous.

In August, 1914, the total tonnage of the world was, approximately 45,000,000 gross tons; of this about 5,000,000 tons was interposed between the ports of the Central Powers, leaving about 40,000,000 tons. Mr. Hoover stated before the committee. This 40,000,000 tons, however, included large numbers of ships used by the navy of Japan and the United States, for their own purposes. The available figures of the allied shipping authorities show that in August, 1914, 31,500,000 tons of shipping was all that was available for the allied powers. This does not include the American shipping which was comparatively small.

The total imports of Europe (other than Russia and the Central Powers) were about 170,000,000 tons annually. It required the employment of about 25,000,000 tons of merchant shipping to transport these imports overseas to their European destination.

In the first 28 months of the war, or to January 1, 1917, the net loss of this tonnage amounted to 400,000 tons. The allies had, therefore, 31,000,000 at their disposition, American sea tonnage of 2,500,000 not being included.

10,000,000 tons of this shipping was being used by the allies for military or naval purposes, other than trans-Atlantic convoys and supplies. Another million tons was constantly under repair. The net amount available for munitions, raw materials, etc., was, therefore, only 1,000,000 tons. War restrictions had reduced imports enough so that the margin was sufficient, and a margin of safety was in fact as large as that at the outbreak of war. This fact was a comforting circle, and was constantly emphasized by the government to discount, in the minds of their people, the losses through the submarine campaign.

But the margin changed sharply for the worse, however, with the beginning of 1917. In the first quarter the net losses rose to 1,300,000 tons. In the month of April alone the net loss mounted to 800,000 tons as much as in the whole period of the war, up to January. In four months the margin between the amount of shipping available and the absolute minimum required had been cut nearly in half. The margin had sunk from about 6,000,000 tons to about 3,500,000 tons, being made for the increased amount under repairs, and damage received in unsuccessful attacks by submarines. At a rate of loss amounting to about 800,000 tons net per year, this margin would have been wiped out within five months, or by October 1, 1917.

Europe had already been reduced to 100,000,000 tons of shipping, a reduction of 40 per cent. That is by the decrease of luxuries, and that sort of thing. They could hardly go much further without starving the armies or the civil population of the allied countries. By starving the neutrals and cutting their shipping, enough tonnage might have been kept to keep things going until the end of the year. It is, therefore, a certainty that, if the rate of losses experienced had been continued, the Allies would have been compelled to surrender by the end of 1917. They would have lost the war. The United States might have been ready to render later assistance, but absolutely unavailing.

But the adoption of the convoy system, and also of the other measures recommended to the department from the beginning, resulted in a reduction of the losses to half the rate in the last half of 1917, and to one-third the April, 1917, losses in the first months of 1918.

The losses were still very heavy, and caused great privation in the allied countries. It has not been sufficiently realized that the efforts were made in order to overcome the shipping losses. Imports of the allied countries were cut in half, and the population on comparatively meager rations.

The United States alone would have failed to meet the issue. The tonnage available would still have been greater than the tonnage required, if this tonnage had been kept on its normal schedule. Through the war efforts of America, however, the United States became almost the sole supply source of the Allies. Shipping was concentrated on the longer South American, Pacific, and Oriental routes, and concentrated on the trans-Atlantic route. The number of trips each ship could make per year was reduced.

just so much tonnage added to the allied mercantile resources. Mr. Hoover's appeal to the American people for food for the Allies was promptly responded to, and America was able to provide enough food to meet the Allies' needs, and the shipping hauls were thus eliminated.

Australian wheat, South American wheat, and so forth, but three and four million tons. It takes shipping a very long time to bring it. The food could be supplied from America by the same haul.

Despite all these efforts, the crisis was very grave in the months of 1918. Hence the importance of the time element was so repeatedly insisted upon to the Navy Department. The average monthly losses for the six months of the unrestricted marine warfare, before American naval aid became effective (February to July, inclusive), were 640,000 tons per month. The losses for the first six months of partial American intervention of the use of convoys (August 1, 1917–February 1, 1918), were 390,000 tons per month. The average losses for the remainder of the war, when American help was really effective (February 1, 1918–November 11, 1918), were 250,000 tons per month.

It is therefore possible to estimate what American help would have accomplished had it been rendered promptly instead of being delayed for some months. There is the point of all the criticism made—practically the basis of it. If the process of our getting into the fight, once we were at war, had been accelerated, as could have been done, by sending over immediately, in April, 1917, all available antisubmarine craft, and by accelerating and adopting the convoy system, there is no reason to doubt that, during May, June, and July, the losses would probably have averaged 250,000 tons per month less than they did, that is, the difference between the average for the first two periods just referred to. For the six months following the losses would probably have been 140,000 tons per month less than they actually were. For the remaining nine months of the war losses would probably have been reduced another 100,000 tons per month. While this is only an estimate, it is based on the results obtained when our help became effective. The delay of the Navy Department in getting into the war in the critical zone, by not helping up the Allies whole-heartedly, and accelerating the production of antisubmarine craft, probably resulted in the unnecessary loss of the allied cause, as a whole, of 2,500,000 tons of merchant shipping. The loss of this shipping in 1917 and the early months of 1918 delayed proportionately the transport of the American army to France. If a million additional tons of shipping had been available at the beginning of 1917, the rate of transport of American troops and supplies would have been doubled; the Allies could have been in a position to make a counter attack three months earlier, and the war might well have been ended by the time when, as a matter of fact, the allied attack only began, i. e., in July, 1918. If this had been possible, six months of bloody fighting would have been avoided and probably half a million lives saved, to say nothing of some billions of dollars.

The shipping shortage was therefore acute from the middle of 1917 on to the time of the armistice. All plans for American assistance to the Allies was conditioned upon and limited by the tonnage available for consideration, as Mr. Hoover has testified. From the standpoint

There was a choice between receiving supplies to maintain the American troops, which would require more of the importation of which tonnage was not available. In this situation, America was not pressed to send troops, which were needed, but the Allies decided to keep their own supplies with the available tonnage. Only the German submarines forced the Allies to appeal for American reinforcements. In order to transport these to Europe the Allies abandoned practically the whole of their shipping routes from America, and to turn over practically the whole of the tonnage for the transport of American troops. New England had to bear on the neutrals, and they were practically turned over to the Allies an additional half million tons. Only then was the transport and supply of the Allies in 1918 made possible.

From these facts, it is not a difficult matter to estimate with some degree of accuracy the losses suffered by the allied cause as a whole, by the Navy Department to cooperate whole-heartedly, and to the war zone all available antisubmarine craft in the course of the war. As has been already noted, there were no losses in the unrestricted submarine campaign, distinguished by the American cooperation.

During the period, February, 1917, to August 1, 1917, when the American effort was ineffective, and when the bulk of the shipping was lost. Losses were on the average 640,000 tons per month.

During the phase of moderate assistance from America, the employment of the convoy system, the period from August 1, 1917, to February 1, 1918. Losses were 390,000 tons per month on the average.

The third period was from February 1, 1918, to the armistice, averaging 250,000 tons per month; this was the period when full cooperation was given by America, and when full use was made of the convoy system.

Had we got into the fight, once we had gone to war, as accelerated, as it could have been by the immediate employment of all available antisubmarine craft, and by the adoption of the convoy system, as was urged upon the Allies in the first period referred to above would have been reduced. Losses during May, June, and July would have been reduced to the period, or 250,000 tons a month less than was actually suffered. Similarly, the second period would probably have been reduced to 100,000 tons a month, and losses for the next six months would have been reduced to 100,000 tons a month less than the actual figures. The campaign would have been so far defeated by February 1, 1918, that losses during the remaining period of the war would have been reduced by another 100,000 from those actually suffered. It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the Allies a whole 2,500,000 tons of shipping, sunk unnecessarily. Of course, only an estimate, it is based on actual experience, and what actually happened in the various phases of American cooperation in the war.

The result of the loss of this shipping can also be translated as a prolongation of the war, and an unnecessary sacrifice of blood and treasure in accomplishing the victory.

If, in the fall of 1917, the Allies had had at their disposition an additional million tons of shipping, which, as has been pointed out, was unnecessarily lost to the allied cause, by the delay on the part of the Navy Department in getting into the war, and in adopting the convoy system, it would have been possible to double or triple the number of American troops that were being sent abroad. In April, 1918, without affecting the transport to the Allies of our military supplies or foodstuffs. America could have had a million men in France by March 1, 1918, instead of 250,000.

The earlier defeat of the submarine campaign would have had a great effect on the morale of the German army and the German population in 1917, as it actually did in 1918.

Now, there is the point I would like to make with all possible emphasis. If we could have put a million men in France in the fall of 1917, as we actually did in 1918, we would have broken down the morale of the German population and the German army that much sooner. The information that we have at the present time shows us that the German army went to pieces because of the decrease of its morale and because of the decrease of the morale of the population behind it.

The German high command would have been forced to undertake a desperate military venture earlier than was actually the case. They would have been forced to endure, in the early spring, the victorious assault of the Allies. In either case, the presence of a million Americans on March 1, 1918, and of another million within the next few months following, would have forced the victory by July, if only we judge by what actually happened when this American force became available. We know what did happen.

The unnecessary loss of shipping can therefore be stated as having caused a prolongation of the war a minimum of about four months and thereby was responsible for the unnecessary killing of a million men, and of the expenditure of many billions of dollars.

Now I would like to put that in the form of a perfectly simple illustration which can be understood by anybody. It all hinges upon one question, Was our naval effort in the war effective? We all agree that it was. Those who oppose this argument have got to show that it was not. If it was effective, it must have shortened the war. It therefore follows that if there was delay in making it effective, the delay prolonged the war. If three engines will put out a fire in a certain time, four engines will put it out in less time. If there is a delay in sending the fourth engine, there will be a corresponding prolongation of the fire. I have shown by the official records that there was delay; delay in preparing for war, even after February 2, 1917, and delay in sending our forces and personnel after we declared war. Therefore those responsible for this delay are responsible for the appalling sacrifices of blood and treasure that resulted. That, I think, makes the situation entirely clear.

Senator TRAMMELL. According to a chart that you introduced as evidence here, if I understand it correctly, about the 1st of July, 1917, there was a very rapid decline in the submarine menace, beginning from the 1st of July. This is a chart that you introduced in testimony.

ANS. Yes.

TEAMMELL. What do you attribute that very rapid accomplishment of the submarine to, beginning with July 1917?

ANS. It was largely due to the introduction of the convoy system at that time a good proportion of the American shipping was lost and it was due also to the augmentation of other defenses. They were using then the depth charge to a great extent than they had before. They were also using mines, etc.

TEAMMELL. In September I wrote a letter to the Navy Department. I will quote a paragraph here. [Reading:]

"In the anti-submarine campaign, generally speaking, the losses have not increased but, on the contrary, appear to be on the decrease. The fact that the number of submarines operating has, if any, increased is difficult to explain. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the cause. The most reasonable opinion as to decrease in submarine losses which there is the greatest degree of unanimity is as follows: extension of the convoys system together with increased experience of the merchant shipping and escorting craft.

"The anti-submarine craft and constant increase of experience thereof, and the extensive use of the depth charge.

"The anti-submarine morale from the above, and particularly, from the use of depth charges. It is wholly impossible to estimate the number of submarines caused by depth charges, but the fact that depth charges are used every time a submarine is encountered, unquestionably has a marked effect.

"The enemy must be experiencing in maintaining an adequate supply of submarines."

TEAMMELL. Was our navy rendering any effective assistance with the 1st of July, 1917, when there seemed to be a turn in the tide of submarine destruction?

ANS. We may say that if we had sent over only one destroyer we could have been rendering effective assistance in protecting the merchant ships. A number of destroyers employed as a whole by the Navy on July 1, 1917, we had 20 destroyers and 2 tenders actually at the front. They were extremely useful, as useful as the vessels of like character of the Allies. Our destroyers were as good as anybody else's. They helped out. The day when we put it in operation, was the turning point of the war. I do not know that it would be well to go into any detail about that thing now, because it is rather a technical question. But I come to consider the fact that in the situation in which we were in 1917 and 1918, the whole of the war hinges on the preservation of sufficient tonnage to carry on the war, or the termination of the war to a termination as soon as possible, there was a time when it would not have been advantageous to put in a convoy system. Without going into any explanation I can just give you an idea of what I mean. Many of the men interested in very large shipping companies, having over 200 ships, were opposed to the introduction of the convoy system and it was for this reason. One of those men said that by experience that one of my ships can make 100 voyages, on an average, without getting torpedoed. But if he goes into a convoy, where he has to wait for convoys to be made up, where he has to conform to the speed of the slowest

ship, I can get only, say, 8 round turns instead of 12 in the same time. Freight rates are so high that I can afford my ship after 12 or 13 trips, rather than to cut down the number of trips by that much."

Applying the same principle to all the tonnage of the Allies follows that if you want to bring a war to a successful conclusion you can do the same thing with your tonnage; that is to say, to bring supplies in the fastest possible time, if you think it is worth doing so. There comes a period, however, when it is no longer worth doing so; and the adoption of the convoy system was the turning point of the whole thing, as has been fully explained in my testimony in the articles that I have written.

Senator TRAMMELL. When did our associates in the war adopt the convoy system?

Admiral SIMS. They adopted the convoy system on the 1st of May. They carried out experiments during the early part of May.

I recommended the convoy system about the 1st of May. It was then in discussion and had been for a long time. They carried out an experimental convoy which, if my recollection serves me, arrived in Great Britain about the 20th of May, and I think that on the 21st of May I reported to the Navy Department that it had been adopted in principle and would be put in operation as soon as possible.

Senator TRAMMELL. These losses, then, which occurred from the submarine during April and probably part of May, if they had been put into full operation, if they are to be charged to anybody, should be charged to our associates probably more than to America, should they not, if there was a mistake and there was a neglect in adopting the system?

Admiral SIMS. It depends on when the convoy system was put into operation. That is something on which I do not care to express an opinion. When the whole thing came up there it was a question of animated discussion among the Admiralties as to when the convoy system should be put in operation. There were those who were in favor of it and those who were opposed to it. As I have already explained, one of the principal opponents of the thing were the merchant shippers themselves and the merchant shipping companies; but it was finally decided that they should be put in operation early in May, and they had an experimental convoy that came up from Gibraltar, and on the 21st of May, as I remember, the 31st of May. Here is a cable that I sent to the Navy Department on the 31st of May. [Reading:]

With reference my two previous dispatches concerning convoy system of merchant shipping, Scandinavian and North Sea convoys in force now over the Atlantic have proved very successful. First ocean convoy from Gibraltar arrived on May 20. Second ocean convoy from Hampton Roads of 12 merchant ships escorted by British cruiser sailed May 24. They will be met outside and escorted by our submarine danger zone. The department's cooperation with the plan set forth in my dispatch of May 1 is urgently recommended. Early reply important in that Admiralty plans may be governed accordingly.

So that on the 1st of May I recommended that the Navy Department cooperate with the Allies on a convoy system, but I was unable to get them to do so, and I was constantly urging them for some months before they would come into the convoy system. This was due to a false estimate which they made which was based

that concerned the Army, the merchant ships, and ~~ships~~ etc. I can explain that further if it is necessary.

TEAMMELL. Now, it is apparent that our associates in the ~~putting~~ the convoy system into effect. Might we not ~~that~~ they put the convoy system into effect six months ~~earlier~~ would have been ended six months sooner?

SAS. You can perfectly well do that, provided that they ~~were~~ to do it. But all the testimony I have given shows, ~~not~~ by the testimony of the British Admiralty, Admiral ~~that~~ in the communications on this subject, that they ~~the~~ ships that were necessary to do it. They were ~~not~~ ~~releasing~~ their submarine craft, they were building ~~a~~ destroyer program provided for six to eight destroyers ~~that~~ they got enough destroyers to do so, they put the con- ~~voys~~ operation. They could not put it into operation ~~without~~ the destroyers of America. They asked us for 14 ~~destroyers~~. America did not accord them those cruisers ~~without~~ delay, and it then finally gave them. Up to that ~~time~~ had been used on what is called the ten s o (?), ~~and~~ off the ice banks, to head off the raiders that had ~~been~~ the *Moore* and vessels of that type. They had to ~~be~~ and put them on convoy.

TEAMMELL. When they first adopted the convoy system ~~and~~ maintaining a great many ships on those long trade ~~and~~ that convoy system adopted after they had diverted ~~to~~ the Canadian and American coast more, so as to ~~be~~?

SAS. I do not quite understand the first part of your

TEAMMELL. When they first adopted the convoy system ~~and~~ sending ships to Australia, and having ships go on ~~the~~ ~~the~~ weeks for a voyage, instead of sending them ~~to~~ where they could get them quicker, as they could ~~be~~ Canada?

SAS. You would have to go into the history of the ship- ~~ping~~ when that was done. I would not be sure about that. ~~At~~ point you have not mentioned, and which bears on ~~particularly~~. You must remember that the unrestricted ~~submarine~~ campaign only began in February. If you will read Grand ~~Admiral~~ Treppe's book, which for anyone interested in naval ~~history~~ of the most interesting publications I have ever read, ~~there~~ there that the submarine campaign before February ~~was~~ one, and he constantly inveighed against the restrict- ~~ions~~ were not allowed to attack certain ships, and the sub- ~~marine~~ commanders constantly reported that that restricted them, ~~because~~ because they could not always be sure whether a ship ~~was~~ or passenger ship, and they did not dare fire for fear ~~of~~ commission, and all that sort of thing. The whole ~~thing~~ when the Germans determined that they must put in ~~a~~ campaign: that is, any ship at all big enough to waste ~~their~~ they would fire at it. That brought about a new situa- ~~tion~~. That new situation began from that point; because, ~~pointed~~ pointed out, up to the time of the introduction of the ~~submarine~~ submarine campaign the total losses of the Allies (

whole were only 400,000 tons, or half as much as they lost in 1917. So that what we are talking about is the force subject you see, to February, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. If anybody is to be blamed for the April, 1917, it is not the United States, is it?

Admiral SIMS. How is that?

Senator TRAMMELL. If anyone is to be blamed for the loss in 1917, which was the high water mark in losses, the United States not to be blamed for that, is it?

Admiral SIMS. The United States is not to be blamed for that, but the United States is to be blamed for the losses in the latter part of the month of April, and for the losses in the month of May, in proportion to the assistance they could have given.

Now, as to whether the convoy system was put in operation as it ought to have been or not, that, I say, is a matter of professional opinion. You will find that thing explained in the United States Service Institute by an officer there, who discusses this whole question. It is a question of naval controversy there at that time, whether it ought to have been put in earlier, as to the errors by the Allies in reference to the convoys, if they were errors, in reference to the conduct of the war in general—heavens knows there are plenty of them, as you will find out by reading the criticisms since in books published. The severity of the criticisms there, the criticisms that I have made here look like 30 cents. Of course they made mistakes all during the war. It was a new proposition. Nobody had any experience of this kind of warfare at all, and nobody could be savage enough in his disposition to know what the Germans would do, and therefore to prepare for it; so that I would advise to be a little bit gentle in criticisms of the naval officers in general, because they were not prepared for this war, because we are more or less civilized people, and we could not possibly have imagined that the Germans would do what they did do. If we could have imagined it we would have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, and could have persuaded Congress to give us the money.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am not criticising, Admiral, at all, but I realize that hindsight is always a good deal better than foresight, and that is so even more than in matters of everyday affairs, in fact I know it is true that hindsight is better than foresight, so that I do not criticise. I said "if anybody was to be blamed."

Admiral SIMS. Now, as to whether the Allies were to be blamed, it is not quite the question. We went over there and had the best information as fast as we could acquire the information, of knowing what errors and alleged errors they had made, and with that information, which the Allies did not have when they started the war, we should not have made the same errors that they did; but unfortunately we did. Great Britain was tardy in going into the submarine campaign—it makes no difference to our case whether she was or not—we are doubly to blame, if we believe that for being tardy ourselves and for being back for some months. That is the point about the whole thing, and I tried to make the whole thing clear.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I have in my mind is to fix the responsibility for this loss of 500,000 lives and the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping unnecessarily, and also the expenditure of \$15,000,000 unnecessarily. I want to find out if the blame for all of

rest upon the United States, or probably some of these ~~may~~ at least to a minor degree responsible for it, if that

~~may~~. They may have been responsible for certain errors, ~~but~~ about it is this —

~~Mr. Tammell~~. I want to find out what the facts are, and I ~~ask~~ whether the United States has been guilty of practicing in 500,000 cases and the waste of this great treasure, and the other nations should stand under that indictment; ~~and~~ are partially responsible for it.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. Let me point out this fact. Anybody who takes ~~the~~ the delay of the United States in going into the war ~~responsible~~ for certain losses must assume that the naval ~~of~~ of the United States was not effective. And I do not ~~say~~. I assume that the United States intervention was ~~not~~ fully effective in proportion to the number of the ~~war~~ over. In order to make good the argument that our ~~going~~ in did not result in loss of life and property, you ~~must~~ assume that the United States naval intervention ~~decreased~~. Now, I assume that it was effective, and that it ~~decreased~~ these losses, and that it thereby lessened the ~~length~~ war. If it was not effective, or if there was delay in ~~it~~ must have proglonged the war. Now, I take the atti- ~~tude~~ United States intervention was effective, and I think ~~we~~ forced to take the attitude that the United States ~~was~~ was not effective, and therefore it did not make any ~~difference~~ whether we got into operation or not.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. I did not say so.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. No, but I think that conclusion is forced.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. I did not take your position, at all. I do ~~not~~ think, though, that if your statement is correct that the ~~people~~ people were lost unnecessarily and all these other ~~people~~ the United States has not got that indictment ~~on~~ her head and that the facts do not sustain it.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. I believe that the facts do sustain it.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. You might as well say that the other people ~~did~~ not do this, that and the other 6 or 12 months pre- ~~vious~~ by which they might have won the war have ~~been~~ charged up to them.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. Every one of them has got to have something ~~to~~ them; but that does not alter the fact that we have ~~been~~ to us. If our intervention in the war did decrease ~~the~~ war, and if it was useful it did decrease the length ~~of~~ it; if it was not useful it did not, now I claim that it ~~was~~ effective, and in order to sustain your argument ~~you~~ take the position that it was not effective.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. No, I claim that it was effective. I see by ~~the~~ that beginning in July the submarine campaign ~~was~~ diminished in its effectiveness, and the line began ~~to~~ very little.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. It did drop, and if we had put in that same effort ~~it~~ it would have begun to go down that much sooner.

~~Mr. Tammell~~. Oh, yes; if we had declared war a year before ~~the~~ the war would have been over that much sooner.

Admiral SIMS. Not a year before.

Senator TRAMMELL. Or six months. That involves the possibility of the country going into the war.

Admiral SIMS. The country had already gone into the war on the 6th of April. If those vessels had sailed that night, and for no God's reason why they should not have been ready to get gotten into the thing by the end of April, the decrease in the losses you speak of in July would have begun then, and we would have saved 2,500,000 and we would have been able to put an army in France by May 1, 1918, of a million men.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, if our associates had put into operation the convoy system sooner, would it not have had the same effect?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but we were the ones that delayed the system. You see, we delayed it because we did not adopt it until we started in May, and it takes a long time to get ready and get it into operation, and we waited and waited and waited, after we recommended it; we waited seven weeks, and my recommendation to send over 14 cruisers was not put into operation, and in the meantime they kept these vessels over on this side, at a distance of 100 miles from where the fighting was taking place. That is where the point comes in. That is what my criticism is about; and we are responsible for those heavy losses of life and property, and we have got away from it.

Senator TRAMMELL. What was the percentage of destroyers that we provided?

Admiral SIMS. For the convoy?

Senator TRAMMELL. What was the percentage of our destroyers in the way of protecting the situation?

Admiral SIMS. It was very great. I will give you the figures in a minute. There were, on the other side, a good many destroyers, but many of them were held with the Grand Fleet. They were held in Harwich; they had to be held for a fight in case the German fleet should come out, and they were in various other necessary places. The existence of the German fleet and the possibility of its coming out compelled them to keep those destroyers in those places. We were obliged to keep with them 100 destroyers to take place in case if the German fleet came out. They could not use them for any other work.

We escorted 62 per cent, or about 1,250,000 troops of the United States expeditionary forces to Europe, without loss from enemy action. The United States destroyers escorted 27 per cent of the United States, allied, and neutral shipping carrying cargoes to England and France and Italy, during the period from April 6, 1917, to November 9, 1918, or during the duration of the war. The reason we had such a small proportion of destroyers to the whole is because we never had more than about 70, and the Allies had about 100. The reason we were able to do so much in proportion was because many of these allied destroyers had to be used elsewhere. As we have seen before, 100 of those destroyers had to be in the Grand Fleet to protect the fleet. They were down particularly in Harwich, and on the Scandinavian coast, and so forth; so that on our advice from the other side we concentrated our destroyers as far west as possible so that they would be handy to their own bases. We put them

because the facilities for repairs and refuelling with oil were better there. Brest was better strategically, and as fast as we increased the storage facilities there for oil we took them. Finally we had 28,000 tons of oil there, and we sent them to the destroyers were almost exclusively used for that purpose. We did not get many submarines, because our business was not submarines but to protect the convoys and troops. If we had begun that thing in April, and we could have begun it, we had our hand on our number and prepared those destroyers. Even after war was declared they had to go into the harbor and stay there for days and days to get painted and fixed up. That is the point about the whole business—the coming into the war in those first few months.

There may be some little confusion on account of what I said sometimes to the newspaper men who came over to the States. I was exceedingly embarrassed over there with some of them. One can afford to be patient to a certain extent in his own country, because if a man is publishing a paper to sell it, he has got to tell about his own people; he carried to such an extent that when these things were on the other side it placed me in an embarrassing position, of course. The French, Italians, and others are very sensitive. They knew that I knew all about it, and they knew that I did not know, and so forth; and the consequence is that in the case of these newspaper men to let up on the thing and on the facts in the case, I showed them that at a certain distance at the end of the war, we had about 120 craft of our own, and the Allies had about 5,000. I told them so; if any old thing, we had only 2 or 3 per cent, and we had 5 or 6 per cent. But that does not alter the fact of our being able to release from the west coast of France allied shipping on their own coast, and convoying troops and convoys of all the allied and neutral shipping that came to the coast. we were able to do a very great service; and the conclusion is that we ought to have begun to do that earlier, and we did not begin to do it whole-heartedly for six or eight months, and the official records show it, by their own and my telegrams. There is no getting away from it. TRAMMELL. I suppose that when you speak about the "small number" and so on, you probably make some reference—some in mind to your statement on page 61 of the hearing records, that at one time you told a contingent of that the American force constituted only 3 per cent of the total forces of the Allies, and our maximum force around Brest was what you call a "small number." You say it was 5 or 7 per cent.

TRAMMELL. Well, I stated, the effective force. Of course, if you add all the subchasers, which we used because we had no other way, one of the mistakes of the war—but at the end of the war adding all the subchasers and supply ships and everything else over there, there were about 370, to compare with 12 or 15 or five thousand vessels of the Allies, as you please.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you state in a speech in London, October 10, 1918, as follows:

Another idea was sometimes in the American mind, that the American had been doing the bulk of the business over here—at least a half. That was not true. There were about 5,000 antisubmarine craft operating day and night, and the British can craft numbered 160, or 3 per cent. The figures were about the same in the Mediterranean. Again, Americans seemed to regard it as a miracle of their power that they had got a million and a half troops here in a few months and had protected them on the way. "We didn't do that," said Admiral Sims. "Great Britain brought over two-thirds of them and escorted one-half. We escort only one-third of the merchant vessels that come here."

Do you remember that?

Admiral Sims. Yes. All those statements are substantially correct, if you take the effective craft. I eliminated from that the subchasers that were sent there, and all sorts of small craft, like ships like that, in ports, and so forth. That was the effective force. I gave a memorandum to the House Committee, rather a brief summary of the United States naval forces in European waters, showing the organization at headquarters. They were asking questions about it, and I thought it was best to get up the whole business. I have got it all down here, and you can include that in the hearing if you want to. In this connection, the following approximate percentages are of interest as giving a comparison between the naval forces of the Allied Powers.

Those were the figures, and the statement that I made in my speech was approximately like that, eliminating all the small craft. When you saw an example of what I objected to, somebody sent me a picture consisting of a whole page from a Boston paper, and the impression conveyed was, without an actual statement there, that we were pretty nearly doing the whole business. There was a photograph taken of the destroyer flotilla when the governors of a number of states came out there, some time before the war. We had 20 destroyers there. The artist very carefully, on the end of this photograph, jotted them down clean over the horizon. There must have been hundreds of them. This was supposed to be an actual picture of the destroyers operating in European waters. Of course I put my picture up in the corner, and all that sort of thing and all the rest of it. Those things were damaging and that was the reason for those speeches.

The point about it is this, that after these headlines had been on for a good while, the plain, ordinary, every day facts in the newspapers were distasteful to a good many people, including some naval officers. They would rather have let the impression remain as it was, as the headlines; but it was not possible for me and my people on the other side to get along with the war in harmony with the Allies without stating the facts. It was a situation I was confronted with that had to be attended to, that was all.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you recall the date of the draft?

Admiral Sims. The date of the draft?

Senator TRAMMELL. The first draft.

Admiral Sims. I do not recall the date of it, but I recall the impression it made on the other side. It changed the whole attitude towards us on the other side. It gave them over there their realization, I believe, of what they had to expect from us. I think the opinion was almost universal among those peoples over

was a heterogeneous mass and mixture of populations, and that there was hardly any occasion could arise that brought people together even in spirit, and I think that was one of their lives, when those ten million men registered, on the day when we passed the conscription act. I do not remember

It was pretty early in the war.

TRAMMELL. I think the conscription act was passed some time in May, 1917.

SWAN. It was pretty early.

TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not the soldiers had been and were ready for being transported at earlier dates than they were actually transported?

SWAN. I do not know very much about that.

TRAMMELL. I mean, any great number of them?

SWAN. I do not know anything about the actual figures, but I do know this, that one of the most energetic and eloquent statements that I ever heard was made to our representatives in France who was then the chief of staff of the French army. The burden of the whole thing was "Send over troops! Send over troops! Send us the men in France. Get them here. Here is the place where we can teach them what we have learned." I do not know how many troops we had to send, and I do not know what the training was, but I do know that the insistence on the other side was to get the troops over and to train them where they could learn this new kind of warfare.

TRAMMELL. You are telling us the policy of the people on the other side. I think that our people on this side felt that our troops ought to be sent over there untrained, but that they ought to have training at home. Of course this is a matter of policy, and it is not the American policy, instead of the policy that they adopted.

SWAN. I have not anything to do with that, except to tell you what the Allies wanted. It does not seem to me that it has much to do with the American policy.

TRAMMELL. I think it has a good deal to do with it, because I think that if we had had a million soldiers there by the time 1918, instead of 300,000 only, it would have made all the difference. Now I would like to know the facts, as to whether the troops were trained and training, ready to get into the fighting, and what was the situation on the first of March, 1918?

SWAN. That is a year after we entered the war.

TRAMMELL. We had to take our boys and train them from the time we entered the war.

SWAN. That is a year after we had entered the war.

TRAMMELL. A great many of them had never done a day's work in their lives. They were not even seasoned physically.

SWAN. About a year after we had entered the war.

TRAMMELL. About a year; but it was not a year after we passed the conscription act. It was not a year after we had drafted the men; and of course, on this side we had to construct everything from the ground up, absolutely. We could

not assemble our boys as they did, because we had no camps constructed, nor any place to put them. In the first place, we have started our training a month or two sooner had we had the cantonments and the munitions and equipments and everything. Now, the question with me is whether we were recreant in not having more men over there on the first of March, not having 1,000,000 men there instead of 300,000 men. That is the important question in the controversy.

Admiral SIMS. Can we afford to take the position that in time, if the tonnage had been available, plenty of it, we could have recruited and hardened and partially trained 1,000,000 men in view of the fact that all over Europe recruits were taken out of dry goods stores, out of the mines, out of all sorts of places, in the actual fighting line inside of two or three months, and were doing effective work? They had to do it. The last draft that came out of Great Britain was 400,000 men. Those were recruits; I know some of them; they were raw men. They were put through a period of intensive training and put right on the front.

Senator TRAMMELL. They might have done that in the early part of the case; but they did not do it in the early part of the war. I have frequently talked with a colonel of the British Army who happened to be stopping at the same hotel here, and in the early stages of the war, as far as the time concerning which you are expressing your opinion, so far as he was concerned he told me that he thought our men ought to have 12 months' training; that it was almost suicidal to take men and put them right into the trenches four or five months after they had assembled in camps, many of them never had seen a machine gun before or a rifle or a gun before.

Admiral SIMS. Here is what Gen. Pershing said:

Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the importance of target practice and musketry training, and recommending that instruction in trench warfare be made the mission of troops in the United States, while the trench warfare so far as necessary be conducted in France.

Of course, Senator Trammell, you are asking nothing but a layman's question, every day sailor about the Army. If you would get some of these Army people up here they could tell you about that more accurately than I could.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just wanted to know whether you had taken that into consideration in your accusation against the War Department.

Admiral SIMS. Thoroughly so.

Senator TRAMMELL. It seems to me, in view of the fact that the Army had to be transported, and that the men who went to the front and went into the trenches and did the fighting and had some part to do with the victory, the question is as to our ability to get them to the front even if we had had the ships had some part to do with it.

Admiral SIMS. I think it would be best to ask the Army people who have had the experience over there, what they think about it. Of course, I did not make these accusations without having considerable knowledge of the matter by talking with Army people, etc., and it is my opinion that those troops should have been sent over and gotten to business as soon as possible. The effect on the morale of the Germans would have been immense. I think

troops had fired a shot at all, but 2,000,000 of them had been killed or 1,000,000 at an earlier period, the effect on the German armies, as described to us in various ways, because they had been publishing all the time, "We will be able to get their troops over. We will destroy the submarine." The clamor became so insistent that Tirpitz, who was then at the head of the German navy, was put out, made an explanation as to why he did not stop those troops. It is a technical explanation, danger of attacking, and how he would have to abandon sinking merchant ships if he had gone out into the ocean which transport troops were coming, etc.

Pershing's report [reading]:

On 11/17/17, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department with the following recommendation:

"In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the war that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have by the end of June is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon Gen. Bliss and all members of the conference. Gens. Robertson, Foch, and Bliss are of the opinion that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the minimum we should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available tonnage would not seem to warrant it."

THOMAS. By that time do you know about what number we had there?

ANS. December, 1917? Yes; we did not have, up to

THOMAS. I mean at the time he estimated we should have that number.

ANS. Yes, sir; it is given in this report. Even up to the time of the great drive we only had 300,000 troops altogether by March, 1918; and the big transport of troops began at the rate of 300,000 a month after that. Just how many were here in December, 1917, I do not know. There were about the same number, 250,000 to 300,000 only.

THOMAS. He said he would like to have a certain number by the end of June, 1918?

ANS. Planning to have in France by the end of June?

THOMAS. The end of June?

ANS. His language is:

"The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear."

THOMAS. Did we not have approximately that many troops by the end of June?

ANS. We had 250,000 to 300,000.

THOMAS. No, I am talking about the last of June, 1918. Approximately the troops that he had requested?

ANS. June? We have the figures here. This was June 17. There were 176,665 American troops in France, and 100,000 had appeared at the front. I think I read that

That is December 31, 1917. This is from the report of Pershing. Here is a little extract from Gen. Pershing. He says on page 8 of his report [reading]:

"Considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the following to Washington: 'I contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May.'"

I had forgotten where I got that statement. That was July 6, 1917, or only a few months after we entered the telegraphs that the plans should contemplate sending over 1,000,000 men by next May, which would be May, 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. What was that second report he made read from, Admiral? At a later date he said that he wanted there by the last of June, did he not?

Admiral SIMS. Here is an extract from a cable of Gen. to the War Department on December 20, 1917 [reading]:

The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule now the middle of December and the First Corps is still incomplete by entire divisions and many corps troops. It can not be too emphatically demanded we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is one of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result. in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of fact the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment which is now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be sent at once as already recommended in my cables and by Gen. Bliss.

That simply accentuates the point I have been endeavoring to make, that if we had gone into the war promptly with all our submarine forces we would have had that tonnage to carry the troops over which Gen. Pershing says we did not have at the time because if, after the intervention of our forces, the success increases of tonnage were as shown, in the first place 640,000 tons in the next period 390,000 tons and in the next period 250,000 tons it is as plain as a pikestaff that if we had begun that intervention four months earlier, we would have in those four months saved and a half million tons of shipping which we saved in the subsequent four months, or after the first four months, and therefore Gen. Pershing would have had the shipping and he would have had the troops over there as he wanted to have them.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, if I understand you, the loss of life was caused by the failure of the arrival of our troops on the western front to terminate the war; that is what I understood.

Admiral SIMS. Would you mind repeating the first part of the question?

Senator PITTMAN. I understand your reasons for believing that the war was continued for four months longer, with the consequent loss of life, was due to the failure of a sufficient number of our troops to arrive on the western front.

Admiral SIMS. That is one of the elements; yes. When our troops did arrive on the west front, it had a very marked effect, particularly upon the morale of the German Army and the German people who had been told all the time that they could not get their hands on us, that the submarine campaign would turn us down, etc., and so on. The discouragement was intense, as we found out from prisoners and so on. That is one of the elements of the thing.

Senator PITTMAN. Of course 300,000 men might have affected the morale of the British Army or the French Army; but the thing I am getting at is the excuse you give for the loss of life. It was the lack of man power on the west front, was it not?

Admiral SIMS. Partially.

MR. PITTMAN. Partially. Well, I can not comprehend yet how we have won this war without man power on the west front.

MR. SIMS. I think you were not in the room here when I went through the tonnage situation with Senator Trammell. I think you had

MR. PITTMAN. I would like to invite your attention to this little summary.

MR. PITTMAN. I do not care anything about the tonnage. The impression I have in my mind is this; This war was on the west front. I realize there were a great many questions involved in the conduct of that war; but as a matter of fact it was the soldiers on the west front that finally won out in this war. The getting of the men to the front was essential, also. But the question is, Were the soldiers prevented from getting on the west front by reason of the Navy?

MR. SIMS. No.

MR. PITTMAN. By reason of our Navy?

MR. SIMS. By reason of the lack of merchant tonnage; by the lack of merchant tonnage of two and a half million tons of our four or five months' delay in getting effectively

MR. PITTMAN. Do you know how many men were obtained in the first drawing in August?

MR. SIMS. I do not, but I know that Gen. Pershing wanted 100,000 men there on May 1, and could not get them.

MR. PITTMAN. Do you know when the next drawing took place and how many men there were?

MR. SIMS. No, sir.

MR. PITTMAN. Or the next?

MR. SIMS. No, sir.

MR. PITTMAN. Do you know why they did not draw them all?

MR. SIMS. No, sir.

MR. PITTMAN. Do you know that soldiers were held here on this coast and could not get transportation?

MR. SIMS. Yes, I do.

MR. PITTMAN. You do know that?

MR. SIMS. Yes; so I understand.

MR. PITTMAN. You understand it? From what report do you know that?

MR. SIMS. I know this, that when the crisis came and there was a great drive over the drive on the western front, the tonnage was not in operation and available to bring the people over, and they had to divert tonnage, in their extremity, all over the world in order to get over 300,000 troops a

MR. PITTMAN. If, as a matter of fact, the soldiers found transportation wherever they were in preparation, according to the plan in order to go abroad, then your whole charge that the Navy is responsible for the loss of 500,000 lives has no foundation in fact, is it not true?

MR. SIMS. Will you repeat that again? If what?

MR. PITTMAN. If, as a matter of fact, the Navy was prepared to transport, or rather saw to the transportation of, troops wherever they were ready, then your whole foundation falls, no matter what the transportation was?

Admiral SIMS. If that is true, then Gen. Pershing was wrong about the whole business. I am only judging by what was wanted.

Senator PITTMAN. That is the sole answer? That decision, does it not?

Admiral SIMS. No; not at all, because they insisted on this side and advised on the other side, with all their experience in trench warfare, that you send the troops right over, and Gen. Pershing said he pounded his fist on the table and said, "Marche, marche. Send the men over here."

Senator PITTMAN. I am not talking about what Gen. Fox or what Admiral Bayly said or any other foreigner. This country had established a policy of training. I ask you if, when the troops were ready according to the decision of the American Army to go abroad, the transportation was not ready for them as they were ready?

Admiral SIMS. If it was not ready for them?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. What is the question?

Senator PITTMAN. It is a very simple question.

Admiral SIMS. I know, but——

Senator PITTMAN. As these American soldiers were ready in accordance with the decision of the American Army officers and the Army staff, if transportation was not then ready for them, were they ready?

Admiral SIMS. If it was ready for them?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. But it was not, though.

Senator PITTMAN. Where is your evidence of that?

Admiral SIMS. Because they had to bring in transportation all over the world to bring them there in time.

Senator PITTMAN. But they got there?

Admiral SIMS. They got there; but, great scott, if they had not been there a year before, we would not have lost all those people.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes, I understand; but do you not know——

Admiral SIMS. You do not need to point your finger at me. It does not do the least bit of good.

Senator PITTMAN. I will use my own judgment about that. You are not now on the bridge of a ship.

Admiral SIMS. I would like to ask, as a special favor, that you not adopt those methods of the police court lawyer here.

Senator PITTMAN. It is the only method, apparently, that you bring me down to the proper courtesy due to the United States Senate.

Admiral SIMS. I do not think it is a good thing, do you, for me to point your finger at me? I do not think it is a good thing, now.

Senator PITTMAN. If it makes the Admiral uneasy——

Admiral SIMS. It does not make me uneasy.

Senator PITTMAN. But answer my question, now, Admiral.

Admiral SIMS. Certainly; I will be glad to.

Senator PITTMAN. If you please. The troops were being prepared much more rapidly in April, 1918, than they were in the fall of 1917. Is not that true?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know, at all.

Mr. FITZMAN. You do not know?

Mr. SIMS. I do not know whether they were prepared more in 1917 than in 1918.

Mr. FITZMAN. Is it not natural that the rate of preparation of men in 1918 was far more rapid, with the greater facilities that were in 1918, than in 1917?

Mr. SIMS. Oh, you have turned it around, now. I understand you mean. I think you inadvertently said 1917 when you said 1918.

Mr. FITZMAN. You said you did not know. I ask you again.

Mr. SIMS. The facilities in 1918 would necessarily have been better in 1917.

Mr. FITZMAN. They were, undoubtedly?

Mr. SIMS. Yes.

Mr. FITZMAN. They were turning out more prepared soldiers than were in 1917?

Mr. SIMS. I suppose so. I do not know.

Mr. FITZMAN. You would assume so? It was natural?

Mr. SIMS. You can assume it. I do not know anything

Mr. FITZMAN. If you do not know anything about it, I think it is a serious charge to make against the Navy of the United States that it is responsible for the loss of 500,000 men, when you are talking about the facts that is most material, and that is that the soldiers were as prepared to go in 1917 as they were in 1918.

Mr. SIMS. Prepared to go?

Mr. FITZMAN. Yes.

Mr. SIMS. They were there. They were enlisted and they were in uniform and soldiers; and soldiers were sent over that had been in uniform, when the crisis came, less than 10 days; and they had been sent over in the early part of the war the way they were not because they did not have the tonnage

Mr. FITZMAN. Have you any evidence at all or any reports or statements that soldiers were prepared by the Army and Navy Department anywhere along in September, October, or November, 1917, and that they did not find transportation for them?

Mr. SIMS. September, October, and November?

Mr. FITZMAN. 1917.

Mr. SIMS. I have not any official documents here to that

Mr. FITZMAN. You have not?

Mr. SIMS. No. We were transporting about 25,000 men a month. The official records it shows that they were telling us that 16 vessels that were available for that, only. This is Pershing's report. [Reading:]

"...to carry construction material and animals at the beginning of the war. Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements. The tonnage available reached about seven and one-half million tons to December 1917, but was a little less than one-half of the total amount obtained.

"...and seem to answer the question, that there was not enough shipping.

Mr. FITZMAN. Oh, there was not enough shipping.

Admiral SIMS. To transport the troops.

Senator PITTMAN. We all know that there was not enough shipping to give the Allies and their populations all the men and animals they wanted to have.

Admiral SIMS. This does not say "the Allies" at all [continuing reading]:

The lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals was serious.

That is, American construction material to build up the French and American animals. [Continuing reading:]

Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war went on, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements.

That answers your question, absolutely. "There was not enough shipping sufficient for our requirements." We lost two and a half million tons of shipping, and we did not have sufficient shipping to transport our troops over.

Senator PITTMAN. There no doubt never was sufficient shipping for our requirements, as Mr. Hoover has testified, and everyone knows, but they did get enough food there to live on; and we come back to the question whether or not the soldiers of this country could be transported or could not get transportation?

Admiral SIMS. According to Gen. Pershing they wanted to get the soldiers there by a certain date and could not get them because we did not have enough shipping.

Senator PITTMAN. When did we first draw soldiers? When did we begin in August, 1917?

Admiral SIMS. When did we first do what?

Senator PITTMAN. Have our draft of soldiers?

Admiral SIMS. I am not sure about that.

Senator PITTMAN. I think it was in August, 1917. I think it was. Just how long did it take them to assemble? I just want to call your attention to the fact that we did not have any army to transport.

Admiral SIMS. Then Gen. Pershing must have been mistaken in supposing that they did have an army and that they did not have enough shipping to transport them. Now, you can not get away from that thing. Gen. Pershing said that he wanted troops to come over, so that they must have been here; but he says they did not have enough transportation to carry them.

Senator PITTMAN. How much of an army did we have when the war began?

Admiral SIMS. We did not have more than 25,000 or 30,000 effective troops.

Senator PITTMAN. It did not take very much tonnage to transport them. Now, the draft occurred in August. Under the law established by our Army, which I assume the Navy has not anything to do with, those men required an intensive training there.

Admiral SIMS. Gen. Pershing said that they were ready to go and he did not have the ships to bring them.

Senator PITTMAN. The fact remains, Admiral, that you have charged that the Navy is responsible for the loss of 500,000 men because of the failure to get our troops to the west front.

Admiral SIMS. I believe so.

MR. PITTMAN. You can not substantiate that statement, sir, we can prove that the Army was relying upon them for the means to transport them, and they could not do it.

MR. SIMS. There you are. Gen. Pershing said that he wanted a number of men by a certain time, and they could not get them to transport it, and if you want any more evidence——

MR. PITTMAN. You not only have not given that evidence, but, you could not, and those facts will be demonstrated here when the time comes—that there is no foundation for that.

MR. SIMS. Then you must refute Gen. Pershing's own report.

MR. PITTMAN. No; we do not have to.

MR. SIMS. Yes; you do, because he said that he wanted them and did not have the transportation to get them there.

MR. PITTMAN. Oh, no.

MR. SIMS. Well, yes; now, really.

MR. PITTMAN. You have read what is there.

MR. SIMS. Here is another quotation. Here is "Organization" [Reading:]

and organization project, covering as far as possible the personnel of all staff and administrative units, was forwarded to Washington on July 11. Prepared by the operations section of my staff and adopted in joint conference by the War Department Committee then in France. It embodied my views on the military organization and effort required of America after a careful French and British experience. In forwarding this project I stated: That a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit which in modern war is a complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization. However, it is equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study is construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to France. It is taken as the force which may be expected to be used for an offensive in 1918 and as a unit and basis of organization. The future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture of munitions and other material, on three times this force, i. e., at least 3,000,000.

The fact remains that according to Gen. Pershing he wanted them there and could not get them because there was not enough tonnage; and there was not sufficient tonnage because two million tons were clearly lost by the delay of the American going into the war.

MR. PITTMAN. According to his report he wanted 1,000,000 for the campaign, 1,000,000 American soldiers for the campaign.

MR. SIMS. He got the 1,000,000 soldiers there in the first week.

MR. PITTMAN. They participated in the fights, in the campaign of 1918. They participated in the victory. I was in hopes that you had some knowledge of the military situation over here, as you apparently had.

MR. SIMS. I thought that I could rely upon the accuracy of the report by Gen. Pershing to the President.

MR. PITTMAN. You have not discussed this matter with Gen. Pershing, have you?

MR. SIMS. What?

MR. PITTMAN. You have not discussed this matter with Gen. Pershing, have you?

Admiral SIMS. I have not seen him at all since we were in.

Senator PITTMAN. No. But you must realize, Admiral, conditions that existed here at the beginning of the war; and you left before it commenced, as has been stated by Senator TRAMMELL. As you said, we practically had no army in the beginning of the war. I do not think that is the Navy's fault. We had no facilities for training at the beginning of the war. I do not think that is the Navy's fault. The policy decided by the War Department in this country was to train our soldiers on this side. I do not think that is the Navy's fault. And, as a matter of fact, until the beginning of 1918 it must be evident to you that we had very few soldiers anywhere; and then they commenced to come on all at once, when they came on all at once, the combined navies of the world, the ships of the world got the food there to France, they sent the amount of troops to France that Pershing said he would need to win the war in 1918. I do not think there is any blame attached to the Army; I do not think there is any blame attached to the Navy; and I think that you ought to take back the assertion that the Navy is guilty of the murder of 500,000 people, until you produce evidence stronger than you have produced.

Admiral SIMS. It seems to me that the evidence that I have produced shows very clearly that the Navy is responsible for the loss of those men and those billions of treasure. As I said to Senator TRAMMELL, it all depends upon whether you assume that the intervention of the Navy was effective, or whether it was not. If it was effective, it decreased the length of the war, and if it delayed making it effective, it prolonged the war. When the Navy intervened and the convoy system was put in operation, there was a decrease in loss of shipping. It began in a certain period.

If it had begun earlier, we would have saved just so much shipping, and if we had had that shipping we could have sent troops faster to France, and we would have done it, there is no doubt about that, all, because Gen. Bliss in his first visit over there and on his way back again said they had to get a million men over there as fast as possible, and they did not have the transportation to do it at that time.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, it was effective; and you do not have to take the position that it was either effective or not effective. It was not effective as it would have been if Congress had appropriated money for more ships years before; but it was sufficient to get over to France every soldier that we had trained to go to France.

Admiral SIMS. Congress did not appropriate as much money as the Navy would have liked to prepare for war, but that is not the point, at all. We are not criticizing Congress for that, at all. The fact that the antisubmarine forces we had were on this side, 3,000 miles from where the fighting was going on, and that they were not sent over, actually. We declared war on the 6th of April, 1918, and there was not a single force on the other side until the 4th of May. What do you know about that for preparation for war. And I can give you the dates that they arrived—another bunch of ships. I can show you that after two months there were only 30 destroyers there. I can show you that at the end of a whole year there were approximately 120 vessels of all classes, including supply ships.

was built since the war. There was no reason why they had not have been all sent over immediately upon the declaration and if they had been there, we would have put the submarine out of operation, and decreased the losses. I do not know why they did not send them over there. The good Lord knows why they did not send them over there, but they did not send them at all.

-PITTMAN. There were only two things they sent over there, the submarines for the war.

-SIMPSON. Yes.

-PITTMAN. All they wanted over there first was man power, just as you have stated. They had everything else but men. We got every soldier to France for the campaign of

-SIMPSON. That the tonnage would carry.

-PITTMAN (continuing). That was ready for it; and that is supported by the evidence.

-SIMPSON. The German offensive began on the 21st of March. At that time the great American Nation had 300,000 men only in France; they had to call in the shipping from all over the world, and were enabled to do at that time because the curves had

been for that fact they would not have been able to do it; it was too dangerous to do it, because you would have been killed armies. At the end of March, within a year, we had 1,000,000 men in France.

-PITTMAN. Yes; and in August we did not have any in the United States.

-SIMPSON. What is that?

-PITTMAN. In August we had none in the United States. In October we had none in the United States. We had recruits that were being trained.

-SIMPSON. They had men in the Army. They must have had.

-PITTMAN. We had no camps for them.

-SIMPSON. If you had had ships, they would have put them on ships and taken them over, like every other country that sends troops.

-PITTMAN. But that is not involving the Navy Department. The Navy Department decided they would not send them until they were trained.

-SIMPSON. Was that the reason, because they were not trained? The Navy Department held their antisubmarine forces on the coast because the fighting was not going on?

-PITTMAN. That is another side-step of yours, Admiral.

-SIMPSON. Not at all. I asked if that was a part of that plan, to not send the antisubmarine forces over there.

-PITTMAN. You have been trying to get away from the facts. You have said because you do not know the facts you have made assumptions without any knowledge of the facts.

-SIMPSON. Not without knowledge of the facts. I have based my report of Gen. Pershing to the President.

-PITTMAN. But you do not know anything about the facts of the war, and it will be demonstrated before you get out of it. But you have assumed that we had a million sol-

Admiral SIMS. Not at all. I never said so.

Senator PITTMAN. You read it, shipment, by the time that there——

Admiral SIMS. Will you fix that thing now? I did not were there, on the other side. I said they wanted the men over there as soon as possible.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, your complaint is against the War Department and not the Navy.

Admiral SIMS. Not against the War Department.

Senator PITTMAN. For not shipping a lot of green men over to be slaughtered.

Admiral SIMS. Like everybody else did. You know as well do, Senator Pittman, that we put the greenest possible men on the western front. They put men there who had not been in form more than two or three or four months. We had to get them there; but we would not have done it, in the first place, if we had had transports; but we did not have the transports and could not get them there, with any endeavor. We had 16 transports only, and we had to get them there; straining every nerve to get them across.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, on November 2, 1918, you not report to the Secretary of the Navy as follows?

Admiral SIMS. What is that, please?

Senator PITTMAN. This report of yours on November 2, 1918, I am asking you about. [Reading:]

16. I consider Liverpool the safest port of entry in the submarine area. At present, however, I think we shall have to send our large ships to Brest, and then, when they are unloaded, escort them to England to be coaled.

17. I have previously reported against using the *Vaterland* for the present, as we have a little more experience in handling the other large transports. The *Vaterland* is, of course, a much longer target, and injury to her would be a serious affair, assuming too that all of the troops that we have to transport for the next few months can be accommodated in other transports, assisted by British liners. When the situation becomes pressing I presume we shall have to use the *Vaterland* and take an additional risk.

Admiral SIMS. The nautical questions involved in that are, that the *Vaterland* had no wharf to go alongside of in Brest, and she could not be coaled in Brest, because we would have to take her to sea to get coal to Brest, and then she would have to go into Southampton, and then through the submarine area.

Senator PITTMAN. The matter that attracted my attention was this [reading]:

I am assuming that all the troops we have to transport in the next few months can be shipped in other transports, assisted by British liners. Whenever the situation becomes pressing, I assume we shall have to use the *Vaterland*, and take an additional risk.

So that it was not pressing on November 2?

Admiral SIMS. According to Gen. Pershing it was very pressing, and he had not the transports to get them over.

Senator PITTMAN. Then you gave a wrong report to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. It is quite possible, through ignorance of the military situation, that I might. But we can not get away from Gen. Pershing's report, really.

Senator PITTMAN. But that was your duty over there, to find out the facts.

Q. Not at all.

A. You did not have anything to do with the use of troops?

Q. Of troops?

A. Yes.

Q. Nothing at all, except to escort them in.

A. Then you do not know anything about the use of troops?

Q. Yes, I do, because I have read Gen. Pershing's

A. Have you had any conversation with any of the officers who had anything to do with the transportation

Q. Yes, I have seen lots of them.

A. Have you based it on anything they said to you?

Q. Based what?

A. Your statement about this?

Q. No; I based it on Gen. Pershing's report.

A. What is the date of that report?

Q. September, 1919.

A. Was that the first time you knew there was a delay in the transportation of troops?

Q. That there was pressure?

A. Yes.

Q. Oh, no; I had known it in a general way; but I had not known it officially.

A. You did not know it on November 2, 1919?

Q. I did not know it as well as I did later. That was the situation in the game, you know.

A. That was the time you are complaining that we had been transporting troops very little.

Q. Yes; but the fact whether I knew or not has not anything to do with the case, as compared with Gen. Pershing's

A. You are relying upon that report for your charge against the Navy?

Q. For the official part of the information. Surely, I think that was pretty good evidence.

A. It bears on the construction you put on it, as I have said.

Q. Nevertheless, you come back to the very same proposition that you have nothing excepting such conclusions as you can draw from the report of Gen. Pershing, to sustain your charges that we did not get to the front by reason of the failure of the

Q. That is your statement, but that is not mine. I presented here of the tonnage situation, and showed very clearly, just what the tonnage was. That was my idea. I think that the evidence I produced there from the reports, etc., amply substantiates that fact, that the delay in the war cost us those lives and those billions of dollars.

A. Do you not think, as a matter of fact, Admiral, that the shortage of tonnage that you have referred to resulted in

shortage of foodstuff, as testified to by Mr. Hoover, and sacrificed foodstuffs; but they did not sacrifice the transport troops?

Admiral SIMS. They had to do both. It was very, very difficult, I think. When Mr. Hoover told me that the actual food in England, what he called here in his testimony—I have forgotten the technical term of it, but it means the supply in stores, not the ones in the retail stores, was only three weeks, that was serious. Now, if the transportation of troops continues under such circumstances, without the possibility of supplying them as they got them there, there is where the danger of the thing comes in. Gen. Pershing points out in his report. I will admit it was a matter of astonishment to me that they would want 50,000 tons of food landed in the ports of France per week. If you put a mile in there, you have to give them that. They cut down on the supply in those countries, I think, as far as they dared. When you get down below a certain point, you know what happens, as shown from the conditions in Germany. They reduced those supplies considerably below that danger point. They reduced the supply of bread considerably, and cut out that of sugar almost entirely. They reduced all supplies all along the line, as far as they dared. The food-supply situation was extremely dangerous, and there was great anxiety, as Mr. Hoover has testified.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, in order to make the testimony complete in regard to the line I was taking this morning, I want to have the testimony of Mr. Byrnes and Senator Glass and Admiral Sims also in connection therewith, included in this report at this point this morning, where we leave off. I refer to the testimony of Admiral Sims in connection with that of those two witnesses with regard to the one subject, and that is those letters.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It is so ordered.

(The testimony is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. BYRNES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Byrnes, you are a Representative, are you not?

Representative BYRNES. I am.

Senator PITTMAN. How long have you occupied that office?

Representative BYRNES. Since the Sixty-second Congress; nine years, now.

Senator PITTMAN. A statement made by you on the floor of the House of Representatives recently was introduced in evidence a few days ago by the Secretary of the Navy, when testifying before this committee. That statement has been correct to a certain extent, as the evidence will disclose, by Admiral Sims in his testimony this morning. The portion of the speech that I refer to is as follows [reading]: "In October, 1918, with two of my colleagues, Representative Glass, of New York, and Representative Whaley, of South Carolina, I went to France, and among other places visited Tours, the headquarters of the Services of Supply of our Army, and was thrilled with pride at the marvels worked by this branch of the Army. On October 30, with my colleagues, I saw Admiral Sims, who was then in command of the Navy in France. I shall never forget that interview. The armistice had been requested by the British, and Admiral Sims told us of the magnificent progress made by the British on the English Channel, and as we listened he proceeded to tell us that the armistice would have to be accepted because Pershing had been unable to break through the German lines, owing to an absolute breakdown of transportation behind the American lines. With his voice he told us how unfortunate it was that this breakdown occurred at so critical a moment. In amazement we listened, and in the monologue he delivered he proceeded to tell us that while Americans believed their Navy was working very hard, that as a matter of fact we had but 3 per cent of the antisubmarine craft in

had brought over two-thirds of our troops and had escorted them not only depressed at the failure of the American Army, but the part played by the American Navy. Believing that this Army, which, according to Sims, made necessary our granting of money, was destined to be a national scandal, Mr. Whaley went to the headquarters of the Services of Supply in order to clear this disaster. Because of Sims's statement we traveled to London. When we informed the commanding officer and the staff of the Services of Supply with reference to this matter they told us that it was the first time they had heard of it. They told us that Gen. Pershing, after the St. Mihiel drive, had thanked the Services of Supply, and again, just a few days prior to our leaving, the Services of Supply upon its continued success in the field. Wishing to avoid friction between our officers, and not revealing the source of our information.

When it must be more gossip in Paris, we advised the commanding officer that the information came from an officer of high rank in the service. In response to that statement an officer present said: 'That is impossible, and the only American officer who could have told that is Admiral W. S. Sims.'

Returning to the naval headquarters to secure information as to the accuracy of Admiral Sims. He courteously invited us to his quarters. Recalling that he had delivered his lecture to us in Paris, he began by reciting the small part our Navy played in the war, reciting the part which I have proved to be false. Not satisfied with the part we played upon the sea in time of war, he proceeded to tell us that we should seek to play no part at all. He expressed the view that the United States should be a merchant marine, and that she should be astray by the agitation for a merchant marine. He stated that the United States, because of her geographical location, must necessarily control the world's commerce upon her at all times providing a merchant marine to carry her goods to foreign markets. When I took issue with him, he stated that it was the view that it would be desirable for the United States to have a merchant marine, but that it was impossible because we could not compete with the British. He stated that it would be necessary to pay subsidies, for which our people would not consent. He stated that it was the part of wisdom for us to develop the great West Indies and the West Indies. With that Government, he said, we would never be able to compete. Britain could be depended upon at all times to care for her own interests.

Q. Now, I delivered by you, Mr. Byrnes, in the House of Repre-

A. Yes.
Q. Now, date, do you remember now?

A. January 27.
Q. Now, when Admiral Sims was testifying with regard to the part played by the American Navy, which was introduced in evidence and which I have just read to you [reading]

A. I made a statement in reference to what Mr. Daniels had to say in the House of Representatives. I am sorry to say that my statement was very badly twisted. As I read it in the press, it was that Gen. Pershing's army practically went to pieces behind the lines as a result of that it was necessary to ask for an armistice,

Q. Now, I told this to Representative Byrnes, and I warned him to be careful everywhere, and that he must not believe it or repeat it. But I told it to every Congressman or Representative at that time and whom I saw. I told it to all of the prominent men I got in contact with. Of course, you know that in a war there is only between armies of different nationalities, but there is no such thing as an American Army, and these stories if they are not checked: I told an American correspondent whose name is probably [redacted] an officer during the war. He was a liaison officer with some of our troops who were serving. He spread his hand out and said: 'I will talk to them they will curse out the American Army corps. I will say that in the last offensive they were not properly supported. I will come to an American Army corps with a British or French Army and the same criticisms are made.'

"It was that I was trying to get these Americans to understand, and I to make that statement to all the prominent Americans who came through. is mistaken in supposing that I was the authority for this. I was simply what was going about, so that when he went down onto the Continent in contact with all classes of people in Paris, he was not to believe any such

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman, would it not be well to read all of the in regard to this matter, of this morning?

Mr. BYRNES. I wish you would.

Senator PITTMAN. It probably would be. Continuing where I left off testimony of Admiral Sims [reading]:

"I remember hearing an officer in our service, who was a bit of a wag, and the younger officers, when they were discussing a matter of this kind, ever get surprised at sea in a fog, or anything, sing out "Hard aport," and then take your ship away from you; but if you do nothing they will."

"The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo also said—perhaps I should correct what about his statement before. He said that he understood that that was the

"Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

"The CHAIRMAN. He did not say authoritatively that it was the policy.

"He also stated—I will look up his testimony so as to quote it exactly.

"Senator PITTMAN. While you are looking that up, may I ask a question?

"The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

"Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, I do not presume you had the record before regard to the charges made by Congressman Byrnes?

"Admiral SIMS. I only had what was in the paper, Senator.

"Senator PITTMAN. I think you are entitled to have the exact language of language was taken from a written speech made on the floor of the Congress. excerpt from it, which was placed in the record, is as follows.

Then the part of your speech which I have just read to you was read then continued with my question to Admiral Sims as follows [reading]:

"I think that is the end of the quotation from Mr. Byrnes. Now, his statement correctly before you and not having to depend upon a newspaper of it. I will ask you if that statement is true?

"Admiral SIMS. It is not, and I can not understand how any such idea gotten into his head, because I never entertained those views. I was very exercised about this rumor that was going about, about the operations before Argonne front. It came to me in a number of ways, through Paris, and so far as I said before. I took advantage of having this information that came to my way, because I had many sources of information, to explain to these people my opinion of the Army, I think, is perfectly well known. You can ask Generaling what it is. But those criticisms are always there; and the only explanation can make of it is that these gentlemen in their trip through Europe, and with people they had talked to, and so forth and so on, with all this, you can create a paganda if you want to, but I do not think it was that; I think it was just jealousy that arises between armies; they got the thing mixed up, that is all. I never held any such opinions at all.

"As to the merchant marine, it is a surprise to me that anybody should tell I have expressed any opinions about it, because I never had any. I may have of course, that there may be some difficulty or competition, as everybody knows may be; but as to whether Great Britain, on account of her geographical position, remark which, to my mind, does not mean anything at all—should have all the shipping of the world, and we should depend upon it, I can not imagine how anybody should have arisen at all.

"As for the relative amount of the work that our Navy did on the other side of the things I tried to get into the minds of the people that came over there, batch after another of newspaper people, etc., and also Congressmen that came was to get some just idea in the minds of the American people as to what we had done over there. Now, anybody who has had the curiosity to read the that I have written since last September will see that I have done the best with my limited literary ability to express my very high appreciation of the excellent work that was done by our Navy on the other side. It is not depreciating work of our Navy to make the simple statement that we had about 3 per cent of our Navy antisubmarine forces. I do not remember the figures, now, but it was something like 175 vessels at that time that we were using in antisubmarine work, counting the small fry, and that the other people, including all the Allies, had 5,000. Surely it is not depreciating the magnificent work that I have described in these articles, of our forces, to state that they were not as big as the other. It is an absolute fact, that is all; and the contrary in the headlines of our paper

was hurting us on the other side, and was making difficulties for the Allies, and that is what I sought to correct. In two or three places, etc., where these American correspondents were entering into the American people the truth of this matter so that you will not be misled on this side by saying things which of course we know to be not true, and which the Allies know that we know, and which is difficult for us; that is all.

— Talking over two-thirds of the troops, I said that they brought up the first year of the war, beginning in April, 1918, about 59 or 60 per cent, or something of that kind. That certainly does not depreciate the magnificent effort that we made of the troops.

— That portion of Mr. Byrnes's statement, then, is not incorrect? — That portion is not incorrect. That is not incorrect.

— The first portion here where he says, 'Sims told us of the armistice by the British on the English front.' I take it is correct. — He wanted to tell us that the armistice would have to be granted because we were unable to break through the German lines owing to the transportation behind the American lines.

— That is exactly what I told him, yes, and warned him not to say that I did tell him. And it was, of course, absurd. I warned

— You warned him that it was not true and not to believe it?

— I am perfectly positive that I warned him that it was not true, and I told him.

— Did you notice anything else in the rest of Mr. Byrnes's statement that he could have so understood you?

— The only thing I can think of is that he had talked to a great many people, and a good many people in Paris, naval officers and Army officers, and the thing mixed up; that is all.

— Nothing else, because I never had any such idea at all, and it never came about. It seemed to indicate that it was set on after the war was over. Then was when they broke out. When the enemy asked for an armistice, there was a flood of these things passed to those who went through there, and told them to be careful. I will look up my correspondence with Gen. Pershing, and see whether I have not written to him on that

— If you have any letters bearing on it, I suggest that you give them to me, and we will put them in the record.

— I will look and see. The relations between Gen. Pershing and Mr. Byrnes could possibly imagine them to be between two men, exchanging photographs and that sort of thing.

— Do you remember the visit of Mr. Byrnes, do you?

— I do not at all.

— I am surprised at that. I thought you stated a while ago that you had said you told him, but in addition to that you told him that you did not remember the visit of Mr. Byrnes?

— I do not identify Mr. Byrnes and those other two, because every one of a number of Congressmen or newspaper representatives, etc., might be mistaken. I might mistake Mr. Byrnes if I saw him again.

— Do you remember meeting Mr. Carter Glass over there, who was in the West?

— I do not remember it after I got back here and saw him.

— Do you remember meeting him?

— Yes, when he came through there. When I came back I went on a trip out in the West, and I remembered it then. I might have seen him now, but I do not remember the occasion of his coming, or the occasion of a dozen similar other visits.

— Then you do not remember what conversation you had with Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Whaley?

— Not particularly, no, but I do know I told everybody I could get them not to believe these things, and I could not have said that I never had any such idea in my life, that the armistice had

— Failed there.

— You know Mr. Carter Glass very well, do you not?

"Admiral SIMS. I know him from having met him on this tour for the loan, that is all. I never saw him before unless I saw him when he came there.

"Senator PITTMAN. And you feel that you might meet these gentlemen and then have a subsequent conversation with them again in London later? Do you not remember it?

"Admiral SIMS. No; it was not in Paris. I never was in Paris but once and I did not meet any of them there. I went there once, in October and November 1918.

"Senator PITTMAN. He states that he met you in October in Paris.

"Admiral SIMS. I was there just once, just before the armistice.

"Senator PITTMAN. Then they state that they called on you again just before your departure from England.

"Admiral SIMS. Yes.

"Senator PITTMAN. And again discussed this same matter?

"Admiral SIMS. Yes. There were a great many hundred people came to the office on similar missions. The way we came in contact with them was in a sense my headquarters took charge of all the distinguished Americans who came through. That is to say, we were notified that they were coming, and we went aboard the steamer when they arrived and told them that all they had to do as they were told, and that they would be perfectly well taken care of that their reservations were made on the trains, and reservations were made at hotels, and that an officer would meet them at the station, and they would be furnished with automobiles, and so forth. Naturally all these men came through my headquarters, and I saw them usually coming, and usually if they went away, because we facilitated their travel. If they said they wanted to go, all they had to do was to tell us about it, when they wanted to go, and even if they would be taken care of for them, and they had nothing to do but go.

"Senator PITTMAN. Now, I understand from you that if you did have these suggestions which Mr. Byrnes has recited you did not criticize the service that was proposed to supply Pershing's forces?

"Admiral SIMS. By no means. I told them what the criticisms were. It would be proper for me to tell you the ways in which that information would come to me, but it would not just now. I was immensely impressed by the way the information came to me, and of its danger, and that is the reason I told the people to look out for it: that this was what was being said.

"The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever talk over with Gen. Pershing the general idea of cautioning Americans who came over to the front about not making too boastful talk about what America was doing?

"Admiral SIMS. No; I never saw Gen. Pershing much over there. I never went to the front at all, because I forbade all my officers to go to the front. I saw him when he came through there the first time. I saw him once when he came up to the front for a conference. I saw him once or twice down in Paris, but I never was at the front and I never had any extended conversation with him, although we had considerable correspondence about various affairs.

"Senator PITTMAN. As I understand it, then, if Congressman Byrnes and Congressman Whaley and Mr. Carter Glass got this impression from you, or rather if they got this impression in their minds, you can only account for it by the fact that they have gotten it mixed up with the impression they got from somebody else?

"Admiral SIMS. I do not know how they account for it, but I never held any opinions at all. I never held the absurd opinion that the armistice had to be made because of the condition on the western front. I never thought that for a moment.

Mr. Byrnes, in the light of the statement made by Admiral Sims, which you have just read, do you still contend that your statement made in your speech, which has just been read to you, is correct?

Representative BYRNES. I regret that Mr. Glass and Mr. Whaley and myself did not make more of an impression upon the admiral when we called upon him, but we could not remember us; though he did say, as I remember, at first, that he remembered very distinctly warning us to not repeat what he told us. But my recollection is very clear upon it. The admiral made a more lasting impression upon me, and I am satisfied also upon my two colleagues. I can recall with distinctness that we called upon him at his hotel between 9 and 10 in the morning, and while my recollection would not be clear upon this, I am almost certain it was as the result of a telegraphic message received by Mr. Glass from him. At any rate, we did call. I remember distinctly meeting a very prominent Frenchman, who at one time served in the British army, as we ascended the stairs to his room.

Admiral Sims very courteously asked us to his apartment, and there made a statement to Mr. Glass, to Mr. Whaley, and to me the statement which I made in my speech.

and put into this record. That he told us, as he now says that this was propaganda, and that "I want you to contradict it." It might be possible if it was only one man who received such information from his statement, but when three men hear a statement together with the feeling of depression and of humiliation that we did,

COMMITTEE. Mr. Chairman, just a second.

MR. BYRNES. Yes.

COMMITTEE. I understood that these gentlemen were called here as wit-

MR. BYRNES. Yes.

COMMITTEE. To testify to what occurred.

MR. BYRNES. Yes.

COMMITTEE. Mr. Byrnes is now making an argument as to the matter.

MR. CHAIRMAN. Of course, if we are going to insist upon those technicalities, Mr.

MR. CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Byrnes would better testify as to his own impressions.

MR. BYRNES. Mr. Chairman, as a lawyer, I submit that I can testify as to why I am emphatic in my recollection.

MR. CHAIRMAN. That is it.

MR. BYRNES. And only for that reason do I make that statement. I am an attorney that when we—

MR. CHAIRMAN. I submit that this morning Admiral Sims, in giving his reasons for not saying that, went into a rather argumentative statement. He said not say it because he did not entertain such views as that, and that he said that way. Now, I am sure that the witness at present is just explaining that he did not have gotten the other impression of the remarks of Admiral Sims.

MR. BYRNES. And I will promise the chairman and my friend, Senator, that I am not going any further.

MR. CHAIRMAN. We want the facts.

COMMITTEE. The only reason I object is because it opens up a whole

MR. BYRNES. I will promise the Senator that I am not going to speak

COMMITTEE. Yes.

MR. BYRNES. I state that the reason that I am emphatic as to my recollection is that we left the hotel and the three of us were going back to our own apartments; discussed the grave consequences of the situation that we felt as the result of the information given to us by Admiral Sims, and with respect to ourselves we then determined to visit the headquarters of the American Army in France to ascertain from Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood the details of this

engagement which precluded his accompanying us, but he agreed to go. We were satisfied by reason of the statement made by Admiral Sims that it would become known in America in a short time and become public, and in order that we might know the facts, we decided within 5 minutes after leaving his apartment that we would go to Tours, and the

statement to this extent, that whether it was the next day or the following day, I am in doubt; but certainly my recollection is that it was the next day. Mr. Whaley and myself drove 150 miles to Tours; we visited Gen. Hagood, and we then told those gentlemen what Admiral Sims had said in Paris.

According to his recollection now, as I understand it, that he was in London so that if we went to the Continent we would not be able to state that the statement he made to us was not in London. It was in Paris, at the date of October 31, 1918; and immediately after that we went to Tours, and back from London to go there. And, as the admiral forgets the date of the fact that it was that date.

On that date, if I had any doubt about my recollection, my reason for it would be that when we went to Tours we learned from Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood that the statements made by Admiral Sims were not true. It was impressed upon our minds, and Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood were then Gen. Pershing congratulating them upon the service rendered. Then, three or four days later, just preceding our visit there, and again Pershing again thanking the S. O. S. for their splendid service,

I can well remember that we did not return until about 11.30 in the evening. Our colleague, Mr. Glass, was so interested in awaiting our report, that he was up at midnight, waiting to learn the facts about this terrible disaster about which we had been informed, and we told him then the story.

Unfortunately, I had not a diary. I did not know that I was going to come before this committee until an hour or so ago. I looked for a very old diary—I never kept one in my life before, and only kept this in order to see the diary that my friend, Mr. Glass, was keeping on the trip. I found, however, a diary [indicating], which is very incomplete and which has not any record of the conversation we had with Admiral Sims. It starts only with the memorandum of our trip to the S. O. S. I was so impressed with the achievement of the fact that I wrote down my impressions of that trip, and I find in my shorthand a very statement that was made to us by Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood as to what I had put in my speech, which is now in the record, and the date, but it was the first time that we went down to Tours. I can add nothing else to my statement that my visit to Tours was not for the purpose of ascertaining anything about a propaganda of which we had been warned in London or any other place.

Senator PITTMAN. And the statement of Admiral Sims to the effect that you told you that such a thing was not true and not to be believed, is not correct?

Representative BYRNES. Absolutely not correct. The fact is I was amazed that the admiral would say that. I thought of several things he might have said, but I did not think he would say that. And I might say, if emphasis is necessary as to the statement as to the merchant marine, that that conversation in my speech was not in Paris but was in London, where the admiral very cordially invited us into his office when we met him at the naval headquarters, and the course of the conversation he made to me the exact statement that I have in this speech. I took issue with him because I have very strong views on that question. I did not go into very great detail, but I remember distinctly that in that conversation that while in years past the argument in favor of the merchant marine had come from the manufacturers of this country, that by reason of the fact there had been a change of mind on the part of the farmers of this country, the farmers of the South found in 1914 that they could not ship their cotton because of the uncertain movement of ships, and that the wheat grower in the North found out that subsidies were necessary to establish a merchant marine; and to-day the farmer was an enthusiastic advocate because he had learned the necessity of ships. I remember distinctly of going into an argument on that question. I was interested in it and have no doubt about it. And if he can recollect seeing us at all, and I do recollect seeing him and what he said, my statement is more apt to be correct.

With reference to the statement the admiral made I again wish to challenge him. He says the Navy did not transport but a certain per cent of our troops. That the statements made in my speech come from the official records of the Navy Department, and I submit that the statement about the 3 per cent that the admiral makes is not correct according to the published report, Bulletin No. 5, from Admiral Sims's headquarters, which the committee can obtain, in which bulletin he gives the figures as to the escort and the number of troops transported. This will cause Americans to be more proud of the achievements of their Navy. The statements contained in the record there. I refer to the statement in the Times History of the War, volume 20, page 42, which is substantially the same as which the admiral made to Mr. Glass, Mr. Whaley and myself in Paris, and again in London as to what our Navy had done. This is the Times History of the World War. It says [reading]:

"While speaking in London on October 11, 1918, Admiral Sims said: 'An impression sometimes in American minds that the American Navy had been doing the business over here; at least a half. That is not correct. There were about 300 antisubmarine craft operating day and night, and the American craft numbered about 3 per cent.'"

According to the figures of the Navy Department, that is not correct. The figures according to the Navy Department on that date—he was speaking on October 11, 1918—show that there were 323 United States naval vessels in European waters, and on November 11 there were 373 United States naval vessels in European waters, including 70 destroyers, 5 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters, 127 marine chasers, 27 Army minesweepers, 12 submarines, 13 mine sweepers, and 10 mine planters, making in all 262 vessels engaged in operation against the submarines, instead of 160.

Those were the discrepancies of statement to which I referred and which I took from any information of mine but from Admiral Sims's statement.

If the committee has any further questions to ask me, I shall be glad to answer them.

Q. Mr. Byrnes, after you had this interview there with Admiral Sims, what did you do?

A. What did I do?

Q. Yes. Did you make any report to the Navy Department or to the War Department?

A. Well, I did not to the Navy Department. Of course, I did not. I was so amazed at it that I did make a report.

Q. To whom did you make a report?

A. I made a report to the President of the United States, in conversation with the President. Because of the impression made on me by Admiral Sims, I believed it my duty to advise the President, and did so of the substance of my conversations with Admiral Sims, as I did.

Q. How did you advise the President? By a written report?

A. No. I stated that in the course of the conversation with Admiral Sims about it.

Q. When was that?

A. I can not give you the date, but I can tell you when it was. It was on Saturday afternoon before Congress met in the fall of 1918. The first Monday in December, so it was the Saturday night previous, Thanksgiving Day, that was Thursday, or the day before Thanksgiving. After my return and prior to the President's departure to Europe I in-

Q. Did you talk with the Secretary of the Navy about it?

A. No, sir; I did not. The only other person I mentioned it to was Mr. Tumulty at the White House while waiting to see the President. I remember telling him, and I remember very distinctly that Mr. Tumulty said to me, "Do not tell Daniels about it, if you feel that it is so important?" And I did not want to, that hostilities were over. But I knew that the President should know it because the President should have naval advisors, and I believed that if Admiral Sims advised us, he would be so incorrectly advised that in fairness to him we should know what had been said to us, and then he could determine for himself what to do with the information he received from Admiral Sims.

Q. Then, afterwards, when Secretary Daniels recommended Admiral Sims as an advisor of the Navy, the President was fairly cognizant of what had been said, and the attitude of Admiral Sims during the war, and so on in any way.

A. Yes. You are asking me to make an argument but you objected to my making an argument in the beginning.

Q. And then I allowed you to go on.

A. If you are asking me about the President, I know nothing about his views on this subject, why he didn't. I am not authorized to say anything of no reason why he should have recommended Admiral Sims. But if you ask him, he would advise you.

Q. Mr. Byrnes, what was this trip that you made abroad? Was it an official trip?

A. It was not.

Q. You had three Congressmen—Senator Glass was a Congressman at that time—

A. He was.

Q. You made this trip on your own initiative?

A. Yes.

Q. And went to the front, and went around over the war zone in France?

A. Yes.

Q. Not officially in any way?

A. Not officially, except as a Congressman to secure information abroad, but not by direction of the House of Representatives.

Q. But not by direction of the House of Representatives?

A. I say not by direction of the House of Representatives.

Q. You had nothing to do with the Naval Affairs Committee that went to Europe?

A. No. I am a member of the Appropriations Committee, and Mr. Glass, Mr. Whaley, and myself went not on that trip.

ports but on the French line at our own expense, and on our own initiative, official capacity.

Senator POINDEXTER. Did you make any protest in the House of Representatives to the Naval Affairs Committee against the conferring of the rank of Admiral Sims, Mr. Byrnes?

Representative BYRNES. No. I am very glad to answer the question, Senator. When that bill came up in the House I was sick, absent from the House, therefore did not vote upon the question at all. In fact, I did not know it was presented, and did not see it for several days afterwards.

Senator POINDEXTER. You did not know that it was pending in the House at the time the vote was taken on it?

Representative BYRNES. No; not until two or three days afterwards, I did not see it in the newspaper.

Senator POINDEXTER. Do you recall when the armistice was agreed to?

Representative BYRNES. November 11.

Senator POINDEXTER. I understand that your conversation with Admiral Sims was October 31?

Representative BYRNES. Yes; October 31.

Senator POINDEXTER. You say in that conversation he was explaining that it was necessary to agree to an armistice?

Representative BYRNES. Yes; he said that.

Senator POINDEXTER. The armistice was agreed to, or at least the terms of it, on the 11th of November?

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

Senator POINDEXTER. Some time after your conversation?

Representative BYRNES. Yes, sir; 11 days. At the time we saw Admiral Sims, Paris, Jellicoe and others from England were at our hotel, and a representative of the Italian Government had come, Col. House had arrived on this date—I do not remember the date—too from this country, and they were there for that purpose preparing the terms of the armistice. According to the most general information I received from Paris, they were meeting for that purpose at that time on October 31. That is what we learned from them.

Senator POINDEXTER. That is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know, Mr. Byrnes, whether Congressman Glass is coming this afternoon?

Representative BYRNES. May I say that Mr. Whaley advised me that Congressman Glass is sick in bed for three weeks and came out yesterday for the first time, and telephoned me before I left the house and said that he would be unable to be present, that he was writing a letter which he asked me to present to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will read the letter.

Representative BYRNES (reading):

"FEBRUARY

"Hon. FREDERICK HALE,

"Chairman Subcommittee on Naval Affairs,

"United States Senate.

"MY DEAR SENATOR: I am informed that your committee at its hearing on February 12, 1918, has decided to have Senator Glass and Representatives Byrnes and myself appear at a hearing this afternoon to make statements as to the conversation with Admiral Sims in Paris and London in October and November, 1918.

"I have been confined to my room for almost three weeks with influenza. My physician advises me that it would be dangerous for me to comply with the wishes of the committee and attend this hearing. It is my hope that within a few days I will have sufficiently recovered to enable me to appear before the subcommittee. I shall then not only be willing but shall greatly desire the opportunity to appear. If the committee, however, desires to close this part of its hearing at this time, I determine not to await my presence, I ask that there be inserted in the report of the committee containing my recollection of the conversations above referred to.

"My recollection is very clear about them. In October, either the 30th or 31st, 1918, Mr. Glass, Mr. Byrnes, and I called upon Admiral Sims at the Hotel d'Alsace in Paris, in response to an invitation extended to us over the telephone by him. During our conversation with the admiral the question came up about the making of an armistice. He was asked why it was necessary and his reply was that the German transportation had broken down; that ammunition and supplies could not be brought up to Gen. Pershing; and that the Americans could not advance any farther.

"This astounded us all, as we had been down to Tours some weeks before and had been informed by Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood, his chief of staff, of the work of the S. O. S. There was no intimation by Admiral Sims that this was

ready but was a direct, concise statement of fact by the admiral and was for the purpose of giving us the inside information as to why the armistice was

not the admiral at the hotel we were so disturbed at his statement and because of the fact we felt the American Army was being unloaded on, and myself decided to make another trip to Tours. Mr. Glass could not have had an engagement the following day, but urged us to go and discuss the matter, as all three of us felt it was one which would come and be a source of a great deal of political discussion, national and

the afternoon Mr. Byrnes and myself got in communication with the headquarters of the American Army, in Paris, and endeavored to make arrangements for the next day. About 6.30 in the afternoon we received a telegram stating that arrangements had been made whereby Mr. Byrnes and I went down in an open machine. We left the following day for Tours about 2 o'clock, and we spent that afternoon and evening and part of the next day with Gen. Harbord and his staff, and informed them of this statement by Admiral Sims. The general advised us it was absolutely untrue, and quotations from Gen. Pershing containing the highest praise for the admiral. Gen. Harbord told me, with some heat, this was nothing but propaganda and that there was but one man in Paris yelling for an armistice. Mr. A. Tours satisfied us that the statement made by Admiral Sims to the contrary was untrue.

Before we visited Admiral Sims again at his office in the American Embassy. During this interview he made the statement that America must get rid of the merchant marine business and should get rid of its merchant marine in England to control the merchant marine. I did not take part in this to any extent except to listen with astonishment to his statements. However, I did ask him many questions on this line and my recollection is that he was very emphatic in his opinion that America should not go into the merchant marine business on any large scale.

Admiral Sims has made the statement when he told us about the line of communication back of the American Army, that, at the time we were in France, this was propaganda that was being circulated and he wanted us to know it was incorrect. I desire emphatically to say that this is absolutely untrue. If he had told us any such story it would never have been misunderstood by anyone. We would have, at great inconvenience, traveled 150 miles in order to be misled by this alleged disaster. Had Admiral Sims told us it was untrue, we would never have reported it to Col. Harbord and Gen. Hagoood, and I am sure in my memory of the conversation with Admiral Sims that it was a charge against the American Army and his explanation was simply an afterthought in order to avoid his statement which was a charge on the American Army in France.

My recollection of the matter succinctly and shortly, but I would express to you my desire to appear before the subcommittee so that any one will have the opportunity of cross-examining me.

Very yours,

"RICHARD S. WHALEY."

The bill making Admiral Sims and Benson permanent admirals in the United States Navy, which was introduced in the House of Representatives, Representative Whaley having voted in favor of the bill.

SENATOR GLASS, will you proceed?

THE HON. CARTER GLASS, MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE.

SENATOR GLASS, you heard the statement read that was made by the admiral this morning, in regard to the question of the visit made by yourself, Mr. Byrnes, and Congressman Whaley, and you observed that statements were made that if he had told you anything in regard to this report that he had received of a warning, and that he had advised you that it was not true. Now, in your recollection of that, Senator?

I want to say in the first place, Mr. Chairman, that I am neither a hostile witness. It is rather distasteful to me to be drawn into a contest because I entertain a very warm affection for my former colleagues and I have entertained a great admiration for Admiral Sims, and as a man as one might form for a man whom he has encountered in place

It is quite obvious to me that Admiral Sims has somewhat confounded conversation held by him with some persons in London with his conversation with Representatives Byrnes, and Whaley and me in Paris. As I find from my diary for Monday, the 28th of October, Capt. Jackson, United States naval attaché, arranged for me to see Admiral Sims at the Hotel Crillon, and on October 30 I saw Admiral Sims.

Senator POINDEXTER. What date?

Senator GLASS. October 30. The notation here is "Admiral Sims at Hotel Crillon," so I take it that was the date upon which we saw him.

I had a letter of—

Senator POINDEXTER. Let me ask you there—not to interrupt you—Mr. Byrnes's statement that it was the 31st?

Senator GLASS. Yes. I am giving my statement now, not Mr. Byrnes's.

Senator POINDEXTER. Mr. Byrnes is evidently mistaken about it.

Senator GLASS. Either Mr. Byrnes is or I am. [Laughter.]

Senator POINDEXTER. Which do you think it is? Do you think it is you, Mr. Byrnes that is mistaken? I am trying to get information. It could not be both dates. You see, one or the other is mistaken.

Senator GLASS. It could have been both dates, because we might have seen him two times.

Representative BYRNES. If you will pardon me, I think in justice to me you will remember that I have stated that I fixed the date by this diary, which shows that we were at Tours on the 1st, and that it was my recollection that it was the 30th previous. It might have been the day before that.

Senator GLASS. Certainly that is not material.

Representative BYRNES. I fixed it only by the date we went to Tours. My memorandum here from which I concluded that it was next day.

Senator POINDEXTER. I think you did say that.

Senator GLASS. I think it is totally immaterial whether it was the 30th or the 31st.

Senator POINDEXTER. It is material or immaterial as showing the liability of a man to forget things.

Senator GLASS. Yes; anybody on earth is liable to forget things, particularly when to whether a thing happened on the 30th of the month or the 31st of the month of the year ago.

Senator POINDEXTER. I think that is true, and I just call attention to it to make it size it.

Senator GLASS. At all events, Mr. Chairman, we did go to the Hotel Crillon in Paris, and I sent up to the apartment of Admiral Sims a very cordial letter of introduction from the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Sims promptly came into the lobby of the hotel and sought me out. I presented to him my two cards, and he invited us up to his apartment.

My recollection of the incident is a little different from that of my former colleague, Mr. Byrnes. As I recall, what Admiral Sims said was prompted or provoked by a statement that I made to him that we had been at general headquarters at Chaumont, and had gotten the distinct impression that Gen. Foch was opposed to an armistice, whereupon Admiral Sims responded, as I remember, that we were obliged to grant the armistice because of the breakdown of communications of supply. I was not impressed with the idea that Admiral Sims was in a critical state of mind but was simply stating his view of the situation. I did not say that I got the impression that he was undertaking to discredit the statement, but was merely stating what he supposed to be a fact.

I am quite clear that Admiral Sims did not say to us that he did not believe the statement, and that he did not caution us not to believe the statement, because that was the first intimation that any of us had received on the subject, and it came as an unqualified statement. It is incredible—and this may be argumentum ad absurdum—improper—it is incredible that two sane men—and all Congressmen are sane—should have put themselves to the great inconvenience and indeed physical discomfort in the state of the weather over there, to have gotten into an automobile and traveled, as Mr. Byrnes says, 150 miles, from Paris to Tours, to undertake to prove or disprove a statement, when they had been in advance told that the statement was not true and not to believe it. As a matter of fact, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Whaley, according to my diary, on October 31, go from Paris to Tours. My notation is "Thursday, October 31. Whaley and Byrnes went to Tours to see S. C. M. I did not go; and Byrnes will pardon the frank statement that I did not go because I wanted to get rid of him and Whaley the next day. I wanted one day in myself. [Laughter.] I wanted to see things that they did not want to see, and I saw them in their absence. I find that they were perfectly harmless things."

Mr. L. J. Byrnes, the British ambassador, and I went to the Church of Notre Dame. I remember that I "prayed in Notre Dame." At all events they did a great deal of levity, teased them about having their South Carolina general, instead of that sort of trouble. I had no Virginia general there to look at—another reason.

Q. They were rather indignant over the statement made by Admiral Sims, were they not? A. I was a little regretful at the statement that was a breakdown of communications of supply, and that because of that.

Q. Is it your recollection that it was at that interview and in that conversation Admiral Sims spoke of the merchant marine, and spoke specifically of the work, in contrast, done by the British and American naval forces.

A. Yes, also. But undoubtedly, in London, Admiral Sims did make a statement, as Mr. Byrnes has said, though I did not enter into it to any great extent, except I recall, in response to the suggestion of what we would never have a merchant marine because of the policy of the United States, having answered that I thought the American people, I think, would decline ever to be caught in the humiliating situation in which we were at the beginning of this war.

Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that Admiral Sims made substantially the same statement? A. I can not say that they made exactly the same impression on me as on my colleagues. I had been, myself, regarded as decidedly against the war before the war began, by some of my friends had been regarded as such. I recall very distinctly laughing at my colleagues and telling them that Sims beat me at it, all to pieces. And I did feel some sense of disappointment that apparently our Navy had not done a great deal.

Q. Is there any doubt in your mind, however, that these statements were made because of the "because" not "because." There is no doubt.

A. And in perhaps two of the most prominent statesmen of Great Britain I received letters of introduction, and it happened that both of these statesmen in a very mysterious way referred to this breakdown of the American communications of supply, and I remarked to my two colleagues that there must be some truth in what Admiral Sims had told us in Paris, because these two prominent statesmen in conversation with me, had mentioned the same incident.

Q. The month, when we went to the British front, Maj. Norie, of the British staff, at the chateau at which we were stopping, made reference to the same matter. I visited my South Carolina colleagues with the fact that their communications had broken down and that there must be some truth in what Admiral Sims had told us in Paris.

Q. When was this, Senator? Was it before the armistice?

A. Yes, this was all before the armistice.

Q. Did Admiral Sims have no recollection of receiving Whaley and you? A. He was a great man over there, and we were ordinary American soldiers, many of whom went over and went to headquarters.

Q. Were you not indignant at his failure to remember me? A. I remember that because he gave us the rare opportunity of visiting the Grand Fleet on board a British battleship when the wireless news came of the armistice, and there by the courtesy of Admiral Sims. I believe that I stated as succinctly as I can do, stated my recollection of the matter.

Q. Did you make any entry in your diary of the principal conversation with Admiral Sims that you have referred to, on the 30th of October?

A. No. I did not; nor have I repeated the conversation since I have returned.

Q. I am referring to what you testified to here just now.

A. Well, I did not testify that I made any notation of my conversation.

Q. But you testified to a conversation.

A. I did, yes.

Q. And you made no note of that in your diary?

A. I said I had not.

Q. When were these conversations you had with the two principal statesmen of Great Britain?

A. Why, immediately before or immediately after the armistice. I believe immediately before the armistice; sometime between the 4th and the 10th.

Q. Of course, then, that was after Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Whaley had returned and made their report to you?

Senator GLASS. Oh, yes. They made no report to me, however. They stated conversationally that Gens. Harbord and Hagood explicitly denied that there had been any breakdown of the communications of supply, and had shown them—and indeed they had obtained copies of—recent orders from Gen. Pershing highly commending the efficiency of their sources of supply.

Senator POINDEXTER. Do you remember what they said to you when they showed them with the fact that it must be true, in view of what these British officers said?

Senator GLASS. Well, I would not like to repeat here in this presence what they said.

Senator POINDEXTER. It is quite interesting to know the substance of what they said. I could leave out any offensive part of it and tell what they said.

Senator GLASS. All of it was offensive.

Senator POINDEXTER. I guess that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not know of any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I was not present when Congressman Harbord's letter was read. Does he ask to be heard before the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. He says that he will be very glad to appear, unless we wish to close the hearings immediately.

Representative BYRNES. Mr. Whaley says that he is not only willing but anxious to have an opportunity to come before the committee. His doctor told him that it would be very unsafe for him to come down town here to-day. He has been sick for three weeks.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think we have covered the principal points involved.

Representative BYRNES. He said that he desired to appear before the committee if they wanted to cross-examine him in reference to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Representative BYRNES. He hopes to be out in two or three days.

Senator TRAMMELL. So that, unless the committee decides later to call him, there is no necessity of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Admiral Sims, have you anything further to say to the committee?

Senator TRAMMELL. I just want to ask one question.

The report of Gen. Pershing which you read from there, Admiral Sims, does it state that the soldiers were ready and available or not?

Admiral SIMS. I do not think that it says that the soldiers were not available; but when he asks to have them sent over by a certain time, of course he would not have asked unless they had been available. They would have been available or that would have been foolish. He must have known the situation thoroughly.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that would have been sufficient. I think he knew they were preparing our soldiers, and he wanted to know in advance the number they would need by a certain time, and of course it may be, making that request that a certain number be furnished by that time, the War Department would go ahead and try to get that number ready for him.

Admiral SIMS. I think it is altogether probable that the time of the training of the troops was governed by what they knew of the limitations of the transports to carry them across. I assume that as being entirely reasonable.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as you knew, the soldiers were reported and available at the time that he requested them to furnish a certain quota requested in that communication?

Admiral SIMS. He made a request for a certain number of troops and he said he made it that size because he knew that they could not get them over. Here is what he says (reading):

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight prepared by the War College Division in September contemplated that entire first corps with its troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November and that an additional program for December, January, and February contemplated

ment of the second corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries really completed by the end of February. Should such a program be put on schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would be placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of auxiliaries, in France by the end of May.

Reading of that dispatch, which is dated December 20,

Understood here that a shipping program based on what was prepared in War College Division," etc.

And that they were shipping troops over there conditioned upon condition of tonnage, and probably their training in that way.

WHEELER. It remains as a matter of fact that they did not, and, according to the report of the Secretary, got to 1,000,000 men there by the 30th of June, 1918?

WHEELER. I will give you the figures there, in a minute. There were about 880,000 troops by the end of June; that included service of supply and auxiliaries, etc., as mentioned in the report.

WHEELER. By the end of June?

WHEELER. By the end of June. That is the arrival in the United States. These are the Navy's figures of the total at the time they reported. They reported back to us. Here is a memorandum submitted to me by the officer who handled convoys, and passed directly through his office of the amount of troops on each transport, etc. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE" FLAGSHIP,
July 12, 1918.

From the Admiral.

There had arrived in Europe 878,878 troops. These have been

| | |
|-------|---------|
| | 463,625 |
| | 408,657 |
| | 4,943 |
| | 1,653 |
| | 878,878 |

more than 50 per cent total to date.

And the British began to reorganize their shipping, placing combined convoys on the run between United States and England. The first was in England on May 7. During May an additional 114-knot troop transport and the first convoy arrived on May 24. The process of reorganization. During the months of May and June 55 per cent of the troops were in British ships or in ships under British control. During that time a troop in British was about 57 per cent.

And it is also increasing its fleet of transports by adding Dutch ships. There is also a contract has been made with the French to use a number of their ships to carry troops direct to Europe. Thus far French ships have contributed nothing to troop transport.

And this thus far would indicate that July will be the biggest month to date, upwards of 250,000 troops carried during this month. It looks as if we could carry about 55 per cent of the total for the month of July.

And a periodical report that was sent in by the man handling the reports. He got all the figures as they came through.

WHEELER. When was the great troop shipment from the

Admiral Sims. It began after the drive in March. It April. Just running down through the figures, without taking details of the entries, I find: January, 40,000; February, 72,000; March, 72,000; April, 104,000. Now we begin to get the numbers. May, 233,000; June, 230,000; July, 318,000; August, 311,000; September, 202,000; October, 202,000; November, 97,000. It began with May—say, the 1st of May or the latter part. In April there were 104,000 and in May 233,000. So that it is the latter part of April. The drive began on the 21st of May. Remember it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was there more allied shipping in May than there was in October, 1917?

Admiral Sims. Was there more allied shipping when?

Senator PITTMAN. In April, 1918?

Admiral Sims. Than there was in November, 1917?

Senator PITTMAN. In November, 1917?

Admiral Sims. No; it was still going down. No, it did not to increase the shipping, up until what was the month?

Senator PITTMAN. And yet in April, when you had less tonnage—

Admiral Sims. What month?

Senator PITTMAN. April, 1918, when you had less allied tonnage than in November, 1917—

Admiral Sims. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. You transported 247,000 troops?

Admiral Sims. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Two hundred and forty-seven thousand and four hundred and fourteen troops?

Admiral Sims. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. While in November, 1917, you transported 23,722 only.

Admiral Sims. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, when you had less allied tonnage, there were transported over ten times as many troops in a month?

Admiral Sims. Yes. I think you were out of the room when I explained why they were able to do that. I think you heard and Senator Trammell was talking to me about it. The reason we were able to do that was this: When we were in this point of the curve—and this is very important—where these things were diverging from each other, the future looked very black, as Mr. [unclear] explained. We did not see how we could escape defeat. When we put the convoy system into operation the losses of shipping began to go down, and building of shipping began to go up. Just as we got up about here and here [indicating on chart], knowing we were approaching the point where they would cross, we then that the submarine campaign could not win for Germany. Then we were able to bring in ships from the outside that way, route, that we would not have dared to bring in before. The point I want to make very clear. As long as these lines were diverging from each other, and the loss of shipping was very greater than the building, we did not dare haul those ships in all over the world, and concentrate the shipping all in on one line. When it began to come down this way [indicating on chart], we

measurable time these two lines would cross each other, ~~the~~ would be superior to losses; but until we could see ~~a~~ converging—and we kept this curve for that purpose; ~~acted~~ that they would cross there, and I predicted within ~~something~~ like that of the exact time—we did not dare ~~our~~ ships. This was all done in sight of the members of ~~council~~. They said where they were going to get this ~~and~~ and it was not that they had less tonnage to use for ~~but~~ it was that they could use tonnage that they did not

PITTMAN. I am not interested in the reason. I just say ~~that~~ that it was within your power that with the tonnage ~~could~~ transport 247,000 tons in April, 1918, when you ~~used~~ 23,000 with a greater tonnage in November, 1917. ~~was~~ Certainly it was within our power, but it was not ~~was~~ of ordinary, mere common sense to have done it ~~as these curves converging~~.

PITTMAN. I am saying it was possible.

~~was~~ The possibility has not anything to do with it at ~~made~~ as a combined military decision of all the military ~~men~~ in the supreme war council, with all the naval ~~and~~ stopping men with the fate of the country in their ~~therefore~~ it was not possible to do it at all as long as ~~as~~ remained the same as they are.

PITTMAN. In other words, there were British ships on ~~the~~ runs that could have been used?

~~was~~ No; the ships were British, French, Italian, Portuguese sorts of ships. They were bringing supplies along ~~from~~ South America into the United States; many of those ~~completely~~ essential, many of them articles that the war ~~could~~ without. But as soon as we saw that we had the ~~campaign~~ a failure, then we could bring those ships in. ~~we~~ say that it was possible before. Of course, it is possible ~~in~~ thing in the world, but no reasonable man sitting ~~at~~ table could have done it before that.

PITTMAN. No; but if there had been a million troops in ~~States~~ in 1917, which there were not, and their immediate ~~France~~ was essential to win the war, they would have ~~been there~~.

~~was~~ They could not have been gotten there at that time ~~in~~ our way clear, because there would have been no way ~~in~~ there. We would have had an Army there all dressed ~~in~~ place to go. We did not dare to put too many troops

PITTMAN. I see. Then Gen. Pershing was not in such a ~~of~~ them there after all?

~~was~~ According to what he says, he was.

PITTMAN. But you say that you would have had them ~~used~~ up and no place to go.

~~was~~ The thing has to be carefully worked out as to ~~is~~ going to do. You have got to have the tonnage. Our ~~was~~ was due to the fact that there were 2,500,000 tons ~~by~~ our not going into the war in the beginning. Now ~~that~~ that thing is a matter of military opinion, and t

no doubt in the world that about 2,500,000 tons were lost unnecessarily to the allied cause by our not going into the war until

Senator PITTMAN. You mean not declaring war sooner?

Admiral SIMS. No; I mean not putting forth our early effort we could have done in April, 1918, and resisting the convoy. That is what hurt us, not sending the antisubmarine forces on the other side, which would help convoy, because we convoyed ships with only five or six destroyers. That was a scandal. Our ships were bumping up and down our coast here, and they would not send them over. They would not give them cruisers to escort them across the ocean, to protect them against raiders. That is the whole business about it.

Senator PITTMAN. That is a technical matter?

Admiral SIMS. No, it is not a technical matter. It is just common, ordinary common sense. There was a war going on there, and they did not send the ships over. It was months before any of them got there.

Senator PITTMAN. Undoubtedly there will be some other people come on here and explain every policy here, and I imagine they will get some common sense.

Admiral SIMS. They are going to be up against it.

Senator PITTMAN. All the admirals in the Navy will be up against it.

Admiral SIMS. They surely will if they undertake to explain why they could fight the war on this side. - What we are trying to do is to get Senator Pittman—and you are a good American and you are with us in this—is this: God help us if this had been a real war. As far as the Navy was concerned, if we had declared war against a single power that was ready on the drop of the hat with a fleet, where would we have been? None of our ships, to speak of, would be ready. There was no plan made as to what we were going to do with the submarine campaign; and officers of the Navy are here to find out that as soon as they find it out; and we do not want it to happen any more, and that is the reason we are bringing this out, to have it discussed.

Senator PITTMAN. The question of having an efficient fleet is a matter, of course, that appeals to every naval officer, and I think it appeals to every member of the Naval Committee.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; it is the first line of defense.

Senator PITTMAN. And it has, for a long time; but there are people in Congress to whom it does not appeal very strongly. There is an appropriation bill prepared by the department and presented, but what it is cut all to pieces. When the three-year naval program came up, the House cut it all to pieces, and the Senate Naval Committee doubled it and extended the life of it. But that is a matter of policy, of course, that is established by representatives of the various sections of the country.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; I understand that.

Senator PITTMAN. You can not build ships or repair ships nor maintain personnel for ships without money. That policy we are not going to get into.

Admiral SIMS. No. What I am speaking about is that they did not use the ships they had.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; and I am confining my objection to the line of testimony on that. The only thing I am questioning is

Q. I consider hasty statements on your part with regard to the Navy; and I have not any doubt that you think the plans adopted by the board here with regard to the coast were absurd, and yet some of those are very much felt that the first consideration of the Navy was the protection of the ports of the United States.

A. You can not protect the ports when they are not

Q. Yes; I understand that; but they thought they were attacked.

A. Very well; but I told them, and it turned out to be true. I said "There will never be a submarine leave the coast," may tell you her name and number and when she is going to do. Listen to this: A submarine that comes from the other side to attack our ships would have no chance but to come over at a speed of 4 or 5 knots and it would take nearly a month; and our submarines, as I said, would come at double the speed, because they come right back and refuel; and the destroyers could be sent back. In the situation, with a war going on 3,000 miles away, holding back the forces here for fear some of these would come through and come over here and attack the coast. If we held the coast in any force at all they must have lost it. This is the case: There are the ports of the submarines, separated by 1,000 miles. Everything that leaves out of those ports across the ocean has got to go back in that hole there. It is in coming way over here looking for them, when they come right back there to go back in their hole. I considered it certain that the war would be lost to the United States if we sent their submarines over here.

Q. You could not have sent them without my knowing it.

A. I told them every time a submarine left the coast where she would go and where she would lay her traps. I told them all about it every time. If they were not satisfied that the information was all right, for the Lord's sake, why did they send somebody else over there that they would believe

Q. I do not know whether you are right or wrong as an officer.

A. I do. I know.

Q. I know you are indiscreet about some statements that you have had to take back, so far, during the

A. Yes. Let me tell you one thing. I would like to say that in all the propositions that were made on the subject of putting down of the submarine campaign, all of them, with exception, the ones that are worth talking about, were accepted by the Navy Department during a period of three or four months, and were then finally accepted and adopted. There have been right in the opinion of the Navy Department that was put up by the Navy Department on the subject of particular importance, was rejected by the Naval Board on the other side as not being practicable, and was finally, after a delay of two or three months, acknowledged by the

Navy Department here as not being practicable. That is what they are complaining about; the violation of every principle of common sense that you send a man where the fighting is going on to catch the submarine, and then try to tell him, from a distance of 3,000 miles, a little thing that he is to do. We can not afford to put up with that sort of thing another time.

Senator PITTMAN. I know one thing, if they had accepted your advice and taken it, you would have escaped one unfortunate thing, and that is this hearing.

Admiral SIMS. Let me interrupt, right there, please. It was a question of my advice in the case. You can go through the records, and you can find repeated expressions about "my advice," but it was not my advice. It was the advice of the ablest men of the allied navies, sitting around in a council chamber, men who had three years of experience in this war, and the whole thing was thrashed out with the army people on the other side; and the decisions were sent over here. That is what is called, popular advice. Every one of those decisions was reached after a discussion of those able men, and was based on the discussion. You could send to any part of the admiralty in Paris, or wherever it was, and get all the information on anything and lay it on the table, and we would sit there for a week, if necessary, and discuss the things, and we would determine on the policy and then I would take it to Washington, and what happened? Nothing doing. They would not even discuss it; and then after two or three months of correspondence, finally they would say "The scheme of the council"—not my scheme—"is approved, and we will adopt it."

Senator PITTMAN. Did they ever follow your advice in recommending catching submarines with fish nets?

Admiral SIMS. With fish nets?

Senator PITTMAN. No; with nets?

Admiral SIMS. I do not understand.

Senator PITTMAN. Did they follow your advice about catching these submarines out of the ocean?

Admiral SIMS. They tried every possible scheme. They used floating nets with glass balls on the top, not to catch the submarine but in order to trace him. During the years we were out of the country, certain information drifted over here in various ways. I was frequently by church societies and such organizations to tell them what I knew about the submarine campaign. We did not know much about what they were doing on the other side then, and some of the attachés who were over on the other side, and the men serving in Washington, had been on the other side, and they told us what they knew about it, and it was full of misinformation; the lectures delivered then there were a good many things given to us as actual information, which were not true, or they had been tried and were not successful. Among those were the floating nets, as they called them. They would suspect the presence of a submarine and they would put out a drift net with glass balls on top, and the idea is that the submarine comes along and puts his nose into the net and he can not get clear of it, and he is driven along these glass balls on the top, and it shows you where he is. I never recommended anything after I got over on the other side.

the result of full conferences, naturally, with those leaders
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MITMAN. I do not believe that I have time to finish now,
 have not much more.

MAN. I think that we had better adjourn now. It is

at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee took a recess
 (1 o'clock p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION.

committee reconvened at 2.30 o'clock p. m., Senator
 (chairman) presiding.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

MITMAN. We will just turn to another question and go on
 after that I had in mind. The *Vaterland*, with regard to
 route on November 2, 1919, was afterwards known as the

name. The *Leviathan*.

MITMAN. Did you not, Admiral, on the 24th of October,
 as follows:

MITMAN. It is against using the ship *Leviathan* as a transport. Her length
 is larger than smaller vessels.

On October 28, 1917, you reported:

that using United States ship *Leviathan* already have been submitted.

Now when the *Leviathan* was put in service as a transport

MAN. I could not tell you about that; but I can tell you
 recommended that she should not be used, and that was on
 lack of facilities in places to get her coal. As I remem-
 ber now, she required about 8,000 tons of coal. She was
 a passenger steamer and required a great deal of coal; and
 was not in France. It had to be taken there.

MITMAN. The *Leviathan* did carry over 100,000 American
 to France, did she not?

MAN. Yes; when we got the facilities for her, and when we
 got five different big anchors in the harbor so that she
 could hold there, then she was used as a transport. She was one
 in that although her anchor was of the very largest size
 could not hold her at all, even in a moderate breeze. When
 all things cleared up we used her as a transport to bring

The reason we put that down, not to use her as a
 first, bad holding ground; second, lack of port facilities;
 third, too much delay in disembarking and coaling, owing to
 position where she had to lie out, at Brest. We had not
 enough lighters and steam lighters, etc. When all those dif-
 ficulties were overcome, as I say, she was used with great success as a

MITMAN. You know that in December they began to use
 her?

Admiral SIMS. I would have to look up the records. I know.

Senator PITTMAN. Here is a letter of February 9, 1918, which as follows:

I have just had a conference with the Admiralty and the Ministry of War regarding the use of the *Leviathan*, *Olympic*, *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* as troop transports. The following points were discussed.

USE OF LARGE SHIPS.

There was complete accord in the opinion that the use of these ships for troop transports introduces a considerable element of danger, owing to the large tonnage these vessels make. I pointed out, however, that this added danger would be accepted in order to carry out the programme of troop transport. The Admiralty officials wished to have it recorded that they considered the increase in risk in using these large vessels was marked, and that we might expect to lose one of these vessels at any time. All agreed, however, that the shipping situation required that these vessels be used for troop transports, assuming the necessity for early arrival of a large number of troops from America. Every effort will be made to give these vessels adequate protection.

SUITABLE PORTS FOR LARGE VESSELS.

A representative of the ministry of shipping desired that all of these vessels use Brest, but it was pointed out that Brest has no facilities for handling them and can not provide the necessary coal. The Admiralty officials were opposed to the use of Southampton on account of the added danger of submarines.

That is, having to go all through the channel.

In this I agree under present conditions. There remain only the ports of Liverpool and Glasgow. Of these Glasgow can not provide docks, and there is difficulty in providing water and coal. Liverpool is the only port that can be satisfactorily used, and even this port has many limitations. Already it is congested. During the last few weeks a greater number of submarines than usual have passed north about the coast of through Dover Straits, and have entered the English Channel via the Irish Sea. This has greatly added to the dangers of the use of Liverpool; but at the same time Liverpool port is safer than that of Southampton under present conditions, and is the only port that can be used for these large vessels. In an emergency these vessels can be used in the Clyde below Glasgow; but troops would have to be transferred by tugboats, and tugboats would also have to remain in attendance in the event of the vessels being attacked.

RÉSUMÉ.

I think it is clear to the department that there is some added risk in using large vessels, and that there are many limitations to the employment of them. We are restricted to use of British harbors, owing to the lack of suitable harbors in France and lack of coal in France. With the submarine situation as it is at present, and as it has been for some time, we are practically restricted to the use of Liverpool, and the congestion and lack of facilities in this port for large vessels restricts us to having not more than two of these large vessels in port at the same time. Liverpool has but two berths that can accommodate these large ships under all conditions.

It will be necessary to arrange westward sailings in advance of the arrival of the bound transports.

That was the difficulty. When those difficulties were removed we used her with great facility.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral SIMS. February 9, 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. And your first reported objection to it was in October?

Admiral SIMS. Sir?

Senator PITTMAN. Your first reported objection to the use of the *Leviathan* was in October, 1917?

Admiral Sims. October.

Pittman. In which you said that the consensus of opinion was using the United States ship *Leviathan* as a troop transport, her length made her a better target than smaller

Admiral Sims. Yes.

Pittman. Now, Admiral, that is only a memorandum of what we have.

Admiral Sims. About this submarine menace, and about your plan for it, how soon after the war began—I mean the European

Admiral Sims. How soon after what?

Pittman. How soon after Germany and Great Britain entered in war, did they commence to use the submarine?

Admiral Sims. Very soon after the war there was torpedoing of ships. The whole of that situation is given in the best form. I should say, in Admiral von Tirpitz's book, where he states his attitude as to the use of the submarine, and the prime British attitude, and he explains in there the initiation of these attacks, and the limitations, and their suspension, up to the final decision to start the unrestricted submarine war. I could not give you those dates now.

Pittman. It commenced in 1914?

Admiral Sims. Commencing in 1914.

Pittman. They did commence, I say, in 1914?

Admiral Sims. There were torpedoings in 1914.

Pittman. Yes.

Admiral Sims. Shortly after the war began.

Pittman. As a naval officer, I suppose you were interested in all of the problems created by those submarines in naval

Admiral Sims. Certainly; yes.

Pittman. And you were studying it from the time it commenced to the end of the war?

Admiral Sims. In ignorance, at first; as to the conditions, the same as all officers were. That is a very singular thing. If you will look at things in Von Tirpitz's book, and in the articles that I am recently publishing, you will see that the opinions of practically all the naval officers in the world as to what the submarine could do and its limitations, were almost grotesquely in error. I have seen some of these articles to make the statement that none of them, at the beginning of the war, how much the submarine could do, and I do not want to make that statement without backing it up with any evidence, because there were a good many officers who did not know what that evidence was, and in looking at it, I found that the principal officers of the British service, many years before the war, had expressed their opinion that they thought a submarine would be able to do, and I do not think that any of them, according to these statements, believed that a submarine could operate any considerable length of time away from its base, and consequently they believed that it could not go any considerable distance away from its base.

Pittman. As *Audacious* was torpedoed, you will find in the British account, and also in Admiral von Tirpitz's book, the

British were so sure that that submarine which laid the mine blew up the *Audacious* could not have been operating from a haven in the Heligoland Bight, but that it must have an base some place; that they searched the west coast of minutely to see if they could find the base. The expressions of naval officers before the war were to the effect that submarines have to have parent ships with them; that the question of ability alone would prevent them operating any length of time from their base. So strong was that opinion in the German itself that, although Admiral von Tirpitz, in his building insisted upon submarines that were seagoing and not merely operate around their own coast, so strong was that opinion had to have a very secret experiment carried out to demonstrate to his own people something of what a submarine could do according to his statement in his book he sent a number of submarines, I think there were 11 of them, to go 300 miles north of the North Sea and see how long they could remain; and they remained for 11 days, which was a very astonishing thing at that time demonstrated that they could do that.

With further improvements as to inhabitability, as you know they were able to operate much farther.

It is perfectly safe to say that it was a surprise to practical naval officers in the world to find that submarines operated to three hundred and 400 miles west of the west coast of Ireland west of the west coast of France, and that they remained usually anywhere from two to four weeks, depending upon luck they had, the limitation being the ammunition that they carried, the ammunition being torpedoes.

Before the unrestricted campaign they used to sink ships by surface fire. They would pop up out of the water close by a ship and would have to stop and surrender on pain of being torpedoed. They would send a boat to take off what they wanted from the ship, allow the crew to take to the boats, put an inexperienced bomb on board, blow a hole in her bottom, and watch her sink.

When the unrestricted campaign came on and when vessels were generally speaking, armed, they had to attack without warning from under the water by torpedo, and when their torpedoes were exhausted they had to return. That, generally speaking, was the information they had about submarines at the beginning of the war.

Senator PITTMAN. You mean at the beginning of the German war?

Admiral SIMS. At the beginning of the German war.

Senator PITTMAN. Not our war with Germany?

Admiral SIMS. No, no. By the time of our war with Germany we knew better what they could do. But they did some things after we joined it, also.

Senator PITTMAN. How long was it before it was discovered that submarines were out in the Atlantic?

Admiral SIMS. It was very early in the war when the *Audacious* was torpedoed. They knew then, directly afterwards, that they were operating out there, because she laid a mine that the *Audacious* ran into.

Senator PITTMAN. Very soon after the beginning of the war?

Admiral SIMS. I do not remember just the date.

PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, you have criticized the fact that we went into the war, in 1917, we were not sufficiently prepared to meet this submarine destruction. You had been studying as a very high expert, and on December 19—

SIMS. Studying the question with a very grave lack of knowledge as to what the conditions were over there.

PITTMAN. Yes.

SIMS. We did not send over officers to any great extent to learn, and we did not know much about it.

PITTMAN. The fact was that there were certain physical conditions observed, that came to us, with regard to the vessels on the Atlantic, such as the *Audacious*.

SIMS. Yes.

PITTMAN. On December 19, 1916, about four months before the war—in fact, less—the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives was dealing with the question of a Navy. I assume to be, when you gave this advice. I am reading from the hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives on the bill submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 1917, at page 3002.

With a reasonable number of submarines at the Canal an enemy fleet could not pass, could it?

I think I took that question up with the committee when I was here

in March. I think.

Understand that a submarine cuts no ice at all as long as your enemy has command of the area in which he wishes to operate. A fleet has line after line and as soon as a submarine comes along she has to go to the bottom.

But where you have a comparatively narrow territory to guard, would it be parallel to that along the German coast?

As far as you can reach out with your guns at the Canal entrance, or as far as the entrance as you are willing to build fortifications, you are safe from attack by a foreign fleet, because a fleet can not stand the fire of guns from the shore where they can not be reached by ship's guns; and they can not enter the area which you are disposed to protect by fortifications. But if they are strong enough to keep them from coming over here at all they can destroy your forts, and you are at their mercy. It is foolish to suppose that a fleet is strong enough to oppose the enemy's fleet and protect the canal from attack by submarines.

Like the band of water across the English Channel, where hundreds of thousands and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies have been sent and transports are going back and forth all the time and nothing is lost because that water is thoroughly patrolled.

Whether you gentlemen know how dangerous a sufficient number of submarines are for submarines. I have explained that to perhaps 15 or 20

times you have wanted to know about the Navy. To give you an idea of the danger let me say this: Suppose this table is the English Channel.

Divide it into sectors, and each sector is in command of an officer, with a flotilla for the whole business. They protect the channel against submarines. The channel is regularly patrolled, and that patrol is kept at work all the time. For a submarine to get through that patrol are very small. If a submarine was sighted here [illustrating]. As soon as the command is given the submarine she has got to go down. The commander of the patrol immediately sends out a wireless saying the submarine was at such a place at such a time, say 6 o'clock in the morning. By 7 o'clock the submarine is in that area [illustrating], and by 8 o'clock it will be within this

area. The flotilla at this point [illustrating] will start out his flotilla from there and deploy on a line from there to there [illustrating] by 9

o'clock, and if the submarine is there it will be seen. At the same time aeroplanes come out, and they begin to look for the submarine, and look for traces of the disturbance on the surface of the water caused by that body going through underneath. They look for although the submarine may be down 100 or 150 feet, there will be a disturbance on the surface. The waves are of a certain regularity on top, and that regularity will be disturbed by any vessel passing beneath the surface. As soon as the aeroplane sees the disturbance on the surface he will notify the destroyer, and the destroyer lowers a net in front of the submarine.

This net is about 300 yards long and about 100 feet deep. It is made of wire not much bigger around than a match, and the meshes are about 10 feet square. When you bundle it up it makes a very small bundle, and you can put it in a barge or trough on the stern of a destroyer. The submarine comes along here [illustrating] and this net is put out, and it forms a barrier in front of the submarine. The submarine sticks its nose through one of these meshes in the net and is caught. The net remains on the surface, and the submarine can not get away from it. When the submarine goes down to the bottom, the patrol boats know where she is, and then the commander of the submarine is ordered to say whether he will come up or not.

That is what makes it dangerous for the submarines to operate in the English Channel.

If a fleet is coming along, it has a line of scouts out here [illustrating] and another line there [illustrating], advancing toward the canal, and any submarine that sees a line of scouts knows the fleet is behind, and if the submarine goes down the commander knows that by the time he gets to where the fleet is his ability to steam under the surface will be about gone.

The submarine on the surface is like a powerful gasoline automobile; it can run as long as its fuel lasts, but can not use its oil engines when submerged. As soon as a boat goes below the surface it becomes an "electric runabout," being propelled by electric motors, and when the batteries are exhausted he has to come to the surface and go to the bottom. After he gets to the surface he has to stay until he charges his batteries again. Submarines are no good at all in the face of an enemy who comes to the surface of the water.

Mr. CALLAWAY. What have you to say about the action of the submarines when the British fleet was at the Dardanelles?

Capt. SIMS. They attempted it several times. The submarine which torpedoed three British cruisers at the beginning of the war attempted to attack the British fleet, and so far as we know that is the only one who has ever gotten at the British fleet. When he went down he went under the screens and came up in the middle of the fleet and was promptly rammed and sunk.

Mr. CALLAWAY. At the Dardanelles they went in there and began to sink everything.

Capt. SIMS. They sank vessels in there. The trouble about the whole business is that there are not enough boats in the world to patrol all the areas you want to patrol. The British Navy has probably about 200 destroyers with the fleet, and they stay there for fear the German fleet will come out.

Mr. CALLAWAY. There were quite a number of ships at the Dardanelles, and the British had complete control of the surface of the water, and one submarine went in there and it sank two battleships, and at the time it sank the last one the statement was made that the smaller craft steaming to the aid of the sinking ship were so many that the smoke from the vessels almost obscured the sun, and they did not discover where the submarine came from.

Capt. SIMS. They did not understand at the beginning of the war how to attack the submarine. That would never happen now. As to how the submarine would be opposed, that is a question of nets. If this fellow goes down to the bottom instead of electing to run, and they wait for him in that area and do not let him go, they conclude he must be on the bottom.

Did the Navy Department follow your advice with regard to these nets?

Admiral SIMS. I never gave any advice.

Senator PITTMAN. I assumed that that was advice.

Admiral SIMS. Not at all, sir. That was simply repeating a statement that I heard at the War College by an officer who had been over there during the greater part of the war. Just how much of it was true I do not know. I was informed since that they did in the latter part of the war use nets with some success until the German submarines came onto it and rigged their boats with appliances that would easily break a net.

used in the early part of the war with great success, we found that with these net cutters they could stick any net of any size unless the net would give, as they say, and did not bring it up with a halt. All sorts of methods of just whether those are descriptions of actual things or not I am sure I do not know. I listened to this lecture with interest at the War College by a man who had been on the other side, telling what he knew at that time. Of course, that thing was in connection with what I told them of the Panama Canal, etc. That is entirely true. If you control the water and have a sufficient number of patrol boats you can go practically where you please in spite of submarines, as you have seen done all during the war by the

Grand Fleet is the perfect example of the convoy; that is to say, they are so adequately protected that they can go practically where they please with immunity from the submarine. You will find in my book that during the first, probably, two weeks of the war the Grand Fleet used an anchorage at Scapa Flow, at the northern end of Scotland, in the islands, every submarine was reported outside in the neighborhood, the fleet came in, under way and went out, proceeded and surrounded by submarines, being the safest place it could be; because a fleet at anchor, or going slowly, is always in danger from submarines. In port it is practically helpless unless the harbor is blocked by nets and mines, which was not the case at

Mr. PITTMAN. That is all.

Mr. ALLEN. I find that the draft law was passed on the 18th of May, 1917, and registration took place on June 5, and the men reported on July 20, and the men reported on September 5. I find that aside from the men who were drafted, there was a considerable number of volunteers in the war, somewhere between 100,000 I think, and these volunteers included the National Guard. Now Admiral Sims, can you give me any idea how many men there were serving under the colors on the 1st day of January, 1918?

Mr. SIMS. You mean in our own country or in France?

Mr. ALLEN. Can you tell us, altogether, at that time?

Mr. SIMS. Both in France and America?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes.

Mr. SIMS. I could not give you the figures on that, but it was a considerable number.

Mr. ALLEN. Can you give us the figures so that they can be put in the record?

Mr. SIMS. Yes; I can get those figures.

Mr. ALLEN. Of how many men there were serving under our colors in this country and abroad, on the first day of each month of the war up to the 1st day of January, 1918?

Mr. SIMS. I will get that thing to insert in the record.

Mr. ALLEN. How many men had we transported to Europe on the 1st day of January, 1918?

Mr. SIMS. On December 31, 1918, there were 176,665 American troops, and but one division had appeared on the front. Pershing's report, page 18.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if we had volunteers to the number of 700,000 to 800,000, and there were only 176,000 in Europe, that is a large number of men before the draft took place, in this country.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have been available for service?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir; there must have been. And, as it seems to me that as we actually demonstrated, after the month of April, immediately after the month of April, 1918, that we could keep over 300,000 a month and keep it up until there were certainly a million there, it makes it perfectly certain that in the six months preceding we could have done pretty much the same thing if we had had the tonnage; but we did not have the tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated this morning, or Gen. Pershing's report as read by you has stated, that we ought to have had a million of 1,000,000 men in Europe by the 1st of May.

Admiral SIMS. The 1st of May, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many men were transported in May?

Admiral SIMS. Up to May?

The CHAIRMAN. No; in May; during May, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. It was a small number in May. No; in May, about 233,000. I remember that now.

The CHAIRMAN. And in June, 1918, how many?

Admiral SIMS. I can not quite be sure; but I have the figures. In April it was 104,000 and in May it was 233,000.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the figures substantially. You can give them afterwards.

Admiral SIMS. There were 233,000 transported in May, and then they began to go up more rapidly and in July there were 317,000.

The CHAIRMAN. And on the 1st day of July there were about a million men on the other side?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; in June there were 285,000.

The CHAIRMAN. The last of June?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, subtracting the troops that went in May and June, on the 1st day of May, when Gen. Pershing said we should have a million men there, there were very little over a million men there; is that true?

Admiral SIMS. Something like 600,000, I should say. I have the figures here now. In April there went over 104,000; in May 233,000; in June 230,000; in July 317,000. Now, we can give you any figures that you would like to have.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give those figures to the reporter? I made the point that I had in mind.

Admiral SIMS. These figures show that in the first of May there were 420,000, and in reference to these figures, if you come to compare these with any others, remember this, that these are the figures from our own headquarters in London, representing the arrivals of troops at the port. The report I read to you a little while ago was made by a captain who had charge of the routing of all convoys, and when a convoy arrived with troopships, it was automatically reported how many ships we had and how many troops on board. We did not know that before us. That did not represent troops at the front or at the rear, *except arrivals at the western ports of France, and some in other ports.*

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I want to ask you now a few questions about the convoy plan. The British put a convoy plan into operation on the 21st of May, 1918, did they not?

Admiral SIMS. The first convoy arrived in Great Britain on the 20th of May. They started to put it in about the 1st of May. I sent an officer down to Gibraltar to instruct them on each ship, and give them information, and it took some time to get the signalmen, and it took some time to get ready, and then I appointed a convoy commander; and the first convoy arrived in the channel on the 20th of May, and on the 31st of May I cabled the department that they had adopted the convoy in transport. In the first place, on May 1 I cabled to the Navy Department as follows:

British Admiralty has decided to give trial to the convoy scheme described in my last dispatch. Instead of present plan of naval forces operating independent of each other against raiders, there will be a high sea convoy against raiders, such convoy to be organized as quickly as possible on all main trade routes, and on approach to dangerous waters this side will be met by destroyers and escorted into port. Hampton Roads and New York have been proposed as assembly ports for eastbound vessels on our Gulf, with convoys sailing every fourth day. Plan decided on after long consultation by Admiralty and war council, and is considered absolutely necessary. It will require all British resources of personnel and ships to the limit and we must assist by the same route, at least, if the plan is to be carried out. Admiralty desire to know whether we can provide escorts for convoys sailing from the rendezvous at New York. British estimate about 14 ships will be required for New York service, and a similar number for other routes, including Mediterranean and South America. Vessels should have sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots and 6-inch guns. I very strongly recommend favorable action. Through British naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary.

That was May 1, 1917. On May 31 I cabled as follows:

With reference to my two previous dispatches concerning convoy system of merchant shipping. Scandinavian and North Sea convoys now in force over the Atlantic have proved very successful. First ocean convoy from Gibraltar arrived on May 20. Second ocean convoy from Hampton Roads of 12 merchant ships escorted by British cruiser sailed May 24. They will be met outside and escorted through the marine danger zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the first American convoy?

Admiral SIMS. The first one from America.

The CHAIRMAN. That sailed on May 24?

Admiral SIMS. May 24. [Continuing reading:]

The department cooperation with the plan set forth in my dispatch of May 1 is urgently recommended. Early reply important in order that Admiralty plans may be governed accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. And subsequent to that date the Navy Department sent all its merchant vessels over in convoys?

Admiral SIMS. They did not send them over in convoy, and did not get the thing in operation for some months after that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral SIMS. On July 5 was the first time that the Navy Department agreed to help out in the convoy, and they gave us 7 vessels on that occasion. They said they would provide 7 vessels instead of the 14.

The CHAIRMAN. Then on that date we had in all seven vessels that were aiding in convoy?

2. ~~Seven~~ Seven that they offered, yes, in the cablegram of 1917. I will read as follows from the department to ~~last~~ 10, 1917. [Reading:]

~~the~~ the situation in regard to American shipping. A few vessels route ~~direct~~ ~~to~~

~~a few~~ of their vessels. [Continuing reading:]

~~Most~~ Most ships confer with British shipping offices to get the latest ~~information~~. An effort is being made to induce American ships to take ~~the protection~~ offered by convoy. It is not possible to compel this ~~movement~~ owned or chartered vessels until the Government takes over ~~all shipping~~. After studying your numerous cables on the subject, ~~the opinion~~ that what you want now is for it to furnish, after departure, ~~the sailing, etc.~~ of the following class of American ships only: those ~~not~~ sailing direct and not taking advantage of convoy. In the ~~case~~ ~~of~~ ~~troops~~ troops, and all Army and Navy cargo supply ships, you ~~must~~ forwarded you.

~~the~~ lines unless you instruct otherwise. All other reports of sailings, ~~department~~ reports through you, will cease.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

~~the~~ system was not in operation generally until certainly ~~late~~

ADAM. At that time was the department doing every-
possibly could to aid the convoy plan?

ADM. No, they were not, because they evidently did ~~not~~ stick in the convoy plan; and the reason of the thing ~~was~~ because of the false estimate of the situation that ~~was~~ reference to armed merchant ships. While I was at ~~it~~ I have forgotten just the date now—I received a ~~letter~~ from the Secretary of the Navy which I have mentioned ~~in~~ testimony, which reads:

~~I~~ I consider that American vessels having armed guards are ~~not~~ independently.

~~It~~ long after that I received another cablegram from ~~the~~ it was signed "Daniels," but, as I explained ~~it~~ only the department in which it originates, which ~~is~~

~~strongly~~ strongly of the opinion, based on recent experiences, that the ~~the~~ adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships is one ~~of~~ be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of ~~the~~ is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive ~~measures~~

~~the~~ as its policy its willingness to cooperate in every way, and ~~the~~ of supplying additional naval forces of types other than ~~the~~ whenever the advisability of so doing is justified.

~~the~~ also considering the outline of a scheme which it is hoped will ~~the~~ of cooperation and ability to supply escort vessels through ~~the~~ without interfering with the destroyers' other duties as much as ~~the~~ of individual escort, and it will not displace the present ~~the~~ merchant shipping from United States ports. Details when ~~the~~ added.

DANIELS.

Secretary of the Navy.

~~I~~ explained before, my discouragement on receiving those ~~the~~ was very great, and I replied to the department giving ~~the~~ of the *torpedoing* within a period of five or ~~of~~ *Queenstown* of some thirty-odd vessels, none of which at ~~the~~ *submarine* or its periscope. Subsequently I recei-

what we call in the Navy an estimate of the situation, was drawn up in the Navy Department, and which was based on a particular measure of the arming of merchant ships, and the estimate of the situation reasoned the whole business out very much based upon this premise, that if you have armed guard crews on the merchant vessels in charge of a competent officer, with a well-trained crew, that they will see the submarine in time to prevent the ship against the attack by the torpedo. Well, the difficulty was that the whole business was that the premise was entirely wrong, as shown by the information I sent in from Queenstown, on the experience of the war, of the number of military vessels bristling with guns, and the well-trained mystery ships with guns on board, were out searching for submarines having been torpedoed without warning. And in this estimate of the situation it inveighed against the stupidity of the allied navies in not being able to see the submarines and thereby arming their vessels with competent crews and navy guns. That I think must have been the reason why we resisted the convoy system.

But whether that was the reason or not, the convoy system resisted until the date I stated, I think the 5th of July, when we offered us half the number of vessels that we wanted.

Now I do not want anybody to suppose that I ever expected the Navy Department to adopt any particular measure like that. I, Admiral Sims, said so. In all cases the recommendations sent in to the Navy Department were the recommendations that were based upon three years' experience of the war on the other side, the daily conferences with the admiralties concerned, with the knowledge before us of the position of every submarine on the seas, with the movements of those submarines had been, projecting the probable change in tactics of the submarines, and so forth, and based upon that, these recommendations went over. They were not my recommendations. They were the recommendations of the Allied armies at the front, and the attitude of the Navy Department was that they were not willing to base their action upon these recommendations until we could explain the whole matter fully to them, and it was up to me to do that over a very heavily overworked staff and by correspondence, with the assistance of one aide, not to mention the fact that I was asked at the same time for information on a great number of technical subjects, that 20 competent officers could not be supplied. I can give you my word, gentlemen, it was a very hard earth.

The CHAIRMAN, Then, Admiral, it was not until the 1st of September, or six months after we had entered the war, that we were cooperating with the British effectively in the convoy plan?

Admiral SIMS. About that date, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall when the convoy plan was suggested and talked over by the English?

Admiral SIMS. When I arrived in London the whole business was boiling down there in the admiralty. The convoy section, or, I may say the antisubmarine section, which was in charge of the British admiral, was the one that was particularly interested in it. It was up to them to devise means of protecting the shipping, and that was divided against itself. There was a captain and a number of commanders in that office with all their staff, and the thing was

and studies on the thing had been drawn up, and it had been decided.

There was an outline proposal for convoys by the Navy to ports including the St. Lawrence, and it is a very technical thing. I do not think it is worth while to read it except to invite the fact that the date is May 5. This was forwarded to us on May 4, from the Admiralty to our Navy Department, as a proposal for a convoy system. So they had all the details there in Washington as to what the proposal was.

MAN. What I want to know is whether the British Admiralty was considering the question of running convoys before we entered the war.

SIMS. Yes; they had been considering it for some time.

MAN. And one of the reasons that they could not do it was that the Navy could not take the destroyers and other ships from the Grand Fleet?

SIMS. They did not have enough to put it into operation, and the value of our coming into the war was that we supplied the British with destroyers to initiate that thing, and they were supplying the British with destroyers a month and it gradually built up from that. They did not have the cruisers to furnish the ocean escort.

They called attention where they had to take the cruisers from. They were trying to prevent the exit of the German raiders from the North Sea by having a line of patrol vessels extend up to Iceland, and they had to head off some vessels and destroy some. The only way to put the convoy system into operation naturally was to take the cruisers from this patrol system. If they did that, of course the British got no intimation of the raiders coming out. So they kept these cruisers there to keep back the raiders. They did not have enough cruisers to provide an escort of all the convoys. The reason why they were depending on the United States was that we had to come out and furnish the cruisers, which we ultimately did after a long delay.

MAN. Admiral, if our Navy had been thoroughly prepared at the time that we entered into the war, and could have provided the destroyers and cruisers for the use of the convoy system, is it probable that the British would have started the convoy system at that time, or had they known that they could have availed themselves of it?

SIMS. That is their proposal as you see in the telegrams of the 1st of May, and if we had been ready we could have provided the cruisers and the destroyers to put it in operation. It does not mean that you can put it in operation like that, but you have got to get information about the merchant steamers, you have got to be sent to the rendezvous, and you gradually build up the system according to their speeds, and so forth, but getting the system in complete operation would have taken place several months earlier if we had been ready with our cruisers and submarine forces to jump right into it.

MAN. And that in your opinion would have been one of the principal things that would have contributed toward ending the war?

SIMS. According to figures that I gave this morning, of the first, second, and third periods, we would have

saved 2,500,000 tons of shipping if we had gone in to that immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any comment to make on your November 9 to Admiral Bayly which Senator Pittman read this morning? The letter was read, but no questions were asked.

Admiral SIMS. The only thing I have got to say about that it was simply stating to him what the conditions were on the front. Recently there has been published a review of the western front at the time of the demand for the armistice, of the military critics on the other side, Gen. Maurice, who has been in this country lecturing, and he stated, in almost exactly the same words, what the condition was behind the British front and the French front in regard to the question of transports. I think anyone who has not looked at a military chart behind an army on the western front and seen the network of big and small railroads, specially built automobile or motor roads can have very much a conception of what it means to suddenly move an army forward against a retreating enemy even 10 or 15 miles, when that all has to be done. He makes a distinct statement that none of the armies on the western front could have kept their transports going after the advance of the armies farther than they did. It takes too much time to build the roads. They have to depend on the motor roads. They cannot follow up quickly enough on the other roads. That same condition obtains behind all armies. It obtains behind any army for a long time afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. In the testimony yesterday an unsigned memorandum was submitted by Senator Pittman referring to the most efficient way to employ America's man power on the western front. Did you, in your capacity as commander of the naval forces on the other side, have anything to do with the question of brigading American troops?

Admiral SIMS. Nothing whatever, so far as concerned any official. I, of course, discussed it with Gen. Bliss, and I discussed it with a number of other people.

I should like to say in this connection with reference to papers that have been used that are marked "from Admiral Sims's personal file." Of course, in the position that I occupied on the other side there was a swarm of such arriving every day. Those letters were handled automatically. The only letters practically that I opened were those that were always recognized by my secretary as being the handwriting of my wife. All other letters were opened automatically a good many of them under general orders. They were letters from all kinds of cranks, and all kinds of inventors. They were opinions and advice given to me by everybody from Spain to Sinn Feiners. Those things were usually answered by some member of the staff, who would file the things in my personal files. The great bulk of those things I never saw at all. Now, when the Secretary of the Navy very late in the war, after giving up the idea of an established historical section in Washington to write up the history of this war, ordered me to establish one on the other side, I did so under the very able command of Capt. Knox, and I told Capt. Knox that he was at liberty not only to take out of the division files anything which he found had any bearing on the war, quite independent of his opinion as to whether it was correct or not, and that he should also go into my personal files and do the same thing, take out

the personal files that he thought might throw any light on a good many things in there that are exceedingly confidential. They will be useful to a historian to show the atmosphere are letters there written to me by foreign officers of whom in which they have expressed opinions which would be embarrassing to those officers to have given out now, and I would like to see those things as giving the general picture at the time. I only make this point to show that the document came out of my personal files, it does not mean that I saw the document.

Q. Or that you indorsed it in any way?

A. Or that I indorsed it in any way.

PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, on January 14, 1918, we have a memorandum —

Q. Who is it from, sir?

PITTMAN. I will read it so as to identify it to you, or a moment. I am referring to the one we are discussing.

Q. The memorandum that you were talking about?

PITTMAN. The one that you have been talking about.

Q. Yes.

PITTMAN (reading):

a small dinner last night at which were present Balfour, Cecil, and the last, a very important person. There was also present another somewhat radical views as to the most efficient way to employ America on the western front, instead of organizing a separate army with its organization and supply.

The above mentioned were greatly interested in the expression of these views and approved of them and the discussion turned upon the means to realize them.

That that meant that Balfour and Cecil and Reading were pleased with the plan?

Q. They were more pleased that Gen. Pershing did at a certain stage of the war.

PITTMAN. But this plan of January 14 was not to have an army with its own lines of communication and supply." as the memorandum says. Now, then, in the third paragraph of the memorandum it says. [Reading:]

We went to France to discuss the matter with Pershing, and came back disappointed."

The memorandum evidently indicates that the writer of this memorandum considered that Pershing was very much opposed to the plan. He appealed to Balfour and Cecil and Reading?

Q. That is the same plan he adopted, is it not?

PITTMAN. That is not the plan that Pershing was for on

January 24. I find your letter following 10 days after the memorandum was dated, in which it is said. [Reading:]

I am pleased to know that the question I mentioned to you about the man power of America on the western front is now up for consideration.

On 30, 1918, we have the testimony of Mr. Byrnes to the effect that he had with you in Paris, which has already

been put in this record, and came out in the medals-awards [Reading:]

I shall never forget that interview. The armistice had been requested by the enemy. Sims told us of the magnificent progress made by the British on the British front, and as we listened he proceeded to tell us that the armistice was to be granted, because Pershing had been unable to break through the German lines, owing to the absolute breakdown of transportation behind the American

That statement was substantiated not only by Senator Glass's testimony at that time and by a letter from Mr. Whaley, but also by a letter from Senator Glass in reply to your letter which was introduced as evidence this morning reaffirms it, analyzes it, and adds to it.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, then, still later we have this excellent testimony in another letter that you wrote to Admiral Bayly, of the British, on November 9, 1918, but two days before the armistice was granted. [Reading:]

It had been the opinion that it would be impossible to force the enemy back from the Argonne Forest, not only on account of the great difficulty of the terrain, but because the troops operating in this area could be supplied only over one road. It was hardly thought possible that this road could carry supplies sufficient for the number of troops necessary. There is no doubt that the military opinion was sound, assuming that the attacking forces were not willing to make greater sacrifices than troops are usually called upon to bear. That these sacrifices were not made, but too apparent. Of course I do not know much about details at present, but I know that they were very severe. It turned out as was to be expected.

I want particularly to call attention to this as in line with the general thought on this subject, and my opinion is evidenced by everything I have read.

Admiral SIMS. I do not understand.

Senator PITTMAN. I am calling your attention to this particular language as influencing me to believe that you not only had this information on January 24, 1918, that there should not be a separate American Army, but that you had it on October 30, when you wrote to Senator Glass, Congressman Byrnes, and Congressman Whaley, but you still had it at the time you wrote this letter two days later. I am calling your attention to this language. [Continuing reading:]

It turned out as was to be expected—

Admiral SIMS. Behind the armies.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing reading):

That the road was not sufficient—

Admiral SIMS. It was not 20 miles long.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing reading):

To supply all the needs of the troops.

Admiral SIMS. That is right.

Senator PITTMAN. You told Senator Glass and Mr. Whaley, and Mr. Byrnes October 30, according to their testimony, that you were of the opinion that the armistice was necessary because there was an absolute breakdown of transportation behind Pershing's line.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Here it is reiterated again on November 9, 1918. [Continuing reading:]

Horses had to be slaughtered to supply the troops, notwithstanding the scarcity of horses at this time. However, there is nothing succeeds like success, and the construction of the important railway line has been accomplished.

Q. Everything that is stated in those letters I told Mr. Byrnes and Glass, and what they did not get and I have stated here, that I told a lot of other people about this thing, that it was being said, and Glass said that he went and was told the same thing there. It was those things going around the armies that I was trying to counteract, and not seize that point.

A. Making a statement that there was a single road there, that there was a single road that they had to use, 20 miles long, and a lot of trouble with it. As Gen. Maurice said, they were in trouble behind all armies. I never had any such idea, and it had to be signed because we could not drive through. It had to be signed because the French people made a mistake at the cost of carrying that on after the enemy had asked for it. The position that the Government of France was in. The enemy asked for an armistice, and when you demand that you are willing to impose upon the army and an additional sacrifice. We naval men wanted the German to surrender instead of interned. Gen. Foch—I was not at that interview at all, but I was told that Gen. Foch had to say that we were all called down to Paris. The naval men thought they should be the terms of the armistice, and the men on their side said what they thought should be the terms of the armistice. We had no joint meeting. But I was told that when we Navy men wanted to insist upon the surrender of the vessels instead of their being interned, Gen. Foch said: "I will ask the French people to submit to the sacrifice of from 50,000 to 100,000 men in order to change the word 'interned' to 'surrender'?"

Q. I told many people at that time. We discussed it

A. In my memorandum, I do not know anything about that. I do not know where it came from. It has been in my files, and in other things that I mentioned a little while ago. I did not say at any time at any dinner where those men were that Cecil and Reading.

Q. Now, I call your attention to the similarity of your letter of January 24 to Admiral Bayly and the letters of the other men. The letters say [reading]:

"The man power of America is on the western front."

Q. You say [reading]:

"The way to employ America's man power is on the western front."

Q. I did not say that in the memorandum. I do not know about it. That is what everybody was talking about, and it was a part of conversation between military and naval people. Glass's idea, that he was going to make a recommendation to the Government, I came to him I asked him if he had done so and he said no. I understood what the brigading of our troops meant in a period of the war. I did not understand it to mean a prohibition on the forming of a great American army. The point about it was this: If you are going to form an army, you can take charge of a whole section of the line where it is expected that the whole force of the German attack would

fall, you must train them month after month behind the line until they understand it thoroughly. That makes delay. The question at issue was whether or not it was not advisable to bring them to where they would have veterans on each side so that they would be more like veterans, and after they had got experience you could take their army out of them. That is what they did, and I believe that is one of the things that Gen. Pershing is proudest of, that when the crisis came he did brigade them, and they did splendid work, that the Australians commended them very highly on the way they acted, but said that the Americans were a little bit rough.

Senator PITTMAN. In your letter of November 9 you state emphatically [reading]:

It has been the opinion that it would be impossible to force the enemy back from the Argonne Forest not only on account of the great difficulty of the terrain but because the troops operating in this area could be supplied only over one road.

Admiral SIMS. It was quite true that there was only one road. They had to use it. That is all.

There is no recommendation that I ever made on this question. I simply discussed it like any other intelligent man would. I brought the question up before everybody, most interesting at that time, everybody, when the crisis was coming. I do not understand what the idea is. Do you want to try to imply that I was recommending that there should be no American Army? Now, I ask this question: Suppose it were true that I did recommend no American Army, what does it have to do with the convoy system or the handling of the Navy during the war?

Senator PITTMAN. I think you are entitled to an answer. I will try to answer it. Admiral, in the first place, there are evidences before this committee that you relied very greatly upon the Admiralty for all of your opinions.

Admiral SIMS. There is no such evidence at all. It was the Naval Council, consisting of the heads of all those navies. Now, how can you conceive an American officer of my experience, my service record, either being so dumb intellectually or being so demoralized morally that he would recommend to his Government not what he believed but what the British Government wanted? For God's sake, how can you imagine an American doing that?

Senator PITTMAN. You have asked me a frank question.

Admiral SIMS. And I want an answer.

Senator PITTMAN. I am proceeding to answer. There is evidence here in your own letter that you favored the British policy or French policy, certainly not the American policy, of sending troops over to the other country without training here. It is in your letter here that you recommend that some of these soldiers be sent to the navy yards to work as laborers.

Admiral SIMS. Not that they should be worked as laborers, but that an experienced shipwright should not be taken out of the shipyard and put into a camp when we needed ships.

Senator PITTMAN. There is nothing said in your letter as to

Admiral SIMS. That is what it says, to take a man of that kind out of the Navy would be asininity, taking him out of the navy and making a soldier of him.

PITTMAN. There are letters here also which indicate to my mind the reason I am going along with this examination—namely, that the whole American Navy to be turned over to the British as far as the protection of the coast was concerned, or as a policy that they had, that you cared nothing for that. Letters here indicating that your opinions were formulated in Bayly with regard to these matters.

SIMS. I was not with Admiral Bayly one one-hundredth I was over there. I was in London.

PITTMAN. Your letters were very confidential. There is evidence also that in writing to Admiral Bayly you were opposed to a plan, and were in favor of the British plan with the disposition of our soldiers; that you were in January a separate army. There is evidence here that you dispatched Pershing a separate army on October 30. There is evidence on November 9 you still thought—

SIMS. There is none of that there.

PITTMAN (continuing). That Pershing had broken down and never expected him to get through.

SIMS. No.

PITTMAN. That you expected he was broken down, by the line of railroad and not sufficient communication.

SIMS. It was not a railroad at all; a road.

PITTMAN. That communications with the rear were so bad that they had been compelled to slaughter horses for

SIMS. All the armies had to do the same thing. What I said—

PITTMAN. What I think about the proposition is, we are not sure whether your advice on these matters was creditable.

SIMS. All right.

PITTMAN. We are considering as to whether your advice was followed.

SIMS. That is the point.

PITTMAN. And I think that this evidence is material, in our advising from the standpoint of foreign countries and the policy of your own country.

SIMS. I see. Well, Senator Pittman, that is the veriest bit of rot, for this reason, as pointed out explicitly all the time—statement that this advice that was given to my Government was not only based upon all of the discussions that we had over there, but that it was adopted by our own Government. If it were true that the advice I gave has proved to be the case of the convoy, and in the case of this, that, and the other, it would be something in what you say. But it proved to be false and was adopted only after those long delays that cost blood and treasure.

PITTMAN. We had a separate army?

SIMS. You take them and you brigade your troops in the field. I did not recommend a separate army at all. That is all. It was simply discussions that were going on between men about the military questions of the day. There is nothing there that I wanted to recommend. All I wanted was coordination with the British Navy. That was

achievement of the Navy in the war. Here is what the Secretary of the Navy says about it. [Reading:]

Abroad, the Navy has given a demonstration that can only be characterized as wonderful, of its readiness to join with our associates in teamwork for the common end and the common good. * * * (In all areas and with all allies.) The United States Navy has cooperated without friction, looking always to the end to be attained, and has won the warmest encomiums and appreciation from our associates. * * *

Much of the above could not have been accomplished at all and none of it could have been accomplished so well, had not the American Navy, from top to bottom, fully appreciated the fact that in war teamwork is absolutely necessary and that prejudices and ambitions, if they exist, must be sacrificed and subordinated to a common end in a common cause.

We worked with those people in teamwork, with the Italian, and English officers, independent of nationality.

Senator PITTMAN. Separate entities can cooperate.

Admiral SIMS. They were separate entities, and they cooperated.

Senator PITTMAN. There is quite a difference between cooperating and being submerged.

Admiral SIMS. They were not submerged. They were separate entities, and they were based upon our own supply ships, and they were mobile forces. I have read telegrams to show that we could be moved from one place to another. We were hard up again when we first went to Queenstown. The necessities were such that we had to cooperate. We did not have enough forces sent to take over the Queenstown station. Our forces were relatively small, containing destroyers, supply ships, and some sloops. We had mine sweepers operating there. All those things were necessary in order that those channels and ports be used. We did not have the material to take over the port of Queenstown and patrol the coast and escort in our troops. We worked together. If our destroyers were broken down, our sloops, and so forth, British ships were supplied. It was necessary that that be done. It was the same way pertained in the Mediterranean. The same way pertained in France, where our forces were greater than those of the British. It is perfectly absurd to say that we subordinated ourselves to the British.

Senator PITTMAN. No; we did not—

Admiral SIMS. Excuse me. There was never a time at all when all the American forces on the other side were not absolutely under the command of men of the Navy Department. They could not have been moved any place.

Now, you may say that we could have been made into the American Army. It would have been wholly impossible to do so. You must remember that the British had an advantage with their fleet, which they had been years in forming, that we did not have. We had to go on their bases, and there was no place in Ireland where all our force could have been based, the 5 battleships, 140 destroyers, etc. There was no possible place where those ships could have been put in a body and effectively used.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, you have read from the Secretary his suggestion as to cooperation. Permit me to read what you submitted to the Secretary of the Navy on July 16, 1917. [Reading:]

It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if any of our Allies—Italy, France, England, or the United States—were selected to coordinate operations, the others merely keeping the one selected fully informed of resources available, and submitting to complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these resources.

Yes; that is not a recommendation. It is an illustration: would be desirable if the Allies could do that, but not and would not. Nobody would dispute that that if the Allies were so amiable with each other as to co-ordinate, it would be more efficient. Naturally, they were to do that, and so we instituted—our Government did—Naval Council. And we got together and discussed the to do with the forces available, which were inadequate. Common sense men. We did not sit there drawing lots in of any French or British or any American or Italian, that council and advocating that his forces should be to that of another nation, to the detriment of the com- That does not appeal to common sense. That is all I about it.

MITMAN. Then another question. When you spoke of the troops in this country by reason of the volunteer service, are that troops are not available when war is declared; unable by reason of the training not being sufficient?

Yes. I did not know anything about that at all.

MITMAN. Do you know when the volunteer troops, those volunteered, were drawn?

Yes. I do not know those dates; no.

FRANKMELL. I want to ask one or two more questions. In the number of troops that were transported by May 1, was Chairman, what you were asking about?

Yes.

FRANKMELL. The chairman, I believe, asked you to give of troops that were transported by May 1.

Yes. I will get the figures.

FRANKMELL. Well, while you are getting that information, you also to get the information as to the number of troops transported by June 30, 1918.

Yes. June 30!

Yes. I suggest that you get the figures down to July 1, the number transported every month.

Yes. All right. The figures will be the arrivals in ports. I have available.

FRANKMELL. I believe it has been suggested here that Gen. recommended a million troops by May, 1918, and pertinent subject I find this in Gen. Pershing's report. [Reading:]

armament planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 15, of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and force, and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to a total of some 650,000 men.

Yes. That is the extract I read this morning and also

FRANKMELL. Now, that seems to be the number that the armament planned for in July, 1917, to be sent over by June Pershing goes on to say. [Reading:]

armament fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military and must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies with coal,

INVESTIGATION.

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SIMS. Of course it is not necessary to observe that of an in the field—of the British Army I think there are about 4 that is fighting at the front, and in the French Army 1—I am not sure of those figures—but it is something of the extreme value of untrained troops is that though in warfare they can relieve perfectly trained men at the multitude of jobs that have to do with transportation and bayonets at the front, when the great push came, they or any men they could pick up to release men that forward on the line. If these three distinguished military together and pointed out the necessity of sound training of I guess they knew what they were talking about all

CHAMAS. Admiral Sims, a few minutes ago you began a summary which Senator Pittman attempted to bring out. After January 7 you criticized the Navy Department for operation in carrying on the war. This is and will be of a main purpose of this investigation. It is unavoidable that issues will come in during the course of the hearings. But deflect us, however, from our main purpose, which is whether the charges made in your letter are or are not

SIMS. I would amend that to say the lack of prompt Our Navy Department did cooperate with the Allies The great difficulty about the whole business is that not cooperate promptly. There were all the rest of those recommendations made as the result of the cooperation Allied Naval Council and the acknowledgment of the that by the Navy and the putting of that into operation. The rest of the letter, and it would have been a very, very situation in case we had been up against a navy that was not or "contained," as they called it, so far as its battle concerned, and helpless to do anything against us in our except a submarine which had to come over with half

CHAMAS. That is all.

At 4.10 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Wednesday, March 24, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

MR. PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed with another

I observe in this morning's press that there are copies of
a letter from Gen. Bliss, addressed to the Secretary of War,
dated March 23, 1920, denying certain statements made by
him in his testimony upon yesterday, and there is a letter
of the Secretary of War transmitting the letter to the Secretary
of the Navy. I have also a copy of a letter of the Secretary of the
Navy, chairman of this subcommittee, transmitting these. I
want that they be published in the hearing—the whole matter.

MR. CHAIRMAN. I received the letter from the Secretary of the
Navy. I replied to him this morning. I will read a copy of my
reply.]

MR. DANIELA.

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

MR. SECRETARY. I have your letter of March 23 inclosing copy of a letter
from the Secretary of War with inclosed copy of a letter from Gen. Bliss to the Secre-
tary of the Navy. I have also a copy of the original order under which Gen. Pershing proceeded to
testify that you wish to have these letters and the accompanying order
read at the hearings of the subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs.
I agree with me that in the course of the hearings it is entirely improper
to insert in the record at the request of parties who are not before the subcom-
mittee. The witnesses will be called before the subcommittee within a very short time and
at that time you can of course present any testimony or papers
and they will then be made part of the record. I wish to call
attention to the fact that the papers submitted by you have nothing whatever
to do with the definite criticism of lack of preparedness and prompt support on
the part of the Navy Department made by Admiral Sims in his letter of January 7,
1919. The subcommittee is limited in its investigation entirely to matters connected

with the subject.

FREDERICK HALE,

Chairman Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

MR. SENATOR PITTMAN, if you as a member of the subcom-
mittee have these papers inserted in the record at the present
time they will be so inserted. If not, the Secretary can bring them
and testify before the committee.

MR. PITTMAN. I realize, of course, Mr. Chairman, that a letter
has the same force and effect as sworn testimony; but undoubt-
edly it will be requested by some of the committee to testify
and as only portions of his letter were published in the
press it is only justice to Gen. Bliss that the whole matter
be established.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection whatever.

Senator PITTMAN. I would just like to have it all put in the record at this time. I think it is only fair to Gen. Bliss.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection. It will be so ordered.

(The correspondence referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In the hearings before the subcommittee on Monday, Rear Admiral Sims, in his testimony, is quoted in the press (I have not seen the report) as attributing to Gen. Bliss the recommendation of the policy advised by Admiral Sims of brigading the American forces with units of the British army. I am in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of War this afternoon inclosing a letter addressed to him by Gen. Bliss, saying that at no time did I make recommendation for the brigading of American forces with the British army, but the truth was the reverse.

In his letter Secretary Baker includes also the original orders under which Gen. Pershing proceeded to Europe. Secretary Baker says this order was drawn up by Gen. Bliss and approved by him. He also calls attention to the fact that laid down in the orders to Gen. Pershing "had the direct approval of the President."

I am sending you copies of these letters and accompanying orders that may be incorporated in the hearings of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Very truly, yours,

JOSEPHUS D. BAKER

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 22, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In to-day's edition of the Washington Post is a comment attributed to Admiral Sims with regard to the "brigading" of American forces with units of the British and French armies, in which certain views are attributed to Gen. Bliss. I beg leave to hand you herewith a full exposition of the views of Gen. Bliss on this subject, prepared by him for my information.

In addition to what Gen. Bliss says in his own letter, I have the honor to enclose the original letter under which Gen. Pershing proceeded to Europe and assumed command of the American Expeditionary Forces was drawn by Gen. Bliss and submitted to me for approval. I attach a copy of that order and ask attention to paragraph 1 thereof, in which the policy of maintaining the separate and distinct identity of the forces of the United States was laid down. This policy, comprising as it did the original orders to Gen. Pershing, had the direct approval of the President and was never departed from by the War Department or by Gen. Pershing, except to the extent indicated in Gen. Bliss's letter, where, to meet a pressing emergency, a temporary association of lesser American units with British and French units was authorized.

I do not know whether this letter of mine, the orders to Gen. Pershing, and Gen. Bliss's letter can properly be tendered to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs for admission to the record in the inquiry they are now making, but if it can be so admitted, I would be glad to have the record thus made complete on this important subject.

Cordially, yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, March 23, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My attention has been called to a paragraph in the 10:00 a.m. edition of the Washington Post with reference to yesterday's hearing of Admiral Sims before a Senate committee. This paragraph is as follows:

"Senator Pittman then read from an unsigned document taken from Admiral Sims's files, urging that American troops passing through Great Britain be brigaded with the British forces. The Senator said this was British propaganda, 'tended to be against Pershing's effort to establish a separate American Army.'"

"...by me," said Admiral Sims, "and I object to your calling it military reasoning, and what Bliss recommended." "And, therefore, I do not know to what period of the war the ... relates, but the following are the facts: Every communication, of whatsoever kind, written by me ... from the time of our entry into the war and on any ... Not only at no time did I make any recommendation for ... with the British Army but the truth is exactly the ... that I ever came in contact with Admiral Sims in Europe ... the American Mission (the so-called House Mission), in London ... November, 1917. During that entire time the idea of the ... of American troops with foreign armies had not, so far as I ... of anyone. As my report to you dated December 18, ... British military and political men were urging the sending of ... for the purpose of having in Europe an American national ... the information that the United States hoped by about ... in France 12 complete and equipped American divisions. ... I had in London from November 8 to November 22, British ... argued that this effort must be doubled and that by the end ... we should have in France not less than 24 divisions. In ... December 6, 1917, the same demand was made. And all ... Paris, while on the American mission, was directed to ... the equipment and the transportation for the larger ... Allies were then demanding of us. In respect to the few ... arriving in England on commercial liners, the record ... was in seeing how we could most quickly get them to ... across the channel to France. The idea of "brigading" ... other groups is an absurdity. During the battle our divisions ... an emergency in connection with either British or French ... way. French divisions were used with our troops. At no ... Mission's visit to Europe did I hear even the suggestion ... brigaded either in large or small bodies, with foreign troops. ... a suggestion, much less a recommendation. ... the temporary use of any American troops with those of ... the time when they apprehended the near approach of the ... and during the continuance of that drive. On January 29, ... in chief agreed with the British in a signed document ... six divisions in additional shipping which they would ... purpose, these divisions to be trained behind the British ... the American Army when their training was completed. ... the ultimate formation of an American Army, because we ... this additional shipping in any other way. During the ... War Council from January 30 to February 2, 1918, Field Marshal ... that he would not want to use British troops in battle which ... at home and five months in France prior to his ... He concluded by expressing the opinion that "he, conse- ... the Allies could expect the American force, as a force, to ... year. He thought that the best use to make of them ... sections of the line." ... with the conclusions arrived at by Sir Douglas Haig." ... said that "in his opinion the entry of American troops ... French or English divisions, not only for training, ... the greatest assistance that the United States could ... a solution to the crisis with regard to effectives." ... amalgamation with the British and French armies." But he ... amalgamation, of course, was only temporary. The ... back its units afterwards and become fully autonomous." ... this subject at this session of the Supreme War Council, ... the question as to whether the United States Government ... amalgamation (which can be nothing else than what Admiral ... "brigading". I then made a statement leading to the con- ... permanent amalgamation of our units with British and ... tolerable to American sentiment." The presiding officer, ... declared that "this point was settled," and nothing was ... subject.

On March 27, 1918, in the very crisis of the battle which began on March 21, 1918, military representatives recommended that in that crisis the American Government should send to Europe American Infantry and machine-gun units; that the principle, of those units with Allied troops be permitted; that no American troops in Europe should be so used; and that the Infantry and machine-gun units should be so used temporarily and only during the crisis and to be eventually returned to the American Army. Before acting on it I took this recommendation to Gen. Pershing at the latter's house at 73 Rue de Varonne, where you dictated to the President an approval of the recommendation, based upon "the present crisis" but making it perfectly clear that the training and use of these troops was left to the discretion of the American commander in chief.

The joint note in which you took this action was not formally considered by the Supreme War Council until its fifth session at Abbeville May 1 and 2, 1918. At this session the American commander in chief was present. The object of this session was to learn to what extent the wishes of the Allies could be met without jeopardizing the timely formation of the American Army. After the discussion, the American commander in chief with Gen. Foch and Lord Milner withdrew in order to consider the details of the proposition. These details were embodied in a resolution of the Supreme War Council of May 2, 1918, the first paragraph of which reads:

"It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry out the successful conclusion an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag."

This was the last time that the question of the use of American troops was brought up.

To my knowledge, the question of the "brigading" or the "amalgamation" of American units in foreign armies was not brought up or suggested prior to the session of the Supreme War Council January 30 to February 2, 1918; it was then suggested only by Gen. Petain as a purely temporary measure. No attention was paid to it then, until Baron Sonnino, one of the Italian political representatives, insisted upon an answer to his question as to whether the United States Government would permit brigading or amalgamation. The answer having been made, the proposition was promptly vetoed. It was only during the crisis of the drive of March, 1918, in order to meet that crisis, that the military representatives proposed to recognize the possible temporary use of American Infantry and machine-gun units in the Allied armies. Before that crisis it was not dreamed of and with the speedy passing of that crisis it was not heard of again.

Sincerely, yours,

TASKER H.

The Hon. NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.

From: The Secretary of War.

To: Maj. Gen. J. J. Pershing, United States Army.

Subject: Command, authority, and duties in Europe.

The President directs me to communicate to you the following:

1. The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating in Continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including any part of the Marine Corps which may be detached for service there with the Army. From your command are excepted the military attachés and others of the Army who may be on duty directly with our several embassies.

2. You will proceed with your staff to Europe. Upon arrival in Great Britain, France, or any other of the countries at war with the Imperial German Government you will at once place yourself in communication with the American embassy through its agency with the authorities of any country to which forces of the United States may be sent.

3. You are invested with the authority and duties devolved by the laws, regulations, orders, and customs of the United States upon the commander of any army in the field in time of war and with the authority and duties in like manner devolved upon department commanders in peace and war, including the special authorities and duties assigned to the commander of the Philippine Department so far as the same are applicable to the particular circumstances of your command.

4. You will establish, after consultation with the French War Office, all necessary bases, lines of communication, depots, etc., and make all the incidental arrangements essential to active participation at the front.

against the Imperial German Government you are directed to co-operate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but the governing idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which is essential. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions as your judgment may approve. The decisions as to when the United States and its parts, as ready for action is confided to you, and you will determine it in determining the manner of cooperation. But, until the United States are in your judgment sufficiently strong to warrant operation under a separate command, it is understood that you will cooperate as a component of the army you may be assigned to by the French Government.

You are to keep the department fully advised of all that concerns your command, and to make your recommendations freely and directly to the department. You are vested with all necessary authority to carry on the operations of the command with the spirit of these instructions and toward a victorious

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. HARRIS LANING.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

Q. Now, Capt. Laning, can you give the committee any information as to the steps that were taken by the Navy Department in regard to conducting the naval activities during the late war, and please state what were your duties in the World War up to the present time, showing your own experience and observations for observation? Will you state the matter in your own words?

A. A few days after the announcement in the newspapers that a Senate committee had been appointed to investigate the conduct of the war by the Navy Department, rumors came to me that I would be called as a witness. It is anything but pleasant to be a witness in an investigation of the department, but it is my pride and honor to serve, but when it came to be called before the committee I naturally made up my mind that I could to tell the facts as I know them. I made a review of my memory and studied the papers in my possession, and I prepared a statement of the facts. With the consent of the committee I will read that statement.

Q. Very well.

A. My sole object in presenting the facts as I will is to inform the committee what I believe to have been serious faults in the administration of the Navy Department in connection with the war, so that the faults being made known their recurrence might be avoided. I therefore request the committee to ever bear in mind that my statement is utterly devoid of personal feeling and that I make it because it is my duty to do so.

From my knowledge of the Navy and from information gained through my personal contact with the Navy Department, I am convinced that from the starting of the World War the department has neglected the Navy as it should have, and as a result the Navy was not properly ready for war when we entered the war, and that it did not carry on its part in the war in the early days as it should and should have been carried on.

I have many things to bring about my convictions, among them the following particulars:

1. In the years immediately preceding our entry into the war the Navy Department did not take an attitude on legislation

and policies that would enable the fleet to be made properly for war, and that the fleet was not properly ready when war was declared.

Second. That even when war was imminent, when it was known that war could not be avoided, the department even then did not do those things that ought to have been done to make the fleet ready to carry on the war in its full strength and along the proper lines.

Third. That at about the time war was declared, although a fully drawn up plan, outlining what direction the Navy's first operations should take, was prepared by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the department's approval, the plan was not approved as a result at the very time a plan was most needed the Navy did not have any general plan that was based on the peculiar conditions imposed by an enemy whose naval effort was restricted entirely to the use of submarines.

Fourth. That not having a definite plan to work to, the various parts of the Navy Department could make no coordinated effort to carry on the war, but, on the contrary, each part was obliged to do what that part thought might be best, with the result that not only was the effectiveness of the naval effort greatly reduced in the early stages of the war, but also the cost of the war was increased considerably and unnecessarily added to.

Fifth. That during the war it was always difficult and frequently impossible to obtain the department's approval of essential operations and policies; that this made it necessary for subordinate officers to go far beyond their authority to get things done, and that as a result the difficulties of carrying on the war were increased while the effectiveness was decreased.

It is not possible for me to produce documentary evidence for every detail of the above five particulars. In most cases where I can not produce documents I can give you the names of officers who can substantiate my statements and can refer you to Navy Department records and reports of congressional hearings where such information can be obtained.

That you may understand my competency to report the facts that follow I will give you a history of the duty I have been performing since the beginning of the World War. At the time of the declaration of war I was in command of the Reserve Destroyer Flotilla, Atlantic Fleet. On October 5, 1916, I was relieved from that duty and the following day reported for duty in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was assigned to duty under the Aid to Material, Capt. J. S. McKean, and became his senior assistant. I remained in that position from October 6, 1916, until July 16, 1917, when at the request of then Rear Admiral L. C. Palmer, Chief of Bureau of Navigation, I was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation and placed in charge of the Officer Personnel Division, which position I held until September 21, 1918, when I was advanced to the position of Assistant Chief of Bureau of Navigation. I continued as Assistant Chief of Bureau until March 31, 1919, when I was detached and ordered to duty as Chief of Staff, Destroyer Squadrons, Atlantic Fleet, which is my present duty. Rear Admiral L. C. Palmer was detached from duty as Chief of Bureau of Navigation about November 1, 1918,

until the first part of January, 1919, when Rear Admiral Clegg, Chief of Bureau, I was the acting Chief of the Bureau of Naval Operations.

I reported for duty in the Navy Department on January 1, 1919, and until I left it on March 31, 1919, I was in very close contact with the Secretary of the Navy and the other members of the department. Not many days passed when I did not have a conference with the Secretary on important subjects before him matters and papers requiring his action. I was an adviser on many matters in regard to material and operations and in regard to personnel while I was in the department. During the time I was acting Chief of Bureau I was an adviser to personnel matters. Officially I came to know the department and its ways very intimately, and from my contact with the Secretary and my intimate knowledge of the department and its methods. My statements are, therefore, usually made, but are based on my personal knowledge of the department and to the affairs.

In the first particular, I will show how the department, in regard to certain legislation, made it impossible to have the Navy ready for war either in regard to personnel or material. I do not intend to criticize the department's attitude on the building program for the Navy, for it has generally advocated a large building program. Whether or not the numbers and the cost were correct is a point on which opinions differ, but the department advocated a large building program. The remark that the department's attitude was its apparent inaction in regard to the necessity for legislation that would provide adequate manning for the ships or that would provide for adequate maintenance of the completed ships fully ready for war. You will find in the report the Secretary of the Navy has made that he has given consideration to the total number of ships we have and to the condition of their actual material condition for being manned for war. It must be apparent to any one that a ship means nothing in readiness for war. To be of any use it must be in a material condition to fight, and it must be fully sufficient to fight it but trained to fight it.

In the future to realize the necessity for the legislation that must be had in black and white, the evidence can be found in the recorded hearings before the Naval Committees of the General Board, Naval Operations, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance, especially as to personnel from a letter written by Admiral Clegg, Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Reserve Fleet, 1914, and from the remarks made by Admiral Clegg, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, in the "Report of the Spring of 1915." Officers who can testify as to the condition of the ships and the work on ships to put them in the best possible condition during the years just before the war are the various officers in the material bureaus during that time.

Those officers were all at that time, if called upon, can testify as to the necessity to get alterations essential to fighting efficiency and the cost of funds. Those same officers can testify as to the

personnel difficulties on even the best manned ships, and of the ships that should have been manned and ready that were immobile and therefore useless for war purposes for the officers and men. I personally know these things to be fact, the department itself did not make sufficient effort to have them remedied and they were not remedied. On the contrary such accounts of the Navy and its splendid condition and efficiency given out by the department that few, if any, outside the department realized the true condition. The Secretary's reports, his statements before Congress, and his statements to the press at that time all had the effect that the Navy was all right and entirely ready.

When the World War started in 1914, to most of the people in this country it seemed advisable that our Navy at least should be as ready for war as it was possible to make it. We all hoped to get out of the war, but many realized that a mere failure to be ready for war would not keep us out of it. Most of us realized that on the contrary a failure to be ready might tend to drag us in. In fact from August, 1914, until the spring of 1917 the press, the public, and Congress showed their willingness to have the Navy ready for war. With the plaudits of the country Congress authorized the greatest building programs ever known. It was generally understood in the Navy Department and throughout the service that the things necessary to make the Navy ready for war would be supplied by Congress if the needs were made known. But even then the needs as to personnel, and personnel will ever be the life blood of the Navy, were not truly presented to Congress. When Congress was seen to be anxious to put the personnel on a sound footing so that the ships might be manned for war, the service was astounded to learn that the department had recorded itself against any increase of personnel, and this at a time when only about half the ships were manned with even peace complements. To prove this you have only to read over the congressional records of the years just before the war.

The result of the failure to supply an adequate personnel for the Navy was fully stated by me to the House Naval Committee in its hearings before it on December 17 and 18, 1918, at which time I was acting chief of Bureau of Navigation. The statement is found in House Document No. 11, pages 674-680, which statement I will insert in the record. In order to emphasize the personnel situation at the time war was declared and the first few months after I will read one or two paragraphs from that statement:

At that time, on the west coast of the United States, of our armored cruisers all but two of them were manned with partial crews so small that the ships could not run. At League Island and other navy yards we had a number of battleships in reserve because we did not have enough people to operate them. We had about 25 destroyers half manned and a number of other ships that ought to have been in operation all the time and weren't even partly manned because we didn't have men and officers even to half man them. Those ships began to set up a cry for men and officers as soon as the war started, for the ships were needed and needed badly. It wasn't only there we had our trouble. We began to enlist men by the thousands to man our unmanned and undermanned ships and these men had to be trained. Our regular training stations were filled with them and new training stations were set up in many places. Each one of these stations began to call for officers to train their recruits and there were no officers. We were in the predicament of not having personnel to man our ships and also of not having it to even train recruits. *A more difficult or serious situation at the beginning of a great war hardly be imagined.*

... was that?

... in 1917, at the beginning of the war, with Germany. Right at the start of Naval Operations needed officers in his office to handle ... but they were not to be had. The Bureau of Ordnance was ... began to turn out guns and ammunition and needed ... guns and ammunition to look after the production, but ... to send to them. Everywhere there was a cry for officers ... We did send green recruits to fill the places of the men ... and trained, but for officers we had none to send. That was ... about three months after the war started when I was called ... of Naval Operations and put in charge of the Officer Division of Navigation. We had 2,394 commissioned officers in the line of ... and we actually needed right then and there between six and ... officers trained in time of peace that they might be ready ... the vast Navy of the United States the only ships we had any ... half our battleships and destroyers, and even they were ... in personnel, while the shore end, which is essential to the ... had nothing at all.

... was put up to me at that time was to make 2,394 officers do the ... of 7,000 should have been ready to do. The enlisted men ... for we could get the raw material, and though the men ... absorb them in the ships and train them very much quicker ... The situation with regard to men was mighty bad, but the ...

... Admiral Palmer and I put in some sleepless nights about that

... from House Document No. 11, above referred to, is ... full as follows:

... we take up the details of our present and future needs I ... statement to the committee as to the personnel situation both ... of the war, and to tell you something of what we have done ... I don't think anyone knows except the Bureau of Navigation. ... you will make some points clear that would otherwise need

... Then you go ahead and we won't interrupt you. You can make ... and then we can take the other up in the analysis I have indicated. ... that For the past 20 years we have been building up the ... We have had several building programs. Right now we are ... building program of any and there is some talk of this session ... larger building program. In all this increase of the Navy ... was done to increase the personnel to man those new ships that ... was some increase in personnel but it didn't compare with the ... the result has been that though each year we actually had in ... more ships than ever before, at the same time we had ... operate because of lack of personnel, more ships than ever ... of those that were not operating was constantly growing ... that were, and that was all due to the fact that we did not have ... all the ships we built or needed to perform either the peace ... of the Navy.

... two or three instances of the effect on the Navy of that failure ... back to 1914, just before the World War started, when we had ... In a situation like the one we had in Mexico, we should have ... down there to handle it. We didn't have sufficient of ... to handle the situation, and so we had to send the battleships ... North Atlantic Fleet to do the work. They were taken off their ... training and preparation for the kind of work they were built ... to run work in Mexican waters. They did the work all right, ... training and readiness for a real naval war. We had ships of ... for the task and ought to have had the men to man those ships ... handled that situation without calling on our main fighting ... personnel those ships were not ready and could not be sent, ... battleships and destroyers to do their work.

... the war began For lack of personnel we were still unable to ... except the battleships and destroyers I remember in 1916 ... of the reserve destroyer flotilla and the revolution in the

Dominican Republic started. I had my little flotilla at Key West at that time we were holding our target practice. I had only half crews, men and officers on the destroyers, and on the *Panther*, which was flagship. The Navy Department wanted somebody down there to handle that Dominican Republic situation. We were from torpedo practice about noon one day and on the way in I received a message if I could go down there with my little bunch of ships to meet that situation. I promptly telegraphed back that if we could forego gun practice, which we were doing in a few days, I could get away. At 4 o'clock that afternoon I received word. We have eight destroyers. At 7 o'clock that night five of the oil-burning destroyers were on their way half manned with only 2 officers and about 45 men. The next morning I succeeded in getting off two more coal-burning destroyers. There were not enough men in the outfit for both the *Panther* and the other destroyer. Either the *Panther* could take the men and go and leave the *Preston* behind, or the *Preston* could go and leave the *Panther*. I telegraphed the department asking for enough men to send either the *Panther* or the *Preston*, but that as it was only one ship to go, and that before the other could go we had to have some engine-room men. The department sent word to put the men on the *Preston* and that men would be sent for the *Panther*. So I took men off the *Panther* and put them on the *Preston*. Before she could get away I got word for the *Panther* to go. I then took the men off the *Preston*, put them back on the *Panther*, and away she went. The *Panther* spent several days getting the men she needed to enable her to move.

Well, we went down to the Dominican Republic and we did our part in that situation. Those half-manned destroyers were running around that island night after night without sufficient officers or men to properly handle or take care of them, because the proper ships for that kind of work could not be supplied with crews, and therefore laid up and unable to operate.

I stayed there about six weeks and came back, and just about four hours after I got into Key West I got a telegram to send three of those destroyers to patrol work. They were still manned with only the 2 officers and 45 men on each destroyer, but they went and did the work.

I cite those instances to show you that even for minor naval operations that we do to the Navy in times of peace we, with all of our vast expenditures for that class of ships. We not only did not have the cruisers and gunboats to meet emergencies like these, but also we didn't have enough to "show the flag" to other countries where there wasn't emergency.

As bad as was the situation for the ordinary naval operations we are called upon to perform in time of peace, it was a good deal worse when we came to getting ready for war. We only had about one-half of our battleships fully manned before the war. We had about 30 of our destroyers fully manned and about 40 half crews. Those were about all the ships the Navy did have fully manned when we wanted to get our fleet ready for business when war came, and naturally we had to engage in maneuvers. In order to get sufficient ships for those maneuvers we had to use all sorts of subterfuges. We would send a collier out and let her represent battleships in a big war game, the battleships themselves being unmanned. That wasn't much of a way to train for war, but without men it was the best we could do. As far as being ready for war was concerned, the readiness and the efficiency of those four battleships was truly represented by the collier, and that was a very good illustration of the Navy's readiness at that time. The Navy was not ready to fight with its full strength when war begins. It is the one arm of the service that can't wait. If we do not have our ships manned and ready to fight, it will probably be too late to get them ready after war begins.

When the war actually started for us, the next year after 1916, when we were in San Domingo, we had manned every ship our scanty personnel would let us have, but even then only about half our ships were capable of operating. The Atlantic Fleet was in Cuban waters. It had in it practically all of the ships that we had manned and consisted almost entirely of battleships and destroyers, because we had no men with which to man our other ships, and even these ships were manned at that time with what we called peace complements, which is less than the war complement. We have since learned that a peace complement is something we should deal with, since it takes fewer men than are required to fight a ship in battle. You can't train a team properly unless you have all the members, and we were training the ships in our main fleet about like you would train a football team with eleven men up to the day of the big game, and then on that day put 11 men in. They were better off in men than in officers. The men had been increased a little *rapidly than officers*, and when the war started those ships down in Cuban waters had approximately 27 officers and about 85 per cent of what we now know to

...a battleship. Those 27 officers should have been either 37 or 39 ... had been properly manned. The ships clamored for men and ... and they wanted them right away and badly, and while we ... them green and untrained men to fill their vacancies, we could ... which, of course, were not to be had so easily.

... west coast of the United States, of our armored cruisers I think ... manned with partial crews so small that the ships couldn't ... and other navy yards we had a number of battleships laid ... we did not have enough people to operate them. We had about ... and a number of other ships that ought to have been in ... weren't even partly manned because we didn't have the ... half man them. These ships began to set up a cry for men ... the war started, for the ships were needed and needed at once. ... had our trouble. We began to enlist men by the tens of ... and undermanned ships, and these men had to be ... training stations were filled with them and new training camps ... Each one of these stations began to call for officers to ... there were no officers. We were in the predicament of not ... our ships, and also of not having it to even train recruits ... difficult or serious situation at the beginning of a great war

... was that ... that was in 1917, at the beginning of the war with Germany. Right ... the Chief of Naval Operations needed officers in his office to han- ... war but they were not to be had. The Bureau of Ordnance ... That bureau began to turn out guns and ammunition and needed ... guns and ammunition to look after the production, but ... to send to them.

... was a cry for officers and men that we did not have. We did ... the places of the men we should have had ready and trained, ... to send. That was the situation in July, 1917, about three ... started when I was called from the office of the Chief of Naval ... in charge of the Officer Division of the Bureau of Navigation. ... officers in the line of the Navy at that time, and we actu- ... there between six and seven thousand line officers ... that they might be ready in time of war. Of all the vast ... States the only ships we had anywhere near ready were about ... and destroyers and even they were not up to battle strength in ... end, which is essential to the success of the sea end, seem-

... was put up to me at that time was to make 2,394 officers do ... or 7,000 should have been ready to do. The enlisted men ... better for we could get the raw material; and though the ... could absorb them in the ships and train them very much ... officers. The situation with regard to men was mighty bad, ... was desperate.

... Admiral Palmer and I put in some sleepless nights about that ... to get officers and men, and we had to man our ships and carry ... not only that, but on the day I went to the Bureau of Navi- ... Naval Operations called on us to man and put in operation in ... the 16 huge German ships that formed the nucleus of our ... At the same time they were calling on us from the "other ... in driving down the submarines, and we were taking over ... other craft in large numbers, all of which had to be manned ... as possible.

... combatant officers literally jumped up by the thousand, ... original 2,394 to meet the demand. I made an estimate of ... the decision that there were certain things that simply ... destroyers were needed abroad to meet the desperate situa- ... submarines. Come what might, they had to go over, and ... The yachts had to get their crews so that they too could fight ... the transports could carry troops over. We had to man and ... didn't do anything else, but also we had to get our submarines ...

... had been robbed of their officers until they had only 21 line ... required 37, yet we had to get those battleships in fighting trim. ... situation I came to the conclusion that those battleships would ... for at least three months, for the British fleet had the Huns

up, and even if they came out to fight we would still have three months to in. I figured that each day that went by without the Germans coming on three months from that day before we would be called on to fight a general engagement and therefore we had three months we could use to develop and train personnel.

Mr. OLIVER. What do you mean by that?

Capt. LANING. I figured if that if the German fleet came out on any day some chance whipped the British fleet—which however improbable it might still had to consider as a possibility—it would be at least three months before they could repair themselves and be ready to tackle us. Of course, each day as it went by their coming out left us still three months grace for preparation. We decided to take advantage of it.

We couldn't make those 2,394 officers go very far. I believed, however, that the finest officers in the world and that by using them as leaven in the dough of splendid officer material that this country has, we could turn out a loaf that met our requirements. The idea was to spread the leaven of trained officers as far as possible, and, making with it the splendid material we had, bring the whole thing to a fairly satisfactory condition. If we did only what could be done with our few officers, our part in the war would be small, but if we could carry out our idea of them as a leaven and were given the time, we could meet every demand made. Every young man who came to us and who seemed to have the qualifications of an officer was to be at once put in training for an officer, and as soon as he had the rudiments of an officer's training we would send him to a battleship to be trained and absorbed into her complement.

When we decided to take that step the battleships had already been cut down to 21 or 22 officers when they ought to have had 37 officers, and to place those green men on them to fill the gaps was, to say the least, an experiment of dangerous proportions. We believed, however, that they could be trained quickly for the subordinate positions and later for higher positions and that by a process of younger officers using older officers and taking over the older officers' duties we could gradually release officers from various ships and made available for positions of greater importance on other ships we were taking on.

The plan was certainly radical, and in order to have success with it we had to have the hearty cooperation of every officer in the United States Navy. I went with the scheme to Admiral Palmer, and he said:

"It looks like the only chance we have to do our part in the war, so let us try it, but before we put it into effect we had better talk to the commander in chief and to the officers of the fleet to see if they think it can be done."

If the officers afloat felt that the proposition would not work, and if they were not in heart and soul and carry it out, it would be impossible to put it through. Admiral Palmer sent a telegram to the commander in chief and one to the commander of the cruiser and transport force, telling them that on certain days they were to be with them to confer on officer personnel, and on those days to assemble admirals, captains, and executive officers for the conference.

The fleet was at a base in Long Island Sound, and I arrived on the *Pennsylvania* the night before the conference. Admiral Mayo was abroad at that time and Admiral Coffman was in command. As soon as I arrived on the flagship I went to see Admiral Coffman. When I went in the cabin, Admiral Coffman, who is my very dear friend, said:

"Laning, I know what you are here for. You want to take more officers away from my ship, and I tell you now you can't do it. You have stripped us now and we are dangerous. If you take any more out you will ruin this fleet."

I replied:

"Admiral, I am sorry that we can't get any more officers from you, for to carry out the plans we must have them; but at least you will let me talk to you about it, won't you?"

He said, "Yes." And I talked to him that night until well after 11 o'clock. I was leaving the cabin the admiral put his hand on my shoulder and said:

"It is the only way to do it, and I am going to back you up in it. There may be a good deal of opposition to it at the start, but it is the only thing to do."

The next morning I went in to the conference facing all those flag officers and captains, and just as Admiral Coffman did, they knew what I was there for. They knew I was going to suggest that they give us some of those 21 officers they had to do with of 37; so when I began my talk I faced officers who I knew were naturally hostile to my plan. And well they might be, for I was calling on them to give up more of their already too few trained officers and the replacing of them with green *material for officers*, but material that was absolutely green and untrained. Admiral Coffman knew the situation and met it in a way in introducing me by saying,

the soundness of the plan, and that it simply had to go through. In the battle on sea, with the life of a nation at stake, it was rather a matter of our dreadnaughts that in three months they must be ready and during that time must train green officers (as well as their crews) and give up 4 of their trained officers, reducing the number to

the reasoning in our proposition, and when my talk was over they agreed that it was the only thing we could do that would enable us to win the war. More than that, they all said that it not only could be done.

I have been in the Navy's force and had a similar experience, and when I told Admiral Palmer that the fleet was with us and our proposition was sound. We then issued our orders to the service, and from then on the Navy trained officers and men while it did its work of the war. It is not difficult to see that a few outside of the service even at the beginning of the war, but the Navy, as a whole was not ready to fight until many months later. Had we met the German Navy this year we could have faced them in the readiness and ability of our Navy, but we must not have waited before our personnel was ready. The next enemy may not be the Germans, and we may be compelled to fight and at the end of the war. We can not and must not again count on having an easy war after war is declared and for that reason we must be ready.

The 2,500 officers we had in the beginning of the war in preparing our personnel as the Navy's greatest accomplishment. We should take advantage of their magnificent work and keep the price in effort and in treasure and we would be foolish to have been so dearly bought by allowing the Navy to go back to the beginning of the war. It serves us nothing to pay billions of dollars for them useless by not paying the millions it takes to man them. We can not make a navy or at least can not make a fighting navy. If we may have them count as nothing unless they can fight. We must have personnel. In the last few months the Navy, for the first time since the war, has been ready to fight. Let us keep it ready by the maintenance of the personnel.

To keep the Navy ready naturally divides itself into two parts: one to retain what we now have while we are building up our permanent strength and the other to establish what we have to become a part of that permanent strength. The legislation necessary to establish a permanent strength has been drawn up and careful thought has drawn up the legislation covering these two parts. If the legislation is passed as recommended the United States will at once be as to personnel and ready to fight with its full strength the next day. No part of the legislation recommended can be omitted. It is the service, and I trust that the naval committee will see fit to take it up and that Congress will enact it into law. Economy, efficiency and safety demand this legislation.

To further emphasize the situation in regard to the personnel in the early stages of the war I refer to the letter submitted to the Secretary of the Navy by the Bureau of Navigation at the end of October, 1918. The letter is dated October 28, 1918 and was prepared by the bureau in accordance with a request from the Secretary to submit information for the annual report made about the end of 1918. The letter is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT.

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION.

Washington, D. C., October 26, 1918.

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the cooperation in annual report.

Very respectfully,
a. Memorandum of October 15. b. Secretary's letter of

October 15. Your wishes expressed in the above reference the following work of the Bureau of Navigation is forwarded for incorporation in the annual report to the President.

At the time the United States entered the war, the personnel of the Navy of a high standard, was entirely inadequate to meet the needs of war as it is to-day. Neither of enlisted men nor of officers were there enough to man the ships of the Navy that were then ready. It was possible to man and put in war those ships for which there were crews, but those ships were only a part of our fighting force. The newer battleships and destroyers were manned and ready when war was declared, but the older ships, including battleships, armored cruisers, etc., had only half crews and a few were not even in commission.

It was evident that if the Navy were to do its full share in the war by expanding the personnel would have to be adopted immediately. Fortunately for us the enemy was not at our doors. The allied fleet that for nearly three years had kept the enemy sea forces in check were still sufficient to hold them enough long for our personnel ready. In this we were very fortunate but we should not allow our Navy personnel be so reduced that we can not on the declaration of war put our fighting forces into operation.

The plans adopted for rapidly building up our personnel have proved successful.

* * * * *

Capt. LANING. The letter then goes on to tell what we have been doing in building up that personnel. Further confirmation of the correctness of the statement as to personnel at that time can be obtained from Capt. L. C. Smith, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and Capt. L. M. Owen, who had charge of the enlisted personnel division. As to the material unreadiness of our ships with the fleet when war was declared, I refer you to a report submitted to the department at that time by Admiral Mayo, commander in chief. That report is now on file in the Navy Department and should now be on its files. Based on the work that was necessary to do on them at that time and taking into consideration our available repair facilities, it was found that it would require a period of over 100 days to get all battleships of even the fleet materially ready for war.

I have in my possession the original estimate of the time that would be necessary to do the work and later will refer to it and submit it in connection with another particular. Even though you may not care to detail the department's records and congressional hearings to show that the department did not make sufficient effort to have the fleet ready as to material and personnel, the evidence that the Navy was not ready in these respects, will be before you in Admiral Mayo's letter just referred to and in the statement from House Document No. 11.

Passing on to the second particular that even when war was imminent things that ought to have been done were not done the following is submitted:

For many months prior to February 1, 1917, our representatives in Germany were reporting on the situation over there. They gave us fairly accurate information of Germany's submarine blockade program and of her intention to carry on unrestricted attack on merchant shipping, whether neutral or not, as soon as the submarines were ready. These reports can be found on the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence. But in spite of them the department even then failed to take steps to get the fleet ready for war. As a matter of fact the dreadnoughts did not go to the yards for work until summer—many weeks after the declaration of war. I wish to point out that had we sent the battleships to the yards in the winter 1916-17, and had concentrated on getting them

as material is concerned, they would have been ready when we declared war. As it was they were not ready either as to material or as to personnel.

The third particular, on February 1, 1917, Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare. At that time we practically gave up hope of averting war and whether or before, there was the necessity of at least preparing for a war against Germany. Certainly we should have been then, to enable us to act promptly and effectively when it came. But although I was in the office of the Navy Department and would have known of them, I did not know of these plans. So fearful of the result was I that on February 7 I prepared a memorandum on the subject. It

MEMORANDUM.

FEBRUARY 18, 1917.

At present, with the really little progress we are making toward preparing for war in the present situation. Our general plan of war is to keep an enemy free to move in general as he pleases and to make up a strong offensive force. We have made no plan for meeting a situation like the present where the immediate menace is so great. The final menace, if the submarine effort is successful, is so great we can raise to meet it and for that reason our first step should be to destroy the immediate menace and thereby remove the final menace.

From this view there seems to be no general plan for handling the situation. No other plan in mind than that developed to meet a situation like the present situation, the Navy Department as a whole is at a standstill. While there is nothing new in the situation. While there is nothing new in the situation, there is certainly no concerted effort to meet the ultimate menace. No one knows what particular task will fall to his share in the situation and therefore can not prepare himself for his part. No one knows what general plan must be followed in a situation like the present. The whole department is at a standstill in preparing for war.

A general plan can not be obtained at present, but is being prepared. A plan can not be made ready for submission and the different parts of the organization are not prepared to carry it out. It is essential that the different tasks will be and will be prepared to carry out. The present situation is going to call for a plan of action. The different parts of the organization have been previously trained for or have prepared for. The plan that must be put into effect to meet it is essential to the success of the war. The officers are to be prepared to carry out their part. Its execution must be known and the organization perfected to put it into effect when it is adopted.

To prepare a plan for use when needed. In fact, I can not prepare a plan and to indicate what it is to the cooperating parts of the organization. They are prepared to expeditiously perform their tasks in it. There is no present energy. Each part of the organization is directing its own efforts. Some may be headed in the right direction. All could be more or less right if a logical general plan were directed to meet it.

We are at least ready to put a plan of some sort in operation. We are not doing our duty if we fail to do so. We are not utilizing the resources of the Navy Department and they can be used to enormous advantage if we have a plan and an organization ready to carry it out.

It is not clear if we don't do all we can to meet the emergency? We must have a plan and an organization ready to carry it out.

I handed to my immediate superior, who later showed it to the Secretary of the Navy. It shows very clearly the situation in the department.

Some few days later, just after the naval appropriation March 3, 1917, was passed, I took the matter up verbally with Admiral McKean, and the following morning, at a conference of the officers in Operations held in Admiral Benson's office, McKean brought up the question of formulating a plan for conducting the then inevitable war with the particular view of determining how to best utilize, to meet the then existing conditions, the new resources in money placed at our disposal in the appropriation bill. Admiral Benson then and there told the officers to bring the question up and submit plans for consideration. I began an estimate of the situation, and on March 13, 1917, submitted the estimate which embodied my idea of the plan which would follow in our first war efforts. It must be remembered that at that time we were in possession only of general information. We had no inside information of the true state of affairs or as to what the Allies would want when we joined them in the war, and for this reason our estimate and decisions at that time had to be based very largely to our case at home. Still it was essential that we should once take all the steps we could to prepare both for our own defense and for those things our information showed us we would have to do. It was not known until some time later that the greatest of all our naval efforts would be in overcoming submarines in European waters and in the transportation of troops. I will insert in the record a copy of that estimate and plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that plan the plan of the Bureau of Naval Operations that you referred to before in your statement?

Capt. LANING. No; that is leading up to that plan. You will see in a moment, after I have read a little farther.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. LANING. The paper is a long one. It analyzes the situation as it appeared three weeks before we declared war. It shows what we would have to do to combat the submarines and in arming up our forces suitable for that and other war purposes, and in using up the money resources then available to create and prepare additional forces the estimate showed to be necessary.

A study of the estimate should enable you to see how unprepared we were at that time, in so far as material was concerned for a war against submarines. It shows that with the exception of 52 destroyers, of which, I may add, only about 30 were in active service, the United States Navy had practically nothing with which to combat submarines.

The estimate of the situation is summarized at the end of the decision of 28 parts, each of which covered an action to be taken once. I will insert the entire paper in the record, but will here insert only the 28 parts of the decision:

DECISION.

1. Arm all merchant ships engaged in trade with the allies, cost to be charged to ordnance appropriations. Use guns of 5-inch or larger caliber, if available.
2. Encourage by subsidies and insurance as many additional ships as possible to enter into trade with the allies, arming all that do.
3. Encourage new construction of merchant shipping in all ways.
4. Enter into contracts for all 5 and 6 inch guns and ammunition for auxiliary ordnance appropriations permit.

X

to the 16 dirigibles now contracted for and enter into contracts as soon as possible.

to determine of the air-patrol stations for the above dirigibles.

to use emergency fund \$10,000,000 for dirigibles, stations, and other

to use new and rush to completion, or charter, 300 large size patrol vessels. These built should be not less than 110 feet long and not less than 24 knots.

to charter all craft suitable for harbor and in-shore patrol. to be available at once for the above patrol vessels from the emer-

to obtain patrol vessels at once with suitable guns, to be paid for from the ordnance appropriations.

to take from the emergency fund \$5,000,000 to be used by the Navy to obtain additional guns and ammunition for patrol vessels that are not in the ordnance appropriations.

to obtain mine sweepers by commandeering, charter, or purchase of foreign vessels. If 100 pair can not be obtained in this way construct

to use the emergency fund for obtaining sweepers.

to equip and arm all mine sweepers from present ordnance appro-

to use Service that many largest size spar buoys will be needed for travel, and set aside \$100,000 from the emergency fund to purchase Service has funds for the purpose.

to use surface patrols in protected and convenient harbors, setting aside the emergency fund for equipping them.

to use the 10,000 anchored contact mines.

to use the wide antishubmarine nets in large quantities both for lanes of travel, and for use of patrol boats.

to use the emergency fund to Bureau of Ordnance for use in connection with purchase of mines and nets.

to use the following craft under construction or authorized: First, all authorized craft; second, all authorized destroyers; third, all authorized submarines.

to use the emergency fund for rushing the above construc-

to use the authorized ships to completion to the greatest possible extent from the appropriations.

to use the emergency fund to supply an additional emergency fund to authorized craft and to provide such other craft as may be specially authorized.

to use the remainder of the \$6,000,000 appropriated last year for the construction of the new construction at earliest possible time and at the least cost.

to use the appropriated for improving yards available and at the least cost to occupy them properly. It must be remembered that the yards are already necessary.

to use the additional subsidies provided for in the new bill to the \$5,000,000 to provide for such additional subsidies that may be necessary to handle the increased supplies and

to use the large up on them the necessity of bringing our fleet up to meet the ultimate menace which in addition to all the other requirements requires the following: Five battleships, first line; 10 destroyers; 10 fast submarines; 800 tons of 15 feet mine layers; 20 mine layers; 20 fast ships; 8 supply ships; 8 submarines; 2000 tons.

The bill referred to is here printed in full, as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, March 15, 1917.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The appropriation bill having become a law and its funds made available to determine the best plan for utilizing these funds in the

X

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION.

About February 1, Germany announced her intention of destroying all ships without further warning in certain zones established by herself, around the nations in Europe with which she is at war. The United States denounces Germany's right to destroy any neutral ships without warning and without search and safeguarding lives, at once broke off diplomatic relations. Since that time both enemy and neutral ships have been sunk in the Baltic by German submarines without warning, but as yet no United States ships have been so sunk. In order to protect American ships from these illegal attacks the Government has ordered the arming of merchant ships and authorizes them to resist illegal attacks.

At this time the condition is not one of war, but with German submarines carrying out the announced German policy and being resisted therein by our Government armed ships, a state bordering on war exists and the situation is such that at any time we may be actually involved in war.

The situation has been gradually developing and in order that the Navy be ready to meet war conditions, Congress has passed an enormous naval appropriation bill and has made its funds immediately available. If the Navy is to be ready for a possible and probable war there is no time to lose in preparing for it. There is no doubt that Congress and the entire Nation expect us to immediately use the appropriated funds as are necessary to prepare ourselves. To fail to do so now to the best advantage may bring terrible disaster to the Nation, but if we do so, if war comes, we may bring it to a successful conclusion. But the proper way for using the funds at once and in the best manner is that we may keep ready for war on the vast scale of the war in Europe, even if we do not altogether avoid it.

ENEMY FORCES.

Strength and disposition.—The possible enemy forces in the present situation are those of all the Central Allies. On both land and sea their forces are enormous, magnificently trained and equipped, and are organized in a way beyond the conception of the vast majority of our population. They wage war in the most systematic way and apparently let no opportunity of injuring their enemies escape. They are brave, resourceful, and ruthless.

Fortunately for us, the tremendous forces of the Germanic powers are not yet able to operate against us in their full strength. Their vast armies are generally on the defensive and are opposed by armies of greater numbers and as splendidly equipped. To maintain her armies Germany depends entirely on her internal resources; this lies her strength. To maintain their armies, the Allies seem obliged to depend on the rest of the world, or at least to bring supplies across the sea, and in that lies their strength and their weakness—their strength because of the inexhaustible quantity of their supplies, but their weakness because of the danger to their communication.

The huge naval forces of the Central Powers, as great as they are, do not yet dominate the sea. Their coast is blockaded, and except for submarines their fleets are contained. So blockaded, except for her power of self-sustenance, Germany would have collapsed long ago, but in spite of her enormous resources and her intelligence, she is facing serious shortages of food and possibility of other supplies essential to the conduct of the war.

If the present conditions can be continued, everything points to the final success, but there is some doubt that these conditions will continue. There is but little chance of victory for the German armies until the Entente's supplies are broken, and it is at these, with the only weapons she has, that Germany is attacking and in so striking has denied our rights on the sea. It is yet too early to estimate the result of her blow, but it is to prevent the success of the blow that we must make our efforts. Should we, with the Allies, fail in that effort, success may come to Germany and should it, it may fall to us to have to meet Germany's full strength alone.

It follows, then, that we must prepare ourselves to render futile and destroy the immediate menace of the German submarine campaign, in order to destroy the ultimate menace of her full strength used against us, but at the same time we must prepare ourselves to meet the ultimate menace if it comes, for unless we are prepared to do so the very life of our Nation is endangered.

Probable intentions.—The enemy intentions are fairly well understood. With his enormous submarine force he is endeavoring to break the lines of supply of the Entente forces. Should he succeed, he may gain a decision or at least get a victory, either of which would leave him with far greater strength than we have. His submarine pressure works against his enemies in the field and against noncombatants.

any of these in the field, he may win a decision. If he cuts off our submarines, their demands may force an indecisive peace. This is in view. Even though he may not immediately succeed, the expectation that their demands will force the Entente powers to withdraw their fleets to save their populace from starvation. In such a case, the advantage of the lack of protection to the Allied Fleet, which may be attacked and possibly engage it successfully, thereby gaining command of the sea and immediately threatening us, as well as the

general plan. Germany is already operating her submarines. That she will continue to operate them there can not be doubted. These zones that shipping converges, and it is there that submarines have their base. But knowing also that those zones are best defended, it is likely and probable that other much used lanes of travel will be attacked, lacking bases, not a great many submarines can be used and it would take many to stop shipping at the source. However, it is possible for some to so operate, and it is natural that they should attack the lanes that are nearest and most frequented. Such lanes are our own east coast ports, including the Panama Canal, and it is that we must prepare for counter operations at once, even though they are offensive operations in conjunction with the Allies.

When a nation has entered this war against her, Germany has at once delivered a powerful blow. Such blows delivered as soon as war comes are of damaging and discouraging the new enemy and reducing the courage of Germany's own people. There is every reason to believe that we be involved in the war Germany will make such an attempt. We may expect serious attacks from her emissaries within the country, but such attempts are not to be met by this department. To deliver the Navy a hard blow and a serious one is to operate submarines. Germany knows that we have practically no security force in our waters. A small submarine force could possibly deliver a serious blow. We must be ready for a blow.

Our intentions in the immediate submarine menace have been stated. The ultimate menace, should she get into a position to adopt it, is a full strength against us. It will probably take the form of an attack with a naval force to gain control, accompanied by an army campaign on land. The details of the methods she would employ are not to be taken up here. That we must be ready for both is evident and while preparing to meet and overcome the immediate menace must not lose sight of the ultimate menace or fail to prepare for it. The immediate menace may remove the ultimate menace, but against both we must prepare for both.

OUR OWN FORCES.

As compared with the forces of our probable enemy we are in no way ready to defend the country. Even if we are taken to prepare land forces, they can hardly be ready within a year. Our sole reliance for many months to come is the Navy and the Navy must at once prepare to meet both menaces.

Our forces may be grouped into three classes: (1) Ships completed or that will be ready shortly; (2) ships now under construction; and (3) the funds made available in the recent appropriation for providing material in addition to (1) and (2).

It is best to utilize the third part of our force that this estimate is based on, that I must ascertain what is needed to meet the present menace, what is now ready, and then arrange my expenditures to meet both menaces as far as possible. I must realize that an expenditure in the right direction, will materially reduce any power that the greatest care must be exercised.

As to (1) my available fighting force now practically ready for service: 12 battleships, first line; 21 battleships, second line; 9 armoured cruisers, second class; 12 cruisers, third class; 7 gunboats; 11 coast destroyers; 3 mine layers; 4 mine sweepers (with 12 aircraft); 26 aeroplanes; 28 submarines; 3 kite balloons.

Under forces appropriated for but not ready we have: Now building—Navy ships, first line; 1 scout; 27 destroyers; 58 submarines (coast); 3 submarines (fleet); 1 gunboat; 16 nonrigid dirigibles; 78 aeroplanes; 12 kites. Authorized—Three battleships, first line; 5 battle cruisers; 5 scouts; 15 submarines (800 tons).

Under funds immediately available that may be used to complete authorized material or to provide material not specifically authorized we have the following:

| | |
|--------------------------------------------|----|
| For aviation..... | 11 |
| Ordnance and ordnance stores..... | 12 |
| Batteries for merchant auxiliaries..... | |
| Ammunition for merchant auxiliaries..... | |
| Storehouses, New York and Puget Sound..... | |
| Naval emergency fund..... | 11 |
| For equipping navy yards..... | 12 |

COURSES OPEN TO US.

In order to ascertain what to do we must first compare the above-listed forces with what we actually need to meet both the immediate menace and the ultimate menace. Let us therefore study the methods of combating each menace and thereby determine our needs after which we will determine how to provide all of them, or not. We must provide for all to provide those things that will best enable us to meet both the immediate and the ultimate menace and hold them in check until we can prepare additional forces.

The immediate menace is from submarines so our first step must be to render the menace futile and to destroy it. It will become futile if, in spite of it, we and our allies can maintain the allies' overwater lines of supply. If we destroy the submarine the first mission is gained. How can we do those things?

Submarines have only three offensive weapons—guns, mines, and torpedoes. Of these the gun is naturally the favorite for use because by its successful use it can do the most damage at the least cost. To use guns the submarine must operate on the surface, but so operating, owing to the very few guns they carry and the vulnerability of the ship, they are easily sunk by gun fire. A submarine can not operate on the surface against armed ships and hence properly arming ships requires that submarines attack while submerged and denies the use of their guns.

With their guns eliminated, submarines must depend on mines or torpedoes. With mines they may carry both the floating and the anchored types. They are well suited for using floating mines and at best such mines do not meet their requirements. Good lookouts usually enable a ship to avoid them. Anchored mines are more effective but submarines can carry only a few of them and when laid they can be quickly destroyed by sweeping. They can not be used in over 50 fathoms of water, and in any quantity is limited they must be placed in the approaches to harbors. To eliminate the danger from mines requires that we must keep certain lanes for ingress to and egress from our harbors, free of mines. This requires sweeping, for which special ships and boats especially fitted for their work, are required. Owing to the facility with which mines can be placed and the large areas along our coast that are suitable for their work, we will require a very large force of mine sweepers, but with such a force the dangers from anchored mines, placed by submarines, will be a minimum.

With guns and mines practically eliminated the only other weapon available to submarines that we need fear is torpedoes. Torpedoes are powerful weapons, but they are expensive and submarines can carry very few of them. By arming merchant ships we force submarines to depend almost entirely on torpedoes for their offensive operations and to remain submerged while attacking. This alone greatly reduces the danger from submarines, for working submerged they can use only slow speed, they can not choose their positions, and have great difficulty in getting the course and direction of the target upon which knowledge accurate torpedo fire depends. But while these steps practically insure their safety from gunfire and coincidentally make torpedo fire less successful, these steps only tend to render submarine warfare more dangerous. We must expect many casualties even after we arm merchant ships, and the only way to stop those casualties is to effect the destruction of the submarines. How can we effect their destruction?

To destroy submarines we must first locate them and then sink or capture them. A submarine's safety lies in her ability to completely hide beneath the surface of the water. Its greatest weakness lies in the fact that it can not remain submerged for a great length of time except while resting on the bottom in less than 30 fathoms.

the best means of destroying submarines is to utilize the most effective means of detecting them and when they come to the surface to bring to bear the most effective means to destroy them. The best position for seeing submarines is from the air, not from surface craft, but eyes well above the sea not above the water but can see better. Aircraft are therefore a necessity. Lighter-than-air craft are especially suited for this work. They are lighter than air and entirely dependent on speed to remain up, are more maneuverable, better arranged for the work, able to cover as much ground as faster craft and being capable of moving slowly in any direction if necessary. We should have small lighter-than-air craft for the purpose. The lighter-than-air craft appears best suited for it.

To sink submarines when located by the dirigibles we must have them armed near at hand. To have them near at hand at all times they must be available in great numbers. Those that operate close to the coast must be large enough to carry the necessary size guns, but those that operate outside must be large enough to withstand any and all weathers and be able to operate in all weathers. It would appear, then, that we must have many large patrols and many smaller ones. For outside work the minimum size would be the 110-foot

type. Destroying submarines by gunfire we may also destroy them by mines and nets. Nets to entangle submarines can also be used to protect shipping in shallow waters. They should be used to protect all lanes of travel in sufficient quantities, to protect lanes of travel of shipping. They should be used with entanglement nets.

That the steps to meet the immediate menace are:

1. To have all merchantmen carrying supplies to the Allies to insure their safety.
2. To have enough patrol vessels sufficient to sweep all lanes of travel from our harbor to the outer limit of our depth.
3. To have enough buoys to mark the lanes of travel kept clear of mines.
4. To have enough rigid dirigibles to maintain a close air patrol over the approaches to our harbors and the waters adjacent thereto.
5. To have enough patrol vessels, large and small, the former to operate offshore and the latter to patrol the lanes of travel for shipping and the waters adjacent thereto.
6. To have enough mines in large numbers.
7. To have enough nets to cover the outside entrances to all harbors and to equip patrol vessels.

What material do we need? At this time it is impossible to say the total amount we will require but it is far more than the resources of the Government can produce in a short time. We must provide as much as possible of each kind at once, bearing in mind that the amount we get now it will be far short of what we must have.

To have all armed merchant ships become auxiliaries and to equip them with guns and ammunition we now have ready for arming auxiliaries. We have a great many guns for the purpose we can probably arm all the auxiliaries going to Europe. But as more shipping enters for that purpose more ammunition will be needed.

We must bear in mind that they must have gun fire superior to that of the submarines. It follows that guns for merchantmen should be of equal caliber to those carried by submarines and they must be so placed as to permit them to engage submarines. Depending on the way ships can mount guns they should have guns of 5 inch calibre or larger. To provide these, contracts have been made for all the 5 and 6-inch guns and ammunition for them that will be needed. Appropriation for Batteries for merchant auxiliaries, \$1,751,000. For merchant auxiliaries, \$7,751,000. Three-inch and 4-inch guns for merchant ships until larger guns are available. But all future guns should be of 5 inch calibre or larger.

To have enough carrying supplies to the Allies the United States Government must provide at once. All ships are to be provided by the Government. The amount of money required is more than the present naval appropriations. We can and should

encourage private ships to enter the trade by offering insurance or subsidies of vital importance that the supplies to the Allies be maintained. On the of maintaining them a favorable decision for the Allies rests and their success means our own success at the least cost.

To provide mine sweepers will not be very difficult. There are already motor tugs and steam fishermen that can be quickly taken over by purchase or charter. Sweeping equipment is easily obtained. The number of sweepers so obtained probably not be sufficient and we may have to construct many. We should have for at least 100 pairs immediately, arming each with a small gun, preferably 4.7. The sweepers will have to be obtained out of the "emergency fund" and \$1,000,000 should be set aside from that fund for the purpose. The battery, ammunition, sweeping equipment of the sweepers will have to come from the ordnance appropriations "Ordnance and Ordnance Stores" and "Reserve Ordnance Supplies."

In order that there may be proper buoying of swept lanes, an enormous number of buoys must be provided. These buoys should be provided by the Lighthouse Establishment and notice should be sent them immediately to provide those buoys. The Lighthouse Establishment may not have funds at this time we could possibly borrow for them and arrange for reimbursement later. To make sure that the buoys are ready we should set aside \$100,000 for them from the emergency fund. The Lighthouse Establishment should be informed of the lanes to be kept swept and show the buoyage system to mark them.

Our coast air patrol as now arranged for provides for 15 stations. It seems that dirigibles would be the minimum for each station and that those stations near important ports where close patrol is necessary should have more. We have 16 dirigibles ordered and need 44 more to equip stations to the minimum, but if we get 64 that should be enough for a start. That means 64 more dirigibles than have been ordered, and these will cost about \$50,000 apiece. They should at once be ordered under the appropriation "Aviation, \$5,133,000." But in addition to providing dirigibles we must provide places for their stowage and operation. Of these we have none and they will cost much. We must allow \$10,000,000 from our emergency fund for these purposes in addition to the "Aviation" appropriation.

Patrol vessels to be provided are of two classes—those for inshore work and those for offshore work. There are many small craft available for inshore work that can be purchased or chartered and perhaps not many small boats will have to be built. A very different situation holds for the larger patrols for offshore work. There are a few fair-sized yachts immediately available by charter or purchase but in addition we require many more. We should allow for at least 300 offshore patrol vessels at a cost of \$100,000 each (\$30,000,000). For patrols \$30,000,000 of the emergency fund should be immediately utilized. The arming and equipping of these patrols will have to be paid for from the Ordnance appropriations or other bureau appropriations.

Bases will have to be provided for these patrols and funds must be found for them since without bases they can not be maintained. Makeshifts can be provided if necessary, are available, and at least \$5,000,000 will be required for that purpose.

Mines will have to be provided from the Ordnance appropriation and in large numbers. Ten thousand should be provided for at least. Submarine nets also come from the Ordnance appropriations and are needed in enormous quantities. The Ordnance appropriations are probably insufficient to provide for as many nets and mines as are needed at once, so we should allot \$5,000,000 for those purposes from the emergency fund.

Up to this point we have discussed only those materials to meet the immediate menace. What we have found necessary to provide so far is material to meet the immediate menace alone. But what should be done to meet the far more dangerous ultimate menace? To meet that requires that I must have a strong and well-balanced force. It is not sufficient to merely have the power to strike, for unless I have a secure source of information of force the enemy can attack my heavy ships at will, while I cannot attack him because I can get no information of his whereabouts. A study of what will be required to meet the ultimate German menace shows what we should have. Without going into the reasons, the force we require is indicated in the second column of the table given below. In the third column I have listed what we now have; in the fourth column what must be provided to give us the needed strength; and in the fifth column what has been done toward providing the material column three indicates is necessary.

| | Number required. | Now ready. | To be provided | Steps taken to provide missing units. |
|--|---------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| | 27 | 12 | 15 | 9 building, 3 authorized, but not contracted for. |
| | 21 | 21 | | Completed. |
| | 8 | | 8 | 5 authorized, but not con- tracted for. |
| | 9 | 9 | | Completed. |
| | 24 | | 24 | 1 contracted for; 5 authorized. |
| | 120 | 52 | 68 | 27 contracted for; 15 au- thorized. |
| | 87 | 29 | 58 | All under construction. |
| | 60 | | 60 | 3 contracted for; 38 author- ized. |
| | 20 | | 20 | 3 contracted for. |
| | 20 | 4 | 16 | None. |
| | 10 | 3 | 7 | Do. |
| | 114 | 36 | 78 | All been ordered. |
| | 40 | 20 | 20 | 1 building. |
| | 12 | 4 | 8 | 1 building. |
| | 8 | 3 | 5 | 3 authorized. |
| | 12 | 2 | 10 | 2 authorized. |

... previously mentioned as necessary to meet the immediate menace ... in the second column above, we should be able to meet even the ... We may not even with those forces be able to win a decision over ... practically certain that she would not be able to decisively defeat ... the minimum we should have to be even reasonably safe from

... the above table that we have much to do. It might appear at a first ... should at once prepare to meet the ultimate menace by completing all ... and starting additional ships as necessary. Such would be the case if ... funds to do that after providing for the immediate menace. But we ... providing for the immediate menace as indicated above, we have less ... available in the emergency fund which is not even sufficient to rush ... authorized ships, much less to provide for additional destroyers and ... To determine how best to handle our remaining funds we must ... program ... ships authorized, the actual construction of only five has been ... are well along in completion and two are started. All five may ... the ultimate menace comes and we may act wisely in expediting ... able that the other three authorized can be made ready in time to ... and therefore to use any of our emergency fund on them would be ... expedited to the fullest extent within their special appro- ... should be taken to provide money to allow the work to be rushed. ... expedited, \$1,000,000 each should cover the cost of expediting ... advanced and \$2,000,000 each for the other two. ... scouts, excepting one scout, have not yet been contracted for. ... of them can be completed in time to meet the ultimate menace, so ... present small emergency fund on them. They should be ... possible under their present appropriations and other appropri- ... expedite these and to build the many others required. ... we urgently need destroyers. We should get all we can at the ... not only by rushing to completion all that have been provided ... as many more as we can put on the ways. We have 27 con- ... authorized, and all these can be rushed to completion at an ... \$200,000. We should allow money from the emergency fund ... ask for more money to provide additional destroyers and ... immediate need for meeting the ultimate menace is to have ... We can not win a decision with submarines, but it is probable that ... we can keep the enemy from gaining one over us. A large sub- ... an invasion for a while at least, and they should therefore ... attention now. We should rush to completion all that are now au- ... as many others as the building capacity of the country permits; and ... asked to provide them. ... have 15 small size contracted for, and they can be rushed to com- ... cost of not over \$150,000. We have three 800-ton submarines ... authorized that can be rushed to completion at a cost of not over

\$250,000 each. We have three fleet submarines under construction that can be rushed to completion at a cost of not over \$300,000 each. We should provide for rush work from the emergency fund, but should at once ask for additional funds to provide for the cost of the rush work that should be undertaken on new construction. A summary of the rush work that should be undertaken on new construction and its cost is shown in the following table:

| Ships on which work should be rushed. | Number. | Cost per ship to rush. | Total. |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------|--------|
| Battleships, first line..... | 3 | \$1,000,000 | |
| Do..... | 2 | 2,000,000 | |
| Destroyers..... | 42 | 200,000 | |
| Submarines: | | | |
| Small..... | 58 | 150,000 | |
| Coast..... | 41 | 250,000 | |
| Fleet..... | 3 | 300,000 | |
| To be allotted for speeding up construction..... | | | |

The remaining ships called for on our list to meet the ultimate menace should be rushed to completion also, but not at the expense of our emergency fund. We should be urged to provide for these.

No consideration has as yet been given the essential shore stations and handling these large amounts of material required for either menace, yet in maintaining the upkeep of that material and to supply it requires vast additional shore plants. Our facilities for handling our fleet upkeep work are constrained even in peace times. They simply can not handle a larger fleet under time conditions. Toward supplying the fleet we find the same inadequate position. Fortunately we have some appropriations that can be used to meet emergencies outside of our emergency fund.

We have the remainder of the \$6,000,000 made available in last year's appropriation for equipping yards for building ships, and \$12,000,000 available from an appropriation in the event the Secretary of the Navy is unable to secure from private shipbuilders contracts for the expeditious construction of the ships hitherto authorized at a fair or reasonable price to enable him to equip the navy with suitable and necessary machinery, implements, building ways, and equipment for the construction of such of said vessels as may be assigned to navy yards for construction. It is practically certain that private shipbuilders will be unable to construct expeditiously at a reasonable price all the ships authorized, and the total, \$18,000,000, will be available for adding equipment to yards, which, if installed for building purposes, would be available and used also for upkeep purposes. The need of equipping yards is pressing and no time should be lost in using all the funds available and allotting them to yards for equipment, etc. The \$18,000,000 available should be sufficient to cover the yards' needs for upkeep, and I need not consider utilizing any of the emergency fund for that purpose at this time.

Supplying the fleets in peace times has reached a high state of perfection, but preparations are insufficient for an increased fleet, and especially so under war conditions. The bill contained two items of \$500,000 each for storehouses at New York and Puget Sound, but while these will help they will not nearly meet requirements. Central distributing depots will have to be provided, as well as distributing stations. The stations may be of a temporary nature, but funds should be provided for them at once. We should set aside \$5,000,000 from the emergency fund for that purpose.

It is also to be noted that the tremendous augmentation of naval craft needed to meet the immediate and ultimate menace requires tremendous additions in fuel depots. This is especially true of oil fuel, for while there will not be a great increase in coal burning craft there will be enormous additions of oil burners. Even now our fuel oil storage is inadequate and not underground, as is necessary for its proper protection. As establishing fuel-oil stations requires special appropriations for the purchase of land, Congress should be asked to make special appropriations for the purpose. Estimates have been asked for storing 2,000,000 barrels of oil to meet the fleet requirements at a cost of \$10,000,000 and that amount should be asked for, for the purpose.

A particular feature that must be borne in mind in this estimate is that the machinery and personnel of the department in Washington was designed largely on a peace basis. With the vast expenditures provided in the naval bill the act

are multiplied. Technical experts, draftsmen, material experts, etc., are absolutely necessary to all bureaus and offices to carry out the work, yet the wording of the appropriation bill is such that no specific authority is given by law for such expenditures. Unless steps are taken to provide the additional personnel to do the work in the department the whole program may be seriously retarded upon the convening of Congress steps should be taken to supply the essential personnel.

We have covered to some extent the things we need immediately. We have not made sufficient provision to fully meet either the immediate menace, but if we do all that has been laid out we will be in the right direction. We will at least have started some of the things immediately needed without which we are practically helpless. When Congress will again be in session and if more is needed, provision for it will be made. Having started the work, we will and tremendously increase it if necessary.

What should be allotted now is about \$10,000,000 less than what is needed. It is not safe to set it all aside at this time as there are surely things needed at once. If we find the \$10,000,000 remaining will be for other purposes, we can devote it to increasing our material along the lines indicated above.

To provide for the country's safety as seems to be the wish of the country and the intent of Congress, we should at once allot money in accordance with the following decision and proceed to carry that decision out as

DECISION.

1. Ships engaged in trade with the Allies, cost to be charged to the Government. Use guns of 5-inch or larger caliber if available.

2. Provide insurance and insurance as many additional ships as possible to the Allies, arming all that do.

3. Destroy construction or merchant shipping in all ways.

4. Provide for all 5 and 6-inch guns and ammunition for auxiliaries and operations permit.

5. Order the 16 dirigibles now contracted for, and enter into contracts for the same as soon as possible.

6. Provide for the air-patrol stations for the above dirigibles.

7. Provide emergency fund \$10,000,000 for dirigibles, stations, and other

8. Order at once and rush to completion, or charter, 300 large-size patrol vessels keeping the sea. Those built should be not less than 110

9. Those built should have a speed of not less than 24 knots.

10. Order or charter all craft suitable for harbor and inshore patrol.

11. Order available at once for the above patrol vessels from the emer-

12. Order patrol vessels at once with suitable guns to be paid for by the Ordnance appropriations.

13. Order from the emergency fund \$5,000,000 to be used by the Navy to provide additional guns and ammunition for patrol vessels not provided by their appropriations.

14. Order mine sweepers by commandeering, charter, or purchase of suitable vessels. If 100 pairs can not be obtained in this way,

15. Order from the emergency fund for obtaining sweepers.

16. Order and arm all mine sweepers from present Ordnance appro-

17. Order the Service that many largest size spar buoys will be needed for the coast patrol and set aside \$100,000 from the emergency fund to the Light House Service has funds for the purpose.

18. Order contact patrol in protected and convenient harbors, setting up the emergency fund for equipping them.

19. Order provide 10,000 anchored contact mines.

20. Order provide ant submarine nets in large quantities, both for the coast of lines of travel, and for use of patrol boats.

21. Order from emergency fund to Bureau of Ordnance for use in contact patrol fund for purchase of mines and nets.

21. Rush to completion the following craft under construction or authorize the five battleships now nearest completion; second, all authorized destroyers and all authorized submarines.

22. Set aside \$35,250,000 from the emergency fund for rushing the above construction.

23. Endeavor to rush other authorized ships to completion to the greatest extent within the limit of their appropriations.

24. Urge upon Congress as soon as it convenes to supply an additional emergency fund of \$250,000,000 to complete authorized craft and to provide such other material as may be needed not specially authorized.

25. Make immediate allotment of the remainder of the \$6,000,000 appropriated this year to improve yard equipment to the east coast yards.

26. Call for bids on all authorized new construction at earliest possible time and thereby make the \$12,000,000 appropriated for improving yards available, and allot the money to the yards to equip them properly. It must be remembered that additional yard equipment is absolutely necessary.

27. Start the construction of the additional storehouses provided for in the bill for New York and Puget Sound and allot \$5,000,000 to provide for such additional storehouses and depots as may be necessary to handle the increased supply of material.

28. As soon as Congress meets urge upon them the necessity of bringing up to the required standard to meet the ultimate menace, which, in addition to the material above provided for, requires the following: Five battleships (first class), 3 battle cruisers, 18 scouts, 26 destroyers, 19 coast submarines (800 tons), 17 submarines, 16 mine sweepers (fleet), 7 mine layers (fleet), 20 fuel ships, 8 supply ships, 5 destroyer tenders, and 8 submarine tenders.

I have introduced this paper not only because it is an item of record but also and more particularly because it gives you some idea of the decisions are reached as to what to do in war and shows what we should have been doing weeks before we actually declared war. That Congress expected us to do those things was evidenced by the huge appropriation bill of March 3, 1917, that Congress had passed through.

On or about March 14, 1917, that estimate and outline of plan was handed to Admiral Benson, who, after reading it, directed V. O. Chase, Capt. W. V. Pratt, and Capt. F. H. Schofield to examine it and draw up a more complete estimate and plan. I was shown the results of their work, but was several times questioned by them as to certain features of my estimate, and Capt. Pratt told me that their decisions were practically the same that I had reached. Later I was told by Capt. Schofield that they had completed their estimate and plan and that it had received the approval of Admiral Benson, but that they had been unable to get departmental approval to go ahead with it.

Had the department approved that plan, or even authorized Admiral Benson to go ahead with the plan, which must have been presented about the time war was declared, the various parts of the Navy Department would have been informed as to what their decisions were and could have proceeded to carry them out. With such a plan no one knew what to do. The Bureau of Ordnance, having any definite plan to provide guns and ammunition for, was forced to order them for all kinds of projects, whether or not such projects might be feasible in the war as it was necessary to wage. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts had no information on which to base their purchase of supplies and was forced to buy not what was actually would be needed, but what they guessed they might possibly be called on for.

Department of Navigation had no idea of what they should do as to their personnel. Every bureau and every office was in a confusion. Such a plan was equally necessary to those without it instructions could not be given them as to how to direct their efforts. All of these faults would have at once been remedied had there been an approved plan on which the whole could be concentrated.

It is not to infer that the Navy Department had no general plan for war. As in all navies we had a more or less general plan for the conduct of a war along the ordinary lines in which our ships are free to operate. What we did not have at that time, was a plan for waging war against a navy that used only submarines. That such plans were not made before is not remarkable, for until the Germans used submarines as they did, no one conceived of such a war. However, at the time we entered the war, submarine warfare was an established fact, and its methods were sufficiently well known for us to be able to combat it.

In war and economy in war both demand a general plan. It is the uncoordinated effort of the entire service along correct and efficient lines to win a war. When there is no plan, it is impossible for any one who supply material to tell what to get. When there is no plan each bureau becomes fearful that it may not have everything that will be called for, and it provides material not only in excess of needs, but material that may not be needed at all. In such cases sums can be wasted.

One of the failures to get authority to carry out the plan submitted was because there was no general plan for providing material to meet the conditions then existing, each office and bureau in the Department was forced to guess at many of the things it ought to have, each, without reference to any other office, go to the Treasury and ask for allotments from the emergency funds with no definite things.

Expenditures were frequently made, and resulting contracts for supplies were entered into without the Bureau of Supplies and Stores having sufficient cognizance to know how the emergency fund was being used. I know that one day, a month or two after the armistice, Admiral McGowan, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Stores, called to me:

"Remember the plan you tried to put through at the outbreak of the war that was to use the emergency fund, and which the Secretary wouldn't approve because you hadn't done it! The way things have gone, we find that after the war is over we could do other appropriations, we have overexpended the emergency fund by about \$165,000,000.

By congressional action, money was transferred from other appropriations to cover the overexpenditures. I do not cite this to show that the money was wasted or lost, but merely to show the want of a definite plan for using funds that had been appropriated. It was not only impossible to provide exactly and only what was needed to carry on the war in the most efficient and economical manner, but also it was impossible to even tell how we stood at the end of the war, allowed us to carry it on.

Without a definite general plan to work on, the operating part of the Department was in quite as much of a quandary as the material

part. Instead of concentrating on a broad and clearly defined plan, the Navy began the war with merely a series of efforts exerted in several directions, and only coordinated as each effort received consideration in the same office, that of the Chief of Naval Operations. You can imagine the difficulties Admiral Benson was in under these circumstances. You can realize how impossible it was for him to send to Admiral Sims the antisubmarine craft that were wanted so badly on the other side.

You can see why for a long time he was unable to tell Admiral Sims what forces were ultimately to be sent to the war zone to overtake the submarines. Instead of having his original plan approved, he might put the machinery of our great Navy to work to carry out and insure a successful conclusion in the least possible time, but he was compelled to himself sink into details and get approval of first one part and then another part of his plans. I was and am still amazed that the Navy was able to accomplish the remarkable work it did. It is certain that what it did accomplish could have been accomplished much more quickly and much more efficiently than it was accomplished if we could have had a plan from the very start—a plan that was based on conditions as they were. Furthermore, I believe that had the Navy worked on that original plan, frequently modified to meet the changing conditions and new information, as all war plans must always be modified, we could have accomplished all that it did and much more in a very much shorter time and with much less expenditure of money. The above are my reasons for believing the fourth particular.

It should be clearly emphasized that subordinate officers of the Navy Department ought not to be criticized for any action taken that may have led to large expenditures. In the absence of guidance from higher authority to guide them, it was their duty to do the best thing they could that in their individual opinion would help to win the war. They would have failed in their duty to the country if they had not assumed the responsibility and taken action to carry out the plans they themselves thought necessary, because of the absence of a general departmental plan.

Under the guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations the various efforts did ultimately follow a correct and sound general plan. I don't believe the full plan was actually ever laid down on paper, but that under the necessity of having to get approval by pieces, a general plan could have been laid down. Operations did what they could to establish a definite general plan at the time war was declared, but did not have the authority to order such a plan carried out. Nearly as I can recall, it was about the 1st of July, 1917, before a well-defined antisubmarine plan was approved. About that time the Secretary did approve the suggestions submitted by the "Board of Devices and Plans Connected with Submarine Warfare" and instructed the bureaus to take steps to carry them out. That, I believe, was the first really definite plan the bureaus were given, but it was not until then, about three months after the war started, that the bureaus even as much of a war plan to work to as that.

Passing on now to the fifth particular, it would be impossible to explain the situation I have just described without touching upon a matter that I speak of only with great reluctance and hesitation.

... it were it not essential to a clear understanding of the plans were not approved and why delays occurred in many important matters. But as the personal characteristics of executives often have profound effect on the direct, an understanding of those characteristics is an understanding of the workings of that organization. The personal characteristics of the Secretary of the Navy made it impossible to get approval of the really important things. I found this myself, and many others found it. If it is desired on this point I can give the names of

... a plan or a policy was presented to the Secretary he delayed action on it. The personal interest in all matters connected with the department absorbed him that he never had much left to give to us on the other affairs. Therefore when we would present something, though it might be urgent, we could secure only a discussion it. We would generally be directed to leave it for consideration. Now it is remarkable but it was left for "consideration" were for the most part not found. The officer who presented the paper hunted it out. If it was followed up the paper could not be found. If there would usually be some reason for not approving or delaying action. We always considered it much more a sound plan or policy than it was to get permission to carry it out. It generally took longer to get approval, and in getting it at all, than it did to formulate the plan. The condition finally became so bad that officers used to go ahead to put their plans and policies through without required authority.

... in this respect were probably greater than those of the Navy only to get approval of plans or policies, for not only papers of that kind to present but also, being in the personnel division, I had to prepare the vast number of officers, commissions, etc., that the Secretary by his orders had to sign. I mention this only to show you how necessarily afforded me excellent opportunities of dealing with the subject I am now discussing.

... know, the Bureau of Navigation is responsible for the personnel of the Navy. The mission of the bureau is to distribute personnel. Early in the war the bureau could rarely obtain approval of its plans for performing the war and from that time on the bureau was given more authority in those matters than actually it had. In spite of failure to get plans for obtaining men, in spite of repeated orders not to take men into the Navy, Palmer directed that they be taken in and we followed. Capt. Palmer himself can give you further information. When it came to plans for training men, approval was hard to get. Capt. Palmer and Capt. E. L. Bennett can give interesting details of their difficulties in that line and how they went ahead and did things without having the approval of the Navy. As for the distribution of personnel, the

Secretary of course rarely knew about the distribution except in the case of officers. But in the case of officers I met a most remarkable attitude in regard to sending officers not attached to ships for duty in the war area. I made it one of the rules of the department that when Admiral Sims asked for officers he was to get them. I always had lots of trouble getting such orders signed. As a matter of fact not once but several times during the war the Secretary told me, and told the chief of bureau, too, that he didn't want such officers sent abroad. Of course they had to go and we sent them by the simple process of assuming an authority we did not have by issuing the orders and passports ourselves.

Having above given you an insight into the difficulties of the department, I will now present some documents. The first document is one prepared by me on April 12, 1917, in an effort at the request of Admiral Earle, Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, "Operations" do something to help him get approval of Congress for the reserve 14-inch shells for our dreadnaughts and for torpedoes for our new destroyers. The document was prepared and handed to Admiral Benson by Capt. McKean with a letter having the paper presented to the Secretary by Admiral Benson. It reads as follows:

[Confidential memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, April 12, 1917.

1. I have to invite your attention to conditions so alarming to the country that in my opinion immediate steps must be taken to avert them. The conditions are reported by the Bureau of Ordnance's quarterly report, "Preparedness for War." These serious conditions are summarized as follows:

(1) Shortage of shells, 14-inch caliber.

(2) Nonaward of contracts for 1,296 torpedoes required by the 1917 building program.

2. As the Navy stands to-day we have the full allowance of 14-inch shell for battleships in commission having that caliber guns. These are the (1) *Arizona*, (2) *Nevada*, (3) *New York*, (4) *Oklahoma*, (5) *Pennsylvania*, and (6) *Texas*. Should these ships be called into battle and expend their ordinary supply of shells—which is sufficient for a short battle—we have not on hand to-day sufficient reserve shell to refill their magazines. The total reserve supply of 14-inch shells for the fleet is 1,861, an average of less than 31 shells per gun. Furthermore, if this small reserve is used for refills there would be no shells at all available for the *Idaho*, *Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, now well along to completion. I can not bring too strongly to your attention that without shells for the guns battleships and all they contain are helpless. They not only can not defend themselves but can not even fight to save themselves. To be without sufficient shells for our largest and best battleships exposes the Navy but the whole country to disaster. I most earnestly urge that the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance be given authority and orders to provide sufficient reserve shell at the earliest possible time to fill out the allowance for the ships built during the war and to complete the reserve stocks essential for those ships.

3. While the situation as to 14-inch shell is dangerous, that with reference to torpedoes is none the less so. Our new submarines, Nos. 78 to 107, and destroyers, Nos. 75 to 94, are all being speeded to completion and will undoubtedly be ready for service as soon as ready. Neither can be used unless they are equipped with torpedoes they were built to use. Unless the contracts for their torpedoes are awarded at once the ships will be ready before their torpedoes are.

The price for the 1,296 torpedoes involved, which has been the cause of delay in executing the contracts, has been adjusted and the contracts have been awarded to the E. W. Bliss Co. The price having now been satisfactorily arranged, it only remains to sign these contracts to start the work. It is earnestly recommended that the contracts be signed at once and the Bureau of Ordnance directed to have the work speeded to completion.

weeks before the declaration of war Admiral Earle had effort to get those contracts approved, but for some time been unable to do so. You can imagine the situation of Ordnance to find itself unable to place contracts which might be needed at any moment. With the Nation's shells for our dreadnaughts and the torpedoes for our submarines were essential, and Admiral Earle had been urging for weeks but without result. On or about April 28 I was handed back to me to find out from the Bureau of Ordnance was any change in the situation. I found the contracts had been placed, but was informed that on that date the shells was still unplaced.

Early stages of the war those of us working on problems of Ordnance saw that with skilled men leaving important war plants for the war we might become seriously handicapped in material for war purposes. At that time a number of the department begging us to take action that would prevent disruption of their plans through their men leaving at the solicitation of the Army which was seeking conscripts and was making a great campaign for them without regard at that time as to whether or not the men were needed in the private plants that were supplying war material.

First to bring this matter to the attention of the department was the Trozenas Converter Co., who, I believe supplied the department with munitions. It can be seen that such companies were the fundamental requisites for war and that if their employees supply munitions or the machines needed to make munitions could not get the munitions. Realizing the necessity of this important matter settled before any serious disruption occurred, on May 10, 1917, I prepared a departmental letter to the Secretary giving a plan for handling it, which letter I will now read.

This letter was not signed, nor was any action taken for some time on this matter. The original of this letter, with a further memorandum by me, was filed in the Operations file under No. 4488 and can be found there. At the same time I prepared a letter to the Trozenas Converter Co., which I will also now read.

The letters submitted by Capt. Laning are here printed in full in the original form.

The letter was submitted on May 10, 1917, but not signed. Original is on file in the Operations file with a further memorandum prepared by me explaining the situation.

The letters are forwarded to the War Department for consideration, and are being acted upon.

The department is receiving daily a number of letters from private firms asking for men of munitions essential to this department and to the allied nations. The fact that through the enlistment of their employees the manufacture of munitions is being seriously disrupted is no doubt but that the War Department is having the same

problem. It is apparent that the situation is serious, especially in view of the fact that at this time even of more vital importance than men. It is the draft system for raising the additional Army increments that

this feature will undoubtedly be covered, but in the forces that are recruited from volunteers it will continue.

The forces relying on volunteer recruits are (1) the Navy, (2) the Marine Corps, (3) the Regular Army, and (4) the National Guard. Even when the selected measure is passed these four forces will continue their call for volunteers. The result will be to continue the present disastrous plan.

It is realized that to properly cover the situation and to permit every man in the country in the place he is best suited for will require an organization and authority of an executive department which it will be difficult to provide by legislation, and which can not be put into effect in time to meet the immediate pressing situation. I am of the opinion that the situation can be fairly well covered by coordination by the War and Navy Departments along the lines suggested in the attached correspondence. By this plan all Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and National Guard recruiting officers will become cognizant of the names of firms in which they are engaged in making munitions for either department, and with that information they will be able to advise applicants employed by those firms not to enlist but to continue the work where they will be rendering the best service to the country. At the same time the plan provides for placarding the munition plants with authoritative notice to the men employed therein that by remaining at their work they will be serving the national interests.

While the plan outlined above will not insure the complete immunity of munition plants from loss by the volunteering of their essential employees, it is believed it will so materially reduce it as to make the loss negligible. It is comparatively simple to put in operation and its effect will be of vital good to the Government.

Hoping the War Department will see its way clear to cooperate with the Navy Department in putting the plan into effect, I am,

Very sincerely, yours,

The SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 4, 1917, concerning the loss of services to your contracting plant, R. S. Newbold & Son Co., by the enlistment of men in the services.

The Navy Department recognizes the difficulty of the situation and agrees that men at work supplying machines can render no better service than to remain at work at this time. Having this view, the Navy Department is endeavoring to put into effect a plan to discourage such men from leaving that work to enlist, and I have no doubt but that R. S. Newbold & Son Co. will be included in the provisions. In the meantime it is hoped that your losses through enlistment in no way interfere with the output.

Sincerely, yours,

_____, Secretary of the Navy

Mr. G. MUNTZ,
Vice President Tropenas Converter Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. You prepared these letters for the Secretary to sign?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir. These particular letters I am submitting to you now, the originals were approved by Admiral Benson, but they were not approved by the Secretary.

Later, on June 1, 1917, this same question of the loss of men from munitions plants was still before us, at that time taken up in a different way in connection with the operation of the Espionage law, and when we again tried to get the matter before the War Department in a way that would at least cover individual men we were still unable to get any action. I will insert the letter in the record.

(The letter submitted by Capt. Laning is here printed in the record, as follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

Secretary of the Navy.

War Department

Mr. Jones & Bros. Co. request advice on the subject of conscription of

The importance to the Navy Department of the material referred to, correspondence is forwarded to the War Department with the request that it exempt men listed from conscription under the terms of the

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Returning the original the Secretary of the Navy scratched over the

above penciled memo made by me at the time, as follows: "All this is after June 5"

HARRIS LANING.

LANING. Failure to get approval of these letters caused great difficulty in making an agreement with the War Department in the very early stages of holding skilled men for the work in munition

As we were formulating the Navy's plans for the war found, at the early stages, that appropriations made for specific purposes were not our money resources in such a way as to enable us to go to the best advantage in carrying on the war. War requires change, and money to provide material to carry on the war usually be appropriated for specific purposes. In view of the previous errors and to enable us to go on without any further delay after obtaining approval, on May 1, 1917, prepared for departmental signature a letter which was signed by Admiral Benson and submitted for signature. This is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

Mr. Speaker: I have to invite your attention to a serious oversight in the Navy of House bill 3971, making appropriations to support the Navy in the Naval and Military Establishments on account of war

As presented to the House there is absolutely no provision made for the construction of destroyers, submarine chasers, patrol boats, mine sweepers, and many other additional small craft that will surely be required for the purposes in this war. I believe this to be a most dangerous oversight. The Navy has already entered contracts for these craft up to the amount of \$250,000,000, and the additional craft and other material required for the construction cannot be obtained because no funds are available.

It is impossible to forecast what direction additional construction or operation of the exact kind of material they will call for. It is certain, however, that when the time for action comes, this department must be able to act immediately on a large scale. I therefore recommend that Congress be requested to establish a naval emergency fund of \$250,000,000, to be known as naval emergency fund, and to be available for expenditure in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy not otherwise provided for.

If action is made in the very near future it may not be possible for the Navy to carry out the operations that may be essential to success in the war.

Very respectfully,

-----, Secretary of the Navy.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The bill was not signed and was later returned to me for file.

Had it been signed at that time it would probably have provided what we needed in the way of money resources, and

what would have enabled the Navy Department to go on with development and carrying out of plans for which there was material then available.

Of all the matters on which action was delayed there is none that gave the aid for material more worry or longer than that of getting the dreadnoughts materially ready. Before and after February 1, 1917, and even after April 6, 1917, war was declared, the material condition of all our ships, particularly our heavy ships, was repeatedly discussed and we were asked to get them ready to fight. But the authority to get our heavy ships ready was long coming. About the time war was declared announcement was made to the public that the Navy was entirely ready, but as late as May 18, 1917, we were still urging the battleships be sent to yards to have work done that was necessary to their fighting efficiency. I will now read a memorandum I prepared and which Capt. McKean signed and Admiral Benson approved about May 18, 1917.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, May 18, 1917.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Repairs to battleships, Divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8.

1. Attached hereto is correspondence on the subject of repairs to battleships of divisions recently known as the active fleet, as follows:

(1) A letter from the commander in chief, setting forth in general terms the material condition of the ships referred to and pointing out the necessity of establishing a definite policy as to putting them in condition for any kind of service.

(2) Letters from each of the bureaus, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance, commenting on the above, indicating that the necessary work can be done, and each recommending that the essential work be done as soon as possible in order that the fleet may be ready for any service.

(3) Rough lists of the major items of repairs required on each ship.

2. It appears that the essential repairs to these battleships can be completed in approximately the following times:

Connecticut, 45 days; *South Carolina*, 20 days; *Michigan*, 15 days; *New York*, 10 days; *Texas*, 40 days; *Oklahoma*, at yard, June 9; *Delaware*, 20 days; *Florida*, 10 days; *Utah*, 50 days; *Arkansas*, 15 days (with turbines, 50 days); *Pennsylvania*, 10 days, June 30; *Wyoming*, 30 days; *Nevada*, 12 days; *Arizona*, new propellers, June 10; a few days; *North Dakota*, 35 days for fire control and over 4 months to install new gun mounts, ready January 1.

3. Based on recommendations of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, suggested that a schedule for repairing these ships be considered along the following lines:

Boston: Take *Utah* immediately, followed by *Delaware*, then *North Dakota* (total, 100 days).

New York: Take *Arkansas* and *New York*, immediately followed by *Texas* and *Wyoming*. *Arizona* to arrive middle of June for propellers (total, 105 days).

Philadelphia: Take *Connecticut*, *Michigan*, and *South Carolina* in order recommended by commander in chief (80 days).

Norfolk: Following *Oklahoma*, take *Pennsylvania* (already arranged for) and *Florida* (or *Florida* may be sent before *Pennsylvania* leaves if yard is ready) to go to yard when material is ready (total, 100 days).

4. By the above the fleet will be ready for anything about the middle of June.

With this memorandum and the papers referred to in it which were later sent to the files, where no doubt they can be found, Admiral Benson was finally able to get approval of a definite plan for the overhaul of the dreadnoughts. I do not know when the work on the ships actually started, but you can see for yourselves the long time that was required to do the work of getting them ready for the work did start. Attached to the signed memorandum is

of memorandum and detailed lists of the larger items of work on each ship. These I will insert in the record.

MEMORANDUM.

Below are lists showing the major items of work each battleship now at fleet that was unfinished when the ships left the yard to go to the fleet. The lists do not include any additional repair work that may have been done by the arduous winter maneuvers.

It is practically all battleships require work that is essential to their service. The important work is mostly in the nature of the uncompleted changes in the fire-control systems necessitated by the 1915 fire control board and the new changes make for better gun fire in action and therefore should be made as soon as can be found to make them.

We must also weigh the fact that the ships with the fleet have been out for five months and that in the course of a few months more they will be at sea; they are to be ready to make their speeds in case of war.

From above it would appear that we must give careful consideration to the fleet and weigh its probable employment. The time must come in a few months when each ship will require docking and some overhaul.

U. S. S. "CONNECTICUT."

| | Time to complete (days). |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Rebuild ast. cylinders..... | 64 |
| Rebuild control valves to after dynamo stops..... | 25 |
| Rebuild gear of 8 and 12 inch turrets to enable quicker shift to slow from fast to slow rate of train (work started). No estimate. | |
| Rebuild all 12 and 8 inch turrets; adjust to proper convergence, check with guns cross-connected and singly..... | 25 |
| Rebuild connecting gear of 12 and 8 inch turrets and install indicators to determine when oil motors are in neutral position (work was completed but indicators were not installed)..... | 10 |
| Rebuild oil expansion boxes for oil motors, all turret guns..... | 15 |
| Rebuild gear train in place of chain drive in limit switch of 12-inch turret..... | 25 |
| Rebuild Repair. | |
| Rebuild Make tight steel deck under and around No. 12, 7-inch gun turret..... | 4 |
| Rebuild and refit gun port shutters..... | 20 |
| Rebuild Move tubes from upper deck radio station to after bridge..... | 8 |
| Rebuild Install nonmagnetic torpedo defense fire-control station in place of present wooden one..... | 20 |
| Rebuild Seal-proofing of arc radio station..... | 5 |

"SOUTH CAROLINA."

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Rebuild Make machine experiments..... | 15 |
| Rebuild Make under blowers in both engine rooms..... | 4 |
| Rebuild Make protectors for sea charts..... | 25 |
| Rebuild Make shields and umbrella tops on torpedo defense stations in both engine rooms..... | 4 |
| Rebuild Make gunners' compartment in fire-room bilges..... | 15 |
| Rebuild Make armatures with fans in place..... | 10 |
| Rebuild Make bottom braces, starboard engine, repair leaks in water jacket... | 20 |
| Rebuild Make three fire room traps..... | 10 |
| Rebuild Make all boiler safety valves to yard testing plant and adjust; determine if any repairs needed, if so make them..... | 30 |
| Rebuild Make auxiliary lighting system..... | 30 |
| Rebuild Make and install hydraulic speed gear for boat crane..... | 30 |
| Rebuild Make auxiliary lighting system..... | 30 |

"MICHIGAN."

Ordnance:

1. Manufacture and install extension to 12-inch guns elevating controls of each 12-inch gun (work started).....
2. Change bag ejector at top of 12-inch auxiliary powder hoists so as to operate without breaking powder bags.....

Steam Engineering:

1. Overhaul counter-gear, etc. (work completed at yard, but not satisfactory).....

Construction and Repair:

1. Fit cast steel bolster outboard on each hawser pipe.....
2. Manufacture and install strong backs for shell bins.....

Steam Engineering (electrical):

1. Necessary electrical work in connection with changes in voice tube systems, in accordance with 1915 board of fire control.....
2. Modify fire control salvo system, fire control board report (can be completed by ship's force).....
3. Install auxiliary lighting system.....
4. Mechanical distant control for search lights.....
5. Run feeder and connect up to panel for (1) 4,000 cubic foot blower.....
6. Install 1 1,000 foot ventilating blower.....
7. Remove and relocate rammer motor rheostats in Nos. 1, e, and 4 turrets.....
8. Number of small electrical items requiring from 2 to 10 days.....

"NEW YORK."

Construction and Repair:

1. Calk leaky compartments (not double bottom).....
2. Calk leaky seams and rivets in double bottoms.....
3. Renew two steel wire nets in mainmast.....
4. New sound proof radio booth.....
5. Weld steel plate protections around sea chests.....
6. Search light platforms.....
7. Rearrange present friction band steering gear, etc.....

Bureau of Ordnance:

1. Ordnance work in connection with installation of two anti-aircraft guns.....

Steam Engineering (electrical):

1. Provide and install director firing system complete.....
2. Provide and install ball bearings in all motors and remove, retap, and reinstall field coils.....
3. Provide and install return calls for fire-control voice tubes.....
4. Auxiliary lighting system, magazines, shell, and handling rooms.....
5. Turret salvo system alterations.....
6. Alterations in torpedo defense salvo signal system.....
7. Change fire-control telephone system to conform to plan for California class.....
8. Relocate searchlights.....
9. Fire-control telephones for antiaircraft guns.....
10. Rearrange radio room.....
11. Overhaul and modify battle radio system.....

"TEXAS."

Steam Engineering (electrical):

1. Torpedo defense salvo signal system alterations. No estimate.
2. Fire-control changes, turret and target bearing system.....
3. Fire-control changes, telephone system to conform to California class. No estimate.
4. Relocate searchlights. No estimate.
5. Provide and install return calls for certain fire-control voice tubes. No estimate.
6. Auxiliary lighting in 14-inch magazine and shell rooms. No estimate.
7. Provide and install wiring for plotting indicators in conning tower. No estimate.
8. Provide and install fire-control telephone circuit, aircraft guns.....

Construction and Repair:

1. Install stiffening in way of 22 VS WT door-operating gear brackets.....
2. Repair leaky seams, rivets, laps, etc., in double-bottom compartment.....
3. Renew gaskets on oval bunker doors.....

| | Time to complete (days). |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Repair—Continued. | |
| Admiral and Chief of Staff quarters..... | 20 |
| raise of ventilation and cooling pipes, raise sprinkling pipes to | |
| storage of original number of powder tanks..... | 28 |
| side around torpedo defense stations..... | 45 |
| over torpedo-defense stations..... | 20 |
| searchlight platforms..... | 38 |
| defense platforms..... | 24 |
| present system and install additional fire-control voice tubes.. | 60 |
| friction band of rudder to clear armor..... | 25 |
| to antiaircraft guns..... | 25 |
| No. 1 turret..... | 13 |
| and install an upper-deck radio house..... | 10 |
| Material: | |
| the material for which is to be sent to ship, and ship to do work. | |

"OKLAHOMA."

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| directorscope, Mark IV, in turret..... | 15 |
| work in connection with installation of 2 antiaircraft guns.... | 10 |
| and reinstall torpedo air compressor, accumulator, and pipes | |
| of after torpedo room..... | 15 |
| clutch and lever for shifting rammer motor, turrets 2 and 4..... | 20 |
| on bottom of 20 pneumatic cylinder shell hoists, all turrets.. | 6 |
| inside diameter of nose caps in shell carriers of shell hoists in | |
| turrets..... | 12 |
| ribs securing guides in upper end of shell hoist tubes and | |
| with countersunk head bolts in turrets 1 and 4..... | 6 |
| caps in clutch between elevating motors and speed gear in | |
| turrets 1 and 4..... | 6 |
| and install safety catch on rammer control levers in turrets 1 and 4.. | 15 |
| brake trays (24) to cars of powder hoists in turrets 1 and 4.... | 15 |
| light metal oil seal covers on rammer friction disks in turret 1.. | 6 |
| bearings of shell rollers abaft upper hoists in turrets 1 and 4.. | 12 |
| and install heavier counter springs to shell trays in turrets 2 and 3.. | 4 |
| Electrical: | |
| light on each 2-gun turret adjacent to each sight scale..... | 10 |
| fire-control action cut-out switches in plotting rooms.. No estimate. | |
| ammunition hoist motors and two 2-gun turrets..... | 10 |
| cease-firing gongs for 5-inch guns, and cease-firing con- | |
| trollers in both torpedo defense stations..... | 15 |
| switchboards, forced-draft blowers, to original position..... | 15 |
| fire-firing system..... | 3 |
| telegraph system..... | 25 |
| for auxiliary lighting systems, magazines and handling | |
| | 20 |
| and switch panels for operating anchor windlass motor from | |
| or after generators..... | 45 |
| voice tube from shaft alley to engine room..... | 20 |
| mechanically controlled high-power search lights..... | 10 |
| work for fitting up auxiliary radio room..... | 15 |
| auxiliary lighting batteries..... | 20 |
| work in connection with replacement of forced draft blowers.. | 15 |
| telephones..... | 25 |
| indicating indicators in conning towers..... | 10 |
| install switches for various lights..... | 25 |
| lighting system in magazines..... | 25 |
| efficient torpedo defense salvo buzzer system..... No est. | |
| accumulator bare forced-draft blowers..... | 20 |
| repair, and install one 5-kilowatt transformer radio set..... | 10 |
| armature for forced draft..... | 10 |
| radio rotary gap motor..... | 5 |
| install high-low power device..... | 10 |

Steam Engineering:

1. Install superheaters on 6 inboard boilers.....
2. Alter bottom blow overboard discharge piping in boilers as required connection with the installation of 2-inch independent sea chests in each boiler compartment.....
3. Cross-connection pipe between the circulating pumps for distillers.....
4. Fit connections for and supply portable air gauges for furnaces and takes.....
5. Shields over oil return rings, outside of connecting rod forks for air engines.....
6. Install system for cooling oil used for forcing lubrication of generator and generator turbines.....
7. Install exposed handwheels for operating gear for fuel oil cut-out valves.....
8. Steam hose and connections in each fire room.....
9. Install discharge line from dynamo condensor hotwell pumps to feed tanks.....
10. Replace electrical forced draft blowers by Terry steam turbine blowers.....
11. Renew brick in boilers (3 unfinished).....
12. Repair runner shaft and bearings main circulating pumps.....

Construction and Repair:

There are 88 items on the Construction and Repair list requiring from 100 days. Largest item is structural changes following removal of after torpedo room.....

"DELAWARE."

Construction and Repair:

1. Ash ejectors.....
2. Replace zinc protectors around sea chests with mild steel protectors.....
3. Install an approved design of gun spray operated from turret boots on each 12-inch gun.....
4. Renew top of fire control towers.....

Steam Engineering:

1. Install motor type engine revolution telegraph. No estimate.
2. Complete installation of heating and cooling coils in starboard and port forced lubrication oil tanks.....
3. Install 4 ash ejectors and 2 pumps in fire room.....
4. Complete auxiliary lighting system.....
5. Install 8 automatic contractor types controllers with master switches controlling blowers in blower room.....
6. Modify solenoid operated antenna switch.....
7. Make changes to ship service telephones.....

Ordnance:

1. Ordnance work in connection with manufacture and installation of powder conveyance hoists.....

"FLORIDA."

Construction and Repair:

1. Repair as necessary sections of sprinkling system and flushing fire main. No estimate.
2. Overhaul and make water-tight all 5-inch gun port shutters.....
3. Examine and calk oil leaks in compartments C-3, C-4, etc.....
4. Renew asphalt formula where metal of hull is exposed in double bottom engine and fire room bilges.....
5. Overhaul steering transmission shafting and bearings.....
6. Overhaul coaling winch gear.....
7. Renew the inner and outer rings in fourth tier and the outer rings in fifth tier of mainmast.....
8. Remove wire nets in cage masts.....
9. Remove, repair, and replace 34 McCreery elbows.....
10. Repair by acetyline process outboard casting of ash ejector.....
11. Make changes in voice tubes.....
12. Wind shields and umbrella tops, torpedo defense stations, etc.....
13. Provide and install bulkheads fitted with water-tight door at frame. install shelving, etc.....
14. Replace zinc protectors around sea chests with mild steel protectors.....
15. Strengthen bulkheads in wake of main feed pumps.....
16. Install antiaircraft guns.....

| | Time to complete (days). |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| REPAIR—Continued. | |
| Rebuild bulkhead for radio room..... | 8 |
| Rebuild station..... | 15 |
| Rebuild Kelster meter..... | 10 |
| Rebuild and install house on upper deck for radio station..... | 25 |
| Rebuild approved design of gun spray at each 12-inch gun..... | 30 |
| REPAIR ELECTRICAL: | |
| Rebuild searchlights and control platforms to conform to 1915 fire-control board report..... | 60 |
| Rebuild mechanical control of searchlights..... | 40 |
| Rebuild fire-control telephone system to conform to 1915 fire-control board report..... | 40 |
| Rebuild changes in torpedo defense and turret salvo systems to conform to 1915 fire-control board report..... | 30 |
| Rebuild voice tube system to conform to 1915 fire-control board report..... | 60 |
| Rebuild changes to voice tube call system to conform to 1915 fire-control board report..... | 25 |
| Rebuild firing system complete..... | 30 |
| Rebuild auxiliary lighting system to fire and engine rooms, central station, etc..... | 20 |
| Rebuild auxiliary lighting system in 12-inch magazines, shell rooms, and loading rooms..... | 20 |
| Rebuild searchlights, Mark IV, in turrets 2 and 3..... | 15 |
| Rebuild approved design of gun spray at each 12-inch gun..... | 30 |
| Rebuild oil-watt arc transmitter, etc..... | 30 |
| REPAIR: | |
| Rebuild and defective tubes, both main condensers..... | 30 |
| Rebuild fuel-oil heaters..... | 6 |
| Rebuild steam lines in dynamo room..... | 25 |
| Rebuild lock operating gear to cut-out valves main steam line..... | 35 |

"UTAH."

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| REPAIR: | |
| Rebuild as necessary, bearings, line shaft and main..... | 4 |
| Rebuild stern tube and strut bearings as required..... | 15 |
| Rebuild engine room bilges..... | 30 |
| Rebuild and test compartment C-99 for leaks and repair..... | 20 |
| Rebuild and calibrate, Cory shaft and revolution indicator system..... | 20 |
| Rebuild starboard feed heater..... | 20 |
| Rebuild two expansion H. P. C. turbine..... | 50 |
| Rebuild turbine throttle and automatic stop valves..... | 25 |
| Rebuild turbine casings and rotors..... | 60 |
| Rebuild bent and broken flame plates in all boilers, line up and secure all..... | 50 |
| Rebuild nozzles of ship joints in M. H. P. throttle valves and shrink on..... | 12 |
| Rebuild bulkhead back of main feed pumps..... | 30 |
| Rebuild settling oil settling tanks..... | 40 |
| Rebuild operating gear from deck to 6 out valves of main steam line in..... | 35 |
| Rebuild steam lines in dynamo rooms..... | 25 |
| REPAIR: | |
| Rebuild..... | 20 |
| Rebuild armature No. 1 deck winch..... | 15 |
| Rebuild field coils of 35 horse power deck winch motors..... | 8 |
| Rebuild change in voice tubes, etc..... | 52 |
| Rebuild torpedo defense stations, search light platform, etc..... | 45 |
| Rebuild protectors around sea chests with mild-steel protectors..... | 5 |
| Rebuild bulkheads in wake of main feed pumps..... | 30 |
| Rebuild foundations, platforms, etc., for three antiaircraft guns..... | 30 |
| Rebuild tanks for main, auxiliary, and vertical antennae leads..... | 15 |
| Rebuild approved design of gun spray for each 12-inch gun..... | 30 |
| Rebuild bulkheads in connection with rearrangement of arc radio..... | |
| Rebuild and installation of Kelster motor..... | 20 |

Ordnance:

- 1. Overhaul cross-connecting gear, turret No. 5.....
- 2. Install springs and other parts to upper powder-hoist doors for each turret.....
- 3. Install modifications to periscope mounts in turret officer's booths (for each turret).....
- 4. Install a device on shell hoists to prevent premature hoisting (for each hoist).....
- 5. Install new clutches for elevating cross-connection gear of all turrets (each).....
- 6. Install directorscopes, Mark 4, in turrets (time per turret).....
- 7. Install approved 12-inch gun spray (for each gun).....

Steam Engineering (electrical):

- 1. Submarine signal oscillator.....
- 2. Return calls from forward distributing room to both radio rooms.....
- 3. Install antennæ lead in 30-inch turrets, etc.....
- 4. Install gyro repeater compass in radio direction finder station... No est.
- 5. Overhaul and calibrate shaft revolution indicator system.....
- 6. Install auxiliary lighting system in 12-inch magazines, etc.....
- 7. Provide and install director firing system complete.....
- 8. Changes in voice tube call system.....
- 9. Changes in fire-control telephone system.....
- 10. Changes to torpedo defense and turret salvo system.....
- 11. Install auxiliary lighting system fire and engine rooms, etc.....
- 12. Provide and install turret auxiliary lighting system.....
- 13. Install mechanical control on 8 searchlights.....

"ARKANSAS."

Construction and Repair:

- 1. Rearrange friction bands and tightening gear of rudder to clear armor.....
- 2. Pneumatic tube for delivery of radio messages.....

Steam Engineering (electrical): Auxiliary lighting systems in magazines, shell rooms, etc. (started).....

NOTE.—No mention is made in report of turbine work required on *Arkansas*.

"PENNSYLVANIA."

Construction and Repair:

- 1. Rearrange after torpedo room.....
- 2. Metal wind shield around torpedo-defense stations.....
- 3. Canopies over torpedo-defense stations.....
- 4. Provide and install stowage for antiaircraft ammunition.....
- 5. Install valves and protections on all pipes that pierce armored deck over steering-gear compartments.....
- 6. Stowage for 5-inch ammunition.....
- 7. Install 10-inch copper antennæ trunk.....
- 8. Ventilation for auxiliary lighting system, engine and fire rooms, etc.....
- 9. Stiffen near after keel knuckle.....
- 10. Install supports for tops 5-inch hoists.....
- 11. Strengthen decks under lower handling room.....
- 12. Change port bucklers No. 1 turret.....
- 13. Install voice tubes between turret chamber and upper powder handling room..... No estimate
- 14. Install voice tube from forward torpedo-defense station to barbette, etc.....

Steam Engineering (electrical):

- 1. Install lighting system in magazines, etc.....
- 2. Provide and install smoke-indicator system..... No estimate
- 3. Shift electric leads to steering gear.....
- 4. Electric indicator system for steering telemotors..... No estimate
- 5. Auxiliary lighting circuits torpedo and steering engine room... No estimate
- 6. Provide and install smoke indicator system.....
- 7. Install fire control circuits for antiaircraft guns.....
- 8. Complete installation of flagship battle radio.....

Steam engineering:

- 1. Install separators in evaporator vapor lines, etc.....
- 2. Install distant control for steam stop valves fuel oil and booster pumps fire room..... No estimate

| | Time to complete (days). |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Continued. | |
| Connection from reserve feed tank suction pipe to main air pump | No estimate. |
| Other alterations not essential to war efficiency | No estimate. |

"WYOMING."

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Repair | |
| Make arrangements for antiaircraft ammunition | 30 |
| Present and install additional fire control voice tubes | 28 |
| Extension to flying bridge, etc. | 18 |
| Install wind shield to flying bridge | 20 |
| Present friction hand and tightening gear to rudder to clear | 25 |
| Install protectors around sea valves | 38 |
| Repair | |
| Repair circulating pump shafts | 15 |
| Material repair and realign baffles of boilers | 18 |
| Material for removal of evaporator leads 3 and 4 | 9 |
| Electrical | |
| Accumulators of 2 forced draft blowers | 15 |
| Bells for voice tubes | 6 |
| Lighting system in magazines and shell rooms | 30 |
| Relay telegraph system | 20 |
| Install turret power panels in flame-proof boxes | 35 |
| Wires for directorscope in main top | 15 |
| Circuits for antiaircraft guns | 4 |
| Power elevating central for director firing sprocket chain | 30 |

"NEVADA."

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Repair | |
| Anchor windless machinery (may not be required) | 30 |
| Check and stop leaks in steel shell, all weather decks | 25 |
| Repair all 5-inch gun port shutters | 15 |
| Leaks in deck around both windlass foundations | 15 |
| Leaks around No. 1 turret water-tight | 15 |
| Temporary installation of turret training control gears | 10 |
| Alterations in connection with after torpedo room | 30 |
| After brake-band bracket and install new brackets | 35 |
| Steering near after-keel knuckle | 10 |
| Storage for 14-inch shells | 20 |
| Steering gear clutch to shift from steam to electric steering | 15 |
| Stiff dressing table in sick bay | 10 |
| Lift bulkhead in shell-handling room in turrets 1 and 4 | 20 |
| Convert fire room rooms into sound-proof booths and fit voice communication | 20 |
| Installation of ventilation system for charging station | 10 |
| Training control shafting | 10 |
| Install 7 stationary type foam fire extinguishers | 35 |
| Leaks in bulkheads in machinery spaces below third deck | 20 |
| Complete metal radio house on bridge | 15 |
| Seal all pipes piercing deck over steering house | 40 |
| Star and torpedo defense station | 30 |
| Install metal house on boat deck | 60 |
| Auxiliary lighting system | 15 |
| From engine rooms to shaft alley | 20 |
| Present and install additional f. c. voice tubes | 50 |
| Signal lights on main yardarms with controllers on bridge | 15 |
| Stents in water drums of all boilers | 30 |
| Boilers | 30 |
| Coal meter | 20 |
| Central forced draft blowers by Terry steam blowers | 30 |
| Relay telegraph system | 25 |
| Directorscope mark four in turrets | 15 |
| Head and rear tail torpedo air compressors, accumulators, and air | |

The second memorandum and the lists of work had been prepared by me some time before war was declared and were items essential to the fighting efficiency of the ships. It should be noted that the items were all known to be necessary at the very time the announcement was made that the Navy was ready, for they were only essential work that had been authorized and left unfinished when the ships left about January 1 to go to Cuba for winter maneuvers. I have no record of the additional repair work required on those ships as a result of their several months of operations in tropical waters.

There is perhaps no achievement of the Navy that has been as favorably commented on as its work in transporting troops across the ocean during the war. I will now point out how hard it was to get the Navy Department to take any action that would enable the Navy to get control of and operate the transports.

In connection with my duties in regard to Navy material, early in May, 1917, after carefully studying the situation, I prepared a memorandum on the subject of the Navy manning and handling the transports that would be utilized in carrying troops abroad. Unfortunately I did not save a copy of that memorandum. However, about May 24, 1917, no action having been taken on the matter and a letter having been received concerning the use of the *Vaterland* for transport duty, I took the occasion to prepare a department letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, who at that time had possession of the seized German ships, setting forth the necessity of having troop transports manned and operated by the Navy and requesting that 16 of the largest, fastest, and most suitable of the seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out for that purpose. The letter followed closely the lines of the memorandum I had previously prepared. It reads as follows:

N. S. C. 65.

Mat-1-M. L. 5 '25.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 25.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22, forwarding a copy of the letter from the collector of customs of New York, in which he recommends that the *Vaterland*, not being suitable for a cargo ship and being especially suitable for a transport, should not be intrusted to a merchant crew but should be under the command of an officer of the department that would operate her in the transportation of troops.

I most heartily concur in the collector's view and recommend that not only the *Vaterland*, but also such other of the seized German ships that are required for use as troop transports, be turned over to the Navy Department to be prepared, fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy in that service.

In this connection I invite your attention to the necessity of the Navy operating all vessels used in the transport of troops during war, and especially of those vessels operating in waters where the enemy may be encountered. Unless such ships are manned and operated by the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased, and since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight of munitions and lives. It follows, then, that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection and especially so against submarine attack. The ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under command of the convoy commander.

Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be entrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition but the whole Navy that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships carrying the most precious and essential part of our war forces must be entirely manned by men tried and true. The methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping if used in obtaining crews for vessels in our transport service leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathizers to work into the crews of those vessels and they can carry out any nefarious design they might wish. We must man transports from captain to coal-passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents.

From the above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on the ships engaged in carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the convoys after sailing it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination between every unit of the expedition can success be expected and with the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added dangers by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unorganized assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be doubt.

I therefore strongly urge that this matter be given careful attention and that not only the *Vaterland* but all the other vessels listed above as necessary for transport duty and that are not now assigned the Navy, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and put in service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expedition but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, it should be decided on now and not wait for terrible disaster to show us the error of adopting any other plan.

Sincerely, yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Four days later I prepared a letter to the Secretary of War asking the War Department's assistance toward getting the troop-transport service turned over to the Navy and the service established on a sound basis. This letter, which was returned to me some days later from Admiral Benson's office unsigned and marked "hold," reads as follows:

In reply address the Secretary of the Navy and refer to Mrr. 1-5/29.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Washington*.

(Penciled note:) "Hold."

Capt. McKEAN.

SIR: There is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter I am this day sending the Secretary of the Treasury, suggesting that certain seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy as troop transports.

While the Navy Department does not desire to change the arrangements already made with the War Department concerning the immediate transportation of troops across the Atlantic, it feels that the ultimate problem is so essentially naval, that it would be derelict in its duty if it did not point out what it believes to be the most practicable and safe method of carrying out its part of the general mission.

The Navy is concerned in transportation of troops only from the time they go on board the troop ships until they leave the ships, but during that time it is entirely responsible for the expedition. The points of embarkation and debarkation mark the beginning and end of the Navy's responsibility, and in view of that responsibility it recommends a well-planned and carefully organized service.

The Navy Department is of the opinion that the transportation of troops should interfere as little as possible with shipping now engaged in transporting supplies across the Atlantic, and to that end proposes that certain seized German ships, especially designed for use as transports in war, be fitted up for the purpose. The ships can not be used immediately, but when repaired, equipped, and properly manned will be the best ships possible for the work. The ships named in the letter will give excellent service and will probably handle the transport question fully, enabling this country to deliver in the neighborhood of 70,000 troops per month on the western front.

The second memorandum and the lists of work had been prepared by me some time before war was declared and were items of great importance to the fighting efficiency of the ships. It should be noted that these items were all known to be necessary at the very time the armistice was made that the Navy was ready, for they were only the work that had been authorized and left unfinished when the ships left about January 1 to go to Cuba for winter maneuvers. There is no record of the additional repair work required on those ships as a result of their several months of operations in tropical waters.

There is perhaps no achievement of the Navy that has been so favorably commented on as its work in transporting troops across the ocean during the war. I will now point out how hard it is to get the Navy Department to take any action that would enable the Navy to get control of and operate the transports.

In connection with my duties in regard to Navy material, on May, 1917, after carefully studying the situation, I prepared a memorandum on the subject of the Navy manning and handling of transports that would be utilized in carrying troops abroad. Unfortunately I did not save a copy of that memorandum. However, about May 24, 1917, no action having been taken on the matter, after a letter having been received concerning the use of the *Vaterland* for transport duty, I took the occasion to prepare a department letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, who at that time had possession of the seized German ships, setting forth the necessity of having transports manned and operated by the Navy and requesting that 16 of the largest, fastest, and most suitable of the seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out for that purpose. The letter followed closely the lines of the memorandum I had previously prepared. It reads as follows:

N. S. C. 65.

Mat-1-M. L. 5/25.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 25, 1917.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22, forwarding a copy of the letter from the collector of customs of New York, in which he recommends that the *Vaterland*, not being suitable for a cargo ship and being especially unsuitable for a transport, should not be intrusted to a merchant crew but should be under the command of an officer of the department that would operate her in the transport of troops.

I most heartily concur in the collector's view and recommend that not only the *Vaterland*, but also such other of the seized German ships that are required for troop transports, be turned over to the Navy Department to be prepared, fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy in that service.

In this connection I invite your attention to the necessity of the Navy operating all vessels used in the transport of troops during war, and especially of those operating in waters where the enemy may be encountered. Unless such ships are manned and operated by the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased, and since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the possibility of such loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious cargo of munitions and lives. It follows, then, that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is in itself sufficient protection and especially so against submarine attack. The ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under command of the commanding officer.

... a haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops, with per-
 ... or even to communication with the leader of the force,
 ... disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing
 ... troops. It may be justly likened to detailing an un-
 ... into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have
 ... and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would
 ... any chance against the enemy's fighting navy, and to carry
 ... waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping, places
 ... danger
 ... details in connection with the transportation of troops,
 ... of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports.

... vessels of suitable type, with sufficient capacity and speed.
 ... operations of the vessels
 ... for transport service requires care. Ships suitable must have
 ... number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and
 ... Speed enters into the selection for several reasons.
 ... safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship
 ... the question of grouping the transports according to speed.
 ... speeds in one group of transports, the speed for all of the
 ... that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24
 ... containing one ship of, say, 15 knots' speed, the *Vaterland*
 ... knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed.
 ... selecting and arranging ships for transport service, we must
 ... for each group, and sufficient groups to carry out our task.
 ... possible requirements of our overseas operation it would seem
 ... ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed, each group can
 ... once each month, and this would give us a constant and
 ... and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships
 ... the Navy Department is convinced that the best ships
 ... of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to
 ... in service in the shortest possible time. It is advisable
 ... and the regularly established shipping routes will be least
 ... ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose
 ... below will answer the immediate requirements. They are
 ... each group would form one unit of the transport service,
 ... could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as
 ... follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an
 ... carried:

FIRST GROUP.

SECOND GROUP.

| Estimated troop capacity. | Speed. | Ship | Speed. | Estimated troop capacity. |
|---------------------------------|--------|-------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
| | Knots. | | Knots. | |
| 8,000 | 24 | George Washington | 19 | |
| 7,000 | 23 | America | 17½ | |
| 7,000 | 23 | Martha Washington | 17 | |
| 5,000 | 23 | | | |

THIRD GROUP.

FOURTH GROUP.

| Estimated troop capacity. | Speed. | Ship | Speed. | Estimated troop capacity. |
|---------------------------------|--------|----------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
| | Knots. | | Knots. | |
| 5,000 | 16 | Cincinnati | 15 | |
| 6,000 | 15½ | President Grant | 14½ | |
| 6,000 | 15 | President Lincoln | 14½ | |
| 5,000 | 14 | Frederick Der Grosse | 14½ | |

... operating in groups as above we could handle about 70,000
 ... equipment except animals
 ... safely, they must have the personnel trained to operate in
 ... applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship but also
 ... men to man and operate the guns, the signalling outfit, and the
 ... trained in naval methods can not operate any of these things, and
 ... the ship's safety.

Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be entrusted any but naval men. They are most secret and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition but the whole Navy and them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships carrying the most precious material part of our war forces must be entirely manned by men tried and trained in the methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping if used in obtaining transports in our transport service leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathizers to work into the crews of those vessels and they can carry out any nefarious work they might wish. We must man transports from captain to coal-passer with dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents.

From the above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on transports engaged in carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the transports after sailing it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close cooperation between every unit of the expedition can success be expected and with that coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added danger by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unexperienced assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be any doubt.

I therefore strongly urge that this matter be given careful attention and that not only the *Vaterland* but all the other vessels listed above as necessary for the duty and that are not now assigned to the Navy, be assigned to the Navy at once so that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and manning service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expedition but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, it should be decided on now and not wait for terrible disaster to show the error of adopting any other plan.

Sincerely, yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Four days later I prepared a letter to the Secretary of War asking for the War Department's assistance toward getting the troop-transport service turned over to the Navy and the service established on a sound basis. This letter, which was returned to me some days later from Admiral Benson's office unsigned and marked "hold," reads as follows:

In reply address the Secretary of the Navy and refer to Mr. 1-5/20.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington.

(Penciled note:) "Hold."

Capt. McKEAN.

SIR: There is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter I am this day sending to the Secretary of the Treasury, suggesting that certain seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy as troop transports.

While the Navy Department does not desire to change the arrangements now made with the War Department concerning the immediate transportation of troops across the Atlantic, it feels that the ultimate problem is so essentially naval that it would be derelict in its duty if it did not point out what it believes to be the most practicable and safe method of carrying out its part of the general mission.

The Navy is concerned in transportation of troops only from the time they board the troop ships until they leave the ships, but during that time it is responsible for the expedition. The points of embarkation and debarkation mark the beginning and end of the Navy's responsibility, and in view of that responsibility it recommends a well-planned and carefully organized service.

The Navy Department is of the opinion that the transportation of troops should interfere as little as possible with shipping now engaged in transporting supplies across the Atlantic, and to that end proposes that certain seized German ships, now designed for use as transports in war, be fitted up for the purpose. These ships should not be used immediately, but when repaired, equipped, and properly manned should be the best ships possible for the work. The ships named in the letter will give *prompt service and will probably handle the transport question fully, enabling them to deliver in the neighborhood of 70,000 troops per month on the western coast.*

request that all supplies for troops be sent on these transports, though it would be better to carry all that their capacity permits. Munitions, animals, etc., must, as a rule, be transported by merchant ships, while fresh troops with their baggage will go forward on transports.

As for the Navy handling this service are set forth in general terms in my letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, and in view of the necessity of at once establishing the service on the best possible basis I request that the War Department, if it is in the views set forth, assist in every possible way to establish the service as soon as possible at the earliest possible time.

Very yours,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

cc: the SECRETARY OF WAR.

Before that letter was not signed and was returned to me "Hold."

As late as July 3, 1917, I was still hammering away the little to get the transports turned over to the Navy. This is evident in a memorandum submitted by me to the Chief of Naval Operations on July 3, 1917, and which I will place in the record:

N. S. O. 65. Mat-1-ML (7/3). "M."

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 3, 1917.

MEMORANDUM

Enclosed is a copy of a letter addressed to the President by the chairman of the Shipping Board, in which it is requested that all seized ships not already turned over to the Navy be transferred to the Shipping Board.

In the letter that while the Shipping Board is apparently adverse to turning over the Navy or Army any of the seized ships that are to be used as transports, it is suggested that the President give the matter consideration and that a decision of the Government shall operate troop ships should be reached after the arguments of all concerned are heard.

It is noted from the letter that the board states that there is abundant time to get the ships ready before the ships are ready to load. This statement would be true if the ships were ready for use as a transport whenever she is ready to load.

A very considerable change must be made in merchant ships to make them suitable for transport use, and to delay making these changes would be to delay the readiness of the ships for the service. The decision should be reached as soon as possible and the fitting-out work started.

In conversation with Shipping Board representatives it is understood that they are of the opinion that the German ships must be used as transports, but they are of the opinion that they should be officered, manned, and operated by the Shipping Board.

The Army on "time charter" whenever it becomes necessary to transport troops. They apparently fail to grasp the idea that if we are to transport a large number of troops to France it will require a special service of large fast ships, and that the ships engaged in that service will be worked to capacity and can not be used for anything other than to bring such cargo from their ports of call in Europe when the ship is about to return. Inasmuch as the transports can do no other work at all, it hardly seems proper that the board should have them officered, manned, and operated by civilian complements.

It is a very serious matter to have our ships in the submarine danger zone with any but the best discipline and loyal crew available is merely inviting colossal disaster. The Shipping Board to officer and man its ships as all merchant ships are officered and manned, but to read the reports of the officers in charge of our armed transports is to see the absolute menace to any ship by employing that method, yet it is the plan to apply it to ships carrying invaluable munitions and supplies upon which our success in war depends. Unless troop ships are manned by trained and loyal men of the Navy the chances of their loss will be enormous, and, since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and property in the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chances of such loss to a minimum.

The consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even a mine can sink a transport with practically all its precious freight.

7-3-17

of munition and lives. It follows, then, that every plan for transporting must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a navy is not in itself sufficient protection to troop ships, especially against submarine attack. When attacked, the ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate under the command of the convoy commander. It is evident that the gathering of ships to transport troops with personnel untrained to maneuver and to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting catastrophe. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be just likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into a battle line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful submarine enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the fighting front in industrial shipping places them in the greatest possible danger.

While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops, there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning ships to this duty. These are:

- (1) The selection of vessels of suitable type with sufficient capacity and speed.
- (2) The personnel and operation of the vessels.

The selection of ships for transport service required care. Ships suitable for transport service must have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons. First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is the ship to submarine attack. Next comes the question of grouping the transports for speed. If we mix ships of various speeds in one group of transport, the speed of the group at once becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland* at 24 knots speed, in a group containing one ship of, say, 15 knots speed, the group becomes for that trip a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows, then, that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service we must select ships of similar speeds for each group and sufficient groups to carry out our plan.

From a study of the possible requirements of our oversea operation it follows that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed, each group can make a round trip about once each month and this would give us a constant steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships available for the purpose, the Chief of Operations is convinced that the best ships available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed for transport of troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is advised that they be used, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes will be maintained. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose. Of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are listed as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as it exists. The groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an allowance of 10 tons per man carried:

| Groups. | Estimated troop capacity. | Speed. | Groups. | Estimated troop capacity. |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| First group: | | <i>Knots.</i> | Third group—Continued. | |
| Vaterland..... | 10,000 | 24 | Konig Wilhelm II..... | 3,000 |
| Kronprinzessin Cecelle.... | 3,000 | 23½ | Prinzess Alice..... | 3,300 |
| Kaiser Wilhelm II..... | 3,000 | 23½ | Princess Irene..... | 3,300 |
| Second group: | | | Fourth group: | |
| George Washington..... | 8,000 | 19 | Cincinnati..... | 5,000 |
| America..... | 7,000 | 17.5 | President Grant..... | 6,000 |
| Third group: | | | President Lincoln..... | 6,000 |
| Hamburg..... | 3,300 | 16 | Frederick Der Grosse.... | 3,300 |
| Grosser Kurfurst..... | 4,000 | 15.5 | Barbarossa..... | 3,000 |

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle 70,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have a personnel trained to operate by naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship but also to the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signalling and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these things and yet on them depends the ship's safety.

emergency fund, but the fund was too small to provide as like the required number. It was to provide for just such as this that caused me, on May 2, 1917, to prepare for the Secretary's signature the letter I inserted above addressed to the Speaker of the House, asking for an additional emergency fund of \$250,000, which letter, as you will recall, although approved by Mr. Benson, was not signed by the Secretary.

Evidently no action along the line of getting more modern destroyers and other small craft had been taken up with the Secretary prior to June 22, 1917, for on that date Capt. Schofield, of the "Operations" came to me and told me that in spite of all that had been impossible to get the Secretary to take up the matter of getting appropriations for additional destroyers. He said it was imperative to get action on this matter which was vital, and in order to force action it had been decided to each day submit a memorandum prepared by an officer giving that officer's argument on the necessity of providing the additional destroyers. Capt. Schofield then gave me a copy of his memo. which was to be submitted the next day and asked me to prepare the memo. for the following day. These memos. read as follows:

[Capt. Schofield's memoranda.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, June 21, 1917

Success in the present war means success in combating submarines. This is so patent to everyone that we have grown accustomed to the idea without being properly stimulated by it.

No war can be won on defensive measures. The offense is the only known way of imposing our will on the will of the enemy.

To date, the most effective offensive against submarines is the destroyer. As the submarines extend the area of their operations seaward the "chase" becomes less and less effective and the demands made upon the destroyers increase.

The number of destroyers now is wholly inadequate. They are working under heavy strain. Their material will deteriorate. Units will be lost. These conditions, in the face of the present and foreseen demands have lead the General Board, all of the fleet operations, and Vice Admiral Sims, to urge that every possible effort be made with facilities already obligated to the Navy, to build the maximum number of destroyers in the shortest possible time.

The above recommendation contemplates laying aside for the present the building of additional battleships, battle cruisers, and concentrating on the building of destroyers.

The cooperation of shipbuilders and the authority of Congress are essential. Any delay may be fatal.

The following day I submitted this memorandum:

JUNE 22, 1917

The country relies on the Navy to save the submarine situation and will hold the Navy Department responsible for any failure to do so. It is possible to save the situation by a comparatively small expense, but failing to save it now will we pay the penalty in life and treasure but we will actually jeopardize the existence of the country. It follows that this department must leave no stone unturned to fulfill its duty to the people and the country.

Up to the present time practically every measure we and our Allies have taken against the submarine warfare has been defensive. We are allowing our enemy to continually increase the number of his submarines and enlarge his area of operations. It takes but an instant's thought to show that this policy plays directly into the hands of the enemy and that unless we can reverse the condition he must surely succeed and we and our Allies suffer defeat.

Our present defensive measures are perhaps the most extravagant and wasteful as well as the most futile that can be devised. We are not using every effort to destroy the increasing number of wolves feeding on our flock, but rather are

immense cost, that these wolves may feed the better. To continue to feed them is more than military defeat—it means economic ruin for all the world.

Our great wealth is no reason why we should allow it to be sunk in the sea. It can not sustain the cost we are putting upon it. Congress, as well as our Allies, are spending billions for ships to feed the wolves whereas a small part of those expenditures, if used to create a fleet that would destroy them. Shall we continue to spend billions and still we spend millions wisely and insure success?

Experience has developed but one type of vessel capable of coping with the submarine—the destroyer type. It alone has the speed, offensive power, maneuverability, and other characteristics that the submarine can not overcome. Properly equipped, will drive the submarines down, and keep them from coming up. Should we not build every destroyer possible in the world?

Merchant ships built to be sunk will cost us life and untold treasure. If kept afloat will save the situation. It is the Navy's duty to drive the submarines from the sea to keep the merchant ships from being infinitely less than to overfeed submarines on costly laden ships, and fail in the hour of need by not providing the only known cure—

HARRIS LANING.

These show how strongly we had to argue before we got action. I have no knowledge as to what other officers thought nor how long after the "memo" method was action was finally taken. It is sufficient for me to know what lengths we were put to to get action on vitally important matters and how such matters were delayed through the lack of getting action. That these difficulties made the Navy's position harder is certain; what the resulting delays cost in lives and treasure no one can even guess.

That is of my statement.

BERMAN. Capt. Laning, what was the feeling in the department when the German ambassador had been given his passports? Was there a general feeling that war was inevitable?

LANING. As I recollect it, he was given his passports about the first of February.

BERMAN. I think that is correct.

LANING. The general feeling at that time among the officers was that war was inevitable; yes.

BERMAN. And the general feeling among the officers of the Navy was that preparations should be made at once?

LANING. Yes.

BERMAN. Preparations for war?

LANING. Yes.

BERMAN. Can you give me any information as to the complement of officers and crews on the various battleships and destroyers in 1917?

LANING. On the battleships at that time we had what was called the peace complement. That was about 85 per cent of what was considered to be the war complement. Later we found that what we considered to be the war complement was inadequate to meet the demands of war as it is waged to-day. The introduction of submarines and certain other craft made it necessary to have a great many more men for lookouts, and the submarines required many additional men; so that at the time of the war we had not what was then thought to

battle complement, but what we then called the peace complement and what we then thought to be the battle complement, what we now know to be the fighting complement of those ships.

Of the destroyers at that time I think the crews were 94 men but when they got over into the war zone they found that to fight submarines, particularly, the destroyers had to have something like 120 or 125 men.

Now, the figures I have given you, of course, were for the fleet. Those were the ships that were actually operating. There were a number of ships that were not operating. A number of large battleships were in reserve, and the armored cruisers were in reserve on the west coast. I think all but two were in reserve on the west coast. Of our destroyers we had approximately 30 with 94 men each and something like 25 that were manned with what we call reserve crews; that is, 50 per cent of their full complement.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to bring them up to full fighting complement?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; we did not have the men with which to bring them up. The law at that time, I think, gave us about 16,000 men, and we were pretty well recruited up to that number, but at that time we had no way of increasing the number of men on the ships unless that law was changed.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to enlist any more?

Capt. LANING. Just at that time, Senator, I was dealing with matériel and operations, and I did not know much about the personnel situation, did not pay much attention to it from October, 1916, until July 16, 1917, when I went to the Bureau of Navigation, and I am competent to give you all the figures for that period, or to tell you what they did as to personnel at that time. I know that when the war started we did not have enough men to man all our ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any plan of any kind made by the War Department to increase the efficiency of the Navy as to preparation between the 5th of February or the 3d of February, when the ambassador was given his passports, and the time that war was declared?

Capt. LANING. Oh, undoubtedly there were a number of things done.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the general plans of the department?

Capt. LANING. There was not any big general plan that I ever saw of, but I am sure that each bureau went ahead and did a number of things that it could do to get ready, but I do not know what the plans were.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the Secretary had any particular plan of his own?

Capt. LANING. No, I do not. I do not think he had.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was no general plan given out by the different departments?

Capt. LANING. Oh, no sir, there was no general plan. There have been some individual plans carried out, but there was no general plan at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to put in commission battleships that were in reserve?

LIVING. As soon as they could get the men, of course, they got them in commission; but that is a detail that did not come in for at that time, Senator, and I am unable to answer.

HURMAN. Was any attempt made to get merchant vessels, or know anything about?

LIVING. No, sir.

HURMAN. For transporting either troops or supplies?

LIVING. I heard of no attempt by the Navy to get any troop or other than these that I have read to you. I initiated myself. I do not know of any other efforts to get troop transport at that time. We did get some merchant ships for certain naval use at that time, but that was not until after war was declared,

HURMAN. When were you transferred to the Bureau of Navigation?

LIVING. July 16, 1917.

HURMAN. Can you state the condition of the ships of the Navy at that time as to matériel?

LIVING. My recollection is that at that time we had started repairs to the large battleships. When I submitted that report, about May 18, and took up the subject of repairs to the fleet, a definite plan was established immediately after that, and went on and was carried out during the summer of 1917. As for the destroyers, they were repaired as fast as they came in. As soon as they were repaired a great many of them were lost. But that was an operating plan for handling those destroyers with which I am not familiar. In the first part of the war I dealt with matériel, practically entirely with matériel. There was nothing else.

HURMAN. Did you have anything to do with the personnel in the first few months of the war?

LIVING. No, sir, not until July 16, 1917.

HURMAN. I think you have stated that on July 16 we had something more than 6,000 officers, and we actually had only around 2,400.

LIVING. We had 2,394 officers in the line of the Navy, that is, the class of officers, on July 16, 1917, which was the day I took charge of the officer personnel division in the Bureau of Navigation. The actual situation at that time called for about 10,000 thousand trained officers, and we had gotten pretty short. I had begun to take officers off of the dreadnoughts. In the Bureau of Navigation they had already stripped the dreadnoughts down to 22 commissioned officers of the line. The complement of those ships called for something like 37 or 40 line officers. Even by reducing those large ships to the shortage was still so great that I had to make plans for the fleet, and that is entirely explained in my hearings before the Naval Committee, which I have inserted here, where I told you we had to formulate to get officers to carry on the war. It was a desperate situation at that time. We were only able to get them into effect and carry them out because we felt that the fleet would not have to fight on less than three months. We made our estimates for handling the officer personnel on the basis that the dreadnoughts would not have to fight.

that is, that the dreadnoughts that were on this side would not be able to fight on less than three months' notice, and we based that on the fact that if the German Navy came out and offered a general engagement while there was the possibility that they would not win, we had to figure on the possibility that through some chance they might win, but we believed that if they did win in a general engagement with the British fleet, it would take them at least three months to get ready to fight against us, and that we would have three months in which to get our personnel ready: so that was the basis of our plan for handling the officer personnel situation on July 16, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the first volunteer officers begin to be used?

Capt. LANING. When did they begin to enter the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. When did they begin to be used as officers in training?

Capt. LANING. Do you mean by that men who were not trained before?

The CHAIRMAN. Men who were not trained before.

Capt. LANING. I suppose you mean at sea?

The CHAIRMAN. And in connection with that, when was the training of volunteer officers first begun?

Capt. LANING. That was begun before I went into the Bureau of Navigation, because when I arrived there they already had a class of reserve officers at the Naval Academy undergoing a three months' course of intensive training. That was started before my coming to the Bureau of Navigation, and that is something about which I cannot answer, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer as to when they first began to graduate from this training and to be used in the Navy.

Capt. LANING. I could not answer that without refreshing my memory. I think it was some time in September, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. So that during the time between July and September you were still going ahead with only about 2,300 officers when you needed 6,000 officers?

Capt. LANING. Yes. As a matter of fact you might say that the only really highly trained officers we had during the war were the 2,394. Of course, other officers took up the training in a reserve way. Those reserve officers were of the very highest class, and the temporary officers were of a high class, but they were not experts in all branches of the naval service, even when the war ended, but they were mighty expert along certain lines on which they had been working during the war. Of course, when a big war like that comes along you naturally want enough officers and men to man all your ships. We did not have anything like enough at that time. Of course, we could not have had enough at that time unless we had had legislation some years before to provide for it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the shortest amount of training that a civilian, who is not familiar with naval affairs, would need before he could be utilized in the Navy as an officer, in an emergency?

Capt. LANING. We did use them after about three months' training, is, after they had had that intensive training at the Naval Academy in the reserve class. Then we started other classes at other points.

everywhere where we had a station, we had a little training of officers, and we would turn them out in about three months. We send them out with the rudiments of a naval education, get them to work; but of course, they were not all-around by any means. We put them on one single job and they master that, and as soon as they had mastered that they would study another; and they gradually took up one thing and another, and developed into right excellent officers.

CHAIRMAN. So that, if early in February an attempt had been made to train civilians as officers, you might have had some of those men to take part by the 1st of May?

LIVING. Yes, we could have had some of them ready to be of very excellent advantage, as we did use them later.

CHAIRMAN. But that was not done?

LIVING. No, sir; that was not done around February at all.

CHAIRMAN. The war began early in April. At what period could you say that the fleet was ready as regards matériel and personnel to have engaged in a battle with the German fleet if it had come through the blockade?

LIVING. With regard to matériel I think it was ready about the end of September. With regard to personnel, it was not ready until the end of the war. You see, the battleships were used only for training purposes. We trained officers on them and men on them, but it was a long time before we had enough men in what we called the active fleet, battleship force, to be actually ready for battle. Of course, the ships that were sent to Europe were ready, I think, before the others. I could not say just when the fleet was actually ready. You have to ask the commander in chief that, sir—that is, in regard to personnel. In regard to matériel it was not ready until the end of the war.

CHAIRMAN. You say that the department probably had some plan at the beginning of the war. You can not tell me what that plan was, what was the initial step to be taken in it?

LIVING. No, sir; I have not seen that plan, but it is always necessary to have a more or less well-drawn up plan to meet any emergency.

CHAIRMAN. You do not mean in connection with this particular war; you mean in connection with any war, the plan would be the same?

LIVING. Yes; in connection with any war that might come. Whether they had such a plan or not, I do not know positively.

CHAIRMAN. And you do not know that there was any such plan ready before war was declared?

LIVING. For the war with Germany?

CHAIRMAN. Yes.

LIVING. No; I do not think there was any plan that would meet the emergency situation as it was then.

CHAIRMAN. What was there to meet other situations that might arise?

LIVING. Well, there is a general outline of a plan that was used in a war with Germany if she had been fighting

The CHAIRMAN. When was that plan outlined?

Capt. LANING. That I do not know, sir. That would probably be handled by the General Board, and did not come under our

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in existence some time before April?

Capt. LANING. I think it must have been. I think there must have been a plan before that.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are not familiar with the details?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; there was not any plan for carrying on war along the lines that we actually had to carry this one on. I am sure of that.

The CHAIRMAN. In his annual report for 1918 the Secretary of the Navy says:

Before the President went before Congress on the 2d day of April, 1917, and in his epoch-making message, which stirred the hearts of all patriots, and in which he said, "America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles which gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured; God helps her who can do no other," the Navy from stem to stern had been made ready to the extent possible for any eventuality. More than a year before war was declared the President approved the three-year program of increase in the Navy, a radical departure from the long-accepted custom of making yearly authorizations for naval expansion, and Congress gave the authority and appropriation for this new policy. From that day to this hour, with appreciation of its pressing need and with large vision of the future development of the Navy, the Congress has done everything that could be desired to insure effectiveness to the naval arm. This was done this after thorough study and full investigation, not only of the need, but also after the most complete investigation of the administration of the Naval Establishment.

Would you say that that statement was borne out by the facts?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; I do not think the Navy was ready from stem to stern when war was declared. I know it was not ready in matériel or personnel, and those are the things that make a Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was possible for the Secretary of the Navy to have done anything which he did not do, which might have reasonably been foreseen, either to prepare for war after it came imminent or to have hastened its successful termination?

Capt. LANING. Yes; I think there were many things that he might have done. When war became imminent, he could have issued orders that we have a plan of procedure. We could have laid out our plans and could have been prepared to go before Congress immediately and state what was needed to carry out those plans. He did not do that. We did not do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. One other matter that I omitted to ask you. Do you know anything about the conditions of our submarines at the commencement of the war?

Capt. LANING. No, sir. While I was in the office of Materiel Operations, I did not handle the submarines and I am not familiar with their condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, have you any questions which you desire to ask?

Senator KEYES. No.

Senator BALL. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Capt. Laning, you speak of not being prepared in matériel and personnel. Was the Navy built up to the limit in personnel as far as authorized by law?

Capt. LANING. Approximately; yes.

MR. TRAMMELL. Then the Navy Department was exercising its authority, and to its full limit, as far as authorized by law in personnel?

MR. LIVING. Yes; it had all it could get.

MR. TRAMMELL. Whose neglect was it that you were not as far as the law authorized you in matériel?

MR. LIVING. That was due to the fact that we did not have the means to provide all the matériel that was essential. That is, on the other hand, for instance, we are always developing new things in the line of control—that is, the control of the firing of the guns—recently those things were not put in because we did not have the means available to put them in.

MR. TRAMMELL. The Navy Department was doing the best it could as far as matériel was concerned, considering the available means?

MR. LIVING. Oh, yes; there is not any question about that; the point I made was that it had not presented the facts to Congress in order to get the funds that it ought to have had to do those things.

MR. TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not Congress would have approved of it if they had requested it prior to our entrance into the war?

MR. LIVING. Well, yes; I think Congress would have, because it was expected at that time to be sure that we were ready. At least it would have been put up to Congress. That is the way I think.

MR. TRAMMELL. After all, that was a matter of conjecture on your part as to what Congress would have done?

MR. LIVING. Yes.

MR. TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, Congress had not authorized greater personnel or any greater expenditure for equipment than we were operating under at that time?

MR. LIVING. No, sir; it had not.

MR. TRAMMELL. Now, between February and April 6, the day when war was declared, did Congress pass any law authorizing enlargement of the Navy?

MR. LIVING. On March 3 it passed the regular annual appropriation bill, and in that bill it made all of the funds appropriated immediately available, and made a particular appropriation of \$115,000,000 emergency fund to be spent at the discretion of the President for such things that were needed by the Navy. I do not remember the exact wording of the bill, but it had that emergency fund in it.

MR. TRAMMELL. On March 3, a little over a month prior to the declaration of war, somebody did bring about legislation making new appropriations then in existence. Do you think that the Navy Department had anything to do with that?

MR. LIVING. I do not know. I can not answer that question. I do not know whether they did or not.

MR. TRAMMELL. You do not know whether that was done at the request of the Navy or not?

MR. LIVING. No, sir; I do not.

MR. TRAMMELL. If that is true, then, Captain, you do not know whether the Navy Department was active prior to our entrance into the war as far as getting appropriations and trying to make some provision for the war?

Capt. LANING. No, I do not know what it did about appropriations. The thing I brought up particularly about that time was that they had no plan of using the appropriations and they had no way of knowing what appropriations to ask for, as they had no plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. You are more familiar with the propriety at least of the Navy, and probably of the Government, than I am, but would it have been proper for the Navy Department to call on Congress and get out a war plan a month prior to the time we entered the war, a war plan for a war with Germany?

Capt. LANING. Yes. We ought to have had one. You can talk about it, but you are always supposed to have plans for emergencies that may arise.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, I am not talking about the question of preparation in different departments, and different operations. You stated that there was preparation being made by different departments. They were doing quite a good deal. But I am talking about a plan, just as though you were going into war with them, and it circulated all through the Navy and advise the Navy, generally speaking, that these are our war plans for war with Germany or other country? Would that have been proper?

Capt. LANING. Not to have spread it broadcast, Senator, no. It was proper to have a war plan for use in an emergency. You would not tell the whole Navy about it, but you only tell those who are concerned in getting certain parts of it ready so that they may know how to carry on their results. You should have such a war plan, you should have it years before, if you can get it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course I realize the wisdom of that in a general way, but I mean a specific plan. You say there was a general plan, but I believe you did state that there was quite a deal of activity in the Navy after the ambassador, for instance, had been given his papers.

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. There was something being done?

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. There was not total inactivity on the part of all the different branches of the Navy throughout those months?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; there was not total inactivity. I stated that in the memorandum.

Senator TRAMMELL. The neglect, then, if there was neglect, consisted in the fact that the plan was not general, prior to our entrance into the war?

Capt. LANING. Well, that was the principal thing. That is the greatest defect, that there was not a general plan. No one knew what to do, and what anybody did do was rather on his own guess.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were connected with the Bureau of Navigation, were you, in 1918?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir. I went there on July 16, 1917, and stayed there until the 31st of March, 1919.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you recall having a letter brought to your attention by—I do not know whether it is Admiral Pratt or what rank was at that time; anyway, I will say Admiral Pratt—by Admiral Pratt from Admiral Sims; a letter dated August 13, 1918, in which an officer by the name of Carter made more or less criticism in regard to the manning, I believe it was, of the destroyers abroad?

LIVING. Yes, sir; I remember that letter. I think it was on the subject of manning submarines, Senator. He had a letter in subject of which was "Set a Thief to Catch a Thief." Is

TRAMMELL. Yes, "Set a Thief to Catch a Thief." That is the subject in the letter.

LIVING. Yes, I remember it.

TRAMMELL. Do you recall whether or not under the date of August 26, 1918, you wrote a letter to Admiral Sims in reply to his letter?

LIVING. Yes, I wrote a letter.

TRAMMELL. Mr. Chairman, Capt. Laning admits that he wrote a letter to Admiral Sims on August 26, 1918, in reply to a letter to him, it seems, by some officer by the name of Carter. The letter seems to have been entitled, "Set a Thief to Catch a Thief." I would like to present the letter of Capt. Laning. It just shows the Captain's views on August 26, 1918.

CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning's views?

TRAMMELL. Yes; Capt. Laning's views.

CHAIRMAN. Will you read the letter?

TRAMMELL. It is a pretty long letter. I will read it, [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 26, 1918.

DEAR PRATT: Pratt called me in this morning and handed me your letter of August 26, 1918, with the inclosure, "Set a thief to catch a thief." We are always glad to receive your work especially from you, and inasmuch as the criticism in this letter comes from my office as well as from Operations it behooves me to sit up and take notice. I am not a part of Operations and therefore do not formulate the plans. It is nevertheless my mission to distribute the officer personnel to carry out the plans. I lay no claim to genius in carrying out that mission, and I have no doubt made many mistakes, but they can not be laid to a lack of careful consideration. I have been confronted with although Carter says that is the reason for the contrary I have studied the plans and have made new estimates. As a result that even after reading Carter's screed, I am not convinced that we have erred in its general plans or that my office has erred greatly in carrying them out under them.

Many officers along similar lines by officers from every force and yet when they come to my office and had the general plans explained, they saw the situation. Whereas before they had seen the situation from the point of view of their own force, after an explanation of the general plan they have altered their minds. Undoubtedly we on this side have erred in not making the plans widely known to the service, but there are two reasons for not doing so. It might not have been advisable to spread them broadcast; it might have been advisable, the few of us who are in the jay bird seats over here might have done it. It of course is not my province to disseminate that. I am not the plan maker but I will endeavor to give you some idea of the situation. It is a matter of justification both to Operations and the Bureau of Navigation. It is after my explanation, you feel that Carter is right and we have erred? If you will I promise that the Bureau of Navigation will at once try to rectify, as well as it can, the situation and I am sure Operations will change the plans if they are found to be wrong.

When the war was declared we must start from the beginning. When the war was declared we had in the Navy about 2,394 line officers. Of these about 350 (two hundred and fifty) were from the Naval Academy and could hardly be called experienced. The argument let us accept it that we had 2,394 experienced officers of the Navy. Everything else we have is green and untrained, or at least we have to train them. It is necessary for those 2,394 officers to not only plan our part in the

and carry out the operations, but also to provide and train all the other officers and men that might be required. It should be remembered that that number of men was entirely inadequate to man the ships of the United States Navy as they then existed and much less adequate to meet the enormous expansion of activity which has taken place.

Senator TRAMMELL. It is all right, Mr. Chairman, to put that letter in the testimony without reading it, if you are agreed that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the contents of this letter, Captain?

Capt. LANING. I remember writing it, but I do not remember everything that is in it; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to have the letter read in full?

Capt. LANING. If you want to question me about it, I will be glad to be questioned about it. I do not remember everything that is in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then perhaps it would be well to complete the reading of it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Very well. [Continuing reading:]

It is evident that a decision had to be made, and made at once, as to what we should do in the war. We could take our 2,394 officers and our 57,000 enlisted men what ships we could, and let it go at that, or we could use those officers and men as a foundation on which to build a truly great Navy, one that could deal some blows to the Huns. It was evident that what we then had could not win the war, so that the second plan had to be adopted. We may have made an error at that time, and should have been content with a 57,000-man Navy, instead of the 400,000-man Navy we are rapidly coming to. Up to the present, however, we have no reason to think we have erred in adopting the plan of an expanding Navy. We took advantage of the enemy's inability to strike hard while we were building up our Navy for such a great war. The problem as it seems to us was not to deal a puny and futile blow at the start, but to build for the blows that in the end would crush the enemy. To have wasted our strength to strike quickly when that was not sufficient to win would have been foolish. We would have sacrificed and in the end could have been only worse off than at the start.

Our mission was and is to decisively beat the enemy. If we accept some other mission we won't win the war. The first mission, subordinate to but a part of our mission, was to defeat the U boats. Almost everyone assigned a task in this mission immediately ran away with the idea that it was about the only mission we had. They were fortunate enough to get in the game, but once there they did their part in it. Even you yourself questioned the advisability of keeping our battleships in commission, and suggested putting them out to send the personnel over to France. To have done that would have been disastrous, for those battleships have over 100,000 men and thousands of officers, which we would not have now, if we had carried out the suggestion.

We recognize the importance of the work against the U boats, but we did not think that their extinction could alone win the war, nor that even by sending over 2,394 officers over we could extinguish them. As early as July 1 last year it was known on this side that no matter how much we curtailed the U boats the war would be lost if we did not get troops to France. How were the troops to get there? The Navy took them? The situation in our merchant marine was such that it simply could not carry out the task of transporting those troops, even assuming that their officers were sufficiently skilled in handling ships in convoys. The Navy only had to convoy the troops across, but also it had to operate all the transports carrying the United States flag. It at once became evident every cruiser we sent over would be a vital factor, and that transports were even more vital.

Suppose the transport service had not been developed early; where would we have our allies have been to-day? Just as the little force we put in against the Germans swung the balance in our favor on the sea, so the transport and cruiser force swung the balance on land to our side. Hasn't it turned out that making your army go and making the transport and cruiser force go were the allied salvation? We have operated over 40 troop transports and several hundred cargo transports. We could have had either the officers or men to man them had we stripped this side for them side early in the war; yet without them could the enemy have been stopped on

... saving the day, and I believe it would be unfair to put blame on the personnel for putting them across instead of sending the personnel to chase them. These were essential, but neither one by itself could save the day. In our U-boat efforts the transports have gotten across, but if the transports to sink U-boats our troops wouldn't have gotten over, and our allies be now?

... that there were at least two important missions under the curbing of the U-boats and (2) the delivery of troops to the only missions? I don't believe so, and certainly not after some of your own letters on the subject of battleships.

... called on to send some battleships across, and I daresay all will sooner or later be called on, perhaps not with the Grand important duties in the war area. Will anyone question keeping these ships ready? Because they are not being used

... proof that they won't be called on to-morrow. Anyhow, we are ready, and surely in this you agree. This will account for our about our older battleships? There is the rub. What are

... They are the groundwork of the whole scheme for a Navy big Without them we would practically have no training place of thousands of men and the thousands of officers required new destroyers, transports, cargo ships, mine sweepers, sub- and the many other types of craft we are turning out in great

... of 10 regulars on each of these ships, or 180 in all. Hidden and all chances of honor and renown, those fellows work and make possible the manning of our thousands of ships. Does that we should cut off our sole means of preparing personnel for more officers to the chasers? For the present we might get the long run we would do less to win the war. I believe that battleship forces are an essential part of the general mission and subsidiary missions can logically be sacrificed to insure the bet- another subsidiary mission. The missions are (3) (for dread- ready for battle, and (4) (for predreadnoughts) to train com- and men to man the ever-expanding Navy.

... our major operating forces, but have endeavored to show how is essential and one that can not be cast aside. We have such as the submarine force, the district forces, etc. Of these has any regular officers, and then only in small numbers. made up almost entirely of reserve and Coast Guard officers. has only a leaven of regulars. The vast majority of officers to any naval vessel on this side are newly made. On dread- now have a total of 14 regulars; on predreadnoughts, average, 10; on first-class cruisers, 7; on smaller cruisers, 4; on gun- construction comes on the regulars will become fewer and Each regular is actively at work, each is engaged on the general what we believe will finally bring the total defeat of the

... only officers afloat. There are a considerable number of their disgust, are held on shore duty. It may be contended there, but if one looks into the situation even casually he we have gotten along with so few on that duty. As a matter is that because of the lack of officers for the handling of the probably not succeeding as well as it should. Although every an function has been called to active duty, and hundreds of put in such positions ashore as they are competent to fill, difficult time to carry on its work. We are spending billions of providing of which must be handled by experienced officers. training alone on shore for which we must have some experi- Lakes Training Station, with 47,000 men, has three regulars are similarly curtailed. I could recite the details, and they there is no use. I am sure you will believe me when I tell officers are working to the limit of their endurance on shore, men's would have been considered impossibilities 18 months on shore is such that we are open to severe criticism because others to do the work as it should be done or to properly safe- of billion- of dollars

One of the big tasks that has fallen to the Navy is to man and operate the merchant ships now being built by the Shipping Board. The supply of officers and merchant sailors is exhausted, and the Navy alone has the facilities and organization to provide the personnel. While the cry that 'ships will win' may not be correct, it is pretty certain that we can't win without them. The Navy will train and provide 20,000 officers and 200,000 men for these ships. It takes many regulars to handle this task, but it takes some. Is their task such that it can be taken from it?

Perhaps it may be illuminating to tell you of our estimates of personnel presented to Congress recently. We figured that to merely man the permanent regular Navy on July 1, 1919, we would require 131,000 men, or counting under training to fill vacancies caused by expiration of enlistment, men for casualties, and men for aviation (regular), 152,000. Of the latter figures we speak. The former, mind you, are needed to man only regular vessels; vessels temporarily in were not counted, such as transports, yachts, sweepers, "sub" cargo ships, coast-patrol craft, etc. To properly officer and run just the regular ships would require 5,263 regular officers. But, in addition to that, we have other ships, where combatant officers are required, to the point of making the total of officers required about 8,600. To meet this we have now not 2,394 officers, only about 2,370, so we can have regulars, where regulars ought to be, only one out of three places. You can see the veneer or leaven of regulars has to be pretty thin in every force. I have spread it just as thin as I have dared. Each force would do a great deal better if it had more regulars, but I can't make it and as each force has to operate, we give them all we can and count on them to get away with the job with the only tools we have.

We can't win the war with anything less than all our forces. We might throw battleships in the discard, but would you advise it? We can't throw our old ships (old battleships) out and continue to expand. We can't cut down our transports without curtailing our troops movements. We can't cut down the shore end lest the sea end fails because of a shore-end failure. And so it goes along the line. I have studied the situation—in fact, do nothing else but study it. I can't see any way to send a larger proportion of trained men to the chasers than we are sending. I admit it would be well to do it if we could, but it can be done only by sacrificing something else. Looking at it in the broad light, what would be the sacrifice?

Reading over Carter's article, do you believe he has my conception of the effort of the United States Navy? He has written a very convincing article. His caption is good and his logic sounds plausible, provided his premises are correct. He makes a general estimate of the situation from the one point on the line. He sees, though general deduction from local and incomplete information are valid. The great trouble with such arguments presented as his is, is that when spread it weakens the morale. Over there you give us the devil because we don't do what you want us to do. You feel we are failing you. Does it help the morale over here to do that? I know we, over here, are not in the limelight; that no matter how hard we work and how carefully we plan, there is no glory coming to those who are tied to the swivel chair. But please don't think we are quitting on the Navy. The Navy is paying the penalty of past shortsighted policy. That, we can correct at once, but I am sure we strive now, have strived in the past, and will strive in the future, to meet your necessities as far as we can with the small personnel we have. We know your needs and meet them as far as we can, but we can't give you what you ought to have, for the officers simply don't exist.

I suppose we must suffer disagreeable criticism for not sending more officers in regular service over there, but when you count those permanently there and those that go over and come back with the convoys and transports, I think you will find that a very large per cent of regulars are quite actively engaged and that the small number of officers who want to be similarly engaged but can't be that are on this side are doing vital work without whimper and without chance of reward. It is bad enough for an officer to get a chance in this war, but to have our motives and efforts impugned by officers who do not know of anything but the little part they can see is disheartening.

Let me point out where Carter is dead wrong. In his opening paragraphs he says that the most important work of the United States Navy is either one of two: the defeat of the Germans on the sea or the defeat of the Germans undersea. That premise and the use of false logic he proves his case. Both his premises are wrong. The important work of the United States and its Allies is to beat the Huns. It doesn't make any difference where we beat them, just so we do. It may be on the sea, but it is much more likely to be on land. It is the Navy's business to use its efforts to beat them whether it be done on land or sea. If we can

And it looks like that is where we must beat them, then our help beat them on land. And after all, beating them on the final decision must be on land. We can win this war if we can land and can prevent them beating us on the sea, and it looks like we will be successful. Carter fails to see this; fails to grasp what is at stake and therefore his whole idea is illogical.

There is more here than in his assumptions. He apparently thinks the sea is the cure-all. Suppose we had done as Carter implies we are doing that doesn't tend to curb the U-boats. Wouldn't the Allies say if we had adopted that plan a year ago and forsaken our present plan? Suppose we had kept up our troop arrangements and cast "Fritz" have a better chance to win on the sea with our fleet irreparably out of business? The mere fact that even if he had our Grand Fleet, there is another fleet ready to fill the gap must be a part of his plans, and anyhow if it didn't, it is a mighty good thing to have a fleet against the slight possibility of his success. As a matter of fact it isn't any cure-all. We have got to work along all our lines, and we can, keeping in mind that defeating the enemy on one line will help us to win the war in a reasonable time.

As for brass tacks as Carter calls them, I admit we have not put the best men there. We have, however, put the best men there we could. We should have sacrificed our heavy battleships or our training ships. I don't agree; neither do the officers in Operations, and I know that many officers over there are of that opinion, but what is the entire situation in coming to it? And is the calling of our men to the remote contingency Carter calls it? It does not seem so to the contrary.

It requires more brains and experience to handle convoys and hunt submarines? and then says that if the answer is "no," it doesn't follow that we must always consider the relation of the two. Here is where his false premise looms up. You can't get away from the fact that the putting of troops into France is second to anything. The answer to his question is "yes." The biggest thing we are doing is fighting men into France and our best brains must be concentrated on that accomplishment. I don't believe we would facilitate the best by putting the brains now doing that work on hunting

regular officers are enough for the hunting squadrons, but since they are so few, or steal, sending that many was a "Hobson's choice." If we wanted to send more, would have been only too glad to send more. We can't see the wisdom of stopping other Navy efforts to get more hunting officers so rotten as to be a scandal? They are not so rotten; won't they, like the rest of us, get away with the job? We have been here these days and the need is quite close at home, yet we are so busy in changing our policy.

Now Carter says that a goodly percentage of submarine officers are on board and even that many will be hard to procure. It shows how little he understands the situation. Our regulars on board and even that many will be hard to procure. Cruisers, cruisers, battleships, and everything are running on. Nothing can raise the number of them we have. If, as Carter says, they should be chosen from those in the war zone and sent to the front, there is no objection to your so assigning them. Of course we have reassignments over there, but his Carter's argument can't stand up.

It comes up because it does not appear to be considered important by those in authority. Appearances are often misleading in this case. As a matter of fact, we have probably more hours than Carter has minutes. If he thinks the staff is so important over the vital importance of swatting the U-boats, we have weighed the question both above and it can be seen that the plan which I don't believe he has done, and our decision is to keep the staff on the general plan instead of on the narrow one.

We have not yet decided on their organization for the simple reason that we are not sure how they can best be organized. It is not that the commanding officers won't be equal to the

because they did not graduate before 1914. If we carried out his ideas take 117 officers prior to the 1914 class just for commanding officers and dividers of those boats, about 9 per cent of the officers below captain and a 1914 class. As some 600 officers must come out of that same group for destroyers the rest of the Navy must also be run to a large extent by them, I can't quite see how the supply can anywhere near meet the demand. This illustrates the folly of telling how to do things when one doesn't know the situation or ignores it to prove his case.

It is a good thing to act a thief to catch a thief, but if you haven't the thief you can only put your best substitutes on the job, and that is what we are doing.

Carter's argument doesn't bother us much because it is based on incomplete information and false assumptions from which anyone who sees only his immediate situation is unable to get a correct perspective. Your own short letter, however, in the last paragraph states as follows:

"When the history of this war comes to be written there will be a number of facts that will not be very creditable to the United States Navy. If hearings are held on the conduct of the war, a number of rather disagreeable facts must inevitably be brought out. Without going into details I may say that as far as the Navy is concerned we have fought this war with the bulk of our experienced personnel of the Navy on the inside of the ocean where there is no war. We will have to be able to show that it is entirely necessary that we should have had to fight the war over here with a large proportion of reserve officer who did not have the necessary experience."

And it is that paragraph that hurts. Are you sure that the bulk of our experienced personnel is on this side of the water now? Of course if you don't count transports and transports you are right, but if you do count them as being engaged in action you are wrong. Do you realize that ultimately two-fifths of our experienced personnel will be on destroyers alone and of the remaining three-fifths at least half will be there before the war is over, provided of course transports and cruisers may be considered as working in the danger zone? The bulk may not be there to-day, but we are expecting them to go and are planning for it. Please remember experienced officers number all told only about 2,370 and there is much for them to do on this side that may be less spectacular and not deserving of credit, yet for all that it is without which the Hun can't be licked.

Please don't think for a minute that I alone can change the situation even if I am ordered. It is not my province to determine operating plans. Such plans are made in our bureau but it is our task to provide personnel to carry them out when they are made. We have endeavored to do that and at the same time have fought hard for proper consideration for the personnel. We started with a handicap we have been able to work off. Criticism is easy, and just criticism beneficial, but there is more lowering to the morale than unjust criticism, and criticism made with knowledge and thought is apt to be unjust. I am not claiming that we don't get a lot of it, but that which comes from a paper like Carter's is not just.

I am sorry to have taken so much of your time and I will consider it a favor if you will come back at me and point out where we are wrong. I certainly hate to do that though I have to stay on this bum job I am also making a mess of it. I feel that even if there is no honor or glory in it that after all it wasn't so bad. And don't lose sight of the fact that it is only by loyalty to the general plan and holding to it that decisions are gained.

Before closing there is one question I want to ask. In your opinion, when the Navy has an actual and vital part in the war, is it advisable to separate the experienced officers from the bulk of the naval forces, in order that some particular forces with particular missions should the better accomplish their missions, and doing disregard the fact that we actually interfere with the Navy's primary mission in the war? Carter's article is based on the answer yes to that question as are a number of "disagreeable facts" that you tell us we must face.

With best wishes to you and all of your gang, one of which I long to be, believe I belong there, I am as always,

Sincerely yours,

HARRIS LANING

Was that letter expressive of your views on August 26, 1918, on the points that it touched upon?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have not changed your views in regard to the matters that you touched upon at that time?

Capt. LANING. No, sir.

EVAN. I suggest, that if you have a copy of Mr. Carter's letter, you produce that and let it be included in the report along with this.

TRUMMELL. I have not a copy of that. We might see if we can get it.

EVAN. Will you try to get it from the department?

TRUMMELL. Yes; I will see if I can get it.

What is referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:

THE PROBLEM OF CATCHING A THIEF, OR WHY SUBMARINES ESCAPE.

One of the most important work of the war to be done by the United States Navy? Is that of preparing to defeat the German High Seas Fleet if it attempts to extend for mastery of the surface of the sea. The British Grand Fleet has been successfully attending to that for three years before our entry into the war.

But then it must be defeat of the German Undersea Fleet. If this German Undersea Fleet (the U boats) be accepted as the most important work of the United States Navy, the only thing to be sure of is that we are going to meet it in the most available known way.

What we have adopted consists of building merchant ships to replace the sinking ships as much as possible by light craft, to prevent as far as possible from sinking them; hunting the submarine with light craft specially designed detection devices; and patrolling certain beats with fleets of submarines, whose only weapon of destruction is the torpedo. We do doubt that all of these elements should be employed, but there is no doubt as to which should be given the most thought. It is not that it would be folly to try to build ships faster than they could be destroyed by submarines roaming unhampered about the waters through which our shipping must pass. It has already been stated by competent authorities that the convoy system alone will not protect them. It has however, also been stated that an offensive which will destroy or drive the submarine from these waters is the answer to the problem. Such an offensive has already been inaugurated by the task, hunting vessels with specially designed detection devices and weapons of destruction. Nevertheless, until the personnel of the vessels engaged in this task are capable of solving the problem, the problem will continue to exist.

When we talk in generalities and get down to brass tacks have we put the problem of hunting vessels? We have not. The problem is one which requires brains and experience that can be obtained. Most of our regular officers are on the surface vessels than those employed in hunting. The battleships in our fleet have an average of eight regular officers below the rank of captain, and the Naval Academy class of 1915. They have in addition many lieutenant commanders, of the reserve force. If it is true that the German High Seas Fleet can be expected to successfully deal with the German High Seas Fleet, what would be the harm of using some of these officers in more important work? If we had to go to the extent of stripping the battleships to the bare bones, would the battleships of four or five years ago? They would still have experienced men and a sufficient number of officers to keep them in perfect condition as regards material and probably could hold considerable drill and training.

Do we want to keep these ships with full complement of officers of them in a condition which most all are morally certain will never exist, and keep them in a perfect condition as regards material, and use their officers in the hunting of enemy submarines?

Do we want to keep ships "standing by" for a reason which it does to prosecute an offensive against the wily and tricky submarine?

Do we want to keep ships with full complement of officers of them in a condition which most all are morally certain will never exist, and keep them in a perfect condition as regards material, and use their officers in the hunting of enemy submarines?

Do we want to keep ships with full complement of officers of them in a condition which most all are morally certain will never exist, and keep them in a perfect condition as regards material, and use their officers in the hunting of enemy submarines?

On our battleships in home waters alone there is an average of eight regular officers of useful qualifications. In the entire Navy there are approximately 100 officers, junior to Captain, but senior to the Naval Academy class of 1915, and the number there are but 11 now assigned to hunting vessels.

Is that a fair assignment?

Is the task before this hunting force of such little importance or of such small accomplishment that 11 regular experienced officers are sufficient?

The hunting vessels are being officered mainly by young inexperienced, bright, keen, and willing men who it is believed will eventually learn the game. "Deliver the goods." Undoubtedly they will eventually learn a lot about it, but I believe that like the allied armies they will always be a lap behind the Germans. By the time they have learned what to do to cope with the submarine tactics of to-morrow and there will be new tactics by the submarines.

Our regular officers, on the other hand, can learn the game in much less time and then will have a fund of knowledge from past naval experience upon which to draw for initiating advances, change and amplifications of tactics against the submarine.

No matter how bright and keen the reserves are, is it to be expected that they can learn in a few minutes that which regular officers have acquired in from 4 to 6 months?

Many of these young reserve officers are men who were lawyers, bankers, and other business men with no technical training prior to entering the Navy. They are in charge of vessels fitted with mechanical devices of an extremely complicated nature, and if they learn them at all it can only be in a merely superficial way.

Is it to be expected that they can ever learn these devices as well as regular officers who have been brought up on mechanical "gadgets"?

Is it to be expected that officers who do not have the capabilities and experience of the devices of their vessels at their finger tips, can handle their vessels in a manner as officers who do?

There will be times when certain devices will not be suitable, and certainly there will be. For example—at certain times a submarine runs at a very slow, noiseless speed, or balances, or rests on the bottom, obviously a listening device will be of little value in detecting her. Here a magnetic, electrolytic device, or a device of some kind must be used and in using it, frequently the listening device must also be used to ensure the submarine has not started to run at an audible speed; or, it may be that the charges judiciously used will start the submarine running away at an audible speed. In all these cases careful judgment resulting from naval experience will be necessary to decide what to use and when and where to use it. It might be advisable to hunt along a re-tiring search curve. How many of our reserve officers are there who would realize that such a maneuver was the thing; and how many could do it?

In connection with knowing the submarine's tactics, who would know more about it to expect and who would be expected to size up a situation more quickly than a submarine officer? In other words, should there not be a liberal percentage of experienced submarine officers taken from submarines and put into hunting vessels?

Furthermore, should they not be the best submarine officers; that is, choose those who have had experience in the war zone?

This whole question of experienced officers for hunting vessel is brought up, but it does not appear to be considered in the light of comparative importance of having the authority to control it. Capt. R. H. Leigh has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of having experienced officers with the 110-foot chasers, but up to date there have been but two added. There are at Corfu four regular officers of the 110-foot experience, and one reserve officer of that experience. These 5 officers are utilized on 1 tender, 36 chasers and a shore base.

Is it a sufficient number considering the importance of the task?

The Navy Department is about to assign officers to the first of the Eagles, 18-knot hunting vessels, and has cabled that they will be officered by four officers: a commanding officer not senior to the class of 1914 Naval Academy, an executive officer formerly a boatswain or gunner, an engineer formerly machinist or electrician, a trained reserve, and a communication officer who will be a reserve officer. The department has also stated that no division commanders for these vessels are contemplated.

The commanding officer at the most will have had but four years' experience in graduating from the Naval Academy, and there will be no division commander with any greater experience to guide them.

Would it not be better to assign to every group of six one commanding officer with considerably great experience, to act as division commander as well as commanding officer?

Q. Is it better to have more Eagles commanded by officers senior to independent division commander as well?

A. I think other work of greater importance than hunting the submarine, and that they should be spared for hunting?

Q. Is it a natural trend of thought inherited from the past that the work went with the size of the ship, and the curve of battleship, cruiser, submarine, etc., followed right down to chasers, in the assignment of importance of the importance of the work of the Navy in this war?

A. I think that reserve officer should be replaced by regular officers, but rather than that should be added and the reserves kept as well. The question of ratings, which is bound to arise, need be given very little consideration.

Q. The lower ratings of enlisted men and all hands fleet downward for the purpose of their take chief petty officers' quarters, etc. If necessary, the ratings should be lowered. An educated man can do this better than an uneducated one, and when the emergency arises we then have a shortage. In most all exploration expeditions, etc., there have been men who have roughed it (cooked, cut wood, slept on the ground, etc.) and others did. The Army officers are doing worse in this respect.

Q. Are the submarines corresponding in size to those of ours which have three officers and five or six as their complement?

A. Yes, they realize the advantage of many officers?

Q. Are they manned by the most skillful and experienced officers it is possible to get?

A. Yes, against them in hunting tactics our least skillful and experienced officers are manned by officers who have been trained in submarine school boats, and in war submarines.

Q. Do you put against them as many similarly trained officers as possible?

A. Yes, "catch a thief." Let's try that and set against the submarine many of our most skillful and experienced officers possible to obtain—and as many more officers as possible.

W. R. CARTER.

A. I just want to ask one or two more questions. One of them from that letter is as follows:

Q. Is it true that Operations has erred in its general plans, or that my office, or the staff, greatly in carrying out its mission under them.

A. Yes, that in your office in 1918. You still agree to that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. TEAMMELL. I judge from that letter—I am not going to put in any more extracts from it—that you had a broad view of the entire situation, Captain, and you considered that you had to consider this side, and that you were looking at it with a vision covering not only the operations abroad, but the country in preparation, and everything of that kind?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. TEAMMELL. And that was the reason that you said that "secondary," or "subsidiary devices," using your language, were made superior to the primary, main mission of carrying out the general plan?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. TEAMMELL. As far as you felt at that time the general plan, you do not know whether you called it, you might call it "General Navigation or Operation," you felt that it was being carried out on proper lines?

A. Yes, At that time, yes, sir.

Q. TEAMMELL. Yes.

A. Yes, That was August, 1918; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Well, in August, 1918. You were not connected with it until July, 1917, were you?

Capt. LANING. Connected with what?

Senator TRAMMELL. The Bureau of Navigation.

Capt. LANING. Yes; I reported there on July 16, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what I say, July, 1917.

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You seem to defend, in this letter, the policy of the department in the matter of the handling of the officers, the personnel, as to its plan of distribution, and so on, between this side and the other side; and as between the war zone and the port zone. Was that policy at that time, when you wrote that letter in 1918, any different from what it was, say, 18 months prior to that time?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir. Up to the time I went in Navigation in July, 1917, we did not have any general plan, and we built up a general plan after that. That is, it was built up a part here and a part there until the Bureau of Navigation had a pretty definite idea of what its mission was, and we were carrying out that plan in a doped on this piecemeal method. We were carrying that out until I wrote that letter to Admiral Sims.

Senator TRAMMELL. But even prior to the time that you became connected with the Bureau of Navigation there had been something done, I believe. You said in your direct testimony that they had withdrawn certain officers from some of the dreadnoughts. Had they done something of that kind, had they not?

Capt. LANING. Before July, 1917?

Senator TRAMMELL. Before you went in there.

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were doing something, were they not, Captain, when you got into the bureau?

Capt. LANING. They certainly were. They were doing all that they could.

Senator TRAMMELL. Prior to July, 1917?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not question the efficiency of your service, and I think you no doubt rendered a splendid service, but I wanted to find out if all these other officers were doing nothing at the time you got into the Bureau of Navigation in July, 1917.

Capt. LANING. Did my testimony give you that idea? I do not intend it so.

Senator TRAMMELL. No; it did not; but you made a remark a while ago that after you got in they got everything all right.

Capt. LANING. No; I did not say they got it all right. I told you I spent some sleepless nights about that time.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was the substance of it; that the things pretty well organized and going after you got in.

Capt. LANING. Well, it took a long time to do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I know you did splendid work. I have the impression, though, that it is a fact that a very large percentage, nearly all, of these naval officers did fine work. I do not feel that one man did it all, and I do not feel like one man made all the mistakes. *I believe officers are just about like everybody else; some of*

of mistakes and some of them do some good work. I was ~~convinced~~ that most of them were doing pretty good work. ~~Just~~ my casual observation.

ANYWAY, the department was at work on this problem, and connected with the bureau here?

LIVING. On the problems of personnel.

MR. TRAMMELL. Yes.

LIVING. Certainly; yes, sir.

MR. TRAMMELL. I do not think I have anything further to ask.

CHAIRMAN. The statements made in this letter, Capt. Laning, of the general plan, refer to the plan in operation in August, ~~was~~ this letter was written?

LIVING. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. That does not, as I understand it, refer to the first six months of the war?

LIVING. No, sir.

CHAIRMAN. And to the matters that were connected with Sims's letter of January 7?

LIVING. No, sir; that dealt with the time at which the letter was ~~sent~~ August, 1918, if I am correct in the month. By that ~~time~~ or less well-defined plan had been built up, and I stated ~~my~~ testimony that especially a correct and sound general plan had been built up, and this was the result of it. But it was in the ~~past~~ that we should have had a plan and did not have it.

CHAIRMAN. And it does not approve of the lack of support that ~~was~~ given to Admiral Sims during the first few months of the war ~~when~~ to furnish him with a sufficient staff to conduct his

LIVING. Not at all. This letter dealt only with the question ~~of~~ some submarine chasers. The question of supplying Admiral Sims's staff came up largely before I entered the Navy Department. You see, I did not get there until July 16, 1918, and I do not remember now what arrangements had been made, ~~before~~ to that time we did try to send him officers whenever we could get them; and ultimately I think we got him practically all that he needed.

CHAIRMAN. What were the circumstances leading up to the ~~writing of~~ this letter? Were you asked to write that letter by the department or was it a private letter?

LIVING. No, sir; this was all personal correspondence. Capt. Pratt received a letter from Admiral Sims inclosing a paper ~~with~~ "Let a thief to catch a thief," and the idea was that if you ~~could~~ catch German submarines the thing to do was to put ~~more~~ officers on subchasers, and that they knew the tricks of German submarines and would catch them; and it went on in any way ~~to~~ criticize the distribution of officers. Capt. Pratt handed ~~it~~ over and said something about its being one of my pigeons ~~sent~~ and that I had better prepare a reply; so that I wrote ~~the~~ letter to Admiral Sims, so that he would get an idea of what ~~the~~ situation was with us at that time. That was in 1918, ~~before~~ the war started. I think I made pretty clear in that ~~letter~~ the personnel situation was still pretty bad.

MR. TRAMMELL. The chairman's question suggests another ~~point~~ *on my part. Of course, the letter speaks for itself.* 7

is the best evidence. The letter is a very strong defense of the action of the Navy Department up to that time in the matter of the subjects touched there in the letter. Now, while the man involved in the original Carter criticism, of setting a thief to catch a thief, might have been in regard to providing officers for destroyers, you went ahead and elaborated on several other subjects in the letter, discussing the general plan of the Navy and going into the transport question and everything of that kind; and the man, as I understand, wants to rather make it appear that he was at the inception or the dawn of this plan. If that was the case, why did you go ahead and recite in here the accomplishments that had been made by the department up to that time?

Capt. LANING. I do not understand the question, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not say you agree with that idea, but the chairman wants to convey the idea, apparently, that this was at the beginning of the plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted information.

Capt. LANING. He did not convey that idea to me.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. LANING. When he asked me the question he conveyed the idea that at this time there was a plan and that it was not a plan that was evolved in the first two or three or four or five months of the war, and when I answered him I told him that it was a plan that was evolved in the first three or four or five months of the war, but it was evolved in the course of the war up to that time. That was a year and a half, approximately, after the war started.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, if we are going to bring in the question of a year and a half after the war, at the period of this letter, August 26, 1918, what had the Navy done toward furnishing transport for troops?

Capt. LANING. They had furnished a great deal of transport for troops.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, we had over a million soldiers over there at that time, and you took the position in your letter that that was even probably more important than the submarine question. You gave importance to each, but you emphasized the submarine question that the man that was dealing with the submarine problem must not lose sight of the other problem.

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, this letter was really commenting largely not only upon the plans, but you also recited more or less to the accomplishment of the plans, on August 26, 1918; told the number of officers you had in training and men and about the 4th Army at camps on the Great Lakes; and you did not utter any criticism at that time about what had not been done during the first three or four months of the war.

Capt. LANING. Why, of course, I did not; no, sir. I would not have uttered as much to anybody, until I was called before the committee.

Senator TRAMMELL. I notice that you rather resented Admiral Sims's threat about investigation. That is one part that you seem to take to heart more than anything else, may be.

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir; I was personally concerned in that.

TEMMELL. Here is an extract from Admiral Sims's report that he had in mind investigations back in 1918.

When this war comes to be written there will be a number of features creditable to the United States Navy. If hearings are held on the war, a number of rather disagreeable facts must inevitably be brought out. Without going into details, I may say that as far as the Navy is concerned, we fought this war with the bulk of our experienced personnel of the Atlantic Ocean where there is no war. We will have to be able to do what was necessary that we should have had to fight the war over here with a portion of reserve officers who did not have the necessary experi-

ence in reply to that. [Reading:]

"A paragraph that hurts. Are you sure that the bulk of our experienced personnel is on the Atlantic side of the water now? Of course, if you don't count the cruisers and destroyers, you are right, but if you do count them as being engaged in active service, no. Do you realize that ultimately two-fifths of our experienced personnel, destroyers alone and of the remaining three-fifths at least half of the transports, are the war is over, provided, of course, transports and cruisers are working in the danger zone? The bulk may not be there to-day, but we are sending them to go and are planning for it. Please remember experience tells us that all told only about 2,370, and there is much for them to do over there. The Hun can't be licked.

At least, did not agree with Admiral Sims's criticism in that letter. Admiral Sims had his criticism about the way you were using the personnel and the officers, and you at that time were in agreement with the admiral on that question, and stated that you were using the best you could with the whole plan considered, and that your primary mission should not be set aside for a secondary mission.

That is what you said in that letter. I have just read that letter. That is all, I think.

TEMMELL. Capt. Laning, in August, 1918, the submarine situation was what, do you remember?

LANING. No, sir; I have no statistics on that.

TEMMELL. I think the testimony shows that at that time it was something like 100,000 tons a month.

LANING. They had been greatly reduced at that time.

TEMMELL. They were greatly reduced and the submarine situation was practically under control at that time, was it not?

LANING. Well, it was only about the middle of the summer, immediately after the middle of the summer, that the sinkings began to decrease materially; but the exact statistics I do not know. We began to feel certain, then, that we were going to win there in time.

TEMMELL. At that time we were still sending troops over there, were we not?

LANING. Oh, yes, sir; the troop shipments each month were heavy, I think.

TEMMELL. So that with the submarine situation under control and the vital importance of sending troops over, might there not be a change in plans?

LANING. Yes, sir; but I do not know.

TEMMELL. Whereas, in the early part of 1917, it might have been necessary to take care of the submarine situation, in August, 1918, it ceased to be a vital matter?

Capt. LANING. Oh, the situation changed very materially in time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. Well, now, you express an opinion in your letter on the question of the relative importance of the submarine and the providing of transports. You stated in this letter that the matter of providing transports and being sure to make arrangements for getting the troops over was really of greater importance than the matter of the temporary victory over the submarine at that time. You stated that in that letter, in substance, I, of course, am not quoting it exactly. I just ask you that because the chairman asked you the other question.

Capt. LANING. Yes; I stated that.

Senator TRAMMELL. You stated, once, that if we took a little force and sent it over there and they defeated our little force by an effort, with the submarines, then we would have nothing. You stated that in this letter, in substance?

Capt. LANING. Yes; I stated we could not rob the other country and send everybody over to hunt submarines.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your letter went into the policy very much in regard to that of the department, on this side and the other, and your views were then in harmony with the policy adopted by the department. Any man that reads your letter fairly could not say anything else.

Capt. LANING. No, and I do not say it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your views were thoroughly in harmony with those of the department when you wrote that letter?

Capt. LANING. Yes, and they still are, even at this time, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this point until tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, March 25, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

present. Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.
CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Palmer,
will you take the stand?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. L. C. PALMER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(Witness was sworn by the chairman.)

CHAIRMAN. Capt. Palmer, will you state what official position
you held during the war and what were the general responsibilities
of that position?

CAPT. PALMER. I was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation of the
Navy Department from approximately the latter part of August,
1914, before the war, until the last day of October, 1918, when
I was detached for duty with Admiral Rodman abroad.

The duties of the Bureau of Navigation apply generally to person-
nel recruiting, training, and enrollment of both officers and men,
and assignment of these officers and men to the various activities
required by the Chief of Naval Operations. Under the bureau are
the United States Naval Academy and the four great training sta-
tions at Norfolk, Newport, Great Lakes, and San Francisco, and
covering ships and seaports, and the recruiting bureaus and
offices are scattered all over the country.

In addition we have charge of the Hydrographic Office, which
issues charts and sailing directions, and the Naval Observatory,
which has to do with the nautical instruments and time system.

CHAIRMAN. Will you state the condition of the personnel of
the Navy at the time when you were assigned to the Bureau of
Navigation as to the sufficiency of the officers and enlisted men to
meet the requirements then in the Navy, together with the requirements of
the war?

CAPT. PALMER. I do not believe I will be able to give it in actual
figures, but what appeared in the printed reports at the time and
the report of the present Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
Generally, when I came into the office there were approxi-
mately 12,000 regular line officers and about 51,000 men, with an
additional 400 reserves.

There were about 9,000 militia, I should say, but they were not
mobilized and did not get into the service until the war started. Of
course I remember that this was the basis; this was the little force

before the war; the hearings state approximately 28,000 regulars and militia and 463 reserves.

ations gave us an additional list of for war, and as those came I revised nished the department with informa- on February 20, 1917, and on that committee on the subject of our urgent

the numbers that we were short for the shortage of reserves on account perations wanted us to man for war their figures.

opportunity on February 20, in that number did not include any working estimates would be necessary to be sudden impetus which war or mobilization might result in the rapid construc- which submarines and destroyers, all of which re- the rate of 9,000 per 100 destroyers; needs, adding up, roughly, 20,000 for

96 men per destroyer was not sufficient. However, it was modified,

based on the three-year building program, just put through. They gave this program, approximately in 1921; So I sent to the Chief of Construction and Repair and asked him to give me dates of completion of the vessels he could as to dates of completion of the vessels prepare the personnel beforehand, and could ask the Congress for the necessary people. The Chief of Construction and Repair sent me a list of estimated completion date, and things may arise which may change this time; but generally it showed that the three-year program would be completed at the middle of 1921, and on my basis of our personnel needs, because Congress continuing program then on which to work.

That was in 1917?

This was started before that. In fact, it was the was started in the bureau, and in my first annual was printed on the 10th of October, 1916, there was statement that I had prepared this estimate sheet, and the first page that I estimated, for instance, that we mobilize that immense force of the three-year program plus approximately 43,000 reserves.

But that was before we had gone into the war?

Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the plan was not a war plan? It was a peace plan, providing for the increase that Congress had provided for.

Capt. PALMER. Yes. We really had no authority to go on with arranging anything on a war-plan basis. In fact, there was quite enough to do to get action on the peace plan work because of that large increase. Most of this data was presented to the Government and submitted to the Congress in the recommendations that went out particularly our necessity for more officers. We were far behind, and I wanted to get the course at the Naval Academy shortened to three years, simply to make up the number of officers who would be required to make this material building program a real live one. For instance, one thing we had to start on was recruiting service. The recruiting service had not been reauthorized to do any special work, because we had only a certain number allowed by Congress, and the machinery was not in operation. It was necessary to have it in operation, so that was one of the principal things that I had to undertake—to reorganize the recruiting service.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me what provisions of law exist under which expansion of the regular personnel could have been accomplished by means of reserves?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. I can refer best—

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. Did you have something further to say on the other matter?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir. I can refer best to Admiral Washington's report of this year—he is the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, in which report he has very ably laid out the things that were authorized by Congress to give us ample provision to provide personnel. The first step, of course, was the law that Congress put through, that of August 29, 1916. That gave the authority for an increase in enlisted personnel to a total of 68,000 enlisted men plus 6,000 apprentice seamen. That is a total of 74,000 men. This then gave the President authority to increase this number of 68,000 to a total of 87,000, and we assumed that that would allow 6,000 apprentice seamen also, and that authority was equal to 93,000. That was to be given in case of emergency. And the President, when he was asked to do that, when the request was taken to him by the Secretary on the 5th of May, 1917, signed it immediately. The President signed the thing immediately as an emergency measure. There was also a reserve bill which was worded so that it was quite difficult to give it a definite, legal interpretation on many of the points, but it was also so worded that a favorable interpretation would permit you to do anything with it. It is one of the best things we have ever had. We could do anything we wanted in order to advance the interests of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. What was the date of the passage of that law?

Capt. PALMER. August 29, 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. August 29?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. Now, the further things that were done. On May 22, 1917, Congress authorized a temporary increase from 87,000 to 150,000, and also an allowance for an additional 10,000 apprentice seamen.

nothing was on July 1, 1918, when Congress authorized a decrease to 137,485 men, including apprentices, and also a reserve force of 181,000 plus 24,000 apprentices, and a flying corps from 350 to 10,000. That latter was a big thing. I must say that Congress was practically unanimous in everything that the department asked for and for pushing it to a successful conclusion.

CHICKMAN: The same was true just before war was declared, was it? The large increase was provided?

POWELL: Yes. This dates back as long as I was in the Navy, back to the latter part of August, just before the war. The Navy Department had to do was to ask and Congress gave it. Our naval committees in both the Senate and the House were in the most hearty spirit of cooperation, and the whole thing was plainly "Just show us how we can help you and we will

do it." particularly in this Senate Naval Committee the two members were assigned to the committee for naval work and to the needs. There was the acting chairman, and later the Senator Swanson, and Senator Lodge. They impressed me as going around like two brothers. They could be depended on most of the time, and they were all working to do what they could for us. They let it be known that they could be depended on at any time, day or night. Senator Swanson and Senator Lodge were charged with this thing, let it be known that they could be depended on at any time, day or night, for anything so far as the Navy was concerned, and that was the attitude as to everything.

CHICKMAN: Also that prevailed before the declaration of war?

POWELL: Yes. In fact they were of the greatest help to me. Senator Swanson and Senator Lodge, who represented the committee were of the greatest help to me.

At peace times a navy should have a sufficient number of ships and men to properly man all the vessels of the active fleet with a certain percentage for shore allowances, and for vessels in the reserve force we should have 50 per cent of regulars and allow for the other half for reserve personnel. It would be a great deal better for us to have all regulars to man the active and reserve, but it is a question of congressional appropriation, and if they cut down it is best to make some provision having 50 per cent of the personnel on the reserve ships and 50 per cent of regulars and 50 per cent of reserves. Of course when after going over the personnel situation during the war it was found that that was not the condition at the time war was declared the naval peace personnel was far short of the peace requirement. That is simply to man the vessels, which the Chief of the Bureau told me had to be manned. That is just for peace mobilization business.

The lack of regular personnel at the declaration of war was, of course, a great handicap of the Navy's activities, because the Navy had to begin at once and have our officers and men afloat. It is a fact that lots of people can talk understandingly of the value of ships and their money value, but a very much smaller number of people that ships are only effective when they are efficiently manned. There is no charge against people for not knowing that,

because it is quite human to talk in material things, but when dealing with personnel and know what the needs are, that is the point about it.

Personal requirements do not receive sufficient attention from this point of view. When a ship is authorized, of course the personnel should be authorized by Congress in sufficient time to have personnel recruited and trained. Now, I have spoken of that in my annual reports, and I think people are generally in accord with that idea now. It was not originated by me, but I brought it up in several places in the printed report, that a proper procedure should be, if it is possible to authorize the necessary enlisted personnel approximately two years before the estimated date of completion of the ships, where that can be done. Of course, the estimate of completion will change, but that two years was what I asked for, as it was a reasonable allowance for the time taken to recruit and train them.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what recommendations did you make prior to the war and during the first few months of the war to provide for the necessary personnel, with particular reference to the enlisted men; and also state whether the department did everything possible to assist the personnel bureau in these recommendations, or if not, in what particulars it opposed them.

Capt. PALMER. I do not know that I can——

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations did you make previously about the enlisted men?

Capt. PALMER. I do not know that I can give that in detail, but I have not all the papers on the subject. My recollection would cover a good many of the points, but I would not say that I could give all.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us in a general way?

Capt. PALMER. Let us see. Of course the first thing was to reorganize the bureau, to put that on a business basis that would produce the proper number of men and officers, that we were ordered to prepare. It did not take much time to organize the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. This was done prior to the war and during the first few months?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; it did not take much time to prepare. We started with simple organization principles, and we carried out that organization during the war. I have stated it in my annual reports here. We started the organization of the recruiting service, put it on a practical basis, so that we worked up from practically no enlistments, to a large number in January. We were gradually working up.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that date?

Capt. PALMER. Just roughly, in January. I have not any accurate dates on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Nineteen hundred and seventeen?

Capt. PALMER. Nineteen hundred and seventeen. Of course at that time war was not then an assured fact, and we did not have that incentive to make the young men come in. I think if they had known that war was really coming, they would have jumped in just as soon as they found it out, but it did not start immediately. It took some time to work up the recruiting districts. You know the recruiting districts which were under my bureau were spread

and these had to be increased largely in number.

In the month of January the recruiting service, which had been obtained in the whole year before, was due to the fact that they were not authorized in the year before. There was a certain limited amount allowed by Congress.

It was first organized to meet all those conditions. For instance in preparation. We got our Navy recruiting bureau in New York speeded up, and they did the recruiting and enrolling the assistance of the newspapers and periodicals all over the country. The newspapers and periodicals all over the country agreed to help us out and they gave us assistance. We recruited about everybody in the country who did come across. In fact, I do not know of anybody who did not help us, in the various activities of civil life. For instance, the amusement houses, the business people, the doctors, in fact, everybody without distinction of class. We also reaped the benefits of the work that was being done by officers and members of the Navy League all over the country who had been endeavoring to help us out on recruiting. It was not prominent at the time as far as coming to the aid of the Navy was concerned, but we reaped the results of their work. They were actively engaged in helping out the Navy.

We asked large cash sums to promote different works and when we were before the House Naval Committee asking for places to build barracks, we were told that there was somewhere on Long Island. I think Mr. Hicks was the one who began to look into those sites, because we had a place for the training station at Newport, which, of course, was a very poor place to expand it. However, I think those of the Navy League heard about our needs for barracks there and they began to furnish the money and build all the barracks that we needed. That was not done, because I think Mr. Hicks at about that time took up the subject with Newport and said that we were going to get the ground there, which was a very much better place for us to expand from a small place than to establish a new overhead by going to a new place.

Good many other people at this time I believed were beginning to get very soon, and so I speeded up all the activities. For instance, I changed, for instance, with the commander in chief of the fleet, while his force was still in West India, to have officers on each battleship in active training, so we should enter the war.

Do you remember when that was?

No, it was several months before the war started.

So that several months before the war started you knew that war was coming?

Yes. That is, I was certain as far as my belief that the war was coming.

What was your belief?

Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the belief generally in the department?
Capt. PALMER. That was the thing I was going on, in order to provide personnel, and that was the belief on which I acted. I came down here before the various committees on the proper thing that we required to put through. In that particular case, that was just an incident to show that there were several steps to be taken to push this thing; and that was the first definite step toward getting commissioned officers from enlisted men. We had not done that before, except through the ordinary course of events, but it was evident that we were so far behind in officers that we had to take some steps so I wrote to the commander in chief a confidential letter, because we could not state anything about getting into the war; but we knew we must have officers, and I wanted to start them and try it out, and all the officers in the fleet were anxious to get every enlisted man who had ability. They have always been that way, and they thought they could put it over. So they put men on watch, just took the officers off and put the enlisted men on watch, those who were capable, and they came across beautifully.

It was rather slow getting it started, but they had them then, and Admiral Mayo reported that the thing was an entire success. Although that was started by the bureau then, that was the original idea of mine, because officers had suggested that from time to time, and as far as that is concerned all the things that were done by the bureau during the war were really not original proposals. They had been suggested from time to time by officers who had been thinking about this.

Now, at that time I urged the listing of merchant ships under the American flag. This was along in December, I think, that I suggested that, so that we could enroll that personnel. That was the kind of personnel that we needed very much during the war, but we had nothing in the way of a merchant marine. We did not have sailors and navigators, as some of the other countries had.

The CHAIRMAN. This was in December, 1916?

Capt. PALMER. In December, 1916, before the war. We wanted to be able to employ those officers and such men of them as were capable.

Another important point about that was that we could enroll them, and if we had authority to enroll them, then we could start in training them and give them the necessary instruction as to naval matters, so that when war did start we would have that force prepared instead of having to do all the teaching afterward.

This matter of listing merchant ships was started. It was considered by naval operations to be most important, from our point of view, and I think we got them partially listed somewhere in January or February. That was one of the steps of preparation.

Now, in the printed hearings before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee on February 20, 1917, quoting a memorandum that was sent to the department at the time, it was shown that we would spend a great deal of money on shipbuilding. All our work in the Bureau of Navigation was based on the estimate that we believed the war would last for three years. Of course, that was simply our own estimate, in order to go ahead with work. Actually, in coming down to the details of the preparation of personnel we worked out a sheet which was good.

from the knowledge we had of the things that ought to be done, and from the orders we had from the Chief of Naval Operations, that we knew at any time where we were going to go, and how we were going to train it and where, at all our schools, training stations, and colleges, and just how we were going to take to deliver these men to the Navy, that is what the Chief of Naval Operations wanted us to do.

As the work, as it continued during the war, every activity of the Navy, whether afloat or ashore was carried out, certainly with a large number of officers and men. That is, we had the

men ready by the time the ships were ready to start; and that is not saying they were trained. They were not, as they could be in the time that had been given us.

As the work of the war activities, whether afloat or ashore, that officers that we had to start with in both the line and staff, and the few regular men we had to start with, were responsible for the wonderful work that was accomplished afterward, and expanded ten-fold, and while they were expanding and doing all these active things that were required for by the department.

WHELAN. Captain, what I want to find out is whether you made any recommendations to the department about preparing the necessary personnel to be used in the Navy?

PURVIS. Yes.

WHELAN. About enlisted men especially?

PURVIS. Well, I wanted to get in the enlisted men.

WHELAN. Whether you made direct recommendations to the department?

PURVIS. Oh, yes; I made direct recommendations to the department based on the knowledge of our great shortage of regular enlisted men for peace needs, at the beginning of the war. This, I was based on the instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations. I urged the department to do everything in their power to recruit of regular enlisted men.

WHELAN. Generally that the department did this. The Secretary of the Navy. He liked to see the members of the enlisted men that he spoke of it and wrote about it many times. He wanted the enlisted men come in. Of course, some of the difficulties in getting them in were very difficult for us, because at the beginning of the war, the Secretary would not let us employ regular enlisted men and we were so far short of men that we needed to have some stations to be able to recruit the men, and without regular enlisted officers and other men we could not recruit the regular enlisted men; that is, the delay in getting regular enlisted officers who were willing to come. I do not know whether that was not allowed, but I know it was not

WHELAN. They delayed you in getting the necessary enlisted men?

PURVIS. Yes. I will not say that that delayed us—that it was a delay in the war though. It delayed us in getting men to carry out our schemes, and, of course, it had something to do with the training of them.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in general, the Secretary approved plan of the increasing of the enlisted men?

Capt. PALMER. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how about officers? Did you make recommendations about increasing the officers?

Capt. PALMER. If I may finish on the subject of the enlisted first——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PALMER. As I understand it you want to know what I took, and whether I did my part of the job as well as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. No; we do not question that, Captain. You are not on trial. We simply want information about whether you are backed up by the department.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think what we want to get is the facts of them, not whether the facts reflect on anybody or commend anybody. We want commendatory facts if there are any, just as facts that reflect on anybody. That is the fair thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PALMER. I think I am open to as much criticism as anybody else on this, and if I did not do the things correctly, I think it is the time to bring it out.

The CHAIRMAN. But you yourself are not on trial in any way. Senator TRAMMELL. The defendant is absent to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that there is any defendant.

Capt. PALMER. It does not make any difference to me. I just like to mention here that in all this business I am very appreciative of the wonderful work that our naval officers and regular enlisted men did, to buck against all the obstacles they had, which, from my point of view, personally, were due to original shortage of personnel. I have never had the opportunity to say before how keenly appreciative I am of the wonderful work that these officers and men did; but I want to say that in addition to the regular service people in line and staff, when we got the reserves and militia and national naval volunteers and coast people, and the reserves of various classes, including the yeomen who helped us out so wonderfully during the early part of the war, they are deserving of just as much credit.

We got, during the war, of, course, a great many of the officers in. In fact, there were five retired rear admirals and the armed guard commanders who had been in my bureau for many years, and they came across beautifully; and they not only were thoroughly loyal in the way they did things, but they had the ability too. They showed up beautifully.

Now, I started schools, or rather I did not do it, but my officers, Commander Overstreet and Lieut. Bennett at the time were responsible for any good from those; they started schools and training camps and in colleges and technical schools in every part all over the country; and these schools were added to from time to time as the additional requirements came in for those things. I make a reference to the scope of these schools by referring to what they were, to show what the Navy was doing. They had courses for practically all trades, and that including courses for divers, electricians and radio men, carpenters, machinists, blacksmiths

... painters, bakers, cooks, stewards, hospital men, winch men, camoufleurs, musicians, voemen, signalmen, steel and concrete construction men, fitters, firemen, quartermasters, helmsmen, gyro-compass mechanics, lookouts, armed-guard crews, submarine boat men, hydroplane crews, kite and free balloon flying and mine-sweeping experts, paravane men, hydrophone specialists, aviators, aviator mechanics, etc.

Q. For any operations we were called upon for. That was the work of the bureau on that, and in addition to that of universities and technical schools and manufacturing plants and hotels and civilian organizations, all very busy themselves on this.

Q. Did you make recommendations about these dif-

ferences? Yes.

Q. Were those recommendations followed out?

A. At the training stations I gave instructions to the schools, and they carried them out. They were in line with the bureau's idea of what was necessary for the navy; and the bureau was able to keep hands off altogether. I delegated it to them, and they came up to the mark and de-

termined what other schools were concerned, where they were initiated, and at the training stations, at schools, we had a great deal of difficulty in getting them through. There was the question of whether we needed the people. I think it was all due to the fact that the department could not see the need of getting hold of them before and training them. They did not appreciate the need to train people for engineering duties, and so forth; and the general attitude of "Well, we can postpone that"; and we postponed it. I know how long it took to take these people through, and we could not postpone it; and we really had a great deal of difficulty in getting the schools through.

Q. When did you first take up the question of starting

A. Well, we started schools of one kind and another

Q. We took up that question with the department

A. Before the war was not declared. But my opinion

Q. Going in war; and there was another thing that

A. I thought, and that was that the office of naval opera-

Q. Well, we will probably have to do this, and that";

A. For me, going far enough back to get the men re-

Q. At that time so that I could deliver the goods when

A. The thing was that the general board had some paper

Q. Of Naval Operations sent to me, on which to base my

A. For work, and that paper said that the Bureau of

Q. I have the personnel ready within a week of the

A. The order was ordered. Of course you can not get the

Q. A week of the time, unless you have taken steps long

A. That was the point that I brought up to the department.

This was before the war, and during the war this was a common thing. There was just lack of appreciation of how long it takes to train people, how long it takes to build the barracks, and how long it started in order to carry out the instructions that came from the general board. To be prepared when the ships were compared with the personnel, I had to start long before.

Senator KEYES. Capt. Palmer, who had that lack of appreciation?

Capt. PALMER. Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, was the one with whom I was most closely associated on these things. That is my opinion of it. Mr. Daniels, as you know, wanted to have things done, and I know that he was badly worried on it in 1917. I could refer to his annual report and to his speeches, and I know as showing this, and I know that he was really delighted that things were done; but it is my impression that he did not—did not appreciate the needs as we saw them. I was charged with personnel business, and I had studied the thing carefully; not only I myself, but all my officers; and we were convinced that the steps were necessary for preparation in order to be able to carry out the chief of naval operations' orders to provide men in time. Of course the chief of naval operations frequently said, "It is going to be you will have to man so many ships of this kind, and you have to get the men for them." The important thing for me to know was when those men would be required; and in each case, operations required "We want them as soon as we can get them. We want to have them now, or within a few weeks." Of course I could not recruit men and train them and get barracks for a few weeks. So that, after one or two orders of that kind, and that operations could not have foreseen the need of, I decided it was up to me to be prepared for any operation they had. I took the responsibility of going ahead and working this organization into a production plant, keeping it up to peak load all the time so that I would be prepared for anything that came across.

The CHAIRMAN. And you took matters in your own hands and went ahead?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; I did. I did not do that, however, until I had exhausted every means to get the thing done. I think, in the whole thing was due to procrastination.

The CHAIRMAN. On the part of the Secretary?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. I was forced—

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary give you any reasons for delaying the carrying out of the plan?

Capt. PALMER. Well, no reasons, of course, that appealed to our people that were charged with personnel; they would say "We have too many reserves now. We don't want more."

The CHAIRMAN. This was within two or three months immediately preceding the war?

Capt. PALMER. And after the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And after the war had begun?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that we had too many reserves?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. That was due to a lack of appreciation of what was required in order to get the people together. On one hand, I had the office of Naval Operations stating that

—were to be started—and I knew that if I did not in time I would not be doing what I was ordered to do. I started with seeing that the personnel was provided in time; on the one hand I was pushed by Operations to get them, and on the other hand I could not make any headway with the department taking the steps necessary to take in order to get them. I took the subject of housing the men, and a good many things. I simply got the statement, after many trials and pressure, in its most forcible manner, "We have no appropriation and I think that was the correct statement. But still, they wanted me to do these things. They said, "We have the men at that time;" and this meant getting ready for each one of these things. So that when I came to the end I came to a stone wall on it, I decided it was best to take the steps necessary to deliver the men in the time, even if I did not have the appropriation or did not have the money.

BUCHANAN. One minute, Captain.

PALMER. Yes, sir.

BUCHANAN. In regard to appropriations, you have already said Congress was ready to appropriate anything that the department asked for?

PALMER. Yes, sir. I know the members of this committee. They will do anything we can for you, any time," and I felt that Congress would do anything the department asked; so I felt confident that if I took the responsibility of going around the law, in order to get the appropriations I had heard all the Senators and all the Representatives, statements of the people all over the country that they were fighting the war to the limit; and so I thought they meant it, and they meant it, and I thought there was no reason for not making an appropriation that would delay our works for months, the best thing would be to go ahead with it, to take such steps as I could go ahead with the thing.

arranged, for instance, with the captains of the training stations, particularly with the Great Lakes training station, and we came to the conclusion that the work could be done, and that we could go on without having full authority of Congress at that time, and by the time it could be presented to Congress the department we might be along a couple of months on these matters, and be just that much in advance, so that we would be able to put the men, for instance, in cold weather.

BUCHANAN. To say that the Congress did not come across that way. Before the Appropriations Committee and was asked whether they had heard that barracks were actually built at Great Lakes and some other places, and they asked whether I built without any money, and I told them that it was not true, that when I could not get authority to do it, when I asked the department to take the authority on that point, the question whether they should have taken it or not. There have been things that kept them from taking it, but when I did not take it, I went ahead, with the assistance of the men at the stations. And you probably all have heard of

the Great Lakes Station and the way it boomed ahead, but we had even at that station enough quarters for the men in the But we were very much further on to the required number than would have been had we delayed and waited on the appropriation.

Now, before that Appropriations Committee they mentioned that I had, in a way, taken the law into my own hands; but they also were very pleasant about it, showing that they approved, and they actually did approve all the expenditures.

The same thing happened before the House Naval Investigation Committee which investigated the war, I think some time in the latter part of 1917, and they note here in their report of investigations:

At the commencement of the war our training stations could only accommodate about 6,000 seamen; but the Chief of Navigation early assumed the responsibility of increasing the housing room at the various stations, and we now have various training stations barracks for more than 50,000.

That is, they approved the action taken in advance.

That is about all I can remember for the time on the subject of enlisted personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the enrollment of officers and the Reserve Force?

Capt. PALMER. As I said, that reserve law, you could do anything with it. The first thing was to get legal decisions on it. It took considerable time to do that. It was signed in the latter part of August, and it took a long time to do that; but it gave us authority to do anything we wanted, so that we got favorable decisions at a time, and started in enrolling. I sent some officers out to the Great Lakes district, for instance, to get hold of those officers and men who were seamen, and there were a few we had in the coast guard, seamen, who were tied up on account of the ice in the Great Lakes, and we actually got them before the war and sent them down to Admiral Mayo's fleet, and had quite a number of them down there.

But in January there was something appeared in the papers that we now had over 1,000 reserves, and I am not sure where it was published; but, at any rate, it was brought to the Secretary's attention, and he said that he wanted the enrollment stopped. He said, "We have got enough men now. We have got enough men for a year." Of course, we told him what our needs were, and that we did not have enough men; that we were just on a peace basis, and we were short about 1,600 reserve officers and 39,000 reserve men, and we ought to hump it along and enroll just as fast as we could and get these people in. He said, "No; I want it stopped."

The CHAIRMAN. Who said that he wanted it stopped?

Capt. PALMER. The Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that he wanted the enrollment stopped.

Capt. PALMER. Yes; and he gave the order that they should be stopped.

I would like to say that I had a talk with the Secretary just a few days ago, and the Secretary does not remember anything about it. He said, "I have no recollection of it." I told him some of the details that happened at the time. The Secretary asked me, "Can you produce the written order?" I told him that I could not; that it *might be there*. But he gave me the order directly, and told me

... and that was the first time. I mean, he frequently told me to stop. The reason he frequently told me to stop was to go ahead and get them.

Q. That was the first time he told you, and that was

A. The latter part of January.

Q. 1917?

A. Yes, sir. I do not remember the exact date, but it was very strongly impressed on my mind, because our object was getting officers and men and training them for the war; whether we could get the people in early; and I made the statement, as an argument, "Well, the ships are not ready, just wait until we get a little more information." But I knew they were going to be ready, and I knew that if they were ready we could not get the people started; so I made exceptions.

Q. That is, you did not stop the enrollments?

A. No, sir.

Q. Later on, after the war had started, did the Secretary order the enrollments stopped?

A. Yes, sir; they were ordered stopped—oh, I should say many times. But in the meantime—

Q. Up to about what time?

A. Oh, I should say—this is just a general guess, but about the latter part of 1917.

Q. The latter part of 1917?

A. Yes, sir; and it was done later, too; but, for instance, I was ordered by the department to prepare, or when we would have to prepare, for taking over all the merchant vessels. I knew that that would require more than six months before we would get anything of value; and later on we did get the order from them to man a sufficient number of ships, and they called for 222,000 officers and men. That was the order. And I had the machinery going so that we could use men by the time the ships were ready, all of them. They were the best trained men in the world, but they were not ready to do, and that was possible because we went ahead of them in time.

Q. At the close of the war, of the 500,000 men, substantially we had in the Navy, how many were in the reserves?

A. There were more men in the reserves than in the active service.

Q. When I left the bureau, which was the last day of the war, I think we had approximately 290,000 reserves.

Q. Practically 3 to 2?

A. Yes, sir; 290,000 reserves; and at that time we had about 100,000 active. Well, we had over 30,000 reserve officers. Now, just after we got those people and that they kept on going, the department was really pleased that it was done. I know we were often called on to give the number of officers and men, when the Secretary was to make a speech, and a question in my mind whether the storm would be after he found out that more men had been enrolled than at any last time; but in pretty nearly every case the Secretary went with the numbers. He was pleased with the figures.

that the barracks were built. He went out and inspected the Lakes, and he was delighted with the barracks, and I really think that everything that was done along that line was done so redound to the department's credit. In fact, so far as the end of reserves was concerned, and when it was ordered stopped time, I told Mr. Daniels, "Those people are going to save for the Navy. We can not afford to stop enrolling them." "We started with an initial shortage, and this will get us in a very difficult predicament." If we had been required, of course, to go into the war with a single enemy on the 6th of April, 1917, we would not have been able to take any of the officers and men on the ships which would be required to go into the area of operations and engage in actual battle. I could not have induced anyone to let me get them off the ships; and therefore it would have been impossible for us to do any of that training. I want to say that the conditions were very favorable so far as the conditions of this particular war are concerned, and we ought not to make conclusions because we won out on that proposition we could win out again if we had to go right out and fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary ever criticize you for not carrying out his orders; or did he ever talk to you about the fact that he had not done so??

Capt. PALMER. Well, the Secretary sent for me several times on the subject. In fact, I was in the Secretary's office at least three times each day. This was all, generally, in regard to the designation of a man or an officer, or something like that, which I wanted to ask about. He said, "I told you to stop the reserves, but it has not been done. Now, I want to see the order about stopping the reserves"; and he wanted them stopped. Pretty soon he found out that some one was in some place, and he would ask me about it. I would say, "Mr. Secretary, we had to go ahead. We had these people and those people." And I said, "We got the word from the Operations and we simply had to go ahead." Well, the general idea was, "Well, don't get any more." That was the general idea.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had not done so, the Navy could not have performed the signal service during the war that it did perform.

Capt. PALMER. It could not have done anything, sir. It could not have done anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Capt. Palmer, can you tell me anything about the plan to shorten the course at the Naval Academy?

Capt. PALMER. Well, yes, sir; I can. I was very much interested in that. It all comes back to the shortage at first. I took the question of increasing the number of men there, and Congress was always willing to do that; and I took up the question of reducing the course from four years to three years for such a period as might be necessary to provide the necessary officers for the three-year training program. Even if we reduced the course to three years, that is what we could do, as far as graduates of the Naval Academy was concerned, we were to be in 1921 still shy about 500 officers.

Now various people had different opinions on that, and the opinion of the Secretary was that the course should be increased. In fact, that was what he said time and again. He said, "My idea is that we should increase the course to five years." I was not in accord

I was in accord with keeping it at four years provided it could be done, and I think every officer felt that way about it, but it could be done; but we were face to face with the conviction of a shortage of officers, which meant continued lack of efficiency due to that shortage, and I think they all agreed that we should reduce it to three years. At any rate I know that the Chief of Naval Operations said that he believed it, and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Admiral Eberle, believed it, and I felt so important that I talked with the Secretary time and again but he said he did not believe it, he did not want it.

CHAIRMAN. This was immediately preceding the war?

MR. PALMER. That was when I first started in. This was to get the three-year building program on a peace basis, in order to make the program a live one. I think I mentioned that in my first report of October 10, 1916. On page 4 of that report I said:

—

is the great shortage of officers—

was necessary by Congress to make the completed program a live one.

discussed in that and in the memorandum to the department for officers. That was really much more important than for men, because it takes so much more time to train an officer. I stated that the output of the Naval Academy should be for a limited period, returning to normal conditions when shortage of officers had been made up.

then stated:

In this recommendation in this report the bureau recommends that the appropriate each Senator and each Member of the House of Representatives should that the course at the Naval Academy be reduced to three years until shortage is made up, and that the present first class be graduated on April 1, 1917.

That was a measure that was necessary in my mind, and in view of the officers who were attached to the department at that time to prepare for our three-year building program that we had given us. I said:

of primary importance in order to properly meet the wishes of Congress to the first arm of defense as expressed in the large program provided

in my statement in my regular annual report, October 10,

Secretary was against that. He was against the reduction of the course. He was looking along the educator's line, which was for him to do, and I was looking along the line of the needs of the Navy, and it was a question which was the right step.

I wanted the young officers from the academy to come out in better condition, so before I put this proposition up I got the President of the Naval Academy to go over this thing, the Chief Educator, and I got him to tell me what he thought. He took up a course and said that by modifying certain of the courses and speeding up during certain parts of the year he could do it. Also, since the war was coming on, he felt perfectly confident that the increased incentive of war would make the midshipmen hard enough to get away with a four-year course in three years, which was actually the case.

In addition we had precedents in regard to that. Several had been graduated before their time, and I got a list of the ones taken at random, who had been graduates of those classes, and I made an argument to show the Secretary that we still could get good officers when it was necessary to take a strenuous step and reduce the length of the course for any purpose, and that I regarded this time as much more important than previous times. I got a list of fifty officers, and I had it ready for the Senate committee. There were five from each class for instance, taken at random, and the Secretary happened to be one of them at the time, a very able officer, and the others were all about the same.

I took this thing up again in my hearings before the House Committee on December 5, 1916, and again as appears in the proceedings before the Senate committee on February 20, 1917. On February 20, the time of February 1, when I wanted these officers graduated, had already passed, and as the war clouds seemed to be approaching very much nearer, it was still more important to get them out, because we were so short of officers to start the war.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the length of the course finally reduced?

Capt. PALMER. The Secretary said that he did not agree with it and he would never listen to it. I told him Admiral Benson was for it and Admiral Eberle, and that practically all the officers who had been talking on the subject were for it. He said, "Well, I am for it," and he would not listen to further argument about the matter as far as the Navy was concerned. I think he was just wedded to the educational value of the four-years' course, and I think it was quite right for him to be so in ordinary times; but when I went before the Senate committee they put it in the bill, and when the Secretary saw it incorporated in the bill, he said that that was dead again, and that I should not have gone down to the Senate committee on that.

The CHAIRMAN. That was February 20?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. I told the Secretary that I had authority from him to go; that I had one not down without the authority which he had given for the chiefs of bureaus to go before the committees and say what they thought was best for the Navy; that I acted on that authority, and my responsibility in the case, as far as of the bureau only, was such that I ought to present it, and therefore I did present it. He told me then that he was dead against it, and that he would try to knock it out, and I think it was a mistake in regard to the number of years that this should stand; but at least it gave us a start, and I knew that if we got it started, the course of the war would show that it was absolutely necessary to continue it, even if they had not thought so before. But Congress passed it through, and later I remember the Secretary spoke about it in some of his speeches at the academy, or in his talk to the people, and that these young men had come out and developed in a fine way by this intensive course of three years at the academy.

The CHAIRMAN. If the plan had been adopted in December instead of in February, would you not have had available a considerable number of officers in the first part of the war?

Capt. PALMER. Well, no, sir, we would not have had any officers available the first part of the war if it had been adopted in December, before the war, instead of in February, but we

ready, and in training as actual officers afloat. The Chief of Naval Operations said must be put before the war, for mobilization. In fact, that was our troubles just before the war, that we were not in the mobilization plan. Now when I speak of mobilization I do not mean the board matter of mobilizing the country and so forth, such as they had abroad, but that thing that would get the ships together. The Government wished to have them, wherever the Chief of Operations wanted to have them, and put them on a war plan rather than on a peace organization. To do that I wanted more officers, and for that reason I wanted to get more officers, to put them in places where active service was withdrawn and sent to sea. I wanted to get them from the post graduate Naval Academy the post graduate course, not the first year, and I wanted to get that first Naval Academy class. There were 170 men in it, and when you are very short of men that way. With those people we could have put the mobilization as far as our allowance of personnel was concerned, but we have been required to shift officers and men from one kind of ship to another kind of ship simply to get on the war plan instead of the peace plan. The reserve force were required to be put in the active force. The active ships were being sent to yards for some reason, and meant taking the officers off the active ships.

Q. Captain, what were your instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations regarding officers abroad for Admiral Sims's staff?

A. Admiral Sims had gone abroad, as far as I knew, to get information and bring it back to the Navy Department and know what plans to work on. That was my instruction. I did not know whether that was it or not, but at any rate I went to the Chief of Naval Operations and went over as a staff officer.

Q. The Chief of Naval Operations had told me that he would not allow for him submitting direct requests for personnel from some of his assistants and subordinates, when they were going through, would say, "Now we must have this," and then come down and talk to us about it and say, "We want that officer." There were a great many requests, and to get them together Admiral Benson said, "I am going to tell the people in my office to the effect that all requests must come through me." So all the requests from Admiral Sims were sent by cable and letter to the department. Q. You were called on by Operations to put 20 ships, 200 tugs, 100 Ford boats, merchant vessels, and there were hundreds of things, the armed forces, and we provided the personnel as best we could for operations. We did not get an order to send a lot of people abroad to Admiral Sims, but I knew that for Capt. Pratt frequently, and I knew that from the people up in Operations. I heard later that it was not through some of the officers in Opera-

tions, possibly through Capt. Pratt himself—he said, “We ought to get some people over there to Sims. Can’t you do something for us?” Well, whenever such a request as that came in, we sent it up and I got the detail officer, who was Capt. Laning, or Commander Baldrige, and asked them what they could do, and invariably they could get people if Operations were willing to give them up for some other activity. At any rate we went as far as we could in giving them, but the request did not come to us from Admiral Benson except later on in the war when he sent personal requests, and in the war also Operations began to send down the carbon copies of those cablegrams. I do not think they were prepared to do so earlier in the war, because, as you may remember, we did not have any clerks and we were scattered all over the city in dozens of places and I think it was probably very difficult for Operations to have any work just up to date. It got very much better when we supplied them with the yeowomen as clerks, and I think it was after that that we used to get carbon copies of the cablegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. At substantially what date was that?

Capt. PALMER. I think it was somewhere along in the latter part of 1917, but we did not get any orders from Operations to send people over, except when they definitely said, “We want such and such a person sent,” and then we always sent him. I remember that Admiral Sims asked by name for a good many people from Admiral Benson’s office, but Admiral Benson felt that it was necessary to keep them there. I remember Admiral Sims later asked for a name for an officer in my office, and I did not let him go. I thought it was best to keep him in my office, because he was in charge of some important work from my viewpoint—that is, the supplying of personnel on the big expansion that was required. But later on an officer went over and the Chief of Naval Operations sent several of his officers over to Admiral Sims.

I am not very clear about any of the dates there, because I did not keep any files. When I left the bureau in October, 1918, I did not take any files with me. My recollection is that later on he sent the officers that he required and also the enlisted men that he required.

As far as enlisted men were concerned, the department was responsible for his not getting enlisted men. I was responsible for that. I did not know that he had not gotten the number of enlisted men until it was brought out here the other day, and I was then questioned on that. We got the enlisted men to him as soon as we could get them trained, with the kind of a start we had, and I do know that the reserve and enlisted men for the destroyers that went to Queenstown were sent as soon as they possibly could have been sent, with all the activities that the Chief of Naval Operations directed us to perform in putting ships in commission from day to day. With all those activities it required a great many enlisted men, so that they could not be gotten together and trained in time. All this had to do with things before the war, preparation, training stations, etc. But at any rate, when the enlisted men got over there I know that they did not have the barracks ready for the number we sent. However, that is so only——

The CHAIRMAN. But so far as it was concerned during the first months of the war, when Admiral Sims was calling for officers on

As far as the Bureau of Navigation was concerned, if the operations had been willing to send them over, you could not get the men?

Yes. We could have provided them by taking them from the places provided Operations said, "You can do so." They were the most important activities; and I think at that time decided, "We can not afford to take these places."

Now you say, however, there was one officer sent over?

Yes; Lieut. Commander Daniels—now Commander—mentioned in reading Admiral Sims' statement, that he was sent on April 30. Our detail officer in Operations came to me and he said, "I was just up in Operations, and I saw a man Sims asking for Daniels, and I have already ordered Operations asks you about this, you can say he is already on his way." That was Commander Daniels. He was

as an aide, and he did go over with the destroyers. In good many of those cases it was difficult to get space and officers and men, but Commander Daniels did go over in the game. I think Admiral Sims's testimony received word on April 30 that Daniels had been sent; our detail officer also picked up an officer from the mine force; I think it was, a radio officer or communication officer; sent out of the mine force at the same time, and they went over there. I think they made use of him at Queens-
 He was free, for instance, temporarily; Commander was temporarily free, and then we would hear something Sims had said that he wanted some officers, and we would send those that was available, without saying anything to me. I had taken that up to Operations, they would have said, "Send him if you can." When the second batch of

over we sent five officers that they could use with
 As far as the personnel was concerned, we had, I think, as much a personnel as it was possible to have. They went when they went over there. They had five regular officers and crew. This number was greater than the number of officers that the British had in their destroyers, according to reports that were brought back. In fact, we got word that the British destroyers had but two regular officers, and that the others were made up of reserves. So that it is that our personnel over there was as fine as it could be; we did not have a great fund of regular officers to draw on for any of the activities, because we started with a total line officers, and they had to expand to ten times as many; one officer had to fill the place of 10.

What instructions did you get from the department permitting enrollments or promotions on the other

Well, there was an order for no enrollments on the other side. I am generally in accord with that idea. That is, I think that we should go over there and take any one who was fit himself. The idea was that we here on this side had the personnel there was available, and we could send it over as practicable, as soon as it had some training; but

there were other considerations. The department took the right at first that we should not have any enrollments abroad; I think that general stand was good. But then came the request for definite numbers of people. "We must have them for this and that because we have not any regular officers right here." We kept turning those requests. I did not get those requests; they did not come to me until a good deal later, because all of the personnel went to Operations, and I do not remember just whether Operations took that up or not, or whether they knew the department had laid down the general policy that there should be no enrollments and took no steps along that line.

For instance, when they had the investigation as to what the department had done in regard to giving Admiral Sims the backing up in personnel abroad I was called before that committee and they asked me if I knew that Sims did not have the personnel that he asked for. This was before the House Naval Investigation Committee in 1917, the latter part of the year. I told the committee there that I did not know about that, for all the orders about personnel came to Operations; but that I had received a letter from Admiral Sims shortly before that, saying that as far as he was concerned, the bureau was doing very satisfactory work. He did not mention his shortage to me; but of course it was quite proper for him to send his recommendations to his chief direct.

At that time I did not know that the department had sent a telegram to Admiral Sims asking him about what was the condition of his personnel, and I did not know that the reply came from the department. I did not know anything about that until that in the hearings the other day. Although that was a personnel subject it did not come to me. Admiral Sims either wrote or dictated to Capt. Pratt, and Capt. Pratt told me, or some armed guard told me, that he was just in the most urgent need for six dozen officers in his place at London. I am rather inclined to think that Capt. Pratt told me about it, but I am not sure, because he did not mention the fact that we had better send so and so over to him and in every case where we had the authority to do it we did it. In any rate, we had the order out about enrollments, and the Secretary did not want to enroll anybody abroad, and even in that case that later on another letter came over about it, and then I decided, as I told the Secretary a few days ago, that it was a necessity, and I gave an armed guard officer the necessary enrollment blanks not for the 6 that Admiral Sims asked for, but for 12, because I thought maybe he might want to open it up a little bit more. But the general principle of enrollments abroad still existed, and I think the general principle was right; but I think it was also right that we should send over a few when he made that urgent appeal for the personnel thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You did send over enrollment blanks, so that they could enroll them on the other side?

Capt. PALMER. They were enrolled.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was not under the orders of the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir. Now, about promotions abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. How about promotions abroad?

Q. The promotions abroad the department is not responsible for those—or the lack of promotion—of the personnel and I got requests from all over these important operations that we had, in all parts of the country, and in each case they had most of the officers and trained officers; all of them had that; so to size up the situation and consider all the requests. I thought that the people closest to him were most concerned, and I think they were, from each man's point of view. I thought I had the only officers in the Navy in my hands. I wanted to make them all admirals, and I think everybody was about it, and the only reason they felt that way was that the officers were doing just wonderful work against odds. It was a one-person-win-the-war business; it was the whole thing as a team.

A. The reserve officers, the reserve law, as I have said, was a thing to interpret, and things did not get along for a considerable length of time. We had no persons in the different districts of these people; so that, for instance, their records giving dates were months behind at the beginning of the war. I had no officers there to do it. And the promotion business, it came up not immediately but later on, and I think we did not do better in promotions. I think that I could; that is,

A. I think I could have done better in promotions if I had been a little earlier, but I had a good many calls for a great many important things than promotions, and the promotions were class 1 and 3, which took in a great number of the men of the fleet, were approved by all concerned—both sides.

Q. The other classes were class 4, who were coast defense people, and class 5, really, and class 5, for flying officers.

A. For coast defense people, it was necessary for us to adopt a plan for promotions and not allow any particular place to establish a plan, and I think that is what we are doing now. I may be wrong, but I think head-on we should adopt that, so that all forces would get an equal chance. Promotions should not be made on various bases. I think there is much comment about the fourth class either. In the flying corps, Admiral Sims made a recommendation. I think he mentioned at that time two of them who had done German planes, and one of them who had done just about the same, but had not quite accomplished what he was intended to do through no fault of his own, and I have forgotten their names. Some of them, I think, were for advancement. They would be in a better administrative position. But all of them were very young, and I did not get out a good plan of promotion until along in July, 1918. You will remember that many of them were not in the war very long at that time. Promotion was really a secondary thing, from my point of view at that time, and I felt that as we would get along towards the end of the war a great stress should be placed on that, so that we should give all these people their just dues before they left the service. I worked out a plan of promotion for class five officers, for young officers in aviation, and I only made it out for the first few, and it would give them something

to look forward to. That plan was for more rapid promotion came to any other class, but it was not in active operation the war nor in the middle of the war. It was only late in that that plan was in active operation.

And the principal thing, I think, Admiral Sims desired was able to give the men promotion on the field, as he spoke of a man does an heroic thing—brings down a plane or something of that kind—to give him promotion on the field. I admit that was a good viewpoint, but mine was different, and the department was responsible for this. I felt that knowing the conditions about the number of heroic acts that were being done day after day, the number of men that had brought down 5, 10, and 20 planes actually to their credit, and were still either enlisted men or officers, the principle of promotion for heroic deeds was not the one; that promotion to a higher grade should be for qualification in that grade after comparison with other officers, and not for heroic duties. We can find a great many men who are very brave but have no ability beyond that. So that I felt that if we promoted a man on the field for an act of heroism of that kind, we might promote him the next week for an act really as brave, and other men were doing that week after week, and our total limit of promotion was to the rank of lieutenant commander. I thought that recognition should have been given by appropriate medals, but as medals were not available, by letters of appreciation until such time as the medals could be given. So that, on that subject of promotion, the department is not responsible. I am responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that Admiral Sims's testimony was that his officers had very low rank who were connected with him.

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In order that they might have proper dealing with—

Capt. PALMER. Foreigners.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Officers of similar position to our Allies.

Capt. PALMER. Well, that was very much discussed at the time between officers in all services. Our limits, you see, were lieutenant commander, and during the first year of the war we were allowing lieutenants in the reserve. Lieutenant commander was then a rank which would correspond to the most expert duties along certain lines. I remember, for instance, it was given to Mr. Daniels to Mr. Vandyke, for instance—lieutenant commander then for administrative people all along. And Mr. Daniels was then to Mr. Osborn, whom he had in charge of the naval prison, he considered him the foremost in his line; and that was the reason the lieutenant commander's rank—to give it to the leading men. As to the value of rank with the foreigners, it is really an interesting thing; but you could see that our officers—commanders, ensigns, lieutenants—were conferring all the time with people like admirals and admirals in foreign navies, and we could never hope to get anything like that, because the law of Congress would not go beyond lieutenants, and not until the last half of the war lieutenant commanders. They had the same trouble here in the United States, but the ranks were apportioned in accordance with the ability of the people to carry out certain technical duties. That point was

bureaus came to the Secretary and asked for technical men ranks in the bureaus. That was just before the war in the first months of the war.

They were at their wits' end to get the proper people and did not have any officers, and they could get very few on the outside who were worth \$10,000 or more, and to come into the Navy with the rank of lieutenant commander called for a pay, I think, of \$3,000 a year plus allowance.

They could get in that way men that they could not get outside for from \$7,000 a year up. In fact, I remember one bureau, that of Construction and Repair, made an estimate of the men that they really needed of that kind in the early part of the first months of the war, and they showed that they needed approximately 70 or 80 high-class men at a total cost of \$250,000, whom they could get just by giving them ranks of lieutenant commander at \$3,000 and lieutenants at \$2,000.

They showed that it would be a great saving. But the Secretary did not want to let them in. He said he did not want to encourage people to come in the department. Of course they could not do that business, and we did not have the money in the country. That was one bureau that submitted a request, and they also said that if the war kept on they would need a much greater expansion. Now, I do know that all this came together, time after time again, with the Secretary, and the great necessity for these technical men to give them and therefore get them, because they knew that they were losing all sorts of other organizations, in the Army and other departments, everywhere, and that they would be lost to us in a very large percentage at the time; but we never got them in any large cases. I know, for instance, in the Bureau of Construction and Repair they wanted to have 70 or 80 of these high-class men, but we got only a few, later on, after a great delay.

Q. Now, Captain, can you tell me what plan of operations was given you by the department, or by the Chief of Naval Operations, on which to base in logical manner your general future assignments of personnel to different forces?

A. I did not quite understand the question.

Q. What plan of operations, if any, was given to the department or the Chief of Naval Operations on which to base assignments, your general future assignments, of personnel in a manner, to different forces?

A. Oh, well, we had no plan. We had only a mobilization plan which was a sheet stating the vessels which would be mobilized. That was gotten up by the Office of Naval Operations, but we had no definite plan on which to base our assignments.

Q. I could not go on the plan that we were going to have a battle-ship warfare or a submarine warfare or anything of that kind. I could not look far enough ahead and specialize on that.

A. As regards numbers and duties; but I did receive orders from time to time. They said "We will have to have 10 ships here probably within a month"; or the next time they said "We must have trawlers"; probably had to have 20 trawlers.

Q. And another time it would be, "We are going to have mine force business now, and we want to have the

vessels ready on a certain date." Of course the mine force is a large organization, and the transport force was another that was a very large organization; the ships that we required to take the Army, and later to bring the Army back. I must say they were a fine lot, too. The Navy takes off its hat to the Army on the men they sent over there, and the way they looked and the way they acted. They were splendid. We had various calls of them from time to time, and in each case, when I would say, "We want these to be ready," they would say, "Oh, we want them as soon as you can possibly get them; in fact, in a month or two months." Just ordinarily the training of any people, equipping them, and so forth, and getting barracks ready for them, that can be done in two months to speak of.

The CHAIRMAN. But was there any general plan in the department under which all the bureaus could cooperate together, and which was to be followed out throughout?

Capt. PALMER. Not that I know of, sir. Not in my bureau. We did not get anything of that kind. In fact, we had simply an order from the general board which said that we should be prepared to furnish in a week after the order the personnel. We had no plan. I understood, though, that a plan was being prepared in Operations, and I went up and asked for it several times—that is, an estimate of the situation and what we were to do, because it was very valuable for me to have such a plan so that I could place the personnel in a logical way, and endeavor to train them; but I was told that there was a plan in process, and they were getting one at that time. That was just before the war. And I heard again that it was being drawn up during the last months of the war. But I did not get that plan. I do not know whether it was actually gotten out or not; but I understand that the thing that affected personnel was some letter, which was mentioned in Capt. Laning's hearing yesterday, something about personnel which showed the priorities of ships in August; that is, which ships were to have the call for personnel; that is, whether they were to be battleships or destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any orders about priority of personnel?

Capt. PALMER. Not until that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What time was that?

Capt. PALMER. I do not remember what date that was. July or August.

The CHAIRMAN. 1918?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir; 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. 1917?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. But, of course, that was not the only plan we could go on in personnel. We had already established our own priorities. Since I found that there was not any such as I expected them to have; that is, I had been led to believe from the War College course up there—which I have not had the opportunity to take yet, but I had been led to believe—that the thing would generally have a plan drawn up for the personnel situation which existed at the time, and say what you are to do. "Each force is to prepare this and prepare that," and so I thought there would be such a plan. But when I found that there was not, and we could not get a definite order of the kind, I went ahead

To be sure, that is not a very good way to do, but I did not have the information which should have been available to try to work out any plan. I established my own priorities, but that really was a very small part of it. I established the priorities which the department got out later on, of July and August. But I remember one thing that was, I wanted to know enough about the war to believe I could make use of personnel on battleships to train others. Of course, we were short on personnel right at the start. I asked Operations if they could give me any probable areas which our battleships would not be actively required to go for actual fighting, and I was told they could not. "Can you give me six months?" "No." Just in that case I did not feel justified in saying, "Well, you can go on the assumption that they will not go in action for six months, or one year." There was the cry always to have the battleships ready for action, of course, if they were to be ready for anything. But, of course, take people off of them to train others; I worked out in my own bureau, with my own planning and my own bureau, a scheme for making use of the officers that were in order to do that I had to establish some definite assumptions of which was, I made the assumption that the active fleet would not be required to take active part in actual operations of the war zone within six months.

That was a decision which was made without adequate basis. It just happened that they were not called in that time to adopt something, so that I took that plan and then I took off 6 officers from the 36 or 34 out of the actual fleet and then put them in to train other people for the enormous expansion in the other activities. In fact, the battleships were training people all the time. Every ship afloat was a training ship for the destroyers afterwards on the other side. But taking 10 officers off of the battleships when they could not have had enough officers, was a very important step. I did not have been able to do it at all if I had not come to Admiral Mayo and gotten his cooperation. He took the view of the situation, and I think it shows just what he is. I explained to him what I thought were the requirements and the great expansion we needed for forces everywhere. He would have been perfectly justified in saying, "Well, I am going to keep the battleships of the Atlantic Fleet, and we are going to keep the personnel, and I am going to keep them"; and I believe that stand I could not have gotten them. But he took the whole situation from a broad viewpoint, and he said, "I think it is not best for me, for my battleships, for the way we have got to win this war." So that, I took the officers, one at a time; and the captains rightfully I think I would have made a great deal more objection if they did; and they did object and persisted in their objection at the same time they went to the job. They said, "We are in order, and we will deliver the goods"; and they did. That was a step that I had to take on the assumption that

about two years to train a recruit so that he will an ordinary war's man, and 10 years to train officers, you can see that not have any more trained men than we had in the beginning.

Senator TRAMMELL. You provided them and they had at least sufficient training to meet the situation?

Capt. PALMER. To get the ships going. I do not mean they would meet the situation in the most efficient way, by any means, but they were the best under the circumstances, with the amount of time given for training. They trained them intensively at all places, and they did very fine work.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I wanted to get at was, were they sufficiently trained and equipped to get the desired results?

Capt. PALMER. It would be pretty hard to tell, Senator. That in specific cases we had people—for instance, Admiral Sims—that a certain bunch he had on little yachts or trawlers, I have gotten which, over on the French coast, were very inefficient. I think he used the words, "Their inefficiency was deplorable." I have forgotten whether it was on yachts or trawlers; some vessels. But, at any rate, I would not be sure that he was not in that. I do not know about the actual adjectives in the case. I think there were a good many cases where there was a good deal of inefficiency among the organizations, that is, I mean among individuals in organizations.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, would not that apply to some people in the regular Navy? Would it not apply to some particular individual connected with any man's staff? Some particular individual connected with your bureau, for instance, might not measure up to the highest standard?

Capt. PALMER. I will agree with you on all except my belief. [Laughter.]

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what I thought.

Capt. PALMER. Oh, yes——

Senator TRAMMELL. I did not mean to reflect on anybody, but human nature and the frailties of human nature and the accomplishments and achievements of human nature run throughout the world just as through any ordinary, everyday bunch of men; that is the point I am making.

Capt. PALMER. That is exactly right.

Senator TRAMMELL. But the broader point is, taking it as a whole, did not the men that you provided accomplish results?

Capt. PALMER. I should say that the results accomplished by the Navy were perfectly wonderful during this war. I would say that they were accomplished in spite of the obstacle of not having the best people to start with, and having a short time to train, and the newness in the war. I think the results were wonderful.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is my opinion. I would not pick out some isolated case of some fellow that made a failure, and cite that as the precedent for the Navy or for the reserve forces.

Capt. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would take it into consideration as a whole.

Capt. PALMER. I know what a fine showing our battleships, for instance, and our destroyers, made. In fact, all the commendations we have seen in the papers and in books, bear that out; and Ad-

instance, speaks of the wonderful lot of men we had on board, and that they were ready for anything. Also Admiral [redacted] about his people in the battleship force in the North Atlantic. I know we have occupied a very high position with the [redacted] Fleet. I could mention also the mine forces; I could mention all the forces.

Q. TEAMMELL. I believe you stated you began to take [redacted] to the enlargement of the Navy, and looking [redacted] of the Navy, very shortly after you went into [redacted] Navigation office in 1916, did you not?

A. YES. Yes, sir; I undertook activities; I undertook to [redacted] Yes, sir; I did.

Q. TEAMMELL. Was that restricted alone to the bureau with [redacted] connected or did that same activity go in the Bureau of Operations, I believe you call it?

A. PALMER. Yes, sir. Senator, I do not want to put in anything out of my own bailiwick. I could only give [redacted] as far as anything else is concerned. I know that Admiral [redacted] associates stated to me, "We know this is a big job [redacted] personnel is concerned because we have not any to start [redacted] would like to help you." That was the attitude of [redacted] and all his officers, and I must say that they helped [redacted] Bureau of Navigation did any good work, it was because [redacted] Operations helped.

Q. TEAMMELL. I presume in providing personnel and trying [redacted] men to meet the situation, that you would not have been [redacted] Operations had not been making some preparation [redacted] additional craft for the utilization of those men. It [redacted] the merest folly to have been doing that?

A. YES. No, sir; I would not have made any preparation [redacted] the data on which to go about the number of ships. [redacted] mobilization sheet on which I worked.

Q. TEAMMELL. They did have a mobilization sheet on which [redacted]

A. YES. Yes, sir. That was providing for vessels that we [redacted] regard to my future operations of supplying men [redacted] vessels in the Navy, the kinds that would be with them [redacted] would be with them in the mobilization. Of course [redacted] ready so far as the mobilization was concerned [redacted] were ready. In fact some of our greatest troubles [redacted] stations were because we could not send men that we [redacted] them on the ships on the mobilization dates. [redacted] were not ready, a certain number of them, so we [redacted] stations congested and that meant there was difficulty [redacted] those men and getting them properly housed.

Q. TEAMMELL. It is very evident from your testimony that [redacted] information on which to equip as best you could [redacted] of time a sufficient number of men to meet the [redacted] different vessels and in other different places [redacted] was required, at the time that it was required?

A. YES.

Q. TEAMMELL. You had sufficient information to do that before [redacted] that.

Capt. PALMER. I had sufficient information, not in regard to details of them, but I went on and worked the Navy to getting all officers and all men of all kinds as soon as I could.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, there has been more or less said the question of the general plan. What if a general plan for the war and carrying out the conduct of the war so far as was concerned had been made in January, 1916? Would the subsequent developments during the war have justified the carrying out of a plan in detail?

Capt. PALMER. I should say that any plan of the kind would have had to be modified here and there, but I should say also that a plan might have been made looking toward, for instance what the character of the war was from the information that could have been accumulated from the two previous years that the foreign countries were in war.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you not think that those things were taken into consideration in the manner of making preparation in the matter of ships and different equipment and also in the question of mobilizing the personnel? Do you not think that that had something to do with it?

Capt. PALMER. That plan that they had?

Senator TRAMMELL. That was an element of consideration.

Capt. PALMER. Well, I should think so; but, of course I could not get the benefit of any of that because my instructions from operations were from day to day, "We think we are going to do this," the next day or the next week, "We have to shift from this to that." For instance, they would say, "Here, we want so many more officers, aviators on these ships, or we want armed guards, we want to provide for two of the new ships, and for the armed crews on them," and the next time would be the establishment of a patrol force, and really nothing I could go on as to picking up a kind of men or doing anything—

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you not think that the developments that they were developing rapidly day by day would have a great deal to do with it?

Capt. PALMER. Very much.

Senator TRAMMELL. You spoke of the armed guards. It was not until February that Germany declared that there was going to be an unrestricted submarine campaign.

Capt. PALMER. That could not have been foreseen.

Senator TRAMMELL. That could not have been foreseen, and no definite policy could have been formed, when the Germans did adopt the unrestricted submarine policy until February.

Capt. PALMER. The necessity for armed guards came out of a clear sky.

Senator TRAMMELL. The submarine menace did not reach its height until July, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. April.

Senator TRAMMELL. It did not reach its height until July, 1917, according to the chart filed by Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. There were 800,000 tons of shipping sunk in April, which was the highest number.

Senator TRAMMELL. But its height was not reached until July. There might have been a greater number at some previous time.

er did not begin to fall off until after July 1. I am going to file by Admiral Sims. I do not know whether it is or not. I presume that it is reasonably so. So a general might have been made in December, 1916, or January, and have proved totally inadequate to have met the situation developed?

PALMER. It might.

MR. TRAMMELL. Was there such delay on the part of the Navy during its part of the war after we entered the war as to the war for any great length of time, in your opinion?

PALMER. Well, it would be just an opinion. I do not know if it prolonged the war. I should say—I can give an opinion as far as my personnel is concerned, I mean that it would be nothing I am qualified to talk on—I should say that all those delays were simply due to postponement—well, I guess "postponement" would be the word—and when I found things to be done after taking every step I could, I went ahead and did it as far as personnel so we did not really have many delays, as far as personnel was concerned, on winning the war, on the total thing.

But I say that we had a week's delay or a month's delay as far as the Bureau of Navigation was concerned. But I do not know the general plan.

MR. TRAMMELL. I believe you stated that you did begin preparing in 1916 to enlarge and increase the efficiency and strength of the Navy?

PALMER. Yes, sir.

MR. TRAMMELL. Congress passed a law in August, 1916, providing a considerable increase, did it not?

PALMER. August 29 they passed a splendid bill, a splendid

MR. TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not the Secretary of the Navy was in sympathy with that measure?

PALMER. I think he was fully in sympathy with that measure, in my impression. I would not like to speak for him, but I think he was fully in sympathy with it.

MR. GLENN. I think that is all, Capt. Palmer. You may be

At 12.45 o'clock p. m. the subcommittee adjourned (Friday, March 26, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a.m. in the Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding. Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.
CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Taussig, please the stand?

EXHIBIT OF CAPT. J. K. TAUSSIG, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

CHAIRMAN. Capt. Taussig, can you give the committee any information as to the steps that were taken by the Navy Department during and conducting activities in the recent war, and especially regard to the personnel of the Navy and the destroyer force, and will you please state what duties you performed from the beginning of the World War in 1914 up to the present time, showing the same for observation, and stating in your own way your knowledge of any matters pertinent to this investigation?

TAUSSIG. I will, sir. I have a prepared statement which, with permission of the committee, I will present.

CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TAUSSIG. The following duty was performed by me just prior to the beginning of the World War:

Assistant to officer in charge of enlisted personnel, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, from April, 1912, to May, 1915, a period of three years.

Assistant in connection with and commanding U. S. S. *Wadsworth* from June, 1915, to November, 1917, a period of two and one-half years. Eight months was after the United States declared war.

Assistant in connection with and commanding the U. S. S. *Little*, from January, 1918, to August, 1918; eight months during the war.

Assistant to officer in charge of Enlisted Personnel Division, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, from September, 1918, to May, 1919, a period of seven months.

In view of the length of time necessary to educate officers and to train enlisted men in times of peace, it will be necessary to present to the committee the state of the naval personnel when we entered the Great War, and the reasons for its condition. I will begin as far back as 1914, when the European conflict began, and when it became practically certain that this country would or later become involved. Unless measures had been taken in 1914 to place our personnel on a proper and adequate

CHAMAN. Very well.

CHAMAN. The report, in its changed form, was published in the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1914, relating to personnel, follows:

The general board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of carrying out the repeated recommendations of the general board year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and reserve, sufficient to man the fleet for war.

Of the general board this is a matter of even more serious import than, for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. The purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of the ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be a useless mass of steel whose existence leads only to a false sense of

strength of the fleet is measured too often in the public mind by the number of material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its material and its personnel—and its material; and of these two elements the personnel—is too often forgotten and neglected in making plans. The general board can not impress this point too strongly on the department and recommend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct this. It is urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a reserve sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call

at time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. All leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and enlisted men, to keep the best of their fleet in full commission, and all the serviceable ships in a material condition for war; and in addition a trained reserve sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus every nation except ourselves is prepared to mobilize its entire navy, by order, with men trained for service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of men recruited after war is imminent or declared. To quickly mobilize the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in commission with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained

personnel. All that has been herein set forth, the general board recommends: That the department be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted men, to keep in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with them, and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that at time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore

work. The general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the reserve in the proportion indicated in (a).

That steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and enlisted men, the work be pushed until this reserve, in connection with the active list, reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be sufficient to man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent reserve.

That the Naval Militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more effectively reinforce the regular service at need.

GEORGE DEWEY.

The report itself shows that the Navy was in a very unsatisfactory condition so far as personnel was concerned.

Paragraph 43 (a) of the just quoted report of the general board, which paragraph is the one from which the recommendation of an immediate increase of 19,600 men had been removed, is stated in his annual report, dated December 1, 1914:

By wisely utilizing the present personnel all ships of the classes named contained in full commission without addition to the present enlistment and no legislation is needed to carry out their recommendations. This is clear in a report by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which is printed in the *Record* on page 64.

The figures submitted by the chief of the bureau in this report did not allow for adequate complements for the ships mentioned in the General Board's report, and did not provide for nucleus crews for the other 225 ships of the Navy required manned by the General Board. As the officer in the Bureau of Navigation who actually worked out the details of the enlisted personnel to ships and stations, and who personally prepared the orders for such details, I know that the personnel as it existed at that time could not be utilized so as to man the ships as recommended by the General Board.

The General Board had found that in order to carry out its recommendations an immediate increase of 19,600 men of the active enlisted force was needed.

We in the enlisted personnel division of the Bureau of Navigation who were charged with the administration of the personnel found that the immediate increase should be approximately 19,000 men.

The Secretary requested no additions for the active enlisted force. Consequently, the unsatisfactory personnel situation continued.

While in the Bureau of Navigation, and immediately after leaving the bureau in 1915, I made an exhaustive study of the whole personnel situation. The official records were at my disposal. I had an experience of three years in the administration of the enlisted personnel force of the entire Navy. This study resulted in my writing in 1915 a paper on the subject of "Naval Personnel."

It was shown in this paper among other things:

1. That the allowed complements of the Navy ships in commission were "peace" complements and were from 15 to 30 per cent less than would be required in time of war.

2. That, in spite of the inadequacy of the peace complement, ships did not even have these allowed peace numbers on board. Battleships in full commission having an average of 100 vacancies in the enlisted force.

3. That there were 42 ships with only three-tenths of their complements on board, 16 ships with only one-tenth of their complements on board, 38 ships out of commission with no personnel on board. No personnel was available to fill these up.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of this paper with you?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a copy of it inserted in the record.

Capt. TAUSSIG. I have here the only copy extant, one of the original copies; but the committee is welcome to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have it put in the record. Was it an official paper?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir; this paper that I am talking about is not an official paper. It is a study that I made.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it presented to the department?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I mention that later, here. If you will just let me finish this point, then I will bring out just that point about it, which shows its status.

LEMAN. Very well.

INSSIG. The next point is:

: there were in the Navy in 1915 a total of 1,920 commis-

: officers and 53,000 enlisted men.

: if we put what material we had (plus 75 auxiliaries to be
 : purchased) in operation for war there would imme-
 : require a total of 4,440 line officers and 106,900 enlisted
 : men. We were 2,520 line officers and 53,900 more men than we had
 : in 1915.

: the staff corps were correspondingly weak.

: after impressing into service all our available organized
 : naval reserves, including the Naval Militia, we would still
 : have immediate requirements 1,088 line officers and 29,000

men.

: much additional personnel would be required as the war

progressed.

: the Naval Reserve Force consisted of only 150 men.

: it took considerable time to educate officers and to recruit
 : enlisted personnel.

: a report on naval personnel was submitted to and accepted by
 : a committee for publication. It received "first honorable
 : mention" in the prize essay competition for that year.

: since with Navy regulations, the department's authority
 : for publication was requested. The Navy Department refused
 : to publish it without giving reasons, and as a result
 : it was not printed. That answers the question you asked me.

LEMAN. Yes; that answers my question. I would like to
 : have it inserted in the record.

: the report referred to is here printed in full in the record as

NAVAL PERSONNEL.

: it is my belief that good men with poor ships are better than poor men with

INTRODUCTORY.

: the United States has so neglected the opportunities for placing
 : her Navy on a defensive basis, we are, to-day, in a position which, in the
 : event of a sudden attack, would be precarious. Our enemy would have
 : the advantage to deal us a staggering blow from which our recovery
 : would be difficult at the best. While recent events abroad have forced
 : recognition of the country's unpreparedness, there appears to be a
 : feeling that this condition of affairs applies mainly to the inadequacy of
 : our ships, and to the insufficient number of Navy ships. The true situa-
 : tion of the personnel of the Navy has been overlooked. It is evident that
 : the country do not appreciate the necessity for an adequate and efficient

: this paper is to discuss only that phase of unpreparedness which
 : is concerned with the personnel of the Navy. It is realized that all the intricate questions
 : cannot be thoroughly elucidated, and some can not even be touched on;
 : but by stating the facts, and by making a few observations and sug-
 : gestions, it is hoped to bring about a better understanding as to what we have, what we need, and what we
 : should do. It will be imparted to those who need enlightenment, and to those

: we have an insufficient number of ships, and that those we have are not in
 : the proper class. We have, through the medium of the European conflict,
 : learned all too well that we have not sufficient personnel to man our insufficient
 : ships. That such personnel as we have are not in the proper proportions
 : to the ships is a fact of interest comparatively few. Not only is our personnel

inadequate for manning the ships now on the Navy list, but no provisions have been made for supplying the necessary personnel for the vessels under construction and those recently authorized. The country, through the press, is crying for more ships. The country apparently does not care whether or not the ships are manned. This is certainly a most peculiar state of affairs. That it can be due to the fact that the people do not understand the true situation. They do not know the facts. The reason for this ignorance is their lack of interest in naval matters. To them the ships are everything. They see a division or squadron of ships steam majestically by. Each vessel has the Stars and Stripes displayed at the peak. The onlookers pride themselves on being Americans, and say to one another, "We can lick anything afloat." It is the valor of ignorance. It never occurs to them that these ships have on board only about three-quarters of the personnel necessary to man them properly; that, owing to this lack of personnel, they are not able to "lick anything afloat."

This lack of knowledge concerning naval personnel applies not only to the public at large, but also to their Representatives in Congress, and (what is most unfortunate) to the Navy itself. We can rest assured that there is no such lack of knowledge on the part of the naval attachés of the various foreign embassies in Washington.

That the Navy, as a whole, does not appreciate the true situation and does not know the facts, is shown by the conflicting testimony given by those high in authority before the House Naval Committee during the consideration of the last appropriation bill. It was held by some that there was sufficient personnel for all immediate requirements. It was held by others that we were short of requirements many hundreds of men and 18,000 enlisted men. In view of such conflicting opinions, it is not to be wondered at that Congress failed to pass any personnel legislation. So our lack of provision for continuing the building of ships, without making provision for the necessary personnel, remains with us year after year with our present weak personnel as a legacy. It is hoped that the fallacy of this insane procedure will be realized before it is too late, that the country will awake to a realization of the fact that an unmanned ship is worth less than no ship at all, as it requires protection instead of giving it; that a manned ship is more or less of a menace in that it would be called on to accomplish what is required of a fully manned ship, with probably disastrous results.

The quality of the personnel has steadily improved. The quantity of the personnel has spasmodically increased until to-day it is numerically greater than ever before. But while this numerical increase has been developing, the material has also increased and at a much more rapid rate than the personnel. Consequently we find ourselves with less personnel in proportion to our material than at any previous time. If it were true that "man for man we are as good as other navies," this condition would avail us little if, in case of war, the average must be lowered by the introduction of a large untrained element. Such a contingency confronts us at present. It behooves us to remedy this condition as soon as practicable. It is not sufficient that at peace times our personnel be as efficient as that of any possible enemy. It is essential that the personnel be in a status where there is every reason to believe we will be as efficient as, or more efficient than, any possible enemy with whom we may be drawn into a war. That our personnel is not on this basis is unfortunately true. The greatest need of our Navy to-day is an adequate and efficient personnel.

Practically all of our personnel legislation has been done piecemeal. The existence of a general staff has resulted in the absence of a progressive program. When appropriating for ships, provision is made for armor, armament, and equipment. Sometimes necessary ammunition is authorized. Never is provision made for manning the ships when completed. This procedure continues year after year until the personnel becomes so inadequate it is imperative that something be done. Then, and not until then, a rider is attached to an appropriation bill providing for an increase in the number of men, or relieving some intolerable condition among the officers. The provision for men is always inadequate, as the fact that it takes so long to recruit and train men for service on board ship is repeatedly overlooked. The result, when the additional quota has been recruited and passed through the training courses, we find, owing to the completion of new vessels and the authorization of others, the same unsatisfactory conditions prevailing as existed a few years previous when the additional men were authorized. The relief for unsatisfactory conditions among the officers has usually been temporary in character, as almost without exception, such relief to the officers of one corps or grade, has, in the course of a few years, resulted in an intolerable situation in some other corps or grade. Naval officers can be held partly responsible for this unsatisfactory legislation. They have differed widely in their opinions as to what is necessary and what is best, that Congress has had great difficulty in ascertaining the true state of affairs. But practically all of

the necessity for a general staff and have advocated legislation for the same. Consequently in so far as the lack of such a staff has effected the personnel condition, it seems equitable that Congress should be made aware of the fact. There is no doubt that had Congress authorized a general staff on a properly represented, such a staff would have welded together the various opinions as to what is desirable, with the result that a bill would have been introduced by the Navy, the Navy Department, and the Congress would have passed and enacted into law. We would not then have had the existing personnel conditions that now exist. There appear to be no prospects of the authorization for a general staff, in view of which there is no satisfactory personnel legislation. However, if we could produce a staff of officers high in rank, who is willing to take up the cudgel and fight for the necessary reforms, there would be an excellent chance of producing satisfactory results. The Navy has, on several occasions, produced such results by their ability, zeal, magnetism, and force of character, have, by their efforts, succeeded in getting for the service many reforms that were long overdue. The efforts of these officers have been along material or technical lines. They have neglected the personnel. A personnel champion is needed at present.

Some of the facts of what follows relate to the entire enlisted force, and, in some cases, to the line officers of the commissioned personnel. The various staff departments are not included because of a lack of appreciation that these corps are most important in the Navy. The necessity for suitable naval organization, but because that the existing conditions in the line is equally true of conditions in the staff. The statistical data becomes boring. For these reasons, therefore, the following is used for illustrating our weakness.

THE FACTS CONCERNING OUR ACTIVE FORCES.

In 1915 the active list contained 1,920 commissioned line officers, distributed in the various grades as shown in the following table:

TABLE I — *Distribution of commissioned line officers.*

| Grade. | Number in grade. | Percentage of whole number. |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| Admiral | 24 | 1.3 |
| Vice Admiral | 90 | 4.7 |
| Commodore | 122 | 6.4 |
| Captain | 204 | 10.6 |
| Commander | 351 | 18.3 |
| Lieutenant Commander | 761 | 39.6 |
| Lieutenant | 368 | 19.1 |
| | 1,920 | 100.0 |

In the above, as extra numbers, 6 rear admirals, 20 captains, and 100 lieutenants. This makes the percentage of the whole number higher in these grades than would be under normal conditions.

The number of commissioned warrant officers and warrant officers of the line is approximately 670, distributed as follows:

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Warrant Officers | 200 |
| Warrant Ensigns | 200 |
| Warrant Boatswains | 270 |

The Navy has an enlisted force of 48,000 men and 3,500 apprentices, making 51,500. This number is exclusive of men performing duty on ships assigned to the Navy and of those prisoners in confinement who are sentenced to discharge. Included in the number are approximately 1,500 men of the Navy. These men can not be considered as a part of the fighting force. At the present time the Navy is recruited to its full authorized strength, so the total number of men, including those on naval militia ships, and the prisoners, is about 53,000.

inadequate for manning the ships now on the Navy list, but no provision made for supplying the necessary personnel for the vessels under construction recently authorized. The country, through the press, is crying for more ships. The country apparently does not care whether or not the ships are manned. This is certainly a most peculiar state of affairs. That it may be due to the fact that the people do not understand the true situation, and do not know the facts. The reason for this ignorance is their lack of interest in naval matters. To them the ships are everything. They see a division of ships steam majestically by. Each vessel has the Stars and Stripes dipping from the mainmast peak. The onlookers pride themselves on being Americans, and say to themselves, "We can lick anything afloat." It is the valor of ignorance. It never occurs to them that these ships have on board only about three-quarters of the personnel necessary to man them properly; that, owing to this lack of personnel, they are unable to "lick anything afloat."

This lack of knowledge concerning naval personnel applies not only to the public at large, but also to their Representatives in Congress, and (what is most to the Navy itself. We can rest assured that there is no such lack of knowledge among the naval attachés of the various foreign embassies in Washington.

That the Navy, as a whole, does not appreciate the true situation and does not know the facts, is shown by the conflicting testimony given by those high officials before the House Naval Committee during the consideration of the last appropriation bill. It was held by some that there was sufficient personnel for all immediate requirements. It was held by others that we were short of requirements many hundreds of men, and 18,000 enlisted men. In view of such conflicting opinions, it is not too much to say that Congress failed to pass any personnel legislation. So our lack of provision for continuing the building of ships, without making provision for the necessary personnel, remains with us year after year with our present weak personnel. It is hoped that the fallacy of this insane procedure will be realized before it is too late, and that the country will awake to a realization of the fact that an unmanned ship is no ship at all, as it requires protection instead of giving it; that a manned ship is more or less of a menace in that it would be called on to do what is required of a fully manned ship, with probably disastrous results.

The quality of the personnel has steadily improved. The quantity of it has spasmodically increased until to-day it is numerically greater than ever before. But while this numerical increase has been developing, the material has advanced at a much more rapid rate than the personnel. Consequently we find ourselves with less personnel in proportion to our material than at any previous time. If it were true that "man for man we are as good as other navies," this condition would avail us little if, in case of war, the average must be lowered by the introduction of a large untrained element. Such a contingency confronts us at present. We must take steps to remedy this condition as soon as practicable. It is not sufficient that our personnel in peace times be as efficient as that of any possible enemy. It is necessary that the personnel be in a status where there is every reason to believe that they will be as efficient as, or more efficient than, any possible enemy with whom we may be drawn into a war. That our personnel is not on this basis is an unfortunate fact, and the greatest need of our Navy to-day is an adequate and efficient personnel.

Practically all of our personnel legislation has been done piecemeal. The existence of a general staff has resulted in the absence of a progressive policy. When appropriating for ships, provision is made for armor, armament, and ammunition. Sometimes necessary ammunition is authorized. Never is provision made for manning the ships when completed. This procedure continues year after year until the personnel becomes so inadequate it is imperative that something be done. And not until then, a rider is attached to an appropriation bill providing for an increase in the number of men, or relieving some intolerable condition of the officers. The provision for men is always inadequate, as the fact that it is necessary to recruit and train men for service on board ship is repeatedly overlooked. The result, when the additional quota has been recruited and passed through the training courses, we find, owing to the completion of new vessels and the authorization of others, the same unsatisfactory conditions prevailing as existed a few years ago when the additional men were authorized. The relief for unsatisfactory conditions among the officers has usually been temporary in character, as almost without exception, such relief to the officers of one corps or grade, has, in the course of time, resulted in an intolerable situation in some other corps or grade. Naval officers may be held partly responsible for this unsatisfactory legislation. They have been widely in their opinions as to what is necessary and what is best, that Congress has had *great difficulty in ascertaining the true state of affairs.* But practically

the necessity for a general staff and have advocated legislation for the same. Consequently in so far as the lack of such a staff has effected the personnel condition, it seems equitable that Congress should be made aware of the situation. There is no doubt that had Congress authorized a general staff on the same basis as the Army, such a staff would have welded together the various opinions as to what is desirable, with the result that a bill would have been passed by the Navy, the Navy Department, and the Congress would have been enacted into law. We would not then have had the existing personnel conditions that now exist. There appear to be no prospects of the authorization for a general staff, in view of which there is no satisfactory personnel legislation. However, if we could produce a staff of officers high in rank, who is willing to take up the cudgel and fight for the necessary reforms, there would be an excellent chance of producing satisfactory results. The Navy has, on several occasions, produced such results through their ability, zeal, magnetism, and force of character, have, by their efforts, succeeded in getting for the service many reforms that were long overdue. The efforts of these officers have been along material or technical lines. They have neglected the personnel. A personnel champion is needed at present. The facts of what follows relate to the entire enlisted force, and, in addition, to the line officers of the commissioned personnel. The various staff corps are not mentioned because of a lack of appreciation that these corps are most necessary to the Navy for suitable naval organization, but because that the existing conditions in the line is equally true of conditions in the staff. Each statistical data becomes boring. For these reasons, therefore, the following is used for illustrating our weakness.

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In 1915, the active list contained 1,920 commissioned line officers, distributed in the various grades as shown in the following table:

TABLE I.—Distribution of commissioned line officers.

| Grade. | Number in grade. | Percentage of whole number. |
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| | 24 | 1.3 |
| | 90 | 4.7 |
| | 122 | 6.4 |
| | 204 | 10.6 |
| | 351 | 18.3 |
| | 761 | 39.6 |
| | 368 | 19.1 |
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In the above, as extra numbers, 6 rear admirals, 20 captains, and 100 lieutenants. This makes the percentage of the whole number higher in these grades than would be under normal conditions.

The commissioned warrant officers and warrant officers of the line are approximately 670, distributed as follows:

| | |
|-------------------|-----|
| at-sea. | 200 |
| | 200 |
| machinists. | 270 |

The enlisted force of 48,000 men and 3,500 apprentices, making 51,500. This number is exclusive of men performing duty on ships assigned to the coast guard and of those prisoners in confinement who are sentenced to dishonorable discharge. Included in the number are approximately 1,500 men of the United States Marine Corps. These men can not be considered as a part of the fighting force. At present the Navy is recruited to its full authorized strength, so the total number of men, including those on naval militia ships, and the prisoners, is about 53,000.

In order to illustrate the extent to which this personnel is distributed the following table is inserted showing the status of all serviceable vessels:

TABLE II.—*The status of ships.*

| Class of ship. | In full com- mis- sion. | In re- serve, 0.3 of crew. | In ordi- nary, 0.1 of crew. | Not in com- mis- sion. | Under con- struc- tion. | Autho- rized. |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| Battleships: | | | | | | |
| First line..... | 7 | 1 | | | 6 | |
| Second line..... | 13 | 8 | 1 | 3 | | |
| Armored cruisers..... | 6 | 3 | 1 | | | |
| Cruisers: | | | | | | |
| First-class..... | 2 | 3 | | | | |
| Second-class..... | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | |
| Third-class..... | 10 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | |
| Destroyers..... | 38 | 17 | | 2 | 11 | |
| Monitors..... | 5 | 2 | | 2 | | |
| Submarines..... | 38 | | | | 19 | 19 |
| Transports..... | 2 | | | 3 | 1 | |
| Gunboats..... | 21 | 1 | | 7 | | |
| Supply ships..... | 4 | | | | 1 | |
| Fuel ships..... | 22 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Converted yachts..... | 5 | | | 11 | | |
| Tugs..... | 48 | | | | | |
| Tenders..... | 7 | | | | 2 | |
| Special types..... | 7 | 2 | | 1 | | |
| Torpedo boats..... | 1 | | 13 | 5 | | |
| Total..... | 237 | 42 | 16 | 38 | 41 | 20 |

In addition to the large number of ships, there is our extensive shore establishments that must be provided with personnel. This comprises the Navy Department with its bureaus, offices, and important boards; the War College, Naval Academy and four training stations; the numerous trade schools; 18 navy yards and stations with their various adjuncts; an aeronautical station; and many smaller stations such as hospitals, magazines, recruiting stations, and radio stations. The shore establishment is so large its requirements demand 25 per cent of the total commissioned officers, 35 per cent of the commissioned chief and warrant officers, and 20 per cent of the enlisted force.

Below is shown the number in each grade and the percentage in each grade of officers performing duty on shore:

TABLE III.—*Officers performing shore duty.*

| Grade. | Total number in grade. | Number perform- ing duty on shore. |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Rear admiral..... | 24 | 16 |
| Captain..... | 90 | 59 |
| Commander..... | 122 | 63 |
| Lieutenant commander..... | 204 | 103 |
| Lieutenant..... | 351 | 99 |
| Lieutenant (j. g.)..... | 761 | 147 |
| Ensign..... | 368 | 20 |
| Chief boatswain and boatswain..... | 200 | 80 |
| Chief gunner and gunner..... | 200 | 80 |
| Chief machinist and machinist..... | 270 | 80 |
| Total..... | 2,590 | 747 |

Although such a large percentage of the officers and enlisted men are performing duty on shore, their numbers are reduced to the lowest practicable limits. The establishment is for the proper maintenance of the fleet. The fleet would be maintained if the personnel on shore were increased. Those of us who go to sea feel that the ships do not get as good service at the navy yards as they should; and

at the yards, or who are performing duty at the yards, know nothing of getting the efficient service that would be forthcoming if adequate personnel were available. To further reduce the shore complements in order to save fleet complements would result in a reduction in efficiency.

The personnel on shore is very unfortunate. The inadequacy of the shore personnel is most deplorable. From Table II we ascertain that there are 11 vessels having only three-tenths of their full commissioned complements, 11 vessels having only one-tenth of their full complements. There are 11 vessels in commission with no personnel on board (except a few ship boys). There are 11 vessels under construction and 29 vessels authorized for which there is no personnel, and for which no provisions are made for the necessary officers and crews.

It is a mistake to suppose that the vessels in full commission had their full authorized complements. Such a supposition is a grievous mistake. The full complements as now authorized, are "peace" complements, and not "war" complements. These peace complements are from 15 to 30 per cent less (both officers and men) than are necessary properly to fight the ships. But what is still more serious, these full commissioned ships have not even their allowed peace complements. All of them are short a number of officers, and the battle-ship is short a list of over 100 men per ship. It was recently necessary to increase the complements of destroyers by 20 per cent in order to provide crews. There are no reserves—either officers or men—available for emergency. When a new ship is to be commissioned, one or more already in service must be taken out of commission, or the personnel for the new ship provided by a further depletion of the already depleted line. This general reduction process continues for some time. The Navy lives from hand to mouth so far as personnel is concerned, and the living is most frugal. But there is no relief in sight. When construction nearing completion, the conditions must continue to deteriorate until such time that any provision Congress may make for additional personnel is ineffective.

Statements of the facts leave no doubt as to the inadequacy of the personnel to survive, with discomfort, this state of affairs in times of peace. Can we overcome the handicap in case of war? Not unless our enemy is so weak, and there are no prospective enemies in sight who have the strength to permit themselves to decline to such an extent.

The number of line officers is inadequate, but the various grades are not properly represented. Captains are performing the duties of rear admirals, lieutenant commanders, lieutenants those of lieutenant commanders, and ensigns those of lieutenants. They perform the duties and have the pay of the higher grades, but they receive neither the rank nor the respect of the higher grades. The seriousness of this situation is added to by the fact that the personnel is at a standstill, except in the case of ensigns to junior lieutenants, whose grade is being increased at the rate of about 125 a year. This has created a current of unrest and a feeling of discontent among the personnel that is detrimental to the efficiency of the service. With the present is made manifest by a spirit of indifference; with the future is a worry. All officers feel that the time has arrived when they must relieve the present unsatisfactory condition. They know that the present condition is maintained for the purpose of providing a remedy, and they are disappointed that the legislation as has recently been recommended will not produce the necessary results. The personnel of the commissioned personnel on a proper basis is to-day at a lower ebb than at any time during the history of the Navy.

The assignments have been evident from time to time have been based on the personnel situation. A few years ago the vessels were assigned in accordance with the characteristics of each ship, and the assignments were permanent. The Bureau of Navigation took steps toward assigning and transferring both officers and men could serve on ships that went to the same home port. The lack of permanency in the assignments of vessels is manifest by a comparison of the details made a few years ago with the details of to-day. Numerous cases have occurred where vessels' home ports have been changed owing to certain material conditions in the vessels themselves, or to a navy yard for more or less work, or even for political reasons.

The effect on the personnel appears not to have been considered, and if considered dismissed without serious thought. Only recently have the home yards been changed from Portsmouth, N. H., to New Orleans, La. The effect on personnel was clearly defined by the commanding officer of one of those yards as usual, personnel considerations were subjected to the material viewpoint, policy of subjugating the personnel to the material survives in spite of the fact. "Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships. We appear to ignore a fundamental principle when we make the personnel subordinate to the material. The mere possession of good material can not produce efficient personnel, but an efficient personnel will, by reason of its very efficiency, raise the material to a high standard.

Despite the lack of collective efficiency as represented by the whole Navy, which is due to inadequacy in numerical strength and weakness in organization and administration, it must be conceded that the individual efficiency and character of officers and men has steadily improved. The reason for this is the high and duty standards required. The selecting-out board produced a healthy reaction to individual effort, and increased the average efficiency through the elimination of many below the average. The establishment of post-graduate schools for officers, and the facilities offered for special instruction along various lines, have had a marked effect in boosting individual efficiency. The general trend of the times in demand for a higher state of individual efficiency in all walks of life, has left its impression on naval personnel. As for the enlisted men, one has only to look back to the conditions existing at the Spanish-American War in order to appreciate the great advancement that has been made. Higher qualifications for enlistment, more stringent rules for conduct, improved methods of discipline, a firm stand against liberty bells, drunkenness, and the establishment of training stations and trade schools, have all had a salutary effect.

And yet, with this marked advance in individual efficiency, the collective efficiency has failed to keep pace through no fault of the personnel actually on the ships and stations, but because the inadequacy of this personnel has been too great a handicap, and because the personnel in general has received repeated setbacks to the benefit of the material. The inadequacy of the personnel has not only produced the singular result of having all our ships underofficered and undermanned, but has caused so many and such frequent changes in the personnel, that the necessary work required to make an efficient fighting machine can not be developed. Target-practice rules prevent the employment of artificial means so far as training is concerned, but there is not a ship in the Navy that is not forced to use artificial means in the employment of its personnel during target practice. It is regrettable that the confidential nature of "Report of Battle Practices, Spring, 1915" prevents quoting in full of the remarks made by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet concerning the shortage of personnel in his fleet during the last battle practice. It is unfortunate that no matter what legislation the next Congress enacts, the present state of affairs must continue for some time, as officers and men can not be made over in the length of time required to educate the officers, and to recruit and train the enlisted men.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS IN CASE OF WAR.

Should the country be involved in war it would be necessary, in order to properly man our ships and shore stations, to have an immediate increase of 2,520 line officers, 647 commissioned warrant and warrant officers, and 53,900 enlisted men. The respective percentages of increase over what we now have are 130 for the line officers, 102 for the commissioned warrant and warrant officers, and 102 for the enlisted men. These figures are so astonishing it is not sufficient to pass them by with the mere statement of fact, but, in order to make the truth impressive, it is considered necessary to set out in detail and in tabulated form the requirements of the various units which compose the Navy as a whole. First, the requirements for services afloat will be shown.

TABLE IV—Requirements for immediate service afloat in case of war.

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... included all vessels on the Navy list excepting those specially designated as unsuitable for war purposes, all vessels under construction completed by January 1, 1917, all the fuel ships that are required, and 75 vessels, which is the minimum number that is required. The number of officers and men required adequately to man these vessels are not a matter of hearsay or guesswork. They are based on experience that has shown to be necessary.

...that actually happened in the Spanish-American War, and it is an instant that the Government is spending large sums of money on men-of-war that would not be used in case of war. The public funds would be an extravagant waste.

all but 4 are manned by merchant crews. Two of the four are engaged in surveying duty, and the other two have which the department evidently considers can not be satisfactorily manned by merchant crews. There can be only two good reasons for operating with merchant crews. One reason is because there is not enough detail for this duty. The other is because it is cheaper. The service now conducted operates more or less satisfactorily in peace but gives efficient service in time of war unless the merchant crews are Navy crews. This is due to the unfortunate fact that the crews are composed of practically all nationalities except Americans. If the crews would have to be discharged, many would desert, and the service would be untrustworthy. There are no American merchant sailors to take the place of the discharged crews. Therefore we should have to provide naval personnel for them.

During the Spanish-American War found the Navy Department making
to have vessels of all descriptions, and as a result of these efforts
obtained and manned with Navy crews. Should we again
be necessary to purchase vessels and convert them into mine
patrol boats, supply ships, fuel ships, and transports,
large merchant personnel, and a lack of organization among

A 30 per cent increase over the number of officers now performing shore duty be considered a very modest estimate when contemplating the probability amount of business to be accomplished will at least be doubled and that a high degree of efficiency will be demanded from the shore establishment than is evident at present.

There is an impression in some quarters that, in case of war, it will be a matter immediately to send to sea all officers performing shore duty. Not only is the impression that this could be done, but many believe that it would be. Those who entertain this conviction fail to comprehend that the fleet cannot exist without the assistance of the shore establishment, and that this is the reason for the existence of and for the maintenance of the shore stations with their numerous adjuncts. The fleet must depend on the navy yards and stations for stores, provisions, repairs, and docking. The fleet must depend on the War College, Naval Academy, and training stations for the necessary trained personnel. The fleet must depend on the Navy Department for information and instructions, and for the administration of all affairs not directly concerned with the internal management of the fleet units. In fact the efficiency of the fleet depends in a great measure on the efficiency of the shore establishment. Surely, in view of this, it can not be expected that the Navy Department, when war is imminent, will cripple the fleet by depleting the shore stations of the personnel necessary for their proper conduct. This brings up the important question as to what personnel is necessary for the proper conduct of the shore establishment. The answer must be—the sea-going personnel. Only those who go to sea can appreciate the necessity of having the shore establishment created and operated by men who thoroughly understand the personnel and material requirements of vessels employed on active duty. And only men who have been to sea can thoroughly understand these complex requirements. It is essential, therefore, that line officers continue on duty at the Navy Department, the navy yards, and other shore stations after the beginning of hostilities, and any reduction in the number of officers performing such duties will result in a corresponding reduction in the efficiency of the fleet. Navy yards are military establishments and must be operated in accordance with military principles and methods. In order to do this successfully,

and a rank must be the controlling factor. An officer of any other corps can not have the necessary experience or education along the proper lines to cope with the difficulties that would confront him in time of war. To place the navy yards under civilian control would undoubtedly have the result

that the navy and the training stations must continue in operation unless, otherwise, we are to fill vacancies in the numerous vessels with personnel untrained. There should be not less than 5,000 apprentices under training, and the training period should be reduced to two months. This will give us only about 80 men a day to send to the fleet. To conduct training stations would require 1,000 men as a minimum. The navy yard where recruits and ex-enlisted men are being enlisted and assembled must at all times no less than 3,000 men. The large number will be due to the fact that they can not be distributed without first collecting them. The process

of collecting the officers and men required for duty afloat and duty on shore, it is estimated that there be a 5 per cent excess to allow for casualties, sickness, etc., traveling to and from their stations. If this percentage is not provided for, it is certain that our ships and stations will never have their full complements, and it is of almost importance that this condition be not allowed to confront us in

time of war. If the numbers of officers and enlisted men required for service afloat and duty on shore, and the 5 per cent additional necessary for casualties, etc., it is a simple matter by combining these to ascertain the total required at the beginning of hostilities. If from this total we subtract the number now possessed, the result will be the necessary additions that must be made by our reserves and such recruits as can be mustered into service. The figures stated below, are most impressive:

TABLE VI — Total requirements for immediate service in case of war.

| Flag officer. | Captain. | Commanders. | Lieutenant commanders. | Lieutenants. | Lieutenants (j. r.). | Ensigns. | Midshipmen. | Chief boatswains and boatswains. | Chief gunners and gunners. | Enlisted men. |
|---------------|----------|-------------|------------------------|--------------|----------------------|----------|-------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| 1 | 80 | 138 | 372 | 990 | 940 | 1,000 | 3,543 | 320 | 390 | 91,300 |
| 2 | 85 | 120 | 165 | 215 | 15 | | 665 | 92 | 102 | 10,500 |
| 3 | 8 | 53 | 27 | 61 | 90 | 70 | 212 | 21 | 25 | 5,100 |
| 4 | 17 | 251 | 560 | 1,272 | 1,041 | 1,050 | 4,410 | 120 | 370 | 1,317,900 |
| 5 | 122 | 200 | 351 | 761 | 308 | 1,920 | 300 | 300 | 270 | 55,000 |
| 6 | 110 | 300 | 921 | 380 | 682 | 2,750 | 200 | 152 | 240 | 51,000 |

THE SOURCES OF SUPPLY.

The sources of supply for providing the personnel required, as shown in Table VI, are: The first of these sources consists of the retired list, the Naval Reserve, and the Naval Academy. The second source consists of ex-officers and ex-enlisted men, and the untrained masses.

Of the retired list have been retired because of old age, length of service, disability, undesirability, or personal request. There is no doubt that these officers, if assigned to active duty in time of war, would give to the navy the best that is in them. While a number of them are well quali-

or duty ashore, only a comparatively few could be expected to perform duty afloat. Many of these officers would undoubtedly be assigned to duty in the Navy Department, and arrangements have been made for the necessary cases where the officers' ages or physical condition permit of active service. However, in view of the fact that most of these officers were retired because of unsuitability for active duty in times of peace, we should not count on many of them for any great length of time under the strain that war conditions impose.

Below is shown the number of retired officers of the line and the number in each grade to be assigned to active duty in case of war:

TABLE VII.—*Retired officers of the line.*

| Grade. | Number on retired list. | Number to be assigned to active duty. | Percentage. |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| Rear admirals..... | 144 | 23 | 15.97 |
| Commodores..... | 45 | 22 | 48.89 |
| Captains..... | 63 | 31 | 49.05 |
| Commanders..... | 105 | 80 | 76.19 |
| Lieutenant commanders..... | 40 | 26 | 65.00 |
| Lieutenants..... | 44 | 35 | 79.55 |
| Lieutenants (junior grade)..... | 18 | 15 | 83.33 |
| Ensigns..... | 30 | 28 | 93.33 |
| Chief engineers..... | 23 | 2 | 8.70 |
| Past assistant engineers..... | 20 | 7 | 35.00 |
| Assistant engineers..... | 13 | 10 | 76.92 |
| Chief boatswains..... | 42 | 28 | 66.67 |
| Boatswains..... | 17 | 15 | 88.24 |
| Chief gunners..... | 20 | 15 | 75.00 |
| Gunners..... | 17 | 14 | 82.35 |
| Chief machinists..... | 19 | 16 | 84.21 |
| Machinists..... | 41 | 37 | 90.24 |
| Total..... | 701 | 404 | 57.63 |

As the commodores to be assigned to active duty were advanced to their grade on retirement, and never performed the duties of flag officers, they must be considered as captains. The engineer officers are of such age and have been retired so long that there are only a few duties to which they can be assigned.

There are fewer than 600 men who have been retired on the completion of 30 years of service in the enlisted force. In view of their ages, not more than 100 could be suitably assigned to active duties.

The Coast Guard, which in time of war would probably be placed under the command of the Navy, has the foundation for an excellent reserve provided the Navy Department will arrange with the Treasury Department for the training of the personnel along the lines that would make them the most useful in case of war. But if this were done, the Coast Guard can not be considered as an organized reserve so far as the manning of the Navy material is concerned, because the entire personnel would be required to man its own vessels and stations. Therefore no assistance in manning our ships in time of war can be obtained from the Coast Guard.

There is authority for the formation of a reserve of 25,000 ex-enlisted men who have received honorable discharge from the Navy. The actual strength of this organization is at present less than 150 men, so its value as a reserve must be considered negligible.

While the Naval Militia is the only organized reserve, unfortunately it can not be considered an efficient trained reserve. The units composing this organization are a conglomerate assembly, each having its own standard of efficiency. Until the passage of the Naval Militia act by the last Congress, there were no apparent attempts on the part of the Central Government to make the various units into a well rounded organization. In some States the organizations resembled social clubs. In only a few of the States were there any semblances of real efficiency. That the organization as a whole is not so efficient as it should be is not the fault of the individuals who, through their love of patriotism, join this service. These men deserve much credit for giving their time to such drills and such service as are practicable. The fault has been partly with the State governments in not making suitable laws and appropriating sufficient funds, and partly with the Central Government in not insisting on suitable laws and in withholding financial aid until assured that the money provided would bring an adequate return.

The Naval Militia act, if conscientiously enforced, will be conducive to a great benefit throughout the entire organization. It provides for the organization of the militia in units of convenient size, in each of which the number and distribution of the total enlisted strength among the several companies and other enlisted men shall be established by the Secretary of the Navy. It shall also establish the number of officers, petty officers, and other personnel for the organization of such units into larger bodies for administrative purposes. Provision is made for the examination of officers and the appointment of instructors from the regular naval service. The Secretary has the authority to call the Naval Militia into the service of the United States if necessary; and when so called the militia shall be governed by the regulations and the articles of the government of the Navy. Naval Militia members as such into the regular service shall rank with but after members of the Navy in the same grade and rank; except that for the purpose of command shall exercise command over a combined force composed of members of the Naval Militia officers and of vessels commanded by officers of the Navy. All officers of the Naval Militia of or above the rank of lieutenant shall be regarded as junior to lieutenant commanders of the Navy. When called into the service of the United States shall, during the period of service, be entitled to the same pay and allowance as provided for the Regular Navy. An enlisted man shall be held to service beyond the term of his enlistment.

Notwithstanding some defects in the provisions of the Naval Militia act, there is much to be taken advantage of its many good points, to make a really efficient naval service. The Navy Department has enthusiastically responded to the general government, and it is to be hoped that the States will respond with an equally enthusiastic endeavor to do their part. The order issued by the Navy Department sets forth in detail the unit of organization, ratings of enlisted men, qualifications of officers and the examinations required. This order states that the various organizations in order to be eligible to participate in Federal funds; uniforms, equipment, etc.; and in order that they will be accepted into the service of the United States without further proceedings must comply with the provisions of this general order before

they can be accepted. The several States would be much better prepared for efficient fighting if the Navy Department would require training along certain specific lines, instead of along general lines as is now the case. The States get practically all their training on small vessels which have little value for war purposes. A few days each year a small vessel is sent to sea on a comparatively modern vessel. But with the limited time available it cannot be expected that the militiamen can become efficient warships.

Training them all-around men-of-war should be abandoned, and they should be trained for duty on the auxiliaries such as supply ships, transport ships, sweepers and patrol vessels. We would then have, at all times, a force which could relieve the large number of trained men on the auxiliaries. This would enable the department to transfer them to places where their services will be urgently required.

Men may first enlist if he is over 30 years of age. In the regular service first enlist up to the age of 45 years, and they may continue to serve up to the age of 62. We who go to sea know that under modern conditions a man over 45 years of age who is capable of performing efficient duty is exceptional. There are no places for old men on modern men-of-war. This is more apparent in war times than in peace. Since the sole purpose of the Militia is to supply a reserve for the active service in time of war, it is to be made to have the militia composed only of officers and men performing active duty. This will not be the case if the militia's strength is to be men between the ages of 45 and 62. As our reserve forces must avoid the tendency to make the organizations effective on paper only in reality. That there is such a tendency is shown not only by the general order setting forth the Naval Militia requirements, but also by the reserve composed of ex-honorably discharged men. The reserve takes the form of a graded retired list for the enlisted men, which is not an effective fighting force to be called on when the emergency

As men of the Naval Militia when mustered into the service of the United States can not be held beyond the term of their enlistments, steps must be taken in making the term of enlistment of sufficient length to eliminate the probability of a large percentage of the militia being short-time men at the crucial moment when their services may be required.

Twenty-one States and the District of Columbia are represented by Naval Militia organizations. Each State makes its own laws in regard to the numerical strength of its organization. But whatever this strength may be, the units must be in accordance with the Navy Department's requirements. On July 1, 1915, the total Naval Militia strength authorized by the State laws was 12,574. On this date there were enrolled 606 officers and 7,706 enlisted men—only 65 per cent of the allowed strength. Of the 606 officers, 483 are of the line and are distributed as follows:

TABLE VIII.—Line officers of the Naval Militia.

| Grade. | For line duties only. | For engineering duties only. | Total. |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------|
| Commodores..... | 1 | | |
| Captains..... | 5 | | |
| Commanders..... | 20 | | |
| Lieutenant commanders..... | 35 | 6 | |
| Lieutenants..... | 119 | 26 | |
| Lieutenants (junior grade)..... | 93 | 14 | |
| Ensigns..... | 122 | 27 | |
| Warrant officers..... | 7 | 8 | |
| Totals..... | 402 | 81 | |

As the commodores, captains, and commanders become subject to the same regulations as lieutenant commanders of the regular service when operating together, they are considered as lieutenant commanders in making assignments to active duty.

To provide the requisite number of junior officers it will be necessary to send two or three senior classes of midshipmen to sea. If two classes are sent, about 100 officers will be obtained; if three classes are sent there will be an additional 100 officers. There will be some reluctance about sending these young men to sea, and it is certainly a reflection on our methods that our personnel has been so depleted as to make it necessary in time of war to reduce the amount of instruction considered essential to prepare the midshipmen for service afloat in times of war. But there is no question that the midshipmen, with from one to four years of training at the Naval Academy, will make much better junior officers than could be obtained from any other source; and the great demand for junior officers will force the Navy Department to detail them to active duty with the fleet. During the Spanish-American war a large number of naval cadets were sent home on leave until the war ended, and at the same time, a number of acting naval cadets were appointed to active duty in civil life. It is to be hoped that political influence will not again be able to cause such a fiasco on the service.

There are a few ex-officers and many ex-enlisted men who would immediately answer the call to the colors in case of hostilities. Some of the officers are now in the Naval Militia organizations, and, therefore, have been included in Table VIII, leaving only a small number to be included among the unorganized reserves. The thousands of enlisted men who would enlist, constitute a valuable potential reserve that is of the utmost importance to the country. The Navy Department desires to organize these men and succeeded in obtaining legislation, authorizing such an organization, which must not exceed 25,000 men. The plan has proved a failure, for the men will not enlist in the reserve owing to certain conditions imposed. For example, the law authorizes the Navy Department to require a large amount of active service of all men in the reserve; and although the department has waived this requirement, the men will not enlist as long as the power to call them into service at any time in peace times remains. The small amount of compensation does not warrant the taking of unnecessary chances on their part. They undoubtedly feel that they are discriminated against when it is considered that, as trained personnel, they would be liable for one or two months' active service each year, while the untrained men of the Naval Militia are required to perform only a few days of active duty with the reserve service. But even if these men do not enlist in the reserve, they are a valuable asset, as it is probable that there are about 15,000 of them whose ages and physical condition are such that they could be counted on to enlist in the regular service

besides these 15,000 honorably discharged men there are about 3,000 who have been discharged from the Navy with the honor of being discharged by other than honorable means, and who are counted on to enlist if the department will permit, and if, in the event the President will grant them amnesty. Our need for trained men will be necessary to take these men back into the service, just as during the Spanish-American war. It is another case where our shortsightedness in not providing sufficient personnel will require us in war times to depend on men who are not considered suitable in peace times. The numbers of trained men as a reserve in case of war have been enumerated. If the various numbers are put together and the total thus obtained is subtracted from the numbers of men at the beginning of hostilities, the remainder will be the number of men that will be obtained from the untrained masses. This summary is made as follows:

TABLE IX.—Summary of organized and unorganized reserves.

| | Line officers. | Captains. | Commanders. | Lieutenant commanders. | Total line officers. | | Chief boatswains and boatswains. | Chief gunners and runners. | | | | | |
|---------------|----------------|-----------|-------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|--------|--------|
| Active. | 25 | 40 | 24 | 25 | 28 | 279 | 13 | 20 | 53 | 125 | | | |
| Reserve. | | | 47 | 143 | 107 | 149 | 463 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 15 | | |
| | | | | | | 680 | 670 | | | | | | |
| | | | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 33 | | | | | | |
| Total. | 25 | 40 | 100 | 197 | 142 | 837 | 1,432 | 47 | 32 | 61 | 140 | | |
| Unorganized. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Active. | 10 | 50 | 149 | 300 | 921 | 540 | 467 | 2,520 | 219 | 172 | 250 | 617 | 54,900 |
| Reserve. | 25 | 30 | 60 | 250 | 724 | 58 | 1,068 | 192 | 120 | 195 | 507 | 28,944 | |

It is a really startling state of affairs. It can not be possible that the Congress, and the people realize that with all our available active and reserve there would still be required at the very beginning of a war, in order to man such material as we possess, an additional 10,000 line officers, 500 warrant officers, and 29,000 enlisted men. Can it be possible that additional personnel must be recruited and partially trained before they are available for active service, and in order to recruit and train them that more will be required? And can it be realized that during these two years many ships added to the Navy, and there will be many casualties, and that additional officers and men must be continually provided? That it can not be appreciated or we would not continue to hear the loud cry for more ships, and only a faint peep for additional personnel. We need the personnel much more urgently, and it is our first duty should be to obtain sufficient personnel to man at least the ships we could use at the beginning of a war. It will be hard enough to get the officers and men required for new ships and to replace casualties, without leaving until that time the providing of our immediate needs.

One of the higher officers required would be to promote the officers over grade. It is doubtful, though, if the promotions would actually be made, as the officers would be required to perform the duties of the higher grades at the corresponding rank and pay. This, of course, is an injustice, and can only be remedied by the officers concerned, and consequently there is not a ready remedy, especially as the usual status of the Navy list has required

assignments for some years past. Whether or not the promotions are actual it would be necessary under present conditions to assign officers to perform duties of higher grades, as follows: Twenty-two captains perform flag officers' duties, 121 lieutenants perform captains' duties, 121 lieutenant commanders perform lieutenant commanders' duties, and 381 lieutenants perform lieutenant commanders' duties.

As there are only 351 lieutenants on the active list, it is evident that even if they were all called on to perform lieutenant commanders' duties, provided the department desires the duties of that grade to be efficiently performed. The important watch duties would of necessity have to be done by those who are not lieutenants and ensigns, and the 1,100 places for junior officers would have to be vacant until some means of filling them could be found.

The 500 warrant officers could be furnished by promoting chief petty officers. There are a number of such petty officers who have passed the required examination but have not been advanced owing to the policy of the Navy Department to keep the number of warrant officers down to the lowest possible limit the Navy can struggle with.

So the really big problem that would confront us immediately on the outbreak of hostilities is how to obtain 1,100 junior line officers, and 29,000 enlisted men. It must be confessed that we can not possibly obtain them. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that immediate steps be taken towards placing our naval personnel on a basis that in the case of war overtaking us in the future, we will not be in the predicament that we now find ourselves.

While the figures concerning officers relate to the line only, the fact must not be overlooked that the various staff corps are just as deficient in numbers as is the line, and what has been stated in regard to these deficiencies of the line is equally true of the staff.

There should be, in peace times, sufficient personnel, active and reserve, to man immediately all our ships and stations on the outbreak of hostilities. What portion of this force should be active, and what portion should be reserve, depends on the policy of the Navy Department with reference to the status of the vessels of the fleet in peace times, and on the number of reserves that can be organized so as to be immediately available on the outbreak of hostilities. It is manifest that the number of vessels kept in full commission should be as large as possible if the fleet is to be ready at the beginning of a war. Therefore it is essential that our active naval forces be at all times, be as large as the financial problem involved admits.

Our present status with reference to the proportions between active forces and reserve forces, and in comparison with the total forces required is shown below:

TABLE X.—*Proportion between present active, reserve, and required forces.*

| | Commissioned officers. | | Warrant officers. | | Enlisted men. |
|--------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|---------------|
| | Number. | Per cent. | Number. | Per cent. | Number. |
| Present total active force, Table III..... | 1,920 | 43 | 670 | 51 | 53,000 |
| Total required force, Table IX..... | 1,432 | 32 | 140 | 11 | 25,000 |
| Additional required force, Table IX..... | 1,088 | 25 | 507 | 38 | 27,000 |
| Total force necessary, Table VI..... | 4,440 | 100 | 1,317 | 100 | 105,000 |

From this table we learn that our active and reserve forces together are only 43 per cent of what they should be in the case of commissioned officers, 66 per cent in the case of warrant officers, and 73.5 per cent in the case of enlisted men. It is important that immediate steps be taken to make up these deficiencies. The important question is what proportion should be allotted to active forces and what proportion to reserve. In view of the fact that a large percentage of our reserves are not organized and are not in any way under obligation to serve in the Navy, and in view of the untoward results obtained from all efforts to form a satisfactory naval reserve, we conclude that the greater part of the additional forces necessary immediately on the outbreak of war should be obtained by adding to our active forces, and such additions should be made as soon as possible. In other words our active naval forces should be 75 per cent of the total forces needed, and the ratio between actives and reserves should be as three to one.

between the personnel of our Navy and of the other leading naval powers is due to the unreliability of the information at hand. While the active personnel of the navies of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Austria approximate the same per 1,000 tons of ships, the effective trained reserves in each of these countries is so much larger as to make comparisons startling. In the powers mentioned the reserve is 50 per cent as large as the active forces, while in this country it is only 12 per cent as large as the active forces, and if we include the reserves whom we guess will offer their services in case of war, the reserve is 25 per cent as large as the active force. We also know that the personnel of these countries are organized from men who have actually served in the navy, while in this country they are in the merchant marine. The differences in the characteristics of the people enable the foreign countries to organize well-trained reserves which appears to be impossible in this country. These foreign countries also have merchant marines which the governments, thereby giving a claim on the personnel of the merchant marine, is not the case in this country. In addition, the personnel of these foreign countries are natives or citizens of their respective countries, a distinction that the United States can not claim.

A comparison between our personnel and that of foreign countries shows that our active forces and reserves give us 83 officers and men per 1,000 tons of ships, while the average in the six navies previously mentioned was, just before the present war, 123 officers and men per 1,000 tons of ships. It is therefore evident that not only is our personnel deplorably deficient, but it is without reference to the foreign navies, but it is alarming in view of the great extent to which the foreign countries surpass us in the element of national defense and preparedness. The comparison is a strong argument for immediately improving our personnel conditions.

The first step to organize a naval reserve in this country, to be composed of yachts, motor boats, and fishing vessels. That such organization is necessary in order to place the country on a proper defensive basis is proved by all who have followed the European war. But we must not be deceived into believing that such reserves will in anyway replace the stage as shown to exist on our men-of-war and at the naval yards. If these reserves are organized they will be required to man the yachts, motor boats, and fishing vessels, and will not be available for any of the vessels shown

in Table VI that, in case of war, we would require 4,410 commissioned officers, 106,900 warrant officers, and 106,900 enlisted men. As, owing to the lack of a large reserve, the active forces should be 75 per cent of the required force, if properly prepared for an emergency we should now have in our navy 3,307 commissioned line officers instead of only 1,920; 990 warrant officers instead of 79, and 80,000 enlisted men, instead of 53,000. Having this deficiency it becomes necessary to devise a means of supplying the

THE REMEDY.

The remedy is very far below what it should be that, it is, of course, impossible to obtain in a short time. Unless we throw discretion to the winds and say that it will be impracticable, or that will not be satisfactory, it will take a period of from 5 to 10 years to elapse before the naval personnel can be brought to that standard of efficiency which is required through an extended campaign. To do this in the shortest time possible must be to obtain more officers and men. The problem is a comparatively simple matter. We have not more of them than the law does not allow them. We are recruited to the limit of the law and have been so recruited for a year or more. There should be a provision for an increase of 50,000 enlisted men, at the rate of

5,000 a year, because in 10 years the added construction will require 20,000 men in addition to the 30,000 required at the present time. If we obtain all these men at once, and in view of the inability of our organization to make an increase it is not desirable that we endeavor to obtain them all at once. However, an increase of 5,000 a year will permit a healthy expansion of the navy and can be trained and distributed without any great upheaval. The law can be changed so that men can be enlisted each year provided enough recruiting money and sufficient funds made available for properly carrying on

the business. The question of distribution in the various ratings is now in the hands of the Navy Department. This is as it should be, and, in consequence, no legislation concerning the enlisted force is essential other than that which simply provides for an increase.

The two great defects in the officers' lists are lack of numbers and lack of flow of promotion. Now that the selection-out board has been abolished, the Navy Department has adopted the policy of not accepting voluntary retirements. The lack of numbers will be partially remedied by the normal sized graduating classes from the Naval Academy. These classes, with the present number of appointments authorized by law, should average 175 graduates a year. The number of retirements, resignations, and deaths in the line of the Navy should average about 30 a year. Therefore under present laws and rules we can count on the total number of line officers increasing at the rate of 145 a year. In 10 years we would have 1,450 more line officers than at present, and the total would then be 3,370 line officers or 1,450 less than the number required for efficient service with our Navy at its present size. It is certain that in 10 years from now there should be at least 4,000 line officers. After that total is reached, the policy in regard to ridding the service of obsolete vessels will be so well established that there will not be any great numerical increase in vessels, but as new ships are completed, a corresponding number of old ones will be discarded. In other words, if a regular building program of proper balance is adopted, we can expect that in 10 years the Navy will have reached the normal strength in ships beyond which Congress and the people will be unwilling to go. From that date the new construction will be for the purpose of replacing the old vessels. The Navy will then require 4,000 commissioned line officers on the list to provide the 75 per cent of the total that would be necessary to properly man the ships and shore stations in case of war. As there are now only 1,920 commissioned line officers, it is evident that we must furnish 2,080 in the next 10 years—an average of 208 a year. The Naval Academy is the only source from which these officers can be properly supplied, and we have seen that under the present régime the academy only furnishes sufficient graduates to give an average increase of 145 officers a year. Therefore it is necessary to increase the academy output so that the average increase for the next 10 years will be 238, which is the 208 increase required, plus the 30 officers which will be created by retirements, resignations, and deaths. However, the increase authorized in the number of midshipmen will not be felt in the service for 4 years have elapsed, so no matter what is done in this respect, for the next 4 years our increase will average only 145 which gives a total of 580 during that period. The increase in the number of midshipmen must be such that in the 6 following years there must be supplied the difference between 2,080 (the number required in 10 years) and 580 (the number obtained in 4 years), a total of 1,500. This means an average increase during this 6-year period of 250, or 105 more than the present average. Although the number required will not be twice that being furnished, it will be necessary to double the number of appointments to the Naval Academy in order to carry out the desirable and necessary weeding-out process that is so essential in order to obtain graduates who can reasonably be expected to make good officers. We must conclude, then, that in order to obtain the necessary number of line officers as a permanent basis, there should be legislation authorizing the doubling of appointments to the Naval Academy for a period of 6 years.

One of the greatest faults in all personnel legislation affecting the officers is the rule to fix definitely the number of officers allowed in each of the grades below lieutenant and above, instead of having the number in each grade determined by a definite percentage basis so that any increase in the total numbers would be felt in proper proportions in each grade. The fallacy of such legislation as we are now laboring under can not better be illustrated than in the case of the lieutenant grade. In 1905 there was not an officer of this grade in the Navy. To-day there are over 700 of them and the number is increasing more than 100 a year. Under the present laws and rules the officers at the bottom of this list must remain in their grade for 30 years. This condition has been brought about mainly through the absence of a proper distribution of the officers in the various grades. Our second conclusion, therefore, must be to the effect that immediate legislation should be enacted which places and keeps the various grades in a definite ratio to each other. What should this ratio be? There is an apparent tendency towards making such ratios depend on a tonnage basis; that there should be so many flag officers, captains, commanders, etc., for each 1,000 tons of ships. This basis may be satisfactory for a few years, but after that, unless the proportions between the ships of various grades do not change, there must be a readjustment. Changes are bound to take place, therefore readjustments will be necessary. These can easily be made, but...

... a better basis for apportioning the officers in the various grades would ... with our actual requirements for each grade in case of war, rather ... changing tonnage basis.

... and VI are shown the numbers of line officers now in each grade and ... should be for immediate war service. By placing these numbers ... together with the percentages in each grade, it is a simple matter ... what the numbers in each grade should be with our present total and ... be based on a total of 4,000 commissioned line officers, which num- ... determined on as being requisite for a peace basis 10 years from now.

TABLE XI.—Proportion of commissioned line officers in grades.

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Number now on active list extra numbers in paren- theses. | Percent- age in each grade. | Number required for war pur- poses, Table VI. | Percent- age in each grade. | Number should be in each grade at present, based on column 4. | Number that should be in each grade, based on total of 4,000. | Increase required in each grade within next 10 years. |
| | 24 (6) | 1.3 | 69 | 1.6 | 34 | 65 | 41 |
| | 90 (20) | 4.7 | 173 | 3.9 | 75 | 155 | 65 |
| | 122 (10) | 6.4 | 271 | 6.1 | 117 | 245 | 123 |
| | 204 (4) | 10.6 | 564 | 12.7 | 244 | 505 | 301 |
| | 351 (1) | 18.3 | 1,272 | 28.6 | 550 | 1,145 | 794 |
| | 701 | 39.6 | 1,041 | 23.4 | 450 | 935 | 174 |
| | 348 | 19.1 | 1,050 | 23.7 | 450 | 950 | 582 |
| | 1,920 | 100 | 4,440 | 100 | 1,920 | 4,000 | 2,080 |

... of captains and commanders are due to the numbers in those grades designated ... and who are in addition to the authorized total. Extra numbers are not included in

... the present distribution of the commissioned line officers in accord- ... of the total. Column 4 shows what these percentages should ... the distribution equitable, and column 5 shows the numbers that ... each grade in accordance with the percentages given in column 5.

... this redistribution there should be immediate legislation to the

... the passage of the act the various grades of commissioned line ... adjusted so that the percentage of the whole number in each grade

| | Per cent. |
|------------------------|-----------|
| ... | 1.6 |
| ... | 3.9 |
| ... | 6.1 |
| ... | 12.7 |
| ... | 28.6 |
| ... grade and ensigns. | 47.1 |

... should provide that on the 1st day of July of each year an adjust- ... grades shall be made on this same percentage basis, which shall ... 10 years, when the Secretary of the Navy shall require a board of ... whether or not the percentage basis should be changed. Such ... made thereafter in accordance with the recommendations of the

... commissioned line officers are concerned, these two provisions, together ... midshipmen at the Naval Academy, are all that are necessary to ... on a proper basis. That this is so will be demonstrated.

... which requires an immediate readjustment would result in the ... sixteen captains to flag officers, 21 commanders to captains, ... commanders to commanders, 70 lieutenant to lieutenant commanders, ... grade to lieutenants.

... promoted are not large when it is considered that in each case a ... officers are performing the duties of the next higher grade. This ... remedy the injury done by the abolishing of the selection-out ... of the Navy Department not to accept voluntary retirements.

All of the lieutenants (junior grade) who would be immediately promoted performing the duties of the senior grade, and all of them will have been still longer in their present grade.

The provision for adjusting the numbers in each grade on the 1st of July will provide for the necessary flow of promotion. It has been shown that in the next four years there will be an average annual increase of 145 line officers. This total increase when properly distributed in accordance with the percentages recommended, will give a yearly increase in the allowed numbers in each grade as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------|----|
| Flag officers..... | 10 |
| Captains..... | 20 |
| Commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenant commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants (junior grade) and ensigns..... | 25 |

Therefore this annual readjustment, without the aid of resignations, retirements and deaths, would result in the following numbers of promotions on the 1st of each July:

| | |
|------------------------------------------------|----|
| Captains to flag officers..... | 10 |
| Commanders to captains..... | 20 |
| Lieutenant commanders to commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants..... | 25 |

But, even without the assistance of the selecting-out board and the voluntary retirements, we know from the results of recent years that the resignations, deaths and retirements due to age and disability will make the following averages in promotions:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------|----|
| Above the grade of captain..... | 10 |
| Above the grade of commander..... | 20 |
| Above the grade of lieutenant commander..... | 20 |
| Above the grade of lieutenant..... | 20 |
| Above the grade of lieutenant (junior grade)..... | 25 |

These added to the numbers to be promoted due to the annual increase in various grades will give an average yearly advancement as shown below:

| | |
|------------------------------------------------|----|
| Captains to flag officers..... | 10 |
| Commanders to captains..... | 20 |
| Lieutenant commanders to commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants..... | 25 |

Four years after the 1st of next July the total line officers would (owing to the increase in midshipmen) be augmented annually by 250. We would then have the six years following an average increase in each grade as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------|----|
| Flag officers..... | 10 |
| Captains..... | 20 |
| Commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenant commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants (junior grade) and ensigns..... | 25 |

This would result in the following promotions on the 1st day of each July:

| | |
|------------------------------------------------|----|
| Captains to flag officers..... | 10 |
| Commanders to captains..... | 20 |
| Lieutenant commanders to commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders..... | 20 |
| Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants..... | 25 |

As the total line officers increase, the number of vacancies due to resignations, deaths, and retirements for age and disability must increase also, so the average number of vacancies created from these causes during the six-year period may reasonably be counted on as—

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------|----|
| Above the grade of captain..... | 10 |
| Above the grade of commander..... | 20 |
| Above the grade of lieutenant commander..... | 20 |
| Above the grade of lieutenant..... | 20 |
| Above the grade of lieutenant (junior grade)..... | 25 |

the annual promotions would be obtained by adding these numbers to the annual increase in the various grades:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| Midshipmen..... | 14 |
| Ensigns..... | 27 |
| Subalterns to commanders..... | 46 |
| Subaltern commanders..... | 83 |
| Subalterns to lieutenants..... | 163 |

It illustrates the important fact that, if the present law requiring three years remains effective, and if new legislation is enacted for a period of six years and fixing the number of midshipmen for a period of six years and fixing the number in each grade on a definite percentage basis, we can, during the life of the Navy up to a satisfactory strength and at the same time, without resorting to any schemes contemplated, or the formation of an active reserve list.

Every for the satisfactory operation of any plans requiring any selection is complicated. The opinions, both within and without the Navy, as to the best form of selection are numerous and varied. The best method to be selected has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the officers concerned. Consequently, there is, at present, no legislation pertaining to promotion by selection that will be passed. There will be so much opposition to any forms of selection that have been suggested or contemplated, that the mere presence of a proposed bill will probably be sufficient to prevent its passage. The necessity for practicable legislation necessitates the elimination of promotion by selection. The greater efficiency that would result from legislation of this character must be sacrificed owing to more important matters and a proper flow of promotion. As both of these can be secured by legislation that does not involve any method of selection, or any thing resembling an active reserve list, every proper endeavor should be made to the simplicity of the proposed bill.

It is sufficient numerical strength can be obtained to make it possible to deplete the number of officers by any method of selection. Before this time arrives there probably will have been organized a staff of officers from all corps, and on which the seagoing personnel will be selected. Such a staff created by act of Congress and containing some members of all the various corps, will, of necessity, have the confidence of the service. It creates it, the Secretary of the Navy, and of the entire service, and is able to devise the best and most satisfactory form of selection, and the method for carrying it into effect.

It requires the mature deliberation and action of such a staff. It is the best, indicating the necessity for promotion by selection, and when created, it will be necessary to have a board appointed to advise for the necessary legislation. But no board will be able to act without the approval of and has the support of the service. The board is composed in the main of seagoing officers both of the line and staff. As the various staff corps are in practically the same unsatisfactory position as in the line, any legislation for the purpose of improving the line must include those corps. It is essential that these corps be improved in any way, and therefore there should be enacted into law the following:

Section 1. In all staff corps the percentage of the whole number in each grade shall be that authorized for the line.

Section 2. The annual increase in the number of line officers there shall be the same as the increase in each of the various staff corps.

Section 3. The numbers are all that are necessary to place the staff on an equitable basis as far as numbers in each grade, total numbers, and flow of promotion are concerned.

Section 4. It is included that in order to take immediate steps to place the staff on a satisfactory basis as soon as practicable endeavors should be made to enact the following simple legislation enacted:

Section 5. The numbers of midshipmen for a period of six years shall be fixed on the various grades of line officers on a proper percentage basis.

Section 6. If this percentage basis as the total number increases.

4. The staff corps to have the same percentages in each grade as authorized in the line.

5. The percentage of increase in the various staff corps to be the same as the percentage of increase in the line.

The active service, 10 years from now, should have 4,000 commissioned line officers and 100,000 enlisted men. These numbers are only 75 per cent of the total that would be required to man all the material in case of war. It will therefore be necessary to increase our available reserves to 1,350 line officers and 33,000 enlisted men. There are now this many officers if we include 650 undergraduates at the Naval Academy. Efforts should be made to produce this total without making it necessary to send the midshipmen to sea. The total of 33,000 men can be obtained if the desirable portions of the naval reserve act are expunged and if endeavors are made to increase the Naval militia organizations. The naval militia is the best method through which to obtain the necessary reserve officers.

Warning must again be given against the organization of reserves that are maintained for service in peace times only. The maintenance of such reserves is a waste of money and their attempted training a waste of time. In addition, the presence of such a reserve on paper leads to a false sense of security that may prove dangerous when reliance must be placed on them in case of war. It must also be reiterated that such desirable organizations that may be composed of the fishermen, tugboat men, yachtsmen for the purpose of manning their own vessels in time of war, can in any way be considered as an effective reserve so far as the manning of the Navy ships and shore stations is concerned.

CONCLUSION.

The apathy concerning the naval personnel has resulted in the adherence to principles which account for the present unsatisfactory conditions. The principles are:

First. The sacrifice of efficiency to economy.

Second. The subordination of the personnel to the material.

Third. The construction of new vessels and the establishment of additional stations without provision for the personnel necessary to man and to operate them.

Fourth. The restriction of the number of officers in each of the upper grades to a percentage basis as the means for determining the number in each grade.

Legislation which will enable the Navy to abandon these false principles has been needed. The European war has shown our people that preparedness is necessary for successful military and naval operations. Our representatives in Congress have acted on this. They are ready to enact the required legislation provided the action of the Navy is presented in clear and concise form, without the introduction of complicated and complex features. It has been shown that only simple legislation is necessary to produce the much desired improvements in our personnel. Therefore it would be better for the present, to abandon the advocacy of any legislation that by reason of its mere complexity may defeat the ends in view.

Although good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships, we must awake to the realization that in order to be successful in war as it is waged today, we must have both good men and good ships in adequate numbers to make victory possible.

Capt. TAUSSIG. The inadequacy of the personnel, as shown by the report of the General Board, and by the figures deduced by the figures of the enlisted personnel division of the Bureau of Navigation, clearly demonstrated at this time, 1915, and in the following years. As the department did not recommend and did not strive to effect an increase in the personnel at this time, the efficiency of the Navy was clearly adversely affected both preceding and during the Great War.

This will be shown by quoting from official reports.

SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL IN ATLANTIC FLEET.

In the spring of 1915, which was only a few months after the General Board recommended an immediate increase of 19,600

Secretary reported no additional enlisted personnel was needed. Admiral F. F. Fletcher, the commander in chief of the fleet, made the following report to the Navy Department on the situation of the fleet:

"The most vital weakness in the Atlantic Fleet is the shortage of officers. It takes approximately 10 years to educate and train an officer, and no one can provide officers when trouble is imminent. Expansion of the fleet has not increased the number of officers available. The fleet is handicapped by the shortage of officers but by the inexperience of the large number of officers who have been added to the Navy in the past few years.

"Coupled with the shortage of officers, has resulted in officers being overworked and their capacities and for which their experience and judgment are being taxed. Due to the short enlistments, our men require continuous training, and this is certain to result in a lessening of efficiency. The shortage of officers is not confined to battleships, but exists in all types of ships. Second in importance to the shortage of officers is the shortage of men. The shortage of men is a direct consequence to the shortage of officers, since there will always be a large number of untrained and untrained men can be made efficient in much less time than it takes to develop officers. The shortage of men in the Atlantic Fleet, coupled with the shortage of officers, has prevented the fleet from attaining the degree of efficiency expected. Too much emphasis can not be placed on what is the most serious weakness in the fleet to-day—lack of trained officers and men. To equalize the shortage in the different vessels and to avoid the exchange of officers and men tending to promote instability in the various units of the fleet. With a few exceptions the Atlantic Fleet is short of the complement of officers and men needed. The shortage of enlisted men in the battleships alone, as I reported in 1915, exceeds 5,000 men. It is evident that undermanned and underofficered ships cannot be kept in a state of preparedness and efficiency to meet on any emergency as other navies. I believe that all ships in full commission in the Atlantic Fleet should be kept fully manned for battle, ready for any emergency that might be called. In no other way can the units of the fleet be kept in an efficient state.

"It must be placed on this report of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, coming at a time when the department reported that no additional enlisted personnel was necessary. It is an admission that the fleet were not in an efficient state, and this admission was made by the commander in chief.

Q. What was the date?

A. It was made in the spring of 1915, and immediately after that year. The exact date I have not, but it was in the spring of 1915.

Q. Shortage of personnel was felt by all classes of vessels, was it not?

A. It was felt by officers of wide difference in rank as very much as by the men, and that it did adversely affect the efficiency of the fleet. This is shown by the following extracts taken from reports made to the Navy Department in 1915 by fleet gunnery officer, Fleet, Lieut. Commander, now Capt., T. A. Kearney.

Q. These reports were made when?

A. These were all made in 1915, at the time that the fleet reported that we needed no additional personnel.

"I must strongly urge that immediate attention be given to the problem of adequate and permanent personnel. Every problem, every difficulty that we have engaged in during the past year has but one solution—more men. We have neither the officers nor the men necessary to the efficient operation of the fleet. The constant changing of officers, coupled with the assigning to junior duty beyond their years, experience, and ability. The unsatisfactory conditions as regards personnel are so general as to affect every organization in the fleet—battleships, destroyers, and

marines, and auxiliaries—and have during the past year been made the repeated report.

Gunnery efficiency is concomitant with general efficiency, and both are dependent upon the efficiency of the commissioned and enlisted personnel.

Gunnery officer, Atlantic Fleet (Lieut. Commander, now Capt., T. A. Keane):

"Improvement and incentive will also come if the department will direct its

"(a) To an increase in complements of both the enlisted personnel and commissioned personnel.

"(b) To the prevention of inopportune detachments of officers and transfers and to the creation of such impediments as will render discharge, either by pay or expiration of enlistment practically impossible, except during overhaul periods.

"Recent investigations along entirely independent lines fully confirm the conditions set forth in the target practice reports of the *Wyoming*, *Texas*, *Aransas*, *Georgia*, and other ships, that our present maintained complements, including officers and men, are inadequate to even peace time target practice requirements. Continued cruising under war conditions would be physically impossible; even when continuing night and day practices are indulged in, a large percentage of personnel remain more or less, continuously on active duty until the practice is completed. Not only do we lack a reserve to draw upon for replacements due to casualties, but we are so hard pressed to man existing and essential stations that a considerable proportion of both officers and men are doing double duty to the detriment of their paramount activities. Broadside battery crews are in part borrowed organizations; and the personnel of handling room crews are all too frequently a heterogeneous combination of engineer's force, marines, and such other men as are best spared from some other less exacting employment—men whose initial training and allegiance are to other duties and divisions. These are conditions that to-day and have existed for some time. It is pertinent to ask what would we do if war be declared to-morrow.

"The shortages in personnel are as apparent in the flotilla as in the other vessels of the fleet. With the present complements it is manifest that the exacting requirements of continuous service could not be met."

Executive officer, U. S. S. *Florida* (Commander, now Capt., W. S. Crocker):

"It is a fact that every effort has been made to retain individuals at their stations in which they have drilled, and it is probable that the *Florida* does not suffer more than other ships on account of shifting personnel. However, it can not be denied that the complement is so small that the loss of one man is felt, and that the efficiency of the personnel decreases efficiency."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Georgia* (Capt., now Admiral, R. E. Coontz, Chief of Operations):

"The serious shortage of officers and men on board all battleships and especially the old ones, is a matter of record. The extreme seriousness of this condition should be known by the department."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Kansas* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. F. Brewster):

"The existing shortage of personnel on ships of this class was shown by the fact that had to be employed to man properly the 8-inch turrets of this ship."

Gunnery officer U. S. *Nebraska* (Lieut., now Commander, G. V. Stewart):

"This ship suffers severely from the lack of officers and men and more from the lack of permanence in their duties and stations."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *New Jersey* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, J. L. Jellicoe):

"The efficiency of a ship or a fleet at the commencement of war will depend upon its preparation before is declared, and if not ready with an aggressive enemy, may not be an opportunity to complete the preparations before a disaster has occurred. It is therefore highly important that each ship in commission be kept ready. The frequency with which officers and men are now transferred, together with the fact that of both, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to do this."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *South Carolina* (Lieut., now Commander, T. G. Ellery):

"There was a certain amount of artificiality in connection with this practice, due to the shortage of complement."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Utah* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. P. Niblack):

"At every battle drill or practice the serious shortage of trained officers and men in one particular or another is forcibly brought to our attention."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Kansas* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. F. Brewster):

"* * * It must be admitted that we are not making progress in gunnery as we should. This lack of progress is believed to be due principally to two conditions which affect all ships—the shortage of commissioned and enlisted personnel and the constant shifting of the personnel."

First Division, Atlantic Fleet (Rear Admiral Mayo):

Attention is invited to the remarks of the gunnery officer, *New York*, lack of permanency of personnel and to the fact that the ship is undermanned."

5th U. S. S. *New York* (Lieut. Commander G. J. Rowcliff):

The lack of the permanency of the personnel the most fruitful producer that we have. It seems that it is impossible to depend on the continuity of either officers or men longer than to get a smattering of what is new. Add to this that the ships are underofficered and undermanned and resolves itself into one where stations are filled because the names are back rather than because the individual is chosen to fill the station."

5th U. S. S. *New York* (Commander G. J. Rowcliff):

I have made the statement that one of the principal reasons why the work is crude and never progresses further than the elementary personnel changes so fast that it is impossible to put the work on a

Everyone admits that the situation in regard to personnel has been day by day. Those responsible for the detail of officers and men have been living an existence from hand to mouth because there is no time when it becomes necessary to fill vacancies."

2nd U. S. S. *Albatross* (Admiral W. C. Cowles):

was at the navy yard, Olongapo, from the 19th of February until the repairs, and during this time her ordnance officer was detached. It was impossible to send any officer to the *Saratoga* to replace him. There were 70 men in the deck force short of complement, and there were 100 in addition."

1st U. S. S. *Florida* (Commander, now Capt., W. S. Crosley):

The personnel, however, was amply emphasized by this prac-

1st U. S. S. *Rhode Island* (Lieut., now Commander, W. R. van Auken):

to make officers on board to provide for war conditions.

to man both sides of the 6-inch and 3-inch batteries 75

men.

that the deficiencies and changes in personnel are the most which prevent ships being at all times in a top-notch state of battle

REPORT OF ELEMENTARY PRACTICE, 1915-16.

First Division, Battleship Squadron (Rear Admiral Coffman):

Commander can not too strongly impress upon the department the importance of this division suffer because of lack of adequate personnel. The allowed complements are considered far too small to properly man the ships. This deficiency is always accentuated by a shortage of officers and complements. Such a condition of affairs necessitates the use of some of which are more or less incompatible, with consequent

1st U. S. S. *Arkansas* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, W. R. Shoemaker):

low for battle efficiency is a fair degree of performance in the ship. It is serious with the men, but especially so with the officers. The conditions are worse off than others, but these conditions do not conduce

1st U. S. S. *Tahiti* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, A. S. Halstead):

that the ship is the lack of permanence of personnel, presumably officers and men. No lasting results will be obtained until a permanent personnel is brought about."

1st U. S. S. *Tahiti* (Commander, now Capt., E. H. Watson):

The number of changes in officers and men in every ship is the principle

reports just quoted mostly come from our battleships in those few ships which in accordance with the General Order of the Commander in Chief should be fully manned at all times. Many other reports and letters in the files of the Bureau and department which substantiate this deplorable condition of the personnel. In the Secretary of the Navy's annual report of December 1, 1915, recommendation was made that

Congress authorize an increase of 10,000 men, which would bring total authorized enlisted strength to 61,500.

In 1915 the General Board recommended:

With full war complements for all ships of the Navy ready for service in 1917 a minimum number required at shore stations 74,700 men will be needed. In case upon the outbreak of war the personnel of the Navy must be greatly expanded to provide for aviation, coast-defense districts, patrol craft, and other auxiliary vessels of every sort, as well as for a reserve of men under training to replace casualties. The Coast Guard, Naval Militia, and Naval Reserve will be far from sufficient to meet demands. The Navy is the first line of defense of the country. For peace requirements in the fiscal year 1917 the General Board regards as inadequate any strength less than 67,000 men in the regular Navy.

The department requested a strength of only 61,500 men, which was 5,500 less than the smallest force the General Board recommended for peace requirements. The General Board's estimate was based on the inadequate complements allowed at the time, and not on the adequate complements recommended by the Commander in Chief and other officers. The department continued to take no adequate steps toward providing sufficient trained personnel for war purposes. The Naval Reserve law which had been passed would not provide trained men in large numbers for years to come.

The very unsatisfactory condition in which the Navy had been owing to inadequacy of personnel, was fully appreciated by the Chief of Bureau of Navigation in August, 1916. He recommended to the department an immediate increase of enlisted personnel to an active force of 93,957 men. He also recommended that "from 5 to 10 per cent be added to this number for increased complements and war-time surplus, and the authorized enlisted strength should be increased to this number in time for the necessary recruiting and training." These reserves were considered to be necessary in addition to the active force. While up to this time the department recommended an active force of only 61,500 men, we suddenly find the number jumping to 93,957 men plus 5 to 10 per cent for casualties, 10 per cent of this number would make the total for the three-year building program 102,000, approximately 49,000 more than the department a few months previously had recommended.

The chief of bureau, Admiral Palmer, also recommended that the order to provide for the shortage of officers "that the appointments be increased; that the course of the Naval Academy be reduced to three years until the shortage is made up; and that the first class be graduated on February 1, 1917."

Congress authorized, on August 29, 1916, an immediate increase in the active enlisted personnel to 74,700 men and authorized the President in emergency to bring the total to 93,000. The Secretary had recommended only 61,500 men. This was the first really adequate steps toward placing the personnel on a proper footing.

These recommendations and the corresponding action of Congress came too late to permit having an adequate personnel by the time this country entered the war, a few months later. In the meantime the efficiency of the entire fleet was adversely affected as shown in the following official reports made to the Navy Department in 1916 and in the spring of 1917 up to the time of our actual entry into war.

and extracts from some of these reports. These were in
 following:

SPRING OF 1916.

Atlantic Fleet (Lieut. Commander, now Capt., T. A. Kearney):
 "The cause in personnel has been general and insistent throughout
 the fleet."

"Complements and a permanency of detail we may reasonably expect
 to result in general efficiency."

U. S. S. New York (Capt., now Admiral, Hugh Rodman):

"The cause, as pointed out by others concerning the frequent changes in personnel
 is something that can be added to it. Yet if is one of the glaring
 defects of the fleet."

"It can not be obtained when officers and men are continually
 changing."

South Carolina (Lieut., now Commander T. G. Ellyson):

"The better results from gunnery in the fleet is primarily due to the
 fact that the officers running the gunnery jobs have not the necessary rank
 to command them."

Arkansas (Lieut. Commander, now Commander, D. A.

"The lack of personnel seriously affects the battle efficiency of the
 fleet."

New Jersey (Lieut., now Commander, L. N. McNair):

"The lack of officers on the ship to properly man all battle stations and
 to meet the requirements of the Navy Regulations. * * *

"The lack of men on the ship to properly man 6-inch and 3-inch batteries
 and to man the stations are manned."

Wyoming (Lieut., now Commander, R. S. Holmes):

"The personnel was especially noticeable at division practice. Han-
 dling was depleted to such an extent that continuous loading would
 not be possible."

"The shortage and lack in permanence of personnel is most
 noticeable."

San Diego (Lieut., now Commander, G. C. Pegram):

"The ship is handicapped by the shortage of personnel and officers to
 properly man all battle stations without having to shift from one station to
 another. The constant shifting of personnel prevents attaining a high state
 of efficiency."

REPORT OF BATTLE PRACTICE, AUTUMN, 1916.

Atlantic Fleet Vice Admiral Coffman:

"The condition of most of the ships in one way or another called attention
 to the lack of personnel and in some cases to the lack of suitable
 equipment. This condition is well known and a matter of record and con-
 sideration and will not be enlarged upon. It is sufficient to say
 that it is essential not only to man the battle stations, but there
 must be a reserve in order that expirations of enlistments may be adequately
 covered."

Division 5 Rear Admiral Dunn:

"The opinion of the opinion that the paramount cause for the failure
 of the ships to make a better showing was due to their long stay
 at sea and lack of complement and lack of permanence in personnel."

Division 7 Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers:

"On September 30, 1916, the *Florida* took up on the pay rolls
 530 men and transferred 535
 530 men and transferred 25; the *Utah* received 466 men and
 transferred 466. The degree of permanency of personnel is necessary for a high
 state of efficiency and no amount of drill and standardization can counteract
 the effect of constant changes in personnel."

Albatross (Lieut., now Commander, W. E. Eberle):

"The lack of personnel, which always exist, lack of permanence of personnel and
 the lack of equipment were met with in the preparation for this practice. * * *

"The lack of permanency of personnel, can be overcome, the second
 time around, will automatically disappear."

Albatross (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, Monroe Kelly):

"In the preparation for short-range battle practice one of the greatest troubles division officer had to contend with was the frequent changes in personnel. It has been stated quite often that one reason why our work in target practice is not efficient and never progresses beyond a certain stage is that the personnel changes so frequently that it is impossible to put the work on a stable footing."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Michigan* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, Brittain):

"It has been necessary to train almost a complete new outfit of pointers for the main broadside and turret gun, due to the big changes being continually made in the personnel."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Delaware* (Lieut., now Commander, Logan Cresap):

"No other fact has been so forcibly brought out by this practice as the lack of permanent shifting personnel. Altogether some 28 officers on this vessel were utilized in the conducting the ship control, fire control, and gunnery work. Of these some 15 (including the commanding officer, executive officer, navigator, and gunnery officer) were in the same or equal positions as held on previous practice. Figures can be given on the number of crews, pointers, etc., but figures are unnecessary in this report in this respect. It is only to say that the situation was as bad, if not worse with the crew than with the officers."

"* * * Altogether the complement of the ship is short, on a peace basis, by about 75 men."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Minnesota* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, J. H. Coffman):

"The same trouble is still being experienced with lack of permanency of personnel. For several years this unfortunate condition has existed, and there seems to be no immediate relief in view."

Gunnery officer, U. S. S. *Texas* (Lieut., now Commander, H. L. Pence):

"On this ship there is a serious lack of men to properly man stations for gunnery."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Vermont* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. O. Smith):

"The necessity for permanence of personnel can not be too much emphasized. As long as the Navy has too few men to man those ships that must be kept in service, so long will it be inevitable that many changes will be required, and ships will be short-handed. To remedy this there should be a surplus of men. * * *

Commander battleship force, Atlantic Fleet (Vice Admiral Coffman):

"The commander battleship force considers that the provision at all times of adequate personnel is necessary. It is apparent that a large number of faults in the material are chargeable in the final analysis to the inadequacy and inexperience of the personnel, caused by the fact that there has not been available an excess of personnel for training in time of peace."

"The deficiencies in operation can best be handled by improving the methods and opportunities for training. In this respect there are two fundamental difficulties which can not be well handled by the commander battleship force. In order that the personnel may be highly developed, it is necessary that there be maintained on each ship not only a full complement of officers and men, but a surplus complement in order that reliefs for anticipated vacancies may be put in training to occupy the vacated positions when prospective vacancies occur. This condition, it is evident, is very hard to realize, but it is hoped that eventually the effectiveness of training and the efficiency of operation may be increased by a proper adequacy and permanence of personnel."

Those are the reports we had up to the 1st of January, 1917, about 18 months before we entered the war.

The foregoing extracts deal almost entirely with the condition of the battleship force up to a few months before our entry into the war. It should be pointed out that the battleships were, on the whole, better provided with personnel than any other force.

These quoted extracts taken from official reports show:

1. That the entire Navy, for several years prior to the entry of this country into the war and up to the time of actual hostilities, was not as efficient as it should be owing to lack of necessary personnel.

2. That this state of affairs was reported to the department General Board, by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and by a number of other officers.

3. That the department took no adequate steps to remedy the situation.

the department's policy in regard to personnel was one of peace rather than one of preparedness.

My province to point out the result of this lack of preparedness as far as it affected the entire Navy during the war, as there was first-hand information that can do this better than I. As I commanded destroyers before and during the war, at some time the senior destroyer commander in the Navy, with the committee's permission to make a statement in this service.

ARMAN. What committee is that?

ARMAN. With regard to the destroyer service.

During the Bureau of Navigation in 1915 it was necessary that destroyers recommended by the General Board to be in commission be retained in this status to reduce their peace complements by 25 per cent. After a trial was operating on these reduced complements the experiment failed and the old complements were reestablished. However, establishment of these old complements did not mean that destroyers would be provided with the personnel required. They could not be so provided, as the personnel was not available and did not exist, and it was manifestly impossible to provide what did not exist.

Following extracts from the official reports made during 1916 of the bad personnel situation affected the destroyers.

From the reports made during the year previous to our entry into the war. (Reading.)

Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet (Rear Admiral, now Admiral, Gleaves): "During the period of training the complements of ships were short, so much so, from time to time it became necessary to transfer men from ship to ship as all vessels might operate. Such transfers frequently broke up gun crews and groups in training."

Also called by a table showing the average per cent of vacancies in destroyers to be 15 per cent of their allowed complements.

From 1916

Lieut. S. S. Nicholson (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, L. C. Shiebla): "The personnel made it necessary to employ men at stations that they were not trained for in war."

Lieut. S. S. Nicholson (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, L. C. Shiebla): "Operating on a reduced complement, which makes it necessary to employ men on stations that should be manned by deck force. Consequently the battery or the engineer's work is neglected."

Lieut. S. S. Nicholson (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, L. C. Shiebla): "The practice was artificial, inasmuch as there were not enough men on board to properly man the battle stations necessary for war."

Lieut. S. S. Lydon (Lieut., now Commander, J. S. Barleon): "The reduced complement absolutely necessitates the use of every man in the complement of a gun's crew."

Also that five officers is the minimum requirement for a war complement of this type.

Also that the complement is utterly inadequate."

Lieut. S. S. McDougal (Lieut. Commander, now Commander, J. S. Barleon):

It showed conclusively that four officers are not sufficient in time of war.

It is worth the time and money spent in preparing her for war, she is worth the additional cost of two more officers to afford her the protection.

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Wadsworth* (Lieut. Commander, now Capt. Taussig):

"The complement, both officers and men, is not sufficient for a proper ship, guns and torpedo tubes, and at the same time keep an adequate ammunition and run the engines with fires under all four boilers."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Balch* (Lieut. J. M. Cresap):

"The shortage in personnel is an ever-present handicap, one gun crew composed of a ship's cook, coppersmith, and four firemen. There are not enough men on the ship to man all guns and torpedo tubes, magazines, and handling room enough men below for full-power steaming, as would be necessary in time of war."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Dale* (Lieut., now Commander V. K. Coman):

"* * * with a shortage of one-seventh of the ship's company, are the main and attributable reasons for the division as a whole not making better success."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Ericsson* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander R. M. Deane):

"This ship was placed at a serious disadvantage on account of nonpermanent shortage of men."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Jacob Jones* (Lieut. Commander, now Commander W. S. Pye):

"This ship has been from 12 to 14 men short of her complement during the war period."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Wainwright* (Lieut. Commander, now Commander F. H. Poteet):

"During the quarter in which this practice was held this ship had 85 men personnel."

The bad effect of this shortage in personnel, together with the operations of the destroyer force during the year preceding the entrance of the United States into the war, is shown by the unsatisfactory results of the target practice for the year preceding the war. These target practices were held, of course, with the view of making the ships efficient for war, and as many vessels as possible were supposed to take part in them. However, only seven destroyers of the force held a sufficient number of practices during the year preceding the war, classified in the usual manner. In regard to this the department announced to the service in reference to the destroyers:

The gunnery trophy will not be awarded for the gunnery year 1916 because of a small number of vessels completing the year's work and because the scores made by these vessels do not warrant the award of the trophy.

Therefore, it is seen that at the outbreak of war even the department recognized that the destroyer force was not as efficient as it should be.

OVERHAUL OF DESTROYERS.

It was customary for the destroyers to go to the navy yard a year for overhauling. These periods usually came in the summer and fall.

From January to April, 1917, the destroyer I commanded by *Wadsworth*, was operating with the fleet in West Indian waters in addition to carrying on the prescribed target practices, and after diplomatic relations were broken off in February, employed on patrol duty and in picketing the fleet. The service was unusually hard and arduous. In fact, from January 8, 1917, the day *Wadsworth* left the navy yard, until April 13, 1917, the day she was received to proceed to the navy yard to prepare for service—a period of 99 days—the *Wadsworth* was actually under way on 75 of these days. As a result we had had practically no general overhauling of hull and machinery.

The other five destroyers selected to accompany the *Wadsworth* had been operating in a similar manner.

I had nothing to do with the selection of the six destroyers which composed the first division to be sent across, I understood they were selected as being in the best state of preparedness. Although these six destroyers were in fairly good condition they were, after three months of hard and continuous sailing the time when they should go to the navy yards for regular spring docking and overhauling, the necessity for overhauling to be apparent.

For a thorough overhauling we had six days in which to make repairs and to prepare for distant service, and for the day on which we might be called.

Our day was to be we did not know. The division, without a supply ship and without knowledge of how or where supplies were to be obtained, sailed under sealed orders.

On account of what had to be done on account of the lack in preparedness, my experiences while commanding destroyers in the submarine danger zone may be cited.

When a new destroyer placed in commission, 25 of the best crews were taken from those destroyers actually operating in the face of the enemy in order that these new destroyers should have really trained men at all.

As a result in practically all destroyers that remained in the war zone having nearly a complete turnover in their personnel the stability of personnel was the greatest detriment to the efficiency of the destroyers.

When the destroyers could operate against submarines to some degree of success, I am safe in saying that not a single destroyer in the war zone, shortly after the turnover commenced, was in really satisfactory or efficient condition for taking part in a fleet action or engaging enemy destroyers. Had been the intention for the destroyers to engage enemy destroyers it would have taken at least a four months' preparation with stable crews away from the war zone and they would have been expected to operate successfully.

It is true that this procedure of depleting the class of the destroyers in the war zone was absolutely necessary under the conditions of lack of trained personnel in order that the destroyers could operate. In fact Admiral Palmer, the chief of Naval Operations, cabled Admiral Sims that unless this was taken proper personnel could not be provided for the destroyers. But such procedure should not have been necessary. Would it have been necessary had our personnel been stable from the beginning of the war.

CONCERNING THE NEW DESTROYERS.

When the first destroyer commanders sent home from the war zone to take command of the new war program destroyers, I was assigned me to duty in connection with the U. S. S. *Little*, the command that vessel when commissioned. The *Little* was the first of the war program to be completed. Owing to delays in construction, she was not placed in commission until April 1918, a year after we entered the war.

All destroyer commanders placed in charge of fitting out new vessels had the greatest difficulty in obtaining suitable crews. In fact it was not possible to get suitable crews, because the personnel did not exist. Each crew was made up approximately of 25 men returned from the war zone, of about 25 additional men that were picked up from various sources, and about 25 men with practically no seagoing experience. We could and did go on convoy duty immediately on being placed in commission.

It would have required a long period of training before we could have operated efficiently or successfully against enemy destroyers or have taken part in fleet action.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE.

To summarize the testimony just given it is evident that the following facts have been established:

1. That when the World War started in 1914 the personnel of the United States Navy was entirely inadequate for peace purposes and deplorably deficient should this country be thrown into the war event which was apt to occur at any time.

2. That this deplorable and unsatisfactory condition of the personnel was brought to the department's attention by the General Board of the Navy, by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, by the officers of the Enlisted Personnel Division of the Bureau of Navigation, and by many other officers of high rank.

3. That these same officers made repeated and emphatic recommendations to the department that immediate steps be taken to remedy these unsatisfactory conditions, showing conclusively in their reports and recommendations that the efficiency of the Navy was adversely affected by the great shortage of personnel.

4. That the department not only ignored these recommendations but took steps to prevent the reports as to the unsatisfactory personnel conditions from being made public, and the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report to the President in the fall of 1914 stated that the numerical strength of the enlisted personnel was adequate and in his report of 1915 that only an additional 10,000 men were needed, while the General Board in its 1914 report had stated that 19,600 men were immediately needed.

5. That the department did not take adequate steps to provide personnel absolutely necessary for proper conduct of the Navy even on a peace basis, with a result that when this country entered the war in 1917 the ships of the fleet were not as efficient as they should have been and for a large number of ships there was no trained personnel at all.

6. The policy of the department in regard to personnel was one of unpreparedness rather than of preparedness. Such steps as were finally taken were too late to place the personnel on a proper basis at the time this country became involved in the war a few months later.

7. That as a result of this department policy of unpreparedness the larger part of the ships of the Navy operated throughout the war with inadequately trained personnel, and in consequence they were not as efficient as they should have been.

at the efficiency of the destroyers in the war zone was due to the necessity caused by our unprepared personnel of taking many of their most efficient men to the United States to form crews for the new destroyers.

Unless these nucleus crews had been taken from those actually operating in the face of the enemy the department would not have been able to provide sufficient trained personnel for destroyers to permit their operating.

But the new destroyers commissioned during the war were not for fighting purposes on account of the large proportion of personnel on each one.

SENATOR. Then, Capt. Taussig, what have you to say in regard to the statement of the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report that the Navy from stem to stern had been made ready for any eventuality?

TAUSSIG. I think, sir, that my statement here covers that.

SENATOR. You would not say that the personnel of the Navy was not ready?

TAUSSIG. No, sir.

SENATOR. You have spoken of many changes in personnel on the Navy. Was that a necessity, to make the changes as made?

TAUSSIG. The instability of the personnel, that is the lack of senior officers, was caused entirely by the inadequacy of the system.

The whole system of providing personnel was one from which there was practically nobody on the receiving end of any vacancies.

The consequence was that men were displaced at the expiration of their enlistments, and there was nobody to fill the places, and a man's place was not filled until some man came back.

That could only have been prevented by an adequate system of training. There was no possible way of preventing shifting, so long as we did not have sufficient numbers.

SENATOR. It was not the custom to assign men to battleships for training on battleships, and then to assign them to destroyers?

TAUSSIG. Not prior to the war; no, sir. They had to do that after the war commenced, in order to get a trained personnel.

SENATOR. But prior to the war that was not the system employed in the Navy.

TAUSSIG. No, sir; we did not have them to train in that way. We did not have enough men to fill the complements, much less to have them sent abroad to train.

SENATOR. I think you have stated that Admiral Fletcher would take 10 years to thoroughly equip an officer.

TAUSSIG. Yes.

SENATOR. That does not mean, does it, that officers could not be of value in the Navy in a much shorter time.

TAUSSIG. Why, no, sir. It means that an all-around naval officer should be able to perform any duty and every duty commensurate with his rank, can not be trained in less than 10 years.

SENATOR. In other words, officials for the higher commands?

TAUSSIG. Not necessarily the very highest commands. The officers on the battleships, such as the heads of various departments, the gunnery officer, the navigator, and men of

sort, those officers, in order to be efficient, require at least 10 years of service. We can not possibly do it in less than 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. But if the recommendations of the officers of the fleet in regard to increase in personnel and in officers, made in 1905 and 1915 had been followed, it would have been possible to have trained officers who would have been of use after the war began.

Capt. TAUSSIG. Oh, yes, it would have given us those younger officers that much sooner and given them that much more training.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would have released the other officers for higher duties.

Capt. TAUSSIG. It would have released them for higher duties. They would have stepped up. It was a step-up process and it was an essential process where the younger officer had to take the place of the older officer, because the older officer was needed for something else higher up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell, have you any questions to ask the witness?

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral Fletcher made that criticism in 1905, is that right?

Capt. TAUSSIG. In the spring of 1915, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you would take that literally that would have had to start in 1905 with the getting ready of officers for this war than could have been prophesied probably in 1917—I mean, if we were going to rely upon his statement?

Capt. TAUSSIG. There was a great difference—

Senator TRAMMELL. The present Secretary was not in charge of the Navy Department in 1905, was he?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Construing his criticism literally then was a neglect on the part of the Navy Department in 1905?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir, I do not agree with you there. There were steps being taken in 1905. The great trouble came when the big extension of the matériel of the Navy commenced. The expansion of the matériel, when those big battleships began to come out, was after 1905. Practically up to 1912 the personnel situation was not acute, because we did not have so much matériel. It became acute in 1912, when Congress then authorized that the personnel strength be placed at 51,500. In 1905 there was no war imminent. In 1914 there was war imminent, and all the officers of high rank in the Navy believed we were going to be forced into that war. Not only the officers of the highest rank believed that, but the ones like myself.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I have in mind is that you always got to be anticipating war 10 years in advance, so that your officers are concerned, according to his statement, and do not know of anybody in this country who is so prophetic in his vision of the future that he can anticipate a war 10 years in advance if it is a matter of preparing for war that is imminent.

Capt. TAUSSIG. There were a good many who anticipated it.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what you would call purely a matter of guess.

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir, it is a study of history.

Senator TRAMMELL. A good many people thought that the war was coming to an end.

But they had no historical evidence to go by.

THEMMELL. The Good Book says that there shall be wars and wars, and soon the end will come. They thought the war have come to an end by now, but it has not come to an end yet, and can not always tell about those things.

When the recommendation was made that the Navy be increased 750, with a margin of 5 to 10 per cent additional, do you remember or not that legislation was favored by the Navy?

I know this: That in the Secretary's annual report he stated that an increase of 10,000 men, which would make 75,000, was all that we needed. I know that the testimony of the committee which resulted in a big increase, showed a decision on the part of the Secretary at that time to this increase. The General Board, represented by Admiral Badger before the committee, made an urgent appeal for the increase, and that was made, I think, because Congress appreciated that recommendation, not because the department urged it. That is my impression.

THEMMELL. That is your view of it, but do you not know whether the Secretary recommended that increase or not in August,

1915? The only official recommendation of the Secretary that was in his annual report of 1915, made a few months before the meetings of the committee were held, in which he said that only 10,000 were needed. That is all I can give you on that, sir.

THEMMELL. In the same month in 1915 was the General Board recommending ninety-seven thousand and odd men? Have you any way to show that the General Board at that time recommended more than the 10,000 additional?

The General Board said that --

THEMMELL. I think you said that they recommended about the same as the Secretary recommended at that time.

I happen to know something about the inside of the General Board at that time, but I do not think it is proper to tell it because I was not there, and I would suggest that one of the board be called on to tell you. I do know that the General Board knew they had to submit figures that would be accepted. I know that they were restricted.

Who was at the head of the General Board at that

I think Admiral Dewey was still at the head of it. They were restricted in their recommendations, and in this critical situation before the public they were recommending a report that the Secretary would accept, and all their recommendations were founded on this basis. Now, for instance, I know that at the figures that 67,000 men were the least number that would be willing to recommend -- 67,000 the least possible. They based this on the very inadequate complement that they then had, which everybody knew to be inadequate. They took complements. They did not take the complements that were needed. If they had taken the complements that were needed, as it came out afterwards, they would have had

to ask for approximately 93,000 men, and it was shown that we went into the war we should have had at least 106,000 men Navy—that is, to be on board the ships and man the naval stations on that day. That is what we should have had, and we were very far short of it.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I am getting at is that you say that the General Board and the secretary differed in the latter part of 1915 to the extent of less than 5,000 men in what they agreed in this increase?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I said they differed in that, in the report of the General Board on the peace basis, not for preparation for war, it was to maintain the ships as if no war was in sight, and the secretary said it was the smallest number that they were willing to set, and that they had to come down to a small number because they knew that if they put in a big number that recommendation would not get out.

Senator TRAMMELL. I understand what you are trying to do. You are trying to make it appear that the secretary in August, 1915, did not favor the bill that was passed at that time, as far as personnel was concerned. So far the logic of your suspicion and your conclusion is that he had recommended in the latter part of December considerably less. Now, your own testimony shows that in the latter part of 1915 the General Board recommended only 74,700. Then, the secretary is guilty of not being in sympathy with this measure in August, and you based it upon the fact that his recommendation was less in the latter part of 1915; why is it that you do not say that the board were opposed to it because they recommended less in the latter part of 1915?

Capt. TAUSSIG. You will notice that the way the General Board reported is that they came in with this minimum number. They had to come down to the minimum. Every officer in the Navy knew that if we went into the war we would need over 100,000 men. There is no question about that. The figures in this report show conclusively that the General Board were restricted. That is the trouble. The General Board were not free to come out with what they thought, because if they came out with what they thought they could not get anything out at all. Ask Admiral Fiske what happened. I suggest that you ask him. He was there, and he can give you the actual information as to why even the figures of the General Board are inadequate. I will admit that those figures were inadequate, and the General Board knew they were inadequate, and they had to do it to get anything.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point in my mind is that I can not see why you charge the Secretary of the Navy with not being in favor of this, and base it upon these figures, and yet you do not charge the General Board with that. That is the point I am getting at. In other words, you seem to think that the General Board had a right to revise its figures, but that the Secretary of the Navy did not have a right to revise his figures six months afterwards.

Capt. TAUSSIG. After this legislation went through the secretary came out and praised it very highly. In fact, I think he came out in his annual report, and stated afterwards that this legislation, which brought the Navy up to a total of 93,000 men, was the first time adequate legislation had been provided.

• TEAMMELL. Your idea then was that they should have entered in 1914 for a war that did not come for five years.

• TAUSSIG. Yes; that is my idea.

• TEAMMELL. I suppose if we had not gotten into the war we would have considered that this country had pursued a policy in not expending an enormous amount of money for five years for a war that they did not get into?

• TAUSSIG. No, sir; I think we ought always to be prepared

• TEAMMELL. That is a difference of opinion.

• TAUSSIG. I am only stating my opinion, sir. My opinion is that we should always be prepared for war.

• TEAMMELL. I find that a good many people think this country should be a military power and maintain an enormously large Army at an enormous expense to the people of the country, and should not maintain an enormously large Army in peace time. I think you should do it. That is purely a matter of opinion. You favor that and the Secretary does not favor that. I have no more to ask any more questions.

• CHAIRMAN. Capt. Taussig, the increases you speak of that you recommended in the personnel, were not the minimum for a war basis, were they, for the Navy?

• TAUSSIG. This minimum number, this 67,000, were in order that we should have their peace-time complement, the minimum number to be in the service in peace times. For instance, when we went into the war, I can give you exactly how many ships did not have on board in personnel, if you would like.

• CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to put that into the record.

• TAUSSIG. On March 31, 1917, the last date of complete compilation of the entry of the United States into the war, we had 250 ships. We had what were known as in reserve, less than half their complements on board, 47 ships that were known as in ordinary, 16 ships with just enough men on board to prevent absolute deterioration. 51 ships in commission with no Navy personnel on board 51 ships. The figures as they were on the 31st of March, 1917, six months after we declared war. That was the last complete compilation. The number required to man those ships, even with their peace-time complement, was 72,622, which was considerably more than in the Navy at that time.

• CHAIRMAN. But to give them an adequate complement and to carry out the building program that had been laid out, the program laid out by Admiral Palmar would not have been any

• TAUSSIG. It would not have been enough to put them in the war and to run the shore establishment. Of course we had to get everybody off the shore.

• CHAIRMAN. And that had not anything to do with the general policy for the war such as came up later on?

• TAUSSIG. No. I can not give firsthand information on that. The increase to 137,000 was forced through after that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was simply a plan to put all the ships had in the Navy at that time on a basis where they would be in case war came up, was it not?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes. I should like to call your attention to the fact that in this paper I spoke of only 75 auxiliaries that would immediately need to be manned by Navy crews the instant we went into the war. The General Board in some report which I saw at that time said that the required number of auxiliaries would be at least 400. The number of 106,000 which I deduced came out on a basis of 75 instead of 400 auxiliaries. Of course, we knew those figures were based on the number required immediately the day we went into the war. We all knew we would have to have an enlarged number of men in addition to that to be trained, and the expansion of the shore establishment. We could not do that. You can not run ships without people on shore to look after them. That is an impossibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think this is within your province for the information of the committee can you tell me whether it is customary for the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of the Bureau of Operations to consult with the General Board before a recommendation is made by the board?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I do not know, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I want to ask you a little about those ships. Had any of those ships that you say were not manned at that time been practically discarded because they were out of date and more modern equipment and more modern war vessels were concerned?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes, sir; there were a few.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you think they ought to keep those ships constantly manned?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I think we should not in time of peace carry a ship on the Navy list that we are not going to use in war, and therefore every one of those ships being required, if only for housing purposes, for housing the men, for which purpose we did not have enough, every one of those ships would have to be used, and we have to have men on board them to take care of them.

Senator TRAMMELL. The main trouble then was that they were on the list. It was not the main trouble that they did not have to be manned?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Every one of them was used in the war. They were not all used to fight with, but every one of them was used. Although some of those ships are put down as unfit for war purposes, even the few that were so put down were used for housing purposes or something, and we had to keep men on board them, and men were kept on board during the war. Out of the 400 I think about 100 were classified by the department as unfit for war service, but as they were used for housing purposes or something.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you have any trouble in getting men put on them during the war—ships of that character?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Of course we had trouble.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you not put men on them?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes; there were men eventually put on every ship.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, you think those ships

as unfit for war should have had a full quota of men on board.

WESSON. I think we ought to have commenced in 1914 to full quota, which we did not do. I will not say that those ships had the same number of men as if they were going to war; they had to have a certain number of men on board to maintain a sanitary condition.

TRAMMELL. Why did you not tell us in the first instance that there were a number of those ships that were unfit for war purposes, instead of trying to create the impression that they had 500 men on them, and that it was a great neglect to have them, although you knew there were 12 of them that were unfit for war purposes?

WESSON. I do not understand your idea at all, sir.

TRAMMELL. I just want to get at the fairness of the

WESSON. I wish to state emphatically that I have said nothing about any idea of creating a wrong impression in any way. I have said from official documents throughout to substantiate what I said, and I can not believe anybody around here thinks I am trying to create a wrong impression. I am out to tell the truth.

TRAMMELL. Part of it, but not all of it.

WESSON. If I told all the truth, sir, I would be here a week.

TRAMMELL. That is what we want you to do, to tell all the truth. We may feel that it is exceedingly fair to try to make it appear that the Secretary of the Navy was not in favor of 97,000 men in 1916, because he recommended less in 1915. Yet

the same logic does not apply to the other people who recommended only 74,000 in 1915, but were favorable to the larger number in 1916.

WESSON. You stated in answer to a question by the chairman that 500 men was authorized just for the manning of the ships in existence. Do you know whether that is correct? Or was it for the purpose of making preparation to man the ships that were also authorized in the same bill in August, 1916, for the whole program, was it not?

WESSON. My understanding is that it was partly for both.

TRAMMELL. I think that was included in my question.

WESSON. No; you stated the ships then in existence.

TRAMMELL. I think I stated both.

WESSON. Of course, the record will show what you intended to understand it that way. That is the reason I asked about it. Now, Captain, it seems you have had some experience in connection with the personnel. Did you have any difficulty in 1914 in enlisting the required men into the service?

WESSON. Not in 1914; no, sir. We did previous to that.

TRAMMELL. Did you in 1916?

WESSON. I was not in the Bureau of Navigation in 1916, so I did not have to do with it then.

TRAMMELL. The reason I asked the question, Capt. Wesson, yesterday that they had some difficulty in recruiting to full authorized strength in 1916 and even in the early part of the war was very imminent, and then they did have some trouble.

Capt. TAUSSIG. I can not state at first-hand as to that only give an opinion on it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was not that constant changing and due quite a bit to the difficulty in holding people in the especially the enlisted personnel that you speak of, and they wanted to get out when their time ran out?

Capt. TAUSSIG. We were recruited up to our full strength by law in 1914. We had every man the law allowed. We stop recruiting for a couple of weeks, except the men who re whom we had to take in. In 1914 we set up our recruit tions for about two weeks except as to reenlisted men, be were full up to what the law allowed. We could have gotten men that could have been needed.

Senator TRAMMELL. But you do not know as to what th tions were in 1916, as to whether they had recruited up to strength or not authorized by law in 1916?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Oh, yes; they were recruited up, up to the authorization for the increase came in.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know when the naval res was passed?

Capt. TAUSSIG. There were several naval reserve laws. was a law passed first, I think, in 1914. It was while I was in the Bureau of Navigation. I am not sure of the date wh passed the law later providing for the big reserves. I think August 29, 1916. It was modified several times. I can not give those dates.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. You may be excused.

Capt. TAUSSIG. May I have my testimony sent to me to report for correction? I should like to get back to my station.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL C. P. PLUNKETT

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please state to the committee what duties were which you were performing just previous to the entry of the United States into the World War and what duties you performed during the war?

Admiral PLUNKETT. In the summer of 1915, while I was at the Naval War College, in September, Mr. Daniels sent for me to Washington, and on my arrival here I was acquainted with the fact that on the recommendation of Admiral Benson, commander of the fleet, I had been selected for director of gunnery exercises, engineering performances, director of target practice. As I had three months of my work to do at the War College I wanted to complete the course there, and, further, I wanted to go to sea, although I was not due for sea. However, the gunnery situation in the Navy was pretty bad. I think Capt. Taussig's testimony pretty fully substantiates the situation at that time. I received orders which provided for my traveling back and forth between Newport and Washington until the end of the War College course, when I could take the duties permanently, the idea being to get the run of the ship as soon as possible and see what the general situation was.

latter part of December, 1915, I took over the active gunnery under the Chief of Naval Operations as one of his duties that duty until July, 1918, when I went abroad, but during five months of my tenure of office, beginning along in the last of my time was taken up with the organization and the naval railway batteries which went to France in the last year, so that I did not take a very active part in the training of the fleet during those last few months. Owing to a lack of officers, no officer was sent there to relieve me, but during the fleet, under the able command of Admiral Mayo, everything that I could have done would have in anyway retarded the successful progress of gunnery training, it being pretty well organized and systematized by that time.

At the beginning, when I took over the duties of gunnery at the Navy Department, I went to Mr. Daniels and stated in a frank manner that there could be no gunnery without personnel and did not have the people. To make a long story short, I told him, first and last, for two years, without ever making any appeal upon him whatever, that we could have no successful gunnery in the American Navy until we had a sufficient personnel.

I say right now that in all my dealings with Mr. Daniels I have been treated with greater courtesy by anyone, but he is not the man that I ever had anything to do with that I practically made no impression upon. I make that preliminary statement so that you may understand the situation perfectly.

Q. Now, Admiral, will you state what your duties were after

FRANKS. After July, 1918, I was in France in command of a naval battery.

Q. Until the end of the war?

FRANKS. Until the end of the war; yes. At the end of the war when we were on the verge of entry into the war, the fleet was at the highest state of efficiency that it has been in the history of the American Navy. In my opinion this was due to two things: first, to the commander in chief of the fleet, Admiral Mayo; second, to the realization of the number of men that were needed to man the fleet to fight her efficiently in battle.

At that time the question of shortage of personnel was most acute. At that time, when the fleet was in commission, there was a great deal of discussion. There were memoranda and reports and other things about the number of men required to man a ship efficiently. As a result of this we have some definite information from the people in charge of the ship that the number of men that we thought we needed to man those ships efficiently could not be berthed in the ships. The ships were not big enough to hold the crews that we needed to man them in the ships.

With my considerable experience as executive officer of four battleships, and having commanded a couple of battleships, and having given the best part of 15 years of my life to the question of organization, I felt that I was in a pretty good position to estimate what a ship needed to fight her.

Q. When Admiral Mayo became the battleship-force commander he made a report or when he was division commander he made a report

in regard to shortages of personnel, which I think Capt. quoted. When he took over the more important command of the battleship force he took up this matter very seriously, the question of what was the proper force aboard of a battleship in fight the ship efficiently.

I might say right now for the benefit of Senator Trammell, an officer in my recollection ever dreamed or ever thought of having personnel sufficient to man everything carried on the Navy to have it ready for battle at the outbreak of the war. All we went on was that the ships which were turned over to us to operate, which we called our fleet, should be fully manned and should be ready for war; that is all.

As the result of Admiral Mayo's efforts, in which I heartily concurred, we finally arrived in the course of two years at what was the correct number of men and officers in order to man our ships which were then in commission so that they would be efficient in battle. The numbers which we arrived at were far in excess of the numbers which were contemplated in the original design of the ships.

I might say as bearing directly on this and also having an influence on the number of these men, that in 1915 we woke up to the fact that we had built a number of very excellent ships, but we had not figured out how to fight them. Before 1915 there was a fire-control board ordered, which went right into the question, not of using the guns of the ship one at a time but how to use all the guns at the same time so as to bring the greatest volume of fire to bear upon the enemy. It was the report of that board that pretty nearly turned the whole thing upside down, and was the first step in the direction of showing what we actually needed in the way of officers and men on our ships in order to fight them in battle and to bring all their offensive and defensive weapons into action at the same time. Naturally a great deal of money was asked for at once, but it takes time to produce the improvements that were required to be installed in those ships, and naturally our latest ships were the first ones to receive them.

Again, owing to the methods which were taken up under Admiral Mayo's direction, and in fact mostly by his orders, the people of the Navy had brought home to them what gunnery should be in order to arrive at those results. This board was in intimate touch with the most efficient methods for using our guns and torpedoes.

Up to 1915 we had been conducting battle exercises by the method of the engagement by firing a single gun in order to get the approximate range of the enemy, followed by another gun after that shot had landed, some 20 seconds later, also with a view of getting the range by some correction being applied to that second shot; in other words, the method of approximation. The question of range finding was taken up seriously. Up to 1915 we had comparatively no efficient range finding instruments. Those are instruments of prime importance, and at the outbreak of the war we had only a sufficient number of them for our first-line ships. The ships in reserve had practically no range finders worth mentioning.

All those things and the concentration on gunnery training brought home to us the fact that we were terribly undermanned, and it was those reports that Capt. Taussig speaks of here which flowed over my desk in volumes, which kept me pegging away at the Secretary of the Navy all the time asking for more men, and representing to him the fact that we needed those men.

that seem odd, when I was a subordinate officer, that I took memoranda to the Secretary of the Navy; but I assure you that I took them there because the Chief of Naval Operations had put the talk he had in his system.

CHAMAN. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations?

FRANKETT. Admiral Benson. He said, "If you can get them, get them. I can not get them."

Shortly after I took over the direction of gunnery, the Congress, which you probably remember of Representative Representative from Massachusetts, who offered resolutions in the House of Representatives, which were adopted, calling the Secretary of the Navy for a statement as to the gunnery of the fleet. The resolutions were referred to me for answer with reference to gunnery efficiency of the fleet were in fact therefore the answer which went to the House of Representatives to the Speaker, and later a similar answer which went to the United States Senate in response to resolutions submitted by the Senate prepared by me in my office from the actual data of the fleet.

Mr. Daniels took a very live interest in gunnery in the Navy. He was very much pleased with the answers that we were able to give because these answers clearly showed that while we were down, we were on the up grade; that things were going on in gunnery, and eventually, about a year afterwards, when we made considerably more progress, Mr. Gardner visited the Navy with the permission of the Secretary of the Navy, and we convinced him thoroughly that he was on the wrong tack, and that we were doing everything that was possible to build up the gunnery of

the fleet, not only to the ships which were in commission, and the fleet which was going on to the Navy at large was restricted to the officers who were actually on the ships in commission. Those who were on shore and other duty had not to take up these matters. But never in the history of the Navy had there been anything more intensive than the gunnery of the fleet which took place in 1916 and 1917 and 1918. That was that when the war broke out, although we were not at the time, the gunnery efficiency of the ships that were in commission was higher than it ever had been in my recollection of the Navy. As a matter of fact, we had just one battleship, the USS Oregon, which was practicing at nearly 20,000 yards, the longest range ever practiced by the service, and she made the phenomenal record of hits under battle conditions.

I was in the fleet in the spring of 1917, and left there about the middle of the year and came back to Washington, and on my arrival I submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations a report on the status of gunnery operations in the fleet, in which I gave a general account of the practices that had taken place, in a general way, in the fleet. I have first-hand information as to the state of the fleet at the outbreak of the war. I did not comment in my report on the excellence of the training, but just merely stated that target practice had been carried out, and made a statement that the training continue just as it had been; that I had no changes to make; that I was in full agreement with

commander in chief that everything had been done in the laying down correct lines for gunnery training, and that, when war broke out, we saw no reason for making any change in that direction. That the one thing was to insure the permanence of the personnel, that is to say, of the people who were actually in the fleet when war broke out, in the battleships and our destroyers; to retain the people absolutely intact in order to hold our gunnery efficiency at the level we had reached at that time, and which, I say, was the best in the history of the American Navy.

If you remember, about that time, or shortly before it, the armed guard duty was ordered by the President; the question of putting guns on merchant ships and assigning crews. As I said before, the only trained men we had in the Navy were the men in the fleet, because anybody who had been out of the fleet was behind the times. We were moving fast. And the first call for 400 armed guards in the fleet, naturally the people sent were the people who were manning guns of the type we were putting on the merchant ships, and also those who could be spared without impairing too greatly the turret efficiency of the ships; so that the first people that went were the crews which manned the secondary torpedo defense batteries on our battleships, and the officers and petty officers which went with them.

But, as a division on a battleship of secondary battery guns has two or three officers, and as they amount to no less than 25 in some ships, and it only required at the outset from two to three officers on armed guard ships and three only on the liners, you can see that the officers capable of directing the fire of those guns were a little insufficient; and therefore we had to have more officers for armed guard duty, and that was where the trouble began.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral PLUNKETT. I forget now. It was continuous. It began just before our entry into the war and continued right along practically the whole of the year 1917. In fact, it ran up to 1,700 or 1,800 vessels; I do not know how many; a very large number. So the officers who were capable of being assigned to this duty were exhausted. But it involved our going into our turrets and taking a turret off; for instance officers who had had anywhere from two to three years' experience; officers who were thoroughly conversant with our gunnery training methods; officers who were of the highest possible sort in regard to our gunnery training and were in sympathy with it. And that was the beginning of the downfall, you might say, of the fleet efficiency; and I have seen nothing on record to indicate that they ever fully recovered from it, not even when the armistice was signed. Of course, they were as efficient as human perseverance and the mentality of the men at the head of it could make them, but, as testified by Admiral Palmer here, in October, 1917, he began a process of forcing the battleships to give up their reduced allowance of officers still further, nearly 50 per cent, and in filling the vacancies in the battleships—the total number of officers—officers of very little or no experience; officers, for instance, who were not in the Navy before the war at all; some of them college men, others who were sent to Annapolis for short courses of training, reserve officers.

1917, when Admiral Rodman took his ships abroad
 on the other side, the condition in those ships was pretty
 much as in our battleships that stayed behind. They were
 depleted of the number of officers that they had in the spring
 when we entered the war, and had practically only a
 few officers; and naturally they were not ready for battle
 over there. The *Texas* actually had, later on, pretty
 much of her crew green men. She was the ship that had
 a very trophy as the result of her work just previous to
 when she arrived on the other side had not fired a gun.
 That was due, in her case, that she had been un-
 able to get ashore, and had to go to the navy yard and
 be repaired. But at the same time, with 75 per cent
 of a ship, the wildest imagination would not claim that
 she was ready for battle, and I believe that is the way she was
 at her arrival, to Admiral Rodman. The truth of the
 matter when we entered the war we were forced to take the
 defensive, instead of the offensive, we took the defensive. The
 organization of the patrol forces of the Atlantic
 was a defensive measure. That force brought into being
 the light craft we had in the Navy—destroyers, gun
 boats, anything that could be converted into a scout. We had
 almost all of our big cruisers, which had been in reserve
 at the time. They had to be brought around. In fact, I
 think it started immediately before we entered the war.
 That was exactly what the situation was. We had one,
 which was the flagship of the destroyers, the *Scott*. But
 we had practically all the small craft we had, of whatever
 kind, to be used for patrol purposes; and that, in a measure,
 were those craft in that list that Capt. Taussig showed you
 were of very little military value, were called into being;
 they were in the patrol, if you saw one of these submarines,
 you knew sunk you, you gave warning to many of the other
 ships, they could start and search for him right away. It
 was those craft contained military value enough to offer a
 service, but they were there for scouting purposes.
 When it was created, the defensive force that I speak of, was
 at first turned into the splendid force that we had on
 the other side. In fact, in Admiral Sims's letter he refers particularly
 to the fact that it was organized on this side for operations here, instead
 of being organized on the other side for operations over there.
 But, however, before the situation began to clear up a
 little, I think you must realize by this time that we had no
 planned the war—no war plan. We had a mobilization
 plan giving the list of ships and the number of men and
 guns on them, but there was no plan for making war—using
 for war purposes. It simply called for their mobilization.
 As we entered the war, I expect the Chief of Naval
 Operations was flooded with all sorts of suggestions as to how to
 win the war. I know that I offered such a suggestion; and
 I guess a good many others did. But all our suggestions
 were based on a lack of information, because, when all was said and
 done, when we entered this war I think the majority of us thought
 the war was pretty nearly over. As a matter of fact, it was

its most critical stage. Our information was insufficient and tentative. In fact, in many cases it was absolutely wrong, as we afterwards found out.

However, there was no plan for the offensive action. Whatever plans there were, or whatever plans were first evolved, were essentially defensive.

I am not aware how long that continued, as I was not in an intimate touch with the orders which went to the different commanders as would indicate when the attitude changed; but in the absence of any plan, the most natural thing to do was to take a defensive until you find out "where you are at," and that was the situation.

To man the ships that were in the mobilization plan there was a partiality, exhausted practically everything in the way of personnel that we had, and I think that Capt. Palmer and Capt. Taussig clearly brought out what we expected to happen; in other words, we were not surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. That you were not what?

Admiral PLUNKETT. That we were not surprised. In other words, that we expected it. I do not think there was anything in the few days of the war that turned up that surprised us in any way whatever. I do not think that there was any reason why we should have any other mental attitude in regard to it; that it was just away off; that we had been a long time trying to get more men and to impress upon everybody that a navy without men was no navy, that a ship without a proper complement was no ship. We had had any luck, but we realized that the moment we got in the war the stuff would flow in so fast that you would not know what to do with it; and that is just what happened. Money came tumbling in. Lord! There was money to a finish. Men offered their services. We would have broken up Gen. Crowder's conscription plan and had taken everybody that wanted to go in the Navy. When it came to the question why we could not recruit our people in 1915 and the answer is that the era of profiteering had gotten under full way in this country, and men could make so much money out of it and there being no prospect of a war in 1916, why should they go to the Navy? So that when war actually did come upon us, we were short-handed, and it was nothing but the natural instinct of the American that saved the day. They came in vast numbers, more than we had quarters for, more than we could handle, more than we had anything for. These people came and offered their services.

Men were willing to throw up big positions in order to come to sea at a meager salary. I think that was testified to by Capt. Palmer here. He said here that the Bureau of Construction and Repair had 70 men on their list who were willing to come with the Navy, whose salaries running from \$10,000 a year up, and who were perfectly willing to come with the Navy for \$3,000 a year. We met that everywhere. But that does not make a Navy. That is simply material to work with. And so fast was this thing traveling, and so fast were we expanding that in June, or in the early part of May, 1917, Mr. Daniels sent for me one day and he said, "I want you to go to Boston, New York and Philadelphia and Norfolk, and look into this recruiting business." He said, "I do not want you to say a word to a living soul, but I want you to come back here and tell me what you think."

Mr. Chairman, I went right straight to Mr. Palmer, just as I could walk, and I said, "The Secretary is getting a little bit about this reserve business."

MR. CHAIRMAN. What was the date of this?

MR. FUSKETT. It was in May.

MR. CHAIRMAN. May, 1917?

MR. FUSKETT. May, 1917. I said, "I do not know anything about the reserve business. I am here in Washington. I do not know what your fellows have been doing, but I know that you must be some pretty good people. Now, it would not be a good thing if this thing suddenly stopped, even though you made a mistake."

Then I started off, and I went to these various places and came back I made a report to the Secretary, saying that under no circumstances should he do anything to stop the increase in the Naval Reserve; that we were having brought to the material there was in the country, and that, in time, we could turn that material into what we needed to carry on the war. That proved true, for without those people we never could have carried on this war. Of course I do not know whether he did or not. He probably did not. But, at all events, I put upon him as fully as possible the importance of the question, which Admiral Palmer testified. The struggle on the question of reserves continued long after

He was afraid of getting too many people, so that he would not know what to do with them. But, considering the shortage we had of them and our facilities for handling these people and for keeping them and preventing them from getting sick, etc., we had to take all we possibly could all the time.

We changed from a purely defensive attitude to an offensive attitude about through a realization that the war was over there and over here through the fact that we began to understand that the German service was of such a high class that nothing could be done to coast and do material damage anything which would be a material way to win the war without ample warning. That is fully borne out in the reports which came from time to time. Their predictions are nothing short of phenomenal. They must have used the ouija board or something like that. Now they ever got the information, it was so exact.

We had the effect of gradually reducing the patrol force which we had. We had a lot of vessels which could be used in the anti-submarine campaign, and their replacement by other types, submarines, etc. It is entirely probable that we could not have replaced our ships within one month or two months of the outbreak of the war if we did not have the personnel, nor did we have, and we got without the most strenuous opposition, probably, the vessels which could be used for purely coastal patrol. But my private opinion is that the reason we did not take the offensive is the fact that we were not equipped with skilled and trained personnel. In other words, we were taking our suit to fit our cloth. I might say, in passing, that the old-guard proposition, which was clearly beyond any doubt, though the Allies had been doing this for some time, was the breaking up of the efficient condition of what we

had in commission at the outbreak of the war, for the simple reason that when you put a military man on board of a merchant ship they want to deny him the air necessary for his sustenance. They hate to have him around. As a matter of fact, I think the presence of guns on merchant ships is very much against the wishes of the merchant people; but they did put them aboard, and in order to avoid any possible disruption or disputes, although there were a few minor ones, of course, we sent the highest type of our best petty officers in charge of these guards, and officers, so that if any questions did arise, they would be handled in the proper manner, and I might say, in passing, that if the members of this committee have never read the reports of our armed guards, especially those written by our chief petty officers, they have missed some of the most illustrious history that has ever been written of the sea. The work that those people did is thrilling and I do not know a solitary case in which they failed to measure up to what was expected of them. But it raised Cain with the American Navy.

That also was a defensive move. The first solution of that was the adoption of the convoy system, which was an offensive measure. That is to say, if a submarine wanted to get a merchant ship he had to fight for it. If you remember, there was great stress laid on the arming of merchant ships, which was a purely defensive measure. I think I am correct in that, am I not?

The CHAIRMAN. Why would not the submarines have to fight to get the ships that were armed?

Admiral PLUNKETT. As Admiral Sims explained to you, they got them without their ever seeing them.

The CHAIRMAN. But they had to get them by torpedo instead of guns?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes; they had to get them by torpedo instead of guns.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think the admiral is correct in saying that it is to be considered a defensive measure. I think the President took the ground that we had a right to arm them, without our even being at war with Germany, and they were armed before we were at war with Germany, so that it certainly was defensive then. If it had been, it would have been an act of war.

Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes; I think that I am right in that.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; it is considered so in international law. We were not at war with Germany when we first armed our merchant ships.

Admiral PLUNKETT. I have not any familiarity with international law.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am just saying that I think you are correct in stating that that was a defensive measure.

Admiral PLUNKETT. I am simply saying that it was not a measure of offense against the enemy, but it was purely a defensive measure.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just getting the point in my own mind.

Admiral PLUNKETT. So that if we continued it after we went out of the war, we were still adopting a defensive measure and not an offensive measure. In other words, our trained personnel was being used for defensive purposes and not for offensive purposes. Do you get my point?

The CHAIRMAN. I get your point. I wanted it explained.

FRANKS. Yes. There is the parting line, as referred to in the letter of January 7 that Admiral Sims wrote, and that is the line between the fleet and when I speak of the fleet I mean the fleet were not ready for war at the end of the war, because they had no trained officers and men to conduct the gunnery of a fleet.

FRANKS. Has come up here, how long we should have started to get officers. Ten years is not a minute too soon. We should have all our ships fully manned and ready. It is a matter of policy with which we are not concerned in this hearing. But when you attempt to keep 16 battleships in the fleet unless you keep them fully ready for war they are a waste of money you are spending on them, because everything that a ship does not understand that the reason of their inability to fight and fight effectively; and a ship that is not ready can not fight effectively, no matter what the circumstances may be.

FRANKS. In the hearing Capt. Taussig says that if the fleet were sent over on the other side had been required to do fleet work by which he means work in the defense of the fleet and possible action against destroyers, action against submarines and other types of ships, the general work that the fleet is capable of doing he wanted four months to go away to train. Now, this is the officer who, when he was asked how long it would take for him to get ready for anything, said that he was ready. What he meant was that he was ready to go after submarines just as you find in Capt. Taussig's report. He states that in August, 1917, there is a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, paragraph 4. I think it is in the report of Mr. McKean here saying that in August the fleet was not ready for anything. He does not mean that. He does not mean that they were not ready for anything, but he means that it will be some time before they will have the material; they will have the instruments for handling them, and all that is the case he is too good a gunnery man to mean anything else. The point of the matter is that if we had been up against the fleet at the break of this war we would be paying the indemnity of their paying it; and all because we did not have them ready. Because, ship for ship right through the line, the fleet's gunnery was, although they stood the British on the line of Jutland, we were ready for them if we had had them. The reason we did not have them was that the British would not let us get them. He would not let the committees in Congress, would not let us do anything more men, in spite of the fact that everybody from the top through to the bottom knew that we must have

FRANKS. It is a question of 71,000 or 61,000 men, they are not a large number; and no officer of the ability of the officers of the fleet would recommend, except under the most extraordinary pressure, a recommendation so far short of the recommendation of 67,000 men, for what we are doing. I never have at any time acquiesced in the view that we had sufficient personnel. I have never acquiesced in any

the statements in any of these reports that we were ready from stem to stern; and I do not acquiesce in any report to-day that in any way that our fleet is anything but a wreck of what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. A wreck now?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Right now; to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. How about when the war commenced?

Admiral PLUNKETT. I have given you a statement of what condition was when the war commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. The same would apply, that we were not ready from stem to stern when the war commenced?

Admiral PLUNKETT. All that were ready were the ships that were actually full manned, or nearly fully manned, and in commission. Those ships, in my opinion, were ready, but those were the only ones. And by that I mean the battleships and destroyers. I do not mean the submarines, because I understand there was not one of them that was ready. I do not know. That you can probably get from Admiral Grant. But I limit my statement absolutely to those two types of ships alone, which do not go to make a fleet, by long odds. That is only part of a fleet. Our scouting force we had not.

As for the auxiliaries that go with the fleet, we had just about enough for our peace-time purposes and no more.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what ships we had that were ready and in an adequate state of preparation at that time?

Admiral PLUNKETT. What ships that were?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; other than destroyers and battleships.

Admiral PLUNKETT. Well, I could get that information if you want it. I have not got it right at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that information put in the record.

Admiral PLUNKETT. We had one battleship that had just been fitted out, the *Arizona*. At the outbreak of the war she was not ready for war in any sense of the word, because she was a brand new ship. She had been in the navy yard up to December of the previous year, just fitted out. She was a beautiful ship, and is to-day probably one of the most efficient ships, they say, in the fleet. But she had not conducted any firing to speak of. In fact, I do not remember just when we conducted her firings, but we fired all of those 14-inch guns on the *Pennsylvania*, the *Oklahoma*, the *Arizona*, and the *Nevada*, in order to find out what caused the tremendous dispersion of our guns. We have also conducted experiments ever since then—that was in 1916—and we are no nearer the answer to-day than we were then. One reason for it, I think, is due to the fact that when Congress practically offered us a proving ground, to cost \$10,000,000, the Secretary only allowed \$1,000,000. I remember going to him and talking to the Chief of Ordnance. He said, "We have got to get this proving ground and find out why these shells are flying all over the place instead of where they are intended to go, and we must have a proving ground where we can fire the guns and then go and dig up the shells later and find out why this thing is going on." We understand the German dispersion is very much less than ours, and the British, even, is considerably less than ours.

There is one thing sure, that one salvo goes down here, and another beautiful, and the next one that comes down here, they are scattered all over the lot. I think you were probably shown one salvo

data fired, and that was published with big headlines "Wonderful shooting of the Navy," and that was a case where they fired had 12 shots in a very small pattern. As a matter of fact they have not solved that thing yet. Of course, a man does not mean to cuss his tools until he is pretty much as exhausted all possible errors that the personnel make, therefore I have never been on the side of the people who say things because they do not work just the way you want them to go off the bat. In fact, I have been an advocate of everything every shot that we fired with the idea of getting information out of it that we can possibly get, so that if we make any errors, we are going to find out what they are, and we can take steps to avoid them. That is the only way to make improvements in gunnery, just through intensive observation.

Q. Was a case where we had this opportunity, and the Secretary said, "For Heaven's sake, go and see the Secretary. They have got this thing all tied up, and they have given us no proving ground, and he will not allow us but to go on." So I went down again and argued the matter with him, and he was as civil and pleasant as usual, but he thought \$1,000,000 was a big price just then, and he could get more later. We never got it later. That was the time for getting it, if ever; and as a matter of fact, we are still up the stump. We do not know what the dispersion is, and I guess the best standard we got was firing of this same type of gun, 14-inch 50-caliber guns, over to France, where we fired at ranges very, very much less than what would be the battle ranges on the battleships, and the data could not be of very great value.

Q. Does show that those guns are phenomenally accurate at long ranges? Of course that is where the projectile goes up high in the air, and comes down. It is almost like going up to the top of the world and coming down on the earth again. It is an entirely different problem firing at those high angles. The angle of firing at the present does not give a range much in excess of 23,000 yards, with the later types of ships we are building, the range goes up to 30,000 yards because of the increase of elevation angle in operation. But, as a matter of fact, we are to-day where we were 4 years ago on that. We have not got it solved.

Q. Now, You stated that the reason you could not get the money for the Navy in 1916 was because the cost of living had gone up, wages and salaries had gone up, and there was no prospect of that time. You mean so far as the people of the country were concerned in general?

A. PRUSKETT. Yes.

Q. Now, Not as far as you in the Navy were concerned?

A. PRUSKETT. Nobody thought there was going to be any trouble. The majority of the people in the country were glad to go to war. They were pretty well satisfied about it, and everybody was.

Q. Now, I mean the Navy?

A. PRUSKETT. Yes; the Navy, too.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a feeling that we might go into it, was there not?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Well, I don't know; not if there was a feeling of keeping out of it. Of course, after the *Lusitania* note, a good number of us thought that there was no way of keeping out of it. We were sure we were going into it. There was no doubt about it. Of course you could not tell. You were dealing with a mighty uncertainty when dealing with the Hun. If you can guess four things on what they can do, they are pretty sure to do the fifth.

The CHAIRMAN. But was there a feeling that our Navy should be prepared if the war should come?

Admiral PLUNKETT. I never heard of anybody that exercised any other feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Admiral PLUNKETT. In other words, I think the vast majority of our people took the idea that these notes, where the President was writing to the German Government, were getting stronger and stronger all the time, and if the situation became absolutely desperate over there, there is no telling what they would do, and that eventually we would get into the war. It was no surprise when we went into the war; none at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the gunnery practice of the fleet, you say, was excellent in 1916.

Admiral PLUNKETT. In 1916? No; this was in March. We had just completed some long-range practices down the coast of Cuba, firing at greater ranges than we ever fired before, and I think that the average percentage of hits of the ships that fired—and there were probably 8 or 10, at least, that were at this long range—was about 12 per cent of hits, because I remember writing to Admiral Sims, who was at the War College when I was back, telling him what we had been able to do, and that he would have to modify the game-board rules up there at the War College that we had discovered we could hit at much longer ranges than they had allowed for in their rules for plotting the war games at the War College, and I believed if we could keep on the way we were going and hold our people for another year, we would double our scores. I was very enthusiastic about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement that we were efficient——

Admiral PLUNKETT. That just only applies to those ships that were in full commission down there, and the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not mean that the personnel conditions had been improved by that time?

Admiral PLUNKETT. No, no; we still did not have the full complements in the ships. This is just the gunnery thing. Of course the only thing that was particularly encouraging about the gunnery was the fact that we had everybody with us, and the information that we had on all possible things that can enter into efficient gunnery efficiency—were widely circulated in the fleet, in the fleet there; the officers were thoroughly conversant with what we found out by means of cable and from intensive training under Admiral Mayo, and the fact that these people were tremendously improved by these things and were using it and doing everything that they could to bring up the gunnery of the fleet, was most encouraging.

The CHAIRMAN. But you were still short of men?

AD. PLUNKETT. Still short of men.

CHAIRMAN. And what you had was simply enough for the men who were actually there?

AD. PLUNKETT. Right there. Admiral Palmer brought that early. We entered the war with 2,300 officers, and I think the number of men was, but that was what we had. I was with me in a naval battery. Five hundred of those men were with a gun prior to the war. I had six graduates of the gunnery class down there, four former warrant officers who were early entered as junior lieutenants at the time. I had a naval volunteer officer who was a lieutenant, a professor of international law at the University of Michigan—he had been—and then there were 25 other officers that I made out from seamen, second class, to chief machinist's mate. We had young men, college men, that we had on our rifle ranges at the various naval stations; all young men of intelligence and some of them of rare ability. Those people did the stunts that we did and what they did they did remarkably well—perfectly, as a matter of fact. I would not ask for better people. But that is the kind of people of the Navy. I have got them to-day down to the rank of private. I have two of the destroyers now, on which, outside of the commanding officer of the destroyer, the rest of them are all private people, and none of them, except in some very exceptional cases, will qualify for the ranks they now hold. But they are intelligent, and they have got snap and push enough, and they are willing to learn, and we are giving them the chance. They will be better off after a while. But I do not know how many of them are going to stay with us. Most of them are worried to death with their families, and how they are going to make both ends meet. But they are doing remarkably well under the circumstances.

CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions to ask, Senator Keyes?

SEN. TRAMMELL. I do not think so.

CHAIRMAN. Senator Keyes, have you any questions?

SEN. KEYES. No, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Have you any further statement to make, Admiral Palmer?

AD. PLUNKETT. No, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Then we will adjourn until Monday morning next.

At 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until May 2, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1920.

**UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock
Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Tram-

erman. The committee will come to order. Admiral
Will you take the stand?

**TEST OF ADMIRAL A. W. GRANT, UNITED STATES
NAVY.**

Will you state to the committee what duties you performed
beginning of the World War in 1914 up to the present time,
positions you occupied in the Navy?

GRANT. At the beginning of the World War in 1914 I
was in the Navy, in command of the battleship *Texas*, on
station off Mexico, and continued in command of that vessel until
1915, when I was ordered by the department to command
the force of the Atlantic Fleet and to supervise all sub-
marine commission on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic stations.
I was promoted to the rank of rear admiral September, 1915.

I continued until the 20th of August, 1917, when, by
the department, I assumed command of battleship Force 1,
Atlantic Fleet, with the rank of vice admiral.

I continued until March 31, 1919, when I was detached
from that command and ordered to command the navy yard at Wash-

ington. Will you state to the committee what steps were
taken by the Navy Department in preparing and conducting naval
operations during the war, and especially in regard to the submarine
war situation? I would rather have you make a state-
ment in your own language rather than to

GRANT. To answer that question, I will have to tell you
the submarine force was--its evolution. Up to and including
1917 the Government owned 38 submarines afloat, which
were named, from A-1 to the K type of boat, inclusive. I
will give you, which you can put right into
showing the type of boat, the number of boats in their
respective dates of acts authorizing their purchase.

CHAIRMAN. The table will be inserted in the record.

(Admiral Grant here read from the table referred to, which is printed in the record, as follows:)

| Type. | Number of boats in type. | Date of act authorizing purchase. | Type. | Number of boats in type. | |
|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|---|
| A-boats..... | 6 | June 7, 1900 | K-boats..... | 4 | |
| B-boats..... | 3 | } Apr. 27, 1904 | L-boats..... | 7 | } |
| C-boat..... | 1 | | M-boat..... | 1 | |
| C-boats..... | 4 | } June 29, 1906 | L-boats..... | 4 | } |
| D-boats..... | 3 | | AA-boat..... | 1 | |
| G-boat..... | 1 | } May 13, 1908 | N-boats..... | 7 | } |
| E-boats..... | 2 | | AA-boats..... | 2 | |
| F-boats..... | 4 | } Do. | O-boats..... | 16 | } |
| G-boats..... | 2 | | R-boats..... | 27 | |
| G-boat..... | 1 | } Mar. 3, 1909 | S-boats..... | 21 | } |
| H-boats..... | 3 | | Do..... | 20 | |
| K-boats..... | 4 | June 24, 1910 | | | |

These vessels were bought at intervals from 1900 up until 1911. I am speaking the first down to and including the K's there. They were not built upon designs prepared by the Government but upon designs submitted by contractors. Their tonnage, surface displacement, varied from approximately 100 tons for the A-boats to 392 tons for the K-boats.

The first seven L-boats were contracted for under the act of August, 1912.

The first four of these boats were placed in commission in 1916.

Under the act of March 4, 1913, four more L-boats were appropriated for, and they were placed in commission the latter part of 1916, and these boats were of different designs, generally speaking, with slight modifications made by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering.

There were two other boats, M-1 and AA-1, contracted for under previous acts which were single vessels of a type built upon contractors' plans.

Under the act of June, 1914, the department contracted for the M type of submarines, about equal in size to the G-4, which was built under the act of August, 1903. The ordering of this type of submarine was in my opinion a decided step backward, and during my service as submarine force commander I repeatedly expressed this opinion.

During the summer of 1915 tests were provided in the Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair for officers selected for their knowledge of submarines, who were to have special charge of submarine construction and so far as pertained to these bureaus, and also to coordinate the efforts of bureaus with respect to the building of the submarines under contract appropriated for or contemplated. As early as 1915 I recommended the construction of submarines of approximately 800 tons surface displacement, and continued to talk upon the subject until Congress passed the act of August 29, 1916, appropriating for three vessels.

In the initial naval acts appropriating for the N boats and the first of the S boats, Congress appropriated for the O boats in March, 1915. The O boats represented a decided improvement over anything that had preceded them, having a surface displacement of approximately 500 tons.

The R boats provided for in the act of August, 1916, were approximately 800 tons larger than the O boats. It took more than two years of propaganda to bring naval officials to recognize the importance of having a submarine capable of performing equal duty with the German 800-ton U boats.

The L boats, which I have previously mentioned, were the latest type placed in commission while I had command of the force up to August, 1917, and of the previous types I can speak knowingly of their practical use. Their design was good as regards machinery, with especial reference to the oil cooling and lubrication system.

Four K boats, from July 1 to October 1, 1915, were sent to sea for 10 days, and returned to the yard on account of breakdowns, for a period of three months for overhauling due to the poorly designed engines.

The L boats were but a trifle better.

The main trouble with the engines in the K and L types of boats was, as already mentioned above, due to the fact that they were of the two-stroke cycle instead of four-stroke cycle engines. The act that called for the building of the L boats called for the building of three 800-ton boats. It was decided to build them upon designs as follows:

the design of the Lake Boat Co. and the third upon the department's design late in 1916. It was the first time, so far as I know, that the department provided and design completely a submarine vessel.

Between getting the submarine force in readiness for war between 1916 and 1917, there was very little that could be done to get submarines belonging to the United States in an efficient condition for any other purposes, on account of the unreliability of the engines.

In 1917, I received an order from the chief of operations, via commander in chief, for compliance, reading as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 2, 1917.

Transmit to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, 12 submarines for submarine force, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Steam and Navigation.

12 submarines on Atlantic coast for service in European waters.

Prepare the department and prepare the 12 most suitable submarines on the Atlantic coast for service in European waters against German submarines.

Perform all work and on all arrangements necessary to fit these vessels for service in European waters, and to maintain them there in active service.

Report to the department as the date when the expedition shall be in service.

My reply. Do you want me to read it?

GRANT. Yes.

GRANT. This is my reply.

SUBMARINE FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "CHICAGO," FLAGSHIP,
July 13, 1917.

Commander submarine force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

Commander in chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

12 submarines on Atlantic coast for service in European waters.

Department's letter to commander in chief Op 17-4 dated July 2,

paragraph 14 of within letter.

12 submarines are in commission on the Atlantic coast:

| Names. | Battery installed. | Oscillator. | Gun. | Remarks. |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| U. S. S. "Albatross" | February, 1915. | No. | No. | Used for instructional purposes, Officers' Submarine School, New London. |
| do. | January, 1915. | No. | No. | |
| do. | January, 1916. | No. | No. | |
| do. | August, 1916. | No. | No. | |
| U. S. S. "Albatross" | February, 1911. | No. | No. | Experimental purposes; of little military value. |
| do. | June, 1912. | No. | No. | |
| do. | August, 1912. | No. | No. | |
| do. | July, 1917. | Yes. | No. | |
| U. S. S. "Albatross" | January, 1917. | Yes. | No. | 3-inch gun being installed at navy yard, Philadelphia. |
| do. | July, 1917. | Yes. | No. | |
| do. | do. | No. | No. | |
| do. | do. | Yes. | No. | |
| U. S. S. "Albatross" | September, 1916. | Yes. | 1.3 inch. | Detection tests off Nahant. |
| do. | April, 1916. | Yes. | do. | |
| do. | March, 1916. | Yes. | do. | |

U. S. S. "Albatross", navy yard, New York, will be ready as soon as better is installed.

2. It is from the above list of submarines that the 12 most suitable for service in European waters against German submarines are to be designated to the department and prepared for such service.

3. The department's order is being carried out, but it is well to consider before action is taken the following precepts or doctrine concerning war service of submarines in distant waters:

(a) No gas engine submarine should be sent away from the United States.

(b) No two-stroke (cycle) oil engined submarine should be sent away from the United States if possible to avoid.

(c) No vessel not fitted with an oscillator should be sent away from the United States.

(d) No vessel not fitted with a gun of not less than 3-inch caliber should be sent away from the United States.

(e) No vessel that can not submerge (flood tanks) in less than one minute, the average for the K boats is 1 minute 48 seconds, for L boats 2 minutes 23 seconds, averages are of best performances.

(f) No vessel with faulty periscopes which includes nonhousing.

(g) No vessel that does not carry fuel oil enough to make the trip across the Atlantic unaided, taking into consideration that each vessel while en route must trim down and submerge daily, not only for drills but possibly for offensive or defensive work.

(h) No vessel under 800 tons displacement.

4. The D, E and G classes have no oscillators nor guns and with the exception of the two E's and G-3 have gas engines. These vessels may be excluded from the above list at once and consideration given only to the K and L type of submarine.

5. The 11 vessels (four K's and seven L's) are all equipped with two-stroke oil engines which in service lack sufficient reliability to warrant their use on war service. The four K boats have no guns, a 3-inch gun is being installed on L-1, L-2, L-3, and L-4, while the installation is complete on the L-9, L-10, and L-11.

6. The table (par. 1) shows that new batteries have been installed on all during 1917 except for the L-9, L-10, and L-11, which have batteries that were installed last year. Each one of these vessels carry four tubes and eight torpedoes.

7. Orders have been given to expedite the completion of all repairs on the K-2, K-5, and K-6; L-1, L-2, L-3, and L-4; and L-9, L-10 by August 5 if possible in order that the crews may have 10 days for shakedown cruise to New London daily submergence trials thereafter.

8. The department is aware that the L-11 is equipped for and engaged in important tests in connection with submarine-detection work off Nahant, and given no order concerning taking this vessel away from this duty, which would completely stop all tests, leaving the department to decide whether this shall be done or not, as sufficient time will be had after Monday, July 16, 1917, to overhaul and complete work on the L-11.

9. In order to make a twelfth vessel as directed in paragraph 1, reference to E-1 is therefore designated; attention is invited however to the fact that this vessel has neither an oscillator nor gun installed, and it is very doubtful whether these could be added to this vessel. The 12 vessels designated are: E-1, K-1, K-2, K-5, K-6, L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4, L-9, L-10, and L-11.

10. To transfer these vessels to European waters and maintain them there for active and efficient service, the following plan is recommended:

FLOTILLA.

First division (tender *Bushnell*): First section—E-1, K-1, and K-2; second section—K-5, K-6, and L-1. Supply vessel Y.

Second division (tender X): First section—L-2, L-3, and L-4; second section—L-9, L-10, and L-11. Supply vessel Z.

X to be a vessel having quarters for 24 officers and 200 men, in addition to the vessel's own officers and crew; to have well-equipped machine shop; to have a room for ammunition and torpedoes; to carry fuel and lubricating oil in stores; to have spare parts for engines, etc., for six submarines.

Y and Z supply vessels: To be vessels of large stowage capacities with stowage and space for additional officers and crew if possible.

An expedition of this nature going abroad must be self-sustaining from the time they leave the coast of the United States for a period of not less than six months possible and practicable.

The two tenders and two supply vessels should carry for the 12 submarines, divided, about 3,500 tons of fuel oil, and 700 tons of lubricating oil.

ammunition, spares for engines, batteries, auxiliary machinery, gyro compass each, periscopes, stock materials, raw materials for tools and gear for refueling submarines at sea.
Cover a period of six months.
Supply vessel should be fitted with towing gear for towing submarines

supply vessels should be armed with a battery of not less than four of all-around fire if possible.
The submarine service should be carried by these vessels and will man the vessels, while spare officers for submarine service would handle the vessels.

Tenders Bushnell and X) should be fitted with two oscillators, with thin diaphragms to be used in connection with detector compass, a third oscillator for signalling purposes, keel installation should

Y and Z should be fitted with two oscillators, skin installation, with commutator detector device for listening purposes only.
torpedo boat destroyers, if available, should accompany the

For the trip across the Atlantic three officers should be supplied to The vacancies shown in the table shown below can be supplied have had submarine experience:

Submarine flotilla.

| First division | | Second division. | |
|---------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Commander: D. Casey. | | Commander: _____ | |
| Aid: _____ | | Aid: _____ | |
| Tender: Lieut. W. L. Frie | | Tender X: Commander, _____ | |
| | | | |
| Second section. | | First section. | Second section. |
| K 5. | | D 2. | I 9. |
| 1. Lieut. J. R. Morrison. | | 1. Lieut. (J. G.) E. E. Logan. | 1. Lieut. (J. G.) P. T. Wright. |
| 2. Lieut. (J. G.) T. C. Barton | | 2. Lieut. (J. G.) P. C. Ransom | 2. Lieut. (J. G.) R. R. Thompson. |
| 3. _____ | | 3. _____ | 3. _____ |
| K 6. | | I 3. | I 10. |
| 1. Lieut. S. O. Craig. | | 1. Lieut. (J. G.) D. J. Friedell. | 1. Lieut. J. C. de Carr. |
| 2. Lieut. (J. G.) H. E. Kersker | | 2. Ensign R. O. Davis. | 2. Lieut. (J. G.) W. J. Ruble. |
| 3. _____ | | 3. _____ | 3. _____ |
| L 1. | | I 4. | I 11. |
| 1. Lieut. (J. G.) C. A. Reed | | 1. Lieut. (J. G.) L. Hancock. | 1. Lieut. (J. G.) A. C. Bennet |
| 2. Lieut. (J. G.) H. L. Abbott | | 2. Lieut. (J. G.) K. R. R. Wallace. | 2. Lieut. (J. G.) F. J. Cunnison. |
| 3. _____ | | 3. _____ | 3. _____ |
| Supply vessel | | Supply vessel Z: Commander, _____ | |

These are included
submarine force concerning "formations for cruising" which
of three divisions, each division of one tender and three or four
these instructions are very flexible one tender or supply vessel and
submarines could form a group
signals for submarines, file 2642 F, March 31, 1917
file 2642-88-F, March 30, 1917, governs watches to be stood by
supply vessels.

(d) Instructions regarding torpedo defense, etc., file 2710-S, dated April 8.

(e) List of spare parts, oil engines (blanks only). Date to be furnished to the commanding officer of the submarine force and Bureau of Steam Engineering.

15. Considering the facts concerning the 12 designated boats, principally:

(a) Unreliability of engines.

(b) All have fixed periscopes.

(c) Five of the 12 do not carry guns.

(d) *E-1* has no oscillator.

(e) Lack of habitability and radius of action. I am of opinion that should a expedition arrive safely in European waters, the majority of the vessels would be continually for repairs, as all of them have been except the *E-1* since being in commission.

Further, that the first contingent of United States submarines that should be considered for duty abroad are the eight O class of boats building at Quincy (O-10, inclusive).

16. These vessels (O boats) have the following characteristics:

Length, 172 feet; displacement, surface, 520 tons; oscillators, yes; guns, one 30 rounds; torpedo tubes, 4; torpedoes, 8; engines, 4-cycle oil E. B.; batteries, W. L. L., 29 Plante Peate; motors, electrodynamic; normal fuel-oil supply, 20,586 gallons; maximum fuel-oil supply, 20,586 gallons; lubricating oil, 1,185 gallons; water, 900 gallons; estimated radius at 11 knots, 3,000 miles; maximum radius at 11 knots, 6,000 miles.

These eight boats are on the building ways at Quincy and I was informed by the president of the Fore River Shipbuilding Co., Joseph W. Powell, that the O-10 will be launched August 15, and have her trials six weeks later—that the remaining boats will follow at intervals of a week or 10 days.

17. These O boats have some size and their four-cycle engines, all of the same design, should prove immeasurably superior to the two-cycle engines of the K and L boats. The spare parts necessary would be interchangeable and greatly reduced in number as compared with spares for *E-1*, *E-1*, and *E-2*, five different designs; *K-5* and *L-11* of engines; *L-1*, *L-2*, *L-3*, *L-4*, *L-9*, *L-10*, *L-11*.

These vessels may do the work required but the K's and L's never. Even the O boats would be no match for a German 800-ton vessel on the surface.

18. If the department decides to send the 12 above-mentioned boats to European waters, sailing August 15 or at a later date, I would recommend:

(1) That the tender X and supply vessels Y and Z be sent immediately to the navy yard, Philadelphia, to fit out and receive stores.

(2) That a paymaster with submarine experience be sent to the *Bushnell* and tender X.

(3) That urgent orders be issued to commandant, navy yard, Philadelphia, regarding the fitting out of these vessels.

(4) That urgent orders be issued to commandant, navy yard, Boston, Massachusetts, to complete all work, repairs, and overhaul to *L-9*, *L-10*, and *L-11*.

(5) That urgent order be issued to commandant, navy yard, New York, regarding repairs and overhaul of *E-1* and *K-1*.

(6) That urgent orders be issued to commandant, navy yard, Philadelphia, regarding repairs and overhaul of *K-2*, *K-5*, *K-6*, *L-1*, *L-2*, *L-3*, and *L-4*.

(7) That all vessels, submarines, rendezvous at New London for 10 days' drill, date fixed for departure.

19. Attention is invited to the fact that the tenders accompanying these submarines are not provided with facilities for charging and boosting batteries, for air banks, or for providing pure distilled battery water, except the *Bushnell*. The above-mentioned facilities should either be provided on the tenders prior to departure or such facilities be provided at a base abroad.

20. Also, all experimental work with submarine *L-11* at Nahant must cease.

A. W. Grant

The reliability of the submarines sent abroad may be understood better by reading the reports of commanders of flotillas upon their arrival abroad. I have not got them. You will have to get them from the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get them for the committee so that they can have them put into the record?

Admiral GRANT. I have not a solitary thing except from my own memory. These are papers that I happen to have. I have not got them from the department. That is, I have not all the reports. I have

Capt. Hart's report. He took the first five of those there are other reports, which detail the troubles that were getting across, especially with reference to a gale they passed of the Bermudas. One of them returned to Boston, one to Bermuda, and one or more of them arrived under power in the Azores. I have not the details, and do not know about that.

MEYERMAN. If you think it is important to put those reports before please get them for us.

CHURCHMAN. They show the efficiency of the boats that were there.

MEYERMAN. If you will indicate the numbers of the reports, get them from the department. You can get that later on.

CHURCHMAN. I will read this letter from Capt. Hart, dated *Bushnell*, tender, November 6, 1917:

[Confidential.]

U. S. S. "BUSHNELL," TENDER.

November 6, 1917.

Commander Submarine Flotilla Two.

Submarine Force.

In reply to your letter of the U. S. S. *Bushnell*, convoying U. S. S. *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*,

in reply to your Commander's letter No. 5484, of October 21, 1917.

In reply with reference, the following report is submitted:

The *Bushnell* left Philadelphia Navy Yard, convoying U. S. S. *K-2*, on October 7, 1917, 6 a. m. The *K-5* had reported ready but was unable to get underway and had to be taken in tow within 3 miles. All three had delays in their preparations for sea because of the considerable delays in the yard work. *K-2* and *K-6* ran to New London, Conn., satisfactorily, while *Bushnell* towed *K-5* the entire distance; smooth seas;

at New London, October 8, p. m. Submarine completing preparations for sea. Some training submerged. All were overweight, when full of fuel and oil, stripped of some equipment; took out deck anchors and chains, 200 lb. shot, miscellaneous small weights, and four torpedoes out of *K-2*. Loaded all K-class spares available; had their spare crankshafts, spare pistons, spare cells, etc.; was full to capacity of fuel, oil, water, provisions, dry supplies, and had the submarine compartment, torpedo and engine room full of K-class spares and equipment, and extra dry provisions. Draft 10 feet 10 inches; her complement of boats was short by two 34-foot boats.

On October 9, p. m. *K-1* joined from New York Navy Yard. This submarine had just had a "thorough engine overhaul" at New York Navy Yard, had new pistons attached to main engines, had her engines completely assembled before leaving the yard and was expected to be the most reliable of the flotilla. She proved the least reliable. On October 10, 1917, Lieut. Commander Morrison relieved Lieut. Commander Morrison of command of *K-5*; during the voyage *K-5* became second in reliability.

On October 11, *K-1*, *K-5*, and *K-6* got underway from New London, October 12, 1917, delayed four hours by fog. *Bushnell* towing *K-5*, speed 11. Proceeded through the canal, cast off two and passed through, submarines following; *K-1* arrived east end of canal with both engines temporarily disabled. *K-5* and *K-6* to Provincetown and *Bushnell* towed *K-1* to the Provincetown anchorage and joined the Commander Submarine Force, in *Chicago*, for repairs during night.

On October 13, 10.30 a. m., got underway with *Bushnell*, *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*. With *Chicago* latter towing *K-1* and *K-2*, the *Bushnell* towing *K-5* proceeded to Halifax; smooth seas entire distance, speed about 8; cast off tows and entered harbor. *Bushnell* and submarines moored at the Wharf, October 15, 9 a. m. *Bushnell* escaped a serious accident by dropping an anchor when engine-room force failed to obey a signal. Filled submarine to capacity of water, gas, engine, and lubri-

cating oil, and provisioned them for 10 days—with additional emergency *Bushnell* refilled with fuel oil and water.

7. On October 16, 6.30 a. m., got underway with *Bushnell*, *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*, in company with *Chicago*; latter took *K-1* and *K-2* in tow. *Bushnell* took *K-5* and *K-6* in tow. Proceeded toward final destination, on great circle course, west wind, rough, choppy sea, speed about 8. At 12.45 p. m., shackle bolt towing engine wire and hawser broke, or worked out, and left *K-5* with 120-foot 10-inch hawser hanging from bow, by her towing pennant. Had *K-6* slip her hawser and after three hours work succeeded in recovering hawser from *K-5*; while recovering she cut or chafed it very nearly off and 15 fathoms was discarded. Then to get towing pennants back on and make up tow; proceeded ahead of *Chicago*, being unable to make the submarines one-engine speed about 8½.

8. Strong west to southwest breeze until October 19, 1 a. m., with rain. *Chicago* then about 65 miles astern; hove to until daylight, then laid on oil and got *K-5* and *K-6* in tow again. They had run about 485 miles and were in good condition, except that *K-5* was beginning to consume too much lubricating oil. Joined *Chicago*, *K-1*, and *K-2* at 9 a. m. (Oct. 19) and proceeded toward destination via great circle course, both ships towing two submarines as before; calm, no wind, northwest swell; towing easily, speed about 8.

9. Until October 22, 9 a. m., towed as before, calm weather, sea smooth or with low swell, speed 8 knots plus; *Chicago's* boat had communicated, October 21, with *Bushnell* and all submarines and took mail and two passengers. *Chicago* left tows October 22, 9 to 10 a. m., directed them to report to flotilla, commander *Bushnell*, cleared ship and headed westward at about 11 a. m. *Bushnell* proceeded towing *K-5* and *K-6* and attempting to make the one-engine speed of *K-1* and *K-2*, then running broad on each bow, 2,000 yards. East wind and sea getting up; *Bushnell* not to make over 94 revolutions per minute with *Bushnell*—10 revolutions per minute less than had tested the gear at. Using one 10-inch and one 9-inch hawser—towing engine, one on 20 fathoms wire railed on; apparently towing easily.

10. From time of *Chicago's* parting company until midnight, October 22: At 10 p. m. *K-2* experienced scavenger-receiver explosion which disabled port engine for 4 days. At 3 p. m. towing pennant of *K-6* carried away at link of pelican hook. *Bushnell* had been on the towing engine with long scope of wire out—assume cause to be defective metal. This was not a serious mishap, as it would probably have been necessary to cast her off early in the ensuing bad weather and she was in condition to make the remaining distance, as she did. Shifted *K-5's* hawser to the towing engine and *Bushnell* went ahead at about 80 revolutions per minute. At 5 p. m. *K-1* began to stop, which continued more or less frequently during the night; she reported "casualties" occurring on both engines. At 6.30 p. m. *K-5* broke adrift, pelican hook accidentally tripping. This was a serious mishap, since it later became necessary to tow her in good weather through more dangerous water. Proceeded with *K-2* and *K-6* on the *Bushnell's* bows, but usually scattered on account of stopping for *K-1* and the rough sea. Running with dimmed side and stern lights, very rough, submarines closed except induction ventilator; making 5 to 6 knots while running; wind one point on port bow.

11. From October 22, midnight to October 23, midnight, same weather continued but the sea rougher; wind force 6 to 7 and increasing somewhat. *K-1* running what more continuously, after stopping from 4 a. m. to 7.30 a. m., but *K-2* began to stop for considerable periods. Making 5 to 6 knots while running, drifting downwind 1 to 2 knots while stopped. While running, *Bushnell* pounding heavily, submarines most under water; *K-6* able to keep an officer on the platform at top of scope—all others handling from conning tower by what they could see from eyes.

12. From October 23, midnight, to October 24, midnight, at first wind increased with wind force 7, or more in the gusts; then began moderating and backing to seaward. But became somewhat thick and during a long stop for *K-1* and *K-2* submarines became scattered and not all in sight at daylight. Made an oil slick and got *K-2* in tow. At 9 a. m., by which time others assembled, proceeded fairly fast, weather considerably better, *K-1*, *K-5*, and *K-6* on one engine. *Bushnell* took *K-2* until 3 p. m., when her pelican hook accidentally tripped. Then proceeded as before with all running and slowing only occasionally for *K-1* and *K-2*; making 6 to 7 knots while running.

13. From October 24, midnight, to October 25, midnight, wind died out and remained calm for remainder of the voyage. Sea soon became smooth. Became cloudy and rainy, no position fix for 50 hours before making landfall. At 7 a. m. sent boat with provisions to all submarines; division commander went forward. Took *K-2* in tow and proceeded as before; *K-1*, *K-5* and *K-6* running on ahead and on bows; speed 8½. At noon division commander reported *K-1*

disabled. *K-2* reported starboard engine ready and that repairs to port engine nearly completed. At 1.30 p. m. cast off *K-2* and picked up *K-1*; *K-2* then shifted at *K-2*. Proceeded as before, running steadily.

October 25, mid. to October 26, mid., proceeded as before, running steadily. Then took *K-5* in tow, lubricating oil nearly expended. Continued at *K-2* speed about 8, *K-2* and *K-6* zigzagging on bows, running one hour and forty landfall at 7.30 p. m.

Destination as above and moored *Bushnell* in the harbor October 27. Submarines moored alongside, in condition as follows:

K-1—Fairly ready for service, having run farthest of all of them—much of it in bad weather. She was at no time a source of worry or concern to the *Bushnell's* protection by her continued patrol on the

K-2—Ready to run but consuming lubricating oil at an excessive rate, probably piston head gaskets. Had run through all the bad weather, mostly on starboard engine. Port engine is evidently all right and crank-shaft, however.

K-3—Arrived ready for service, having effected repairs but considered less reliable. Had run about 675 miles.

K-4—Arrived with both engines entirely disabled, having run about 550 miles. Working cylinders and pistons, one cracked scavenger-exhaust header, all scavenger valves badly burned and numerous other defects. Examination had been only partial and estimated time to effect repairs. Material and spares were available. The probable cause of most of the trouble was the increased back pressure caused by the repairs at the New York Navy Yard.

The commander's only previous experience with submarines was with the Hawaiian waters. Their engine reliability is such that they can run the last leg of this voyage within 8 days and have arrived in better condition than did the *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*. Materially, the *K-1*, *K-3*, *K-7*, and *K-8* are about as they were completed, with improvements made by their own personnel to effect small improvements, but some are quite the reverse, and the effect has been less war-worthy than are the other four. The funds expended in repairs have been a little worse than wasted. However, *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-3*, and *K-4* are material, quite capable of the duty they are now stationed to perform, now being upon their own resources and knowing they have the tools they have, will improve in efficiency. Good service can be expected from them.

On October 28, the commander, United States Naval Forces in European waters, reported that three submarines were ready for service. Found commander, United States Navy, in port whose orders placing him in charge of our activities. Directed Commander Division Four to report to him and submit a report on his own as in touch with the situation.

On October 28, 4 a. m., began unloading *Bushnell*, using the lighters and storehouse. Completed discharging at 9.30 p. m., and *Bushnell* sailed for Philadelphia on October 28, via southern route. Landed all of Fourth Division supplies and approximately 500 provisions for 100 men. Filled the submarine with water, and left 1,250 gallons lubricating oil in gasoline drums obtained from the supply of fuel and oil had arrived.

The submarines will moor to a sea wall on the inner face of the breakwater. The *Bushnell* will moor on the wall and breakwater and will use arches in its harbor, etc. These arches each have a concrete floor about 20 by 20 feet at one end; as soon as bearded up at the other they will be used. The storehouse is across the harbor, in the city, and is not a particularly good one.

The submarines intend to install themselves on the breakwater, build galley, etc., as independent of tender as practicable. They will be about two weeks running up machinery and exercising, and in the meantime will be at port in the absence of information concerning enemy submarine movements.

The local officials may not be at all times satisfactory. As far as the local officials are not wrongly disposed but appear closely tied down by their superiors. Perhaps the fact that there is quite a local element which openly sympathizes with the United States may influence the situation.

The information concerning enemy submarine movements was of one submarine, carrying 6-inch guns, which operated from vicinity of Madeira

northward, during first half of October; she evidently passed about 200 miles. It is considered that the first thing to be apprehended is enemy submarines attacking shipping in that harbor. The only reason they have not already made an attack must be their fear of mines. But there are none and the enemy maintain that, or a submarine that has run its course and can't get home might try the way of finishing his course mines or no mines.

As the *Bushnell* found the harbor, there were several ships into which a submarine could run torpedoes from outside the harbor entrance or could even enter at dark night without much chance of detection. Any submarine could easily sink several ships there at most any time, which would also ruin the harbor unless the nets were raised. The local officials are making a net; it is about 8-inch mesh but made of weak fence wire; a torpedo would go through it as if it were paper.

If allied shipping is to make a considerable use of that harbor under our present management it is emphatically recommended that we supply a strong torpedo net of the required length is relatively very short. There are lighters available to handle the net gate; there will be required in addition to net, with its buoys and anchors, hand wrenches for opening and closing the gate. It will probably be more satisfactory, if the Government concerned will authorize it, for our forces to plant, maintain, and operate the net. Pending the installation of a net and while the harbor contains much shipping, I have given our S. O. P. in those waters my own opinion that our submarine's best field of operations is off the harbor entrance; at least there is information of enemy activity elsewhere in the vicinity.

22. *Bushnell* arrived at Philadelphia Navy Yard November 7, noon; returned via southern route. This route 350 miles farther than great circle course was chosen to avoid northwest winds and get better weather for carrying out ship drills. Countered considerable wind, all forward of beam. Held ship drills and semi-battle inspection. Fuel consumption was a little greater than the rather scanty allowance on board indicated would be the case; economical speed is not yet known. An eventful voyage returning; sighted several merchantmen, including three steamers in company.

THOS. C. H.

Admiral GRANT. Of course during the period 1915 to 1917, there was a lot of correspondence entered into upon the subjects here mentioned, such as organization of the submarine flotillas, location of submarine bases on our coast, requirements of a standard submarine base, methods of inspecting submarines, submarine training, submarine mobilization, and various other related subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of the trip you have just described?

Admiral GRANT. The date of this letter is November 6, 1917. I think you asked me something about plans in your previous question.

The CHAIRMAN. About what?

Admiral GRANT. Plans for war or something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about the battleship situation, the general activities of the department with regard to this subject.

Admiral GRANT. I do not recall ever having received a plan from the Navy Department looking to the use of available submarines in this war. I did, however, plan to operate them from bases upon our coast. My particular efforts after taking command of the submarines in 1915 were devoted to getting the submarines afloat into operating conditions, and more particularly to getting submarines of proper size and dimensions appropriated for. I was confident in my own mind that the war would continue for some time, and that we could win a reasonable period of time, 18 months, supply ourselves with submarine vessels of suitable dimensions and capabilities to meet our needs.

As Congress had appropriated in March, 1915 for 16 O boats and 2 seagoing submarines, which made 3 of the AA type, I found it very hard to get much real assistance so far as winning advocates for a larger and more efficient size type of boats was concerned. The opposition came from members of the General Board.

January 1916. I was called before the House Naval Committee on a statement concerning submarines, and everything that I may be found on pages 1553 to 1678 of the report of the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives.

WHEATMAN. Can you give us a general idea of what you submitted to the committee at that time?

MR. GRANT. Yes. It was from the members of this committee, the Naval Committee, that I received the first encouragement in building a submarine of not less than 800 tons surface displacement, except, of course, from those officers who were actually on submarines afloat.

I had constant touch with the Chief of Operations and the chiefs of staff concerning both personnel and material, and all were aware of the condition of the submarine force.

The force was practically new, not only to the department, so that no one was concerned in the operation of the force, nearly 100 per cent of the officers and enlisted personnel were new.

As a submarine is a highly technical instrument, it became necessary to train officers and men to meet the expansion of material that took place in March, 1916.

As a result of the establishment of a base and submarine school for enlisted men and officers at New London, Conn., and the location of stations at other points upon the Atlantic coast.

In my remarks I have briefly set forth the submarine situation in the navy at the beginning of the World War. As I have previously stated, the only vessels we had in commission up to as late as 1916 were of the K type. The first of the L boats came in that year.

We did not have a submarine of the proper type and dimensions or properly trained for entering the World War, in my opinion; all this was largely due to want of education.

MR. KEYES. In order that I may understand your last statement, am I not sure I clearly understood you? Let me ask you a question.

Had we any submarines in April, 1917, when we entered the war? In your opinion, were they ready and suitable to meet the demands of the war?

MR. GRANT. We had not.

MR. KEYES. We had none?

MR. GRANT. We had none suitable for entering the war.

WHEATMAN. And when did you first begin to make recommendations for these larger boats?

MR. GRANT. In 1915.

WHEATMAN. And you kept recommending from time to time that they build larger boats?

MR. GRANT. Yes; I talked to everybody that had anything to do with the members of the General Board, and every member of the Naval Committee, and members of the Bureau of Construction, of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, and officers in the navy.

WHEATMAN. Did you receive any support from the department?

MR. GRANT. No; I did not.

MR. PITTMAN. Did you receive any report from anywhere?

MR. GRANT. Any report?

Senator PITTMAN. Any support, from anywhere?

Admiral GRANT. From the House Naval Committee.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

Admiral GRANT. One officer in the General Board assisted; can not recall anyone else in Washington.

Coming to the battleship force, I assumed command on August 1, 1917, shortly after the reorganization of the fleet. This force consisted of 17 battleships assigned to four divisions, as follows:

Fourth Division: *Minnesota*, *Louisiana*, *Kansas*, *New Hampshire*, *Minnesota*, flagship.

Third Division: *Virginia*, *Rhode Island*, *Georgia*, *New York*, *Nebraska*.

Second Division: *Missouri*, *Maine*, *Ohio*, *Wisconsin*.

First Division: *Alabama*, *Illinois*, *Kentucky*, *Kearsarge*.

We have no records to refer to, but as near as I can recall August 3, 1917, there were two or three of these vessels that had joined the force. The fleet had been recently reorganized and of the vessels forming battleship force one were placed in full commission from having been in reserve. These missing vessels had been reported for duty from the navy yards. The material condition of these vessels was not good. This subject will be referred to later.

I am unable to quote the department's order concerning the primary and secondary missions of battleship force 1. My impression now is that in August, 1917, the primary mission of battleship force 1 was to prepare for and maintain itself in a state of readiness for war and the secondary mission was the training of personnel. This policy was later changed so that the primary mission of battleship force 1 became the training of personnel, with the ultimate mission to fit itself for battle. Although sadly in need of urgent repairs, none of these vessels were permitted during 1917 and the winter of 1917-18 to visit a navy yard for a longer period than 10 days, which time they were supposed to dock, have their bottoms cleaned, check sights, have performed other urgent work, and were expected to effect repairs upon all material requiring it. In the majority of cases letters and correspondence concerning the numerous repairs for any of these vessels had either not been acted upon or were awaiting the arrival of the vessel at the yard for an inspection, examination, planning and estimates, approval, and orders for execution of the work. Obviously nothing was accomplished in the navy yards toward the upkeep of the vessels in question beyond routine docking work.

The commander in chief wrote the following order, file 3719, December 3, 1917, concerning the Atlantic Fleet in home waters. File 3719.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP
December 3,

From: Commander in chief.

To: Atlantic Fleet in home waters.

Subject: Readiness for distant service.

Reference: (a) Fleet regulations, article 4.

1. Under present conditions it is possible that any unit of the fleet now in home waters may be called upon for distant service without previous warning.

2. Commander in chief desires that all units of the fleet shall be maintained at all times in such condition that it will be practicable to proceed on distant service at any time after filling up with fuel.

and unnecessary hardship, officers and men should so arrange their private affairs that warning will be necessary in case of orders to distant service. When units of the fleet proceed to sea, commanders of units shall ask themselves the question:

"Am I under my command in such a condition of readiness that if orders are received on distant service no further communication with the United States is necessary?"

Commanders of all United States vessels shall take the initiative in carrying out this policy.

H. T. MAYO.

January 25, 1918, file 13, the commander in chief addressed the Fleet in home waters concerning the Navy Department's warning repairs:

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
February 25, 1918.

Commander in chief.

The Fleet in home waters.

The Navy Department's policy concerning repairs.

The Navy Department's letter No. Mat-T-M1 20778-246, of February 12, 1918, and C. in C.'s letter to Atlantic Fleet in home waters, file 3719, of February 12, 1918.

For information and guidance of the fleet, there is quoted below reference (a), the policy of the department with regard to repairs to ships.

(a) *Long Island*. Request for repairs and inspection report.

(b) Letter of commander Division 3, battleship force 1, to commander Atlantic Fleet, file No. 69, January 27, 1918. (c) Letter of commander battleship force 1, file No. 812-33, January 28, 1918, and end. (d) Letter from commander battleship force 1 to commander battleship force 1, file No. 69, January 27, 1918.

(e) Letter from commander battleship force 1 to C. in C., file No. 426, January 29, 1918. (f) Letter from C. in C. to C. N. O., file 426, January 21, 1918. (g) Letter from C. in C. to Sec. Nav., file 426, January 21, 1918.

The statements contained in the letters of commanders, battleship force 1, and it appears that there is not a proper realization of the importance of the information. As carried out, it would appear to be a very superficial inspection and no real information as to the ship's condition. In the letter of the division commander it is stated:

"In regard to all items which would call for detailed examinations, it is to be noted that such source of information is disregarded, the department depending on these reports for information as to the readiness of ships for any service, and reports which cover her readiness for service on a standard prescribed by the force commanders and the department knows nothing are of absolutely no value."

The department does not consider that lack of knowledge of its policy in the use of ships creates any doubt as to what should be the ship's condition. The force commanders and force commanders should be to keep the ship in readiness for service and this should be the standard on which material reports are founded. The standard the department is not in position to use ships to carry on the service on to perform by its policy. This tendency to lay faults to lack of knowledge of the department's policy is manifest throughout and can not in any way be a reason for misleading reports.

In the letter of commander, battleship force 1, it would appear that too much reliance is placed on standard fixed by various yards as to what repairs were needed. The yards are not to fix such standards. The ship's personnel are, or should be, familiar with the needs of the ship and their standards should govern.

The knowledge as to conditions forces the yards to set standards, but the knowledge as to whether or not a cylinder needs boring without going to a yard and having a man caliper it for them. The department holds the ship, not the yards, for her material condition, and when differences arise as to the necessary work the department will make the decision on hearing both sides, but

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the ship must present better information than they would appear to possess from the spirit of the letters referred to indicate what they are now expected to have.

"4. The *Rhode Island* was sent to the navy yard, Boston, October 3, 1916, and remained there until March 6, 1917, a period of 154 days, and it is evident she left the yard in a poor state of repair, as the deteriorated condition revealed by her need for repairs can hardly be due to her 11 months' service.

"5. The department did away with the 'overhaul period' as it considered a considerable amount of unnecessary time was being taken at the yard, that the policy was for ships to let repairs go, pending arrival at the yard, and not fully use the ship's facilities for upkeep. The department did not intend to keep ships away from the yard when in need of repairs and can not understand how its policy can be considered a reason for ships not reporting their actual material condition. It only intended that every possible effort be made to keep ships away from the yard and on work confined to that necessary for military efficiency. The department realizes its responsibility in the matter of sending ships to yard for repairs, but must insist on the ship's and fleet responsibility in keeping the department fully informed, in having accurate information of conditions, in eliminating all work except for military efficiency, and in making every effort to doing work with fleet facilities.

"JOSEPHUS DANIEL

2. It is desired to emphasize the importance of keeping proper officials informed of the need for repairs, through channels provided for that purpose by the Navy Regulations, i. e., "Quarterly report of material readiness for active war service," "Availability reports," "Reports of necessary work beyond the capacity of the ship's force," "Requests for repairs," etc.

3. It is also desired to emphasize the importance of the ship's forces, carrying out their own repairs wherever possible.

H. T. M.

I read that letter because it has reference to repairs on the *Island* and calls attention to the fact that she was 154 days in the navy yard, until some time in 1917, and yet was completely out of repair.

Her sister ship, the *New Jersey*, was in exactly the same condition. In fact, most of the vessels of the division were.

A board of investigation was held in connection with the *New Jersey*, which lasted a period of two or three months. I have not a copy of the report of that board—only from memory.

During the time from August, 1917, until the spring of 1918, we repeatedly tried to get these ships to the yard here to effect repairs, before the 10-day limit was the order.

In April, 1918, the 10-day schedule for docking and repairs of vessels of battleship force 1 at the navy yards had been completed as far as those vessels are concerned; but as little or no work had been accomplished upon the ships in question, the commander of battleship force 1 addressed the following letter to the commander in chief [reading]:

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
BATTLESHIP FORCE 1,
U. S. S. "MINNESOTA," FLAGSHIP,
April 18, 1918.

From: Commander battleship force 1.

To: Commander in chief.

Subject: Preparing ships for distant service.

References: (a) C. in C., file 3719, dated December 3, 1917. (b) Opnav let. 20392-748, dated November 7, 1917. (c) C. B. F. 1, let. 2690-153 of April 17, 1918.

Inclosure: Copy of reference (c).

1. In compliance with reference (a) ships of this force have submitted lists of repairs and alterations which would be necessary to fit them for distant service.

2. In many cases these alterations though not very extensive will require approximately 30 days at a navy yard to properly complete them.

enter here, which is not in the letter, that these alterations removal of certain intermediate batteries, for their own efficiency, contained in the repair. [Continuing reading:]

The schedule was arranged on the basis of 10 working days and important major items of work have not been accomplished, as there was no time available to warrant the yard's undertaking the work and ships of the fleet the yards with work undone, the completion of which must be secured to ensure a material readiness for distant service.

The ships are at present engaged as a primary mission in training, with an ultimate view to battle.

It is directed to that end it shall maintain a permanent nucleus battle force of officers and men sufficient to keep the material in constant readiness and to permit rapid preparations for battle when battle complement is

They are deficient in their material readiness for battle as indicated in the reports submitted by them to which reference was made in above paragraph. When repairs and alterations are made they will, when a battle complement is not only be deficient from a point of view of material but they will have to go to navy yards for these repairs and alterations which are of inestimable value which should be, and which reference (b) should be directed to training the crew for battle.

Of great military importance of this question, and to the serious consequences which may follow any misunderstanding on the part of the department in regard to the material readiness of these ships for action, I consider it fitting to bring the matter to your attention.

It would appear to be one of policy to be decided by the department. The necessary changes and alterations have been forwarded from time to time. Three months after these changes have been made to train a battle complement can not be accomplished while ships are at a navy yard.

The purpose of this letter merely to present these facts in view of the expressed policy of Naval Operations quoted above which clearly indicates an intention that these ships can, on receipt of a battle complement, immediately begin training, as the primary mission.

To permit it is recommended that in the order found necessary on a number of ships of this force be sent to navy yards to complete the repairs necessary to prepare them for distant service, so that when their service begins all of the time may be devoted to training their new crew for

It has been addressed to ships of this force for the purpose of obtaining a list of all work which will be necessary before being ordered on active duty thereof is forwarded herewith for information.

Based on these reports, material inspection of ships will be held as found necessary and a report forwarded covering all vessels of force 1.

A. W. GRANT.

On 25 April 1918, the commander in chief forwarded the letter to the Chief of Operations: First indorsement, "Forwarded, as follows:

[First indorsement.]

APRIL 25, 1918.

Commander in chief.

Chief of Operations.

Ships for distant service (letter of combat for one).

Letter No. Mat T M1 20778 246 of February 12, 1918, re request for repairs and inspection report.

Approved.

Attention is invited to paragraphs 10 and 12 of the attached letter. As the correspondence concerning work necessary for distant service, the department recommends that such work be done as early as is practicable, in accordance with the department's policy as expressed in reference (a).

H. T. MAYO.

Following the writing of this letter I interviewed personally the Chief of Operations and suggested the holding of a conference at the Navy Department. As a result, this conference was held, as directed in the following letter:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
April 25,

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Bureaus of Navigation, Steam Engineering, Construction and Repair, Ordnance, Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet; commander battleship force 1; commander battleship force 2; commandant navy yard, Boston; commandant navy yard, New York; commandant navy yard, Philadelphia; commandant navy yard, Norfolk.
Subject: Battleships—schedule of navy-yard work.

1. The present material condition of vessels of battleship forces 1 and 2 is to be in general very good; and this condition may be expected to be maintained. However, there has been an accumulation of authorized new installations and deferred extensive repair work that must be undertaken to bring these vessels to the highest state of readiness for battle.

2. To undertake this work and carry it out most efficiently, a general estimate of the situation is necessary, in order to lay down a general plan and schedule of work. There must be a definite list of work to be undertaken on each vessel. Preparation of plans and the assembly of material must be completed before the vessels are sent to the navy yards to begin the work.

3. It is desired that these matters be fully discussed in conference of officers representing the Office of Naval Operations and the material bureaus of the Navy Department, the United States Atlantic Fleet, and the navy yards, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk. The conference will be held at 9 a. m., Tuesday, May 7, 1918, in the office of operations—material, Navy Department. Officers to represent the navy yards and the fleet will be nominated upon receipt of this letter, and orders for orders will be submitted to the Bureau of Navigation.

4. It is of the greatest importance that officers attending the conference be prepared to comment on all matters presented for discussion.

W. S. BRADY

On May 7, the commander of battleship force 1, met in conference at the Navy Department with representatives from the navy yards at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and from the material section of the office of the Chief of Operations. So far as concerns repairs to vessels of battleship force 1, every item was considered and a time estimate for the completion of the work upon each vessel was made, and the order in which the vessels were to be received at the navy yards was tentatively decided upon.

The two following letters show the schedule for the overhaul of 10 battleships at the navy yard, Philadelphia, and 7 vessels at the navy yard, Boston.

3363-132-D.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "MINNESOTA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 12,

From: Commander, battleship force 1.

To: Commandant, navy yard, Philadelphia.

Subject: Tentative schedule for overhaul of vessels of battleship force 1.

1. The following table shows the tentative schedule for overhaul of vessels of battleship force arranged by the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa., May 7, 1918, following conference at Navy Department:

Vessels of battleship force 1, home yard, Philadelphia, Pa.

| | Tentative schedule arranged by navy yard, Philadelphia, May 7, 1918. | Vessels. | Tentative schedule arranged by navy yard, Philadelphia, May 7, 1918. |
|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | May 29-June 20. | Louisiana..... | July 31-Sept. 11. |
| | June 5-July 24. | Missouri..... | Sept. 2-Oct. 28. |
| | June 12-Aug. 1. | Maine..... | Sept. 9-Oct. 28. |
| | June 12-Aug. 7. | Ohio..... | Sept. 16-Nov. 4. |
| | June 26-Aug. 14. | Wisconsin..... | Sept. 23-Oct. 31. |

returning to the fleet, and after consultation with the commander in
view necessary to request the yard to alter this schedule, principally in
time of arrival of vessels of this force at the navy yard. The following
is the schedule, and comment is requested:

*Details of time for overhaul of vessels, submitted by commander battleship
force 1, May 12, 1918, to commandant navy yard, Philadelphia.*

| | Number of work- ing days | Beginning and end of overhaul period. | Ship. | Number of work- ing days. | Beginning and end of overhaul period. |
|--|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| | 40 | June 6-July 27. | Kansas..... | 20 | Sept. 9-Oct. 3. |
| | 45 | June 12-Aug. 8. | Maine..... | 40 | Sept. 18-Nov. 7. |
| | 40 | June 26-Aug. 16. | Minnesota..... | 40 | Oct. 1-Nov. 19. |
| | 35 | July 26-Sept. 10. | Ohio..... | 40 | Oct. 5-Nov. 25. |
| | 50 | Sept. 2-Nov. 2. | Wisconsin..... | 30 | Oct. 23-Nov. 30. |

principal change appears with vessels of the fourth division, moving the
of *Minnesota* to later dates.
it will be impossible to carry out departmental orders if we follow the dates
in the yard's schedule.
it would also seem desirable to lengthen the interval between the time of
repairs of any division at the yard. No change is made in the time for the
departure of the *Alabama* and *Illinois*, vessels of division one.
in going through the list of repairs on the various vessels, I find that there is with
every ship some one controlling item that limits the period of time that
the ship is at the yard undergoing overhaul, and it would seem at present that the
material inspection of these vessels will have the effect of possible re-
sulting in more time of work on these vessels rather than shortening the overhaul period.

A. W. GRANT.

BOSTON NAVY YARD,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
May 11, 1918.

commandant navy yard, Boston, Mass.
battleship force No. 1.
battleship force No. 1, repairs.

minutes of conference at the department between representatives of this
and the various bureaus concerned, and of battleship force No. 1, the fol-
lowing for repairs to battleships having Boston as home port, is submitted:

| | Days required for repairs. |
|--|-------------------------------|
| | 45 |
| | 30 |
| | 30 |
| | 30 |
| | 30 |
| | 30 |
| | 35 |
| | 30 |

2. It is recommended that the *Georgia* arrive at this yard on 5, 1918, and that the other vessels come here in the order named ship to arrive about 10 days before the date set for completion of ship in precession.

W. R. E.

[First indorsement.]

MAY 18

From: Commander battleship force 1.

To: Commander in chief.

1. Forwarded.

A. W. C.

These vessels required from 30 to 50 working days for necessary and urgent repairs to place them in condition for effective service. An order from the department concerning repairs to battleship force 1 is quoted herewith:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 5

To: All bureaus; commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet; commander, battleship force 2; commandant, navy yard, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk.

Subject: Battleships, schedule of navy yard work.

References: (a) Commander in chief's letter No. 9-C1 (15/6), June 1, 1918.

(b) Departmental letter 28577-104, June 1, 1918.

1. The following repair schedule of battleship forces 1 and 2, submitted by commander in chief in reference (a), is approved.

| Ship. | Working days. | Period. | |
|----------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-------|
| | | From— | |
| Vessels assigned to navy yard, Boston: | | | |
| Georgia..... | 45 | June 5..... | July |
| Nebraska..... | 30 | July 26..... | Aug. |
| Kearsarge..... | 35 | Aug. 8..... | Sept. |
| Virginia..... | 30 | Sept. 3..... | Oct. |
| Rhode Island..... | 30 | Sept. 23..... | Oct. |
| New Jersey..... | 30 | Oct. 21..... | Nov. |
| Kentucky..... | 30 | Oct. 23..... | Nov. |
| Vessels assigned to navy yard, Philadelphia: | | | |
| New Hampshire..... | 40 | June 6..... | July |
| South Carolina..... | 30 | June 7..... | July |
| Alabama..... | 45 | June 12..... | Aug. |
| Illinois..... | 40 | July 1..... | Aug. |
| Louisiana..... | 35 | July 26..... | Sept. |
| Michigan..... | 30 | Aug. 5..... | Sept. |
| Connecticut..... | 60 | Sept. 1..... | Nov. |
| Missouri..... | 50 | Sept. 2..... | Oct. |
| Kansas..... | 30 | Sept. 9..... | Oct. |
| Maine..... | 40 | Sept. 18..... | Nov. |
| Minnesota..... | 40 | Oct. 1..... | Nov. |
| Ohio..... | 40 | Oct. 22..... | Dec. |
| Wisconsin..... | 30 | Nov. 4..... | Dec. |
| Vermont..... | 35 | Nov. 18..... | Dec. |

JOSEPHUS D.

Most all of these estimated periods of time for completing the repairs were too short and had to be increased.

I am unable to quote from correspondence concerning the condition of vessels of battleship force 1 previous to 1917 as I briefly stated their condition as I found them. In one instance, however, an investigation was held concerning the material condition of the *New Jersey*. The board in this case made a careful investigation as to the reasons why the *New Jersey* required so much work done upon her. I think the *New Jersey* was placed in reserve

at Boston, in 1915, where little or no work was done upon the vessel took part in the militia cruise in 1916 and was then at the navy yard, New York, and became the receiving ship—*the Rhode Island*. She remained at the New York yard from about May 1, 1916, to May, 1917. During this period practically no work was done upon her.

One of the board of investigation referred to above also mentioned the *Rhode Island*. The material condition of this vessel was about that of the *New Jersey*. As mentioned in the department report of February 12, 1918, to the commander in chief, paragraph 10 above, the *Rhode Island* was sent to navy yard, New York, on October 3, 1916, for repairs and remained there until March 1, 1917, a period of 154 days. Her material condition on August 20, 1917, was not good. To summarize the material condition of vessels forming the fleet force in August, 1917, was not good.

Whether a single one of these vessels could have remained in service in August, 1917, had they received a serious underwater body at that time.

I am making a conservative statement when I say that few, if any, bulkheads in any one of these vessels that was in service were water-tight. They had all been pierced for electric lighting tubes, water piping or steam piping, or for other openings during the days of their construction, due to alterations having been made in the interior fittings in the ship and the holes made in the bulkheads throughout the vessels. The work of plugging these holes and placing the compartments under an air-tight condition was undertaken and accomplished by the ship's force. It has been made regarding the removal of the 7 and 8 inch gun from vessels of the *Connecticut* and *Virginia* classes of 1906. These were not removed until the latter part of the year 1917.

EXAMINER. What measures did you take to get these ships repaired or found that they were not in proper condition?

GRANT. I tried to get them to the navy yards, but was unable to do so for periods longer than 10 days during 1917 and the first 18 months of 1918.

EXAMINER. And the 10 days in a navy yard would have been sufficient in any case?

GRANT. Except to overhaul and scrape their bottoms, it would have been absolutely impossible to undertake any work on them.

EXAMINER. Did you bring up the question of material readiness of these vessels in May or June, 1918?

GRANT. Yes; I talked with the Chief of Operations, and instrumental in having him order this conference at the department which consisted of representatives from the Bureaus of Engineering, Construction and Repair, and Ordnance, to be in conference with officers representing the machinery and hull of the navy yards at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and to meet also in conference with representatives of the commander in chief, Admiral Mayo, and from the fleet, consisting of the force engineer and force ordnance

The CHAIRMAN. That is the conference to which you have referred?

Admiral GRANT. That is the conference to which I referred.

The CHAIRMAN. And after that conference were steps taken?

Admiral GRANT. After that conference the department arranged the repairs as I have stated, giving the number of days' work, arranged with the yards the order in which the vessels were sent to the yards.

The CHAIRMAN. If the German fleet had succeeded in coming out and defeating the British fleet, would your fleet have been in efficient condition to meet them before that conference?

Admiral GRANT. In 1916?

The CHAIRMAN. In 1917.

Admiral GRANT. In 1917 we would have gone out and done the best we could, but it would not have been very much. We did not have the personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not have the personnel?

Admiral GRANT. We did not have any trained personnel in 1917. Let me add a little there.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a statement to the committee as to the condition of the personnel in your belief when you first took command?

Admiral GRANT. As I stated, the secondary mission early in 1917 was training. The only vessels that were doing any training amounted to anything then were vessels of the first and second divisions. Eight vessels that were engaged entirely in training men of the Engineer force, oilers, engine drivers, firemen, men of those forces. All other vessels of the force and of the fleet, too, had begun training and the number of men that were to be delivered by each one of the ships of battleship forces 1 and 2 were laid down, but we did not meet with very much success, and I do not think that any vessels of battleship force 2 did any training after I went to command except to take a certain number of men and train a unit of 70 men, forming the turret crews and handling crews for vessels that were building, like the Idaho and New Mexico.

Battleship force 1 undertook then the training of petty officers of all rates, and on September 1, 1917, 10 days after I took command, an order was issued which covered the training of the enlisted personnel on all ships except those of divisions 1 and 2. We had no one covering every rate of petty officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Schools on battleships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; and we were required to turn out a certain number of men in these ratings periodically—boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, yeomen, coxswains, quartermasters, signalmen, radio electricians, carpenter's mates, shipwrights, shipfitters, plumbers and fitters, blacksmiths, pharmacists, storekeepers, stewards, bakers.

This order, which I have here, covered that detail. I have another copy of it. It is No. 665-75, dated September 1, 1917, addressed by commander, battleship force 1, to the force under my command.

In addition to that training, we began early training the guard crews which manned the merchant vessels fitted with two guns for antisubmarine work. Each one of the vessels of

except vessels of the first and second division had 150 on board: young men who came from the interior, who had not seen a ship or salt water, were placed in the division known as the armed guard division, drilled and trained by two officers for a period of four weeks.

CHAIRMAN. Were those extra men or were they a part of the complement?

ADMIRAL GRANT. They were all extra men; had nothing to do with the complement. At the end of four weeks they carried out target practice every day, day and night, and if successful the units were transferred to the ships singly, but the entire unit, 8 men forming an armed guard crew, 2 crews to a ship, with a petty officer in charge, 17 or 18 men. They had to go as a unit, because, like a football team, you cannot take out one man and ship him here and another one there.

CHAIRMAN. What were the petty officers who were put in charge of these units?

ADMIRAL GRANT. They were men who were trained with the men for the particular purpose of taking charge of the armed guard crews.

CHAIRMAN. New men that you would train?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes; men that we had trained.

CHAIRMAN. Did they not take some of your petty officers?

ADMIRAL GRANT. No, sir; we had to retain some few of our petty officers in order to carry on our work. We could not dispense with them.

CHAIRMAN. But they took some of them?

ADMIRAL GRANT. We took men that we had trained for the business.

CHAIRMAN. These men that you trained in the various schools, were they a part of the ship's complement?

ADMIRAL GRANT. They were not a part of the ship's complement. The complement of the *Minnesota* type of vessel has approximately between 900 and 1,100 men.

CHAIRMAN. And how many did you have on board in all?

ADMIRAL GRANT. We had on board most of the time from 1,300 to 1,400 men.

CHAIRMAN. Were the ships' complements full September, 1917, on the various ships?

ADMIRAL GRANT. We had probably a great many more men than the complement of the ship's company, but we had but very few trained men.

CHAIRMAN. They were not trained men?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Not at all.

CHAIRMAN. So that you did not have a trained personnel on your battleships sufficient to properly carry out the purposes for which they were intended?

ADMIRAL GRANT. We had not the trained personnel, neither men nor officers, on any ship that I was attached to or had anything to do with.

CHAIRMAN. That was the condition in September, 1917?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. In what condition were the ships as to ammunition?

ADMIRAL GRANT. The condition of the ships as regards ammunition was good. That question may be due to the fact that I was asked something about removing certain guns.

The CHAIRMAN. Certain guns were removed for the armed ships, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, yes; yes, to the betterment of the ship. We removed all of the 3-inch batteries from all of the vessels, on the lower decks, and sealed the ports. The only antisubmarine guns of that caliber were high up, where we could see the submarine and fire in any seaway. The other guns that were removed from the ships, *Virginia*, *Connecticut*, and *Louisiana* were 7.6 inch guns on the lower decks, which could not be fought in any kind of a sea. However, this was not a question which came up during the war. It was a thing that had been known for 10 years. Ten years ago certain officers tried to get those guns off the vessels and seal the ports, as being entirely useless on that type of vessel. We managed to get an order sometime in 1918, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. In what condition was the personnel of the vessels in regard to operating the guns, when you took command?

Admiral GRANT. Well, they needed a great deal of training. They had just come from reserve, and there were no full crews in any of the vessels, who were trained, in any of the turrets.

The CHAIRMAN. There were no full crews?

Admiral GRANT. No; no trained crews.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given any plans to guide you in that battleship force 1 was to take in the war, when you took command?

Admiral GRANT. I mentioned that my primary mission at the beginning of the war was to prepare for battle, and a secondary mission, of training. I think that referred to the fact that one of the force divisions 3 and 4, nine ships, were training simply the officers.

The secondary mission referred to, training, referred particularly to divisions 1 and 2, the older type of battleships, that were engaged in training men for the engineer force. Those vessels carried approximately 300 men under training for these different engineer rates. It lasted for a period of six weeks, one half coming at the end of the first week, and half leaving.

Later in the war, when the nine vessels of divisions 3 and 4 were engaged in training the armed guard crews and petty officers and commissioned officers, I may add—the entire mission of battleship force 1 was changed so that its primary mission was training and its ultimate mission was to prepare for war.

The CHAIRMAN. But you were not given any general battle plan for the fleet?

Admiral GRANT. Nothing beyond that. I was fully aware—not in the sense you mean; no. I do not think it was necessary, had we had it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the battleships you were under Admiral Mayo, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that any report you would have made would have been made to him?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the submarines, under whom were you?

Admiral GRANT. I was under the commander in chief, the fleet, although the commander in chief in the winter might be down

GRANT. I wrote to the department direct, but I kept up communication to the commander in chief.

CHAIRMAN. But you could take matters up with the department.

GRANT. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. Did you take the submarine question up with the Chief of the Navy personally?

GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Did you get any satisfaction from the Secretary of the Navy?

GRANT. The Secretary of the Navy—no one in the department in any such submarine as I wanted; no.

CHAIRMAN. He would not listen to your plans?

GRANT. Oh, well, he would listen; but I got no assistance.

CHAIRMAN. Did you take the matter up with the Chief of the Bureau of Operations?

GRANT. Admiral Benson; yes, sir. He was opposed.

CHAIRMAN. He was opposed to your plan?

GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. When the war broke out with Germany, Germany had submarines of the type that you wished to see the American Navy have?

GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. In large numbers?

GRANT. I am unable to tell you the number she had. I

CHAIRMAN. I do not recollect now. She had a large number,

CHAIRMAN. By that time was it known that submarines were used against submarines?

GRANT. There is no secret in that. Certainly.

CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims' testimony showed that the plan was first adopted, but during the war it turned out that that was the most serviceable way of destroying submarines.

GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Was that plan considered while you were in command of the submarines?

GRANT. No plan of that nature was considered; no, sir. When going to meet a German submarine; did not contemplate the vessels we had in commission, as late as 1917, away from home. They were only fit to operate from a base here, for a few hours only. They were totally unreliable, absolutely. I considered sending those vessels abroad was a question of putting them in the hospital as soon as they got over there, and to repair them where they were ill prepared to do such work.

CHAIRMAN. That is, such as we had at that time?

GRANT. Which we sent over; yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. But if we had had larger submarines, we would have been able to send them over?

GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. And they would have been of use?

GRANT. Yes, sir; they would.

CHAIRMAN. Was there any regular plan of the department for the use of submarines in the war, that you know anything

Admiral GRANT. Not that I am aware of; until I got that from the department directing me to pick out several vessels and send them over.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the first you knew of?

Admiral GRANT. That was the first. I did not know where they were going to, either; that is, the particular place or port. It was, of course, immaterial so far as I was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And you reported to the department that the plan was unfeasible?

Admiral GRANT. Not that the plan was unfeasible.

The CHAIRMAN. With the ships you had?

Admiral GRANT. That I would not acquiesce in sending vessels abroad, because I did not think they were fit for the purpose and I have no doubt, and I believe, some of them did do good over there, but it was at a tremendous cost of men and money. If our efforts had been devoted earlier in the war to obtaining the proper type of submarine, and taken control of the matter, we would have had long before 1917 or 1918, a suitable type of vessel, but the fact that we had no vessels, as I say was largely due to ignorance on the part of everybody, myself included as well as everybody else. Why, we went out and ordered submarines from a contractor the same as you would go and buy apples from a peddler on the sidewalk. If he had some green apples you would take them. If they were red you would take those—anything he had; and so many years given in that table, the years of the appropriations, show that we bought some boats from 1900 to 1904 and then some in 1905 and then some in 1908. There was no plan. We did not have one. We did not understand the submarine question on this side of the Atlantic, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in spite of that, you tried to ameliorate the conditions?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; we tried to get more.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately after you took command?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir; early in 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first make known to the department the condition of our submarine force?

Admiral GRANT. I think the department made known to me the condition of the submarine force when they sent for me in May, 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. When they put you in command?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir. I think the department was perfectly well aware of the inefficient condition of the vessels of the entire fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. And immediately thereafter you tried to make the changes made that would have improved matters?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And those changes were not made?

Admiral GRANT. I could not get the department or anyone else to build these larger types. They were too conservative, and wanted to stick to something smaller, especially members of the General Board. And as late as 1913, as I told you, they stepped back and provided for these little N boats; because they were perfectly useless, in my opinion, to operate at sea away from a base more than a few miles.

The CHAIRMAN. And you wanted the larger type boats for coast defense?

ADMIRAL GRANT. I wanted the larger type boat for submarine work; not make any difference whether for coast defense or sea, or else. Just leave that part out—the coast defense.

CHAIRMAN. And you thought we ought to have a number of boats?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. So that we could compete with the enemy?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the personnel of the fleet while you were in command?

ADMIRAL GRANT. We only had such personnel as would man those boats that were in commission in 1915, as I mentioned. They were men—the enlisted personnel, gunners' mates, engineers, electricians—who went to these vessels and were attached to them for a period of not less than six months, until they were capable of filling a responsible position. Officers who were sent there stayed from three to six months, picking up such work as they could and they only knew from the practical work of a submarine, no practical experience. They had very little knowledge of the work.

And that was the reason that in 1916 the department started establishing the school, and I was allowed to go to Newport and I managed to get, in the Bureau of Navigation, 25 of the first class and 50 for the next.

CHAIRMAN. Did you want more?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Well, it was not necessary to have more, because we have any vessels to put them on. I was meeting the bureau and probably not taking too large a number.

CHAIRMAN. What would you say in reference to the statements of the Secretary of the Navy in his report of 1918, that at the end of the war the Navy was ready from stem to stern?

ADMIRAL GRANT. The Navy was what?

CHAIRMAN. Was ready from stem to stern?

ADMIRAL GRANT. No; I would not agree to that. No.

CHAIRMAN. You would not say that it was ready in regard to the fleet or that it was ready as to battleships?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Not that the battleship force was, or the submarine force.

SENATOR KEYES. Admiral Grant, you told us fully in regard to the condition of the submarines. I would like to ask you this question: In your opinion, in April, 1917, when we entered war, a battleship in fighting condition, including, of course, its full complement of trained officers and men?

ADMIRAL GRANT. There was not a single battleship attached to the fleet that was in condition to meet the requirements.

The battleship force 2 was composed of the vessels of the dreadnought type. I can not speak for them, because I had not been with them many years. I think that when I left the *Texas* in 1915 she was whipped anything afloat. I do not see why she could not do it in 1917. She was trained then. I do not know much about the other ships then on those ships. I had been away from the fleet for some time.

SENATOR KEYES. But you can speak of battleship force 1?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes.

Senator KEYES. And not one of them but was not?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only in September but in April?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; I know they were not in April. They were not in September.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those battleships that you were commanding in 1917 were helpless so far as any combatant value, were they?

Admiral GRANT. Not at all. They were vessels of the *Conn* *New Hampshire*, *Minnesota* type. The major batteries were 12-inch guns.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were not sufficiently manned, then, and not sufficiently in charge of trained officers and personnel of any value to the Navy?

Admiral GRANT. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Were they or not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, but their material condition was not good. The majority of them——

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you attribute that to inefficiency of the personnel on the ships, or do you attribute it entirely to some other cause, that they were of no value?

Admiral GRANT. The cause for it was, they were all in reserve at the different navy yards, and had been for a long while, and that they did not have any trained officers on board, it was due to the fact that they were in reserve—held in reserve.

Senator TRAMMELL. This was the reserve fleet, then, that you were speaking about, and not the fleet that continued in a state of readiness for fighting?

Admiral GRANT. Some of the vessels that formed—in fact, I think all of the vessels that formed—battleship force 1, had been in reserve. I am not absolutely positive of two or three of them, but the majority of them had been in reserve; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. When a ship is in reserve; now, I plead ignorance. I do not know just exactly what that means. What does it mean when a ship was in reserve?

Admiral GRANT. You are tied up at a navy yard, say, in the Delaware channel, say, at Philadelphia, with a small number of men on board just to keep the machinery and guns and auxiliaries in condition. There are not enough men on board to man and train the entire batteries; in the engineer force sufficient to keep the boilers and machinery and all of the auxiliaries in condition.

Senator TRAMMELL. The ships, then, that were not in reserve, you do not know as to the condition of them, whether they were in condition or not?

Admiral GRANT. I can not speak for the condition of battleship force 2.

Senator TRAMMELL. These battleships that you commanded were very largely used for training purposes, were they, for awhile, rather than for real service as war vessels?

Admiral GRANT. From August, 1917, until June, 1918, we were at sea with the fleet and formed a part of it, and did exactly the same work as any other vessels of the fleet; and we were at sea, and have made 10 trips to sea, whether they were at sea a month or longer. The primary purpose at first, as I told you, was to prepare for battle, while part of the force was trained. Later that

changed and our primary purpose was training, and the was to prepare for battle.

TRAMMELL. During the time you were going to sea, then, capable of performing some service?

GRANT. They did exactly the same service as any other coming to the Navy.

TRAMMELL. They were sufficiently equipped for that, then?

GRANT. Absolutely, as regards—

TRAMMELL. So that, so far as this war was concerned, the ships you commanded was equally as valuable as the Navy, as far as effectiveness in this particular war was

GRANT. In this particular war, yes, sir; they probably

TRAMMELL. You said something about, I believe, the consequences as to the matter of them not being able to stay afloat things happened to them?

GRANT. Yes.

TRAMMELL. Did any accident happen to the *Minnesota*?

GRANT. Yes.

TRAMMELL. What year?

GRANT. On the 29th or 30th of September, 1918.

TRAMMELL. What happened to her, and was she sunk or

GRANT. No, sir; she remained afloat just because I had

August, 1917, by listing the vessels 5 degrees, and then and we found the condition which I reported. I began by enlarging the repair crews which went to their battle from a few men up to 100 men, on each of these vessels. sent the men in these different departments shores, for and we started in with every water-tight bulkhead and hole and put them under an air pressure of 4 pounds, security. I think it was Friday afternoon—I have the date, but at any rate it was in the afternoon, I was on the *Minnesota*, and I transferred my flag to the *Pennsylvania*. As captain of the ship and I said, "You are going to Hampton Roads ship. As soon as you are coaled I want you to leave Cape Henry at 6 o'clock at night or there before you do it I want you to seal every hatch and every door, and send the first and second officers below with a list that this is done; and do not allow one of those doors for the next 24 hours, until you get inside the capes of the Chesapeake." He did that; they were sealed up; they were tried; and the next morning about 3 o'clock in the morning a mine, under her starboard bow. That mine blew a hole in the hull, extended from somewhere about frame 6 or 8 to about frame 12, carried away the ship's side from the armored shelf and pushed the keel over to port. The vessel floated. from her original draft, which was about 26 forward, to 28 aft, so that she drew 29 feet forward and about 26 aft, in position she went into port, and she went into port because the bulkheads had held. They were shored. The bulkheads were no leaks because we did that work on board ship; had not been done she would not have been here to-day.

Senator TRAMMELL. I gather from your recital of this and then, that the vigilance of the officers in command had something to do with the safety of a ship as well as the department.

Admiral GRANT. I do not think the department has anything to do with it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just wanted to find whose fault it was that the boats were not put in proper shape so when you struck a mine.

Admiral GRANT. Every single one of those vessels had been through in that way, and we were working from 1917 until they were in that condition, and I do not think there was one that was not but what would have come through the same way. Not only that, but cause our orders——

Senator TRAMMELL. Had those officers in command of the ships transcended their authority and gone beyond their duty in putting the vessels into condition, or were they within their authority and their duty?

Admiral GRANT. You mean these holes and things coming from the bottom?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. That had been an accumulation of years, the time the vessels were going into commission. They would have a slight alteration and pierce a bulkhead and take out a piece of something of that sort, and the place was not plugged up. They were unknown. They were not in the condition they should have been.

Senator TRAMMELL. I judge from what you say that you had a repair crew on these battleships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. And it was the duty of that repair crew, of course, under the direction of the commander, to make all these defects, where they could do it, aboard the vessels, was it?

Admiral GRANT. Probably you misunderstand what is meant by a repair crew. In action, if a mast is shot away, or something hanging overboard, a repair crew would be sent to clear away the wreckage. That is what I mean by a repair crew.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said you put 150 men on, I think you said, your repair crew?

Admiral GRANT. I had about 100 men in each. As I stated, they were at general quarters. They were not machinists; they were men that would handle shores and wedges and shore up a bulkhead, cut away a bit of anything held in that way afoul or adrift in action.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were supposed to make the repairs that could be made upon the ship, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes. Well, those 100 men were not men that would do the work I referred to, too. Those would be special men, you know——rating.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time there was some controversy about the length of time that a ship should be in dockage, was there any argument insisting that more repairing be done aboard the ship instead of running it into the dock every time you wanted to get a little of repair work done?

Admiral GRANT. No; I do not think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. I got that impression from an order that I read here. Of course my impression might have been wrong.

the department was trying to keep the ships afloat where you were training men, instead of having them tied up in a dock so as to neglecting your training of men; and they were insisting on getting the people that commanded the ship, from the command immediately all the way up the line, to do that as far as possible.

MR. GRANT. I think you are mistaken.

MR. TRAMMELL. In other words, they were trying to help along the service to expedite the service in that way. Of course it seems to me not able to do it.

MR. GRANT. Naturally we were all trying our best to keep the ships in condition; but the point was to get the ships into a material condition which they were not to start with, and never were.

MR. TRAMMELL. Of course, you take a locomotive engineer—I know a good deal about them; I have an uncle who has been an engineer for 45 years—a good engineer who takes an interest in his engine, does a good deal of little repairs, that a fellow that is careless, and does not care, will not do, and puts his engine together much more frequently than the engineer who does a good deal of things himself on the engine.

MR. GRANT. Yes.

MR. TRAMMELL. I do not know anything about it, but I know from what I gather from the hearing here this morning, that there was a disposition on the part of the department to get as many things done on board the ships as could be done, without getting the ships into the dry dock or navy yard.

MR. GRANT. I do not think that was the department's idea; they were trying to do that. It was work that could not be done on board the ship.

MR. TRAMMELL. I realize there is some of it that could not be done on board the ship; but there is a good deal of it that

MR. GRANT. I beg your pardon; there was none of the work recommended to be done at the navy yards that could be done on board ship.

MR. TRAMMELL. I did not say that there was in your particular case. Of course I am not speaking of the particular case; I am speaking of the question of general policy.

MR. GRANT. Yes.

MR. TRAMMELL. Now, the submarines; when you took charge in 1905 how many of those were of construction as late as a year or two before the time you took command of them?

MR. GRANT. As late as a year? Well, the latest boat that I had in my mind you, in commission—was one of the K boats, the K boats that went to sea that October. The act was passed 24 October 1910; five years.

MR. TRAMMELL. In other words, then, all of the boats that you had that were so deficient and so imperfect were authorized before 1910 and prior to 1910?

MR. GRANT. And prior.

MR. TRAMMELL. Prior to 1910?

MR. GRANT. Yes, sir. The C boats that I had charge of that were at Panama were authorized in 1906, and the D boats that were authorized in 1906, and the K boats in 1910.

Senator TRAMMEL. They were all authorized, then, prior to the present administration of the present Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. He entered office in 1913, was it not the early part of 1913?

Admiral GRANT. March, 1913.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. The first boats that were appropriated for, when the present administration came into power, were June 30, when they built the N boats.

Senator TRAMMELL. In 1914 they authorized the N boats?

Admiral GRANT. The N boats; yes, sir. That was, as I said before, a decided step to the rear. They were smaller. I mean, from a military point of view those little boats were a step backward. They ought to have kept going ahead; and the next year, 1915, they appropriated for the O boats, and then in 1916 came the R boats and the S boats. The S boat is the 800-ton boat.

Senator TRAMMELL. After the beginning of the World War in 1914, there was quite an awakening in the submarine proposition throughout the whole world, was there not?

Admiral GRANT. I should say so.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did our people learn a good deal about it? I mean, was there a good deal for our people to learn about it? It does not mean just one man, but the Navy, generally speaking?

Admiral GRANT. There was a great deal for the entire Navy to learn; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, of course, Germany made a good deal of progress itself in the war in submarine improvement, did it not?

Admiral GRANT. I am not so certain that she did. I do not believe that their engines—any of their later engines, were any better than the original, especially the 4-cycle. We were trying to use a 2-cycle engine on board a submarine, and the Germans were using a 4-cycle.

Senator TRAMMELL. When did they first establish a district command of submarines?

Admiral GRANT. Will you explain that "district"; what you mean?

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not know about it; I mean putting it in command of one particular officer. I do not know what you call it.

Admiral GRANT. I think they have always done that, until recently.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time that you succeeded to the command of the submarine flotilla, had they previously had a command with the same authority and jurisdiction that was given you at that time?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir; Capt. or Commander—I do not know which he was—Yates Sterling, jr.

Senator TRAMMELL. When you were called into the submarine service you received your formal order, of course, but did you receive any other suggestions or recommendations as to the question of being called to that service with the particular purpose of trying to build it up and improve the service?

Admiral GRANT. I was sent for in May, 1915—ordered by rather—to report to the department at 9 a. m. the following day. I think. I was at sea at the time, and I left the ship at Newport

and reported to the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral was present, and he told me he wanted me to leave the ship *Torres* and take command of the submarine force and

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. He wanted you to take command and build submarine force?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes.

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. I believe you recited that in the course of efforts to increase the efficiency of the submarine force, you did create a school for that purpose?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes, sir.

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. Did you do anything else toward trying to the best use you could of the service during your command; to its betterment and the increasing of its efficiency?

ADMIRAL GRANT. I inspected every submarine we had and reported to the department and tried to have efficient engines put on board of the submarines we had; but the department, the Bureau of Steam Engineering particularly, probably for the want of money, could not put outright engines that would make them operate successfully in my opinion.

In addition to that I began the propaganda, as you may call it, for building a submarine of 800-ton surface displacement.

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. And finally they authorized some of them of that type?

ADMIRAL GRANT. The Navy Department authorized them, finally. In the first act, I think 3 of the 800-ton type, as I recollect one to be constructed by the E. B. Co., one by the Lake Shore and one of our own design, and following that, later in that year, they added, I do not recollect whether 18 or 20, and finally 20 more, making a total of 41 800-ton boats.

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. Even if there was a difference of opinion as to details and some policies there was a concert of action from 1917 looking toward the betterment and the improvement and increasing of the efficiency of the submarine force, was there not?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Well, I can not say that there was much concert of action because the Government had never built a submarine. It was dependent largely upon contractors. I was almost at the head of the commandeerings of their establishments and starting the building of these larger, more efficient boats instead of taking what they were building for us.

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. I did not say there was a concert of action as to details or in regard to policies as to this type of boat or any other type of boat, but there was a unanimity of desires and impulses toward trying to better the submarine service; that is the point I was trying to get at.

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes; we all wanted it.

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. Now, you say it was the policy of the Government to buy them from private institutions or concerns. When was that policy inaugurated?

ADMIRAL GRANT. I think the first submarines were bought, say, in

ADMIRAL TRAMMELL. In 1900?

ADMIRAL GRANT. That is when we bought the first A boats—I authorized.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were authorized then?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. When was the first departure from the policy of purchasing submarines from private concerns?

Admiral GRANT. We have never departed from the policy of buying submarines from private concerns. The departure I referred to was in designing our own submarines and having the contractors build them upon our designs, and not taking submarines built upon their designs.

Senator TRAMMELL. If there has ever been any departure from the old policy of being governed by the designs of a private builder, when was that departure made?

Admiral GRANT. That was late in 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then prior to the year 1913, as far as it was within your knowledge, it was the general policy of the Navy Department to purchase submarines from private concerns of the designs as built by the private concerns?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; up to as late as March, 1915.

Senator TRAMMELL. You consider that it was an improvement upon the policy of making its own designs?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. According to your statement, that policy was effectuated in 1916?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was that brought about in connection with your command of the submarines?

Admiral GRANT. I think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Pittman?

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, what portion of your fleet was ever actually ordered to European waters?

Admiral GRANT. Of the submarines?

Senator PITTMAN. Of battleship force 1?

Admiral GRANT. None of them were ordered to European waters to act in concert with our Allies. Our battleship force were engaged in the latter part of the war, that is to say in 1918, doing convoy duty from here to longitude 20, say, and return; but none of them were sent to the other side to act in concert with the Allies' fleet.

Senator PITTMAN. What battleship force was sent to European waters?

Admiral GRANT. The fifth division of battleship force 2.

Senator PITTMAN. Battleship force 2?

Admiral GRANT. Those were the *New York*, *Texas*, *Florida*, *Dakota*, and *Arkansas*. Later it was supplemented by sending the *Oklahoma*, *Utah*, and *Nevada*.

Senator PITTMAN. When did the battleships of force 1, under your command, commence to act as convoys?

Admiral GRANT. I think it was about August or September, 1917.

Senator PITTMAN. What were you doing with those battleships to that time?

Admiral GRANT. Why, from August, 1917, up to that time?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. We were engaged in training personnel and preparing for war.

MR. PITTMAN. During all of that time?

ADMIRAL GRANT. All of the time.

MR. PITTMAN. And what other vessels, outside of the battleships in this force?

ADMIRAL GRANT. There were no vessels that belonged to battle force except the battleships themselves, which, when the war started, consisted of 24 battleships; everything that we had built from 1904 to the *Connecticut* type of vessels—no, everything up to the *Carolina* and the *Michigan*, rather. Of course the training ships supplied us supplied the battleship force as well.

MR. PITTMAN. Now, I understand that prior to our entry into the war—probably prior to that time—undoubtedly prior to that time—recommended the building of these large submarines?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes, sir.

MR. PITTMAN. With a great cruising radius?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Yes, sir.

MR. PITTMAN. And the board did not approve of the recommendation at that time?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Which board?

MR. PITTMAN. Well, the general board?

ADMIRAL GRANT. I do not know what the general board did. I know from individual members. There was only one man on the board so far as I am aware, who believed in these larger sub-

MR. PITTMAN. What was their argument against it, Admiral?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Well, I can not tell you. I do not know.

MR. PITTMAN. In 1917, what were the principal vessels that we were building? We were building some vessels in 1917, were we not?

ADMIRAL GRANT. Battleships, do you refer to?

MR. PITTMAN. I simply want the information.

ADMIRAL GRANT. We were building battleships and submarines and were building all sorts of vessels; but unless I had something to say I could not specify the vessels under construction.

MR. PITTMAN. How many navy yards did we have at that time capable of building a superdreadnought?

ADMIRAL GRANT. The New York Navy Yard, I think, was the only one capable at that time.

MR. PITTMAN. Do you know how many navy yards we had that were capable of building destroyers at that time, on the Atlantic

ADMIRAL GRANT. You refer to those, now, being specially fitted for building destroyers and things of that sort? I do not think we had any that were specially fitted for building destroyers at that time, excepting the Philadelphia yard. I was commandant there for three years and I could have built a destroyer there. But it was not fitted for building them.

MR. PITTMAN. Was it not the opinion of the British Admiralty and of the General Naval Board here that what we needed most was of the destroyers type and of the chaser type, to go out and meet the submarine menace?

ADMIRAL GRANT. I believe so.

MR. PITTMAN. And were not all of the available yards and the best of those yards engaged in the building of destroyers and

Admiral GRANT. No, they were not.

Senator PITTMAN. Which ones were not?

Admiral GRANT. Well, let me see. I recollect seeing at the York yard in 1915, a large number of chasers being built. I know whether they were building any at any of the other yards or not. I had no occasion for visiting them.

Senator PITTMAN. I realize that it is very difficult to remember these things, and I do not expect you to remember all of them.

Admiral GRANT. No.

Senator PITTMAN. But what I am getting at is simply this, Admiral, that possibly the reason of some of the admirals not approving the building of these supersubmarines was because they believed the demand for other characters of vessels was more immediate, or there was a limit to the power of construction in this country.

Admiral GRANT. Oh, I can not agree to that.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you not think so?

Admiral GRANT. I think that if I had given an order to the E. B. Co. or to the Fore River Shipbuilding Co., I would get as many as you would appropriate for.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not necessary for the Fore River with the assistance of the Government, to enlarge its plant?

Admiral GRANT. They certainly did.

Senator PITTMAN. So as to build destroyers?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, and submarines, too.

Senator PITTMAN. But they had to enlarge?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Was there any difficulty in getting ship laborers when they increased the size of these various shipyard and shipbuilding plants?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, I think they had difficulty in getting ship labor; but it was not as serious as one might be led to suppose.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not necessary for us to stop building battleships under our 3-year program by reason of that fact?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; yes.

Senator PITTMAN. You consider battleships very essential to a balanced fleet, do you not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you suppose it would have been a practical unanimous verdict that we should stop building these great battleships, unless there was a shortage both of space and mechanics?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; the force in the shipyards at that time was working upon the conversion of merchant vessels, upon armed vessels, upon producing that type of vessels to carry provisions and stores abroad. But I think that if I had gone to the E. B. Co. and stopped the building of submarines for other people, and the doing of a great deal of other work in their shipyards, that they were working at that time, I could have begun to construct the submarines before we ever attempted it—long before 1917.

Senator PITTMAN. These submarines that were being built for other people, as you say, they were being built for the Allies, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. I do not know where they went.

Senator PITTMAN. You feel perfectly confident they did not go to the enemy?

MR. GRANT. I know they were building engines for Spain at a plant in Connecticut. They were not for us.

MR. PITTMAN. Do you not know that the building of all ships was except for the Allies and for us?

MR. GRANT. Generally speaking, yes.

MR. PITTMAN. The reason I ask you particularly about these is that there were some of the Naval Affairs Committee men who were very fearful by reason of the stopping of these for fear that the policy might be abandoned after the war; and of us who knew nothing but that one idea, were urging the use of the building of these battleships, and they said it was because there were other vessels more needed.

MR. GRANT. That is right, too.

MR. PITTMAN. I believe that the question was asked you, or asked to that effect—I do not remember your answer now, but I remember what I am referring to—that if the German fleet overcame the British fleet or had gotten out of those waters, we have been in no condition to fight them, or that we could not put up a very good fight.

MR. GRANT. I referred to battleship force 1.

MR. PITTMAN. You referred to battleship force 1?

MR. GRANT. Yes; I was talking about that.

MR. PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, that never was in any form was it, during the war?

MR. GRANT. I beg to differ with you; we were training for the time.

MR. PITTMAN. I was drawing the distinction between training and battle—

MR. GRANT. While we were training personnel, we were also fighting battle.

MR. PITTMAN. But when they ordered vessels, or battleships, to complement to the British fleet in the North Sea, they sent any of your ships over?

MR. GRANT. None at all.

MR. PITTMAN. Did you ever believe that the German fleet would overcome the British fleet and get into the Atlantic?

MR. GRANT. I did not think that the German fleet could overcome the British fleet and get into the Atlantic. I was fearful that battle-cruisers would get adrift and get into the Atlantic;

MR. PITTMAN. Now, you did not have any battleships that could take care of those battle-cruisers, did you?

MR. GRANT. No, sir.

MR. PITTMAN. Your policy would have been to hold as close to the coast, as possible, would it not?

MR. GRANT. I am not so certain.

MR. PITTMAN. Well, what would be your theory about that?

MR. GRANT. Fearful they would come out and destroy our merchant vessels abroad. I did not think they would go near our battleships, if they could avoid it.

MR. PITTMAN. If they could have gotten out, what did you think would have happened?

MR. GRANT. That could have overtaken one of them?

MR. PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. I did not have anything.

Senator PITTMAN. You had no vessels in the Navy that could

Admiral GRANT. Yes; we had vessels abroad.

Senator PITTMAN. Which could have overtaken their cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir; not which could have overtaken, but which could have given them battle.

Senator PITTMAN. That is, if they had come in contact with

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, your ships, so far as battle cruisers were concerned, could only have fought a defensive fight?

Admiral GRANT. No; it would have been an offensive. I never fight a defensive fight if I got into it, myself.

Senator PITTMAN. I like to hear that, and I approve of it, Admiral

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. And I am perfectly satisfied that is the kind of fighting you believe in; but, as a matter of fact, the cruisers have had to come within range of your guns or there would be no fight?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the range of the guns on the battle cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. On the battle cruisers?

Senator PITTMAN. The German battle cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. Battle cruisers, did you say?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. Oh, I do not know. I suppose they would be up to 25,000 yards; possibly 20,000 to 25,000 yards. I do not know what range they had.

Senator PITTMAN. You do not know what their range was?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. I was wondering how many of your battleships carried guns of that range.

Admiral GRANT. It is not a question of the guns having the range. It is a matter of material construction of the turrets which gives them that range.

Senator PITTMAN. I was speaking of range.

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. I was led to believe that none of the battleships of our force one had ships which had guns with equal range with the Germans.

Admiral GRANT. No; we could not get those ranges on account of the material construction of the turrets.

Senator PITTMAN. That is what I had in mind.

Admiral GRANT. That is right.

Senator PITTMAN. All of these battleships that you had were constructed years ago, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; the latest ones were the *Michigan* and *South Carolina*. I have forgotten the year of their appropriation when they were appropriated for.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of military policy, did you think that we should have some battleships on this coast—on our coast?

GRANT. That we should have some here?

PITTMAN. Yes.

GRANT. Well, I had not given that a thought. It was that we should have a fleet in European waters which was to overcome without any doubt the German fleet; and that the sending of battleships abroad was useless.

PITTMAN. And do you think there was any necessity for a fleet of battleships along the Atlantic coast?

GRANT. Not for our defense. I hardly thought that the Germans would ever get out and get over here to this coast.

PITTMAN. What did you think about the battle cruisers?

GRANT. As I have said, I thought that it would be the mission of a battle cruiser to get out; but the mission of a battle cruiser would have been the destruction of transports. I think she would have avoided an engagement.

PITTMAN. Now, if we are right in the supposition that battle cruisers are faster vessels than anything we had in the American fleet, that by reason of their construction they had a greater speed, would it have been possible for those vessels to have carried with any of our ships?

GRANT. Yes; singly.

PITTMAN (continuing). And always have been out of range?

GRANT. Yes, singly; that is theoretically so.

PITTMAN. In that kind of a case, what would you do?

GRANT. That is theoretically so.

PITTMAN. Would you keep up a fight when the enemy's ships, by reason of this speed, to keep out of range, and yet

GRANT. Yes, if he would fight me. But they would not.

PITTMAN. That is depending, probably, upon the German fleet. I think that is all.

CHAIRMAN. Admiral, while the German battle cruisers, being faster than our ships, could keep out of range and perhaps destroy our ships, they could not if we had three or four of our ships together, could they?

GRANT. No. I did not mention that. It did not matter much. Two or three ships operating against a battle cruiser, the features of the battle might change in 10 seconds. The wind and weather at sea might put our ships alongside, very close to our range or within the range of our ships, alongside the German ships. I have been out here at sea with two fleets fighting and have come upon one another, in thick weather, very often. Often, it occurs. This question was hypothetical, that is all.

CHAIRMAN. After you took command of the submarine forces about that time, was there a general feeling that the Germans would probably go into the war?

GRANT. I hardly think so, as early as 1915.

CHAIRMAN. When did that feeling first begin to appear?

GRANT. The *Lusitania* was sunk in May, 1915.

CHAIRMAN. May, 1915.

Admiral GRANT. Even then, we felt that we might have got it, as I recall; but I did not think that we would, at that time. We had gone into the war as an active member, I thought the conditions were such that we should prepare ourselves for that that I felt that we had quite sufficient time to provide ourselves with submarines of the type and character that would do the work of the German submarines. That was in 1915. I felt as though the war was going to be a long one.

The CHAIRMAN. After February 5, 1917, after the German ambassador had been given his papers, was any doubt in the mind of the Navy that we would probably be engaged?

Admiral GRANT. I do not think there was.

The CHAIRMAN. The submarine situation by that time had become very menacing?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir: exceedingly so.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time or prior to that time had any officer been sent abroad on behalf of the Navy Department to study the submarine situation that you know anything about?

Admiral GRANT. In 1917? I do not think any officer had been sent abroad to investigate the submarine situation in any aspect, far as I know, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. When was an officer first sent abroad?

Admiral GRANT. The first officer that I recall, I think it was in 1918 that Lieut. Commander Grady was sent abroad, and about the same time there were other officers that were acquainted with submarines. An officer named Pierce——

The CHAIRMAN. But not until 1918, according to your recollection?

Admiral GRANT. I think, 1918. I may be mistaken, but I think those were the first two that I can recall now.

The CHAIRMAN. On February 5, 1917, did we have any submarine building in this country?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, yes; February 5, 1917. In February, there were several of the L boats that had not been delivered. The M boat was under construction. The AA-1 was under construction. Seven N boats were under construction. The 16 O boats appropriated for in March, 1915, were under construction; and on January 8, 1917, contracts were signed—appropriation having been made in August, 1916, contracts were signed on January 8, 1917—for the R boats with the E. B. Co.

On December 30, 1916, the Lake Boat Co., of Bridgeport, signed a contract for building six.

On January 9, 1917, the E. B. Co. signed a contract for building one 800-ton boat.

The Lake Boat Co. on December 30, 1918, signed a contract for building the S-2, an 800-ton boat, and the Government of the United States gave the order to build S-3, one of the 800-ton boats at Portsmouth, N. H., on November 14. Those are the only vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, was there any attempt to speed up the construction and delivery of any of these boats?

Admiral GRANT. Nothing that I can specifically remember and refer to. Of course we were after the contractors, and after everybody all the time. I can not refer to any particular instance.

WHELAN. If after February 5 the department had taken all the proper engines in the submarines that we already put them in commission where they could effectively could they have been used to advantage in the early days of the war?

GRANT. No; because we had no control over the construction of those engines. We could not have gotten them built.

WHELAN. And the engines could not have been changed, as stated in your testimony?

GRANT. I do not think so.

WHELAN. So that our submarine force which we had was an ineffective force?

GRANT. Yes.

WHELAN. Now, when the war first began I think you stated original duties of the battleship force were to prepare for the second, to train personnel?

GRANT. That was the mission, as I recall it. I have not much to refer to, but that is to the best of my memory.

WHELAN. Later that was changed?

GRANT. Later it was changed.

WHELAN. And their first mission was to train personnel, and to prepare them for battle?

GRANT. That was the second mission.

WHELAN. But still to prepare for battle?

GRANT. Yes, sir.

WHELAN. And Senator Trammell brought out the fact by his testimony that battleship force 1 did what it was supposed to do in the war, is to train personnel?

GRANT. It did.

WHELAN. It did not have to take part in any battle, and the fact that it was not prepared for battle did not come out; it did not have taken part in a battle if it needed to do so,

GRANT. Well, we would have taken part in a battle to the extent of our ability.

WHELAN. But it would not have been as effective as it might have been.

GRANT. Not as effective as if we had our crews and fleet ready; there is no doubt about that.

WHELAN. And the fact that you did not suppose that the submarines could break through and get over into these waters, was a warrant enough for keeping our battleship forces in ineffective condition over here, would it?

GRANT. No, indeed.

WHELAN. I think that is all. Have you anything else, Senator Trammell?

TRAMMELL. I do not believe you stated, Admiral, that all ships were in an ineffective condition, did you?

GRANT. No, sir; I only referred to battleship force 1. I did not say anything about the others.

TRAMMELL. Only to your battleship force 1?

GRANT. Yes.

TRAMMELL. Which were the reserve ships?

Admiral GRANT. They had been in reserve, principally. I specifically stated that there were some of those vessels, as I am unable to state specifically whether they had been in the fleet or with the fleet or not. There had been some transfers from battleship force, the *Connecticut*, *South Carolina*, and *Oregon*, not been with the reserve, but had been in the fleet; but the rest of them had been in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Ships are not in reserve when they are with the fleet, of course.

Admiral GRANT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they are in active commission?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Were those ships in as good condition to perform service within their capacity as the destroyer force and chaser force and all that had been sent abroad, and a great many of them had reserves, I think? Were your ships in as good condition as they were for rendering some service?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, they would have rendered some service, not to the extent that a destroyer would or did.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your force, then, was not as capable a force that was abroad—the destroyers—and of course the destroyers as I understand were largely——

Admiral GRANT. The nature of the preparation is entirely different. The preparation of men for a destroyer is one thing and the preparation of men for a battleship of the *Michigan* type is another. It is an entirely different proposition. You can not liken the two in any way—I do not think you can.

Senator TRAMMELL. One of the faults, then, was the particular type of the ships and the complements for the two. That seems to have been one of the faults.

Admiral GRANT. The training of a destroyer's crew to fire guns in opposition to a submarine, or the training, after they were used as detectors, to drop bombs on them, was one thing; but to train men on a battleship with a thousand men on board, and the preparation of handling crews and fire control and engineer force, everything of that sort, is an entirely different proposition. You can not liken the two in any way.

Senator TRAMMELL. These ships were some of them antiquated; they were not the more modern type of ships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; they were the predreadnoughts.

Senator TRAMMELL. The degree of the efficiency—of these ships that you commanded—was due to quite an extent, then, to the particular construction and type of the ships, was it not?

Admiral GRANT. To the old vessels; certainly it was.

Senator TRAMMELL. When were they constructed?

Admiral GRANT. Well, I told you the oldest vessel that was sent to me in May or June, 1918, for training the engineer force was the *Indiana* and *Massachusetts* and *Iowa*, appropriated for about 1894, and the latest was the *Michigan* and *South Carolina*, appropriated for, I should say, about 1908—something like that. I do not recollect. I can not tell you.

Senator TRAMMELL. I suppose at the time they were built they were considered——

Admiral GRANT. Nothing finer in the world.

TRAMMELL. Yes; all right.

GRANT. Of each type.

TRAMMELL. There seems to have been some progress in the
of war vessels.

GRANT. Yes.

TRAMMELL. As well as everything else. No particular
to anybody for the construction of these ships of that
type at the time they were constructed.

GRANT. The *Indiana* and *Massachusetts*, that type of ves-
wonder of the world when they were contracted for and
we have advanced.

TRAMMELL. However, they were constructed prior to the
of the present Secretary of the Navy, were they not?

GRANT. Twenty years before, nearly: yes, sir.

MAN. Admiral, you may be excused now, and the com-
stand adjourned until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until
Tuesday, March 30, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 10 o'clock
in room 235. Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale

and Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

**EXHIBIT OF REAR ADMIRAL H. T. MAYO, UNITED STATES
NAVY.**

(Witness was sworn by the chairman.)

CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo, will you state to the committee
positions you held in the Navy from the beginning of the
war to the present time?

REAR ADMIRAL MAYO. I was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet
from the beginning of the war until June 30, 1919. Since that time
I have been on duty as a member of the General Board at the Navy
Department.

CHAIRMAN. Will you give the committee any information
you may have about the preparation and conduct of the war
in the Navy which you may deem pertinent to this investigation?
You may make your statement in your own language?

REAR ADMIRAL MAYO. I have a statement, and, with your permission, I
will make it.

First, that my opinions and conclusions regarding the points
which have been raised by Admiral Sims may be clearly understood,
it is advisable to summarize briefly my duties, work, and
activities in connection with the preparedness of the Atlantic
Fleet and its activities during the war.

Second, that under the general heading of "Period of the war
covered by this letter" and "Motives for my letter," Admiral Sims
has the following statements:

That a very essential feature of my letter which seems to have failed in
being recognized and understood. It is very important. An examination
will show that the period which it covers is almost wholly concerned
with the months immediately preceding our entry into the war and for
the year or less of our participation. In considering the letter, therefore,
it should not be confused with the conduct of the war as a whole.

Third, that we entered the war with no well-considered policy or plans and with our
fleet not in the highest state of readiness.

Any consideration of the general question of the preparedness of the Navy for war should cover a period of several years prior to our entry into the war; therefore, I shall begin this summary at the date of my assignment to the fleet in 1913.

In November, 1913, I was detached from duty as aid for personnel to the Navy Department, and in December, 1913, I reported to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet for duty in command of the Fourth Battleship Division, hoisting my flag December 28, 1913, on the U. S. S. *Connecticut*, off Vera Cruz, Mexico.

My division was dispersed and in conjunction with other divisions was doing gunboat duty. By gunboat duty is meant the protection of American interests in Central American ports. This duty prevented the training of the battle fleet as a whole, but to some extent also prevented routine target practices and the engineering training of the fleet. This dispersal of the battleships had a very detrimental effect on the fleet and the efficiency of many of the ships was greatly reduced.

In April, 1914, practically the entire Atlantic Fleet, including a destroyer flotilla, was rushed to the Mexican coast, and Vera Cruz was occupied. After the Army had taken over Vera Cruz and the conditions had quieted somewhat, many of the ships returned to their home ports; nevertheless, a few battleships continued on detached service.

War had broken out in Europe in August, 1914, while the fleet was still dispersed. This situation forced attention on the poor condition of the fleet, and plans were made to assemble the fleet and put it into as good shape as possible.

In the fall of 1914, when Admiral Fletcher became commander in chief, I was assigned command of the first battleship division of the battle fleet.

The attention of the division was invited to the fact that a high standard of efficiency was readily obtainable and that necessary action should be taken by all concerned.

At this time there was a strong feeling among all officers of the Atlantic Fleet should be prepared for any duty and that as many ships as possible should be in full commission. In December, 1914, the department issued instructions to all navy yards to so schedule the authorized work that all battleships could assemble in June, 1915, for the work in Cuban waters. The policy with regard to routine overhauls was abandoned. Thus certain ships failed to receive their routine overhaul. The new policy was to the effect that ships should not be sent to a yard for an overhaul unless there were evident signs of deterioration. In this connection, the experience of the war have demonstrated that the facilities available for repair and upkeep can best be used if there is a routine for examination and consequent overhaul as found necessary.

The desire to keep a large number of vessels in commission to develop a well-rounded fleet, emphasized the fact that our personnel was not sufficient. If ships were given a small complement, a larger number of ships could be kept in commission, if they were given a large and adequate complement then the reverse was true. The larger the number of ships in commission, the better the efficiency of the higher commands of the fleet; that is, the flag officers. Individual units could never obtain their maximum efficiency if adequate complements were not allowed. This subject; that is,

...became acute and was discussed and considered by ... and the Congress. This discussion continued but ... in the addition of any adequate number of trained men ... the fleet prior to our entry into the war.

... of the department of December, 1914, resulted in the ... of the fleet in Cuban waters in 1915 for exercises.

... increase in the number of vessels attached to the fleet ... organization of the fleet in order to relieve the commander ... numerous details and to insure flexibility of command.

... organization was made effective in July, 1915, and I was ... command of the battleship squadrons, consisting of all the ... on active duty, and with the additional duty of second in ... of the fleet.

... a very general feeling that the training should be intensi- ... effort spared to get the ships ready for war. The subject ... with the division commanders and instructions regard- ... were issued.

... in accordance with general instructions issued by the Commander ... Admiral F. F. Fletcher, very thorough and detailed inspec- ... held by special and routine boards of inspection. Interest ... and the improvement in general efficiency was very ... during the summer and fall of this year; that is, 1915.

... time to time special instructions were issued to cover certain ... the training in order to coordinate all effort and to crystallize ... These instructions were revised from time to time ... and available information from the war might dictate. ... needless to say that accurate information as to the ... of the war was difficult to obtain, as this country was strictly

... completion of the target practices in the fall of 1915 a strategic ... by the department was carried out by the fleet. Such ... and are essential for the development of the fleet and ... defenses. In view of the dispersal of the fleet on gun boat ... duty the number of such problems had not been as great ... and have been.

... organization proved very effective and was continued in ... that the fleet could have been more effective if more vessels ... had been available, goes without saying.

... recalled that the general subject of preparedness was ... throughout the country at this time and was an ... one.

... following year, that is, 1916, a very large building program ... also in August, 1916, additional personnel was ... Our entry into the war came before these increases ...

... beginning of 1916 the Atlantic Fleet, under command of ... Fletcher, proceeded to Cuban waters in accordance with the ... for training. Owing to the shortage of personnel, ... were in reserve and not with the fleet.

... shortage of personnel was acute as before, nevertheless, very ... progress in the training was made.

... and strategical problems were held en route to and from ... and during the stay there.

Upon arrival at home yards in April instructions were issued by the department in accordance with the recommendations of the commander in chief to proceed with authorized work on vessels to complete all major and important items, especially on battleships in the active fleet. This policy was abandoned a few weeks later when the department issued orders to prepare the units of the fleet for instant service. It was understood that these orders were the result of a study of the international situation arising from the sinking of the *Sussex*.

These orders could not be literally carried out because practically all the vessels were disabled and undergoing overhaul, as previously noted. The urgency apparently passed and certain work was accomplished.

Before the fleet reassembled, and in June, 1916, I relieved Admiral F. F. Fletcher as commander in chief, hoisting my flag on the battleship *Wyoming* at New York on June 19, 1916.

There were attached to the active fleet when I assumed command the following vessels:

BATTLESHIP FORCE.

Predreadnoughts (including *Michigan* and *South Carolina*), 7.
 Dreadnoughts: Coal burners, 7; oil burners, 2.
 Cruiser force, 14.
 Destroyer force (2 tenders), 24.
 Submarine force: Submarines, 19; tenders, 10.
 Mine force, 4 ships, 4 tugs.
 Training, 10.

It will be noted that there were two oil burning and seven coal burning (not including the *Michigan* and *South Carolina*) battleships attached to the fleet.

It is obvious that officers generally felt that no effort should be spared to:

- (1) Train intensively.
- (2) Increase the personnel.
- (3) Increase the number of vessels with the fleet.

The two latter matters were not within the power of the commander in chief.

The fleet was reassembled in July and intensive training began, taking into consideration available information regarding the progress of the war. As previously stated, information was difficult to obtain; nevertheless we did our best to picture the conditions existing in the war zone and planned the work of the fleet accordingly.

Shortly after the fleet was assembled definite instructions were issued regarding the "scope of training and the preparation of the fleet for war."

It is necessary to quote only the first paragraph of these instructions, which is as follows:

In order to attain the desired degree of battle efficiency and to make proper preparation for war, proficiency in the following exercises must be obtained and maintained.

This letter pointed out to each force the nature of the duties which they were to devote special attention.

The instructions to which I refer were issued by the commander in chief.

Senator TRAMMELL. About what date?

Mayo. This was about August, 1916.

Trammell. August, 1916?

Mayo. Yes. The details of training were left to the force commanders except that they were instructed to follow as closely as possible the departmental and other approved instructions, which were considered authoritative.

The reports of operations and inspections were carefully studied and the training directed accordingly. A typical example of the instructions that were issued as found necessary is as follows:

OCTOBER 20, 1916.

Submarine force.

That very little gunnery training is being done by the surface vessels and that few plans have been made for such training.

That a small amount of daily training be undertaken and that this be thoroughly systematized in order that the maximum benefit be derived

from the instructions and on December 13, 1916, report what action has been taken.

During the period the organization put into effect the previous organization. Admiral Fletcher was developed, and force commanders were expected to take the initiative in their work. Tentative instructions covering the general policies were issued, and after a period in the early months of 1917, they were embodied in a part of the Fleet Regulations.

The paragraphs of these instructions are quoted to show approved principles of command were in use and that the readiness for war was always emphasized in the fleet:

The principle of efficient organization is that there shall be due subdivision of responsibility and decentralization of responsibility among subordinates, each officer in the chain of command which he can perform adequately. The central control and coordination of subordinate parts for the common end.

The fleet is to maintain itself in a state of readiness for war which includes material readiness but also readiness of the personnel to operate.

The fleet must be as nearly self-sustaining as possible and shall endeavor to be self-sufficient at a navy yard to a minimum.

Arrangements or arrangements shall be made which tend toward limitation of the mobility of the fleet or the component parts thereof.

A reserve in reserve or with reduced complements shall be maintained on a cruising basis so far as practicable.

Service of the fleet was reorganized as the fleet train. The fleet enabled the most efficient use to be made of the auxiliaries, such as supply vessels, colliers, oilers, tugs, hospital ship, and one hospital ship.

It is noted at this point that the training and development of the fleet was somewhat retarded because there were no mine vessels attached to it. Tugs were fitted and trained as mine vessels, not engaged in towing targets and in dispatch and recovery. The progress made by the mine force under Capt. [Name] was exceedingly gratifying. Although it consisted of small vessels, the lessons and experience gained by this unit were reflected in the successful development and laying of the mine field ever known.

After I assumed command of the fleet, the reserve fleet was placed under the commander in chief, and its relative

to the active fleet was given consideration. Considering the able personnel, officers and men, progress was made in preparing this force for active service. There was inadequate personnel available to place these ships in anything like the condition in which though they were able to perform the duties required of them at our entry into the war. Had these ships been required for anything other than the training, convoy, and patrol work to which they were assigned, time would have been needed to get them into shape.

In the fall of 1916 there was an authorized increase in the active enlisted personnel, and plans were made for the more active employment of the vessels in reserve, especially the destroyers and battleships. These plans were made in conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants and enabled the best use to be made of the new personnel that became available when war was imminent.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time?

Admiral MAYO. Admiral Benson. The department's special problem was conducted during this period, and the mission assigned by the department to the force under my command was accomplished—that is, a constructive landing of troops was effected on the coast in the vicinity of Far Rockaway. The vessels of the Reserve Force were manned largely by Naval Reserves and Naval Militia.

After the holidays, 1916, the fleet proceeded to Cuban waters in accordance with the annual schedule for the employment of the fleet, carrying out such exercises as were considered essential for the preparation of the fleet for any emergency. As previously directed by instructions regarding such exercises were issued shortly after the beginning of the year, I assumed the command of the fleet. Force commanders were directed to and did submit comment on the suitability of these exercises for the preparation of the fleet for war, and the instructions were followed accordingly.

X / The international situation and our own foreign relations were daily becoming more confused and complex. On February 2, 1917, the press news received from the cable station at Guantanamo gave the text of the appendix to the note received by the United States Government from the German Government. The text of the appendix was such that it appeared probable that diplomatic relations with Germany would be broken off.

In order that the work, duties, and responsibilities in the preparations of the fleet for war may be clearly understood, the following activities will be considered practically daily from this date, February 2 until April 6, 1917.

In view of the previously received press reports of the activity of German submarines in the Gulf of Mexico and in South American waters, a consideration of the defense of the fleet in Guantanamo against surprise attack by German submarines was immediately taken up.

It was decided that the situation did not warrant the suspension of the program of training, but that the fleet should be guarded during this training to as great an extent as possible.

Guantanamo Bay offered inadequate area for the concentration of training operations and is very difficult to defend against submarine attack without an adequate supply of antisubmarine armor and torpedo nets which were not available.

therefore decided to shift the fleet base to the Gulf of Mexico as soon as the fleet had completed taking provision and had finished long-range day-spotting practice, which the entire fleet, unless the department ordered to the

for the defense of the fleet in Guantanamo Bay was prepared. It was decided that upon February 5 the fleet would commence movement to Guacanayabo.

At 3. at 1.36 a. m., Six Alnav. was received, as follows:

In present international situation, take every precaution to protect Government and vessels.

The fleet with the flag consisted of the following vessels: 12: destroyers, 22: training ships, 3; cruiser (destroyer) 1; destroyer tenders, 2; the cruiser, *Seattle*, carried sea-

At 5 a. m. the commandant of the naval station informed the senior in chief that unofficial information had been received that diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany had been broken off.

At 6 a. m. a fleet campaign order was issued putting into effect for defense of the fleet in Guantanamo Bay. The necessary orders and preparation for defense was completed during the day.

At 7 p. m. received orders to "Mobilize naval communications in effect, was placing communications on a war basis.

At 8 p. m. received "Alnav. availability," which directed all vessels report their actual readiness for war; the reports submitted were later.

At 9 p. m. received "German ambassador has been given his

The preparations indicate that the preparedness of the fleet was proceeding in accordance with a prearranged plan.

At 4 at 3.59 p. m. sent following to operations:

At 5 p. m. received to the contrary, propose to shift fleet base to Gulf of Mexico after spotting practice, February 5, then proceed with schedule of operations.

At 6 p. m. received the following from operations:

The fleet is well known to everybody. If considered advisable on account of the fleet base to Gulf of Guacanayabo or elsewhere at discretion. Inform the fleet accordingly.

A remarkable coincidence that the message from the commandant to the department stating his intention to shift the fleet base to Guacanayabo antedated the message from operations to shift of base by just 10 minutes. The two messages were simultaneous.

The message "Alnav. availability" report as to the condition of the fleet for active service. The general conditions was made by dispatch.

The message is quoted below as it indicates in general terms the condition of the active fleet:

The fleet is composed of

The fleet is composed of

The fleet is composed of submarine, cruiser, reserve, forces instructed report direct information regarding active fleet follows:

Battleships have full ammunition allowance except antiaircraft and U. S. S. *New York*, U. S. S. *Florida*, U. S. S. *Utah*, lack antiaircraft guns; *Oklahoma*, U. S. S. *Nevada*, have only half searchlight equipment; condition U. S. S. *Arkansas*, U. S. S. *Utah*, U. S. S. *Arizona*, known to department; battleships present with flag have adequate fuel, provisions, and stores.

Mine force have full ammunition allowance except U. S. S. *Sonoma*, *Ontario*, which also lack guns.

These were the tugs.

Conditions machinery U. S. S. *Baltimore* known to the department, other force will have adequate fuel provision by 6 p. m. Sunday; condition U. S. S. *Nibal*, U. S. S. *Leonidas*, not known accurately.

Train all vessels attached to fleet ready for sea except U. S. S. *Culgoa*, *Kanawha*; taking cargo U. S. S. *Maumee* 6,400 tons; U. S. S. *Cyclops* has 8 U. S. S. *Neptune*, U. S. S. *Jupiter*, U. S. S. *Celtic*, empty, now proceeding; U. S. S. *Kanawha*, U. S. S. *Cyclops* lack guns and ammunition; condition known to department.

Destroyer force practically full ammunition allowance except *Fanning*, *Porter*, lack machine-gun ammunition; *Cassin*, *Cummings* defective main valves; *Jarris* condenser needs retubing; *Dunkin* cracked steam cylinder on board main air pump; *MacDougal* evaporator shell needs renewing; condition every *Cushing*, *Davis* known to department; *Wilkes* evaporator inadequate; destroyers present will have adequate fuel provisions stores but *Dixie* stock stores, depleted to 15 per cent. Destroyers not present estimated have full ammunition allowance, fuel condition unknown, armament believed ready except of commission, machinery estimated ready as follows: *Flusser*, February 15, 30 days' work; *Reid*, March 1, 20 days' work; *Perkins*, *Roe* March 1; *Starke*, *Burrows*, ready; *Terry* June 1; *Beale*, *Patterson*, *Jouett*, *Warrington*, defective water drums; *Henley*, *Mayrant*, *Dotnes* need new engines; *Ammen* April 15; *Benham*, February 15; *Paulding*, March 15, *Salem*, *Chester*, *Jacob Jones*, known to department. *Birmingham*, 30 days' work, provisions stores of destroyers not estimated, 50 per cent capacity; *Montana* ready. Letter follows. 16304.

U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA"

A letter was sent to force commanders present, reading in full as follows:

In so far as the Atlantic Fleet is concerned, the commander in chief desires at the earliest possible moment, that force commanders make report in two categories: (a) Ships present with the flag. (b) Ships not present with the flag.

For category A make report on actual readiness of material for war service, stripping ship, having regard for the same items as in paragraph above.

A radiogram was addressed to the commanders of the submarine force, reserve and cruiser forces, directing them to report on Albatross availability direct to the department, and also to the commander in chief. The reports in detail from the commanders of the battleship force, destroyer force, and train are appended to this statement, "B"

February 5: The department was informed of the contemplated movement of the fleet to Guacanayabo.

The department directed that the *Olympia* and *Machias* be sent to the Danish West Indies to observe conditions in and about the islands, especially as regarded existence of German submarine base. *Olympia* and *Machias* ordered.

The fleet left Guantanamo for Guacanayabo, except the *Arkansas*, which was left to guard the naval station. The *Arkansas* was the fleet at sea.

At 9 p. m. issued radio orders for disposition of fleet and defense force at Guacanayabo.

The defense of the fleet in Guacanayabo Gulf consisted of destroyer patrol from Cape Cruz to Lavissa Bank; picket boat

practicable for submarines: airplane reconnaissance of sea area in the vicinity, twice daily.

May 9: Dispatch was received indicating dates submarines available for service. The condition, according to this report, seemed to be good, but the submarines were considered unreliable except for work near their shore bases. Admiral Grant, who was in command of the submarine force, can give their actual condition. A copy of this dispatch appended, marked "C."

May 10: The condition in the navy yards was not definitely stated by the commander in chief, but the following radio indicated repairs had not been adequately expanded to meet the needs of the fleet for war. The radio was:

Repairs in navy yards New Hampshire, Vermont, Illinois, and Maine can be made there. Ordered to report to fleet for such work as can be done with submarines.

Submarines had been operating in Mexican and Caribbean waters since their complements. Upon their arrival at Guacanayabo mechanics from other battleships were detailed to assist in getting them in condition.

May 11: The commander in chief was informed that the design of reserve and reduced commission in the Pacific would be in the Canal Zone as soon as they could be gotten ready.

May 12: On this date received the following radio from Chief of Operations:

Decide that the fleet is properly protected from possible submarine attack. If you suggest, do you advise bringing the fleet north or not?

Message was answered as follows:

Yes, to Australia.

Washington.

Decide that as per campaign order 3 of February 6 as complete as practicable for the fleet to commerce. Ships fleet carrying out target practice schedule, at sea at night frequently and darkening except during gunnery work. Decide that remain south for the present. *Paducah* join fleet for channel work. Designated dispatch vessel Haiti, San Domingo. U. S. S. *Hannibal*, Decide that immediately fitted to join mine force. Visit Colon, Panama, be Decide that northern rendezvous be Long Island Sound. Army arrange to close Decide that and to protect Block Island Sound. Commander cruiser force be Decide that governor to devote himself to development cruiser work. 22,112.

May 10: Panama had been on the approved fleet schedule.

May 11: I issued an order in regard to taking special precautions for the preservation of the military integrity of the vessels of the fleet. Copy appended marked "D."

May 13: The decision with regard to the fleet was received, Decide that

Decide that remain south for the present. Visit to Panama settled later depending Decide that. Surveying vessels referred to engaged in important work. If Decide that, will order any or all to report to you at once.

May 16: The *Drayton* and *Aylwin* having been in a collision Decide that against submarine activities, were ordered to Charles- Decide that.

Decide that the situation in Cuba was serious, a revolution existing. Decide that element had seized the city of Santiago de Cuba, and it Decide that necessary for the commander in chief to send vessels to Decide that. Each vessel so detailed from the fleet reduced

effectiveness of the protection against submarines should the Germans endeavor to attack the fleet before or upon a declaration of war. The commander in chief recommended that no further be detailed from the fleet for duty in connection with the insurrection.

In view of the unsettled conditions in Cuba, the following of vessels were to some extent diverted from their training: Battleships, destroyers, cruisers, mining vessels, and surveying vessels.

February 20: Information was received that orders had been issued to put destroyer flotillas 1 and 2 in material readiness for service.

February 23: Received letter from Secretary of the Navy, campaign order No. 2, as follows:

FEBRUARY 13, 1917.

To: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*, flagship.
Subject: Fleet campaign order No. 2, February 5, 1917.

1. In the Atlantic Fleet campaign order No. 2, of February 5 it is noted in paragraph 3 (a) direct the scouting force to "clear Quatro Reales Channel of submarines and mines." The order to "clear" the channel of submarines cannot be interpreted as authorizing the use of force against any submarines found. The department assumes that it was the commander in chief's intention to clear the channel for possible mines and to search for and report submarines, not to attack them offensively against them.

JOSEPHUS DANFORTH

Reply was sent as follows:

Secnav. letter February 13, subject fleet campaign order No. 2 of February 5. C. in C. intention was to distinctly authorize use of force against such vessels in the vicinity of Fleet or approaching to fleet.

Similar orders are now in force and are considered essential safety fleet as in any such vessels assumed hostile if found as above.

March 2: Information was received that destroyers of flotillas 1 and 2 would be required by the department for neutrality duty and would not be available for duty with the fleet.

March 3: The *Illinois* and destroyers *Jarvis*, *McCall*, *Wright*, *Ericsson*, *McDougal*, *Tucker*, *Duncan*, and *Cushing* ordered to home yards for repairs, leaving 14 with the fleet.

March 8: Received following radio from Operations:

Trip to Panama will not be made. About what date can fleet finish all exercises South and depart North? What do you recommend?

Reply was sent as follows:

From: U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*.

To: Opanav, Washington.

15008. All gunnery exercises finished before April 1, on completion fleet to depart Guantanamo Bay for benefit personnel. Recommend start north about 18602. 08409.

Flag "PENNSYLVANIA"

March 11: An order was received to send north 30 guns crewed by armed guard duty. A copy of this order from the Bureau of Navigation is appended. This order, issued by a bureau, reduces the military efficiency of the antitorpedo defense of the battleships. The policy on which such order must have been based was not known to the commander in chief except by inference from a bureau order.

Under the law, the Bureau of Navigation has cognizance of personnel matters, and was acting within its province in directing

of personnel. It was assumed that the policy had the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Transfer of such a large number of officers and men led to a question of the future situation with regard to personnel. It was known that the active fleet contained the major part of the personnel of the service, and that it would have to supply the personnel for armed guard and other duties, hence the hearty cooperation was then and subsequently given the Bureau of Navigation in its great work of expansion.

Gun crews for armed guard duty were sent by destroyer to Key West from which place they went north by rail.

March 14 Thirty more gun crews ordered north by the Bureau of Navigation.

March 15 Received information that the department contemplated sending a detachment to Guacanayabo with 800 enlisted men for active duty. This personnel did not reach the fleet until its arrival in Key West, due to the fleet's orders to proceed north.

March 16 The above was handed to the reporter on March 31 with a request to insert in page 20 of Admiral Mayo's manuscript:)

Immediately 30 trained torpedo defense gun crews consisting of two gunners, one platoon leader, gun captain, each crew. Above crews to be detailed to each group to consist of 39-men crews. Detail immediately to each group a competent to command each group three guns. Detail to each group a gunner's mate, one petty officer for each group of three guns. Above personnel to be detailed aboard United States merchant vessels as armed guard for protection of merchant submarines. The above personnel to be detailed from the submarine force now with flag. Send above personnel to receiving ship at Key West by destroyer to Key West and rail to New York. Radio probable date March 20 New York. Be prepared for additional details. Acknowledge.

March 17 The commander in chief was directed to proceed with the fleet to Hampton Roads.

March 18 The fleet base was shifted to Guantanamo preparatory to proceeding to the north. The dispositions for defense of the Guantanamo were much the same as before the fleet moved to Guacanayabo, no additional facilities having become available.

March 19 The submarine force, although carried on the organization as part of the Atlantic Fleet, had been operating independently because of the conditions which prevented their active participation in the fleet. Reports were made, as a rule, direct to the department. This condition, though faulty, had been accepted, due to the number of units whose material condition was not good, and the restricted operations of which this force was

The condition is indicated clearly by a dispatch sent from Operations to the commander submarine force on March 22, as follows:

March 22 The need of additional submarines New London for training purposes. Under present conditions it appears to department advisable entire submarine force be moved there immediately. Make recommendation by dispatch.

March 23 The above message was not sent to the commander in chief, nor was recommendation requested. This was expected, more or less, as the commander submarine force had constantly been in direct communication with the department.

March 24 The battleships and most of the destroyers sailed from Guantanamo Bay for Hampton Roads.

The estimate of the situation with regard to the movement of the fleet north, indicated:

(a) That if enemy submarines were preparing to strike the fleet without warning and were informed of the probable movement of the fleet to the north, they would probably lie in wait for the fleet in the Crooked Island Passage where the passage is narrow, making maneuvering of a large number of ships to avoid submarines possible.

(b) That the number of destroyers with the fleet was inadequate for its efficient protection if it proceeded in one formation at low speed.

It was, therefore, decided to proceed with the active battle fleet and available destroyers at maximum sustained speed via the Channel, and to permit the train, mine force, and old battleships to proceed in company via the Crooked Island Passage at a later date.

The battleships and destroyers arrived at Hampton Roads at 10 a. m., March 27; the train, mine force, etc., on March 30.

March 28: Upon arrival at Hampton Roads destroyers were stationed in the lower bay to act as lookouts. When the mine force arrived it was assigned to cooperate with the fifth naval district in placing antisubmarine nets in the entrance to Chesapeake Bay at Hampton Roads.

I proceeded to Washington to consult with the Chief of Naval Operations with regard to possible activities.

March 28-31: No written plan or policy was given to me at that time, but from conversation I understood the policy as follows:

The Atlantic Fleet to be maintained in readiness for active operations. No ships to be sent to navy yards unless in need of major repairs. Fleet to continue training of gun crews for armed guard duty.

I was directed to shift the fleet base to York River, Va., in accordance with my recommendation.

Information was received in Washington of the contemplation of the formation of the patrol force, consisting of vessels from the several forces.

The formation of a fleet force to do a task was an entire change in organization policy. The basis of previous fleet organization was that vessels of a type would form a force.

April 3: The fleet base was shifted to York River, Va., and preparations for the defense of the fleet against possible attack and against mines were put into effect. Patrols were also established on the coast and in the river, the latter consisting merely of armed launches with the battleships.

April 4: Orders were received to organize the patrol force on the coast and to assign all destroyers that could be spared to this force.

An increase in the mine force was recommended to permit it to accomplish its assigned task of placing antisubmarine trap nets. The department asked what destroyers with the battle fleet could be spared for duty with the patrol force. I replied that all then present were required with the fleet, and also recommended that destroyer flotilla 3 be kept intact for use with battle fleet.

In this connection it should be noted that no policy with regard to the future service of the battleships had been decided upon, except as previously noted. In view of the possibility that the fleet might be called upon as a fleet, I considered it essential that at least one of destroyers remain with the battleships.

No orders for the patrol force having been received, inquiries were requested as to the mission to be assigned to the force. The answer to this request was:

"The patrol force will be issued by the department through the commandant."

"At the start of what the commander in chief believed to be a new campaign, namely, control of active operations of subordinate forces in the department. In view of the fact that at this time I was in the area of operations to be covered by the patrol force, in my opinion, should have been assigned to me, with such of my forces as might have been required to do so."

The foregoing remarks cover the preparedness of the fleet upon the outbreak of war, April 6, 1917.

The active fleet arrived in Hampton Roads about the 1st of May. During its training period in Cuban waters, it was in the best of readiness that it had ever been, and there was a feeling among the personnel of being able to cope with any emergency. The personnel was, however, on a peace basis and the transfer of personnel for armed guard and other duty was already causing a decrease in efficiency. The destroyers that were assigned to the war zone, though they were assigned to operations, they had not been specially trained, showed the results of their general training by the efficiency with which they adjusted into their new duties.

It should be pointed out that this fleet was lacking in vessels essential to efficiency, such as battle cruisers, scout cruisers, and fleet submarines; and, furthermore, there were none now available.

The readiness of the active fleet was from good to very good. Such was the condition, was demonstrated again and again by the duties performed by the vessels during the war. The condition is stated in detail in the several despatches and reports which are a part of this statement.

The foregoing remarks apply to the readiness of the available fleet and to the soundness of the methods of training and discipline at the time.

Here are a few paragraphs from a letter which was addressed to the commandant regarding certain phases of the work in Cuban waters:

"Fleet Gunnery exercises, spring, 1917.

"The reports of gunnery exercises held during the spring, 1917, have been received and considered. Notwithstanding the many interruptions in the exercises, the conditions under which the exercises were necessarily held, the steady progress in the ability and confidence of the personnel to observe, aim, and control the fire of the different batteries under varying conditions, it is believed that the final analysis of the scores will show a marked increase in the volume of fire and a reasonably satisfactory increase in accuracy.

"The extracts from the reports are very gratifying to the commander and show an understanding and appreciation of the efforts which have been made to improve the battle efficiency of the fleet:

"There have been accomplished during the past gunnery year than ever before, which stands to prove that present methods, while not complete, are fundamentally sound.

"That torpedo officers have derived from the work on the *Montana* in the flotilla, and the time has now arrived when destroyers be factors to the enemy fleet in day as well as night engagements.

"Day individual practice is merely an exercise of battle procedure, in ammunition is limited and the ship hedged short with certain other restrictions, none of which, however, interfere in the slightest with ordinary battle practice."

"Day action procedure is well standardized now and it is a pleasure to visit the ship during a major caliber fire control drill and be able to tell what she is doing without asking countless questions."

4. The commander in chief has watched with great pleasure, the steady growth of the efficiency of the fleet, and he takes this opportunity of extending to the officers and men of the fleet his appreciation of their loyal support and assistance, and is confident that the entire fleet will be ready in the near future to render service on the scene of active operation in the same spirit as those units of the fleet which have already responded quickly and effectively to the sudden call for service against the enemy.

H. T. M.

In this connection, see my annual report dated December 17, 1917, especially remarks on personnel, copy appended, marked "E."

The operations of the fleet during the period, April 6, 1917, to October 23, will now be considered. October 23, 1917, is selected as the date on which I again hoisted my flag on the U. S. S. *Pennsylvania* after my first inspection and observation of conditions of the fleet forces in European waters.

April 6: At 1.33 p. m. received 16 Alnav, "The President signed act of Congress which declares that a state of war exists between United States and Germany."

A signal was immediately sent to the fleet: "War has commenced."

At 5.50 p. m. orders were received as follows:

Mobilize for war in accordance department's confidential mobilization order of March 21. Particular attention invited to paragraphs 6 and 8.

Paragraph 6 assigned rendezvous of various forces, and paragraph 8 instructions with regard to fitting out at navy yards.

As has been indicated previously the disposition for the protection of the fleet at anchor in York River had been in operation during the period of strained relations.

The policies of the department with regard to the use of the fleet with which I was conversant were:

(1) The fleet will supply armed guard personnel and training for all ratings for general service.

(2) A patrol force has been formed to patrol the Atlantic coast.

(3) The battleship force will be maintained intact. At this time I had no information as to any contemplated employment of the fleet vessels in European waters in cooperation with the Allies.

Under these conditions, no modification of existing conditions of the fleet were required except the establishment of censorship and the commencement of war diaries. These points had been covered by fleet orders and were put into effect with the order to mobilize the fleet.

Under the existing conditions the adopted general mission of the Atlantic Fleet was as follows:

To efficiently train the increased personnel required by the Navy for war, to maintain a patrol of the coast, without seriously reducing the efficiency of the fleet.

April 8: The patrol force was formed under command of H. B. Wilson, United States Navy. Its mission had been assigned to the department, as follows:

To give the maximum possible protection to the trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and of friendly powers in the area to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces.

the mine force.

Information was received that Vice Admiral Browning, Navy, and Rear Admiral Grasset, French Navy, would arrive at Roads morning April 10 for conference with the Chief of Operations, commander in chief, and commander patrol force.

Organization of naval forces, dated March 21, 1917, made no mention of the United States Atlantic, Pacific, or Asiatic Fleets, and a scout force which had not previously existed. There were

positions of command left unsettled, and consequently the

chief communicated with the department and received

which materially changed that part of the mobilization plan

to command. (Letters appended marked "F" and "G.")

Conference with foreign officers was held at Hotel

representatives of Governments as follows:

Admiral W. S. Benson, United States Navy, Admiral H. T. Mayo,

United States Navy, Capt. H. B. Wilson, United States Navy, United

Vice Admiral Browning, Royal Navy, Great Britain; Rear

Admiral Grasset, French Navy, France.

At conference Vice Admiral Browning explained the mission

and read a communication from the British Admiralty

to the representatives of the United States as to the nature

of assistance the United States Navy was prepared to render, and

the desire of the British Admiralty for assistance, especially in

the craft. Rear Admiral Grasset explained the mission of

French and requested that the United States assist in the patrol

of the coast.

Admiral Benson stated that the present policy of the United States

was to maintain the fleet intact and to assist in the patrol of

Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States and waters adjacent

thereto.

Conference adjourned to meet the following day in Washing-

ton to take up the suggestions of the foreign Governments

to the Secretary of the Navy, as Vice Admiral Browning consid-

ered the suggestions required a conference with the Secretary of the

Navy.

Conference held in Navy Department.

Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral W. S.

Benson, United States Navy; Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States

Navy; Vice Admiral M. Browning, Royal Navy; Rear Admiral

Grasset, French Navy; Capt. H. B. Wilson, United States Navy;

members of the general board.

Subjects discussed were similar to those of the previous day.

Following decisions were reached:

1. That the present policy of the United States required

that the fleet be kept intact, a division of destroyers will be sent to

the waters to cooperate with the allied antisubmarine forces in

the

United States to patrol off Atlantic coast of United States and

the patrol of Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.

2. That instructions were received to prepare six destroyers for dis-

patch, selecting those boats which were most reliable from the

point of view of material.

April 16: Fleet exercised in antisubmarine operations. Submarine division 5 operating in York River to train personnel in observation and fire control.

April 18: Information was requested of Operations as to designation of destroyers fitting for distant service in order that orders might be issued.

The department directed that orders be issued to the commander of destroyer division 8 (fitting out for distant service) to proceed as directed by the department. Orders were later issued to this division by the department.

Destroyer division 8 left Boston 5.30 p. m. en route to Queenstown, Ireland, to cooperate in antisubmarine operations with the British force at Queenstown.

April 26: Orders received to direct six destroyers proceed to home yards to fit out for distant service.

No change in policy was received. The order to send six additional destroyers gave no information or plan on which this was based.

April 28: Orders received to send six more destroyers and *Maryland* to home yards to prepare for distant service.

System for intensive training of engineering personnel was put into effect.

While in Washington, I was informed of the new policy relating to assignment of destroyers to assist in antisubmarine operations in cooperation with the British.

I, also, at this time, made an oral recommendation to the Chief of Naval Operations that the commander in chief should proceed to European waters, as the United States forces which would be assigned there would in all probability be the only forces to see active operations. This was not concurred in.

May 1: Twenty-four additional destroyers and *Dixie* ordered to prepare for distant service.

May 4: Destroyer division 8 arrived Queenstown. The commander of this division had orders to communicate his orders regarding operations to Rear Admiral Sims at London, and to be guided by such instructions as he might give.

Beginning in May a number of torpedo defense guns were removed from battleships to make the guns available for arming merchant ships defensively.

The instructions under which I acted in sending destroyers to home navy yards to fit out for distant service were such that it was impossible to retain the previous division organization. Had the policy been settled earlier the division organization could have been maintained, thus adding to efficiency.

May 5: Up to this time I had received no definite statement of the department's policy in regard to material readiness of the battleships for possible active service in European waters.

In order that the policy might be definitely stated, and in order that the department might have the latest information in regard to the material defects which existed in the active battleship force, on May 5, 1917, I addressed a letter to the department from, which I will quote several paragraphs (full copy appended, marked "H").

1. The material condition of battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8 when they left the navy yards in January last for the winter's drills and exercises was, in general, good, although all had some uncompleted authorized work at the time of departure.

in detail in correspondence forwarded to the department by the commander in chief, file 124, of February 27, 1917. Requests for work have been submitted by all these vessels from time to time since that date but except in some few cases—Arkansas turbine work, for example—report of this additional work has been made to the department. When the battleships went South, the commander in chief, file 124 of 1313, March, 1917, in reply to the department's letter, stated that no work was necessary in the immediate future, but that they were to be put in condition for war service at some indefinite future date as required, as was specifically mentioned in the letter above.

The commander in chief in this letter also invited the department's comment on the material readiness of the fleet as follows: "In time of war the commander in chief assumes that the department, under advice of conditions, will determine the policy to be followed—whether to first put in the best material condition or whether all ships are to keep the sea are to do so from the time of mobilization."

The commander in chief is without definite information as to the department's policy on these matters and therefore considers it necessary to present certain facts for consideration.

The battleships are not expected to "keep the sea" or to do any long distance work for some time to come, but what may be required of them is not mathematical. While the vessels mentioned can continue based in the enclosed waters, or could operate near our coasts, if necessary, they are not doing so at navy yards, they are, in general, not now in proper condition to permit them to operate indefinitely from some foreign base. It may not be required, but conditions may demand just that. All ships should go to the navy yards at once, nor should any vessel be sent to a foreign yard is fully prepared to undertake all authorized work. If, however, it is found, and a demand is made later for one or more divisions of the fleet, it would necessarily be sent to navy yards and there would be a considerable delay in readiness for service that could be avoided if they are kept at home as long as the yards can handle the work.

In an actual emergency immediately existing, the vessels are able to move them away from the Atlantic coast to operate for an indefinite period in present condition advisable. To send any vessel away with her hull, or engine, or with any of her fittings or appliances in any way defective would be a mistake, as breakdowns after arrival, even if within the force to make good, would impair efficiency at a time when it is most needed. There is hardly a vessel in the four divisions mentioned, however, without a number of items of authorized work on each vessel, and any immediate action, can not be made good under present conditions will not improve even, as is hardly possible, should they be kept at home except for training the personnel, there is at present no demand for them as fighting units later on. Now, if it is a matter of opportunity, they should be put in the very best material condition possible.

However, the commander in chief recommends that the department consider a policy by which work on the battleships may be taken up at a practicable date.

H. T. Mayo.

Recommendations were renewed that all destroyers not on patrol force be assigned to the destroyer force in order that they could be used and also be available to operate with the battle force.

Destroyers were still assigned to the patrol force.

Recommendations were made in regard to submarine force. It was recommended that the mine force be relieved of duty except in vicinity of fleet bases. Letter appended.

Destroyers attached to patrol force were detached and ordered to the destroyer force.

Naval converted yachts were ordered prepared for distant

June 3: Received from Operations the following dispatch:

11501. Rear Admiral Gleaves has been given full verbal instructions of which department wishes vessels of destroyer force assigned.

Rear Admiral Gleaves had been ordered to Washington by tions, and given instructions as to the use to which a portion of the fleet was to be put without the commander in chief being consulted or informed of the probable use to which the destroyer force was required. Conditions with regard to the proper exercise of command were unsatisfactory as the department was handling many operations of fleet units direct from Washington.

June 4: The department had gradually detached colliers and oilers from the fleet train until at this time no colliers and no tanker was assigned to the train.

June 7: The first troop convoy was assembling at New York. The details of this expedition were learned while I was in Washington.

Copies of department's confidential orders to Vice Admiral Sims, reorganization of United States forces operating in European waters, and to Capt. W. B. Fletcher, re patrol duty off French coast, were received.

June 13: The first convoy expedition was known to be assembling at New York under Rear Admiral Gleaves, and a detachment of yachts was assembling in New York for duty on the French coast under Capt. W. B. Fletcher. I was not properly informed of these activities, nor the status of the various commanders to whom the department was issuing orders direct.

In order that the status of all concerned might be determined and understood the commander in chief addressed the following letter to the department:

File 1445.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP
June 15, 1917.

Confidential, 28754-20-46.

From: Commander in chief.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic.

References: (a) C. in C. let. No. 1445, April 9, 1917; (b) Secnav. let. No. 2808-178, April 14, 1917; (c) Dept. mobilization plan, dated March 21, 1917; (d) C. in C. conf. let. No. Op-10 to Vice Admiral Sims, dated June 6, 1917; (e) C. in C. let. No. Op-10 to Capt. W. B. Fletcher, dated June 1, 1917; (f) Secnav. conf. let. No. 2808-178, May 29, 1917; (g) Secnav. conf. let. No. Op-10, May 9, 1917, to Admiral W. B. Caperton, C. in C., Pacific Fleet.

1. The status of certain naval forces operating in the Atlantic is not quite understood by the commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

2. The naval forces in question are those operating in general as follows:

I. European waters.

II. Convoy operations in the Atlantic.

III. South Atlantic waters.

3. Reference (a) made certain inquiries regarding the department's mobilization plan dated March 21, 1917. Reference (b) is the department's reply thereto. Paragraph 2 of reference (b) is explicit in regard to the jurisdiction of the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, in so far as concerns forces and units existing in the Atlantic at that time (Apr. 14, 1917).

4. Practically all destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet, except destroyer divisions, have been ordered to home yards to fit out for distant service by April 30, 1917. Destroyer tenders *Melville* and *Dixie* had similar orders. Certain destroyer divisions are not generally composed of the same destroyers as laid down in reference (a). The given orders direct by the department to proceed to European waters, re-

to Vice Admiral Sims for duty, copies of the orders being furnished to the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet. It is understood that at the present time the divisions for service under the orders of Vice Admiral Sims are those in reference (d), but these divisions are at present operating under Rear Admiral Gleaves, who in reference (f) was designated as "Commander United States convoy operations in the Atlantic," in addition to his duties as Commander in Chief. There was constituted a force designated as "United States forces operating in European waters," to be composed largely of vessels which were originally assigned to the patrol force, Atlantic Fleet.

This constitutes a force to be known as "United States forces operating in European waters," under the general command of Vice Admiral Sims. It is composed of "United States destroyer flotilla operating in European waters," under the command of Vice Admiral Sims, and "United States patrol force operating in European waters," under the command of Capt. W. B. Fletcher. This is stated in paragraph 1 above.

The destroyer tenders, yachts, and the recently ordered fuel vessels assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and have never been formally detached from the Atlantic Fleet. Although intent to do so might be inferred from the fact that there is no mention of responsibility of the "Commander of United States forces operating in European waters" to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.

The vessels assigned in convoy operations in the Atlantic are likewise largely assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, some of them evidently assigned to the "United States forces operating in European waters," organized and operated by Rear Admiral Gleaves, designated as "Commander United States convoy operations in the Atlantic" in reference (f). The instructions received direct from the department. The commander in chief Atlantic Fleet has only a very general knowledge of the activities of these forces.

This constitutes a "Scout force on distant service" for operations in the Atlantic, composed chiefly of vessels which appear in reference (c) as part of the Atlantic Fleet. No mention is made therein to responsibility of the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Two fuel vessels assigned to the Atlantic Fleet have been ordered by the department to service in supplying the forces operating in European waters.

It has been stated above somewhat at length in order to assemble the facts so that the department may appreciate the viewpoint imposed upon the Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, who can not allow himself to forget that any action of the Atlantic Fleet as a whole (1) will require the assembly of the forces herein mentioned, and (2) that their coordination and cooperation that can be dealt with hurriedly, but must be prepared and arranged in advance of active operations. The department is aware of the steps which have been taken during the past year to exercise and otherwise prepare for active operations. Not the least part of such preparation is the employment of means of supervising the readiness of material and of the proper functions and to keep informed of the employment of the forces composing the Atlantic Fleet as a guide to their condition of readiness.

It is recommended that all vessels in the Atlantic which are suitable for service on the high seas and which would be assembled in case of active operations remain assigned or be assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, in order that the Commander in Chief may perfect the necessary arrangements for the coordination of the several forces and units composing the fleet and be kept informed as to their readiness for service, both as to material and personnel, and also as to their employment.

It is suggested that the department will in many cases wish to issue orders to the commanders of the several forces and units in order to expedite operations. The Commander in Chief considers that he is as fully informed as conditions permit of the location of a copy of such orders or instructions or is included in the dispatches.

In paragraph 10 above, it is requested that the commander in chief be kept informed of the department's decision in this matter, and in any case as to the condition of the naval forces now operating in the Atlantic.

F. T. MAYO.

To this letter the department replied, on June 9:

Op-11. 28754-20 : 46.

JULY 2,

Confidential.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic.

References: (a) Commander in chief's letter, file 1445, June 13, 1917; (b) Op-11 letter to commander United States naval forces operating in European waters, July 5, 1917; (c) Operation's letter to commander in chief Pacific Fleet of July 5, 1917; (d) Operation's letter to commander convoy operations in the Atlantic, July 3, 1917.

Inclosures: References (b), (c), and (d).

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (a).
2. The status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic is defined in the inclosure forwarded herewith.

W. S. BRADLEY

JULY 3,

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander, convoy operations in the Atlantic.

Subject: Forces engaged in convoy operations in the Atlantic to be subject to the orders of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

1. The forces assigned to convoy operations in the Atlantic are attached to the Atlantic Fleet.
2. The commander of convoy operations is authorized to communicate directly with the department when necessary.
3. Keep the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet informed of the employment of forces under your command and submit to the commander in chief such reports as may be necessary and required by him to enable him to supervise the operations of material and of personnel to perform their proper functions in the event of operations.

W. S. BRADLEY

Copy to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

JULY 2,

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander United States naval forces operating in European waters.

Subject: Assignment of United States naval forces operating in European waters to the Atlantic Fleet.

1. The United States naval forces operating in European waters are hereby assigned to duty with the Atlantic Fleet.
2. The force commander will continue to communicate direct with the department as heretofore.
3. Keep the commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, informed of the employment of the forces under your command and submit to the commander in chief such reports as may be necessary and required by him, to enable him to supervise the operations of material and personnel to perform their proper functions in the event of operations.

W. S. BRADLEY

Copy to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

It should be noted that for nearly a month the commander in chief was without definite knowledge of the status of the forces operating in the Atlantic.

June 23. Commander in chief received a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State enunciating policy of the Navy Department:

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, June 23

SIR: Referring to the cablegram from Ambassador Page in London, dated June 1917 (copy attached). After careful consideration of the present naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Department is prepared to announce as its policy in so far as it relates to the

cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in our waters, compatible with an adequate defense of our own waters.

cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising from the war.

While a successful termination of the present war must always be hoped for and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the United States must in no way be jeopardized by an attack on its main fighting fleets.

That the present main military rôle of the United States naval forces is in guarding the lines of communication of the Allies. In pursuing this rôle, generally speaking, the two classes of vessels engaged--minor craft and battleships--have different rôles of action: First, offensive; second, defensive.

As set forth in paragraph (4), the Navy Department can not but in its opinion the offensive must always be the dominant note in our strategy prepared. But, as the primary rôle in all offensive operations belongs to allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its general policy it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies, subject to our immediate needs.

As to our general policy, the Navy Department announces as its policy the following:

1. To maintain its minor fighting forces, comprised of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliaries, in any numbers not incompatible with home needs, subject to a decision expedient by the joint allied admiralties, which is in accordance with our present State policy.

2. As a matter of policy, to separate any division from the main fleet, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad as a cooperating unit when, after joint consultations of all admiralties, it is deemed to warrant it and the entire tension imposed on the fleet is due to the increase in the number of fighting ships which it must stand the strain upon it.

3. To discuss more fully plans for joint operations.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Orders were received to direct *Cleveland*, *Raleigh*, *Albany*, *New York* without delay and prepare for convoy duty, beginning of a new policy, that of using United States merchant convoys.

The Government's letter assigning of the Pacific Fleet was

The number of gunboats and small cruisers ordered to navy

for distant service.

I have been unable to obtain satisfactory information as to the navy yards with regard to the possibility of under-estimating the ships of the battleship forces. I requested and requested to send the fleet material officer to visit the principal yards to determine what work could be done on the battle-

This conference between the fleet material office and the navy yards. I submitted a proposed schedule of over-estimated by Operations. (Copy of proposed schedule attached.)

The yachts which were assigned to the patrol force were sent out for distant service and proceed singly to

The patrol force organization was practically abandoned, the detachment operating from Key West and the Mexican Government, most of the destroyers, yachts, and gunboats were ordered on distant service. On this date all Coast Guard

cutters which had been assigned to the patrol force were ordered to report to the commandants of naval districts, under which the rest of the fleet were now operating. A new campaign order was issued to the various forces and detachments. This order indicated the latest changes in the organization of the fleet and stated the forces assigned to the various detachments.

July 20: Squadron 2 of the cruiser force was assigned to duty.

August 12: On this date I and a portion of my staff left the *Pennsylvania* and proceeded to Washington on temporary duty at the Navy Department prior to sailing for Europe for the purpose of observing conditions and operations in European waters and inspecting the activities of that portion of the Atlantic Fleet.

From August 27 until October 4, I was engaged as just mentioned. Upon my return to Washington I submitted a long report of my observations in Europe, the result of my conferences with the British and French Admiralties and a statement of specific requests for assistance desired by the Allies.

I will read certain quotations from my report, all of which are in inclosures is appended, marked "K."

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM NAVY DEPARTMENT.

(a) The instructions received from the Navy Department as to the purpose and object of the visit to England and France were not in definite and concrete terms but were readily to be inferred from the substance of conversations with the President, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations, supplemented by memoranda from the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants. A summary of the above-mentioned conversations and memoranda was made (while in England) in order to enable definite inquiries to be made to the Government concerned.

(b) The summary was of the following general character. It will be noted that the principal matters of inquiry were understood to be for the purpose of getting closely in touch with:

(1) What has been done—historical—in order that knowledge of original plans and modifications thereof, together with their elements of success or failure, might be brought to the present situation to be understood and proposals for future operations be appreciated.

(2) What is being done—present situation—following history of naval operations up to present time, showing underlying causes of plans and operations now in force—the part that the United States plays in present plans and operations—the present naval strength and resources of the Allies and of the enemy—the situation in the several areas of operations, e. g., the North Sea, the Helgoland Bight, the Skagerrak, the Baltic Sea, the English Channel, the Dunkirk-Zeebrugge area, the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic, etc.

(3) What is to be done—future operations—following the history of plans and operations in their evolution and development to the present time. What new plans and operations are proposed and for what reason? What part are the several allies expected to take? What are the allied and enemy building programs?

(4) Particular inquiry into the anti submarine measures under way and proposals as being the field of endeavor requiring immediate attention—assistance desired from the United States.

(5) The aircraft situation, particularly with regard to construction under way and proposed—and wherein the United States can assist to best advantage for all concerned.

(6) The shipping situation, in so far as it bears on the communications of the Allies.

(7) The transfer of United States troops to France, in so far as the availability of troops will have effect on the outcome of the war, and particularly with regard to the requirements necessary not only for transport of troops but chiefly for the upkeep and support of troops after their arrival in France.

(8) Certain inquiries in the matters of seeking for trade, the employment of men-of-war belonging to private companies, and the rumored transfer of men-of-war after the war.

(9) An international naval conference which the United States had requested the British Government to arrange for.

information for the purposes of the visit appeared in dispatches from the Admiralty regarding Norway entering the war on the side of the Allies and regarding the possible capture of Russian capital ships by the enemy. Information is also being received regarding political, economic, and morale conditions in Germany so far as such conditions have been bearing on the general situation.

THE NAVAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 4-5, 1917.

It has already been made on the proceedings of this conference: it is now available in the form of the official minutes.

It is pointed out in the fact that answers are to be addressed to the British Admiralty in regard to

ships and cruisers available for use in proposed operations to effect the capture of harbors.

It is also pointed out, perhaps even old battleships, for service as escorts to mer-

IMPRESSIONS REGARDING CONDITIONS IN BRITISH ADMIRALTY.

It is pointed out that the British Admiralty is at a loss when asked for the state of the war. Reports of operations are so isolated and scattered and there is not available any comprehensive record of original plans, as well as the degree of success or failure in each case. The result is that the war has been carried on from day to day, and not according to a comprehensive policy to serve as a guide to plans looking to the effective cooperation of effort against the enemy.

It is pointed out that despite the so-called war staff arrangements put into effect during the past three years, until very recently there has been no definite body of men charged with the function of looking back to see wherein lay the causes of success or failure of operations in order that decisions as to continuing old operations or reaching a new policy might be reached with a due sense of "perspective," both as to the coordination of new operations in a general plan.

It is pointed out that the present admiralty policy, originally dated July, 1917, now dated September 17, 1917, not really a statement of policy but rather a summary of activities. That these activities are based on an underlying idea of the "three D's," namely, "proaction," "prevention," "protection,"

It is pointed out that the proposed future admiralty policy dated September 17, 1917, is a statement of the necessity for more energetic offensive measures in the way of preventing his egress from the North Sea.

It is pointed out that the submarine menace has been gradual and the measures to meet it have had to be evolved and applied to new developments. The present dispersion of allied naval effort against the submarine has reached large dimensions, and the actual offensive against the submarine has been through the accumulation of large numbers of vessels to carry out the protective (defensive) operations. The number of vessels engaged in protective (defensive) operations is the entire British Navy in northern waters except the grand fleet. Destroyers and other small craft are also engaged in protective

It is pointed out that the proposed plan of future antisubmarine operations in the North Sea may be necessary to withdraw some vessels engaged in protective operations to make the offensive effective. However, the effectiveness of the offensive is cumulative, thus enabling perhaps nearly all of the available vessels to be diverted from the protective (defensive) to the offensive.

IMPRESSIONS REGARDING THE GRAND FLEET

It is pointed out that the Grand Fleet, after three years' experience in war, including the heavy losses, is in good material condition, ready for all likely operations, and

It is pointed out that operating conditions have been studied and arrangements made for the use of the fleet. Plans and detailed instructions are complete and have been conceived and framed for probable operations

in the North Sea only, with the view that the situation in the North Sea is one requiring present consideration, as it involves the encounter of the two main fighting fleets.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WAR.

(a) The Queenstown force, consisting of 35 destroyers and 2 destroyer (Melville and Dixie) are almost wholly employed in the convoy system under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, R. N., commander in chief at Queenstown.

(b) This force is in good material, personnel, and operating condition; the work is excellent. Admiral Bayly appears to be much pleased with their work, which requires much time at sea and constant exercise of seamanship, navigation, and judgment.

(c) The Brest force is hampered in its operations by general unsuitability of available vessels for high-seas work and by lack of organization, and of general training to serve as a guide in carrying the necessary work; there is also difficulty in getting even minor repairs and upkeep.

(d) The force at Gibraltar and at Bordeaux were not visited owing to lack of time, but are understood to be accomplishing all that can be expected of the number of vessels now available.

(e) The present aviation force is nearing the completion of its training and is expected to receive a marked increase of personnel, after which it is expected that active operations may be begun.

(f) The operations in the air have reached such magnitude and are of such importance that there can be little doubt that assistance in personnel and material by air service will be the most rapid as well as the most useful way of reinforcing the fleet both by land and by sea.

NOTES ON THE GENERAL NAVAL SITUATION.

(a) Apparently the naval plans of the Allies have been in most general terms to have Britain to control the North Sea and Channel; France her west coast and the Mediterranean coast; Italy, assisted as necessary by France, to control the Adriatic. British forces based on Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, assisting in the Mediterranean. Recently the Japanese have given assistance in the Mediterranean, having sent a cruiser and 12 destroyers. United States forces are operating from Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar.

(b) (1) It is apparent from conversations with officers attached to the Operations Division that up to the present there have been no definite naval plans. It can be learned there has been no statement of British naval policy previously issued by the Admiralty in July, 1917, which is in reality a defense of what was done and not a real statement of policy.

(2) The defensive nature of this so-called policy is plainly indicated by the paragraph stating the objects to be attained by naval power; the leading words of the subparagraphs which state these objects are: (1) Protection, (2) prevention, (3) destruction, (4) resistance.

All of these objects and many more would be obtained by the destruction of the enemy's naval power.

(c) (1) In the first month of the war the offensive policy was much more prominent than at present. The British fleet was in fact undergoing a test mobilization when the probability of war became evident. The forces were maintained in a mobilized condition and therefore began the war in a most advantageous state.

(2) The disposition of the fleet was made with a view to opposing the movement of enemy forces out of the North Sea. The main battle fleet was based in the North Sea off Scotland but kept the sea almost continuously. A second battle force was based off the south of England to prevent the passage of any force of less strength than the high sea fleet through the Channel. The armored and light cruisers were continually on scouting duty in the North Sea. The British submarines were stationed in the Helgoland Bight with a view to attacking the German Fleet if it came. No mines were laid in Helgoland Bight by the British during this phase.

(3) The frequent attacks on British cruisers by German submarines, especially the catastrophe in which the *Hogue*, *Cressy*, and *Aboukir* were lost, caused a change in plan as follows:

(4) The main fleet was withdrawn from continuous service under way and placed in a base adequately protected from submarines. The heaviest cruisers were withdrawn from scouting work and their place taken by light cruisers and destroyers. The mining of Helgoland Bight was begun. The development of the auxiliary forces of mine sweeping and patrol was made more rapid.

operations are merely developments of this plan. The fleet is sent to fight a major action, but it is only sent to sea as a fleet when it is expected or thought to be coming out, or occasionally for exercises. Parts of the fleet are often under way for target practice, etc.

NOTES ON THE SUBMARINE SITUATION.

The number of patrol vessels and mine sweepers has been brought up to combat the successful operations by enemy submarines, and against submarines.

The system was developed with the hope of reducing the submarine threat by concentrating the shipping into convoys it was hoped to reduce the number of submarine-sighting merchant vessels; to guard against raiders by ocean patrol and against submarines by destroyer escort within the submarine zone.

The net barrage used by net barrage but due to strong tides and heavy weather and the bottom (sandstone, poor holding ground) this net barrage has failed. Mines and mine nets have also been used in the Straits of Dover. U. B. and U. C. boats based upon Ostend and Zeebrugge seem to be the main threat. The U. boats do not use the Channel.

The successful operations against enemy submarines have been carried out by mines and decoy ships. The submarine versus submarine will be the main battle in the future, though the German submarines, due to the instruments, have a decided advantage and undoubtedly sink more than are lost by themselves. However, this system has proved to be being pursued as vigorously as possible. The decoy ship has been more successful than any other measure. However, the enemy submarine is very wary and it is doubtful if in the future they will obtain much success.

The submarine is by far the most serious menace to ultimate allied victory. At a rate of destruction (500,000 tons of shipping a month), it is estimated that the Allies will be constructing shipping at a rate which will be insufficient. This does not necessarily mean a victory; for if the war goes on that long without suppression of the submarine the restriction upon food and fuel will win of the population of Italy, France, and Great Britain to such an extent that these Governments into a compromise peace.

It is essential that operations to reduce the efficiency of the submarines must be carried out. The German nation is basing its hope of victory on the success of the submarine offensive against this type will effectually raise the morale of the Central Powers. Therefore, if the conditions point to the submarine campaign in the distant future it must be recognized that at that time there is grave danger of the failure of the morale of some of the Allies.

Due to the impracticability of offensive operations against the enemy submarine at this season of the year, the first consideration should be given to the existing plans and a study of the modifications that may be made in the operations of cruising submarines, raiders, and battle cruisers.

NOTES ON THE CONVOY SYSTEM AND THE SHIPPING SITUATION.

The principal antisubmarine effort is to-day being exerted in escorting the shipping through the submarine danger zones in the Atlantic and North Sea and the Mediterranean system will soon be in operation in the Mediterranean.

The increase in the per cent of losses of vessels in convoy has given rise to a question of the adoption of the convoy system by all ocean-going vessels will reduce the losses below the danger point.

The system is strategically defensive though tactically offensive. This is not a counter attack. Such operations on land are never decisive, and with strategically offensive operations are more than apt to fail. Therefore, operations can not win the war. They may, if successful, prevent the Central Powers from being satisfied to let the armies or political movements win the war, a more offensive plan is essential.

The morale is to-day the vital point, and the effect on allied morale by the submarine would be to raise it beyond any possibility of being broken. This would so reduce the enemy's chances of winning the war that the Central Powers would be likely to break.

(c) The convoy system should be regarded merely as a defensive operation on while preparing for an offensive. Such an attitude does not prevent the in carrying out the operation, and in order that it may be successful it requires careful study to anticipate the changed conditions of the winter possible operations which may be conducted by the Central Powers to beat the system.

(d) (1) The convoy system requires the assembly of from 15 to 20 vessels of which are run on a schedule of one every eight days. Assuming that on average there is a delay of two days in and two days out in a round trip, and an average time for a round trip is 50 days, it will be seen at once that this leads to a reduction in shipping of 8 per cent. In addition to this there is the congestion of ports due to arrival and departure of large groups of ships practically continuously, which reduces the rapidity of discharges and loading.

(5) The efficient employment of such shipping as is available for the transportation of materials essential to the conduct of the war offers one of the most fertile fields for reducing actual shortage of shipping.

(e) Defense of convoys against raiders.

(1) The means at the disposal of the enemy with which to attack the convoys are:

1. U-boats.
2. Deutschland type of submarine cruisers.
3. Raiders (armed merchant ships).
4. Cruisers, and
5. Battle cruisers.

(2) It appears that the system of protection for convoys now in operation is efficient so far as the resources available permit. The losses of vessels in convoys is at present about 1 to 20. Of course the safety of the submarine in attacking vessels not under escort leads to a proportion of this form of attack and undoubtedly when all vessels are in convoy the proportion of ships sunk will not decrease in the above ratio.

(f) (2) The dispersion of convoys and the difficulty of maintaining position in a convoy during fogs and gales will seriously reduce the efficiency of this system in the winter.

(g) (1) The introduction of the cruising submarine with its long radius of action will move the submarine menace farther from the coast of Europe and thus necessitate more extensive destroyer escort operations. At present the force available does not permit this extension but as the number of submarines of this type increases (probably six) this disadvantage must be accepted.

(2) This type of submarine is fitted with one or two guns 5.9-inch caliber designed to use this gun as its primary weapon. The system of ocean escorts is a partial answer to this form of attack.

(h) (1) The raider and cruiser menace are similar and can be considered together. It is quite possible that the raiders or cruisers so employed would have guns of 6-inch caliber and therefore the ocean escorts should be vessels with batteries of less than 6-inch.

(2) In view of the difficulty that would be experienced by one cruiser in attacking a convoy of 15 or 20 ships against a raider of equal speed, it seems that the Allies will use fast ships and those of merchant ship type with sufficient speed to beat them; they probably will be cruisers.

(i) (4) The threat from raiders or cruisers could best be met by increasing the number of ocean escorts with each convoy, but due to lack of suitable vessels this is an impossibility unless escort by battleships is adopted.

(l) (1) The most serious threat is that by enemy battle cruisers. If one of these vessels accompanied by a fast supply ship, and preceded by a submarine force, could get to sea the possible damage that could be done would be enormous.

(2) Very serious thought must be given to this possibility and the secret service of the Allies should be directed to ascertain information indicating that any such arrangements are in preparation or even contemplated.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) The military-naval situation among the Allies is such that it is strongly recommended that the United States make the earliest possible decision as to what and extent the assistance to be given shall take and then proceed to exert every effort to expedite the production, despatch, and employment of such assistance. The stress can not be laid on the importance of the time element.

(b) It is further recommended that time be not lost in attempting greater development or improvement of material which has already reached a fairly satisfactory stage of development abroad but that all energy be directed to reproducing such material at the maximum possible rate.

ests of the Allies for naval assistance, from my special
at subject, are appended, marked "W."

ewise appended a copy of a portion of the proceedings of
conference held in London September 4 to 6, 1917,

statement regarding personnel conditions in the battle-
inserted herewith:

or to April 6:

| | | |
|---------------|-----|--|
| | 20 | |
| officers..... | 117 | |
| | 539 | |

nel shortage, April 6:

| | | |
|----------------------|-----|--|
| | 624 | |
| engineer branch..... | 489 | |
| | 29 | |

cess in artificers, commissary, and messmen. This
is based on a peace complement which was known to be
for war.

trained men transferred, to May 26:

| | | |
|--------------------|----|----|
| guard duty— | | |
| etty officers..... | 48 | |
| ee. returned..... | 2 | |
| | — | 46 |

| | | |
|-------------------|-------|-----|
| | 1,157 | |
| ee. returned..... | 181 | |
| | — | 976 |

| | | |
|--------------------|----|---|
| ing duty— | | |
| etty officers..... | 16 | |
| ee. returned..... | 7 | |
| | — | 9 |

| | | |
|-------------------|----|---|
| | 75 | |
| ee. returned..... | 69 | |
| | — | 6 |

| | | |
|---------------------|--|-----|
| duty, at least..... | | 475 |
|---------------------|--|-----|

| | | |
|-------|-------|--|
| | 1,512 | |
| | == | |

| | | |
|--------------------|----|-----|
| June | | |
| and duty— | | |
| etty officers..... | 17 | |
| | 98 | |
| | — | 115 |

| | | |
|--------------------|-----|-----|
| etty officers..... | 17 | |
| | 263 | |
| | 42 | |
| | — | 322 |

| | | |
|-------|-----|--|
| | 437 | |
|-------|-----|--|

is period the battleships remained based at Yorktown,
a short period spent in Long Island Sound. Battle exer-
cised by the battle fleet en route to and on return
Island Sound.

while based on Yorktown provided one week at
two weeks exercises underway. Target practice for the
gun pointers for armed guard and escort vessel duty was
tiguous.

iron of battleships was assigned to the exclusive duty of
gner personnel. Engineer personnel was also trained on
work but not to the exclusion of all other activities.

One week at anchor out of each three-week period gave time for routine overhaul of machinery in order that the state of readiness might be maintained.

The training of enlisted men and temporary and reserve was entered into with energy and enthusiasm and the results were most gratifying. Had the conditions not permitted the use of battleships for training the personnel, the ability of the Navy transports, antitorpedo craft, and cargo ships would have been seriously decreased.

Such a condition can not be considered satisfactory, and the Navy should realize that shortage of officers and enlisted personnel at the beginning of the war, and is to-day, the most serious handicap under which the Navy is, almost hopelessly, striving for efficiency.

The quotations I have made from my report on my trip to Europe in 1917, indicate plainly my opinion of the conditions existing at that time.

Upon my return to the United States, I strongly advised the Chief of Naval Operations to:

- (a) Proceed with the North Sea mine-barrage project.
- (b) To send a division of battleships to operate with the Fleet.

(c) "That the United States make the earliest possible decision as to what forms and extent the assistance to be given shall take, and then proceed to exert every effort to expedite the production, distribution, and employment of such assistance. Too much stress can not be placed on the importance of the time element."

I have quoted certain observations regarding my opinion of our plans and policies of other nations in order that it may not be overlooked that our experience has taught us to look critically at our own history with a different point of view from that generally held at the beginning of the war. I hope the lesson of unpreparedness has been brought home to the country and to Congress. The present tendency is to be toward a return toward the unsatisfactory condition which was the cause of this investigation.

In a consideration of the effect of our failure to be prepared, and our progress in preparation after the policy was definitely set upon, it must never be forgotten that these preparations were made under conditions which may never happen again, and that to repeat such conditions existing again would be folly. These conditions were—the enemy fleet contained by an allied navy and the United States army fully engaged with allied armies. These conditions permitted the United States Navy to prepare uninterruptedly, for even if enemy submarines appeared in United States waters for more than 14 months after the declaration of war.

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY FROM OCTOBER 23, 1917, TO NOVEMBER 1918.

By November, 1917, the conditions with regard to personnel were improving and the individual ships were again in condition to do up work as a fleet. About the 1st of November, 1917, missions were assigned by the department for the various forces of the fleet. A letter appended marked "M-1."

On the trip to Europe my staff had studied the British naval signals and methods of operations and upon my return steps were taken to modify our tactics, methods of operation and radio procedure, in such respects as were necessary and efficiency in joint operations with the Grand Fleet should later become necessary.

Some training and instruction in British signals and radio was initiated in all ships of Battleship Force 2.

The force had been training and experimenting with the new mine which it was hoped that the mine barrage could be made and in October the mine barrage project was approved.

The department still adhered to its decision with regard to not sending battleships to European waters in response to the request of the Admiralty, and this policy was not changed until after Admiral Benson arrived in London.

In conversation with Admiral Benson I had advised sending the four coal-burning dreadnoughts that the British desired, and informed that it was not the policy of the department to send Division of Battleship Force 2, that is, the battleship which had been in active service when the war started.

On October 12 I received the following dispatch from the Admiralty:

The department's desire to expedite sailing Division Nine Battleship Force at a date compatible with efficiency period. To that end expedite completion of target practice then send ships needing it to Boston and Norfolk after docking proceed to home yards to fit for distant service. The earliest date is requested.

The ships sailed on November 24. Some criticism has been made that this delay should not have been necessary. In this connection should not be forgotten that the detachment of a battleship had been consistently opposed by the department and that no special preparations had been made to meet this change in policy.

The ships could have sailed in 24 hours had the conditions been such a haste, but it was surely the better plan to dock the ships and provide them with spare parts necessary for protracted service.

Any delay it had been many months since the request was received for the ships to arrive in Europe with clean bottoms and at their maximum speed and with additional ammunition and stores have been necessary at any time.

Criticism has been made because these ships were of the old type. At this time there was no choice. The British desired coal-burning dreadnoughts on account of the shortage of oil. There were eight of these vessels attached to the fleet, but one of them unfortunately hit the bottom off Block Island, the *Delaware* had had turbine trouble with their backing and the *North Dakota* was in unsatisfactory condition.

When the *Texas* was repaired she was sent over, as by that time were requested. The *Arkansas* followed later on to the *Delaware*, in order to make the division more homogeneous. From November and extending to May, the battleships were at sea on a schedule of one week at sea, one week at anchor and ship-control exercises, one week at anchor for overhaul.

I had several times stated to Admiral Benson that as the operations against the enemy were being carried on in European waters, the commander in chief should be on that side.

On February 2 I submitted in writing an estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet.

A copy of this estimate of the situation is appended, marked but I desire to quote a few paragraphs [reading]:

In view of the fact that practically all of the vessels of the Atlantic Fleet are for service, except the battleship forces, less battleship division 9, are, or soon will be, employed in active operations against the enemy, and of the possibility that the remainder of battleship force 2 may soon be so engaged, it has been considered necessary to estimate the situation to determine what, if any, changes in the conditions can be made in order to increase the efficiency of contemplated operations and of possible future operations.

The forces in European waters are to operate as follows:

(a) Battleship division 9 and such other battleship units as may be assigned to service abroad, are to cooperate with the British Grand Fleet or the high-sea force of some other of the Allied countries.

(b) The mine force is to cooperate with the British Navy in planting a deep mine barrage.

(c) The remainder of the combatant vessels to operate as one task force in operations against enemy submarines and in the protection of transports and trade.

(d) In addition to the operations by forces of the fleet, there are aviation forces which will operate against enemy submarines from bases on the coast of Great Britain and France.

The four types of operations mentioned in the paragraph above divide logically into two general classes as follows:

(1) The operations of battleships in cooperation with the British Fleet and the operations of the mine force are distinctly high-sea operations.

(2) The operations of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade and of the aviation forces operating from bases on the coast are essentially of the nature of coastal or district operations.

The distinction between these two general classes of operations has been thoroughly recognized abroad. The high-sea force—the fleet—operates under the command of the commander in chief, while the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations in defense of trade, and the forces engaged in the protection of transports and trade, are under command of district commanders. Cooperation between forces of different districts is accomplished by fixed policies or orders from the Admiralty.

The high-sea operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is in an early stage of development. It is believed, however, that the future development of the operations of this fleet lies primarily in offensive high-seas operations in cooperation with the British Grand Fleet.

The operations of that portion of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the defense of transports and trade, has reached a state of development such that the methods of conducting operations, the systems of communication, and the considerations governing the cooperation with the allied forces is practically standardized.

Another condition which does not directly affect the operations of the fleet but which is necessarily considered in an estimate of the situation, is the necessity for a representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

The preceding analysis of the situation in Europe and in home waters indicates:

(a) There are two distinct types of operations in progress in European waters in which the forces of the Atlantic fleet are engaged—

(1) High sea operations.

(2) Antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(b) There is an important duty to be performed as the representative of the Office of Naval Operations and as naval attaché at London.

(c) That active command by the commander in chief, or direct supervision by the commander in chief over the operations of those units of the fleet based on and operating from the United States Atlantic coast is not now essential to their efficient development in accordance with their respective missions.

In the preceding analysis of the situation the conclusion was reached that the following functions must be performed in Europe to insure efficiency in the present operations of the fleet and in the development of future operations in cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies:

- of the force engaged in high sea operations.
- of the force of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.
- of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

HIGH-SEA OPERATIONS.

Force 1, battle-ship division 9 and of such other battleships as may be assigned, and of the mine force, are essentially high-sea operations and are connected to the operations of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

The operation of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations was directed by the presence of the commander of that force in Europe for the arrival of any of his force. His proximity to the force with which his operations were to be coordinated and to the Admiralty in London, where his operations were formulated, permitted him to make detailed plans and insured its effectiveness with the least possible delay.

The operation of high-sea forces likewise should be developed. Such operations are of a much more complicated scope, and the failure in such cooperation would be attended by much more serious results.

The development of the operation of the Atlantic fleet in European waters should be primarily along the line of offensive high-sea operations. If the mine barrages are effective, the submarine menace to transports is reduced and much of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations is available for high-sea operations. It is considered probable that the mine barrage will lead to offensive high-sea operations by the German fleet. If the mine barrage is not effective, it may become necessary to adopt a policy of offensive high-sea operations against the enemy submarine bases.

The mission above is confirmed by the mission assigned by the department of battle-ship force 2: "To maintain themselves in instant readi-

ness to be accomplished under present conditions if cooperation with the British fleet is required, but it should be thoroughly understood that there are no plans for cooperation with any allied navy in high-sea operations. Efficient cooperation requires many changes in the methods of maneuvering, signaling, and until such plans are made effective cooperation is impossible. The British chief has endeavored to make the tactics employed by the battle-ship force 2 conform in principle to those employed by the British Grand Fleet, with cooperation in view, but the detailed plans for combined operations have not yet been formulated for effective cooperation do not exist. The duty of formulating such plans can be performed only by the officer who is to direct and supervise the high-sea forces and can only be accomplished from a location in close proximity to the force with which such operations are to be coordinated, that is, at a distance of London, where plans for allied naval operations are formulated.

The facts expressed above it appears that the mission of the commander "to prepare the fleet for, and to successfully conduct war" can only be accomplished by a change in the present conditions such that he can formulate a plan for the cooperation of the high-sea forces with those of the British fleet.

The high-sea operations should be directed and supervised by the officer whose position and experience best fits him for this duty. Such officer should be the commander in chief of the fleet. Personal considerations should not interfere with the selection of the officer under whom such development should be made, and this selection should be made immediately.

OPERATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTS AND TRADE

Force 2, of the force engaged in these operations are based at Queenstown, at Gibraltar, and at the Azores. The aviation detachments will be based on the coasts of Great Britain and France.

Force 3, of the force are primarily antisubmarine operations, and although they can cooperate well at sea, the distribution of the forces, the nature of the command, and the nature of command required, make these operations essentially land operations. This fact is recognized by the British and French navies. The regular forces of these navies are under command of district commanders. The forces of several districts are governed by fixed policies formulated by the respective Admiralties. Forces engaged in this type of opera-

tions are distinct from high-sea forces except in the immediate vicinity of bases.

Efficiency in this type of operations requires an organization similar to the naval districts of the United States, and it is believed that the present organization of this force is of this character. The exercise of command by its commander should be governed by the same principles as would govern the control of district forces by the Navy Department.

The relations between this force and the commander in chief should remain as presently prescribed by operations letter 20392-640, of July 2, 1917, but it should be recognized that when the commander in chief is in European waters he has authority, in case of emergency, to divert such part of this force as may be required for operations with the high-sea force, for which diversion the commander in chief should assume full responsibility.

The preceding consideration of the duties and organization of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of the transports and trade indicates that no change is necessary or desirable.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND NAVAL ATTACHÉ

A consideration of the functions of the representative of the office of naval operations at the Admiralty in London is required in this estimate only in order that the relations between this officer and the commanders of naval forces operating abroad may be carefully considered in order to avoid misunderstandings. The functions of a naval attaché are well defined and do not conflict with those of commanders of naval forces.

The status of this representative appears to be that of an assistant to the commander of naval operations to whom has been delegated the authority to communicate with the British Admiralty and with forces operating abroad. At present this function is simplified by the dual capacity of this officer as commander of United States naval forces operating in European waters and as representative of the office of naval operations in London.

It should be recognized that the function of the representative of the office of naval operations is distinct from that of the commander of the naval forces, and there appears to be no probability of misunderstandings so long as this distinction is kept in mind.

The necessity for such a representative is apparent, and a change in the functions of this officer, or even in the personality of this officer, would not be conducive to efficiency.

CONCLUSION.

In order to insure the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters, it is necessary to recognize three distinct functions to be performed abroad by high ranking officers of the United States Navy:

(a) Command of forces engaged in high-sea operations. This function undoubtedly belongs to the commander in chief of the fleet.

(b) Command of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(c) Representative of the office of naval operations and naval attaché at London. (Functions (b) and (c) are now being performed by Vice Admiral Sims.)

The commander in chief should perform the following:

(1) Supervise the development and cooperation of the forces engaged in high-sea operations and assist in the formulation of plans for future high-sea operations.

(2) In cooperation with the British commander in chief make plans for the employment of such high-sea forces as may be available for such operations.

(3) Direct such changes in the present methods of conducting operations, of procedure, signaling, etc., as may be required to facilitate immediate cooperation by the battleships and such other types of vessels as may later become available for high-sea operations.

(4) Assume active command of the United States forces cooperating with the British Grand Fleet or other allied high sea force when the strength of the United States force reaches that of a squadron.

(5) Assume active command of any independent high sea operations to be performed by United States vessels of more than one type.

The commander of the forces engaged in coastal operations should conduct operations of that force in identically the same manner as it is being conducted. The only change in the status of the commander of this force would be—that battery division 9 now assigned to his force, and the supervision of plans concerning operations of the mine force now under his jurisdiction, would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the commander in chief.

representative of the Office of Naval Operations should conduct the functions of the office exactly the same as it is being conducted at present. He should be authorized to the force commanders such communications as would normally be sent to the commanders of fleet forces by the Office of Naval Operations with the commander in chief, except that orders should not be sent direct to the force commanders in high sea operations unless they are repetitions of orders received from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

DECISIONS.

The commander in chief should proceed immediately in his present flagship, to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet, and with reasonable distance of

from European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under exist-

ing conditions and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

The senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer, home waters," should be delegated to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

A representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted now. He should be authorized to the task force commanders such communications as would ordinarily be sent to the commander of a fleet force by the Office of Naval Operations with the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high sea operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

The decisions reached in this estimate of the situation is requested.

The department did not approve these recommendations.

In the latter part of March, 1918, the Germans started their offensive with great gains in the direction of Amiens and the allied situation appeared serious. It appeared to me that the German intent on isolating the channel ports and that they were using their fleet to stop the flow of ammunition and troops to the front, or to defeat the mine barrage operation in the

On April 12, 1918, submitted to the Navy Department a letter on the subject "Development and operations of the Atlantic Fleet." A copy of this letter is attached "C," but I desire to quote a few paragraphs.

In 1918, the commander in chief submitted reference to the following decisions were reached:

The commander in chief should proceed immediately in his flagship to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet with reasonable distance of London.

The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

Division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

The senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer, home waters," and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

A representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being con-

ducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task commanders such communications as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Officer of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders for forces engaged in high seas operations should not be issued when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations, Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

The request for the approval of the decisions reached in the estimate are hereby renewed and enlarged. The general situation in Europe to-day is similar to that existing at the time when the estimate of the situation of reference (a) was made, except that the military situation is more serious and the terrific intensity of German military effort indicates what is generally conceded. Germany's maximum effort is to be exercised this summer.

It is reasonable to suppose that this tremendous military effort will be accompanied by a similar naval effort. An estimate of this naval effort may develop should be carefully made and consideration given to the desirability of supporting the present naval forces in European waters by United States battleships.

It would be a serious mistake to consider that the German Navy has acknowledged defeat. The German Navy is jealous of its reputation and skill and it may be considered a certainty that many will never acknowledge defeat without making at least a more effort to gain at least a partial control of the sea.

The initiative of the German nation in the development of machinery for use in war has been superior to that of the Allies and it is unreasonable to suppose that when the German Fleet again meets in an engagement that the British Grand Fleet will be subjected to attack by weapons of new inventions or old ones greatly developed.

The above conclusions briefly summarized are as follows:

(a) In order to prevent the development of the mine battle which may defeat their submarine campaign, a victory over the British Grand Fleet is essential.

(b) The inferiority of the German High Seas Fleet makes an action in which gunfire plays the major part disadvantageous.

(c) An action in which the torpedo plays the major part would be advantageous to the German Navy.

Now, can an action in which the torpedo will play the major part be developed?

In order to develop an action in which the torpedo is to play the major part the following must be available:

The high sea fleet—Maximum number of submarines, maximum number of destroyers, maximum number of torpedo planes.

Such an action can not be developed unless—

(a) The Germans can select the place and time.

(b) The British Fleet can not decline the engagement.

(c) The location is such as to insure the arrival of the high sea fleet intact and close enough to the German coast or territory controlled by Germany to be within the radius of action of her torpedo planes.

The governing features of the locations mentioned above is that the location must be in the vicinity of the English Channel in order that the torpedo planes may use Ostend and Zeebrugge as bases.

riest time is, of course, dependent upon the development of weapons. It is reasonable to suppose that a Government prepared such a powerful military offensive as that now being made can equally well prepare the much simpler naval offensive.

It must be realized that this is the crucial year of the war, for the next year the Army will turn the balance in favor of the Allies.

Principles demand a naval offensive in conjunction with the military offensive, for if either fails the success of the other can counterbalance the effect of a partial defeat.

A naval campaign against the lines of communication in the channel would drive France and Italy out of the war. The stake is large and the enemy has been willing to accept great sacrifices to obtain the desired result.

An offensive against the channel ports and traffic would without question draw the British Grand Fleet into the area selected and may be expected at any time in cooperation with the Army in its present offensive.

Available for use the following battleships of the Atlantic Fleet: *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Mississippi*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*.

These ships would increase the power of the British battle fleet by 15 per cent in number of ships and fully 20 per cent in strength. Can this force be used in an engagement is probable and when enemy success might readily result in the war?

Delays have mostly been caused by lack of foresight. Reenforcements sent late. Probably enemy campaigns have not been foreseen. This is the year of the war and the Allies can not be too strong on land and sea. What ships could be added to the British battle fleet worth the sacrifice of ships which would be entailed by the presence of the additional United States ships in the field of battle?

DECISION.

As was arrived at in reference (a) seem to have been correct, but under the circumstances should be modified to the extent that the commander in chief should be authorized to send with his flagship and also all available superdreadnaughts of the battle fleet to cooperate with the British fleet.

H. T. MAYO.

Recommendations were again disapproved by the department. When the first enemy submarines appeared off the United States coast, due to the fact that there were no destroyers with the fleet, their activities were thereafter confined to Chesapeake Bay for such trips as were necessary to reach navy yards and to escort convoys.

Insisted in my recommendation that the number of destroyers in the fleet should not be less than three, but even these were not to be substituted in greater numbers and submarine chasers substituted in greater numbers.

When the enemy submarines appeared off the coast the only vessels for antisubmarine operations except the small number of submarine chasers with the battleships were being operated by the Army or by the naval districts.

The possibility that the Germans might use their battle cruisers in attacking convoys was pointed out in my report of my trip to England and had been under consideration for some time. This subject was discussed upon several occasions with the Chief of Naval Operations.

When I received orders to send the *Utah*, *Nevada*, and *Oklahoma* to the navy yard to fit out for distant service and was given the order that they were to base on Bantry Bay as a defense against cruiser raiders.

In my opinion this was a half measure. The situation on land had become favorable to the Allies and with the aid of the United States

Army it was becoming apparent that Germany must win in 1918 or never. It was my opinion that the German Navy make a desperate effort before it would acknowledge defeat.

I, therefore, on August 12, submitted another estimate of the situation. A copy of this estimate is appended, marked "P," but I do not quote my letter of transmittal. [Reading:]

Secret.

AUGUST 10,

From: Commander in chief.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Estimate of the naval situation and recommendation for the employment of the Atlantic Fleet.

References: (a) C. in C. secret file 211, February 2, 1918, subject: "Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet." (b) C. in C. secret file, April 12, 1918, subject: "Development and employment of battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet."

1. Since submitting the above references the military and naval operations which have taken place seem to demonstrate that the general situation is now as follows:

MILITARY SITUATION.

(a) The successful operations of the allied armies between Soissons and Reims have definitely checked any offensive by the German armies in this vicinity for the remainder of this year.

(b) The withdrawal of German forces from the salients between Hangard and Arras and between Cantigny and Assainvillers indicates that no offensive against Arras is anticipated. This withdrawal was made voluntarily and these salients will not have been abandoned if offensive operations in this vicinity were contemplated. The reason for these withdrawals appears to be to strengthen their defensive position.

(c) If any further offensive operations by the German armies on the western front are contemplated this year, the indications point strongly to that point of the line northward of Albert.

(d) The morale of the Teutonic armies and peoples has been greatly depressed on account of the defeat of the Austrian offensive against Italy, and the German offensive in the vicinity of the Marne.

(e) Any further offensive operations undertaken by the German armies will have for their immediate object the restoration of the Teutonic morale. A successful operation against British and American forces will do the most to restore this morale and consequently the greatest danger, from a military point of view, is to be anticipated by an offensive against the northern part of the western front, or by increased activity against transports carrying United States troops.

NAVAL SITUATION.

2. In reference (b) the possibility of the German High Seas Fleet attempting a major action with the British Grand Fleet, was discussed at some length, and a decision was reached that there was a possibility of such an operation. It was considered that such an operation would be conducted in conjunction with a military offensive against the northern part of the western front, and that in such an event the German Fleet would undoubtedly use poison gas and the torpedo. The probable place for such an engagement would be the eastern end of the English Channel, in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, from which bases the German torpedo planes would operate.

3. In view of the possibility of such an engagement the commander in chief recommended that all United States superdreadnaughts be based in European waters to support the British Grand Fleet.

4. That such a campaign has not yet taken place indicates that the decision was wrong; or, that such operation has been delayed pending the result of a military offensive against the northern part of the western front; or, that the enemy is not yet prepared for such an attack; or, that some more promising opportunity (from his point of view) is being developed.

5. The enemy submarine campaign is decreasing in efficiency, and in view of the progress in shipbuilding there is little probability that the submarine menace will ever again approach the position of a dominating factor in the result of the war.

development of the cruiser type of submarine has permitted an extension of operations, but the operations so far conducted by this type have not been serious enough to warrant the belief that the development of this type will be of great value by submarines.

As the year favorable to raiding operations is now approaching, and in view of the recently given to the ability of the American troops as fighters and the number of troops transported and the insignificant losses in these operations, it is quite possible that a determined campaign against the enemy is planned.

As the enemy's probable intentions are to conduct the type of naval operations which will be most serious to the Allies, we must consider one of the following situations as being the most probable:

1. Extensive raiding operations during the fall and winter months, involving all types of fast surface vessels, including major ships. This will be primarily at our transports.

2. Engagement with the British Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the German coast, in which case poison gas and torpedo planes will take part in the engagement.

3. The commander in chief believes that the following should be the mission of the Atlantic Fleet:

1. To intercept and intercept trans-Atlantic convoys against German or other submarines (including submarines) or strength.

2. To intercept the British Grand Fleet against any attempt of the German High Fleet to gain temporary control of the British Channel.

3. The situation has been prepared with the above as a mission. A plan of action is included.

4. From this estimate of the situation the following decisions were arrived at:

1. The commander in chief Atlantic Fleet the mission of guarding all trans-Atlantic convoys against raiders.

2. The dreadnaughts *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, *Alabama*, *Missouri*, and *Idaho*, when ready at Brest.

3. The seven armored cruisers at Bresthaven as scouts and eastern ocean

4. The *Dakota* and *Delaware* on home coast, Halifax or Guantanamo, as indicated best.

5. The *Carolina*, *Michigan*, and six *Minnesota* type as ocean escorts for

6. The *Tennessee* type on home coast.

7. The commander in chief to assume direct control over any offensive operations.

8. The Division 1 and Division A on home coast and operate them as training

H. T. MAYO.

It should be pointed out that so far as can be learned, the estimate of the probable intentions very closely approximated the operations of the high command directed the German Fleet to carry out in 1918, but which was never executed, due to the revolution of the naval enlisted personnel.

My recommendations were again disapproved by the department.

On August 1 sailed for Europe in the U. S. S. *Utah*, the fastest in leaving than the *Nevada* and *Oklahoma*. My trip, as in 1917, was an inspection of the forces of the fleet in European waters and an observation of conditions.

I have completed the chronological record of my activities in Europe. I have indicated, I believe, that, so far as was the opinion of the commander in chief, the fleet was prepared for emergency. I have quoted from my estimates of the situation at various times not so much to indicate that the department disapproved my recommendations as to point out that there was a time when I or my staff failed to keep in touch with the situation or neglected, so far as we are aware, any action

recommendation which we believed would increase the effectiveness of our Navy in the World War.

I shall now comment on a few points which have been brought in the testimony given by Admiral Sims.

Referring to the statements regarding the policies and plans of the department—our inability to throw the full weight of our resources into the war upon our entry into it, was due primarily, as is known, to our national policies.

I consider that there should be recalled to mind all the circumstances preceding and leading up to the war, namely, the constant neutrality which was the enduring national policy; the views of the people confirming neutrality and the status quo, as evidenced by the outcome of the national elections in November, 1916; the final outcome of events which was initiated by the announcement of "unrestricted submarine warfare" in January, 1917; the overt acts against United States ships which resulted in the declaration of a state of war in April, 1917.

It must not be forgotten, in looking back to our entry into the war, that there existed throughout the country and extending not only to at least some of our legislators, but also to some extent into the military departments a feeling that the participation of the United States in the war might consist principally in the furnishing of munitions and supplies of all kinds. An army in France of the size which that army finally reached, was hardly thought of by anyone at that time.

As brought out by me in my preceding remarks, I always considered that it was my duty to have the active fleet under my command ready for any emergency. Its record during the war is sufficient proof that it was.

As to the broad general plans and policies of the department regarding the conduct of war—the office of the Chief of Naval Operations was not authorized until 1915 and only against considerable opposition. Its scope never was and is not now, sufficiently comprehensive to ensure the best plans and policies for the preparation for or the conduct of war. Without the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, conditions in the Navy immediately preceding and during the war would have been chaotic, and no one can say what would have happened. In so far as the fleet was concerned, I always felt that I had the support of the Chief of Naval Operations though I did not always agree with his plans and policies.

After our entry into the war, the department, in keeping with the spirit of the country, manifested great energy in expanding our naval forces in the direction indicated by information from all sources as most necessary.

Furthermore after a careful consideration of what was learned regarding the plans, policies, and result of work of the British, French and Italian Admiralties as revealed to me during my tours in Great Britain and Europe in 1917 and 1918, I am of the opinion that our preparedness as regards general plans upon our entry into the war compared favorably with that of the powers mentioned. Nevertheless I do think that if the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations had been in existence longer, with even more power and responsibility, a better state of preparedness would have resulted.

ward to the criticism of the policy of docking vessels and giving them a final examination and short refit before sending them to the war zone:

One of the demands on the facilities and equipment in European yards for repairing and refitting and the many differences between British ships and our own, just plain ordinary common sense requires that a vessel about to sail for an indefinite time on a foreign station should be sent to a yard for a few days. It can not be reasonably argued that such delays materially influenced the war one way or the other. In this connection it may be of interest to state that there was difficulty in obtaining suitable stowage for certain stores on battleships attached to the Grand Fleet.

As to the emphasis laid upon the accurate information furnished regarding the movements of submarines:

When the battle fleet to sea after entering the war I insisted on screening vessels. The impression given by previous testimony was that submarine movements were accurately followed from the beginning of our entry into the war, hence no screening vessels were required here. As a matter of fact, it was not until the latter part of 1917, or the early part of 1918, that the system of locating submarines by radio compass bearings was accurate and reliable. Even then all that a submarine had to do to avoid being located was to use the radio. Upon our entry into the war, the only submarines that could be counted upon were seven coal burners and no oil burners. Hence keeping them in condition as recommended by Admiral Sims required work on the high seas, and taking them to sea without screening vessels was not justified.

As to the discussion of the northern mine barrage:

The discussion of the northern mine barrage is misleading. In looking over a memorandum regarding a mine barrage, which contained the details of the mine. The British Admiralty discussed the matter with myself and staff and proposed modifications which were accepted by our department. I incorporate this statement in order that there can be no doubt on the subject. Further, I do not concur in the statement that the barrage was a sub-measure, but I will not attempt to go into the details because the committee will presumably call officers who are more familiar with the details than I am.

As to the several discussions regarding the reduction in the losses of shipping by submarines:

First, that no erroneous conclusions may be drawn, it is considered advisable to record my belief that the reduction in the losses of merchant submarines were due to --

1. Organization of the shipping.

2. Instruction and training of the merchant marine officers in their ships.

3. Development and use of depth charges.

4. Arranging of merchant ships, thereby forcing submarines to re-charge and to use the torpedo instead of guns.

5. Adoption of the convoy system.

6. Increased number of antisubmarine craft.

7. Aircraft patrols.

8. Mine barrages.

9. Listening devices.

Referring to the assignment of our destroyers to Queenstown, the use of British destroyers to escort our battleships with the Fleet and the mining vessels:

The British destroyers at Queenstown were withdrawn after arrival of our destroyers, notwithstanding that the area of operations there was repeatedly spoken of as being the critical one. If British destroyers had been kept there and the number increased, some of our destroyers could have been assigned with our battleship squadrons and our mining force instead of depending on the British destroyers as pointed out by Admiral Sims. Furthermore, the experience of our destroyers in all phases of their work would have been benefited and this certainly was desirable.

Referring to the remarks about the dissimilar ships that were sent to reinforce the Grand Fleet:

There were only eight coal-burning dreadnoughts—*New Texas*, *Wyoming*, *Arkansas*, *Florida*, *Utah*, *Delaware*, and *North Dakota*. The ships sent were *New York*, *Wyoming*, *Florida*, and *Delaware*, the *Texas* and *Arkansas* following later. It must be emphasized that it was impossible to get a division of four similar coal-burning dreadnoughts, as there were only two of each type. The four that should have gone were the *Wyoming*, *Arkansas*, *Florida*, and *Utah*, of similar maneuvering qualities. The *Arkansas* and *Utah*, respectively, developed trouble with one of their backing and cruising turbines and measures had been taken to assemble the material to repair them. While these vessels were in condition to operate, they were not in a sufficiently high state of efficiency, due to this defect, to warrant sending them across.

The *Texas* had run aground and was in bad shape. The *North Dakota* was unreliable and uneconomical, having been sent to the navy yard for reengining early in 1916. This, however, was not accomplished until 1918. The department had, furthermore, consistently indicated its disapproval of sending a division of battleships across, notwithstanding Admiral Sims's recommendations, supplemented by my own. Therefore no extreme urgency existed.

There are many points in Admiral Sims's testimony that I do not feel that I am in a position to give an opinion on, such as the department not completely approving and immediately carrying out my recommendations with regard to the convoy system, not promoting officers in accordance with recommendations, placing of officers in important commands without first obtaining his approval, etc.

Capt. Laning in his testimony attempts to bring out that the active fleet would have been in much better condition when war was declared had the battleships been sent to the yards in the winter of 1916-17 and work concentrated on placing them in material readiness.

I do not agree with this contention, as there is no question of doubt in my mind that the winter's work of the active fleet in 1916-17 was the most essential, and that the effect of this intensive training was conducive to a high degree of efficiency in the personnel which had a great effect on the whole Navy when the Navy was expanded for war.

Referring to the statement of Capt. Laning relative to condition of battleships that it would take over 100 days to get all battleships, even the active fleet ready for war:

This statement is misleading as all were practically ready for operations on our coast, but certain items as specified in my letter of

were necessary if the ships were to operate independently from a base, i. e., ready for every kind of service.

In opinion, there are three faults which were the principal cause of our failure to support the Allies more promptly and with efficiency. These are indicated in the following summary:

SUMMARY.

In my opinion that the material unpreparedness of the vessels in and out of commission, and the shortage of personnel, was mainly due to the national policy of strict neutrality, with its effect of a failure to prepare against war. It should be noted that Holland and Switzerland remained neutral during the war. They were ready to defend their neutrality.

The ultimate resource of foreign policy by which the nation imposes its will upon its enemies in defense of its honor, its safety and its existence. The armed forces of the Nation are the means by which the national policies are supported and en-

forced. The strength of the Navy to be maintained during peace or mobilized for war is a matter of policy for which the Government (the President and Congress) is responsible. The Navy Department is responsible for advising the Government as to the strength of the Navy and the extent of the naval bases and industrial establishments which will be required to enforce our foreign policies.

The Navy Department is responsible for the efficiency of the Navy so far, and only so far, as efficiency can be attained with the appropriations granted by Congress.

A Navy cannot be built and trained in a year or two years, and only the foresight necessary to provide for the construction and maintenance of a navy adequate to its future task is of the utmost importance.

Proper management consists not only in dealing with events as they come, but in foreseeing and forestalling events. Money expended in building and maintaining a Navy larger than required to enforce our foreign policies, is extravagance; but the expenditure of less than required for a Navy strong enough to enforce our policies, is folly, for failure to make adequate preparation beforehand causes the waste of millions when war is eventually forced upon us.

The difference of opinion as to what constitutes an adequate Navy can be traced to our lack of definite foreign policy, which difference of opinion are the cause of much of the discussion as to appropriations which takes place annually before the Congressional Naval Committees.

The remedy for this condition lies outside of the Navy Department, and is vital to the question at issue.

Those responsible for the foreign policy of the United States should definitely inform the War and Navy Departments as to the policies of the United States which the Army and Navy are required to enforce.

If the Government must plan for the future, they must be foresighted, and in such policies should be notified to the War and Navy Departments at once.

The future can be foreseen only in proportion as we know the conditions and the laws of nature. As our knowledge of both is imperfect we can anticipate the future only approximately for a short time, but enough can be done to be of the greatest value in preparing the armed forces for the work which they will be required to perform.

Efficient management adopts definite and correct ideals and aims to obtain them resolutely and courageously. Until the Navy is provided with a definite ideal in the form of a definite statement of the foreign policies of the United States which it is to be prepared to enforce, the management of the Navy can not formulate definite programs and war plans except on hypotheses as to the foreign policy of the United States.

The next most serious detriment to efficient preparation is the organization of the Navy Department. The laws and regulations under which the Navy was operating during the war, and is operating to-day, are unsatisfactory. Under the present regulations:

(a) The General Board is charged with devising measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet in war.

(b) The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for the preparation and readiness of plans for the use of the fleet in war.

(c) The General Board is charged with the preparation of plans for a campaign.

(h) The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for the operation of the fleet.

The Chief of Naval Operations has no authority to coordinate the work of the bureaus whose business it is to supply and maintain material and personnel. The General Board has no executive functions.

Under such regulations coordination of the various officers, bureaus and bureaus can be obtained only by voluntary coordination through the civilian secretary.

So long as the present organization exists the maximum efficiency either in preparation for war, in the conduct of war, or in economic development of the Navy in peace, can not be obtained.

In the present organization responsibility for the readiness of the Navy for war can not be placed anywhere but with the Secretary of the Navy, who, under the present organization, must coordinate the offices, boards, and bureaus.

Every dollar spent on our Navy should be spent with a view to the accomplishment of a definite plan of preparation for war. The Navy is built for war, and unless the Chief of Naval Operations, under the Secretary of the Navy, is held responsible for the preparation, readiness, completeness, and effectiveness of plans for national defense, including plans for the development of the Navy, plans for its maintenance and plans for its use, and is given power under the Secretary of the Navy to exercise supervision through the bureaus, boards, and offices, over all naval activities, the maximum efficiency can not be attained.

In my opinion, the faulty organization of the Navy Department and the absence of definite foreign policy, except that of strict neutrality, were the primary causes of failure to prepare the entire Navy for war.

definite policies and plans were definitely settled upon, after was appropriated, and after the bureaus voluntarily coordinated with the Chief of Naval Operations, the work was pushed with and vigor. The accomplishments were excellent. But our preparation did no doubt delay our assistance to the allies rural time, and if such conditions regarding our preparation exist in the future they may result in disaster.

statement also includes criticisms of another nature, namely, was not kept informed of policies nor properly consulted with the operations in the western Atlantic. As an example, the to consult me before ordering Rear Admiral Gleaves to organize the first troop escort operation.

my opinion, authority was so centralized in the department that led in the neglect of the principle of "due subdivision of labor and centralization of responsibility." Centralized control over and general plans is sound, but centralized control over details tion most often results in loss of efficiency.

stresses my statement, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning; and will you appear before the committee again at that time, Admiral?

ADMIRAL MAYO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The documents submitted by Admiral Mayo in the course of his examination and marked "A" to "L," respectively, are here printed in the record as follows:)

JUNE 1, 1916.

~~Active~~ Atlantic Fleet (active):

Wyoming (fleet flagship).

Yankton (tender).

~~First Division~~

~~Second Division~~

~~Fifth Division~~

Minnesota (flag of division commander).

Massachusetts

South Carolina.

Tennessee

~~Sixth Division~~

New York (flag of division commander).

Delaware

Oklahoma.

Texas

~~Seventh Division~~

~~Fourth Division~~

Florida (flag of division commander).

New Hampshire.

Vermont

~~Eighth Division~~

Arkansas (flag of commander battleship squadrons and Eighth Division).

Kansas

Nevada

~~Ninth Division~~

Memphis (flag of squadron commander).

Alabama

Mississippi.

Indiana

Kentucky

Michigan

Marquette.

Missouri.

Nebraska

North Carolina.

Cruiser squadron—Continued.

Prairie.

Sacramento.

Salem (in reserve acting as receiving ship at Boston).

Wheeling.

Destroyer flotillas:

Birmingham (flag of commander of flotillas).

Third flotilla—

Melville (tender).

Fifth division—

O'Brien.

Fanning.

Jarvis.

Jenkins.

Paulding.

Warrington.

Sixth division—

Wadsworth.

Cassin.

Cummings.

Ericsson.

McDougal.

Winslow.

Seventh Division—

Balch.

Aylwin.

Benham.

Cushing.

McCall.

Nicholson.

Eighth Division—

Conyngham.

Duncan.

Jacob Jones.

Porter.

Tucker.

Wainwright.

Operating with reduced complement:**First Flotilla—**

Panther (tender).

First Division—

Smith.

Flusser.

Lamson.

Preston.

Reid.

Second Division—

Walker.

Monagha .

Perkins.

Roe.

Sterrett.

Terry.

Second Flotilla—

Dixie (tender).

Third Division—

Drayton.

Henley.

Mayrant (out of commission).

Perker.

Patterson.

Fourth Division—

Jouett.

Ammen.

Beale.

Burrows.

Downes (in ordinary).

Trippe (in ordinary).

with reduced complement—Continued.

1st Division—

Columbia (flotilla flag).

Fulton (tender).

Macdonough (tender).

Warden (tender).

2nd Division—

Charlton (tender).

Western (tender).

Potomac (tender).

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(1) Ammunition on board. All ships have their allowance of ammunition except that the following ships are short 410 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition: *Connecticut*, *Michigan*, *South Carolina*, *Texas*, *Oklahoma*, *Delaware*, *Pennsylvania*, *Wyoming*, *Nevada*, and the following ships have no antiaircraft ammunition: *New York*, *Florida*, *Utah*.

(2) All ships present with the flag are practically full of fuel, varying from 70 per cent of capacity for the *Delaware* to 97 per cent for the *Pennsylvania*.

(3) Condition of ordnance material of all the ships is satisfactory with the minor exceptions:

(a) *New York*, *Florida*, *Utah* have no antiaircraft guns.

(b) *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* have about 50 per cent searchlight equipment.

(c) *Connecticut* 7-inch battery has fired an average of 160 rounds.

(d) *Wyoming* 12-inch battery has fired an average of 45 rounds.

(4) Condition of propelling plant. The condition of the propelling plant of all ships is satisfactory with the following exceptions: (a) *Connecticut*, one main propulsion pump out of commission. Can operate indefinitely with other.

(b) *Oklahoma*, defective brick work in boilers. Can operate indefinitely.

(c) *Utah*, one astern turbine stripped. Can operate indefinitely.

(5) Condition of hull. The condition of the hull of all vessels is satisfactory except the exception of the *Oklahoma*, *Pennsylvania*, and *Nevada*, each of which has a structural weakness in the overhang of the stern, but all can operate indefinitely.

(6) Provisions on board. All ships are practically full of fresh provisions and 70 per cent full of nonperishable provisions.

(7) Stores on board. All ships have about 75 per cent capacity of naval account stock and clothing and small store stock.

(B) Ships not present with the flag: *Arkansas*, *Arizona*.

The *Arkansas* is in satisfactory condition under all seven of the headings mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference (a), except:

(a) Under item (1) she is short 410 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition.

(b) Under item (4) one backing turbine is stripped, but not to the extent of preventing her from operating with the fleet indefinitely. The *Arkansas* is expected to join the fleet to-morrow.

The *Arizona* has the following deficiencies of material, which will prevent her from operating with the fleet immediately:

(1) Short 410 rounds 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition.

(2) Has a small supply of fuel on board.

(3) Fifty per cent searchlight equipment.

(4) Stripped turbines, now being repaired at the New York yard.

(5) Structural weakness of the overhang of the stern.

It is estimated that she will be materially ready to join the fleet about March 1, 1917.

2. From the above it will be seen that all ships of the battleship force, except the *Arizona*, are practically ready for immediate war service so far as their material condition is concerned.

D. W. CONGER

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, February 4, 1917.

From: Commander destroyer force.

To: Commander in chief.

Subject: Readiness for war service, destroyer force.

Reference: (a) Commander in chief file 842, of February 3, 1917.

Inclosures: (2).

1. There are forwarded herewith, in compliance with reference (a), reports as follows:

(A) Ships present with the flag.

(B) Ships not present with the flag.

ALBERT GLENN

CATEGORY A.—SHIPS PRESENT WITH FLAG.

SUBJECT NO. 2.—FUEL ON BOARD IN TERMS OF CAPACITY.

Seattle, filled to capacity.

Flotilla 1: *Panther*, estimated 60 per cent.

Flotilla 1, Division 1: None present.

Flotilla 1, Division 2: None present.

Flotilla 2: *Dixie*, 90 per cent.

Flotilla 2, Division 3: None present.

Division 4: Cummings, filled to capacity; Jarvis, estimated 60 per cent; held to capacity; Fanning, 30 per cent.
Division 5: Cassin, filled to capacity; Drayton, 60 per cent (schedule to over trial: Feb. 4; will refuel to capacity within 2 hours after return).
Division 6: Balch, Aylwin, Parker, filled to capacity; Duncan, 60 per cent to hold full power trial Feb. 4; will refuel to capacity within 2 hours
Division 7: Ericsson, O'Brien, Winslow, filled to capacity; Cushing, 50 per cent (scheduled to hold-full power trial Feb. 4; will refuel within two hours after return).
Division 8: Conyngham, 60 per cent; Tucker, Wadsworth, Wainwright, to capacity.
Division 9: Davis, Wilkes, filled to capacity.

Condition of Ordnance Material.

| Division. | Ship. | Conditions of ordnance material. |
|-----------|----------------|----------------------------------|
| | Seattle..... | Ready for service. |
| | Panther..... | Do. |
| Div 1 | None..... | Do. |
| Div 2 | do..... | Do. |
| | Dixie..... | Do. |
| Div 3 | None..... | |
| Div 4 | Cummings..... | Do. |
| | Jarvis..... | Do. |
| | McCall..... | Do. |
| | Fanning..... | Do. |
| Div 5 | Cassin..... | Do. |
| | Drayton..... | Do. |
| Div 6 | Balch..... | Do. |
| | Parker..... | Do. |
| | Aylwin..... | Do. |
| | Duncan..... | Do. |
| | Ericsson..... | Do. |
| | O'Brien..... | Do. |
| | Cushing..... | Do. |
| | McDougal..... | Do. |
| | Nicholson..... | Do. |
| | Winslow..... | Do. |
| | Conyngham..... | Do. |
| | Tucker..... | Do. |
| | Wadsworth..... | Do. |
| | Porter..... | Do. |
| | Wainwright.... | Do. |
| Div 9 | Davis..... | Do. |
| | Wilkes..... | Do. |

... thrown out of line by heavy seas, needs additional bracing; job orders for this has been sent to Bureau of Ordnance at the various navy yards.

SUBJECT NO. 4.—CONDITION OF PROPELLING PLANT.

... One boiler temporarily out of commission awaiting receipt of parts.

FLOTILLA 1, DIVISION 1.

... in very good; ready for service.

FLOTILLA 1, DIVISION 2.

...

FLOTILLA 2.

... Auxiliary feed pumps old and worn. No. 2 boiler furnaces ... Davis is ready for service.

FLOTILLA 2, DIVISION 3.

...

FLOTILLA 2, DIVISION 4.

Cummings.—Excellent except for maneuvering valve which is erratic and leaks badly. New valve being made by New York navy yard. Can put in service pending completion of valve.

Jarvis.—Condenser tubes thin. Estimated life of condensers six months for service operating from a home base. Not ready for distant service. Condensers, condition good.

McCall.—Fair. Hole in crank case of circulating pump engine. Can be repaired by force repair ship after which *McCall* will be ready for service.

Fanning.—Very good. Ready for service insofar as machinery is concerned.

FLOTILLA 2, DIVISION 5.

Cassin.—Maneuvering valve leaks badly. New valve being made by New York, N. Y., otherwise condition excellent. *Cassin* ready for service on receipt of new valve.

Drayton.—Very good. Center and starboard shaft slightly out of alignment but not sufficiently to interfere with movements of ship. Ready for service.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 6.

Balch.—Very good; ready for service.

Aylwin.—Very good; ready for service.

Parker.—Excellent; ready for service.

Duncan.—The *Duncan* has proved to be constitutionally weak in the past. A continuous succession of defects has been encountered. Starboard main air pump a cracked steam cylinder head which has been patched, but which should be replaced before the vessel is sent on distant service. It is considered that the *Duncan* is in better condition than at any time in the past and with the exception of the air pump she is ready for distant service. In the meantime she is in condition to operate from a home base.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 7.

Ericsson.—Excellent. Top casing of circulating pump turbine cracked and leaking. No trouble is anticipated but as a matter of precaution a new top casing should be provided before the vessel is sent on foreign service.

O'Brien.—Very good; ready for service.

Cushing.—Poor. Rotors of both main engines have excessive fore and aft clearance due to weak or improperly secured thrust supports. Fifteen blades in the low stage of the port engine have been removed, but it is not considered that this will affect her availability. Thrust horseshoes on starboard engine require replacement. All possible work within the resources of the force is being prosecuted to get the *Cushing* in condition for service. Work should be completed and trial run made by February 12. If the work now being done does not entirely eliminate the defects which have been experienced, the *Cushing* should be sent to a navy yard for overhaul and strengthening of the main engine thrust arrangement.

McDougal.—Evaporator shells require renewal, otherwise condition good. New shells should be installed before vessel is sent on distant work.

Nicholson.—Very good. There is an outstanding order on two boiler safes to alter them from ball seat to 45° angle seat, but it is not considered that this will interfere with the availability of the *Nicholson*.

Winslow.—Excellent; ready for service.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 8.

Conyngham.—The last row of rotor blades in the second stage of the low pressure main engine, the first two rows of rotor blades in the third stage, and the rows of fixed blades in the third stage have been removed on account of wear. This engine has been cleaned out and reassembled and will hold the trial run on February 4. If no further weakness develops it is considered that the *Conyngham* can operate at moderate speeds with but slight reduction in economy. It is considered unsafe to operate at high speeds and it is recommended that this engine be repaired as soon as the necessary material can be assembled.

Tucker.—Very good; ready for service.

Wadsworth.—Excellent; ready for service.

... —Very good. Minor troubles with main augmenter condensers, but control of the ship's force. Ready for service.

...Excellent. Has had some trouble in the past with leaky main condenser but believed to be under control by the ship's force. Ready for service.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 9.

Excellent The air pumps, fuel-oil service pumps and booster pumps have no trouble with their model valves. This can easily be remedied and new valves can be made.

Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

| Organization | Ship. | Terms of allowance. |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Flotilla 3, division 7. | Seattle..... | 100 per cent. |
| | Panther..... | 100 per cent (estimated). |
| Flotilla 3, division 8. | None..... | |
| | do..... | |
| Flotilla 3, division 9. | Dixie..... | 100 per cent. |
| | None..... | |
| Flotilla 4. | Cummings..... | 98 per cent. |
| | Jarvis..... | 100 per cent (estimated). |
| | McCall..... | 100 per cent. |
| | Fanning..... | 95 per cent (no ammunition on board for machine gun). |
| Flotilla 5. | Cassin..... | 100 per cent. |
| | Drayton..... | 95 per cent (no ammunition on board for machine gun). |
| Flotilla 6. | Balch..... | 100 per cent. |
| | Parker..... | Do. |
| | Aylwin..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 7. | Duncan..... | 98 per cent. |
| | Ericsson..... | 100 per cent. |
| | O'Brien..... | Do. |
| | Cushing..... | Do. |
| | McDougal..... | 95 per cent (no rifle ammunition). |
| | Nicholson..... | 100 per cent. |
| | Winslow..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 8. | Conyngham..... | Do. |
| | Tucker..... | Do. |
| | Wadsworth..... | 99 per cent. |
| | Porter..... | 95 per cent (no machine-gun ammunition and only 1/2 allowance of rifle ammunition). |
| Flotilla 9. | Wainwright..... | |
| | Davis..... | 100 per cent. |
| | Wilkes..... | Do. |

Provisions on board in terms of capacity.

| Ship. | Per cent. | Organization. | Ship. | Per cent. |
|-------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| Seattle..... | 90 | Flotilla 3, division 7. | Cushing..... | 50 |
| Panther..... | 75 | | Ericsson..... | 50 |
| None..... | | | McDougal..... | 50 |
| Flotilla 3, division 8. | 90 | | Nicholson..... | 50 |
| | | | O'Brien..... | 50 |
| Cummings..... | 50 | Flotilla 3, division 8. | Winslow..... | 50 |
| Fanning..... | 50 | | Conyngham..... | 50 |
| Jarvis..... | 50 | | Porter..... | 50 |
| McCall..... | 50 | | Tucker..... | 50 |
| Flotilla 9. | 50 | | Wadsworth..... | 50 |
| Wainwright..... | 50 | Flotilla 3, division 9. | Wainwright..... | 50 |
| Davis..... | 50 | | Davis..... | 50 |
| Wilkes..... | 50 | | Wilkes..... | 50 |

... are to capacity with provisions and then will have about 15 per cent capacity left.

Stores on board in terms of allowance.

| Organization. | Ship. | Per cent. | Organization. | Ship. |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Force flag..... | Seattle..... | 85 | Flotilla 3, division 7. | Cushing..... |
| Flotilla 1, flotilla tender. | Panther..... | 85 | | Ericsson..... |
| Flotilla 2, flotilla tender. | Dixie ¹ | 75 | | McDougal..... |
| Flotilla 2, division 4. | Cummings..... | 66½ | | Nicholson..... |
| | Fanning..... | 66½ | Flotilla 3, division 8. | O'Brien..... |
| | Jarvis..... | 66½ | | Winslow..... |
| | McCall..... | 66½ | | Conyngham..... |
| Flotilla 2, division 5. | Cassin..... | 66½ | | Porter..... |
| | Drayton..... | 66½ | | Tucker..... |
| Flotilla 3, division 6. | Aylwin..... | 66½ | Flotilla 3, division 9. | Wadsworth..... |
| | Balch..... | 66½ | | Wainwright..... |
| | Duncan..... | 66½ | | Davis..... |
| | Parker..... | 66½ | | Wilkes..... |

¹ Dixie will issue sufficient stores to the destroyers to bring their capacity to about 80 to 85. Dixie will then have only about 10 to 15 per cent of maximum stock.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 9.

Wilkes.—The evaporators of the *Wilkes* are of insufficient capacity. Under conditions of water consumption and with a full supply of water, the *Wilkes* can operate to the extent of her cruising radius. The insufficient capacity of the however, renders her continuous operation under all conditions uncertain. proceeding on distant service new evaporators should be installed. In the meantime the *Wilkes* may be considered ready for service.

No information available concerning the *Salem* and *Chester*.

The above-noted defects, except those which have occurred since leaving navy have been made the subject of special report or request for repairs.

SUBJECT NO. 5—CONDITION OF HULL, ETC.

The hull and hull fittings of all vessels with the flag are in condition for active with the possible exception of the *Fanning*, which may have suffered injury from grounding on February 3, 1917.

As far as can be determined at present time, *Fanning* has sustained no injuries.

CATEGORY "B."

Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

| Organization. | Ship. | Stores on board in terms of allowance. |
|-----------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Flotilla flag..... | Birmingham..... | |
| Flotilla tender..... | Melville..... | |
| Flotilla 3, division 6..... | Benham..... | |
| | Downes..... | |
| Flotilla 3, division 8..... | Jacob Jones..... | |
| Flotilla 3, division 9..... | Rowan..... | |
| | Samson..... | |
| | Allen..... | |
| | Shaw..... | |

¹ In hands of builders.

Ships not present with flags.

| Organization. | Ship. | Stores on board in terms of allowance (estimated). |
|---------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| | | Per cent. |
| | Salem..... | |
| | Flusser..... | 50 |
| | Lamson..... | 50 |
| | Preston..... | 50 |
| | Reid..... | 50 |
| | Smith..... | 50 |
| | Monaghan..... | 50 |
| | Perkins..... | 50 |
| | Roe..... | 50 |
| | Sterett..... | 50 |
| | Terry..... | 33½ |
| | Walke..... | 50 |
| | Chester..... | 10 |
| | Beale..... | 50 |
| | Henley..... | 75 |
| | Mayrant..... | (1) |
| | Patterson..... | 75 |
| | Warrington..... | 75 |
| | Ammen..... | 75 |
| | Burrows..... | 75 |
| | Jenkins..... | 75 |
| | Jouett..... | 30 |
| | Paulding..... | 75 |
| | Trippe..... | 75 |
| | Birmingham..... | 90 |
| | Melville..... | 98 |
| | Benham..... | 50 |
| | Downs..... | 50 |
| | Jacob Jones..... | 85 |
| | Allen..... | 75 |
| | Sampson..... | 90 |
| | Rowan..... | 66½ |
| | Shaw..... | (2) |

1 Not of commission.

2 Not completed.

3 The *Beale*, and *Birmingham* could be filled to maximum capacity of stores in about 3 days.
 4 The *Beale* could be filled in about 1 day.

Ships not present with the flag.

| Organization. | Ship. | Provisions on board in terms of capacity. |
|---------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| | | Per cent. |
| | Salem..... | |
| | Flusser..... | 33½ |
| | Lamson..... | 33½ |
| | Preston..... | 33½ |
| | Reid..... | 33½ |
| | Smith..... | 33½ |
| | Monaghan..... | 33½ |
| | Perkins..... | 33½ |
| | Roe..... | 33½ |
| | Sterett..... | 33½ |
| | Terry..... | 33½ |
| | Walke..... | 33½ |
| | Chester..... | 10 |
| | Beale..... | 33½ |
| | Henley..... | 50 |
| | Mayrant..... | (1) |
| | Patterson..... | 75 |
| | Warrington..... | 75 |
| | Ammen..... | 50 |
| | Burrows..... | 50 |
| | Jenkins..... | 50 |
| | Jouett..... | 33½ |
| | Paulding..... | 50 |
| | Trippe..... | 75 |
| | Birmingham..... | 75 |
| | Melville..... | 98 |
| | Benham..... | 33½ |
| | Downes..... | 33½ |
| | Jacob Jones..... | 33½ |
| | Allen..... | 33½ |
| | Sampson..... | 55 |
| | Rowan..... | 50 |
| | Shaw..... | (2) |

1 Not of commission.

2 Not completed.

3 The *Beale*, *Birmingham* could be filled to maximum capacity of provisions in 2 days.
 4 The *Beale*, *Melville*, could be loaded to maximum capacity provisions in 1 day.

Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

| Organization. | Ship. | Tonnage allowance material |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Flotilla flag..... | Salem..... | Present |
| Flotilla 1, Division 1..... | Smith..... | Present |
| | Flusser..... | Present |
| | Lamson..... | Present |
| | Preston..... | Present |
| | Reid..... | Present |
| Flotilla 1, Division 2..... | Walke..... | Present |
| | Monaghan..... | Present |
| | Perkins..... | Present |
| | Roe..... | Present |
| | Sterett..... | Present |
| | Terry..... | Present |
| Flotilla flag..... | Chester..... | Present |
| Flotilla 2, Division 3..... | Warrington..... | Present |
| | Henley..... | Present |
| | Beale..... | Present |
| | Patterson..... | Present |
| | Mayrant..... | Present |
| Flotilla 2, Division 4..... | Ammen..... | Present |
| | Burrows..... | Present |
| Flotilla 2, Division 5..... | Jouett..... | Present |
| | Trippe..... | Present |
| | Jenkins..... | Present |
| | Paulding..... | Present |

¹ Out of commission.

SHIPS NOT PRESENT WITH FLAG.

FUEL ON BOARD IN TERMS OF CAPACITY.

Subject No. 2:

There is no available information with regard to the amount of fuel on board ships not present with the flag.

Condition of ordnance material.

| Organization. | Ship. | Condition of ordnance material. |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| Flotilla flag..... | Birmingham..... | Ready for service. |
| Flotilla tender..... | Melville..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 3, division 6..... | Benham..... | Do. |
| | Downes..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 3, division 8 ¹ | Jacob Jones..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 3, division 9 ¹ | Rowan..... | Do. |
| | Sampson..... | Do. |
| | Allen..... | Do. |
| | Shaw..... | In hands of builders. |
| Flotilla flag..... | Salem..... | Out of commission. |
| Flotilla 1, division 1..... | Smith..... | Ready for service. |
| | Flusser..... | Do. |
| | Lamson..... | Do. |
| | Preston..... | Do. |
| | Reid..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 1, division 2..... | Walke..... | Do. |
| | Monaghan..... | Do. |
| | Perkins..... | In ordinary. |
| | Roe..... | Ready for service. |
| | Sterett..... | Do. |
| | Terry..... | Do. |
| Flotilla flag..... | Chester..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 2, division 3..... | Warrington..... | Do. |
| | Henley..... | Do. |
| | Beale..... | Do. |
| | Patterson..... | Do. |
| | Mayrant..... | Out of commission. |
| Flotilla 2, division 4..... | Ammen..... | Ready for service. |
| | Burrows..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 2, division 5..... | Jouett..... | Do. |
| | Trippe..... | Do. |
| | Jenkins..... | Do. |
| | Paulding..... | Do. |

¹ Training gear easily thrown out of line by heavy seas, needs additional bracing; job orders have been authorized by the bureau for this at the various navy yards.

Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

| Organization. | Ship. |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| Flotilla flag..... | Salem..... |
| Flotilla 1, Division 1..... | Smith..... |
| | Flusser..... |
| | Lamson..... |
| | Preston..... |
| | Reid..... |
| Flotilla 1, Division 2..... | Walke..... |
| | Monaghan..... |
| | Perkins..... |
| | Roe..... |
| | Sterett..... |
| | Terry..... |
| Flotilla flag..... | Chester..... |
| Flotilla 2, Division 3..... | Warrington..... |
| | Henley..... |
| | Beale..... |
| | Patterson..... |
| | Mayrant..... |
| Flotilla 2, Division 4..... | Ammen..... |
| | Burrows..... |
| Flotilla 2, Division 5..... | Jouett..... |
| | Trippe..... |
| | Jenkins..... |
| | Paulding..... |

¹ Out of commission.

SHIPS NOT PRESENT WITH FLAG.

FUEL ON BOARD IN TERMS OF CAPACITY.

Subject No. 2:

There is no available information with regard to the amount of fuel on board not present with the flag.

Condition of ordnance material.

| Organization. | Ship. | Condition of material. |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| Flotilla flag..... | Birmingham..... | Ready for use |
| Flotilla tender..... | Melville..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 3, division 6..... | Benham..... | Do. |
| | Downes..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 3, division 8 ¹ | Jacob Jones..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 3, division 9 ¹ | Rowan..... | Do. |
| | Sampson..... | Do. |
| | Allen..... | Do. |
| | Shaw..... | In hands of |
| Flotilla flag..... | Salem..... | Out of commission |
| Flotilla 1, division 1..... | Smith..... | Ready for use |
| | Flusser..... | Do. |
| | Lamson..... | Do. |
| | Preston..... | Do. |
| | Reid..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 1, division 2..... | Walke..... | Do. |
| | Monaghan..... | Do. |
| | Perkins..... | In ordinary |
| | Roe..... | Ready for use |
| | Sterett..... | Do. |
| | Terry..... | Do. |
| Flotilla flag..... | Chester..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 2, division 3..... | Warrington..... | Do. |
| | Henley..... | Do. |
| | Beale..... | Do. |
| | Patterson..... | Do. |
| | Mayrant..... | Out of commission |
| Flotilla 2, division 4..... | Ammen..... | Ready for use |
| | Burrows..... | Do. |
| Flotilla 2, division 5..... | Jouett..... | Do. |
| | Trippe..... | Do. |
| | Jenkins..... | Do. |
| | Paulding..... | Do. |

¹ Training gear easily thrown out of line by heavy seas, needs additional bracing; job order authorized by the bureau for this at the various navy yards.

SUBJECT NO. 4.—CONDITION OF PROPELLING PLANT.

Flotilla 1, division 1.

Smith—L. P. casing has crack in top and bottom flanges. Starboard L. P. casing distorted. Engines have been operating satisfactorily for several months. Safety valves leak, but it is believed that they will be corrected by the ship's force. The *Smith* is ready for service out of a home base for distant service.

Reid—Undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. The completion is February 12. Upon completion of authorized work, the ship should be in excellent condition and ready for service.

Preston—Oil pumps (lubricating) require complete overhauling. Considers general overhaul of auxiliary machinery and rebricking of the *Preston* can be put in very good condition by a navy yard in thirty

days. Blowers are badly worn and although they can be operated they cannot stand up under continuous or high speed cruising. New blowers are ordered to be delivered at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C., March 1. The *Preston* in condition for service will require the installation of new alignment of the center shaft, overhauling of the starboard air circulating engine and several minor items which have been previously noted. The *Preston* is capable of operating at moderate speeds for several

days. Undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. Assigned completion February 21, 1917. Progress of work indicates that this date should be met. Upon completion of authorized work the *Reid* should be in very good condition and ready for service.

Flotilla 1, division 2.

Walker—Undergoing extensive overhaul at the navy yard, Norfolk, Va. Work is concentrating efforts on other ships and nonarrival of material. Completion unknown, but probably not before April 1, 1917. Upon completion of authorized work the *Walker* should be in very good condition and ready for service.

Reid—Minor troubles under control of the ship's force. Fifteen to twenty days at a navy yard for minor overhaul and repairs will be necessary to put the ship in condition for service.

Reid—Undergoing extensive overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. Completion, February 21, 1917. Should be in excellent condition and ready for service.

Reid—Undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. It is believed the authorized completion is by March 1, 1917. The *Reid* should then be in very good condition and ready for service.

Reid—Ready for service from a home base. Minor overhaul necessary to put the ship in condition.

Reid—Undergoing extensive overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. Date of completion upon delivery of forced-draft blowers, probably about March 1. Steps are taken to expedite delivery. Upon completion of authorized work the *Reid* should then be in very good condition and ready for service.

Flotilla 2, division 3.

Warrington—Water drums of all boilers have developed a characteristic pitting. The installation of struts in the drums has been authorized and should be done before the *Warrington* can be considered ready for high speed cruising. She also requires repairs to furnace walls, re-aligning of main shafts and overhaul of port main circulating pump. When this work is undertaken the *Warrington* may be considered in readiness for service.

Beale—Engines unreliable; new engines are being built. Minor repairs are being made. The *Beale* may be considered ready for very light service until the new engines are installed.

Beale—Undergoing extensive repairs to boilers at the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa. Completion uncertain. When repairs are completed, *Beale* should be in very good condition.

Patterson. Boilers have the characteristic of pitting found in water drums of this type. She can not be considered in condition for extended or high cruising until struts are installed or drums renewed, but until this work is under way she can do light duty. Otherwise in excellent condition.

Mayrant. Out of commission, awaiting installation of new main engines, it is understood, will not be completed until spring.

Flotilla 2, division 4.

Ammen. At navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa., undergoing overhaul. Date of completion April 14, 1917. On completion of authorized repairs, *Ammen* should be in good condition and ready for service.

Burrows. Good. Ready for service.

Flotilla 2, division 5.

Jouett. All of the *Jouett's* water drums are cracked and have been repaired. Steam pressure reduced to 200 pounds. New drums are being purchased; delivery indefinite. Center tail shaft bent and new one authorized. The ship is ready for light duty until arrival of new drums, the installation of which, together with the center tail shaft, will place her in good condition.

Trippe. In good condition; ready for service.

Jenkins. Now undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Boston. Assigned date of completion, February 11, 1917. The completion of authorized work will place *Jenkins* in very good condition.

Paulding. Now undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa. Assigned date of completion, March 14, 1917. The completion of this work will place *Paulding* in very good condition and ready for service.

Flotilla 3.

Birmingham. Now at navy yard, New York, N. Y., for extensive overhaul. It is believed that the amount of work to be done on the *Birmingham* can be materially shortened and the ship placed in readiness for service within less than 30 days.

Melville. Excellent; ready for service.

Flotilla 3, division 6.

Benham. At navy yard, Norfolk, Va., undergoing repairs to both the main engines and minor overhaul. Date of completion, February 15, 1917. Completion of authorized work will place *Benham* in very good condition.

Duquesne. Undergoing overhaul and awaiting installation of new main engines at navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa. It is understood that no date of completion has been set.

Flotilla 3, division 7.

All vessels are present.

Flotilla 3, division 8.

Jacob Jones. Undergoing repairs or alterations prescribed by the board of inspection and survey in order to enable the ship to make her contract speed. Estimated date of completion, 5th to 10th of February, 1917. The *Jacob Jones* is ready for service except for her inability, by a small margin, to make full speed.

Flotilla 3, division 9.

Rowan. Excellent. Ready for service. Now at Pensacola, Fla; scheduled for acceptance trials on February 5, 1917.

Sampson. Excellent. Undergoing hull repairs, navy yard, New York, N. Y. Probable date of completion 10th to 12th of February, 1917. Due at Pensacola, Fla, on completion of repairs for final acceptance trials. Ready for service.

Allen. Recently commissioned. No reports of derangements have been received and it is believed that she is in excellent condition.

Shaw. Uncompleted.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 5, 1917.

Salem and Ches-
Trippe.—Platt:

and will require
The hulls and
in so far as known

From: Command.
To: Commander.
Subject: Readiness.
Inclosures: 1. P

1. The only
2. The estimate
that the ship is
query 2, when
the upper part
lower part the
3. All ships
are ready for

ps, divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8.

leships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8, when they left
the winter's drills and exercises, was, in general,
pleted authorized work at the time of departure.
spondence forwarded to the department by the
ent, file 124, of February 27, 1917. Requests for
ed by all these vessels from time to time since
in some few cases—*Arkansas* turbine work, for ex-
ditional work has been made to the department.

work when the battleships went south, the
124 of March 13, 1917, in reply to the depart-
at no work was necessary in the immediate future,
in condition for war service at some indefinite
ured, as was specifically mentioned in the letter
er in chief in this letter also invited the depart-
ment on the material readiness of the fleet as
or war, the commander in chief assumes that the
edge of conditions, will determine the policy to
to be first put in the best material condition or
ply keep the sea are to do so from the time of

hout definite information as to the department's
and therefore considers it necessary to present
consideration.

vessels referred to would have gone to their home
the period April 15 to May 15 and some of them
period for more extensive work. So far only the
sent to a navy yard since the fleet's return from
March 29, where the *Nevada* remained until April
til June 9. Arrangements have also been made,
letter, file 1566, of May 4, 1917, for docking certain
May 6, and instructions have been received from
an work on the *Pennsylvania* at Norfolk during
instructions relative to work on other vessels of
have been received by the commander in chief.

are not expected to "keep the sea," or to do any
or sometime to come, but what may be required

While the vessels mentioned can continue based
waters, or could operate near our coasts, if necessary,
navy yards, they are, in general, not now in proper
em to operate indefinitely from some foreign base.
quired, but conditions may demand just that. All
yards at once, nor should any vessel be sent to a navy
pared to undertake all authorized work. If, however,
and is made later for one or more divisions of battle-
be sent to navy yards, and there would be a congestion
for service that could be avoided if they are sent in
wards can handle the work.

emergency immediately existing, the vessels are able to
way from the Atlantic coast to operate for an indefinite
condition, advisable. To send any vessel away with her
engine, or with any of her fittings or appliances in any
ld be a mistake, as breakdowns after arrival, even if
trip's force to make good, would impair efficiency at a
ost. There is hardly a vessel in the four divisions men-
now without a number of items of authorized work on
requiring any immediate action, can not be made good
aterial conditions will not improve even, as is hardly
orse. Except for training the personnel, there is at
tleships; there may be a demand for them as fighting
re is a favorable opportunity, they should be put in

Jan. 1917
V. S. S.
V. S. S.
S. S. S.
B. S. S.
A. S. S.
C. S. S.
D. S. S.
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M. S. S.
N. S. S.
O. S. S.
P. S. S.
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S. S. S.
T. S. S.
U. S. S.
V. S. S.
W. S. S.
X. S. S.
Y. S. S.
Z. S. S.

February 2; U. S. S. *Fulton*, February 2; U. S. S. *Tonopah*, indefinite; *D-3*, March 1; *E-1*, February 11; U. S. S. *Worden*, February 20; *K-1*, May 1; *K-2*, May 1; U. S. S. *MacDonough*, February 24; *K-5*, February 20; *K-6*, February 20; U. S. S. *Tallahassee*, February 25; U. S. S. *Columbia*, February 10.

Estimate based on assumption that engines and batteries will remain reliable. 18009.

FLAG COLUMBIA.

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, April 9, 1917.

From: Commander in chief.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Organization of fleet after mobilization; questions re.

References: (a) Department's mobilization plan, March 21, 1917; (b) OPNAV dispatch 18005, April.

1. Reference (a) especially paragraph 2, gives the organization of "The fleet" for war.

2. I have interpreted this to mean that upon receipt of reference (b):

(a) The following force was established under my command: United States fleet— Battleship force, scout force, cruiser force, patrol force, destroyer force, submarine force, mine force, train.

(b) The following forces were established not under my command: Coast divisions— Atlantic coast division, Pacific coast auxiliaries, Philippine divisions, naval districts (Government vessels).

3. Paragraph 6 of reference (a) states that the rendezvous for Pacific coast auxiliaries and Philippine divisions is "as directed by commander in chief."

4. My present orders and my appointment by the President as Admiral designate me as commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

5. Decision is requested as to:

(c) Correctness of paragraph 2 above.

(d) The commander of the Scout Force.

(e) Present status of Admiral Caperton and Admiral Knight.

(f) Officer referred to in paragraph 3 above.

(g) Status of Coast Divisions.

(h) Status of Mexican patrol.

(i) Whether "United States Fleet" is the proper designation for the force listed in 2 (a) and, if so, whether any further authority than the order to mobilize is necessary for me to assume the title "Commander in Chief United States Fleet," or if my present orders and appointment from the President are sufficient authority.

H. T. MAYO.

APRIL 14, 1917.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

(Copies to commanders in chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet.)

Subject: Organization of fleet after mobilization.

Reference: (a) Your 1445, April 9, 1917.

1. The "commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet" shall continue to be the title of the officer commanding the United States Fleet in the Atlantic.

2. The forces and units of the forces enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) of reference (a), are under the command of the commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet when they are operating in the Atlantic but not at other times, unless specially so ordered.

3. The forces enumerated under paragraph 2 (b) of reference (a) are not under the command of the commander in chief United States Atlantic Fleet except as provided for in the Naval Regulations.

4. The commanders in chief of the Pacific and Asiatic stations will continue to exercise command in their respective areas over vessels of the fleet within these areas until otherwise ordered.

5. Command of the Atlantic Coast Division will be decided upon at a later date. At present this division is not available for any service.

6. The Mexican patrol is under the direction of the Navy Department, but assigned to assist and cooperate with the fourth patrol squadron in patrol work.

7. The fleet operating in the Atlantic shall be named the "United States Atlantic Fleet."

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 5, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Status of work on battleships, divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8.

1. The material conditions of battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8, when they left the navy yards in January last for the winter's drills and exercises, was, in general, good, although all had some uncompleted authorized work at the time of departure. This was reported in detail in correspondence forwarded to the department by the commander in chief's first indorsement, file 124, of February 27, 1917. Requests for additional work have been submitted by all these vessels from time to time since leaving the navy yards, but except in some few cases—*Arkansas* turbine work, for example—no special report of this additional work has been made to the department.

2. Relative to the uncompleted work when the battleships went south, the commander in chief in his letter file 124 of March 13, 1917, in reply to the department's radio 14112, March, stated that no work was necessary in the immediate future, but that if the vessels were to put in condition for war service at some indefinite future date, certain work was required, as was specifically mentioned in the letter above referred to. The commander in chief in this letter also invited the department's attention to a previous comment on the material readiness of the fleet as follows: "In case of mobilization, or war, the commander in chief assumes that the department, from its fuller knowledge of conditions, will determine the policy to be followed, whether the fleet is to be first put in the best material condition or whether all ships which can possibly keep the sea are to do so from the time of mobilization."

3. The commander in chief is without definite information as to the department's policy regarding material matters, and therefore considers it necessary to present certain facts to the department for consideration.

4. Under normal conditions the vessels referred to would have gone to their home yards for docking and work during the period April 15 to May 15 and some of them would have remained for a longer period for more extensive work. So far only the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* have been sent to a navy yard since the fleet's return from Cuban waters, both to Norfolk on March 29, where the *Nevada* remained until April 24, and the *Oklahoma* is to remain until June 9. Arrangements have also been made, as reported in commander in chief's letter, file 1566, of May 4, 1917, for docking certain battleships at Norfolk commencing May 6, and instructions have been received from the department to undertake certain work on the *Pennsylvania* at Norfolk during the period June 4 to June 30. No instructions relative to work on other vessels of battleship divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8 have been received by the commander in chief.

5. It is evident that battleships are not expected to "keep the sea," or to do any cruising outside inclosed waters for sometime to come, but what may be required of them in future is problematical. While the vessels mentioned can continue based in Chesapeake Bay or inclosed waters, or could operate near our coasts, if necessary, without any work being done at navy yards, they are, in general, not now in proper material condition to permit them to operate indefinitely from some foreign base. Such operation may not be required, but conditions may demand just that. All vessels should not go to the navy yards at once, nor should any vessel be sent to a navy yard unless the yard is fully prepared to undertake all authorized work. If, however, action is deferred, and a demand is made later for one or more divisions of battleships, they would necessarily be sent to navy yards, and there would be a congestion of work and delay in readiness for service that could be avoided if they are sent in now from time to time as the yards can handle the work.

6. If there was an actual emergency immediately existing, the vessels are able to meet it, but to send them away from the Atlantic coast to operate for an indefinite period is not, in their present condition, advisable. To send any vessel away with her auxiliary machinery, hull, or engine, or with any of her fittings or appliances in any but the best condition, would be a mistake, as breakdowns after arrival, even if within the capacity of the ship's force to make good, would impair efficiency at a time when it should be highest. There is hardly a vessel in the four divisions mentioned, however, that is not now without a number of items of authorized work on each vessel, which while not requiring any immediate action, can not be made good under present conditions. Material conditions will not improve even, as is hardly possible, should they get no worse. Except for training the personnel, there is at present no demand for these battleships; there may be a demand for them as fighting units later on. Now, while there is a favorable opportunity, they should be put in the very best material condition.

7. Without going into minute details of outstanding items of work certain items will be specifically brought to the department's attention as requiring action before the vessels concerned can be considered ready for any service:

Pennsylvania: Subdivision of after torpedo room and stiffening of stern. Installation of two remaining antiaircraft guns.

Arizona: Replacing of four-bladed propellers with three-bladed propellers or such other action as may be found necessary after further trials to reduce the present excessive vibration.

Wyoming: Straightening anchor engine crank shaft; providing stowage for anti-aircraft ammunition, installation of engine revolution telegraph systems.

Arkansas: Repair of starboard H. P. A. turbine; examination and repair as necessary of other turbines; installation of engine revolution telegraph systems.

New York: Installation of antiaircraft guns.

Texas: General overhaul of main engines, including truing up bearing surface of six crosshead slippers; rebabbitting 14 horse-shoe thrust collars and truing up and grinding both H. P. piston rods and renewing packing.

Florida: Installation of antiaircraft guns; installation of new bake ovens; renew and reline salt-water piping in various locations; repair all Waterbury variable-speed gear motors for gun elevating; turn down and true up commutators of main turbo generators numbers 1 and 3.

Utah: Installation of antiaircraft guns; installation of new bake ovens; overhaul all deck winches; overhaul steering engine; overhaul both boat cranes; overhaul and realign elevating system of both guns of No. 5 turret; make new shells for both L. P. evaporators. Repair H. P. C. turbine; blading of main turbines, reported very dirty, S. M. H. P. and both L. P. turbines have not been opened since the fall of 1914.

Connecticut: Overhaul 8-inch cross connecting gear; take up lost motion in 7-inch battery. Install new cast-steel sea chest after starboard ash chute; overhaul air compressor; scrape in all lower brasses of main engine bearings.

Michigan: Overhaul both boat cranes; overhaul anchor windlass.

South Carolina: Overhaul both boat cranes; renew 12 elements in mainmast; overhaul flushing system; reblade, renozzle and rebalance Nos. 2 and 4 generators.

Nevada: Install turret training control gear for left side all turrets now being manufactured at Norfolk, probably ready for installation about June 1, will require about 12 days to install. Ship now has no duplicate turret training control.

Oklahoma: All work will probably be completed during present stay Norfolk.

Delaware: No items of immediate importance.

North Dakota: (This vessel did not accompany the fleet south, is now in division 7.) New main engines, installation of director firing, etc.

8. In view of the above the commander in chief recommends that the department decide without delay, upon a policy by which work on the battleships may be taken in hand at earliest practicable date.

H. T. MAYO.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 9, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Submarine trap nets, recommendations regarding.

Inclosures: Three.

1. The inclosures contain information of the submarine trap nets and obstructions as developed by the British Navy and of the experience of the United States mine force with the trap net at Cape Henry.

2. From the British experience augmented by that of the mine force, it is apparent that:

(a) Submarine trap nets to be efficient must be made very much heavier than those at present in place in United States waters.

(b) The sections of such nets should not exceed 600 feet and that the moorings must be very heavy.

(c) The work of planting such nets requires careful, skillful work and that such work can be efficiently performed only under favorable weather conditions.

(d) Each net requires extensive patrolling and repair.

(e) It has been estimated that a period of two months would be required to plant a proper net defense of New York.

(f) To adequately protect the naval bases and commerce.

(7) The mine force of the Atlantic Fleet has been engaged for over a month in fabricating and planting trap nets at Chesapeake entrance, Hampton Roads, and at base 2.

3. The mine force is an integral part of the fleet and as such must be retained near the main fleet base to perform its allotted share of the work in the defense of the fleet. The commander in chief considers that planting of submarine trap nets, except as part of the local defense of the fleet base, is not the legitimate duty of the mine force.

4. In view of the additional security furnished to the fleet by the nets at Cape Henry and Hampton Roads, this work has been considered in line with the policy expressed above, but the use of the mine force to plant nets, which furnish no additional security to the fleet, is contrary to such policy and is strongly disapproved.

5. As the activities of this Nation in the war become more and more marked the danger of attack by enemy submarine on this coast becomes greater. The entire available mine force, and, in fact, a greatly augmented mine force should be constantly at the disposal of the commander in chief for mine sweeping and other operations for local defense.

6. In order to expedite the placing of Chesapeake Bay in a moderate state of security, the present net must be extended from the Middle Ground to the shoal near Fisherman's Island. As yet (May 4) no definite orders have been received by commandant to place this additional section, nor have orders been issued to purchase the required material.

7. The commander in chief most strongly recommends that the mine force be considered unavailable for work in connection with submarine trap nets, except in the immediate vicinity of the fleet base.

8. Should the department approve a change of fleet base to Long Island Sound, in order to obtain a greater maneuvering area inside of net defenses, the commander in chief considers that the mine force may be considered available for planting the submarine trap-net defenses in that area.

H. T. MAYO.

JULY 10, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.

To: Chief of Naval Operations (material).

Subject: Repairs to battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, 8. *San Francisco* and *Montana*.

Reference: (a) Department's letter No. 28754—18:29 of June 18, 1917; (b) Department's letter No. 22820—161 of July 19, 1917.

1. In accordance with paragraph 5 of reference (a) and paragraph 2 of reference (b), the following schedule of arrival of ships at yards has been prepared and is submitted for the department's approval:

| Ship. | Time required (days). | At yard ready for work. | Yard to complete— |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Navy yard, Portsmouth: | | | |
| <i>San Francisco</i> ¹ | 45 | July 23 | Sept. 10 |
| <i>Montana</i> ² | 48 | July 20 | Do. |
| Navy yard, Boston: | | | |
| <i>Delaware</i> | 25 | July 23 | Aug. 18 |
| Navy yard, New York: | | | |
| <i>New York</i> | 30 | July 5 | Aug. 6 |
| <i>Wyoming</i> | 25 | Aug. 1 | Aug. 27 |
| <i>Texas</i> | 30 | Aug. 22 | Sept. 23 |
| Navy yard, Philadelphia: | | | |
| <i>South Carolina</i> | 25 | Aug. 6 | Sept. 1 |
| <i>Connecticut</i> ³ | 25 | Aug. 30 | Sept. 25 |
| <i>Michigan</i> | 25 | July 16 | Aug. 11 |
| Navy yard, Norfolk: | | | |
| <i>Florida</i> | 35 | Aug. 6 | Sept. 13 |

¹ *San Francisco*; Requires 35 days in dock for shaft work and upon completion this work could, if necessary, leave the yard, although it is highly desirable that she remain for 10 days additional to complete authorized work.

² *Montana*; The estimated time for the *Montana* is that required for installation of aeroplane launching equipment to complete all authorized work on the vessel, including fire control installations, will require 68 days, attention is invited to commanding in chief's first indorsement, file 2717, of July 10, 1917, forwarding commanding officer *Montana*'s letter.

³ *Connecticut*; Has an outstanding job order covering installation of new generators. It is understood that these are to be delivered about August 15. If the vessel is to have the new generators installed during her stay at the yard 20 days additional will be required, making her stay at the yard from August 30 to October 16.

2. It will be noted that the schedule does not include the *North Dakota*, *Arkansas*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, or *Arizona*. Reference (a) states that instructions as to the *North Dakota* would be issued later. As far as can be ascertained from information now available, there are about 35 days' work required on the *North Dakota* for necessary repairs, fire-control changes, etc. It is believed; in view of the amount of work in hand at New York, that it will be preferable for the *North Dakota* to repair at Boston.

Arkansas: The Bureau of Steam Engineering's radio 15425, June, states that purchase of new high-pressure astern rotor drums would be recommended, and that no extensive turbine repairs would be done on the *Arkansas* until new drums were ready for installation. Norfolk yard estimates 60 days required for the turbine work, during which time all outstanding work on the vessel can be completed. There is no information at present available as to when new rotor drums will be available, and it is therefore impracticable to set a date for the *Arkansas* to arrive at the yard.

Oklahoma and *Nevada*: Norfolk yard estimates 50 days required for the installation of the new forced-draft blowers on these vessels. Recent information obtained from the industrial manager as to the status of piping required for this installation is that the Bureau of Steam Engineering has arranged for a partial delivery within from four to six weeks' time, but that no satisfactory arrangements have so far been made for the remainder of the piping, which is principally 6 inches in diameter. Until a definite date for receipt of this piping material can be assured, it is impracticable to set any date for these vessels to go to the yard for work.

Arizona: The *Arizona* is now at the New York yard for about a 10-day stay, and will not require, as far as known, any navy yard work in the near future.

3. It will be noted from the schedule forwarded that work on all battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8 except *Arkansas*, *Oklahoma*, and *Nevada* will have been completed prior to October 1. If possible to obtain material required for these three vessels prior to August 1, 1917, it is believed that work on them can also be completed by this date. To do this, however, it will be necessary to send either the *Oklahoma* or *Nevada* to some yard other than Norfolk, probably New York, as Norfolk will be unable with the men available to undertake the forced-draft blower work on both ships at the same time.

H. T. MAYO.

Copy to: C. B. F.

[Secret. Passage, Liverpool to New York.]

S. S. "St. Louis,"
October 11, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: General report on visit to England and France in August-September, 1917.

References:

- (a) Official Minutes of International Naval Conference in London, September 4-5, 1917, inclosure A.
- (b) Present Admiralty Policy-July, 1917, revised September, 1917, inclosure B.
- (c) Proposed Future Admiralty Policy dated September, 1917, inclosure C.
- (d) Proposed Mine Barrage across the North Sea, inclosure D.
- (e) Chart to accompany reference (d), inclosure E.
- (f) I. The Policy of Blockade; II. The Policy of Defense of Trade; III. Antisubmarine Policy, inclosure F.
- (g) Situation Regarding Northern Neutral Countries, inclosure G.
- (h) Situation on the Belgian Coast, inclosure H.
- (i) Policy in the Mediterranean, inclosure I.
- (j) Policy in Asiatic and East African Waters, inclosure J.
- (k) Specific requests for assistance inclosure K.

1. *General description of report.*—(a) The report herewith rendered is intended to cover, in general terms, the scope of the information gained, observations made, and impressions received by the commander in chief and by members of his staff while in England and France. Detailed report of information, observations, and data are submitted herewith and as separate papers.

(b) This report is presented under the following general headings:

1. General Description of Report.
2. General Instructions from Navy Department.
3. General Attitude of British and French Governments.
4. The International Naval Conference in London on September 4-5, 1917.
5. General Impressions Regarding Conditions in British Admiralty.
6. General Impressions Regarding the Grand Fleet.
7. General Impressions Regarding Coastal Commands.

8. General Impressions of Naval Conditions in France.
9. General Impressions of Naval Conditions in Italy.
10. General Impressions of U. S. Naval Forces in European Waters.
11. General Impressions of Political, Economic and Moral Conditions Among the Allies.
12. General Impressions Regarding the Northern Neutrals.
13. Notes on the General Naval Situation.
14. Notes on the Submarine Situation.
15. General Notes on the Convoy System and the Shipping Situation.
16. Notes on the Blockade.
17. General Notes on Aviation Matters.
18. Comment on Proposed Future Policy, including Future Mining Policy.
19. The Fuel Oil Situation in Europe.
20. Other Matters reported on.
21. General Recommendations.
22. General Results of Visit.

2. *General Instructions from Navy Department.*—(a) The instructions received from the Navy Department as to the purpose and object of the visit to England and France were not in definite and concrete form, but were readily to be inferred from the substance of conversations with the President, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, supplemented by memoranda from the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants. A summary based on the above-mentioned conversations and memoranda was made (while en route to England) in order to enable definite inquiries to be made to the governments concerned.

3. The summary was of the following general character. It will be noted that the principal matters of inquiry were understood to be for the purpose of getting more closely in touch with—

1. What has been done—historical—in order that knowledge of original plans and modifications thereof together with their elements of success or failures might enable the present situation to be understood and proposals for future operations to be appreciated.

2. What is being done—present situation—following history of naval plans and operations up to present time, showing underlying causes of plans and operations now in force—the part that the United States plays in present plans and operations—the present naval strength and resources of the Allies and of the enemy—the situation in the several areas of operation, e. g., the North Sea, the Helgoland Bight, the Skagerak, the Baltic Sea, the English Channel, the Dunkirk-Zeebrugge district, the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic Sea, etc.

3. What is to be done—future operations—following the history of plans and operations in their evolution and development to the present time. What new plans and operations are proposed and for what reason? What part are the several Allies and the United States expected to take? What are allied and enemy building programs?

4. Particular inquiry into the antisubmarine measures underway and proposed, as being the field of endeavor requiring immediate attention—assistance desired from the United States.

5. The aircraft situation, particularly with regard to construction underway and proposed—and wherein the United States can assist to the best advantage for all concerned.

6. The shipping situation, in so far as it bears on the "communications" of the Allies.

7. The transfer of United States troops to France, in so far as the available number will have effect on the outcome of the war and particularly with regard to the shipping necessary not only for transport of troops but chiefly for the upkeep and supply of the troops after their arrival in France.

8. Certain inquiries in the matters of seeking for trade, the employment of oilers belonging to private companies, and the rumored transfer of men of war after the war.

9. An international naval conference which the United States had requested the British Government to arrange for.

10. Later additions to the purposes of the visit appeared in dispatches from the Navy Department in regard to Norway entering the war on the side of the Allies and certain inquiries regarding the possible capture of Russian capital ships by the enemy.

11. General impressions regarding political, economic, and morale conditions in the allied countries, in so far as such conditions have bearing on the general military-naval situation.

3. *General attitude of British and French Governments.*—(a) It appears fitting to record at the outset that the reception on the part of the British Government was all

that could be desired. The files and records of the Admiralty were thrown open and there was constant evidence of cordial and hearty intention to give full information and explanation in regard to plans, operations, and material.

(b) Visits to the Grand Fleet at Rosyth, Harwich, and Portsmouth took place, as well as a visit to Dunkirk followed by observation of a bombardment at Ostend. Several officers of the party accompanied Grand Fleet detachment in a reconnaissance toward Helgoland Bight, and two officers accompanied the Grand Fleet during its change of base from Rosyth to Scapa Flow.

(c) The official entertainment in England included accommodations for the party at the Carlton Hotel up to the time of departure for France. There was a dinner given by the Admiralty to the commander in chief and his staff. There was also a luncheon given by the Admiralty to the representatives (and their staffs) from the several governments to the International Naval Conference held on September 4-5, 1917. In addition to numerous conferences at the Admiralty with Sir Eric Geddes (First Lord of the Admiralty) and with Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (First Sea Lord), the commander in chief had an interview with Mr. David Lloyd-George (Prime Minister), and had a private audience of His Majesty King George.

(d) The reception of the commander in chief and his party in France was marked by the most cordial expressions of appreciation for the friendly feeling between France and the United States, of appreciation of help already given, and of grateful anticipation of the assistance which the United States is preparing to render to the Allies.

(e) The commander in chief and staff had the opportunity of visiting Brest and St. Nazaire, and also of making a trip through the region from which the enemy retreated last spring, approaching to within a couple of miles of the present front.

(f) The official entertainment in France included accommodations at the Hotel Crillon during the stay of the party in Paris. There was a luncheon given by M. Painleve, Premier, and a dinner given by M. Chaumet, Minister of Marine. The commander in chief had luncheon with Gen. Petain, commanding French forces in the field, at his headquarters in Compiègne and had an interview with Vice Admiral Du Bon, Chief of Naval Staff.

(g) The commander in chief had an interview with Maj. Gen. Pershing, United States Army, the substance of which will be transmitted in separate correspondence.

(h) The commander in chief and staff proceeded to Queenstown where they heard of, and noted with pleasure, the excellent work being done by the 35 destroyers and 2 destroyer tenders now operating out of that port on escort-of-convoy duty, under the immediate orders of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, R. N.

4. *The International Naval Conference in London on September 4-5, 1917.*—(a) A report has already been made on the proceedings of this conference; it is now supplemented by a copy of the "official minutes" which appear herewith as reference (a) and inclosure A.

(b) Attention is invited to the fact that answers (to be addressed to the British Government) are expected in regard to—

(1) Old battleships and cruisers available for use in a proposed operation to effect the blocking of German harbors.

(2) Additional cruisers, perhaps even old battleships, for service as escorts to merchant ship convoys.

5. *General impressions regarding conditions in British Admiralty.*—(a) There is little doubt that the British Admiralty is at a loss when asked for the history of the war to date. Reports of operations are so isolated and scattered and without system that there is not available any comprehensive record of original plans, the governing reasons therefor, and the degree of success or failure in each case. The inevitable inference is that the war has been carried on from day to day and not according to any comprehensive policy to serve as a guide to plans looking to the effective coordination and cooperation of effort against the enemy.

(b) It is apparent that, despite the so-called war-staff arrangements put into effect in the Admiralty during the past three years, until very recently there has been no planning section, nor was there any definite body of men charged with the function of looking ahead, or even of looking back to see wherein lay the causes or success or failure, nor any means of furnishing the heads of the Admiralty with analyses and summaries of past operations in order that decisions as to continuing old operations or undertaking new ones might be reached with a due sense of "perspective," both as to past operations and as to the coordination of new operations in a general plan.

(c) The statement of present Admiralty policy, originally dated July, 1917, now revised to 17 September, 1917 (reference (b) and inclosure B), is not really a statement of policy but rather a summary of current activities. That these activities are based on an underlying idea of the defensive may readily be inferred from the leading words in the subparagraphs of paragraph one of the paper referred to, namely, "protection,"

prevention," "protection," "resistance." See also references (h) (i) (j) and inclosures H, I, J.

(d) The statement of proposed future Admiralty policy dated September 17, 1917 (reference (e) and inclosure C), indicates growing appreciation of the necessity for more energetic offensive measures against the submarine in the way of preventing his egress from the North Sea.

(e) While the development of the submarine menace has been gradual and the measures undertaken to meet it have had to be evolved and applied to new developments as they appeared, the present dispersion of allied naval effort against the submarine menace has reached large dimensions and the actual offensive against the submarine has suffered through the accumulation of large numbers of vessels to carry out protective measures. The number of vessels engaged in protective (defensive) effort includes practically the entire British Navy in northern waters except the Grand Fleet, many of whose destroyers and other small craft are also engaged in protective work.

(f) Referring again to the proposed plan of future antisubmarine operations in the North Sea (reference (c) and inclosure C), it appears that it may be necessary to withdraw some vessels engaged in protective work in order to make the offensive effective. However, the effectiveness of the offensive should be cumulative thus enabling perhaps nearly all of the available vessels gradually to be diverted from the protective (defensive) to the offensive.

6. *General impressions regarding the Grand Fleet.*—(a) The Grand Fleet appears now, after three years' experience in war, including the Battle of Jutland to be in good material condition, ready for all likely operations, and of very good morale.

(b) The probable operating conditions have been studied and arrangements made to make the best possible use of the fleet. Plans and detailed instructions are complete and voluminous and have been conceived and framed for probable operations in the North Sea only, with the view that the situation in the North Sea is the only one requiring present consideration, as it involves the encounter of the two major opposing fleets.

7. *General impressions regarding coastal commands.*—(a) The coastal commands in Great Britain (of which Harwich, Portsmouth, Dover-Dunkirk, and Queenstown were visited) are all very well organized and efficiently handled up to the limit of available vessels, material and personnel.

(b) The activities at coastal stations include training of personnel, aerodromes, bases for submarines, trawlers, destroyers, motor craft, mystery ships, etc., and the direction of traffic and of patrol and convoy operations.

8. *General impressions of naval conditions in France.*—(a) At the outbreak of war naval activities in dockyards and arsenals were either allowed to lapse or diverted to the production of matériel for the Army, with the result that no vessels other than small low-powered craft can now be constructed.

(b) The French main fleet is based on Corfu in readiness to operate against the Austrian fleet, should opportunity occur, with or without the cooperation of the Italian fleet.

(c) The personnel of the French navy appears to be in as relatively a depleted state as the matériel, having been largely diverted to operations on land, chiefly in the defense of Belgium. There is a proposal (mentioned in report of International Naval Conference, Reference (a) and Inclosure A) to man cruisers for escort-of-convoy duty with personnel from the older battleships, provided the United States will replace the said older battleships in their duties (in the eastern Mediterranean).

(d) French naval views are strongly inclined to the offensive, especially against the submarine menace, and every effort to this end is being made that the conditions of matériel and personnel will permit.

9. *General impressions of naval conditions in Italy.*—(a) Italian naval views regarding the part that the Italian navy can take in allied naval operations is well indicated both in the report of a naval conference held in Paris on July 25-27, 1917, and in the report of the recent naval conference held in London on September 4-5, 1917.

(b) There is an evident reluctance to undertake any cooperate measures which might result in losses which would affect popular opinion in Italy. This reluctance extends even to the question of proper guarding of the hundred or so British drifters which maintain a drifter-net barrage in the Straits of Otranto.

(c) The Italians are understood to have 34 destroyers available, to which the French have added 10 for service in the Italian fleet. The Austrians are reported to have 22 destroyers available.

10. *General impressions of United States naval forces in European waters.*—(a) The Queenstown force, consisting of 35 destroyers and 2 destroyer tenders (*Melville* and *Dirie*) are almost wholly employed in the convoy system under the orders of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly. *Royal Navy*, commander in Queenstown.

(b) This force is in good matériel, personnel, and operating condition; the morale is excellent. Admiral Bayly appears to be much pleased with their work, which requires much time at sea and constant exercise of seamanship, navigation, and judgment.

(c) The Brest force is hampered in its operations by general unsuitability of the available vessels for high-seas work and by lack of organization and of general plans to serve as a guide in carrying out the necessary work; there is also difficulty in effecting even minor repairs and upkeep.

(d) The forces at Gibraltar and at Bordeaux were not visited owing to lack of time but are understood to be accomplishing all that can be expected of the number of vessels now available.

(e) The present aviation force is nearing the completion of its training and is due to receive a marked increase of personnel, after which it is expected that active employment may be begun.

(f) The operations in the air have reached such magnitude and are of such great importance that there can be little doubt that assistance in personnel and matériel for air service will be the most rapid as well as the most useful way of reenforcing the Allies both by land and by sea.

11. *General impressions regarding political, economic, and moral conditions among the Allies.*—(a) The following observations are general and are mentioned only with a view to consideration of all the varied elements that affect the military-naval situation.

(b) Great Britain: (1) The Government in power appears to hope that it may not be called upon to impose restrictive or other positive measures, and to endeavor to avoid such measures until they can no longer be avoided, with the result that this procrastination has had the regrettable effect that when the Government is obliged to act there is likely to be serious opposition; whereas, if a directing policy had been carried out from the beginning, the people would undoubtedly have acquiesced and approved in the belief that the measures introduced were essential to the proper conduct and outcome of the war. Illustrations of conditions indicated are principally found in the labor situation, in which strikes occur repeatedly, and in the reluctance to introduce a general rationing system, though shortage of sugar has finally developed to such a degree that sugar rationing has recently had to be put into force.

(2) The labor question is serious, especially with regard to shipbuilding, and it is proposed to withdraw 80,000 men from the army to return to their work in shipyards. Personnel for the air services is becoming scarce and of poor quality, while naval personnel is apparently expanded to the limit of available men.

(3) The morale in general is good, subject to above remarks regarding labor.

(c) France: (1) The Government in power in France is beset with labor troubles which are emphasized by the fact that M. Thomas, the chief labor leader, has declined a portfolio in the recently formed ministry of M. Painlevé.

(2) There is a shortage of coal in France which causes great concern, in view of the possible moral effect of the privations about to be endured in the coming winter. France seems to be fairly well off as regards food, except that there are now two meatless days a week. Personnel is depleted except as boys become of draft age; especially is this the case in regard to naval personnel, for the army has the preference, due to the relatively greater need.

(3) The morale is now very good; though greatly reduced last spring after the huge losses attending the French spring offensive, the entry of the United States into the war and success in retaining the ground won has served, in the course of time, to restore the morale to the extent that it now appears to largely depend on getting through the coming winter without serious suffering on account of the shortage of coal.

(d) Italy: (1) The Government in power is apparently unwilling to risk anything at sea on account of effect of possible losses on public opinion, which may indicate an unsatisfactory attitude of the people toward the war.

(2) The coal shortage in Italy is serious; so much so that it is reported that people are being transferred in large numbers from the north to the south of Italy. Shortage also exists in regard to raw materials for the manufacture of munitions, aircraft, and shipping.

(3) The state of the morale of the Italian Army is indicated by their operations against Trieste, but the same test applied to the Italian Navy does not indicate an encouraging state of affairs. The attitude of the Government, which apparently is apprehensive of the effect of naval reverses, at least, may be taken to indicate that popular opinion is not united and needs careful handling.

(e) Russia: (1) The political, economic, and moral conditions are bad, as is well known, but they can hardly fail to improve provided a strong Government succeeds in control.

(2) It can not be again said that all the troubles that usually exist between allied countries engaged in military operations are present among the Allies in some degree. There is believed to exist suspicion and even jealousy of the dominant political and naval power, and the growing military power of Great Britain. All the countries involved undoubtedly give present consideration to probable future arrangements which will take place on completion of the war, with the result that there is a tendency to suspect motives and that proposals for cooperation and coordination are approached with reserve.

3. The only country whose motives and aims in the war are unquestioned appears to be the United States, whose influence can probably be brought to bear to clear up existing doubts and resultant friction to the end that real and full cooperation and coordination may produce the result that can be attained and is so much desired—the complete victory of the Allies.

12. *General impressions regarding the northern neutrals.*—(a) The following observations are general and are mentioned for the purpose of covering all matters that affect the military naval situation. The chief and almost the only characteristic of the attitude of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden is their common desire and intention to remain neutral as long as it is possible for them to do so.

b. Holland has an army of about 600,000 men now kept under observation by a German force, estimated to be at least 200,000 men. Holland's entry into the war on the side of the enemy would therefore bring at least some half million men against the Allies, would enable the enemy to use Dutch ports as bases for submarine and destroyer operations and thus seriously increase the difficulties of the Allies. The entry of Holland into the war on the side of the Allies is unlikely, as Holland has but to contemplate the fate of Belgium and of Roumania and to regard how little assistance the Allies can give her. All of which sums up in the determination of Holland to remain neutral if she possibly can.

c. Denmark has neither army nor navy to enable her to resist vigorously, as Holland does, infringements of her neutrality by the enemy. Her entry into the war on the side of the enemy is unlikely in view of the feeling regarding Schleswig-Holstein, while her entry into the war on the side of the Allies would mean that she would quickly be overrun and subdued, as assistance from the Allies is not to be expected. Denmark has no seaports on the North Sea coast which can be made of use as outposts against the enemy.

(d) Norway is apparently willing to enter the war on the side of the Allies but has no army nor navy of consequence, so that she might well be a hindrance rather than a help, especially in view of her openness to attack by Sweden, whose army is vastly superior and whose navy is relatively much better. The chief reason for consideration of Norway lies in her coastal frontage on the North Sea and the Skagerrak, with the numerous harbors which would be useful as bases and outposts for operations against the enemy. But Norway can not protect herself, is apprehensive of attack by the enemy, and would require military assistance which the Allies are not prepared to furnish.

e. Sweden has a proenemy government and ruling class supplemented by the Conservative party recently in power. The Socialist party, which is large and powerful, is determined that Sweden shall continue her neutral status. The Liberal party is apparently friendly to the Allies, or rather anti-German. The balance of power is against the pro-Allies, and it is likely that Sweden will remain neutral in order to continue to receive the huge war profits which are of benefit to the entire people. The revolution in Russia has relieved Swedish apprehensions of aggressions from that quarter and has thus reduced the tendency to join the war on the side of the enemy, if at all.

(f) See details in reference (g) and inclosure "G."

13. *Notes on the general naval situation.*—(a) Apparently the naval plans of the Allies have been in most general terms. Great Britain to control the North Sea and Channel; France her west coast and the French Mediterranean coast; Italy, assisted as necessary by France, to control the Adriatic; British forces based on Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria assisting in the Mediterranean. Recently the Japanese have given assistance in the Mediterranean, having there 1 cruiser and 12 destroyers. United States forces are operating from Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar.

(b) (1) It is apparent, from conversation with officers attached to the Operations Division, that up to the present there has been no definite naval plans. So far as can be learned, there has been no statement of British Naval policy previous to that issued by the Admiralty in July, 1917, which is in reality a defense of what was being done and not a real statement of policy.

(2) The defensive nature of this so-called policy is plainly indicated by the paragraph stating the objects to be attained by naval power; the leading words of the

four subparagraphs which state these objects are: (1) Protection, (2) Prevention, (3) Protection, (4) Resistance.

(3) All of these objects and many more would be obtained by the destruction of German naval power.

(c) (1) In the first month of the war the offensive policy was much more pronounced than at present. The British Fleet was in fact undergoing a test mobilization when the probability of war became evident. The forces were maintained in a mobilized condition and therefore began the war in a most advantageous state.

(2) The disposition of the fleet was made with a view to opposing the movement of the enemy forces out of the North Sea. The main battle fleet was based on the North of Scotland but kept the sea almost continuously. A second battle force was based in the south of England to prevent the passage of any forces of less strength than the high sea fleet through the channel. The armored and light cruisers were continually on scouting duty in the North Sea. The British submarines were stationed in the Helgoland Bight with a view to attacking the German fleet if it came out. No mines were laid in Helgoland Bight by the British during this phase.

(3) The frequent attacks on British cruisers by German submarines, especially the catastrophe in which the *Hogue*, *Cressey*, and *Aboukir* were lost, caused a change in plan as follows:

(4) The main fleet was withdrawn from continuous service underway and placed in a base adequately protected from submarines. The heavier cruisers were withdrawn from scouting work and their place taken by light cruisers and destroyers. The mining of Helgoland Bight was begun. The development of the auxiliary services of mine sweeping and patrol was made more rapid.

(5) The present operations are merely developments of this plan. The fleet is ready and anxious to fight a major action, but it is only sent to sea as a fleet when the German fleet is out or thought to be coming out, or occasionally for exercises. The various divisions of the fleet are often underway for target practice, etc.

(d) See references (h), (i), (j), and inclosures "H", "I", "J."

14. *Notes on the submarine situation.*—(a) The increase in the number of patrol vessels and mine sweepers has been brought about in the endeavor to combat the successful operations by enemy submarines, especially mine-laying submarines.

(b) The convoy system was developed with the hope of reducing the submarine sinkings. By concentrating the shipping into convoys it was hoped to reduce the chances of the submarines sighting merchant vessels; to guard against raiders by ocean escorts; and to guard against submarines by destroyer escort within the submarine danger zone.

(c) (1) Mining operations in Helgoland Bight have been quite extensive, the main object being the destruction of submarines. The mine fields seem to have been laid at widely separated periods of time and without a general plan. In view of the difficulties attendant upon locating the exact position of a mine field planted out of sight of land, it has been necessary to leave gaps of about six miles between fields in order to avoid chances of striking their previously planted fields.

(2) The difficulties of effective mining have been accentuated in the North Sea by bad weather and the great rise and fall of tide.

(3) Mines laid at such depth as to be effective at high water are as a rule plainly visible from Zeppelins at low water. The ineffectiveness of mine fields which can not be defended has been repeatedly demonstrated.

(4) It is generally conceded that a mine field is only effective when the surface can be guarded against mine sweepers, which in reality means against the enemy's main fleet as a support. This condition can be changed only by the development of nonsweepable mines. Until nonsweepable mines are a demonstrated success it should be accepted as a principle that no effective mine barrage can be maintained in a position where the power of the whole fleet can not be developed in its defense.

(d) The channel was closed by net barrage but due to strong tides and heavy weather and the nature of the bottom (sandstone, poor holding ground) this net barrage has never been efficient. Mines and mine-nets have also been used in the Straits of Dover, but the German U-B and U-C boats based upon Ostende and Zeebrugge seem to pass the barrage at will. The U-boats do not use the channel.

(e) (1) The most successful operations against enemy submarines have been carried out by British submarines and decoy ships. The submarine against submarine will probably prove effective in the future though the German submarines, due to the excellence of the optical instruments, have a decided advantage and undoubtedly sink more British boats than are lost by themselves. However, this system has proved quite successful and is being pursued as vigorously as possible. The decoy ship has accounted for more submarines than any other measure. However, the enemy submarines are becoming very wary and it is doubtful if in the future they will obtain such good results.

(2) The most recent developments in antisubmarine devices are the hydrophones and aircraft (planes and kite balloons). Eight shore stations fitted with hydrophones are in operation and several "hunting flotillas" have been organized which rely on the hydrophone as their initial means of detection.

(3) "Hunting groups" of destroyers carrying kite balloons have also been in operation and it is felt that the development of this plan may, during the summer months especially, yield valuable results. In any attempt to block the North Sea by patrol or mine barrage this type of operation should be developed to the utmost.

(4) Several coastal air stations have been completed and many others are contemplated. Seaplanes and airplanes operate from these bases in patrolling the sea. When submarines are sighted the planes endeavor to bomb them. It is doubtful if much positive damage has been done by these bombs, but upon several occasions ships have been saved by the submarine being forced to dive to avoid bombs from aircraft.

(5) A circling torpedo has been devised and has passed satisfactory tests. So far as known none have as yet been issued to the service.

(f) (1) The submarine is by far the most serious menace to ultimate Allied victory. At the present rate of destruction (500,000 tons of shipping a month), it is estimated that by October, 1918, the Allies will be constructing shipping at a rate which will be above the losses. This does not necessarily mean a victory, for if the war goes on that length of time without the suppression of the submarine the restriction upon food and fuel may reduce the will to win of the population of Italy, France, and Great Britain, to such an extent as to force these Governments into a compromise peace.

(2) It seems essential that operations to reduce the efficiency of the submarine must be devised. The German nation is basing its hope of victory on the success of the submarine. A powerful offensive against this type will effectually raise the morale of the Allies and lower that of the Central Powers. Therefore, even if the conditions point of the failure of the submarine campaign in the distant future it must be recognized that in waiting for that time there is grave danger of the failure of the morale of some of the Allied nations.

(3) The season of the year is not propitious for offensive operations against submarines, so at present all energies must be bent to operations in defense of commerce and equally, if not more important, to the preparation for offensive operations during the period from April to October 1918, at which time the restrictions will be the greatest, and the conditions for offensive operations the most advantageous.

(4) In order to adequately prepare for this offensive, plans must be made immediately and every effort exerted to make the operation a success. The preparation of material and equipment of ships require much time, and unless a plan is decided upon the spring will find the Allies unprepared to take advantage of the favorable conditions.

(5) In view of the impracticability of offensive operations against the enemy submarines or their bases at this season of the year, the first consideration should be given to the improvement of existing plans and a study of the modifications that may be required due to possible operations of cruising submarines, raiders and battle cruisers, against the convoys.

(g) See details in reference (f) and inclosure "F."

15. *General notes on the convoy system and the shipping situation.*—(a) (1) The principal antisubmarine effort is to-day being exerted in escorting convoys through the submarine danger zone in the Atlantic and North Sea and Channel. A convoy system will soon be in operation in the Mediterranean.

(2) The reduction in the per cent of losses of vessels in convoy has given rise to hopes that the adoption of the convoy system by all ocean-going vessels will reduce the submarine menace below the danger point.

(3) Such an assumption is dangerous without more experience than has been had as yet, and as the convoy system had only been in operation during the latter months of the fair weather of summer the difficulties attendant upon operations in the gales of winter and the fogs of fall and spring must be carefully considered.

(4) The convoy system is strategically defensive though tactically offensive. This offensive is merely a counter attack. Such operations on land are never decisive and unless coupled with strategically offensive operations are more than apt to fail on the sea. Convoy operations can not win the war. They may, if successful, prevent defeat. Unless the navies of the Allies forces are satisfied to let the armies or political conditions settle the war a more offensive plan is essential.

(b) (1) From present prospects the decision on land is far distant. The people of the European nations at war are war weary, the losses on land are enormous. Unless the Navy can unmistakably check the submarine menace the war is apt to be decided by political or labor conditions.

(2) National morale is to-day the vital point, and the effect on allied morale or a successful check to the submarine would be to raise it beyond any possibility of breaking. Likewise this would so reduce the enemy's chances of winning the war that the morale of the Central Powers would be likely to break.

(c) The convoy system should be regarded merely as a defensive operation carried on while preparing for an offensive. Such an attitude does not prevent thoroughness in carrying out the operation and in order that it may be successful in its rôle, it requires careful study to anticipate the changed conditions of the winter and the possible operations which may be conducted by the Central Powers to break up the system.

(d) (1) The convoy system requires the assembly of from 15 to 20 vessels, most of which are run on a schedule of one every eight days. Assuming that on the average there is a delay of two days in and two days out in a round trip, and that the average time for a round trip is five days, it will be seen at once that this is equivalent to a reduction in shipping of 8 per cent. In addition to this there is the congestion of ports, due to arrival and departure of large groups of ships practically simultaneously, which reduces the rapidity of discharge and loading.

(2) In order to make up for the loss in tonnage due to controlled sailings, it is necessary to attain the highest efficiency of employment of all ocean-going merchant tonnage. In order to accomplish this it is essential that all merchant shipping be controlled as to route, ports, and cargo by the Government, and that the Government representatives coordinate their efforts with the corresponding representatives of the Allies.

(3) An instance will indicate where the savings can be made. There are about 40 ships a month trading from the southeast coast of South America direct to the United States. Most of these ships are American or neutral, operating on an American time charter. This trade is no doubt profitable, but it is doubtful if it is essential to the conduct of the war.

(4) The United States and the Allies must consider carefully what peace-time trade can be dispensed with to meet the very serious shipping situation now before us.

(5) The efficient employment of such shipping as is available for the transportation of materials essential to the conduct of the war offers one of the most promising fields for reducing the actual shortage of shipping.

(e) Defense of convoys against raiders.

(1) The means at the disposal of the enemy with which to attack the convoys are—

1. U-boats;
2. *Deutschland* type of submarine cruisers;
3. Raiders (armed merchant ships);
4. Cruisers;
5. Battle cruisers.

(2) It appears that the system of protection for convoys now in operation is efficient so far as the resources available permit. The losses of vessels in convoy to the losses of vessels not in convoy is at present about 1 to 20. Of course the greater safety of the submarine in attacking vessels not under escort leads to a prevalence of this form of attack; and undoubtedly when all vessels are in convoy the proportion of ships sunk will not decrease in the above ratio.

(f) (1) The merchant captains state that in the bad weather of winter it will be impossible for ships in ballast to operate in convoys, so it seems that the proportion of shipping in convoy can never (for the next few months) exceed 50 per cent.

(2) The dispersion of convoys and the difficulty of maintaining position in convoy during fogs and gales will seriously reduce the efficiency of this system during the winter.

(3) The bad weather and long nights will, however, seriously reduce the efficiency of the submarine and it is believed that the rate of sinkings from U-boats will remain practically constant.

(g) (1) The introduction of the cruising submarine with its long radius of action will move the submarine menace further from the coast of Europe and thus necessitate more extensive destroyer escort operations. At present the force available does not permit this extension but as the number of submarines of this type is limited (probably six) this disadvantage must be accepted.

(2) This type of submarine is fitted with one or two guns 5.9 inches in caliber and is designed to use this gun as its primary weapon. The system of ocean escort is a partial answer to this form of attack.

(h) (1) The raider and cruiser menace are similar and can be considered together. It is quite possible that the raiders or cruisers so employed would have a battery of 6-inch guns and therefore the ocean escorts should be vessels with batteries not less than 6 inches.

(2) In view of the difficulty that would be experienced by one cruiser in guarding a convoy of 15 or 20 ships against a raider of equal speed, it seems that the enemy will use fast ships and those of merchant ship type with sufficient speed being rare, they probably will be cruisers.

(3) The enemy cruisers, however, have rather short radius of action and consequently could not operate long on the main trade routes unless they could obtain fuel from ships engaged in unneutral service. In view of this fact particular investigation of all ships not sailing in convoy should be made and coal cargoes should be traced to destination. Vessels with cargo of fuel should be made to travel in convoy.

(4) The threat from raiders or cruisers could best be met by increasing the number of ocean escorts with each convoy, but due to lack of suitable vessels this is an impossibility unless escort by battleships is adopted.

(i) (1) The most serious threat is that by enemy battle cruisers. If one of these vessels accompanied by a fast supply ship, and preceded by a submarine scouting force could get to sea, the possible damage that could be done would be enormous.

(2) Very serious thought must be given to this possibility and the secret service of the Allies should be directed to ascertain information indicating that any such arrangements are in preparation or even contemplated.

(j) See details in Reference (f) and inclosure F.

16. *Notes on the blockade.*—(a) The so-called blockade has been in operation since the early days of the war and has been conducted with a straight-forward and direct intention to allow no contraband to reach the enemy. Contraband has, during the progress of the war, been expanded in scope of meaning until it now includes practically all material of every description and is applied not only to goods of enemy destination but that might serve to release other goods to the enemy.

(b) Direct delivery of goods to the enemy was practically stopped early in the war in so far as concerned shipments from all the world except the four "northern neutrals." Leakage through those countries, either direct or indirect, has been checked if not stopped by restrictions on imports into the countries concerned. In all cases pressure of some kind, but chiefly economic, has been brought to bear to cause neutrals to deny export to the enemy. This pressure has taken the form of so-called rationing of neutrals in manufactures, in raw materials, and in fodder and foodstuffs and has extended to the denial of bunker coal to ships and of exports coal to the countries concerned unless certain requirements were complied with.

(c) The action of the United States in restricting exports to the "northern neutrals" is very welcome in adding to the efficiency of the blockade and exerting increasing pressure on the countries concerned to so conduct their affairs that the enemy may profit as little as possible.

(d) These matters are set forth at length in reference (f) inclosure "F."

17. *General notes on aviation matters.*—(a) The British have two air services—the Royal Flying Corps of the army and the Royal Naval Air Service—both of which are fully up to their work to the limit of personnel and material available, but the quality of personnel for increasing the number of active machines and for replacing casualties is said to be falling off.

(b) The French now have one course of air service supply and two operating branches of which the army branch has the preference in men and in material over the navy branch. Personnel suitable for air-service work is depleted and material is limited.

(c) Assistance in air service must, in France at least, include both personnel and material and the fact must not be lost sight of that large numbers of upkeep personnel are needed to keep the machines in shape so that the flyers may operate to best advantage.

(d) Material should take the form of complete machines which should not be shipped in the assembled condition on account of space thus occupied and needed for other cargo on account of the scarcity of shipping. Arrangements must be made to assemble the "knocked-down" machines after their delivery in France.

(e) Personnel should have their preliminary schooling in the United States before crossing to France, where a greater part of their flying education should take place under the competent instructions available there and in touch with actual flying conditions.

(f) It is understood that the United States will establish numerous aeronautic stations on the coast of France, presumably for antisubmarine work of a protective nature. The application of all possible antisubmarine measures to the development of the offensive is so important that it would be a mistake to consider that these coastal aeronautic stations have accomplished their task when in operation to patrol coastal areas. The coastal stations should be training areas for personnel destined to be used in offensive operations, thus incidentally providing for coastal defense as long as it may be considered necessary. It is deemed particularly important that this differentiation of purpose be clearly understood.

18. *Comment on proposed future policy, including future mining policy.* (*Reference (c) and inclosure C*).—(a) The striking feature of the proposed future policy of the British Admiralty is the final open recognition and conviction that the submarine menace is vital and that present antisubmarine measures are inadequate to cope with it.

(b) It is recommended that immediate and careful consideration be given to the reference mentioned above in connection with the proposed "mine barrage across the North Sea." (References (d) (e) and inclosures D F.) This is the most promising plan for coping with the submarine menace that has yet been developed. The time required to prepare the necessary material is so great and the arrangements for instituting and maintaining the barrage require such careful working out, that the earliest possible decision should be arrived at and the intentions of the United States made known to the British Government, in order that preparations may be begun and carried forward with all dispatch as soon as an agreement shall have been reached.

(c) While a greater degree of foresight in the earlier stages of the war might well have enabled measures to be undertaken looking to the direct offensive against the enemy navy in its bases both in Germany and in Belgium, the situation to-day is such that attempts "to dig them out of their holes," "destroy the hornet's nest," etc., would involve such complicated and difficult operations including the employment of practically all the allied navies and exposing them to extreme risk of grave disaster should any large part of the complex operation miscarry, that such plans can not be considered in any degree advisable nor even practicable.

(d) The enemy fleet can only be fought when he chooses to come out of his bases. Measures to force him out of his bases are not available from a naval point of view, except in so far as the contemplated antisubmarine offensive or perhaps future bombing raids via the air may make it appear to him that he has no other alternative to final destruction, defeat, or capture.

19. *The fuel-oil situation in Europe.*—The fuel-oil situation in Europe is always a source of anxiety, as at present, and the British Admiralty is extremely desirous that a just and equitable basis for pooling oil-tanker tonnage may be arrived at. It is understood that representatives of the British Government are now in the United States in connection with these matters.

20. *Other matters reported on.*—Separate reports will be made on the following matters:

- (a) Requests for assistance made by the Allies.
- (b) British shipbuilding programs.
- (c) The shipping situation.
- (d) British gunnery methods and fire-control material.
- (e) British radio methods and material.
- (f) Grand Fleet battle orders, etc.
- (g) Etc., etc.

21. *General recommendations.*—(a) The military-naval situation among the Allies is such that it is strongly recommended that the United States make the earliest possible decision as to what forms and extent the assistance to be given shall take and then proceed to exert every effort to expedite the production, dispatch, and employment of such assistance. Too much stress can not be laid on the importance of the time element.

(b) It is further recommended that time be not lost in attempting greater development or improvement of material which has already reached a fairly satisfactory state of development abroad, but that all energy be directed to reproducing such satisfactory material at the maximum possible rate.

22. *General results of visit.*—(a) There is every reason to believe that the visit of the commander in chief and his staff to England and to France was heartily welcomed and greatly appreciated as evidence of the earnest desire of the United States to get as closely as possible in touch with the situation and problems that confront the Allies. It is further believed that the Governments represented at the International Naval Conference in London on September 4 to 5, 1917, likewise welcomed and appreciated the participation of United States representatives in the discussions and in the conclusions of the conference.

(b) It is considered that better understanding and appreciation of aims and views must be a result of the visit and that the personal contact with the officials of the British Admiralty, with the commander in chief and officers of the grand fleet and with the officials of the French ministry of marine, as well as with the representatives of the several governments at the conference above mentioned, has done much to make the participation of the United States in the war seem more real and the assistance which the United States is capable of rendering much more tangible.

(c) The visit was of very great individual professional profit to the commander in chief and to the members of his staff, as well as of collective profit to the staff as a whole.

(d) There is recommended for consideration the matter of the United States maintaining in the operations division of the British Admiralty and in the flagship of the commander in chief of the grand fleet one or more officers of high rank and of suitable attainments to keep in intimate touch with operations both underway and contemplated. Such officers should return to Washington after a short period (when replaced by officers sent over for similar duty so that continuous touch may be kept) in order to acquaint the Navy Department fully and in detail with the situation in the field of actual operations. Such an arrangement would insure a constant and invaluable exchange of information and ideas regarding operations which could not fail greatly to promote better cooperation and coordination of effort. There would seem to be no reason why the above-proposed liaison system should not be extended, if desired, to the sending of British officers to the Navy Department and to the Atlantic Fleet, and further, to a similar interchange of officers with the French and other allied ministries of marine and principal fleets. It is known that the British Admiralty, at least, would be very glad to have liaison arrangements put into force.

H. T. MAYO.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (Operations).

[File 8012. Confidential.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
PASSAGE, LIVERPOOL TO NEW YORK,
S. S. "ST. LOUIS," *October 11, 1917.*

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Specific requests for assistance from the several allied powers.

References:

- (a) Report of international naval conference in London on September 4 to 5, 1917, extracts, inclosures A.
- (b) Memorandum from first sea lord of British Admiralty, dated September 22, 1917, inclosures B.
- (c) Memorandum of requests from France, inclosures C.
- (d) Memorandum of requests from Italy, inclosures D.
- (e) Memorandum of requests from Russia, inclosures E.

1. The following summary of specific requests for assistance from the United States made by the several allied powers is assembled from references and from notes the made in inter with Government representatives.

2. It is recommended that immediate and careful consideration be given to these requests and that decision or views in the premises be communicated to the several Governments concerned as soon as possible in order that the necessary arrangements for cooperation and coordination of assistance to be rendered may be made, as in practically all cases the time element is of very great importance.

3. Not only should there be the least possible delay in replying to the several requests in order that the Governments concerned may plan accordingly, but where material assistance is involved, care should be taken to concentrate effort on the production of material already found even fairly satisfactory for the purpose intended rather than to institute research and experimental work for development of new apparatus or for the improvement of existing apparatus, thus causing delays in production which would operate to markedly reduce, and perhaps even to nullify, the value of the assistance rendered.

4. The summary of requests is arranged as follows:

- (A) Requests made during international naval conference in London, September 4-5, 1917, inclosure A.
- (B) Requests made by Great Britain, inclosure B.
- (C) Requests made by France, inclosure C.
- (D) Requests made by Italy, inclosure D.
- (E) Requests made by Russia, inclosure E.

5. The commander in chief has made no written recommendation regarding these several requests, but is prepared to discuss them and to explain the points that were presented in connection with them when they were made.

H. T. MAYO.

Requests made by Allies during naval conferences:

The following points for consideration by the Navy Department came up during the international naval conference in London, September 4-5, 1917.

1. The question of a close offensive in German waters.

(a) The conference agreed that the question should be carefully considered by the Allies, and that they should indicate in due course to the British Admiralty the contribution of old war ships (for sinking in blocking German channels), which they would be prepared to provide if such operation was considered practicable.

(b) The suggested contribution from the United States Navy was 12 battleships and 8 cruisers.

2. (a) In considering the question of a mine barrage it was stated that the British shortage of skilled personnel (especially fitters) required for the assembly of mines, limited their output.

(b) The United States and Italian representatives undertook to ascertain how far their respective countries could assist in supplying the deficiency.

3. The conference agreed that the convoy of all craft, including neutrals in the service of the Allies, would require additional ocean escort vessels, and the various representatives agreed to ascertain what further cruisers or old battleships their respective nations could assign to this service.

4. (a) The questions of—I, concerted measures for preventing the establishment of enemy submarine bases overseas; and, II, the development of a wireless warning system and intelligence center in the Azores, were referred to a committee formed from representatives present.

(b) The report of the committee, adopted by the conference, was as follows:

(i) That the respective admiralties and ministries of marine should communicate with their colonial ministers and ask for instruction to be given to their colonies and overseas possessions to keep supervision over all harbors and anchorages to gain intelligence of German submarines or suspicious vessels.

(ii) That steps should be taken to insure close cooperation between allied ministers in neutral countries to make such representations as will insure adequate action to prevent submarines or suspicious vessels being succored or allowed to make use of territorial waters.

(iii) That the question of fitting certain ships in convoys with powerful W T to pass messages should receive consideration whenever convoys should be established, having particular regard to the difficulty of receiving W/T intelligence from vessels attacked off the coast of South America and in the South Atlantic generally.

(iv) That, with the permission of the Portuguese Government—

(a) A United States naval force should be based in the Azores.

(b) A British intelligence center should be established in the Azores.

(c) British directional W/T stations should be established in the Azores.

(d) A British long-distance W/T station should be established in the Azores for the war.

NOTE.—Any British units would work under the general direction of the United States senior naval officer.

5. Vice Admiral Cusani read a statement from which the following is a quotation:

(a) "Besides the various active cooperation by armed forces, there is another field in which the United States can bring to us a welcome, a precious, and I would say a most needed contribution, that is in giving us those supplies and materials of which we and our other allies are short for making ships, machinery, and munitions of war."

(b) We would welcome any declaration from the American delegation to that effect, and we would be then on a firmer ground, so far as Italy is concerned, to bring this conference to useful conclusions.

(c) He had before him a list of the material required, and emphasizing the delay which his government experienced in obtaining the delivery of important orders already placed in the United States.

(d) Admiral May undertook to make representations to his Government with a view to securing an expeditious delivery of the orders referred to. As regards further material help, he professed himself unable to give any undertaking, and suggested that the correct procedure would be for the Italian Government to make representations to the United States Government through the usual channel.

6. Previous to the conference, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in conversation with Admiral Mayo, invited attention to the fact that Great Britain had not commandeered any shipping under construction for any of the Allies, and intimated that he hoped the United States would not commandeer any shipping building in the United States for Great Britain.

REQUESTS MADE BY GREAT BRITAIN FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE DESIRED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Memorandum from First Sea Lord.

The further assistance desired from the United States from available forces or resources is as follows:

1. Four coal-burning battleships of the dreadnought type to replace three or four Grand Fleet dreadnought battleships which it is desired to send to foreign waters to relieve older battleships which are being paid off for want of personnel.
2. An increase in the number of destroyers, in order to enlarge the convoy system and to provide better protection for each convoy.
3. An increase in the number of convoy cruisers for the same reason.
4. An increase in the number of patrol craft, tugs, etc., for antisubmarine work.
5. The rapid building of merchant ships.
6. The supply of a large number of mines for the proposed barrage between Scotland and Norway, and assistance toward laying them by the provision of United States mine-laying vessels.

Notes: As regards (1), the increase in the number of destroyers during the war has forced us to pay off the older capital ships to provide trained personnel for the light cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers. This policy must still continue, as officers and crews will be required during the next 18 months for the 19 light cruisers, 12 flotilla leaders and 119 destroyers now in various stages of construction. Should the United States Government see fit to send over four coal-burning dreadnoughts, they would be attached to the Grand Fleet and form an integral portion of it, working together as a division of a battle squadron; (2) the United States destroyers are more suitable for convoy work on the western approaches to Great Britain than British destroyers, owing to their size and greater radius of action. Any increase possible in this direction would enable more British destroyers to be used in the North Sea to operate offensively against enemy submarines; (3) an increase in the number of convoy cruisers would enable the number of convoys to be increased, or, alternatively, the number of merchant ships in each convoy could be reduced and better control and protection be assured; (4) the proposed barrage of mines between Scotland and Norway will entail the provision of large numbers of patrol vessels. Any assistance from the United States in this respect will be most welcome either to cooperate in patrolling the barrage, or, alternatively, to release British patrol vessels for this purpose.

Naval staff (D. C. N. S.), September 22, 1917.

7. Note with regard to mines: (a) It is considered essential that mines used in a barrage where patrol craft are numerous, should become inoperative upon breaking away from their moorings; (b) the British Admiralty desires to know what type of sinker can be used with the United States mines.

8. Fuel-oil situation: (a) the situation with regard to fuel oil is still unsatisfactory. The amount on hand for naval use is approximately 600,000 tons. Of this possibly as much as 150,000 tons will not be available at the particular point where it is required. This leaves a real available supply of approximately 450,000 tons; (b) the normal monthly consumption under the present conditions of operation (the fleet practically immobilized) is 225,000 tons; (c) the amount on hand available is therefore approximately two months supply; (d) the greatest efficiency in oil supply can only be obtained by pooling the tonnage of the large oil companies and controlling their sailings by a joint committee representing the United States and Great Britain.

Requests made by France:

1. During the time the commander in chief was in France conferences were held with Maj. Gen. Pershing, United States Army, Vice Admiral DuBon, Chief of Staff of the French Army, and with officers of the United States Navy on duty in France.

2. At the suggestion of Lord Derby and Gen. Murray, Gen. Pershing had already cabled to the United States suggesting that he proceed to London for a conference with British authorities and Admiral Mayo, to fully consider all of the demands which will be made upon shipping in order to supply the United States Army and the necessities of the allied nations. He had received an answer to the effect that the President did not consider such conference advisable as the United States Shipping Board was confident that they would be able to supply the United States Army with United States ships only.

3. In view of the above, after general conversation in regard to the great demands that would be made to support the Army, and in the belief that it is quite possible that the magnitude of these demands now, and in the future, may not be fully realized at home, it was agreed both Gen. Pershing and Admiral Mayo would recommend early and serious consideration, and that the question of supplying United States colliers, either naval or otherwise, for transporting English coal to France for the use

of the United States Army would be taken up at once. The amount of coal required by the United States Army is estimated as 80,000 tons per month.

4. During a conference at the Hotel Crillon, Paris, Admiral Du Bon submitted the following points for consideration: (a) That Gen. Pershing confer with Admiral Mayo and arrive at a definite conclusion as to the ports to be used in connection with the transportation of troops, and the proportion of troops to be sent to each port, and that Admiral Mayo should take back the general scheme to the United States; (b) he further recommended that as the larger ships can not go to French ports for landing troops without great difficulty, that the utilization of Liverpool and Southampton be considered, and further that the troops be transported from the above places to Cherbourg, so as not to interfere with the British cross-channel transportation; (c) he requested that the ships that are being constructed in the United States for the French and have been commandeered by the United States, be released for the use of the French Government for military purposes; (d) the question of transportation of coal from England for the French fleet at Corfu is most important as the general shortage of coal is most marked; (e) the French Navy is very short of enlisted personnel. The French have some cruisers laid up in ordinary for want of men and the French Government is willing to turn these cruisers over to the Allies for any purpose desired, if men can be provided; (f) it was suggested that several French battleships could be replaced by predreadnaughts of the United States fleet and the crews of the French battleships thus relieved, could be used to man these cruisers; (g) the question of aviation assistance was mentioned, but full reports on this subject have been submitted by the officers detailed for this special branch; (h) Admiral Du Bon presented a memorandum concerning assistance desired in adding to the efficiency of the ports of debarkation of the Army. The principal points are: (1) The French Marine has bought in the United States, some three months ago, 15 patrol and tug boats, and with these boats expects to strengthen the services of dredging the ports of Brest, St. Nazaire, and Pauillac; (2) for 8 of these vessels the transfer of flag and the ratification of sale has been obtained, but they are kept in America for repairs; (3) for the 7 others the transfer of flag and the ratification of sale are not yet realized; (4) assistance in lessening the delay caused by the necessary formalities, and in hastening the repairs would be very much appreciated; (5) even with this reinforcement, the means at the disposal of the French will not permit the gathering; (6) in order to maintain each of these ports at its maximum efficiency dredging vessels from the United States are required in each port.

5. (a) The French Government is much concerned lest the necessary arrangements for the transport, disembarkation, and upkeep of United States troops should be underestimated in any degree with the result that the number of United States troops available for service in France in the spring and summer of 1918 might fall materially below the estimates; (b) at numerous interviews both French and British representatives repeatedly referred to and emphasized the seriousness of the situation that might ensue if, for any reason, the United States should be unable to forward troops to France in the numbers now expected, and, especially, if the necessary supplies for United States troops in France should be insufficient whether on account of underestimate, lack of shipping, or of shipping losses, thus throwing even for a time the burden of supply on the limited resources of France; (c) it is very apparent that real fear exists lest the shortage of coal in France during the coming winter should have an injurious effect on the morale of the country. In this connection attention is invited to the advisability, and even necessity, that the needs of the United States troops in coal shall not be allowed to increase the embarrassment which the coal shortage in France may bring about; (d) powerful tugs of seagoing type are needed at the ports of debarkation of United States troops and supplies in France. These tugs should be armed, and when not engaged in debarkation work could be usefully employed in salvage work or even on patrol. Two such tugs should be sent to St. Nazaire as soon as possible, to be followed by others for Brest and Pauillac as rapidly as they become available.

(d) REQUESTS MADE BY ITALY.

CARLTON HOTEL,
London, England, September 8, 1917.

From: Commander in chief.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Italian Government; request for expeditious delivery of material.

Reference: (a) Letter from Rear Admiral Cusani-Visconti, Italian naval representative at international naval conference.

Inclosure: (1).

1. The reference (inclosure) is forwarded for consideration.

2. The Italian naval representative at the international naval conference desired to bring up the question of material to Italy. It was deemed advisable not to discuss

his matter in conference, and it was promised that a request of the Italian Government could be duly presented to the Navy Department. The reference (inclosure) is the Italian presentation of the matter in question.

H. T. MAYO.

LONDON, September 6, 1917.

DEAR ADMIRAL MAYO: With reference to our conversation regarding the supply of material to Italy, I beg to inclose herewith a detailed list of those materials which are particularly needed by the Italian Navy, for the most urgent and immediate requirements.

In order to partly replace the heavy loss of tonnage, caused by enemy submarines, it will be necessary to Italy to obtain some cargo boats, of from four to five thousand tons, to be employed in the coal transport, the deficiency of which is now becoming alarming.

I shall be extremely obliged for any good work you will use toward obtaining from the United States Government that the material already asked for, or now being asked, may be sent to Italy as soon as possible.

Please accept, my dear Admiral, with kindest regards, my personal and cordial salutations.

Yours, sincerely,

CUSANI-VISCONTI.

LIST OF THE MATERIALS AND MACHINERY BEING ORDERED IN THE UNITED STATES BY
THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF MARINE.

Nine thousand tons of steel sections and plates for shipbuilding (part in mild steel and part in high-tensile steel); 6,000 tons of steel sections and plates for shipbuilding (part in mild steel and part in high-tensile steel), 1,000 tons per month; 50 motor launches from Messrs. the "Elco" (submarine chasers); 36 "Standard" motors with 18 auxiliary sets; 60 "Sterling" motors for motor launches. Spare parts for "Standard" and "Sterling" motors.

Probable requirements.—Special steels for motor-launch motors and aviation motors (being built by the Fiat, Isotta-Fraschini); tool steel; boiler tubes; semi-Diesel motors, of reliable types; machine tool for new works; cargo boats (from 4,000 to 5,000 tons).

(c) REQUESTS MADE BY RUSSIA.

1. No specific requests for assistance from the United States were made by Russia, but indirect assistance would undoubtedly result from the increase of United States vessels operating with the British Navy, thus enabling additional British vessels to be sent to cover the approaches to the White Sea.

ALLIED NAVAL CONFERENCE.

Sir Eric Geddes, on behalf of the British Government, having offered a welcome to the representatives of the navies of the powers united against Germany, reminded them that the conference was called at the suggestion of the United States Government.

Admiral Mayo explained that he came with no definite instructions, but with the desire to learn how the United States Navy could best assist and cooperate with the allied navies, particularly in dealing with the submarine menace, which his Government regarded especially serious at the present time. He also emphasized his conviction of the value of personal intercourse between officers of his own and the allied navies.

[Secret. Allied naval conference. Sept. 4, 1917.]

AGENDA AND CONCLUSIONS.

Item 1. *The question of a close offensive in German waters.*—Admiral Jellicoe made a statement in full of an offensive which might be taken by the Allies in German waters.

After discussion on the various aspects of the matter and the which it would be necessary to take in order to insure its the conference agreed that the question should be carefully sidered by the Allies, and that they should indicate in due co the British Admiralty the contribution of old warships which would be prepared to provide, the possibility of embarking a proposed operation being dependent upon the supply of the of ships indicated by Admiral Jellicoe.

Admiral Jellicoe suggested that the required number of might be supplied as follows:

| | Battleships. | |
|--------------------|--------------|--|
| British..... | 18 | |
| French..... | 5 | |
| Italian..... | 2 | |
| Japanese..... | 2 | |
| United States..... | 12 | |
| Total..... | 40 | |

Item 2. The alternative of a mine or net barrage either in German waters or afield.—Admiral Jellicoe put forward as an alternative to a close offensive in waters, the suggestion that the activity of the German submarines might be re by the laying of an effective mine field or mine net barrage. If such an were undertaken, he proposed that it should take the form of:

(a) An efficient mine barrage so as to completely shut in the North Sea operation necessitated the provision of at least 100,000 mines, which would available for some considerable time.

(b) He had considered the question of a barrage of mine nets, which was sidered to be impracticable by him.

In the view of the conference it was felt that alternative (a) could not be taken until an adequate supply of mines of a satisfactory type was secured. the adoption of alternative (a), an improvement and extension of the present of minefields was desirable and the conference agreed that a barrage of mine was impracticable.

In this connection the British shortage of skilled personnel (especially required for the assembly of mines was noted, and the Allies undertook to c how far they could assist in supplying the deficiency.

Item 3. Offensive measures against enemy submarines in the North Sea.—The of the best offensive measures which should, as far as possible, be taken against submarines in the North Sea was discussed at length. It was agreed that the desirable were: (a) To attack the submarine bases; (b) to mine the submarine effectively; and (c) to attack the submarines at sea. And it was felt that measures should be amplified as far as possible on the lines explained in de Admiral Jellicoe, which received the general concurrence of the conference.

Item 4. Measures to deal with enemy submarine cruisers of large radius of action the high seas.—Admiral Jellicoe put forward for the consideration of the com the following measures which might be taken to deal with enemy submarine with a large radius of action on the high seas:

(1) The use of decoy ships, working in concert with submarines, for de action.

(2) Concerted measures for preventing the establishment of enemy sub bases overseas.

(3) The convoy of all craft, including friendly neutrals as far as possible.

(4) The development of a wireless warning system and an intelligence cen the Azores. -

Item 1 would require additional cruisers, and the conference decided the Allies should see whether they could provide cruisers or old battleships purpose.

Items 2 and 4 were referred to a committee consisting of Admiral Oliver, Hall, Admiral Salaun, Lieut. Rottiacob, Capt. Twining—Capt. lieut. de C Portugese naval attaché, being invited to join them—it being agreed that their should be adopted as embodying the view of the conference.

Item 5. Establishment of convoys universally for outward and homeward trade and minimization necessary.—Admiral Jellicoe made a statement on the general convoy situation and the conference agreed to accept it as embodying its views. The question of additional cruisers for convoy work to be further considered by the Allies at the next opportunity.

Item 6. Establishment of convoy system in Mediterranean. Necessity for this system in order to insure adequate supply of coal to Italy and to economize tonnage.—After this question had been discussed at some length, it was referred to a committee composed of Rear Admiral A. L. Duff, C. B. (chairman); Vice Admiral de Bon; Rear Admiral Maun; Rear Admiral Majishiro Funakishil; Capt. Massimiliano Lovatelli; to consider and bring up a report at the conference. The report having been duly presented, it was, after consideration by the conference, approved and adopted.

It was also decided that the Allied council sitting at Malta on the general question of trade protection in the Mediterranean should be informed that the International Naval Conference in London the council wishes to know that the conference regarded it of the utmost importance that in their deliberations the necessity of economizing tonnage by avoidance of delays should be constantly borne in mind. This matter was agreed to be of prime importance and it was proposed to discuss it further at the next meeting after the reports of the Malta Council were received.

Item 7. The laying of the Otranto barrage and its defense by Allied destroyers—Aircraft and submarine patrol for the barrage.—Admiral Jellicoe having explained the present situation with regard to the laying of the *Otranto* barrage and having drawn attention to the unprotected condition of the net drifters, stated that a protective force composed of six destroyers constantly on patrol duty at night was necessary. Of this Great Britain is prepared to provide the number required to maintain or patrol three, and asked that the Italian naval authorities should provide the exchange necessary to maintain the other three.

Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti promised that he would consider the point referred to by Admiral Jellicoe and would take steps to ascertain from headquarters whether three destroyers could be provided by the Italian Navy.

Vice Admiral de Bon stated that the French Ministry of Marine would have no objection to some of the French destroyers allotted to Italy being used for this work, in conjunction with the Italian destroyers.

Item 8. Offensive measures in the Adriatic against enemy bases.—Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti was invited to state his views as to a possible offensive against the Austrian naval forces located in the Adriatic, it being suggested that an operation having for its object the occupation of the island of Curzola might be successfully undertaken, and if this were carried through beneficial results would accrue to the Allies. It was further suggested that bombing operations by aircraft might be carried out against the Austrian submarine bases in the Adriatic.

Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti explained the present situation and the difficulties involved in the occupation of Curzola, and stated that this proposal had been considered in the earlier stages of the war. He explained the bombing operations that had already been carried out against Austrian bases and referred to the Anglo-Italian operation of this nature which had just been attempted.

The question of an attack on Durazzo was also discussed.

Item 9. Assistance by allied fleet in the protection of Archangel route and White Sea in submarine attack.—At the request of Rear Admiral Kedroff this matter was considered by the conference. He urged the importance of the immediate provision of protective forces in the Kola Inlet, as he anticipated that the Germans would keep their submarines on the White Sea route for a longer period this autumn than they did last year, because Russia had just established a new naval base at Kola Bay open during the whole winter and connected with Petrograd by a new railway line. He asked whether Great Britain could not supply 12 armed trawlers for the purpose.

Admiral Jellicoe, whilst giving expression to the desire of Great Britain to render all the assistance in their power in dealing with the position which Rear Admiral Kedroff anticipated would occur, stated that owing to the shortage of the number of armed trawlers available we could not hold out hope that Great Britain would be able to provide the force for which Rear Admiral Kedroff asked.

Admiral Jellicoe expressed doubt as to whether the anticipation voiced by Rear Admiral Kedroff as to the German submarines remaining in the White Sea for a longer period than was the case last year would be realized, but undertook to consider what could be done to meet the requirements which had been indicated by Rear Admiral Kedroff.

Item 10. Assistance to Italy by the United States of America in the direction of supplying material.—Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti asked that this subject might be

discussed by the conference. He had before him a list of the material required and emphasized the delay which his Government experienced in obtaining the delivery of important orders already placed in the United States. He hoped that Admiral May might help his Government to overcome these delays. He gave in detail the main requirements of the Italian Navy.

Admiral Mayo undertook to make representations to his Government with a view to securing an expeditious delivery of the orders referred to. As regards further material help, he professed himself unable to give any undertaking, and suggested that the correct procedure would be for the Italian Government to make representations to the United States Government through the usual channel.

Arising out of the discussion upon this matter, the question of the provision of United States or British destroyers for the Mediterranean was discussed, and Admiral Jellicoe stated that if the United States destroyer program resulted in relief of British destroyers from the duties upon which they were at present engaged, further British destroyers would no doubt be sent to the Mediterranean for antisubmarine work or trade protection.

CONCLUSIONS OF SUBCOMMITTEE.

Agreed.—(1) That the respective admiralties and ministries of marine should communicate with the colonial ministers and ask for instructions to be given to their colonies and oversea possessions to keep supervision over all harbors and anchorages to gain intelligence of German submarines or suspicious vessels.

(2) That steps be taken to insure cooperation between allied ministers in neutral countries to make such representations as will insure adequate steps being taken to prevent submarines or suspicious vessels being succored or allowed to make use of territorial waters.

(3) That the following steps be taken as regards the Azores, the Portuguese Government being first asked permission: (i) A United States naval force to be based in the Azores; (ii) a British intelligence center to be established; (iii) British directional W-T stations to be established; (iv) British long distance W-T stations to be established for the war.

British units to work under the general direction of the United States senior naval officer.

The French representative brought up the question of the difficulty of receiving W-T intelligence from vessels attacked by submarines in the South Atlantic, and more particularly off the coast of South America.

It was agreed that question of fitting certain ships in convoys with powerful W.-T. to pass messages should receive consideration whenever convoys should be established.

AGENDA (SECRET).

1. The question of close offensive in German waters.
2. The alternative of a mine or net barrage either in German waters or further afield.
3. Offensive measures against enemy submarines in the North Sea.
4. Measures to deal with enemy submarine cruisers of long radius of action on the high seas.
5. Establishment of convoys universally for outward and homeward trade and organization necessary.
6. Establishment of convoy system in Mediterranean. Necessity for this system in order to insure adequate supply of coal to Italy and to economize tonnage.
7. The laying of the Otranto barrage and its defense by allied destroyers, aircraft, and submarine patrol for the barrage.
8. Offensive measures in the Adriatic against enemy bases.

AGENDA (5TH SEPTEMBER).

1. Report of committee appointed by conference to consider questions arising out of item No. 6, on the agenda of September 4.
2. The laying of the Otranto barrage and its defense by allied destroyers. Aircraft and submarine patrol for the barrage.
3. Offensive measures in the Adriatic against enemy bases.
4. Assistance to Italy by United States Army in the direction of supply material.
5. Assistance by allied fleets in the protection of the Archangel route and White Sea against submarine attack.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
December 17, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Annual report; July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917.
Reference: (a) Naval Instructions 916 (4).

1. The following report of the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet is submitted for the fiscal year 1917.

2. Due to war conditions it has not been considered advisable to go into detail in this report, as much of the data which might be included would be of possible use to the enemy as indicating the methods and principles followed in preparing the fleet for battle. Full detailed reports of all matters mentioned will be found in the department's files.

3. Since the declaration of war on April 6, 1917, the activities of the fleet have been recorded in the war diary which, it is assumed, will take the place of the annual report.

ORGANIZATION.

4. On July 1, 1916, the fleet consisted of the following forces: Battleship force, cruiser force, destroyer force, submarine force, mine force, train, reserve force.

5. The general principle which actuated the commander in chief during the period preceding the war was a proper coordinating of the various forces comprising the fleet, so that the fleet should be in a true sense of the word a "fleet" and not a collection of more or less independent forces. To accomplish this end the commander in chief endeavored to instill into the fleet a proper realization of the importance of "decentralization of authority" and "initiative of the subordinate." The principle was followed of passing down the chain of command the handling of all details to the lowest link in the chain which could properly handle them, and, on the other hand, gathering in and coordinating into the high command the control of all policies and matters of major importance from all the units of the fleet.

6. In carrying out this policy the commander in chief with the full support of the department and of the Chief of Naval Operations and it is believed that mobilization found the fleet and the department working in the closest cooperation.

7. Upon mobilization certain changes in organization became necessary, due to the general and special situations arising from the declaration of war, but the fleet has been able to assimilate new units and a greatly increased number of ships and personnel without undue strain on the organization.

8. As indicating the general policies followed by the commander in chief in preparing the fleet for war, the following extracts are quoted from the Fleet Regulations:

"SECTION II.—GENERAL FLEET POLICIES.

"4. The mission of the fleet is to maintain itself in a state of readiness for war, which indicates not only material readiness but also the readiness of personnel to operate the material.

"5. All vessels of the fleet must be as nearly selfsustaining as possible and shall endeavor to reduce work to be done at a navy yard to a minimum.

"6. No recommendations or arrangements shall be made which tend toward limitation or restriction of the mobility of the fleet or of the component parts thereof.

"7. Vessels in commission in reserve or with reduced complements shall be maintained and shall operate on a cruising basis as far as practicable.

"8. All work done in the fleet and all training of the fleet or of its component parts shall be carried on according to a prearranged plan, which should, in general, cover employment for at least one week ahead.

"9. (a) It is expected and required that all persons in the fleet shall conduct affairs in accordance with the Naval Regulations and Naval Instructions, which are not only orders and instructions but also guides to standard practice and hence aids to uniformity, coordination and cooperation.

"(b) The same is true of these regulations and instructions, the Gunnery Instructions 1913, the Ship and Gun Drills, the Infantry Drill Regulations, etc.

"10. Since the organization, both of the fleet and within the ship, is arranged on a 'group and leader' basis, consideration shall be given to this fact in the management of affairs not only in regard to operations but also in matters of administration.

"11. For purposes of training and in order to impress upon force and other subordinate commanders their proper responsibilities and authority, endeavor shall be made to issue orders and instructions which, as far as practicable, are stated in definite terms as to the results desired but in general terms as to the manner of execution.

"12. The general methods of exercising supervision on the part of superior commanders shall be: (1) Giving careful attention to results attained; (2) giving careful attention to inspections, reports of employment, reports of readiness, etc. (see chapter re Inspections, etc.); (3) taking steps to correct defective execution and faulty practice."

COMMUNICATIONS.

9. In the training and development of the fleet the vital need for most efficient communications has been shown in exercising both command and administration.

10. The communication system throughout the fleet has been standardized, and strategic and tactical exercises held have impressed all officers with the necessity for making every effort to increase the efficiency of all communications.

11. Complete cooperation with the shore establishment has been had and mobilization did not develop any defects in the principles of the communication system, but every effort will be made to continue improvement along all lines.

12. *Visual signaling.*—To improve the efficiency of visual signaling the commander in chief has recommended the establishment of a separate signal branch similar to the radio branch, with proper warrant ranks and ratings.

13. *Radio material.*—Minor improvements in radio standard plans and apparatus have been made for all classes of vessels during the past year. The most important improvements have been in the development of the radio compass and the improvement and increase in numbers of ships long-range arc transmitters. Due to the increasing numbers of naval vessels in active service, it will soon become necessary to increase the number of communications by radio which can be carried on simultaneously without interference. Development work on apparatus which will accomplish this has already been started.

14. *Radio personnel.*—Radio personnel has improved steadily during the past year in both efficiency and numbers. The battleship force has greatly assisted in supplying personnel for ships which have been added to the fleet since the outbreak of war by maintaining large classes under intensive instruction on all battleships. The increase in the number of radio gunners will soon provide one for each capital ship of the first line.

15. *Radio organization and operation.*—The fact that our radio organization is sound and that its development has been for use in war is shown by the small number of changes found necessary in going from a peace to a war basis.

16. A new system of handling routine radio traffic has been developed and put into use which makes much more time available for radio drills.

TACTICAL AND STRATEGICAL TRAINING.

17. The maximum amount of time available was devoted to tactical and strategical exercises.

18. The first series of tactical exercises for the year was held during the week July 10-14, 1916.

19. These exercises indicated the necessity of continued training. The practical difficulties of continued operations, of unfavorable weather conditions, of communication in code and cipher, of assembling forces at night or in foggy weather, brought home to all the vast difference between actual maneuvers at sea and the theoretical maneuvers of the game board.

20. The second series of tactical exercises was held August 11-15, 1916.

21. In many respects the second series of exercises showed improvement in the handling of tactical situations. The conditions due to low visibility were particularly trying. While continual bad weather somewhat reduces the value of the exercises, it emphasizes the necessity of continued training to meet these disturbing conditions. The exercises with the submarines were particularly valuable to that force.

22. The third series of tactical exercises was held December 13-19, 1916.

23. The exercises started with a review of the fleet by the Secretary of the Navy, in Hampton Roads. The commander in chief and several force and division commanders were absent from the fleet, being on temporary duty in Washington in connection with the selection board.

24. These exercises were conducted in inclement weather conditions, low visibility, rain and sleet. The small number of vessels available reduced to a considerable extent the value of the exercises, but the experience gained by those who participated made the exercises well worth while.

25. These exercises showed again that the clothing of officers and men had not been designed for winter weather and emphasized the need of special winter clothing.

26. A fourth series of tactical exercises was conducted while the fleet was enroute from San Domingo City to Port au Prince, Haiti.

27. This series consisted of two night attacks by the destroyer force on the battleship force and one simulated major engagement. The work of the destroyers was much more effective than during the exercises held during the summer.

28. The major engagement emphasized the necessity for rapid deployment into battle formation from cruising formation and the serious disadvantage of funnel smoke interference with gunnery.

29. It is believed that the success of these tactical exercises have aroused a lively interest in this subject and that a continuation of such exercises whenever opportunity exists is the best means of developing tactical skill and of developing battle instructions.

30. From August 20 to 26, 1916, department strategic maneuver No. 3 was carried out utilizing all available forces afloat, and the Atlantic coast shore establishment including the Navy Department.

31. These strategic maneuvers on a large scale which originate with the department are extremely valuable. The use of the reserve force as a defending fleet gave it valuable experience. This practice should be continued in time of peace in order to test out the material condition of the reserve force and to furnish training to additional officers and men.

32. Strategic exercises were also held during the passage of the fleet from home yards to its winter base at Guantanamo.

33. The first exercise was conducted during weather which was detrimental to efficient scouting by destroyers. Frequently the maximum speed of such craft did not exceed 15 knots, but again indicated the necessity for scouting vessels of sufficient size and power to maintain a high speed in a moderate sea.

34. Strategical and tactical exercises are of the greatest importance in the development of the fleet for war and the policy of conducting such exercises upon every possible occasion will be continued.

GUNNERY.

35. Upon the completion of the gunnery year, 1916-17, the country had been at war three months, and the fleet had been operating under war conditions since about the 6th of February and many of the exercises prescribed by the Orders for Gunnery Exercises, 1916-17 had to be delayed or were held under modified conditions.

36. Notwithstanding the many interruptions in the schedule and the conditions under which the exercises were necessarily held steady progress in the ability and confidence of the personnel to prepare for, maintain, and control the fire of the different batteries under varying conditions was made.

37. At the beginning of the gunnery year in July, 1916, the system of training which had produced satisfactory results in the battleship force during the gunnery year of 1915-16 was put into effect on all vessels of the fleet, and when diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off in February, 1916, it was unnecessary to make many changes in the prescribed system. Details of the system have been fully covered in special reports to the department, which have been published in the Reports of Practices. Very full reports have been submitted on this subject as it is considered that future progress depends on a careful study of the work of the past.

38. At the time of the entry of this country into the war, the fleet was finishing the prescribed gunnery exercises. The demands for experienced personnel to place in full commission old ships and to commission new ships had to be met by the active fleet to a large extent, and the withdrawal of many men and officers necessarily reduced the gunnery efficiency of a large part of the fleet. The situation was realized to be one of necessity and every effort has been made to maintain efficiency of the ships to as great a degree as possible.

39. Facilities for conducting gunnery exercises were provided at various points along the Atlantic coast in order that vessels might conduct the exercises according to the prescribed methods as closely as possible. The facilities should be extended in order that all vessels should carry on systematic exercises.

40. Beginning in March the demands for crews as armed guards of merchant ships began and in the early part of April it was necessary to have the battleships conduct an intensive form of training to provide the crews. This training is considered to have had a very beneficial effect upon the morale of the battleships as it added a great deal of interest during a time when many officers and men were being transferred.

41. The spirit and efficiency with which the officers and men of the fleet met the demands for experienced personnel, not only for crews for armed guards but also for other purposes, was particularly gratifying to the commander in chief and reflects great credit on the officers and men concerned.

42. Generally speaking, the material condition of the batteries is satisfactory, though it has become apparent that certain very radical alterations must be made in

the design of the ammunition supply of certain of the battleships. The material questions have been taken up in the usual manner and have been and are being given constant consideration. No effort should be spared to expedite the completion of all authorized and contemplated changes as it is realized that steady progress in efficiency can not be made if ships are continually undergoing repairs and alterations.

43. Available information as a result of the naval engagements of the present war have been considered and studied with a view to taking advantage of them in determining the proper forms of gunnery exercises. The Orders for Gunnery Exercises, 1917-18, were prepared by the department in conference with officers of the fleet and it is considered that they present representative types of exercises which should be held during the war in order to insure a satisfactory degree of gunnery efficiency.

MATERIAL UPKEEP.

44. Constant effort has been made to make the fleet materially self-sustaining, and it is believed much has been accomplished in this direction. This is due to increased tool equipment on the part of the ships and tenders, more permanent attendance with the fleet of tenders and repair ships, the presence of a second repair ship with the fleet during the last six months of the year, and especially to the fuller realization on the part of all concerned of the importance and necessity of keeping ships away from navy yards.

45. Operating schedules for all forces of the fleet have provided frequent and adequate periods for material upkeep and machinery overhaul, and as far as practicable these have not been interfered with.

46. The commander in chief has emphasized in every way possible his belief that ships should not go to navy yards for work unless it is absolutely necessary; that no ships should go to a navy yard until the yard has all material ready and is fully prepared to carry out expeditiously the authorized work; and that ships away from the flag for necessary yard work should rejoin at the earliest possible time.

47. By allowing suitable periods for machinery overhaul, there should, aside from casualties and major alterations, be no necessity for ships that have been overhauled at navy yards to go to yards, other than for the semiannual dockings of about a week or 10 days at a time, for a period of, say, two years. After that length of time in active service a ship should be given an opportunity for a comprehensive and thorough examination and repair. No fixed time can be allowed for this as it will depend on conditions existing at the time.

48. As far as possible alterations should be deferred until the refit period.

49. Since early in February the fleet has been operating under war conditions, but no serious material defects have occurred. There have been a number of casualties during the year, but except for the total loss of the *Memphis* at San Domingo City, Santo Domingo, all material damage resulting from casualties has been made good or arrangements have been made for effecting early repairs.

50. When the fleet went south, early in January, the material condition was, in general, very good. There was, however, more or less outstanding work on nearly every vessel. Much of this was accomplished by the ship's force, assisted by repair ships and tenders.

51. The material condition of battleships of the active fleet when they returned from the winter's work was very good, and except for docking and routing work, no battleship of the active force has had to go to a navy yard for repair work. Advantage has been taken, however, of favorable opportunities to send in three battleships from the active fleet, for desirable alterations and necessary repairs, and a schedule is now being prepared by which other battleships of the fleet can have work, primarily alterations necessary for war efficiency, undertaken at the navy yards.

52. A number of destroyers operating with the fleet developed machinery troubles during the year and the casualties due to service under war conditions were more numerous than ordinarily. All defects have, however, been made good and necessary repairs effected so that the end of the year finds the destroyer force and its tenders in a generally excellent material condition.

53. No special comment is necessary on the material condition of vessels of the cruiser and gunboat classes, submarines, or vessels attached to the train. In general, these vessels are in a reasonably satisfactory material condition. Full information as to their condition is contained in the detailed reports that have been submitted to the department from time to time and in the semiannual reports submitted by force commanders.

SUPPLY.

54. Supply has been satisfactorily maintained during the year, and relations between the fleet and various bureaus and offices of the department in regard to supply have been most satisfactory. The functions of the train have been gradually extended

until now it handles practically all supply matters, keeping the commander in chief advised. This procedure is very satisfactory. It accomplishes the desired results, and the commander in chief is not hampered with many details of supply, while being in possession of all the necessary information.

55. During the latter part of the year the *Bridge*, supply ship, was added to the fleet and is at present on her first service. She will no doubt be of great value and will increase the efficiency of the supply service of the fleet.

56. Additional oil-carrying vessels have been attached to the fleet—the *Maumee* and *Cuyama*.

57. There is great need in the fleet for extra seagoing tugs for use of commander train, especially during gunnery exercises.

PERSONNEL.

58. The situation as regards enlisted personnel showed no improvement in the beginning of this fiscal year over that reported in the last annual report. Large numbers of vacancies existed in all ships, especially in the artificer, engineer, and special branches. This left barely enough men in these branches for operation and naturally had its effect upon upkeep of machinery and material generally. It also necessitated frequent changes in personnel, as labor conditions throughout the country enticed men from reenlistment, and their places had to be filled by men from other ships. These changes in ships' personnel would undoubtedly have affected adversely the efficiency of the fleet had there not been a full appreciation of the situation and extra effort on the part of both officers and men.

59. Schools for the instruction of machinists' mates were established in the fleet repair ships, but the effect was not felt until the close of the year.

60. The necessity recommended in former reports for increased complements of ships was recognized and the enlisted strength of the Navy increased by the act of August 29, 1916. Unfortunately, recruiting continued slow, and the fleet did not feel the effects of this increase until relations with Germany became strained.

61. Boards were convened to recommend standard organizations and complements for the various classes of vessels in the fleet, and these without exception recommended that complements be increased.

62. With the beginning of the war the personnel situation took on an entirely new aspect. Large numbers of men have been sent to the ships of the fleet for training and the fleet has become practically the only source of supply for the men of experience who form the nuclei of crews of new ships fitting out and for men comprising the large number of crews of armed merchant ships. At the same time every effort has been made to maintain the highest practicable military efficiency.

DISCIPLINE.

63. The discipline of the fleet for the past year has been good. The action of Congress in authorizing force commanders to order general courts-martial has produced excellent results. The declaration of a state of war which necessitated trial by general court-martial for such offenses as absence over leave has resulted in a large increase in the number of general courts, but considering the largely augmented force involved the percentage is small.

SANITATION AND HEALTH.

64. The general health of the fleet personnel has been excellent during the year, with the exception of the continuation of measles, German measles, mumps, scarlet fever, and chicken pox among the nonimmunes. These diseases increased markedly during the last quarter and became a matter of grave concern when cerebrospinal fever appeared in the drafts from the Great Lakes Training Station. This increase can be accounted for by a number of factors, namely, their unusual prevalence in all parts of the United States during this period, rapid recruiting and marked increase in the size of the Navy after the declaration of war, the necessity for transferring recruits to the fleet without the usual detention and weeding-out at the training stations and overcrowding both at these stations and on some of the older ships of the fleet.

65. At the end of the year all these diseases, except mumps, have markedly decreased owing to a correction of most of the causes above mentioned and a diminution of the susceptible human material.

66. Except for the time lost during necessary quarantine and fumigation, the incidence of the various diseases has practically not interfered with the drills and exercises and general military efficiency of the fleet.

67. The hospital ship *Solace* has rendered valuable service during the year. She has remained with the fleet continuously, except for necessary absences or docking, repairs, coaling, and transfer of patients. During the last quarter she became frequently overcrowded with cases of contagious diseases and was obliged to perform also the function of an ambulance ship and transport her surplus cases to naval hospitals.

ATHLETICS.

68. Athletics were considerably interfered with during the year due to conditions under which the fleet was operating.

69. In the summer of 1916 at Newport the citizens of that city were most helpful in extending the facilities of the city to the fleet.

70. During the winter cruise there was not much opportunity for athletics, due to the location of the fleet base during the greater part of the time.

71. After mobilization the Navy League was most helpful in assisting the fleet to provide facilities for athletics and amusement at the new fleet base.

72. The commander in chief considers that the encouragement of athletics is most important in maintaining the morale of the fleet, particularly when leave and liberty must be restricted due to war conditions.

H. T. MAYO.

[First indorsement.]

JANUARY 17, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: General Board.

Via: Bureau of Navigation, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded, for information and file.

W. V. PRATT.

[Second indorsement.]

JANUARY 21, 1918.

From: Bureau of Navigation.

To: General Board.

Via: Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Subject: Annual Report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded; noted.

THOMAS J. SENN,
Captain, United States Navy,
Acting Chief of Bureau.

[Third indorsement.]

JANUARY 30, 1918.

From: Bureau of Construction and Repair.

To: The General Board.

Via: Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded; contents noted.

TAYLOR.

[Fourth indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 1, 1918.

To: The General Board, via Bureau of Steam Engineering and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

Forwarded; contents noted.

MCGOWAN.

[Fifth indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 4, 1918.

From: Bureau of Steam Engineering.
To: The General Board, via Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded; contents noted.

O. W. KOESTER,
Assistant to Bureau.

[Sixth indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 7, 1918.

From: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
To: The General Board.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded. Contents noted.

W. C. BRAISTED.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, February 2, 1918.

Secret.

From: Commander in Chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet.

1. In view of the fact that practically all of the vessels of the Atlantic Fleet available for service, except the battleship forces, less battleship division 9, are or soon will be employed in active operations against the enemy and of the possibility that the remainder of battleship force 2 may soon be so engaged, it has been considered necessary to estimate the situation to determine what if any changes in the existing conditions can be made in order to increase the efficiency of contemplated operations and of possible future operations.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.

2. The present situation must be considered in two parts, namely:

- (a) The situation in Europe.
- (b) The situation in home waters.

THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

3. The task forces of the Atlantic Fleet now operating in European waters comprise the following vessels of the fleet:

- (1) All available destroyers.
- (2) Battleship division 9.
- (3) All vessels of the patrol force except the American patrol detachment.
- (4) All available yachts suitable for escort or patrol duty, except those assigned to the American patrol detachment.
- (5) All submarines at present available for duty abroad.
- (6) All available trawlers suitable for mine sweeping at sea.
- (7) In addition to these combatant vessels there are numerous tenders, repair ships, and cargo ships operating abroad.

4. Orders have been issued for the mine force to prepare for distant service and it will soon be operating in European waters.

5. The forces in European waters are to operate as follows:

(a) Battleship division 9 and such other battleship units as may be assigned to service abroad, are to cooperate with the British Grand Fleet or the high seas forces of some other of the allied countries.

(b) The mine force is to cooperate with the British Navy in planting a deep-sea mine barrage.

(c) The remainder of the combatant vessels to operate as one task force in operations against enemy submarines and in the protection of transports and trade.

(d) In addition to the operations by forces of the fleet there are aviation forces which will operate against enemy submarines from bases on the coast of Great Britain and France.

6. The four types of operations mentioned in the paragraph above, divide into two general classes as follows:

(1) The operations of battleships in cooperation with the British fleet and operations of the mine force are distinctly high sea operations.

(2) The operations of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade, and of the aviation forces operating from base shore, are essentially of the nature of coastal or district operations.

7. This distinction between these two general classes of operations has been thoroughly recognized abroad. The high sea force—the fleet—operates under the command in chief, while the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations in the protection of trade operate under command of district commanders. Cooperation between forces of different districts is accomplished by fixed policies or orders from the Admiralty.

8. The high sea operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is in an early stage of development. It is believed, however, that the future development of operations of this fleet lies primarily in offensive high seas operations in cooperation with the British Grand Fleet.

9. The operations of that portion of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the defense of transports and trade has reached a state of development such that the methods of conducting operations; the systems of communication; and the considerations governing the cooperation with the allied forces is practically standardized.

10. Another condition which does not directly affect the operations of the fleet but which is necessarily considered in an estimate of the situation, is the need for a representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

THE SITUATION IN HOME WATERS.

11. The conditions existing in home waters are:

(a) At base 2 with the flag are the battleships available for service except the ship Division 9.

The policies of the commander in chief, are the necessary instructions, concerning the operations of this type of vessel are complete except such changes as may be found necessary to insure efficient cooperation with allied forces, which cannot now be made due to insufficient information and plans for such cooperation.

(b) The remainder of the forces operating on or from the United States Atlantic coast are comprised in the following:

(1) Cruiser force.

(2) Transport force.

(3) Submarine force.

(4) American patrol detachment.

(5) Mine force.

(6) Train.

(7) Vessels under extensive overhaul or newly commissioned.

12. The cruiser and transport forces are operating independently of direct command by the commander in chief; in most cases under direct orders from the Office of Naval Operations. These operations have been standardized and instructions to govern their activities have been issued by the force commander.

13. The submarine force is in part, engaged abroad as a detachment of the fleet, and part on this coast as an independent detachment whose mission is "To train personnel for service in new vessels which may operate against the enemy." The conditions of training are such that cooperation in cooperation with the battleship forces is impracticable.

14. The American Patrol Detachment is operating in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The primary duty of this force so far has been the examination of possible enemy submarine bases and as an assistance to diplomacy in Central America and Mexico. The operations of this force have for the most part been carried out under orders direct from the Office of Naval Operations. The future operations of this detachment will probably be the same unless enemy submarines appear on this coast, in which case this detachment would probably be assigned to duty in connection with naval district forces.

15. The mine force, although still on this coast, is preparing for distant service and its operations have been previously discussed.

16. Most of the vessels of the train have been detached for service abroad. At present there remains at the fleet base only the *Vestal*. One collier and two transport ships are operating for the battleship forces, but one of these has just been detached upon for temporary service abroad. This situation makes the value of the fleet commander practically negligible.

vessels under extensive overhaul and newly commissioned except battleships have little time to train before being sent abroad. Such time will be sufficient only to shake down to develop individual efficiency.

CONCLUSION AS TO THE SITUATION.

Following analysis of the situation in Europe and in home waters indicates

are two distinct types of operations in progress in European waters in which the Atlantic Fleet are engaged: (1) high sea operations; (2) anti-submarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

is an important duty to be performed as the representative of the Office of Naval Operations and as naval attaché at London.

active command by the commander in chief, or direct supervision by him of those units of the fleet based on and operating from the United States coast, is not now essential to their efficient development in accordance with their respective missions.

THE MISSION.

mission adopted is: "To insure maximum efficiency in the command and control of the task forces of the Atlantic Fleet engaged in operations against

the preceding analysis of the situation the conclusion was reached that the operations must be performed in Europe to insure efficiency in the present operations of the Fleet and in the development of future operations in cooperation with the forces of the Allies:

command of the forces engaged in high-sea operations.

command of the force of the Fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

HIGH-SEA OPERATIONS.

operations of Battleship Division 9 and of such other battleships as may be sent to service abroad, and of the mine force, are essentially high-sea operations in a manner allied to the operations of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

effective cooperation of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations is advanced by the presence of the commander of that force in Europe or in proximity to the arrival of any of his force. His proximity to the force engaged in operations were to be coordinated and to the Admiralty in London, and for such operations were formulated, permitted him to make detailed plans for cooperation and insured its effectiveness with the least possible delay.

the cooperation of high-sea forces likewise should be developed. and of much wider scope, much more complicated, and the failure in such operations would be attended by much more serious results.

future developments of the operation of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters are to lie primarily along the line of offensive high sea operations. If the English and Channel mine barrages are effective, the submarine menace to our trade will be reduced, and much of the force now engaged in anti-submarine operations will become available for high sea operations. It is considered that an effective mine barrage will lead to offensive high sea operations by itself. If the mine barrage is not effective it may become necessary to carry out requiring offensive high sea operations against the enemy submarine

position expressed above is confirmed by the mission assigned by the department to the vessels of battleship force 2—"To maintain themselves in instant readiness for battle."

mission can be accomplished under present conditions if cooperation with the British fleet is implied, but it should be thoroughly understood that there are no plans for cooperation with any allied navy in high sea operations. Efficient operations will require many changes in the methods of maneuvering, signaling, etc., etc., and until such plans are made effective cooperation is impossible.

commander in chief has endeavored to make the tactics employed by the fleet similar in principle to those employed by the British Grand Fleet, and future cooperation in view, but the detailed plans for combined operations which would be required for effective cooperation do not exist. T

6. The four types of operations mentioned in the paragraph above, divide logically into two general classes as follows:

(1) The operations of battleships in cooperation with the British fleet and the operations of the mine force are distinctly high sea operations.

(2) The operations of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade, and of the aviation forces operating from bases on shore, are essentially of the nature of coastal or district operations.

7. This distinction between these two general classes of operations has been thoroughly recognized abroad. The high sea force—the fleet—operates under the commander in chief, while the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations in defense of trade operate under command of district commanders. Cooperation between forces of different districts is accomplished by fixed policies or orders from the Admiralty.

8. The high sea operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is in an early stage of development. It is believed, however, that the future development of the operations of this fleet lies primarily in offensive high seas operations in cooperation with the British Grand Fleet.

9. The operations of that portion of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the defense of transports and trade has reached a state of development such that the methods of conducting operations; the systems of communication; and the considerations governing the cooperation with the allied forces is practically standardized.

10. Another condition which does not directly affect the operations of the fleet but which is necessarily considered in an estimate of the situation, is the necessity for a representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

THE SITUATION IN HOME WATERS.

11. The conditions existing in home waters are:

(a) At base 2 with the flag are the battleships available for service except Battleship Division 9.

The policies of the commander in chief, are the necessary instructions, concerning the operations of this type of vessel are complete except such changes as may be found necessary to insure efficient cooperation with allied forces, which changes can not now be made due to insufficient information and plans for such cooperation.

(b) The remainder of the forces operating on or from the United States Atlantic coast are comprised in the following:

- (1) Cruiser force.
- (2) Transport force.
- (3) Submarine force.
- (4) American patrol detachment.
- (5) Mine force.
- (6) Train.
- (7) Vessels under extensive overhaul or newly commissioned.

12. The cruiser and transport forces are operating independently of direct command by the commander in chief; in most cases under direct orders from the office of naval operations. These operations have been standardized and instructions to govern their activities have been issued by the force commander.

13. The submarine force is in part, engaged abroad as a detachment of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations, and part on this coast as an independent detachment whose mission is "To train personnel for service in new vessels that may operate against the enemy." The conditions of training are such that operations in cooperation with the battleship forces is impracticable.

14. The American Patrol Detachment is operating in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The primary duty of this force so far has been the examination of possible enemy submarine bases and as an assistance to diplomacy in Central America and Mexico. The operations of this force have for the most part been carried on under orders direct from the Office of Naval Operations. The future operations of this detachment will probably be the same unless enemy submarines appear on this coast, in which case this detachment would probably be assigned to duty in connection with naval district forces.

15. The mine force, although still on this coast, is preparing for distant service, and its operations have been previously discussed.

16. Most of the vessels of the train have been detached for service abroad. At present there remains at the fleet base only the *Vestal*. One collier and two supply ships are operating for the battleship forces, but one of these has just been called upon for temporary service abroad. This situation makes the value of the train commander practically negligible.

17. The vessels under extensive overhaul and newly commissioned except battleships, will probably have little time to train before being sent abroad. Such time as is allowed will be sufficient only to shake down to develop individual efficiency.

CONCLUSION AS TO THE SITUATION.

18. The preceding analysis of the situation in Europe and in home waters indicates that:

(a) There are two distinct types of operations in progress in European waters in which the forces of the Atlantic Fleet are engaged: (1) high sea operations; (2) anti-submarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(b) There is an important duty to be performed as the representative of the Office of Naval Operations and as naval attaché at London.

(c) That active command by the commander in chief, or direct supervision by him over the operations of those units of the fleet based on and operating from the United States Atlantic coast, is not now essential to their efficient development in accordance with their respective missions.

THE MISSION.

19. The mission adopted is: "To insure maximum efficiency in the command and administration of the task forces of the Atlantic Fleet engaged in operations against the enemy."

20. In the preceding analysis of the situation the conclusion was reached that the following functions must be performed in Europe to insure efficiency in the present operations of the Fleet and in the development of future operations in cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies:

(a) Command of the forces engaged in high-sea operations.

(b) Command of the force of the Fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of the transports and trade.

(c) Representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

HIGH-SEA OPERATIONS.

21. The operations of Battleship Division 9 and of such other battleships as may be assigned to service abroad, and of the mine force, are essentially high-sea operations and are in no manner allied to the operations of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

22. The effective cooperation of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations was materially advanced by the presence of the commander of that force in Europe for some time previous to the arrival of any of his force. His proximity to the force with which such operations were to be coordinated and to the Admiralty in London, where the plans for such operations were formulated, permitted him to make detailed plans for such cooperation and insured its effectiveness with the least possible delay.

23. Plans for the cooperation of high-sea forces likewise should be developed. Such plans are of much wider scope, much more complicated, and the failure in such cooperation would be attended by much more serious results.

24. The future developments of the operation of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is believed to lie primarily along the line of offensive high sea operations. If the North Sea and Channel mine barrages are effective, the submarine menace to transports and trade will be reduced, and much of the force now engaged in anti-submarine operations will become available for high sea operations. It is considered probable that an effective mine barrage will lead to offensive high sea operations by the German fleet. If the mine barrage is not effective it may become necessary to adopt a policy requiring offensive high sea operations against the enemy submarine bases.

25. The opinion expressed above is confirmed by the mission assigned by the department to the vessels of battleship force 2—"To maintain themselves in instant readiness for battle."

26. This mission can be accomplished under present conditions if cooperation with allied forces is not implied, but it should be thoroughly understood that there are no accepted plans for cooperation with any allied navy in high sea operations. Efficient cooperation will require many changes in the methods of maneuvering, signaling, radio procedure, etc., and until such plans are made effective cooperation is impossible.

27. The commander in chief has endeavored to make the tactics employed by the battleship forces similar in principle to those employed by the British Grand Fleet, with the idea of future cooperation in view, but the detailed plans for combined operations which would be required for effective cooperation do not exist. The

duty of formulating these plans can be performed only by the officer who is to direct and supervise the operations of the high sea forces, and can only be accomplished from a location in Europe in proximity to the force with which such operations are to be coordinated, and within reasonable distance of London where plans for allied naval operations are formulated.

28. In view of the facts expressed above it appears that the mission of the commander in chief—"To prepare the fleet for, and to successfully conduct war"—can only be advanced toward accomplishment by a change in the present conditions, such that he will be in position to plan for the cooperation of the high sea forces with those of the allied navies.

29. The development of the high sea operations should be directed and supervised by the officer whose position and experience best fits him for this duty. Such officer should be the commander in chief of the fleet. Personal considerations should not be permitted to interfere with the selection of the officer under whom such development is to take place, and this selection should be made immediately.

ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTS AND TRADE.

30. The detachments of the force engaged in these operations are based at Queens-town, on the French coast, at Gibraltar, and at the Azores. The aviation detachments will operate from bases on the coasts of Great Britain and France.

31. The operations of this force are primarily antisubmarine operations, and although the destroyers of this force operate well at sea, the distribution of the force, the nature of their employment, and the nature of command required makes these operations essentially coastal operations. This fact is recognized by the British and French admiralties, and similar forces of these navies are under command of district commanders. The cooperation of the forces of several districts are governed by fixed policies or by orders from the respective admiralties. Forces engaged in this type of operations are distinct from high sea forces except in the immediate vicinity of the fleet bases.

32. Efficiency in this type of operations requires an organization similar to that of the naval districts of the United States, and it is believed that the present organization of this force is of this character. The exercise of command by its commander should be governed by the same principles as would govern the control of district forces by the Navy Department.

33. The relations between this force and the commander in chief should remain as at present prescribed by Operations letter 20392-640 of July 2, 1917, but it should be recognized that when the commander in chief is in European waters he has authority, in case of emergency, to divert such part of this force as may be required for offensive operations with the high sea force, for which diversion the commander in chief would assume full responsibility.

34. The preceding consideration of the duties and organization of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade indicates that no change is necessary or desirable.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

35. A consideration of the functions of the representative of the Office of Naval Operations at the Admiralty in London is required in this estimate only in order that the relations between this officer and the commanders of naval forces operating abroad may be carefully considered in order to avoid misunderstandings. The functions of a naval attaché are well defined and do not conflict with those of commanders of forces.

36. The status of this representative appears to be that of an assistant to the chief of naval operations to whom has been delegated the authority to communicate direct with the British Admiralty and with forces operating abroad. At present this last is simplified by the dual capacity of this officer as commander of United States naval forces operating in European waters and as representative of the Office of Naval Operations in London.

37. It should be recognized that the function of the representative of the Office of Naval Operations is distinct from that of the naval forces, and there appears to be no probability of misunderstandings so long as this distinction is kept in mind.

38. The necessity for such a representative is apparent and a change in the functions of this officer, or even in the personality of this officer, would not be conducive to efficiency.

CONCLUSION.

39. In order to insure the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters, it is necessary to recognize three distinct functions to be exercised aboard by high ranking officers of the United States Navy:

(a) Command of forces engaged in high sea operations. This function undoubtedly belongs to the commander in chief of the fleet.

(b) Command of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(c) Representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

(Functions (b) and (c) are now being performed by Vice Admiral Sims.)

40. The commander in chief should perform the following:

(1) Supervise the development and cooperation of the forces engaged in high sea operations, and assist in the formulation of plans for future high sea operations.

(2) In cooperation with the British commander in chief, make plans for the cooperation of such high-sea forces as may be available for such operations.

(3) Direct such changes in the present methods of conducting operations, of radio procedure, signaling, etc., as may be required to facilitate immediate cooperation by the battleships and such other types of vessels as may later become available for high-sea operations.

(4) Assume active command of the United States forces cooperating with the British Grand Fleet or other allied high-sea force when the strength of the United States force reaches that of a squadron.

(5) Assume active command of any independent high-sea operation to be performed by United States vessels of more than one type.

41. The commander of the forces engaged in coastal operations should conduct the operations of that force in identically the same manner as it is being conducted now. The only change in the status of the commander of this force would be that battleship division 9, now assigned to his force, and the supervision of plans concerning the operations of the mine force now under his jurisdiction would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the commander in chief.

42. The representative of the Office of Naval Operations should conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted at present. He should be permitted to address to the force commanders such communications as would normally be addressed to commanders of fleet forces by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders should not be sent direct to forces engaged in high-sea operations unless they are repetitions of orders received from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be sent to the commander in chief.

43. Questions of policy affecting the general conduct of operations or the particular operations of the high-sea forces should be referred to the commander in chief for his recommendation before action is taken by the representative of the Office of Naval Operations in London.

44. The only difficulty to be anticipated in home waters is the necessity for the administration of forces remaining there. This can best be met by assigning the senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer in home waters" and delegating to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

DECISIONS.

45 (a) The commander in chief should proceed immediately to his present flagship, to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet, and within reasonable distance of London.

(b) The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

(c) Battleship division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

(d) Designate the senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer home waters," and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

(e) The representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task-force commanders such communication as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high-sea

operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

46. Approval of the decisions reached in this estimate of the situation is requested.

H. T. MAYO,
Admiral United States Navy.

[Secret.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base Two, April 12, 1918.

From: Commander in chief.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Developments and operations of battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet.

Reference: (a) C. in C. Secret File, February 2, 1918, subject: "Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet."

1. In February, 1918, the commander in chief submitted reference (a), in which the following decisions were reached:

(a) The commander in chief should proceed immediately in his present flagship to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet, and within reasonable distance of London.

(b) The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

(c) Battleship division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

(d) Designate the senior vice admiral in home waters as "Senior officer home waters" and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

(e) The representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task force commanders such communications as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high-seas operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

2. The request for the approval of the decisions reached in this estimate are hereby renewed and enlarged. The general situation in Europe to-day is similar to that existing at the time when the estimate of the situation of reference (a) was made, except that the military situation is more serious and the terrific intensity of the German military effort indicates what is generally conceded—that Germany's maximum effort is to be exerted this summer.

3. It is reasonable to suppose that this tremendous military effort will be accompanied by a similar naval effort. An estimate of how this naval effort may develop should be carefully made and consideration given to the desirability of supporting the present allied naval forces in European waters by United States battleship forces.

4. It would be a serious mistake to consider that the German Navy has acknowledged defeat. The German Navy is jealous of its reputation and skill and it may be considered a certainty that Germany will never acknowledge defeat without making at least one more effort to gain at least a partial control of the sea.

5. The initiative of the German nation in the development of material for use in war has been superior to that of the Allies and it is not unreasonable to suppose that when the German Fleet again accepts an engagement that the British Grand Fleet will be subjected to attack by weapons of new inventions or old ones greatly developed.

6. The inventions which may be developed for practical use are: (a) The torpedo plane, (b) antitorpedo protection, (c) gas shells.

7. The torpedo plane: The torpedo plane has been long advocated as an auxiliary of naval warfare. Reports indicate that it has been successfully used by the Germans during the past summer against merchant ships in the North Sea. The British Admiralty has ordered 100 such planes for the service of the British Grand Fleet. It is more than probable that in the next major naval engagement the torpedo plane will play an important part provided suitable means for transportation can be developed or the action should take place in or near waters adjacent to German territory or to alien territory now occupied by Germany.

8. Antitorpedo protection: The fact that many German ships which have been torpedoed have succeeded in returning to port may indicate that some additional protection against torpedoes has been devised. It has been reported that nearly all stores have been removed from the German ships other than those required for a short cruise. It has been reported also that the crews usually reside in barracks and take on board with them only such necessities as are required for use during the short cruises they make.

9. The reduction in weight thus made has probably been equalized by additional watertight bulkheads, blisters, etc., with a view to protection against torpedoes. The exact value of such protection can not be estimated but it is logical to suppose that ships so fitted can withstand torpedoes to a greater extent than can the British or United States battleships which, by the nature of their service, require large storerooms and fuel capacity.

10. Gas shells: This term is used in its broadest sense to apply to all forms of gas attack. It is well known that the gas shells used by the Germans in land warfare are successful and it can be demonstrated that a gas element can be inserted in naval armor-piercing shell without loss of penetration or fragmentation. It is only reasonable to suppose that the next major naval action will find the gas shell in evidence and in addition to the gas shell possibly smoke boxes producing gas clouds of material size and density.

11. The above developments of naval weapons and ship protection may reasonably be expected and the initiative of the German nation in technical and military development makes it probable that when such development is satisfactory the German Fleet will again attempt to secure command of the sea.

12. Possible plan: In formulating a plan of action one of the first considerations should be to determine—

(a) Which of the weapons possessed will be the most effective against the enemy.

(b) Which weapon possessed by the enemy will be most effective against our own force.

The weapons which may be considered available are: (a) The gun, (b) the torpedo, (c) the mine.

Considering these weapons from the point of view of the German and assuming that the developments above have been perfected by them, the analysis of the above questions is as follows:

Past experience in action with the British fleet has demonstrated that:

(a) With regard to gunfire (1) the German Navy is slightly superior in the ability to hit in the early stages of an engagement; (2) that this superiority does not exist long; (3) that the German guns are too small caliber; (4) that the superiority of the British fleet in numbers of ships and guns and superior size of guns makes a gun action of long duration disadvantageous to the German Navy.

(b) With regard to torpedoes (1) German torpedoes are probably better than British torpedoes; (2) that due to excessive use of torpedoes in submarines German torpedo personnel is better than British; (3) that the number of submarines which can be made available in any chosen locality at a chosen time is superior to the number of British submarines which could be concentrated after the information was obtained by them; (4) that at present the development of the torpedo plans by the German Navy is much superior to the British; (5) that the torpedo protection afforded ships of the German Navy is superior to that of the British.

(c) The mine: The Germans are undoubtedly aware of the development of the mine by the Allies and of the contemplated mine barrages. They realize that surface control of the area to be mined is a necessity. Therefore to prevent the further development of the mine barrage a victory on the surface of the sea is essential.

13. The above conclusions, briefly summarized, are as follows:

(a) In order to prevent the development of the mine barrage, which may defeat their submarine campaign, a victory over the British Grand Fleet is essential.

(b) The inferiority of the German high seas fleet makes an action in which gunfire plays the major part disadvantageous.

(c) An action in which the torpedo plays the major part would be advantageous to the German Navy.

How can an action in which the torpedo will play the major part be developed?

In order to develop an action in which the torpedo is to play a major part, the following must be available:

The high sea fleet.

Maximum number of submarines.

Maximum number of destroyers.

Maximum number of torpedo planes.

(b) Seek engagement with the British grand fleet in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, in which case poison gas and torpedo planes will play an important part in the engagement.

9. In view of the above the commander in chief believes that the following should be adopted as the mission of the Atlantic Fleet:

(1) To guard all troop and mercantile trans-Atlantic convoys against German or Austrian raiders of any type (including submarines) or strength.

(2) To support the British grand fleet against any attempt of the German high-sea fleet to gain temporary control of the British Channel.

10. An estimate of the situation has been prepared with the above as a mission. A copy of the estimate is inclosed.

11. As a result of this estimate of the situation the following decisions were arrived at:

(1) To assign to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet the mission of guarding all trans-Atlantic convoys against raiders.

(2) To base the superdreadnaughts *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada* (*Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, and *Idaho*, when ready) at Brest.

(3) To base the seven armored cruisers at Bremerhaven as scouts and eastern-ocean escorts.

(4) To base *North Dakota* and *Delaware* on home coasts, Halifax or Guantanamo, as detail plans may indicate best.

(5) To use *South Carolina*, *Michigan*, and 6 *Minnesota* type as ocean escorts for troop convoys.

(6) To base 5 *Georgia* type on home coast.

(7) The commander in chief to assume direct control over any offensive operations.

(8) To base squadron 1 and division A on home coast and operate them as training units.

H. T. MAYO.

Secret:

AUGUST 10, 1918.

File.

From: Commander in chief.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: An estimate of the naval situation in the Atlantic Ocean.

References: (a) C-in-C. secret file 211, February 2, 1918, subject "Estimate of the situation regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet"; (b) C-in-C. secret file, April 12, 1918, subject: "Development and operations of battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet."

MISSION.

1. The adopted mission of the Atlantic Fleet is:

"(1) To guard all troop and mercantile trans-Atlantic convoys against German or Austrian raiders of any type or strength. (2) to support the British Grand Fleet against any attempt of the German High Sea Fleet to gain temporary control of the English Channel."

ENEMY STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

2. The naval forces at the disposal of the enemy may be considered as limited to those of Germany, as the Austrian forces should be contained by the combined fleets of Italy and France.

3. These forces are organized in two main forces: (a) The High Sea Fleet; (b) the submarine forces engaged in attacks on merchant shipping and transports.

THE HIGH SEA FLEET.

4. The German High Sea Fleet is inferior to the reinforced British Grand Fleet to the extent of about one-half. This inferiority precludes much danger of an attack by the high sea fleet under normal conditions. It is therefore necessary to consider what developments could be made that might be considered to put the High Sea Fleet in condition to warrant such an engagement.

5. The only developments in naval warfare which might be considered to offset the superiority of the Grand Fleet which are known are poison gas and the torpedo plane. There is little doubt but that the next naval engagement in which the High Sea Fleet takes part will find the employment of these weapons.

6. The possibility of the German High Sea Fleet using these weapons, and the conditions under which an engagement with the British Grand Fleet might be sought,

have been discussed at some length in reference (b). In this previous estimate the conclusion was reached that the German High Sea Fleet might seek an engagement with the British Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Mine fields so placed as to let in the path of the Grand Fleet in a southward movement have been located.

7. A campaign of this nature, in conjunction with naval raids in the Channel, or a military raid on the coast of England, might, if made in conjunction with a strong military offensive against the northern part of the battle line of the western front, assume a very threatening nature, and if even partially successful could be used to bolster up the morale of the Teutonic peoples during the coming winter.

8. In view of the possibility of such a campaign, the commander in chief, in reference (b), recommended that all United States superdreadnaughts should be sent to European waters to support the British Grand Fleet.

9. That such a campaign has not yet taken place indicates that the above conclusion was wrong; or, that the enemy is not yet prepared for such an attack; or, that some more promising plan (from his point of view) is being developed. The logical time for such a campaign is in cooperation with a strong military offensive against the northern part of the western front, and it can not be considered that such an opportunity will be overlooked.

10. The fact that his campaign has not yet taken place does not change the previous decision that all United States superdreadnaughts should be based in European waters for the support of the British Grand Fleet, but the development of the cruiser submarine; the lateness of the season of the year, and the improbability of a successful military offensive by the German armies on the western front during the remainder of the season favorable to military operations, may be found to modify the decision to some extent.

CONCLUSION REGARDING THE GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET.

11. The unfavorable turn of the military situation, from the German point of view, will probably prevent a successful military offensive against the northern part of the western front during the remainder of this year. The results of an attempt by the German High Sea Fleet could hardly be such as to insure German control of the sea against the remaining naval forces of the Allies. Such a campaign could not be justified except in conjunction with a strong military offensive, in which case interference with cross-channel transportation, which might accrue from temporary control of the channel, might offer adequate returns. It may be reasonably concluded that no such campaign will be attempted, although the possibility of such a campaign must not be lost sight of, and the disposition of the United States forces, superdreadnaughts and destroyers suitable for a major fleet action, must be such as to offer a chance to support the British Grand Fleet in case of such a campaign, and to prevent the German Navy from gaining even a temporary control of the English Channel.

THE ENEMY SUBMARINE FORCES ENGAGED IN DESTRUCTION OF COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION.

12. The results of the enemy submarine campaign against commerce and transports have undoubtedly been disappointing to them, and with the increase in the anti-submarine craft, and more efficient weapons for use against submarines, it is practically assured that the result of the war can no longer be considered to depend upon losses by submarine operations.

13. The tonnage available for the transportation of troops is, however, not much greater than absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war, and a large part of the building program of both the United States and the Allies is composed of vessels which will not be suitable for troop transportation.

14. Antisubmarine operations can not therefore be replaced, but must be pressed with greater vigor due to the increased area in which this type of craft is now operating.

15. The development of the cruiser submarine has so increased the area of the submarine operations that destroyer escort for troops convoys throughout the entire trans-Atlantic voyage is desirable. Destroyer escort for merchant convoys throughout the entire voyage is also desirable, but on account of the number of destroyers required, not, as yet, practicable.

CONCLUSION REGARDING ENEMY SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES.

16. Although the efficiency of the enemy's submarine campaign is decreasing, and the construction of new tonnage is such as to practically insure adequate available tonnage for the transportation of supplies to the allied armies and nations, the tonnage available for transport of troops is no greater than that required for success.

17. The development of the cruiser submarine has greatly increased the area in which vessels are subject to submarine attack.

18. Successful operations against transports carrying United States troops will be especially valuable to the enemy in raising his morale.

19. Every endeavor should be exerted to prevent successful submarine operations by the enemy, but in view of the greater moral effect of successful operations against our transports, the greatest stress should be placed upon the protection of all troop convoys.

OTHER TYPE OF OPERATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED.

20. Outside of the two types of operations which have been discussed above, there appears to be but one other general type of operations which might offer success, namely, extensive raiding operations against transports and merchant ships, using surface craft alone or in combination with submarine craft.

21. Considering first operations surface craft alone, we may say that there are four types of vessels to be considered: (a) Converted merchant shipping, (b) light or protected cruisers, (c) major ships, and (d) destroyers.

22. (a) Converted merchant shipping: This type has, except in the North Sea, been the only type of raider employed since the destruction of the German light cruisers so employed in the early part of the war. The advantage of this type lies in their harmless appearance and in the possibility of disguise. The disadvantage lies in their low speed and inferior fighting power.

23. Converted merchant shipping may be employed but the fighting power of such craft would not be sufficient to overcome the usual ocean escort, and consequently are not to be feared as a decisive factor.

24. (b) Light and unprotected cruisers: Vessels of these types have a real value in major action with the fleet and the use of such ships as raiders would indicate that an attempt to fight a major action with the British Grand Fleet has been abandoned. These types have the advantage of speed and fighting power, as compared to merchant raiders, but are without the latter's advantage of disguise. The fighting power of these vessels is inadequate to the destruction of the average ocean escort, and their fuel capacity is not sufficient to give them a great radius of action.

25. Vessels of these types would experience more difficulty in gaining the sea than would merchant shipping, because their character would at once become evident. They have insufficient fighting strength to force their way through the light forces that might be encountered. Their one advantage is speed. Because of their inferior power, however, attacks by either of these types can not in all probability, result in such serious losses as to affect the successful issue of the war.

26. (c) Major ships: In this class are included battleships and battle cruisers. Vessels of either of these types would experience considerable difficulty in getting to sea unobserved, but due to their strength would be able to fight their way through the observation forces. After gaining the sea they would be difficult to locate, and due to their strength as compared to most ocean escorts would be able to attack advantageously any convoys of merchant ships or transports that might be encountered, unless the ocean escort is greatly strengthened.

27. The great disadvantage in the use of this type for raiding is the danger that they will be cut off from their bases and be sunk by superior forces, or that they will become derelict through the exhaustion of their fuel. The disaster which might be brought upon a convoy of troop ships by an encounter with a vessel of this type, and the great influence upon the morale that a successful operation of this nature might have upon the Teutonic peoples, make the consideration of this type of operation most necessary.

28. The great superiority of the Allies in major ships can not be employed more advantageously than by assuring the safety of transports carrying United States troops to France.

29. (d) Destroyers: This type have not been used in raiding expeditions except in the North Sea. The limited radius of action and the inferior fighting capacity of the German destroyer compared to the modern British or United States destroyer will probably prevent their use in the Atlantic, though raids in the channel are possible. Such raids in the channel could in all probability be successfully countered by the British without assistance from our destroyers.

COMBINED OPERATIONS OF SURFACE CRAFT AND SUBMARINES.

30. The development of the cruiser submarine affords the enemy a type of vessel particularly adapted to scouting operations. If submarines do not attack, their presence can not be readily detected and, although their radio could be heard, it would

to keep such a vessel from tracking a convoy, particularly before the arrival of the escort.

Additional smaller submarines previously directed to the positions in which the cruiser expected to fuel would operate as a scouting force during such training was in progress.

The combined operation has many advantages and appears to be the most practicable, provided the battle cruisers can get to sea.

CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO RAIDERS IN THE ATLANTIC.

The possibility of successful operations against convoys of troop ships appears a principal menace to the successful prosecution of the war by the Allies, and no vessel that can be successfully employed to insure their safety should be spared.

The possible operations of the German Navy against which the United States must prepare are:

1. Submarine operations against transports and merchant shipping.

2. Surface operations by all types of surface craft, but primarily by major ships and merchant ships.

3. An attempt of the German High Sea Fleet to gain temporary control of the English Channel with a view to forcing the British Grand Fleet to fight a decisive battle at a point selected by the Germans.

STATUS OF OUR OWN FORCES—STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

The disposition of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet at present is based upon a plan which, to some extent, has been governed by a consideration of all types of operations of the enemy considered in the preceding paragraph. Such changes as are deemed necessary are due to the changed conditions which were met in the consideration of the general situation from which the present disposition of the Atlantic Fleet was adopted.

The present policy with regard to the antisubmarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet and the disposition of these forces appears to be efficient. No change in the disposition of these forces is recommended, except that, in view of the possibility of raiders, or from a temporary control of the English Channel by the German High Sea Fleet, it should be constantly kept in mind that when and where the antisubmarine forces should be withdrawn from antisubmarine escort to engage in surface fleet operations.

The British Grand Fleet has been reinforced by battleship division 9, which is considered insufficient in case the German High Sea Fleet should bring the Grand Fleet to action in a position, and at a place, chosen by the Germans. It is anticipated in case of a major action the Germans will be supported by submarines and torpedo planes.

The reinforcement of the British Grand Fleet is considered desirable, but in the event of raiders passing out of the English Channel a strategic concentration of forces is considered sufficient. The disposition of the remaining dreadnoughts of the Atlantic Fleet should therefore be such as to insure the maximum effectiveness against raiders while maintaining a strategic concentration with the British Grand Fleet.

The disposition of the Atlantic Fleet may be enumerated as follows:

1. *Delaware* and *Delaware*

2. Battleship force 1, including division 5.

3. *Delaware*

4. The forces should be used in such manner as to afford the greatest protection to troopships and merchant ships.

5. The disposition of forces should therefore be based upon the following:

1. The dreadnoughts are to be based where they will be strategically concentrated with the British Grand Fleet in the event of a major action near the eastern end of the English Channel.

2. The *Delaware* and *North Dakota* to be based with the superdreadnoughts or where it may appear desirable.

3. The superdreadnought battleships to be based and operated in the manner most effective for the protection of trans-Atlantic convoys against surface raiders.

4. The *Delaware* to be based and operated in the manner most efficient for the protection of trans-Atlantic convoys against surface raiders.

CONSIDERATION OF BASES SUITABLE FOR DREADNAUGHTS AND THE NATURE OF THEIR OPERATIONS.

42. The probable locality of a major engagement is considered to be the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Action in this vicinity could be forced upon the British Grand Fleet by a naval raid in the Channel or by a military raid on the coast of England, in the vicinity of London.

43. In the following consideration of bases, Kentish Knock has been considered as the probable locality of such a major fleet action.

44. The distance from Kentish Knock to Rosyth is about 390 miles. To be strategically concentrated with the British Grand Fleet, the base of the United States superdreadnaughts must be within this distance of Kentish Knock.

45. Within 390 miles of Kentish Knock there are not suitable bases except the channel ports and Brest. The channel ports of both Great Britain and France are overcrowded now, and the basing of a squadron of dreadnaughts on any of these ports would probably seriously interfere with cross-channel traffic. The Brest roads are 360 miles from Kentish Knock and from all data at hand appear to offer a satisfactory base.

46. In case the British Grand Fleet is based at Scapa, the distance of our base from Kentish Knock can be increased without destroying the strategic concentration. This increase in distance furnishes no additional bases for consideration except Berehaven. Berehaven lacks many of the advantages of Brest as regards questions of communication, supply, and fuel, and in the event of operations against battle cruiser raiders in the channel is not so well situated as Brest.

47. In the further consideration of a plan for the accomplishment of the mission of the fleet it will be assumed that the superdreadnaughts are to base on Brest.

ENEMY RAIDING OPERATIONS.

48. Provisions adequate for the protection of our transports against operations by the battle cruisers should be sufficient to afford protection against surface raiders of other types.

ENEMY FORCES—DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

49. The enemy may use any types of surface craft as raiders. If, however, battleships or battle cruisers are based, the number will probably not be large, whereas if merchant cruisers or light cruisers are used it is quite probable that the number of raiders out at once will be as large as they may deem advisable.

50. All enemy vessels of types suitable for use as raiders are based on the home coast of Germany.

51. There are two avenues of escape to the Atlantic Ocean from the North Sea:

- (a) Round the north of Scotland.
- (b) Through the English Channel.

52. (a) Has the advantages of—

- (1) More sea room.
- (2) Avoids British torpedo craft bases.
- (3) Norwegian territorial waters can be used to assist in avoiding mines.
- (4) Longer period of darkness in each day.
- (5) More chance of evasion.

(a) Has the disadvantages of—

- (1) Leading nearer to main bases of British Grand Fleet.
- (2) Being farthest from the probable convoy routes.
- (3) Being the obvious way.

(b) Has the advantages of—

(1) Surface craft of equal power will not be met unless the United States dreadnaughts are based on the vicinity of the English Channel.

(2) Nearest way to the transport routes.

(3) Least obvious way.

(b) Has the disadvantage of—

- (1) Greater danger from mines.
- (2) Greater danger from torpedo crafts.
- (3) More likelihood of being sighted.
- (4) Fewer hours of darkness.

54. There does not seem to be much choice between the two routes. The greater danger in the passage of the English Channel, is the danger from mines. Undoubtedly the German vessels are fitted with paravanes and in addition to those, high speed sweeps carried by destroyers would undoubtedly be used to sweep up the mines. The

battle cruiser would no doubt be screened also by a strong screen of destroyers and light cruisers in sufficient strength to fight off any British forces of light vessels based in the vicinity of the channel.

55. In case of an attempt to pass north about, the battle cruisers will attempt to take full advantage of darkness and fog. It is quite possible that the German High Sea Fleet might make a demonstration in the vicinity of the British coast in order to draw the British battle cruisers and destroyers away from the northern area during the passage of the battle cruiser.

56. In view of the probability that the first attempt of this nature will be the most successful, it is quite within the probabilities that attempts to pass out by both routes may be made simultaneously.

57. The German High Sea Fleet may be expected to make demonstrations against the British coast during the period that the battle cruisers are out, in order to prevent the detachment of British battle cruisers to participate in antiraid operations.

58. As a force of at least six battle cruisers would be required to have a chance of success in running down the enemy battle cruiser, it is extremely doubtful if the British Grand Fleet would be willing to sacrifice that strength to hunting raiders.

59. The cruising radius of the latest German battle cruisers is sufficient to permit them to reach the West Indies at a speed of 20 knots after steaming 24 hours at 25 knots during their escape. They would still have about 15 per cent of their fuel capacity remaining.

60. The problem of logistics would be a most serious one with them and the logical course appears to be to fit out one or more of their larger merchant ships to act as tender and collier.

61. There are available for this:

- (a) The *Imperator*, 52,000 tons, 25 knots speed.
- (b) The *Columbus*, 40,000 tons, 21½ knots speed, and possibly—
- (c) The *Hindenburg*, 40,000 tons, 21½ knots speed, which vessel was building in 1916.

OWN FORCES, DISPOSITION AND COURSE OF ACTION.

62. Our forces would consist of:

- (a) Eight superdreadnoughts, based on Brest.
- (b) *North Dakota* and *Delaware*.
- (c) Two *Michigan* type, six *Minnesota* type.
- (d) Five *Georgia* type.
- (e) Seven armored cruisers.
- (f) Squadron one battleship force, and division A assigned to training and coast defense.

63. There are two courses of action:

- (a) Strictly defensive.
- (b) Strictly offensive.

64. Course (a) is by far the simplest and would consist in supporting the ocean escorts by dreadnoughts whenever it is considered that an enemy battle cruiser may be out.

This course would lead eventually to a permanent escort of dreadnoughts for all convoys of troop ships, but would not prevent the destruction of a perhaps vital amount of shipping not under such escort. It would permit the freedom of the sea to the enemy battle cruiser.

65. Course (b) would be to operate defensively with regard to the one or two troop convoys nearest Europe and offensively with the remaining dreadnaughts and such destroyers and other vessels as might be available, to run down this raider. It is quite true that battleships can not overtake a battle cruiser, but constant pursuit would prevent the battle cruiser stopping to fuel and consequently soon exhaust her fuel supply.

66. In case of a passage through the Channel, the dreadnaughts and such destroyers as might be available should be able to intercept and defeat or drive back the battle cruiser before she cleared the western end of the Channel.

67. A battle cruiser gaining the sea north about will be more difficult to locate and scouts and destroyers will be required to assist the dreadnaughts.

68. The vessels of our Navy most suitable for this are the armored cruisers. It is recognized that they are of inferior speed and power to a battle cruiser, but such a vessel on a raiding expedition would not desire to expend fuel in chasing down scouts. She would not know into what she was being led and would be wary about following a scout.

69. By substituting the *South Carolina* and *Michigan* and six *Minnesota* type for the armored cruisers as ocean escorts, these cruisers can be made available for scouting and, if necessary, relieving the ocean escorts on the eastern end of the voyage.

70. The *North Dakota* and *Delaware* could be based on Halifax or Guantanamo or on the home coast. Their primary duty being to guard the western Atlantic against battle cruiser operations against the coast and to prevent such vessels from fueling in the western Atlantic if they are tracked to this vicinity.

71. The five *Georgia* type would assist the *North Dakota* and *Delaware* in defense of the coast. The radius of action of these vessels is probably insufficient to permit their efficient use as ocean escorts.

DECISIONS.

72. (1) To assign to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet the mission of guarding all trans-Atlantic convoys against raiders.

(2) To base the superdreadnoughts *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada* (*Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, and *Idaho* when ready) at Brest.

(3) To base the seven armored cruisers at Berehaven as scouts and eastern ocean escorts.

(4) To base *North Dakota* and *Delaware* on home coast, Halifax or Guantanamo, as detail plans may indicate best.

(5) To use *South Carolina*, *Michigan*, and *Minnesota* type as ocean escorts and troop convoys.

(6) To base five *Georgia* type on home coast.

(7) The commander in chief to assume direct control over offensive antiraid operations.

(8) To base squadron one and division A on home coast and operate them as training units.

[Secret.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
June 17, 1918.

From: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Visit of inspection and observation to Atlantic Fleet in European waters.

References:

(a) C-in-C letter file 1445, 13 June, 1917, to Sec. Navy (Op.) re "Status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic."

(b) CNO let. file 28754-20:46, 9 July, 1917, to C-in-C in reply to reference (a);

(c) CNO letter file 20392-648, 2 July, 1917, to commander United States naval forces operating in European waters re "Assignment of United States naval forces operating in European waters to Atlantic Fleet"—an inclosure with reference (b).

(d) CNO let. file 29392-649, 3 July, 1917, to commander convoy operations in the Atlantic re "Forces engaged in convoy operations in the Atlantic attached to the Atlantic Fleet"—an inclosure with reference (b).

(e) Art. 1652 Navy Regulations, Paris (b), (c), (d).

(f) Art. 901 Naval Instructions.

(g) C-in-C let. file 8010, 11 Oct., 1917, re "General report on visit to England and France in August-September, 1917."

Inclosures: 4—Copies of references (a), B (b), (c), and (d).

1. References (a), (b), (c), (d) define the status of all forces operating in the Atlantic generally as attached to the Atlantic Fleet, and specifically the forces operating in European waters and those engaged in convoy operations in the Atlantic.

2. references (e) and (f) deal with the duties of a commander in chief in regard to maintaining familiarity with the condition and employment and general readiness of his command.

3. The commander in chief, during his visit to England and France in the late summer of 1917, was able to comply in some measure with the requirements of references (e) and (f) in regard to those parts of the Atlantic Fleet which were then in European waters. Report to the department thereon was included in reference (g).

4. The report made in Reference (g) also includes notes and memoranda in regard to naval conditions in England and France, derived from observation and from personal contact with officers of the British Grand Fleet, of the British Admiralty, and of the French Ministry of Marine.

5. The information gained by the commander in chief in 1917 from direct contact with the allied naval administration and forces engaged in active operations furnished reliable data for the modification of the general operating conditions of the Atlantic Fleet to conform with the experience gained by the allied navies during three years of war, and notably assisted in the introduction of the new system of tactics for the handling of battleships, and also contributed largely to a comprehension of the con-

itions—all of which matters have rendered the Atlantic Fleet more nearly ready to cooperate with the allied navies in general and with the British Navy in particular.

6. About nine months have now elapsed since the commander in chief returned from Europe. During that time that part of the Atlantic Fleet operating in European waters has been greatly increased, notably in the case of battleships division 9 (60 battle squadron of the British Grand Fleet) and of the mine force.

7. It is believed that the benefits to be gained from a visit of inspection and observation by the commander in chief are even greater than from the trip in 1917, on account of the clearer understanding of allied aims and methods acquired from study of the information in hand and the consequent readiness to acquire further and more definite information along more advanced and more detailed lines. It is further believed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to learn, under the most favorable conditions, and at first hand, from those who have the accumulated experience afforded by nearly four years of war—an opportunity which will probably never again be presented to us.

8. The commander in chief has therefore to recommend and to request that he and certain members of his staff be ordered to proceed to Europe for a visit of inspection and observation. In this connection, attention is invited to the following conditions:

a. The *Arkansas* has been ordered to prepare for distant service; i. e., to join battleships division 9.

b. The assignment of flag officers of the Atlantic Fleet in home waters to duty on the selection board, which is soon to meet, and the lack of destroyers to operate at sea with the fleet while enemy submarines are working on the Atlantic coast will largely restrict the battleship forces to ship and division work in inclosed waters for some weeks.

c. The departure of the *Arkansas* deprives the commander battleship force 2 of a suitable flagship, as the *New Mexico* will not be ready for sea for some time.

d. The *Pennsylvania* is due to go to the navy yard for several weeks' authorized work, and there is no relief fleet flagship.

9. The absence of the commander in chief in Europe during the months of July and August can readily be arranged for along the following lines:

a. That the commander in chief and party take passage to Europe in the *Arkansas*.

b. That commander battleship force 2 (second in command Atlantic Fleet) transfer to the *Pennsylvania* to handle the Atlantic Fleet during the absence of the commander in chief.

c. That the *Pennsylvania* go for navy-yard work after similar work has been completed on the *Arizona*, by which time the *New Mexico* may be expected to be ready for sea.

H. T. MAYO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 22, 1918.

Secret.

To: Commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Visit of inspection and observation to Atlantic Fleet in European waters.

Reference: (a) Letter from commander in chief to Secretary of the Navy, dated June 17, 1918.

1. The department approves in general the recommendation of the commander in chief as contained in reference (a). The department, however, does not approve the departure of the commander in chief prior to the completion of the duties of the selection board. Your plans should contemplate departure as soon as possible after the work of this board has been completed.

W. S. BENSON.

MEMORANDUM RE INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION TRIP TO EUROPEAN WATERS.

1. The proposed inspection of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet now operating in European waters should cover the following:

Great Britain: Headquarters, United States naval forces, operating in European waters. London; mine force and mine-force bases; battleship division 9; destroyers based on Queenstown; air stations.

France: Force based on Brest; air stations: force based on St. Nazaire; force based on Bordeaux; force based on Gibraltar; force based on Azores.

NOTE.—This is in no sense to be considered as an inspection of shore stations except in so far as the activities at these stations are intimately connected with the operations of the forces afloat: i. e., the fleet.

2. This trip of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and a portion of his staff has for its aims:

(a) An inspection of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet now operating in European waters, with a view to familiarizing the commander in chief with the operations of these forces and with the conditions existing within these forces. This inspection will furnish the commander in chief with adequate information upon which to base such suggestions and recommendations regarding operations, personnel, and material as may appear pertinent.

(b) To obtain first-hand information of the methods of operation of these forces, and of the methods of operation of the allied navies, in order that the training and preparation of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet now in home waters, which may soon be employed abroad, may be such as to insure early efficient cooperation with our forces now in Europe, or with any allied forces.

3. The principal points upon which information of our own forces should be obtained are:

(a) What type of operations are being conducted, and what efficiency has been attained by the force in the performance of these operations. If a high state of efficiency has not been attained, what is the reason for the lack of efficiency.

(b) What is the organization most suitable for the performance of the type of operations in progress, and how, if at all, can the organization be improved.

(c) In what manner can the material available be used to greater advantage, or in what manner can the material be improved.

(d) In what respects can the methods of communication or the material means of communication be improved.

(e) What changes in the methods of training and preparation of the forces in home waters will increase the efficiency of units upon their arrival in European waters.

4. With regard to the operations of the allied forces.

It is desirable to obtain as much knowledge of the methods of operation of the various types of vessels as possible. It is impossible for officers on active duty with vessels in European waters to give sufficient time to the study of this important matter except in so far as the type of vessel to which they are attached is concerned. Such officers are unfamiliar with the progress that has been made in the Atlantic Fleet in home waters during their absence. Especially valuable is the experience to be gained in the British Grand Fleet, and in the British forces operating from Harwich and Dover. Such an opportunity to learn the practices of forces which have been engaged in active operations of war for a period of four years may never again be presented and full advantage should be taken of this opportunity.

5. Vice Admiral Sims has pointed out in his weekly reports the desirability of enlarging the staff of Rear Admiral Rodman and of assigning officers to duty with the British forces operating from Harwich and Dover, in order to take advantage of this opportunity. It is considered that this request should be complied with, if practicable, in order that the United States Navy may profit to the greatest extent possible from the opportunities presented. The greatest amount of information can be obtained in a short time and the most immediate good be derived from the information so obtained by permitting members of the staff of the commander in chief, who have been selected for their knowledge of various features of naval activities, and who are constantly in touch with the developments of these activities at home, to visit and observe the operations of these British forces.

6. These officers, all of whom were abroad with the commander in chief last year are sufficiently in touch with the British practices to be able to determine what changes have been made during the past year; how these changes affect the practices in our own forces in home waters; and to inquire intelligently into the details and procedures which were new to them last year. It is believed that the information that can be obtained by these officers, who are experts in their respective lines and who are familiar with the present practices at home and with previous British practices, will be most valuable to the forces of the Atlantic Fleet in home waters in preparing such forces for active cooperation with Allied naval forces.

7. Due to the fact that during the commander in chief's trip last year much of the time abroad was consumed in necessary conferences and observation trips to British and French bases, not much opportunity was offered to obtain the desired detailed knowledge of operations that was so much desired. As a result of this trip, however, many improvements were made in the tactics of the fleet, in signalling, in gunnery, and in communications. The trip was of great value to the commander in chief in familiarizing him with the actual conditions abroad, and in indicating the lines of

and should be pursued by the forces in home waters in order to insure cooperation with the forces abroad.

Both direct or indirect, of the commander in chief's trip last year, the crews have been trained with a view to joint operations with the British particularly along the following lines:

TACTICS.

Use of cruising formations. (Fleet S. O. No. 2.)
Use of battle instructions. (Fleet S. O. No. 2.)

GUNNERY.

Use of rules for distribution of gunfire.
Use of conditions of readiness for action similar to British practices.
Importance of concentration emphasized.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Use of radio procedure.
Use of contact reports.
Use of radio and signalling material.
Use code and signal section.

RELATION OF BATTLESHIP SIGNAL FORCES IN BRITISH SIGNALS.

So that the commander in chief may profit by the knowledge and advice it is necessary that these officers keep up to date in the developments constantly taking place, especially in the war zone. It is believed that, familiarity with our present practices and with previous British practices, and the information which will be invaluable to our forces in home waters, in some instances, convey information which will be useful to our allies in Europe.

Under the above, the commander in chief desires to have the following members of his staff accompany him to Europe: Capt. O. P. Jackson, United States Navy, chief of staff; Commander W. S. Pye, United States Navy, war plans intelligence officer; Commander D. C. Bingham, United States Navy, training officer; Lieut. Commander A. B. Cook, United States Navy, flag secretary; Lieut. Commander Leigh Noves, United States Navy, flag secretary; Lieut. Commander H. W. McCormack, United States Navy, flag secretary. Only one of these officers, the flag lieutenant, will have the nature of a personal staff.

At 4 p. m. the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, (at March 31, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS.
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock in room 235, Senate office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

THE CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Mayo, will you continue?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL H. T. MAYO--Resumed.

Admiral Mayo. Mr. Chairman, before any questions are asked may I make a slight correction of my testimony?

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral Mayo. I would like to insert on page 19, after line 7, "and this subject was never again mentioned."

I want to insert on page 72, after line 4, "In December, 1917, I agreed with the department to have one officer of my staff on duty in Washington at all times in order that I might be kept better advised of conditions, plans, and operations."

THE CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell, have you any question?

Senator Trammell. I have not any questions to ask the Admiral.

THE CHAIRMAN. As I have stated several times in this hearing, members of the committee are not to decide differences between the Navy or between officers of the Navy and officials of the War Department, and if mistakes have been made in the course of the operation of the Navy, we want to see what we can do to rectifying those mistakes for the future.

What final summary you stated:

The Navy is provided with a definite ideal in the form of a definite statement of the policy of the United States which it is to be prepared to enforce, the Navy can not formulate building programs and war plans except in accordance with the foreign policy of the United States.

And you state:

That regulations under which the Navy was operating during the war and which are unsatisfactory.

On account of the great position that you occupied during the war and on account of your great knowledge of naval matters in the committee would like to have you, at some future time, make a statement about the foreign policy of the country as it relates to the Navy, and also to state in what particulars the

organization of the Navy was faulty and to suggest some general plan for remedying the faults in the organization, and we shall call on you at some time in the near future to give us a statement about these matters.

Admiral MAYO. Can you give me an idea, Mr. Chairman, as to what length of time I will have in order to get that out? That is a thing that requires thought and consultation and coordination of ideas,

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you as much time as you want.

Admiral MAYO. Very well, sir; I will go at it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral. We have no further matters, and you are excused.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fiske, will you state to the committee what duties you performed from the opening of the World War in 1914 down to the date of the armistice?

Admiral FISKE. I was aid for Operations in 1914. I had been aid for Operations for about a year. I have a statement here which goes into the history of it, more or less.

The CHAIRMAN. You were aid for Operations in 1914?

Admiral FISKE. In 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. And for one year thereafter?

Admiral FISKE. I had been aid for Operations since February, 1913.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, Admiral, can you make a statement to the committee about matters connected with the operations of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I have a statement prepared, Mr. Senator, which goes back to the time when I was aid for Operations, a year or so before the war began in 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. On all matters pertinent to this investigation?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. The first portion of this, the first three or four pages, may seem not pertinent, but they are. It is the groundwork on which what I say afterwards is based.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral FISKE. While captain I was a member of the General Board from August, 1910, till August, 1911. During all except the first three or four months of that time I was in charge of the war plans section of the General Board, and responsible for the preparation and readiness of the war plans of the Navy under Admiral Dewey. On taking charge I was surprised to find that the war plans were extremely meager, and did not embody, it seemed to me, even 1 per cent of what war plans should embody. During the eight or nine months that I was in charge of them I did what I could to make them more full and complete; but as I had only two assistants, and we all had other work to do, and as I had had no experience or training in making war plans, I made no appreciable headway.

As there is some misunderstanding about what a war plan is, I beg leave to state that a war plan is a plan prepared in peace for the purpose of enabling a navy or army to start very quickly on any given line of conduct immediately after war is declared, by deciding on that line of conduct before war actually begins and by arranging all

in advance. If anyone will read history carefully, he will find all the highly successful campaigns of the great commanders began so quickly after war had been declared that their opponents were taken by surprise, and that the plans had been so well worked out in advance that very few if any mistakes were made.

No man to realize the necessity in modern times for the highly complicated and detailed war plans that the complexity of modern warfare demands was Moltke. Moltke set the pace that all other commanders have had to follow since, under penalty of being defeated in battle. The penalty is so great, the number of lines of action so many, the amount of detail so enormous that a war plan at the present time, even a naval war plan, would fill a bushel basket.

A large part of the bulk of the war plan would be not so much the plan itself as the details for carrying it out; just as the general plan of a house or building which one wishes to erect may be shown on a single sheet of paper, while the detail plans which a builder needs to actually to build the house may cover many sheets.

The general plan which may be called the strategic plan, simply states, usually briefly, the line of conduct decided on. For

example, if we were to send a naval force to attack Mozambique, it would state the more routes that are to be taken, and which route will be taken under certain conditions. It also prescribes the amount of force, how it will be divided up, and the numbers and the kinds of vessels which it will be composed. This general plan is usually decided after what we call chart maneuvers and war games have been

carried out and decisions have been reached as to what the general lines of action. The main features of the war plan are decided on, the details of how to carry it out are worked out thoroughly; such as the providing of fuel and food and ammunition. In all cases where sufficient time is allowed certain kinds of vessels, and equipments are constructed.

When sufficient time has been allowed after the coming of war had been declared, and if this time has been utilized to the best advantage, the various units of personnel and equipment will be waiting in readiness for the instant of the declaration of war. When the decision is finally made, and the news sent by radio telegraph to the fleet and other units, they can start to fulfill their mission immediately. I am told that the British fleet started in less than an hour after the declaration of war.

In order to prepare suitable plans of war, the Germans found out long ago what a large body of officers experienced in making such plans was required. To this body of officers the name given in Germany is planning division. No planning division was started in the United States until August 1, 1918. I beg leave to place in the record a paper called "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations."

The planning division in the office of naval operations then was organized, as will be noted on page 7 of this organization plan, not separated from administrative work.

The plan referred to is here printed in full in the record, as

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AUGUST 1, 1918.

Any officer on duty in the Office of Naval Operations or who reports for duty must familiarize himself with the details of this organization.

W. S. BENSON.

ORGANIZATION OF OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

1. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations as head of this office are defined by regulations as follows:

"There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war." (Act Mar. 3, 1915; N. R. 103 (1).)

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

2. For administrative purposes an officer of suitable rank and experience will be designated as assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, and he shall hold the same relation to the heads of the divisions as an executive officer of a ship holds to the head of departments on board ship. The assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations shall not attempt to administer the details of any division.

All questions of policy and questions involving the formation of plans, or a change in plans, should first be taken up with the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations by the head of the division concerned.

DIVISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

3. The primary functions of the Office of Naval Operations are:

(1) Preparation of plans and policies, and (2) operating the forces of the Navy.

The actual planning work will be carried on by the Plans Division, and the actual operations of forces will be administered under the supervision of the Chief of Naval Operations or of the assistant Chief of Naval Operations under the administrative caption "Operating forces." The other activities of the office are administered through the following divisions: Intelligence Division, Material Division, Naval Districts Division, Aviation Division, Communication Division, Gunnery Exercises and Engineering Performances Division, and Files and Records Division.

4. The heads of these divisions are authorized to administer the details of their respective divisions by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. This delegated authority covers only the administration of approved policies and plans. The heads of divisions shall lay before the Chief of Naval Operations, in concise form, for his consideration and approval, all questions requiring his decision or involving a change in policy or plans, using their discretion as to which are of sufficient importance to first be referred to the Planning Division. The above divisions of the Office of Naval Operations exist to obtain effective administration, and the heads of the various divisions must not be allowed to overlook the fact that the final responsibility rests upon the Chief of Naval Operations, who desires and must have, at all times, a comprehensive knowledge of the activities of the several divisions.

5. Heads of divisions will submit, at regular intervals, or from time to time, as may be found most suitable, such condensed statements as will most readily enable the Chief of Naval Operations to keep intimately in touch with their activities, plans, and progress. Such information will be merely supplementary to frequent conferences with heads of divisions. In order to conserve time, conferences should be arranged through the aid to the Chief of Naval Operations or with one of his assistants.

6. The organization of the several divisions is and shall be in accordance with the approved diagrammatic plan. No additions or changes will be made in any part of this organization without the written approval of the Chief of Naval Operations. With any proposed changes, a diagram shall be submitted showing wherein the change will affect the present organization, or, if new work, where it will link with the present organization.

7. In addition to the divisions of the office, an officer of or above the rank of lieutenant commander will be designated as senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations. Additional officers will be ordered as aids or as assistants to the aids to the Chief of Naval Operations as may be required. In addition to the duties prescribed by regulations for an aid, the senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations will have general supervision of all rooms and office space assigned to the office; will handle all correspondence relative to officers' records and officers' orders, and other naval personnel correspondence, and will generally assist, under the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the organization of the office and the coordination of the work of the several divisions of the office with bureaus and with other departments, unless a special representative is designated.

8. The complement of officers and clerical assistants shall be in accordance with the plan above mentioned. This shall be the "allowed complement" from which the "actual complement" may vary under the same conditions as hold in a ship's organization.

9. To explain the method of handling a subject involving the various divisions, the following may be taken as an illustration:

Certain conditions are known to exist, let us suppose, through information obtained from force commanders and detailed information obtained through Naval Intelligence. The information, with the objects to be obtained, is sent to the Planning Division. The Planning Division makes a study of the subject and calls a meeting of a certain plans committee. This committee deliberates on the information at hand and on the mission. It then prepares definite recommendations of what it proposes in order to insure the success of the mission. The matter is then taken up with the Chief of Naval Operations, and if approved by him (or the Secretary if required) is referred to Material Division, Aviation Division, and (or) Districts Division according to the requirements. These divisions proceed with the preparation of the material and personnel which may be necessary to make the approved plan effective.

Everything having been provided, and everything being in readiness for making the plan effective, the operating orders are issued (by the Division of Operating Forces) and the plan is put into effect so far as movements are concerned and forces are handled under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS.

10. *Intelligence Division (Office of Naval Intelligence).*—The Intelligence Division is charged with the collection of information for the department and for other naval activities which require it. It publishes and disseminates such information to the Navy and to Government officials requiring it. It cooperates with the other executive departments of the Government in discovering and bringing to justice persons engaged in activities against the United States. It directs all naval attaches abroad, and is the official channel of communication for all foreign naval attaches in the United States.

It is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence to keep in close touch with all naval activities, both in and out of the Navy Department. The office handles all classes of information excepting purely operating information, which is usually (and should always) be forwarded by the senior officer present direct to the Chief of Naval Operations. Such information is under the cognizance of the Division of Operating Forces.

11. *Planning Division.*—The organization of the Planning Division is, in general, as follows:

It will be composed of a body of selected men who shall have had special training, particularly in war staff work. It may not be practicable to separate entirely the Planning Division from certain administrative work, but the administrative work assigned to the personnel of this division must be as little as the allowance of commissioned personnel in the other divisions of the office will permit. The administrative heads of all divisions of the Office of Naval Operations are ex officio members of the Planning Division. It will not, however, be necessary for the heads of the divisions to sit on the various plans committees, except on matters in which they are interested. The plans committees shall be ordered for the considerations of various classes of papers. There shall be a permanent committee consisting of the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, the heads of all divisions and the officers of the Planning Division.

The Chief of Naval Operations, or assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, may name other committees for the consideration of various classes of papers and they may, at their discretion, call special plans committee meetings, the members of which may be selected by them. The personnel of special plans committees do not necessarily form a part of the Office of Naval Operations, but may be designated in addition to other duties which they are performing. The officer in the Office of Operations who is most vitally concerned in any plans under consideration by a plans committee should sit with the committee which is considering that particular plan, and he, in his administrative capacity, should be the follow-up man on the committee for that particular plan.

12. The Planning Division is organized for the purpose of deliberating upon all changes of policy and all proposed plans of operations which come before the department. Questions involving a change on policy, and those questions upon which a definite policy has not yet been determined, must be referred by the division concerned, with appropriate remarks and all necessary papers, to the Planning Division

for consideration before being presented to the Chief of Naval Operations for decision. The action of the Planning Division or of any subcommittee thereof shall be clearly expressed in proper official form, as briefly as may be consistent with the subject in hand, and signed by all officers who have taken part in the deliberation. The Planning Division shall keep a careful record of all action taken by it as a body and by all plans committees.

13. The Planning Division and plans committees' decisions are in no sense final and shall never be considered as the basis for action until approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. The function of the Planning Division is purely deliberative and not executive or administrative, except as pointed out above.

14. *Material division.*—It will be noted from the diagram that the material division is organized so that the several sections thereof have cognizance of the several general divisions or classes of vessels. It is the duty of the officers of the various sections of the division to keep in close touch with those handling the planning and operating end of the work for their classes of vessels, and to attempt to shape their work to meet the approved plans and the operating orders for the vessels in question, subject, of course, to the approval of the head of the material division.

It is the duty of the head of the material division to coordinate the work of the navy yards and other industrial establishments of the Navy. He shall carefully study all projects which have for their purpose the expansion of any industrial establishment or base, or the building of any new base or plant for industrial activities. It is his duty to anticipate the material needs of the service, to advise the Chief of Naval Operations accordingly, and to initiate correspondence on such questions and prepare such papers as may be advisable for consideration by the planning division and by plans committees.

15. *Naval districts division.*—The function of the naval districts division is to form the connecting link between the Office of Naval Operations and the naval districts. It undertakes the routine central administrative work in connection with naval districts operations and advises the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to matters of policy affecting the naval districts. It undertakes the work of properly supplying the districts with facilities, so far as practicable for carrying out their work including the supply and assignment of district vessels and the locating and building of district bases.

The districts division has cognizance of the routine commandeering of vessels for the Navy, and of the correspondence which such commandeering occasions. It must work closely with all other divisions of the office, and with all bureaus, in order that it may assist in adjusting all matters between the districts and the department about which a clear understanding does not exist.

16. *Aviation division.*—The aviation division has cognizance of all aviation activities which are under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, except the actual operation of aircraft designated for offensive and defensive operations. Such aircraft are part of the operating forces of the Navy.

17. *Operating division.*—The movements of all naval craft, whether surface, submarine, or air, not especially designated for training and experimental purposes exclusively, shall be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, through the officers charged with the responsibility of supervising the movements of: (1) Fighting vessels of the Navy; (2) vessels of the naval overseas transportation service.

In the case of craft assigned to a naval district, a fleet, or a force, the orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandant or force commander, as the case may be, will not specify individual craft unless the character of the mission or the existing circumstances so require. In order that the movements of all classes and types of craft may be coordinated and effectively and efficiently directed, it is essential that the supervising officers work in closest touch with the various divisions of the office, especially with material, naval districts, and aviation.

Complete and accurate records and analyses of the movements and operations of Naval craft shall be made and particularly care shall be taken to disseminate this information to the divisions, offices, and bureaus concerned. Only by the exercise of intelligent thought and constant attention can satisfactory results in this respect be attained. The success of much of the work of the bureaus and the development of the requisite spirit of cooperation between this office and the bureaus depends on the intelligence and skill with which this phase of the work is handled. Commandants of districts and commanding officers of fleets, forces, and stations shall be kept informed of the movements of all of our own and allied naval craft and of all known or probable movements of enemy craft which would make their work more comprehensive or assist them in carrying out the orders of the department. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations will be responsible for the general coordination of the

movements and operations of all naval craft, but the officers supervising the several classes and types of craft will be held strictly accountable for the efficient performance of the duties assigned to them.

18. *Communication division.*—The director of naval communications is charged with the administration, organization, and operation of the entire radio, telegraph, telephone, and cable systems of communications within the naval service, including the operation of the trans-Atlantic radio system and all communications between merchant ships and all shore stations in the United States and its possessions. The foregoing includes the preparation and distribution of all codes, cyphers, and secret calls and commercial accounting. The director of naval communications handles all matters pertaining to radio communication in any manner whatsoever, except those relating solely to purchase, supply, test, and installation of apparatus.

The director of naval communications is also chief cable censor, which involves the administration of the organization for censor in all cablegrams from or to the United States and its possessions, except the Philippine Islands.

19. *Gunnery exercises and engineering performances division.*—That branch of Naval Operations which is the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is charged with the issuing to the service of instructions for gunnery and engineering exercises and operations, for collection, analyzing, and review of data, in regard to gunnery and steaming performances of naval craft, and the review of battle inspections of ships for the Chief of Naval Operations, in connection with the preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war. To this end the director of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is expected to make timely and suitable recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations to increase efficiency.

The functions of the office are divided into four parts: (a) Gunnery, (b) steaming, (c) small arms, and (d) inspections. Each of these functions has three distinct steps: (e) Preparation and training, including the issuance of necessary plans to the service for conducting exercises and tests; standard instructions; and general dissemination of information. (f) The conduct of exercises and inspections, including cooperation with the operating branches of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in the movement of units to conduct exercises, cooperation with operations (Mat) and the bureaus to conduct special tests, improve installations, and increase efficiency in operation. (g) Analytical and historical, including the collection of data of gunnery inspections and engineering as regards actual performances of naval craft in service; and the dissemination of this information to those who would be benefited thereby.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

20. Up to the time of the promulgation of this order heads of divisions have not taken up for consideration the problems of policy with other divisions as much as appears advisable. Careful consideration must, therefore, be given in the future to this question, and the views of the Planning Division and such plans committees as may be ordered must be obtained where doubt exists. It becomes the duty of the heads of all divisions to carefully consider such questions and to refer them to the Planning Division without awaiting the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations to follow this course. The fact that an officer refers questions to the Planning Division for consideration is no reflection upon his knowledge or ability, but rather an appreciation on his part of the value of deliberate professional discussion of weighty problems which are sure to arise from time to time.

21. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations shall call a weekly conference, the committee consisting of the heads of divisions, the officers of the Planning Division, and such others as he may consider necessary for the purpose of discussing the current questions which are before the office, and for the further purpose of taking up for general discussion such questions as may relate to the activities of two or more divisions of the office. It is the duty of the heads of the divisions to prepare such matters for discussion upon the occasion of these meetings.

22. The head of each division should consider the advisability of holding a weekly conference of all officers of his division for the purpose of coordinating the work of his several sections and with a view to giving these attending to details a comprehensive idea of the general work of the division and of the office, imparting to them such information as may assist them in their work or may make more comprehensive the policies involved.

23. Formal correspondence between the different divisions of this office is not approved and shall not be indulged in. Matters in which two or more divisions are jointly concerned must be taken up informally in conference or, if this is not necessary, by memorandum.

24. It is the duty of every officer to consider every piece of correspondence that comes to his desk with a view to its usefulness to others. Nothing helps so much in an organization as large as this office as a wise dissemination of proper information and this fact must be carefully borne in mind and must be a guiding principle. When action is taken in one division upon any matter regarding which other divisions or bureaus should be informed, the division initiating the action must, if necessary, prepare additional copies for the information of others who are concerned or whose work may be facilitated by a knowledge of the action taken. An officer taking any action on any paper or an officer receiving incoming information is responsible for the dissemination of the information to others whether they be in this office, in the bureaus, the districts, or the forces afloat, and he will be held accountable for the same by the Chief of Naval Operations.

25. Officers must bear constantly in mind the fact that the Office of Naval Operations is the coordinating center of all the various naval activities of the service. The function of the office is, therefore, largely one of rendering decisions upon which the various bureaus and offices concerned may base their administrative work. In handling correspondence all officers should be governed by these conditions:

First. Does this paper come under my personal cognizance?

Second. If so, does it reflect upon, or would it make any more comprehensive the work of any other division of the office or bureau of the department?

Third. Shall it be referred by routing slip or by indorsement for information?

Fourth. Does my action on this paper affect, and, knowing same, would it assist any division or bureau other than that to whom it is addressed? If so, shall I send copy of my action or route via party concerned, or shall I consult with the interested parties before taking action?

Fifth. Am I acting in accordance with a well defined and approved policy?

Sixth. If not, shall I refer to the bureau or others concerned, for recommendation, and then to the Planning Division for its action, or is the general policy of the question before me sufficiently well known for me to prepare a brief memorandum to accompany my action letter to the Chief of Naval Operations for his signature?

Admiral FISKE. A year later—that is, on August 1, 1919—this organization was revised, and a planning division organized in the Office of Naval Operations, in which the work of the Planning Division was divided into two parts, the first of which was concerned with war plans only. I beg to place in the record an official paper called “Revised organization orders of the Office of Naval Operations,” and to call attention to the fact that it was not until August 1, 1919, that the Navy Department established an organization for the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war. I beg leave to place in the record an official diagram showing the work of planning division now.

(The revised organization orders above referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:)

REVISED ORGANIZATION ORDERS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, THIRD
ISSUE, AUGUST 1, 1919.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., August 1, 1919.

The revised organization orders of the Office of Naval Operations contained herein are approved.

These orders and the organization which they make effective are the result of war experience in handling the work which legally comes under the cognizance of this office. I earnestly hope that the officers attached to this office and the service at large will realize the tremendous value to the service and the country of the Office of Naval Operations, and will use their best efforts to increase its efficiency and its effectiveness.

W. S. BENSON,
Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The functions of the Chief of Naval Operations as head of this office are defined by the following:

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of admiral, and not less than four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and execution of its use in war. (Act Mar. 3, 1915; N. R. 103 (1).)

The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving as such Chief of Naval Operations, shall have the rank and title of "admiral," to take rank next after the senior admiral in the Navy. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performance of his duties shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have the same force and effect as such. (Act Aug. 29, 1916; N. R. 103 (2).)

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, for administrative purposes, and next in authority to the Chief of Naval Operations, shall be an officer of suitable rank and experience will be designated as Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations. He shall hold the same relation to the heads of divisions as the Chief of Naval Operations holds to the heads of departments on board ships. The Chief of Naval Operations shall not administer the details of any

division, but shall refer all questions involving the formation of plans, or a change in the policy of any division, to be taken up with the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations of the division concerned.

The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations has cognizance of Navy regulations, naval orders, and general orders. When circumstances require it, an officer may be detailed to the details incident thereto.

DIVISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The functions of the Office of Naval Operations are: (1) the preparation of policies and plans, and (2) the operation of the forces of the Navy in accordance with approved plans and administrative work incident thereto.

The functions of the Office of Naval Operations are not administrative, and all work in connection therewith shall be done by a body known as the Planning Division, none of whose members shall have administrative duties.

The Office of Naval Operations will be operated under the supervision of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the administrative details shall be handled by the Division of Operating Forces. The functions of (2) are purely administrative, and for the purpose of making effective the approved work of the Office of Naval Operations.

The administrative divisions are as follows: Operating Division, Division of Communication, Materiel Division, Naval Districts Division, Gunnery Exercise and Engineering Performances Division, and Records Division.

PLANNING DIVISION.

The Planning Division shall be composed, as nearly as personnel conditions will permit, of selected officers who shall have had training in war staff work.

The Planning Division has been organized for the purpose of deliberating upon all matters which come before the department and the preparations of plans and policies. It is important that the members of the Planning Division be selected on the basis of their experience, rank, and reputation, command the confidence of the department and of the naval service. The work of this division is of two kinds, namely: (1) war plans, and (2) plans in connection with current operations. The work of the Planning Division shall be divided into the following sections:

- 1. Foreign relations.
- 2. Naval policies.
- 3. Naval policies.

Section B.—Strategy section:

- (1) Strategy of foreign powers—
 - (a) Peace-time strategy.
 - (b) War-time strategy.
 - (c) Building programs.
- (2) Own grand strategy. This comprises—
 - (a) Naval strategy in peace and in war.
 - (b) Military strategy in peace and in war.
 - (c) Building program—types, numbers.
 - (d) Naval bases.

Section C.—Tactics section:

- (1) Naval tactics of foreign navies.
- (2) Own naval tactics of—
 - (a) Fleet as a whole.
 - (b) All elements of naval power.
 - (c) Building program—tactical requirements

Section D.—Education Section:

- (a) Doctrine.
- (b) Tactical instructions.
- (c) Leadership; cooperation.
- (d) Manuals.

Section E.—Submarine section.

Section F.—Aviation section.

NOTE.—Sections E and F are considered necessary at this time on account of the fact that the naval activities they cover are still under development to such a degree that not only is our future policy in regard to them not yet determined, except in a very general way, but their strategical and tactical value, when properly developed, is considered so important that these special sections for the development of these and related problems are essential. In matters of policy, strategy, and tactics, therefore, the heads of these two sections bear the same relation to submarine activities and aviation activities, respectively, as the heads of the first three sections named bear to other naval craft and bases, the problems of which are more definitely known and are of a more general character.

Section G.—Logistics section:

- (a) Bases.
- (b) Reserve supplies.
- (c) Personnel.
- (d) Mobilization.
- (e) Train.
- (f) Materiel.
- (g) Merchant marine.

Section H.—Secretary.

Section I.—Administrative plans.

WAR PLANS.

5. Every problem should be considered as a part solution of a general plan rather than as something that stands alone, detached, and solitary. For this reason the most general problems should be solved first, and subsequent problems should arise from the decisions of the more general problems. National policy, naval policy, national strategy, naval strategy, logistics, naval tactics, form a descending series from the general to the concrete which may be used as a partial guide in determining chronological sequence of effort in problem solving.

6. The Chief of Naval Operations will propose the problems, and the Director of Plans, in consultation with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, will prepare the problems and assign them to committees for solution.

7. Every solution of a problem concerning war plans that may be submitted shall be examined by all sections. The committee responsible for the solution shall, if necessary, demonstrate in conference to the Planning Division as a whole the soundness of its conclusions.

ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS.

8. In addition to the war plans work carried on by the permanent personnel of the Planning Division, the officers of sections E, F, G, and I will be particularly concerned with administrative plans. For planning work of this character planning committees may be named, when considered advisable, by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for the consideration of various classes

At least one officer from the Planning Division should be appointed to each committee. The number and composition of planning committees will be determined by the Chief of Naval Operations or Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; but as a general rule that such committees will be composed of those officers most familiar with, and in most cases, those handling the administrative subject in hand. Officers composing planning committees are not attached to Operations.

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY PLANNING COMMITTEE.

The members of the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee will be selected by the Chief of Naval Operations from the members of the several sections of the Planning Division. Three or more members will be so designated. The Army and Navy Planning Committee will investigate, study, and report on subjects relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and Navy, to be referred by the Joint Army and Navy Board. It shall also have the right to consider such subjects when in its judgment necessary. The members of this committee are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of national and military policy in which the Army and Navy are jointly concerned, and to consider this joint work as their most important duty. The work of the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee will be informal. Its recommendations shall be confidential and will be made to the Joint Army and Navy Board.

GENERAL REGULATIONS AND PRINCIPLES.

Questions involving a change in policy, and those questions upon which a decision has not yet been determined, must be referred by the division concerned with appropriate remarks and all necessary papers, to the Planning Division before being presented to the Chief of Naval Operations for decision. Reports of the Planning Division or of any subcommittee thereof shall be clearly stated in official form, as briefly as may be consistent with the subject in question, by all officers who have taken part in the deliberation. The committee shall then be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and if approved by him (or the Secretary if required) all divisions concerned shall be informed in order that administrative details may proceed.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the administrative heads of all divisions are ex officio members of the Planning Division.

The staff of the Planning Division shall not be given administrative work, but shall prepare and handle such correspondence with other departments as may be necessary for the study of policy and preparation of plans. On account, however, of the developments and large amount of work necessary in connection with submarines and aviation, it is necessary to assign a large of sections E and F to exercise coordinating supervision over the several sections of the different divisions which are concerned with matters connected with their respective work, and to consult with the Bureau representatives. They shall have full authority to act as far as relates to the personnel of the sections concerned in the execution of this work. Like other sections of the Planning Division they have no plans and plans for their particular work, and are advisory in matters connected with them. All administrative work shall, however, be carried on under the supervision of the divisions concerned.

To insure supervision effective and to insure the cooperation of all divisions, the officers in charge of sections E and F shall frequently call on the respective representatives in the several divisions of the office. These representatives shall be informed of the time and place of these conferences and encouraged to attend. In like manner they shall from time to time visit submarine bases and aviation bases and stations, respectively, and report on their relation to these as they do to the actual operating forces.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

It is to be kept in touch with the activities in all departments of the Government, and in the Navy Department and in the fleets, constant liaison maintained. The Chief of Naval Operations hopes that it will be the aim of the Planning Division to keep in touch with officials of the Government in and out of the Navy Department.

ment from whom information can be obtained which would lend a broadening influence to the work of the office. A member of the policy section will be the liaison officer with State and other departments in routine matters.

LIAISON WITH WAR COLLEGE.

15. An officer of the Planning Division shall be designated for liaison with the Naval War College

DISCUSSION WITH OFFICERS OF THE SERVICE.

16. In order that subjects under discussion may have every viewpoint considered the Director of Plans is authorized to consult directly with officers of the service and, when he considers advisable, he may request the Chief of Naval Operations to order such officers for temporary duty with the Planning Division.

LIAISON WITH OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

17. The Planning Division shall establish a close liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence. The officers of the Planning Division shall call upon the Office of Naval Intelligence for information collated and arranged in the desired manner.

SEPARATE FILING SYSTEM.

18. The Planning Division shall, on account of the nature of its work, have a separate and carefully organized filing system with the necessary confidential stenographers and clerks. It shall keep a careful record of all action taken by it as a body and by all planning committees.

COMPLETED SOLUTIONS.

19. The completed solutions of all problems shall be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations for his action.

20. The director of plans shall continue in close touch, in an advisory way, with the execution of plans.

RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMITTEES.

21. Each committee will be responsible for the completeness and soundness of the solutions of problems assigned to it, and will present finished solutions to the director of plans.

APPROVAL OF PLAN.

22. The Planning Division and plans committees' decisions are in no sense final and shall never be considered as the basis for action until approved.

DIVISION OF OPERATING FORCES.

23. The movements of all naval craft, whether surface, subsurface, or air, not specially designated for training and experimental purposes exclusively, shall be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, through the officers charged with the responsibility of supervising the movements of: (1) Fighting craft of the Navy; and (2) all other naval craft.

24. In the case of craft assigned to a naval district, a fleet, or a force, the orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandant or force commander, as the case may be, will not specify individual craft unless the character of the mission or the existing circumstances so require. In order that the movements of all classes and types of craft may be coordinated and effectively and efficiently directed, it is essential that the supervising officers work in closest touch with the various divisions of the office, especially with Planning Division, material, and naval districts. Complete and accurate records and analyses of the movements and operations of naval craft shall be made and particular care shall be taken to disseminate this information to the divisions, officers, and bureaus concerned. The success of much of the work of the bureaus and the development of the requisite spirit of cooperation between this office and the bureaus depend on the intelligence and skill with which this phase of the work is handled. Commandants of districts and commanding officers of fleets, forces, and stations shall be kept informed of the movements of all of our own naval craft and of all known or probable movements of foreign craft which would make their work more comprehensive or assist them in carrying out the orders of the department. The

Assistant Chief of Naval Operations will be responsible for the general coordination of the movements and operations of all naval craft, but the officers supervising the several classes and types of craft will be held responsible for the administrative work involved.

ASSIGNMENT OF DUTIES.

25 The duties of the sections of this division are as outlined on the diagram accompanying these regulations. The following explanations and regulations are added:

STATISTICAL SECTION.

26. Section G shall become the statistical section for all matters pertaining to the movements and operations of naval craft. Its general scope of work shall be as follows:

1 Prepare an accurate index history of each fleet, unit, and subunit of that fleet, showing the composition of the various units, their movements, and, where possible, the duty performed in connection with these movements.

2 Prepare an accurate index history of each vessel in the Navy. This shall apply to aircraft as well as other naval craft. This data should show the dimensions, fuel consumption, cruising radius, tactical qualities, armament, and all movements of the craft from the date of commission, with duty performed, and the division or subdivision of the fleet or the stations to which attached, if any, at each time. In case of vessels not built by contract for the Navy, prepare a complete history of the vessel's activities previous to delivery to the Navy and method by which the vessel was obtained from the Navy. Also a résumé of any action against an enemy of the United States in which the vessel has been engaged.

3 Continue the present general inspector's duties of naval overseas transportation service until this is abolished.

4 Prepare movement reports of naval overseas transportation service vessels and troop transports as at present until this operation ceases.

5 Prepare summaries of naval overseas transportation service activities as at present until this activity ceases.

AUXILIARY SERVICE—MERCHANT MARINE INTERESTS—TRANSPORTS.

27. Section H shall, with its subordinate sections I and K, carry on the work heretofore under the cognizance of the naval overseas transportation service. One of the most important duties in connection with this section is the liaison with the Shipping Board and the merchant marine. Stated generally, its functions may be defined as follows:

1 The handling of all matters pertaining to the merchant marine.

a Above all is personal interest. Before the war there was no cordial relationship between the Navy and merchant marine. By the formation of the Naval Reserve, and as a result of the Navy handling merchant ships during the war, a closer sympathy between the two has been fostered. The policy in regard to the Reserve Force and its use in time of peace will foster or break the present cordial relations. Find it, if possible, what the Navy can do in time of peace to help the merchant marine.

b Keep in touch with the statistical section to build up a set of statistics on merchant ships with their availability and adaptability for naval use in time of war. Also the shore and port facilities of United States ports. This is a most important duty.

c If the Navy Department should take a similar relationship with the United States merchant marine as is maintained by England, this desk should be the beginning of such a supervision.

2 Maintenance of a nucleus for a naval overseas transportation service organization, in case such an organization is again needed by the Navy.

(a) The idea in this is to be prepared for any emergency and in doing so to profit by the experience gained in naval overseas transportation service during war operations. The merchant marine could not handle the situation of carrying supplies in the presence of the enemy, and the Navy will have it to do again if the emergency arises.

(b) In connection with the plans committees, prepare general plans in regard to routing, coastwise and otherwise, for the preservation of our merchant vessels in case of war.

3) The handling of all matters pertaining to the operation of naval auxiliaries, and cargo vessels operated by the Navy for other Government departments.

(4) The handling of all matters pertaining to the operation of troop transports by the Navy.

NAVAL OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION SERVICE PROBLEMS.

28. In carrying out the above for probably a year there will be a great many matters come up in regard to the naval overseas transportation service. These matters of course will be handled by this desk.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE).

29. The Intelligence Division is charged with the collection of information for the department and for other naval activities which require it. It publishes and disseminates such information to the Navy and to Government officials requiring it. It cooperates with the other executive departments of the Government in discovering and bringing to justice persons engaged in activities against the United States. It directs all naval attachés abroad, and is the official channel of communication for all foreign naval attachés in the United States.

30. It is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence to keep in close touch with all naval activities, both in and out of the department. The office handles all classes of information excepting purely operating information, which is usually (and should always be) forwarded by the senior officer present direct to the Chief of Naval Operations. Such information is under the cognizance of the Division of Operating Force.

COMMUNICATION DIVISION.

31. The director of Naval Communications is charged with the administration, organization, and operation of the entire radio, telegraph, telephone, and cable systems of communications within the naval service, including the operation of the trans-Atlantic radio system and all communications between merchant ships and all shore stations in the United States and its possessions. The foregoing includes the preparation and distribution of all codes, ciphers, and secret calls and commercial accounting. The Director of Naval Communications handles all matters pertaining to radio communications in any manner whatsoever, except those relating solely to purchase, supply, test, and installation of apparatus. During war the Director of Naval Communications is also chief cable censor, which involves the administration of the organization for censoring all cablegrams from or to the United States and its possessions, except the Philippine Islands.

COMMUNICATION OFFICE OF NAVY DEPARTMENT.

32. The communication office of the Navy Department (a section of the Communication Division) is responsible for the handling of all telegraphic and radio communications to and from the Navy Department. In order that the Planning Division may be kept in constant touch with progress in the execution of plans and all other information which would affect their work, the communication office will, from date of promulgation of these orders, furnish the Planning Division with copies of all dispatches sent or received by the Office of Naval Operations.

33. The duties of the sections of this division are as outlined on accompanying diagram.

MATÉRIEL DIVISION.

34. It will be noted from that diagram that the Matériel Division is organized so that the several sections thereof have cognizance of the several general divisions or classes of naval craft. It is the duty of the officers of the various sections of the division to keep in close touch with those handling the planning and operating end of the work under their cognizance and to attempt to shape their work to meet the approved plans and the operating orders for the vessels in question, subject, of course, to the approval of the head of the Matériel Division.

35. It is the duty of the head of the Matériel Division to coordinate the work of the navy yards and other industrial establishments of the Navy. He shall carefully study all projects which have for their purpose the expansion of any industrial establishment or base or the building of any new base or plant for industrial activities. It is his duty to anticipate the material needs of the service, to advise the Chief of Naval Operations accordingly and to initiate correspondence on such questions and prepare such papers as may be advisable for consideration by the Planning Division and by plans committees.

The duties of the sections of this division are as outlined on accompanying diagram.

NAVAL DISTRICTS DIVISION.

36. The function of the Naval Districts Division is to form the connecting link between the Office of Naval Operations and the naval districts. It undertakes the routine central administrative work in connection with naval districts except such as logically comes under other divisions, and advises the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to matters of policy affecting the naval districts.

37. In war or national emergency the Districts Division has cognizance of the routine commandeering of vessels for the Navy and of the correspondence which such commandeering occasions. Upon demobilization it has corresponding duties with such vessels.

38. The Districts Division must work closely with all other divisions of the office and with all bureaus, in order that it may assist in adjusting all matters between the districts and the department about which a clear understanding does not exist.

INSPECTIONS DIVISION.

40. The activities at present under this division are:

(a) Board of inspection and survey, and (b) joint merchant vessels board.

41. The board of inspection and survey is charged with inspection and trials of newly constructed naval vessels and, at intervals specified by law, with the material inspections of all vessels of the Navy. It is in close coordination with the Matériel Division of the Chief of Naval Operations.

JOINT MERCHANT VESSELS BOARD.

42. The joint merchant vessels board is charged with the inspections of privately owned craft and the securing of such data relative to such craft as will determine their suitability for military purposes.

GUNNERY EXERCISES AND ENGINEERING PERFORMANCES DIVISION.

43. That division of the Office of Naval Operations which is the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is charged with the duty of issuing to the service instructions for gunnery and engineering exercises and operations, the collection, analysis, and review of data in regard to gunnery and steaming performances of naval craft, and the review of battle inspections of ships for the Chief of Naval Operations in connection with the preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war. To this end the director of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is expected to make timely and suitable recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations to increase efficiency.

44. The functions of the office are divided into four parts: (a) Gunnery, (b) steaming, (c) small arms, and (d) inspections.

45. Each of these functions has three distinct steps:

(1) Preparation and training, including the issue of necessary plans to the service for conducting exercises and tests; the preparation of standard instructions and the general dissemination of information.

(2) Cooperation with the other divisions of the Office of Naval Operations in the movement of units to conduct exercises; cooperation with the Matériel Division and the bureaus to conduct special tests, improve installations, and increase efficiency in operation.

(3) Analytical and historical, including the collection of data pertaining to the actual performances in gunnery and engineering of naval craft in service, and the dissemination of this information to those who would be benefited thereby.

FILES AND RECORD DIVISION.

46. The head of this division is the chief clerk of the office.

This division shall have charge of the delivery, routing, handling, and mailing of all official mail of the office (both confidential and nonconfidential); of the records of all personnel, except officers, of the office and general supervision of the clerical force of all the divisions of the office; of the procuring and delivery of all supplies, printing, etc., issuance of passes, and such other administrative matters as ordinarily come within the province of the chief clerk's office of a bureau or office.

AID TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

47. In addition to the divisions of the office, an officer of or above the rank of lieutenant commander will be designated as senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations. Additional officers may be ordered as aids or as assistants to the aids to the Chief of Naval Operations as required. In addition to the duties prescribed by regulations for an aid, the senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations will have general supervision of all rooms and office space assigned to the office; will handle all correspondence relative to officers' records and officers' orders, and other naval personnel correspondence, and will generally assist, under the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the organization of the office and the coordination of the work of the several divisions of the office with bureaus and with other departments, unless a special representative is designated.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS—PERSONNEL COMPLEMENTS.

48. The complement of officers and clerical assistants shall be in accordance with the diagrammatic plan approved August 1, 1919. This shall be the "allowed complement," from which the "actual complement" may vary under the same conditions as hold in a ship's organization.

COOPERATIVE WORK OF DIVISIONS.

49. Up to the time of the promulgation of this order heads of divisions have not taken up for consideration the problems of policy with other divisions as much as appears advisable. Careful consideration must therefore be given in the future to this question, and the views of the Planning Division and such plans committees as may be ordered must be obtained where any doubt exists. It becomes the duty of the heads of all divisions to carefully consider such questions and to refer them to the Planning Division without awaiting the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations to follow this course. The fact that an officer refers questions to the Planning Division for consideration is no reflection upon his knowledge or ability, but rather an appreciation on his part of the value of deliberate professional discussion of weighty problems which are sure to arise from time to time.

WEEKLY CONFERENCE.

50. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations shall call a weekly conference consisting of the heads of divisions, the officers of the Planning Division, and such others as he may consider necessary, for the purpose of discussing the current questions which are before the office and for the further purpose of taking up for general discussion such questions as may relate to the activities of two or more divisions of the office. It is the duty of the heads of divisions to prepare such matters for discussion upon the occasion of these meetings.

WEEKLY CONFERENCES IN DIVISIONS.

51. The head of each division should consider the advisability of holding a weekly conference of all officers of his division for the purpose of coordinating the work of his several sections, and with a view to giving those attending to details a comprehensive idea of the general work of the division and of the office, imparting to them such information as may assist them in their work or may make more comprehensive the policies involved.

NO CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DIVISIONS.

52. Formal correspondence between the different divisions of this office is not approved and must not be indulged in. Matters in which two or more divisions are jointly concerned must be taken up informally in conference or, if this is not necessary, by informal memorandum.

REPORTS OF FITNESS.

53. Reports of fitness for officers on duty in the Office of Naval Operations will be prepared and signed by the officers in charge of divisions and will then be submitted to Chief of Naval Operations for approval. The Chief of Naval Operations will personally prepare reports of fitness for heads of divisions and for such other officers as may be required by regulations.

METHOD OF HANDLING BUSINESS.

54. To explain the method of handling a subject involving the various divisions, the following may be taken as an illustration:

55. Certain conditions are known to exist, let us suppose, through information obtained from force commanders or through Naval Intelligence. The information, with the mission clearly stated, is sent to the Planning Division, or a planning committee is named to take up the problem. Those designated deliberate on the information at hand and on the mission. They then prepare definite recommendations stating what is proposed in order to insure the success of the mission. The matter is then taken up with the Chief of Naval Operations, and if approved by him (or the Secretary, if required), is referred to Material Division, Aviation Division, and (or) District Division, according to the requirements. These divisions proceed then to get the required information and authority to the bureau concerned so that they may proceed with the preparation of the material and personnel which may be necessary to make the approved plan effective.

56. Everything having been provided, and everything being in readiness for making the plan effective, the operating orders are issued (by the Division of Operating Forces) and the plan is put into effect so far as movements are concerned, the forces being handled under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.

57. It is the duty of every officer to consider every piece of correspondence that comes to his desk with a view to its usefulness to others. Nothing helps so much in an organization as large as this office as a wise dissemination of proper information, and this fact must be a guiding principle. When action is taken in one division upon any matter regarding which other divisions or bureaus should be informed, the division initiating the action must, if necessary, prepare additional copies for the information of others who are concerned or whose work may be facilitated by a knowledge of the action taken. An officer taking any action on any paper, or an officer receiving incoming information, is responsible for the dissemination of the information to others whether they be in this office, in the bureaus, the districts, or the forces afloat.

58. Officers must bear constantly in mind the fact that the Office of Naval Operations is the coordinating center of all the various naval activities of the service. The function of the office is, therefore, largely one of rendering decisions upon which the various bureaus and offices concerned may base their administrative work. In handling correspondence, all officers should be governed by these considerations:

First. Does this paper come under my personal cognizance?

Second. If so, does it reflect upon, or would it make any more comprehensive the work of any other division of the office or bureau of the department?

Third. Shall it be referred by routing slip or by indorsement for information?

Fourth. Does my action on this paper affect, and knowing same, would it assist any division or bureau other than that to whom it is addressed? If so, shall I send copy of my action or route via party concerned, or shall I consult with the interested parties before taking action?

Fifth. Am I acting in accordance with a well-defined and approved policy?

Sixth. If not, shall I refer to the bureaus or others concerned for recommendation, and then to the Planning Division for its action, or is the general policy of the question before me sufficiently well known for me to prepare a brief memorandum to accompany my action letter to the Chief of Naval Operations for his signature?

(The official diagram presented by Admiral Fiske is not reproduced in this record.)

Admiral FISKE. According to modern principles, the planning division in any navy or army is the original source from which all work starts; because not only the actual operations of war, but all the previous measures of preparation of personnel and material are taken up, after the decisions of the planning division have been made, and approved. This shows that the first thing necessary to do, in order to prepare a navy for war, is to prepare a plan of war.

At the conclusion of my duty on the general board, I went to sea as a rear admiral in command of the fifth division of the fleet. This was in August, 1911. I was afterwards in command of the third and

then the first division, and second in command of the third and then the first division, and second in command in the fleet. I was detached on January 3, 1913, and made aid for inspections of the Navy. I was made aid for operations, the senior aid of the Secretary of the Navy, and his military adviser on February 11, 1913.

I took up my duties with a grave sense of my responsibilities, especially because the failure of the Declaration of London put the whole status of international law, as applied to maritime affairs, in a condition of approximate chaos; so that if any war should occur between any great European nations, the position of the United States, as neutral, would be almost impossible to maintain. Had the Navy been prepared for war, I should not have felt so much concerned, but I knew that the Navy was not only unprepared in personnel and material, but that it did not even have any plan for even entering an important war.

The present Secretary of the Navy came into office in less than a month after I became aid for operations. Naturally, I looked forward to my future relations with him with considerable interest. I was much relieved when I found him to be a delightful gentleman, companionable, sympathetic, and apparently open-minded. He announced his desire to make the Navy efficient, and he was kind enough on many occasions to say things to me and about me that were very pleasant.

The following August, 1913, I spent at the War College at Newport. By that time, I had come to realize that the Secretary's mental characteristics and his previous training were not such as to give him the capacity to regard the Navy as a whole. His tendency was to concentrate his attention on some one part of the Navy, usually connected with its personnel, and to exaggerate its importance with Navy as a whole. For this reason, I wrote him a letter from the War College, pointing out respectfully, but earnestly, the necessity for taking a broader and profounder view. I have a copy of this letter with me, and I will put it in the record if desired. Part of it was written by me personally; the other part was written by certain officers on the staff of the War College. That part is unsigned.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that matter had better be put in the record.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. That was August, 1913.

(The letter and attached matter referred to are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.

GENERAL BOARD,

Naval War College, Newport, R. I., August 26, 1913.

From: Rear Admiral B. A. Fiske, United States Navy, aid for Operations.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Administration of the Navy Department.

Reference: Exodus, Chapter XVIII, paragraph 13 et seq.

1. In presenting this paper to the Secretary I wish to make it clear that the ideas expressed in it are not original with me, but have been gotten from study and from conference with other officers; that they agree with the ideas held by the great navies of the world, and that they are the ideas by which those great navies are directed.

2. The first point to which I ask the Secretary's attention is the fact that navies are members of a competing class. The measure of readiness of any navy is, and must be, her readiness as compared with that of other navies. In this respect, a navy is like any competitor in any competition. Therefore, it is not sufficient to say that any navy is of itself excellent or otherwise, any more than it is sufficient to say, regarding any

to this player that he is excellent. The only prize a tennis player can get is against some opponent; and, unless his excellence is greater than that of his opponent, he will not win the prize, no matter how excellent he may be.

3. If we hold this idea in mind we will then see clearly that the United States Navy must have a readiness for war which will compare favorably with that of her probable opponents; that is, with the navies of Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy. At present we are forced to acknowledge our inferiority to the navies of Great Britain and Germany, not only in point of size, but in point of readiness for war.

4. How to get into readiness for war and keep in readiness, is not only the duty of the Navy in peace—it is its paramount duty. To get the Navy into readiness for war, and keep it in readiness, is not only the duty of the Secretary, it is his paramount duty, so far as his relations to the Navy per se are concerned. When war breaks out between two countries, the war will continue and will according to the numerical strength and the efficiency of the forces engaged, the spirit and courage with which the men have been imbued, the degree of excellence of the organizations in which they are directed, the knowledge and skill which their station and training have imparted to them, the speed and thoroughness of their mobilization. When war breaks out all the forces that will determine the result are already in existence. The result is already determined, though it is not known to mortals. Therefore, far above and beyond all minor responsibilities the direct and immediate responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy is the Navy's readiness for war.

5. We can not comprehend fully this question of readiness, unless we realize fully the change brought about in military and naval matters by the startling revelations of 1870. In 1870 the German and French armies met in a series of battles whose result astonished the world, even the military world. Germany and France were not unequal in population or resources, but whatever disproportion there was, was in favor of France. The armies were not unequal in size, but whatever disproportion there was, was in favor of France. The armies and the generals of France had had much more experience than had those of Germany; "even their generals of divisions and brigades had more actual experience than those who led the German Army corps;" the French were by nature a more military people; they were fully as brave as the Germans, and fully as intelligent. Yet the armies of France went down before the armies of Germany with a suddenness and completeness that had no parallel in history.

6. The reason was eagerly sought and speedily found. The reason was simply that the Germans, under the direction of Von Moltke, had organized a general staff which had made such perfect plans of mobilization and subsequent operations that, on the outbreak of war, the German Army was ready immediately. The whole German Army had been made into a vast machine. All its parts were fabricated, finished, and in place. Steam was up in the throttle; and as soon as war was declared, the throttle was opened, and the whole engine began to move with perfect precision, without friction and without noise.

7. The triumph of the German organization was so splendid and complete that all the military nations of the world took the lesson to heart at once, with the result that to-day every military nation in the world has its army and navy organized on German principles.

8. The last two countries to follow the lead of Germany were Great Britain and the United States. The reason for the inactivity of the United States is not hard to find; but in regard to Great Britain it must be stated that the British Admiralty and the British Navy had never lapsed into the state of unreadiness of the various armies of the world. The British Navy was even in 1870 in nearly the same state of readiness as at the present time. Little attention was called to this fact, however, or has since been called to the fact, because the British Navy has, for many centuries, been kept ready by the Admiralty and no great change was necessary, such as Von Moltke brought about in the German Army.

9. The British Army, however, remained unaffected or very little affected by the lesson of 1870; and as a result was practically disgraced by the Boer War. So startling was the evidence brought about by the Boer War of the unreadiness of the British Army and so directly was this unreadiness traced to the inefficiency of the system in the British War Office as its cause, that a commission was appointed to investigate the matter. This commission resulted in the famous "Esher report." This Esher report recommended that the British war office be entirely reorganized on the basis of the British Admiralty. This recommendation was at once put into effect, and the British war office is now organized almost exactly as is the British Admiralty.

10. In the United States little attention has been paid to the lessons of the Franco-German war by the Government. The United States, being a nonmilitary country, having engaged in no serious foreign war since the Revolution, military and naval

questions have not been considered important, and the great minds of the country, with a few notable exceptions, have not been focussed on them.

11. The War Department, however, during the administration of Hon. Elihu Root, was reorganized on a basis very similar to the German, so far as direction of the Army was concerned; with the result that the administration of the Army has been very greatly improved and the Army's readiness for war very greatly increased.

12. The only organization belonging to the national defense of any great country which is not organized on the German plan, or on a plan similar to it, is the United States Navy. Why the United States Navy has lagged behind all other organizations of a similar kind is not difficult to understand, when one realizes that the United States is a nonmilitary country; and that, while a far-sighted statesman, with the aid of a Congress in political sympathy with him, was able to place our Army on a basis of military readiness, no similar combination has yet been found to do the same thing for our Navy.

13. During the past few years, by reason of our growing familiarity with the principles of war as taught by our War College, there has been an increasing agitation over the subject of giving the Navy a more efficient organization; but nothing was accomplished in a practical way until the administration of your predecessor, in which four "aids" were made advisors to the Secretary, each aid being advisor for a certain division of the duties of the department, the four aids together forming the "council."

14. This system has made a great improvement in the work of the department, especially in coordinating the work of the various bureaus, and in giving to the Secretary the advice of experienced officers, who know what should be done in order to put the Navy into readiness for war.

15. By adopting the "aide system" the Navy Department may be said to have taken a step half way from a previous unmanageable condition to the position occupied by the military organizations of the other great countries, including the British Admiralty.

16. But the step was only half way to efficiency, and the present method of administration can be improved. If the present method were like that of any other great organization, even industrial organizations in our own country; if all the people at the head of it were engaged in doing the most important work of which they were capable; if every one of them had time for the consideration of important matters; and was not perpetually interrupted by unimportant matters; if high officials did not have their time and attention diverted by the consideration of subordinate matters, then we might declare that, while our system is different from all others, it is different because it is better. But this is not the case.

17. As a matter of fact, under the present system much of the time of the Secretary of the Navy, a Cabinet officer intrusted with the direction of one of the most important departments of the Government, must be devoted to comparatively unimportant questions. His time is precious in the highest degree and yet much of it is spent on matters that a subordinate could handle, with the result that the amount of time that he can give to important questions is abbreviated. He is sometimes compelled to delay the consideration of matters on which some subordinate needs a decision.

In any other great organization, even an industrial organization in our own country, the time of the head of the organization is economized in the most scientific way. His time is comparatively free, and he occupies his mind with great questions and not with little ones. If the work of the Navy Department were properly systematized, the Secretary's time and attention would be properly and profitably employed in great public questions connected with the Navy and the country. He would have leisure for conference with statesmen and public men, for reading the writings of authorities on naval and military policies and foreign relations; and he would be, as he ought to be, the man next to the President, or possibly next to the Secretary of State, occupying the most commanding position in the United States with relation to her really important national and international affairs.

18. What has just been said about the work of the Secretary of the Navy may be reiterated with only a little less emphasis about the work of the Assistant Secretary.

19. In my opinion what has been said about the waste of the time of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary must be reiterated with regard to the time of the four aids. These officers are supposed to be valuable men, otherwise, they would not be advisors to the Secretary; yet we find their time wasted also. But while much of the time of the Secretary is wasted by being employed with minor matters, their time is wasted largely by simply waiting to get opportunity for those full and frank conferences with the Secretary which are essential, if efficient teamwork is to be attained.

20. While these statements are true of all the four aids, they apply particularly to the aid for Operations. The handling of the fleet and individual ships, as well as various questions pertaining to the War College, the General Board, and the Office

of Naval Intelligence, and (which is the most important of all), the preparation and readiness of the Navy for war, are in his division of labor; and yet he has no authority whatever in these matters, or any clearly defined responsibility, except that of giving advice.

21. The organization of our Navy Department is entirely different from that of any other of which the writer has knowledge. In every efficient organization, great or small, the head of the organization handles the organization as a unit, through the heads of the various divisions. He alone, at the top, handles no separate divisions. He has the right, for purposes of inspection or correction, to intervene between the head of a division and a subordinate. The heads of divisions have authority in their divisions and should be held responsible to the chief, not for details but for results. These principles, I believe, are common to every great organization of the world, great or small, that is efficiently conducted. In no other way does any successful organization conduct its business. This is the case, even in 99 per cent of the organizations of the world, in which the head of the organization is familiar with the details of the organization, having grown up with it. If such a system is necessary in these organizations; if in these organizations a system is necessary in which the heads of the organization does not manage directly each department, but simply manages the heads of the departments, how much more is it necessary in our Navy Department, of which the Secretary is a civilian, who can not be familiar with the details, and must therefore trust to his subordinates.

22. I therefore recommend that the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary meet the four aids in council every day; that at these meetings the questions before the department be discussed; that each day the Secretary give the various aids such instructions as he sees fit in regard to the work he wishes done in their various divisions, and that each aid then carries out these instructions he has received by means of oral and written orders: written orders being signed "By direction of the Secretary," as was authorized in the Regulations of 1909, but never carried out. I would also recommend that a clerk be present at the meetings of the Secretary and aids in council to keep the minutes of the meetings. No money or legislation would be needed to do this.

23. I respectfully request the attention of the Secretary to a memorandum on this subject, prepared by the War College, in which the ideas embodied in this letter are expressed in "War College language."

B. A. FISKE.

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, AUGUST 26, 1913.

Subject: Administration of the Navy Department.

Reference: Exodus, Chapter XVIII, paragraph 13 et seq.

1. The accomplishment of any task requires, first of all, a clear conception of that task. The task to be considered here is the administration of the Navy Department. We are therefore led to inquire why the Navy Department exists. We find that it is a necessary part of the Navy. The mission of the Navy Department flows directly from the mission of the Navy.

2. The mission of the Navy is to maintain itself in the maximum possible degree of readiness for war in order that honorable peace may be maintained; or, if war comes, in order that honorable peace may be reestablished in the shortest possible time.

3. No mission for the Navy other than this will satisfy present-day conditions. Nations are competing organizations. In peace they compete by diplomacy, by legislation, and by commercial effort. In war this competition is intensified by the competition of armed forces, each seeking the annihilation of the other. The factors that govern the competition of armed forces are strength, efficiency, and readiness. Under modern conditions no one of these factors can be neglected. No matter what the condition of a navy may be when judged by a noncompeting standard, neither its strength nor its efficiency nor its readiness for war are what they should be unless it can compete successfully with navies of probable enemies. From these considerations the mission of the Navy Department is derived.

4. The mission of the Navy Department is to so administer the affairs of the Navy as to maintain the Navy in the maximum possible degree of readiness for war.

5. This mission should be clearly understood and constantly borne in mind by every individual of the Navy Department. Every decision as to naval administration should be derived from this general mission. It must be the guide to effort.

6. At the head of the Navy Department is the Secretary of the Navy, through whom the President exercises the authority of Commander in Chief. The Secretary of the Navy has a double mission. He is the head of a great department of the Government, and as such he is one of the chief counselors of the President. He is, over and above

all, a statesman, assisting his chief in guiding the destinies of a great Nation, which destinies are in unavoidable conflict with the destinies of other nations. There is a unity in great governmental duties that requires a world-wide view by each individual on whom those duties devolve. Each question as it arises is a part of the whole. A clear grasp of the whole permits the true statesman a prophetic vision by which he is the more able to give a true direction to events. From these considerations we derive the Secretary's first and highest mission.

7. The first and highest mission of the Secretary is so to coordinate the efforts of the Navy as a whole with the efforts of other departments of the Government as best to further national aims.

8. The other mission of the Secretary is derived directly from the mission of the Navy Department, of which he is the head.

9. The second mission of the Secretary is so to administer the affairs of the Navy, through the Navy Department, as to maintain the Navy in the maximum possible degree of readiness for war.

10. This mission brings us directly to the question of administration and the foundational methods of its sound practice. Efficient administration requires that there be unity of action, coordination of effort. Centuries of experience since the days of Moses have served to demonstrate the wisdom of the advice which he received from his father-in-law, and on which he acted, that there must be leaders over thousands, and over hundreds, and over tens; a supreme authority flowing downward, through subordinates, in defined channels, to individuals. This arrangement permits to high authority time for the consideration of great questions and delegates to subordinates questions graded in importance to the station and abilities of those subordinates. It results in the faculties of high authority being brought, unfatigued by the consideration of subordinate matters, to the solution of the greater problems of the organization. It results, further, in the solution of all subordinate questions of harmony with great and governing policies.

11. The necessity for the kind of administrative ability here indicated flows from the natural limitations of the capabilities of any individual and from the supreme necessity for the smooth and unclogged working of the administrative machinery of a great organization.

12. Wherever high authority is so submerged in details that it can not give proper attention to great questions as they arise, there we find the sources of the inefficiency. A badly conceived intention of high authority rapidly spreads its influence through every ramification of the organization. The same is true of a well-conceived intention when suitable expression is given to it by action. These considerations lead to the subject of the proper mission of the aids to the Secretary. It is unnecessary to quote from the regulations the present division of administration work in the department or the duties of the aids in that work. The administrative work of the department is grouped with a view to efficient coordination of effort. At the head of each administrative group is an aid, whose duties are solely advisory. This restricted view of an aid's duties is a clog in administrative procedure. The aid is powerless, except for the signature of the Secretary; and too often the Secretary has not sufficient time to see the aids and sign those papers necessary to realize the efforts at coordination with which the aids are charged. Further, the aids can not relieve the Secretary of the administrative details of which he should be relieved.

13. The experience of many years with the bureau system in the department has shown the necessity for a coordinating link between the various bureaus. The aids should be this coordinating link.

14. From these considerations we derive the following as the true mission of the aids to the Secretary. Like the Secretary himself, each aid has a double mission.

15. The first mission of an aid is, under the general direction of the Secretary, so to coordinate the efforts of his group as a whole with the administrative groups of the department as best to execute the purpose of the Secretary in the accomplishment of his mission.

16. The second mission of an aid is under the general direction of the Secretary so to administer the affairs within his own group as best to accomplish the aims of the Secretary in the accomplishment of the Secretary's mission.

17. Coordination of effort requires first of all a clear understanding of what is to be done, and then a knowledge of all on the part of each of the share each cooperating colleague has in the general effort. So the aids need, as a first step in the accomplishment of their several missions, a systematic association with each other and with the Secretary. Such systematized association establishes a feeling of the fullest loyalty and mutual confidence, as all come to know the aims and motives of each. At stated hours each day the aids should assemble with a view to the accomplishment of their first mission. This preliminary conference should be followed by a confer-

... with the Secretary, together with the recommendations of the aids. ... should then give general instructions to the aids, who would then dis- ... at his instructions, and thereby accomplish their several missions.

... FISCHE. By this time, I realized also that the Secretary ... at my insistence on certain measures of preparedness, and ... would be much better for me personally if I should moderate ... This became especially apparent when I, with ... Dewey's approval, nominated Rear Admiral Knight to be ... of the War College. The Secretary declared that I was the ... president. I should have had to go if Admiral Dewey had ... and insisted that I should stay where I was.

... the following year, 1914, I did all that I could to bring the ... to realize the necessity of dealing with the Navy as a whole, ... with its separate parts, but with little if any success. In ... I tried to make him see the necessity of approving a cer- ... of the General Board's general war plan, which we called ... "the administrative plan." This was not a war plan ... in the sense that it supplied the base from which the Navy ... could start to prepare for war. It merely provided that ... bureaus and the department itself should cooperate ... preparedness by means of a system of reports which each ... make to the department once every three months in ... status of that bureau in preparedness. I was unable ... Secretary to approve the administrative plan during my ... of office with him, though it lasted for more than two ... May 11, 1915. I frequently brought it to his attention ... him to sign it, pointing out that until he had signed it, it ... impossible for the Navy even to start toward a state of ... and that it was necessary for him to sign it as soon as ... because, even after he had signed it, it would take several ... war plans could be made and developed and the Navy ... in accordance with them. On every occasion the Secre- ... to sign the paper.

... 1914, I got permission again to go to the War College for ... of August. I arrived in Newport on July 31. The even- ... said that war between Germany and Austria on one side, ... and Russia on the other—and possibly Great Britain— ... declared the following day. I resolved immediately to ... Admiral Knight to call a meeting of the General Board the ... evening. The General Board was then at the War College, ... was in the summer months. I did so; and we spent the ... August 1, 1914, in preparing and sending a letter in which we ... the various dangers of the United States being drawn ... and the consequent necessity of making certain prep-

... I returned to Washington in September, 1914, I found that ... had been done toward preparedness, and that the Secretary's ... thought was the work that he was outlining for an aid for ... an office that he had just established. Naturally I was ... concerned. The officers of the War College had been much ... during August with the situation in Europe, and had con- ... after many conferences, that the chances were in favor of ... and that if Germany succeeded in Europe, she would th

attack the United States as the one bar between her and world dominion.

During the following months of 1914, after many consultations with Navy officers, I concluded that it was my urgent duty to make the Secretary see the truth, no matter what effect it might have on my professional future. Of course my professional future was entirely in his hands. As aid for operations, I was most concerned with the impossibility of getting the Navy ready in time, in case we got into the war, because mainly of the lack of a sufficient personnel and the absence of any staff, or planning division for making general and detail plans of war.

As to the personnel situation, the remarks in my diary during the months of October and November, 1914, contain frequent statements about the endeavors of the General Board and myself to get the Secretary to ask Congress for 19,600 additional enlisted men. I should be glad to read any extracts that the committee may desire. The gist is that the General Board decided to recommend that the Secretary ask for 19,600 more enlisted men, that the Secretary asked the General Board not to put that recommendation in their written report; that the General Board did so nevertheless; that the Secretary directed me to request the General Board to omit that recommendation; that the General Board finally did so, and that the Secretary's annual report, made in December, was generally interpreted as meaning that the General Board did not think that any more men were needed. In my later testimony before the House Naval Committee on March 24, 1916, I was cross-questioned on this matter. I told the whole truth about it; but, of course, it was too late. I have a copy of my testimony with me.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that you put that testimony in the record.

Admiral FISKE. Very well.

(Portions of the hearing above referred to by Admiral Fiske are here printed in the record, as follows:)

(No. 43.)

THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Friday, March 24, 1916.

The committee this day met, Hon. Lemuel P. Padgett (chairman) presiding.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, we have with us this morning Rear Admiral Fiske.

Admiral Fiske, you were before the committee last year, and at some length gave your views in relation to certain matters in the Navy which were published. It is now a year later, and I want to ask if you have any additional or different suggestions to make to the committee other than those given to the committee last year.

Admiral FISKE. I have no suggestions or statements to make contrary to those; but naturally, that has been 15 months ago and my ideas have expanded a good deal, and I have, of course, a good many ideas which I did not have then.

The CHAIRMAN. My question was not if you had any contrary views, but if you had any additional views?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I think I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be glad to have you express your views.

Admiral FISKE. I have prepared some notes, and if it will not take too long, I will just read them over.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed in your own way, without interruption.

Admiral FISKE. Fifteen months ago, on December 17, 1914, I had the honor to testify before this committee as aid for operation. In that capacity I had been brought into closer touch with the Navy and its efficiency compared with that of other navies than any other person; and the peril of the situation had been brought close home to me by the Vera Cruz and Tampico incidents, the disturbance in the public mind about Japan, the fact of the European war, and the danger of our being entangled in it.

American naval officers had been aware for many years that our Navy differed from the other great navies in the matter of preparedness; that the other great navies had followed the lead of Germany in the matter of preparedness and that we had not; that the other great navies had adopted in more or less modified forms the idea of the German general staff, but that we had continued to follow the method that we had been using for practically a hundred years without trying to adapt it to modern conditions. They realized, it is true, that we had established a Naval War College before other nations had; but they also realized that the War College remained a college pure and simple; that it was a thing apart from the Navy and that its teachings were almost ignored. They realized, for instance, that the War College had always insisted that the Navy must have a general staff, or else surrender any chance of being as efficient as other navies, and yet that we could get no general staff. They realized that, as a result, there was no continuity in the aims of either the department or the fleet; that each successive Secretary of the Navy and each commander in chief of the fleet went ahead according to his own ideas, with little reference to the ideas of his predecessor. Of course, in time of peace this state of things wrought no disadvantage; but officers all realize that if war should come with a real military power, it would come so suddenly that we could not get ready in time to fight the war successfully.

During the latter part of the last administration the department was administered under a system that was called sometimes the "aid system" and sometimes the "Meyer system," because Secretary Meyer put it into effect. The system, however, did not embody a new idea, but was the outcome of the report of a board of naval officers, called the Swift Board, which report was founded on the report of a board called the Moody Board, headed by ex-Secretary Moody, of which the other members were ex-Secretary Admiral Luce, Admiral Mahan, Judge Dayton, and others; and the report of the Moody Board was founded largely on the report of the so-called Esher Board in England, which investigated the cause of the unsatisfactory operations of the British Army in the Boer War. The Esher report itself was founded on the organization of the British Admiralty, which had continued in successful operation for nearly 300 years. In other words, the Swift Board recommended a sort of modification of the British Admiralty adapted to the needs and ideals of our country.

There were two Swift reports, however, signed the same day; one recommending the aid system and needing no legislation for its execution, and another report recommending a similar organization, except that there should be four chiefs of divisions instead of four aids, each chief having authority under the Secretary in his division.

Mr. OLIVER. What was the date of the Swift report?

Admiral FISKE. I think July, 1909; I think about that time.

This recommendation—that is, that the four men should be chiefs of division having authority under the secretary in their divisions—needed legislative authority for its execution, and it was not published. The secretary at that time desired to have the latter organization put into effect, but he did not think the time was ripe and therefore did not press it.

When the present administration came in the aid system was in operation. It worked well, but naturally, as it was a halfway or intermediate measure, it was not wholly satisfactory. If the Navy was to remain always at peace, it was unnecessary and complicated the organization of the department unduly; while if the Navy should get into war, it was not adequate to insure quick action and sure coordination. For this reason, it seemed the obvious duty of the aid for operations, as the military adviser of the secretary, and in fact his senior advisor, directly charged with the operations of the fleet, to bring the secretary gradually to the point of view that the unpublished recommendations of the Swift Board should be put into effect. The aid for operations, therefore, started at this task at once (see his letter to the secretary, dated Aug. 26, 1913) and he was still engaged on that task when he testified before this honorable committee on December 17, 1914.

The views which he expressed at that time, therefore, had not been hastily formed and they were not carelessly expressed. Neither were those views radical or peculiar; on the contrary, they were those held by all naval officers of experience and thoughtfulness, not in our Navy only, but in all navies. They represented not only the thought of the great military navies, but their actual practice; they did not advo-

cate any extreme or original measures, intended to put our Navy far ahead of other navies, but only measures to get our Navy out of a rut and put it on a par with other navies.

During the giving of my testimony the chairman of this committee said to me:

"If I understand you, the crux of your criticism of what is lacking in organization is that there should be a general staff?"

To this I answered "Yes." The chairman then said:

"To prepare plans and to do the work of a general staff ashore, preparatory to sea?"

To this I answered:

"Yes, sir; preparatory and during the war."

Perhaps a little explanation may be desirable here, to the effect that the unpublished report of the Swift Board recommended what would be in effect a general staff, though not to be called by that name; the reason for not using the name being a desire not to offend a curious prejudice among some civilians against a general staff, due to misinformation as to its intent and character. In other words, when I used the words general staff, and when American officers now use that phrase, the phrase means only a body of specially trained officers to study and recommend and execute plans, headed by a chief of staff. A general staff is somewhat like any committee, and the chief of the general staff is somewhat like the chairman of the committee. In fact, this committee at this moment is doing general-staff work for the Navy.

Previous to December 17, 1914, however, the excitement about Japan, the Tampico, and Vera Cruz incidents, and the rapid spread of the war in Europe forced on my attention and the attention of the officers in the Operations Division of the department the fact that for sufficiently quick work in mobilization and in conducting a campaign the aid for operations would need a great many assistants that the Swift report did not contemplate. The wonderful speed and certainty with which the European armies and fleets started showed that if we were ever to have to contend against one of them, we would be beaten badly in getting ready; and so we would start with a handicap that it would probably be impossible to overcome. It became clear, not as a matter of academic interest, not as a fact to be mentally accepted and not acted on, but as a living menace that no matter how many fine ships we might have, we would go down as the French did in 1870, because we were not ready and our antagonist was. It was for this reason that I accented the need for a staff to make plans and also the need for 20,000 enlisted men who should be thoroughly trained and actually ready before the war began.

Your committee was evidently impressed with the need for a general staff, for you embodied in the following appropriation bill a provision for a chief of naval operations with at least 15 assistants to prepare war plans. Unfortunately, this provision went out on a point of order, but fortunately the main feature of the provision was restored later, and the bill as it went through established the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. In the opinion of most naval officers this was the most important step toward the modernization of the United States Navy that has been taken since 1880, when the steel ships *Dolphin*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, and the *Chicago* were authorized. Most officers regret, however, the omission of the 15 assistants. Had they been prescribed they would have been able to lighten greatly the labors of this committee by working out, with the assistance of the game board, and presenting a number of alternate plans for your selection; each plan describing a program recommended as the best for a given sum of money.

Since my previous appearance here, the effect has been continuously shown of proper preparedness before plunging into war; and the fact that this has been appreciated for years by the strong nations of the world has also been shown. This war so far has shown no new thing to Army and Navy men, except in details. The underlying principles of strategy, as expounded by the strategists of the past, have been found to apply to modern times; and the present war simply falls into line with other wars and teaches the same harsh lessons. The history of mankind has not been finished, the direction of national progress has not been changed, and the unprepared and weak still go down before those who are prepared and strong. No nation in history has ever become great without the exercise of military power, or fallen from greatness without neglecting it. Only three great nations of the world have maintained their greatness for 800 years, and these are the three greatest nations now, France, Germany, and Great Britain; and each of these nations has always maintained a carefully balanced relation between the civil and the military, allowing neither to wax unduly great in comparison with the other.

All these nations lay great stress on the preparedness of their navies, and not only in the matter of plans, but also in the matter of men; that is, not only in plans, but also in the men to execute those plans. They realize that navies do not consist of

men who use the ships. All those nations have large bodies of reserves existing not only on paper but in fact, existing not only as organizations of men. Service in the reserve is obligatory in all those countries, but practice.

We have no reserve worthy of the name, though we have been trying to get one. If we should get into war in the near future, the only men we could count on for service, or rather for effective service, would be those wearing the uniform. Modern wars come too quickly to warrant that. We may not realize this unless we realize that the probability of a fight, but to win; that the battle between the *Chesapeake* and the *Albatross*, which it was, was as fruitless for the success of the American policy as a battle with the windmill.

My opinion of opinion that it would take at least five years to get a navy to fight effectively an effective navy, like the one then indicated, more than a hundred conversations with officers since then, and not changing my position; every officer with whom I have talked has agreed with me. I wish to say now that I did not believe that it could be done in five years. I think it wise to make a statement that might seem sensational, but that my subsequent studies, discussions, and reflections have led me to believe that after how much money we may spend, we shall never be able to reach the condition of efficiency of certain other navies until we change our system to a system as good as theirs.

As I understand, it is your opinion that had Congress enacted the provision that was reported from this committee we would have a more efficient bureau than we have under the provision that was enacted?

Yes, I think so, yes, sir.

Is it your opinion that the provision reported from this committee would be complete enough to give us a real effective General Staff or whatever name we chose to call it? In other words, did we have the provision reported out from the House Naval Committee?

I think there should have been more than 15 assistants. I do not think so. Speaking only as a naval officer, and not taking any broad view of the Navy as a navy, having only in mind its ostensible duty, I think that it would be well to have some provision whereby in strictly military work the recommendations of the staff should be carried out. I am speaking only as a naval officer. Speaking as a naval officer, I understand you to mean that the staff should be placed under the control of military men, in other words, that the military and military work of the Navy should be placed under naval control.

Of course, it must all be under the President. The President is the chief, and we might call him a naval officer in that capacity. It is the President.

I understand that.

I only wish to guard against giving the idea that I want to put military officers in. Of course, none of us wants that. I want to guard against that impression.

Would you give that authority to the naval officers, over military matters, to the Secretary of the Navy?

I did not recommend that extreme, no, sir.

There was one officer who recommended it. You do not?

No, sir, but I should like to say, in trying to define my position, that I do not.

Interposing. In other words, while you do not recommend it, I understand that you would like to see it, as I understand.

I think it would be safer from the standpoint of what might happen.

In other words, while you do not recommend it, you would like to see the matters of the Navy put under naval officers, independent of the President.

As a naval officer, I can hardly imagine such a condition as that. It is like this. This comes under what is called strategy. Now, strategy is very hard to define. It is often compared to chess, and it is like chess in many ways, but it is a much more difficult game than chess, because in playing chess a man has plenty of time for his moves, and all the pieces are on the board before you play and they are not by the rules of the game, but in strategy you change the pieces.

battle cruisers instead of battleships, etc., and you bring in aeroplanes, etc. I am simply trying to show what a tremendous thing strategy is.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not speaking of management, but I was speaking of control. Admiral FISKE. I will lead up to that in a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Should all military matters be under the control of naval officers who could act on their own authority, independently of the Secretary?

Admiral FISKE. I will come to that in a moment, if you will permit me.

Abroad—that is, in the military countries—they recognize strategy as a specialty just as much as construction, or engineering, or electricity, or anything else; and they take young officers who seem to be capable and send them to the War College. Those who make good there, and seem to be of a certain standard, are put tentatively in the general staff; and if they make good there they are put into the general staff, just as an officer in our Navy is put into the Construction Corps. Under our system of Government, the Construction Corps, for instance, is under the Secretary, and the Secretary can give any orders to the constructor that he wants; but the Secretary does not, as a matter of fact, tell the constructor that the ship ought to be so long instead of so long; and the same way in engineering, he does not say what kind of oil there shall be used on the bearings of an engine. Under our system, it would seem to me that if we recognized strategy in the way that we recognize construction, that we would get very excellent results. That would mean that the military authority would not be independent of the Secretary. We do not—in saying this I think I am in accord with most of the officers in the Navy—we do not wish to have a system whereby the staff could tell the Secretary to do so and so, or to do things without his knowledge and consent; but that it should be understood by everybody that this staff of trained men are there for a purpose, and that their recommendation should be carried out unless the Secretary, as a member of the Cabinet and the trusted adviser of the President, should rule otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Bearing in mind all you have stated, and your opinion on the subject, is it your idea, not your recommendation, but is it your idea that the military functions and duties should be put into execution by the naval officers constituting the general staff, or whatever name they may go by—that is not essential—assuming that the members of the general staff or organization are the very best military and naval men in the Navy, should their orders be put into operation independently of the authority of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is your opinion that there should not be a divided authority?

Admiral FISKE. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the Secretary of the Navy should be the ultimate authority not only on administrative matters, but on determining the military functions of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Just what additional power would you give to the Chief of Operations as the law now stands?

Admiral FISKE. Those powers which are given by the provision which this committee put through last session.

Mr. KELLEY. Nothing further than that?

Mr. BRITTEN. I believe the admiral stated that he would enlarge the number.

Mr. KELLEY. That is a detail.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not limited now. He can have 100 or 200 if he desires.

While we reported that provision out of the House committee, during the time intervening I have been looking into that somewhat. Would not the draft that was submitted to the House and reported out by this committee give to the Chief of Operations supreme control not only of the preparation of plans for war, but would it not give him supreme control of military matters in time of peace for the preparation of plans and also in time of war in administering the plans?

Admiral FISKE. I think not. I think it said "under the Secretary" very clearly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find that the provision which was reported out would give the Chief of Operations administration in war time as well as peace time.

Admiral FISKE. I think it said "under the Secretary."

The CHAIRMAN. It was under the Secretary. It was enlarging his powers into a much broader field of activity than the preparation of the Navy for war?

Admiral FISKE. I am quite sure, Mr. Chairman, that it distinctly provided that everything must be done under the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, it said under the Secretary, but I am speaking of what, under the Secretary, he could do?

Q. My recollection is—

A. Interposing. It was not limited as the law finally put it to the preparing the Navy for war in time of peace, but it was managing, administration of military affairs, both in peace and in war.

Q. Yes, sir, but in the same way, unless my recollection is very wrong, the chief has over his fleet or the chief of bureau has over his department, have direction. To use a phrase in strategy, he had a certain sphere within which he could act, but his action in the large was to be subject to superior authority.

A. If I remember, under the first phraseology, it placed the command of the fleet under the control of the aid for operations in time of war?

Q. Yes, sir, but only in the sense, of course, that he is under the

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The provision in the bill, as you reported it, simply delegated to Naval Operations certain authority from the Secretary. The commander exercised the same as it was before; his status was not changed, except that

A. Naval Operations was recognized as having jurisdiction under the Secretary, the way, is the method abroad. In practically all the other navies

Q. The law provides that the Chief of Naval Operations shall "be in charge of the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of the fleet for war." Does not that language itself give the Chief of Operations the authority, to control the operations of the fleet in war? There is no limitation as to what he shall do in the operations of the fleet in time of peace, and he shall be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation of plans for its use in war." I can not extract any other view from that the Chief of Operations is charged with the operations of the fleet. That does not limit him to the operations of the fleet in times of peace?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It does not say that he shall be charged with the operations of the fleet in war?

A. No.

Q. But it does say that he shall be charged with the operations of the

A. Naturally.

Q. Who must run all through?

A. You can hardly imagine any other situation.

Q. Whatever language may have been used and however it may have been interpreted, we had originally, we finally enacted a provision giving the Secretary that power?

A. I realize that it says the "fleet"; it does not say "the Navy."

Q. It was the Navy. This is limited to the fleet.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The first provision that we reported gave him control of the Navy in time of war?

A. Yes, sir, under the Secretary.

Q. It was a very different proposition from the one we finally agreed

A. Very different, but this provision, as it finally passed, does

Q. Interposing. I limit it to the fleet?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the other one extended it to the whole Navy?

A. Yes, sir, the Navy, yes, sir.

Q. What is the difference?

A. There is a great deal of difference between Navy and the fleet.

Q. That depends on what you call the Navy.

A. The Navy means everything, while the fleet means the fleet that is under the command of the Secretary, the operations and preparation of the fleet, the management and control of the Navy.

Q. To differentiate between the fleet, actually in command, and at the same time, the fleet in reserve?

A. No, sir, that is the administration, that is here in the department.

Q. The Navy that is out on the water. That is why we limited it in its scope, that he should not have control over the whole Navy.

Q. With the Chief of Operations limited in his authority to the control of the fleet all the ships, whether in commission or out of com-

mission, and some other function or bureau or department of the Navy responsible for the gun foundry, the powder factory, the navy yards, and the naval stations, where have you centered any responsibility for a failure to coordinate all the military features necessary for the successful operation of the fleet?

Admiral FISKE. You have not done it.

Mr. ROBERTS. We have a weakness in our present system?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Due to the fact that there is no centralization of responsibility?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And conferring authority to support that responsibility?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. If, under existing conditions, we should be drawn into war and through failure of our navy yards or our gun factory or any other of the military features the fleet was not properly supplied we could not put our finger on any one officer and say, "You are the man to blame." The Chief of Operations would say, "If I had had my way the navy yards would have been ready, the ammunition would have been ready, and the guns would have been ready. My part was all done, but through the failure of somebody else to meet the emergency we met with failure."

Admiral FISKE. I think your idea is correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. If the Chief of Operations is given authority to control all military matters in connection with the Navy, then you have placed the responsibility on one man?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And it is his duty to see that the facilities of the Navy, relating to the military end, are provided, to the one end that the fleet shall be ready for war and efficient when war comes?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. This, of course, all under the Secretary?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. No independent authority, but everything done under his direction?

Admiral FISKE. I think the provision that passed this committee that the Chief of Operations should be responsible for its readiness for war means not only the fleet but the Navy.

Mr. ROBERTS. You recognize, and I presume all officers recognize, that there is a wide difference between having your fleet ready for war and having all the other departments of the Government which must work in harmony with that fleet ready for war?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. We might get the fleet ready for war quite readily and within a comparatively short time, and there would be no means of supplying that fleet with the thousand and one things which you must have to maintain war?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. It is your thought, as I gather, that whoever is responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war and for its operations during war should also be made responsible for everything that goes to make for efficiency, when the war comes.

The CHAIRMAN. That interpretation placed upon the provision that he should be responsible for the thousand and one things and everything that is necessary to make the Navy ready for war would make him the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. No; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What functions would the Secretary exercise, relating to the thousand and one things that are necessary and enter into the preparation of the Navy, that this Chief of Operations could not exercise under the interpretation which you gave? You said that he would have control of everything that went into the preparation of the Navy?

Mr. ROBERTS. The military features. My questions all related to the military side of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Provisions would relate to the military side, for they have to be fed, and clothing would relate to the military side, because they have to be clothed. Everything that is in the Navy relates to the one crucial point.

Admiral FISKE. This officer is responsible to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary would just simply have the authority of passing on such things as he saw fit to submit to him?

Mr. ROBERTS. That is the condition to-day in every bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. No; not one man; it is quite different.

Mr. ROBERTS. We can get around that in a minute if we can have the regulations concerning the Chief of Operations.

Mr. KELLEY. Before Mr. Roberts goes into that, will you discuss briefly just what we are to understand by the military side of the Navy as distinguished from any other side? It seems to me, somehow, that the whole thing is military, that all and everything points to the one function of the Navy, and I can not quite distinguish in my own mind what powers would be purely military in their character?

Mr. OLIVER. Would not that be specially true in view of the defined purposes of the Navy as expressed this morning?

Admiral FISKE. Anybody who has had to map out an organization realizes the difficulty of drawing a line between any two parts and yet have them merge; and if they do not merge they do not work together, I think I see Mr. Kelley's point. The purpose of the Navy being actually military exclusively, the control of all the factors which would lead up to the battle or to war, would practically take in everything. That is true. So, naturally, there would have to be some more or less arbitrary line drawn; otherwise the power of the Chief of Naval Operations might spread over everything, more than any of us would want. There would have to be some arbitrary line drawn as to what constituted the military and what constituted the other.

Of course, if the Chief of Naval Operations were given the authority which this committee's provision seemed to contemplate last year, that would give him power over all the other factors in the Navy. For instance, he could send for a chief of bureau and ask him why he did not do so and so. If he did that and the chief of the bureau had the power of appeal, as he naturally would, to the Secretary, in case it did interfere with anybody under him in his own bureau, why, the Secretary of the Navy could very easily rectify it, I think. The idea of military and naval men is to recognize that in our country the underlying idea of our Government is not to put the military over the civil, but to prevent harm being done by a civilian official who did not quite have the proper conception of the weight of these factors; to have a competent man who is versed in all those matters to be the principal adviser to the Secretary, and also under him, just as an adjutant in a regiment. No Chief of Operations who had any sense at all—in fact I can not imagine any man at all who would want to go and interfere between the chief of a bureau and his subordinates, or the commandant of a navy yard and his subordinates.

The whole training of military men is just the reverse; and our whole training is to keep out of another man's area of discretion. A few years ago there was a regulation put in the regulation book, and it is still there, cautioning admirals not to interfere with the interior discipline of flagships. For instance, an admiral aboard ship could give orders not only to the captain of the ship but to the coxswain of the boat, to the sweeper on the deck, and to the chief engineer. Of course, he has the authority to do it and you can not stop him very well; but the regulations distinctly warn him against it. It would be a very bad thing to do, and we do not want him to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I should like to hand you these regulations with reference to the Chief of Operations and ask you to read them carefully and suggest what additional military power or duty you would give to the Chief of Operations.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

Extract from United States Navy Regulations covering the duties, etc., of the Chief of Operations. Those regulations have been in force since July 1, 1915.)

Sec. 3. The Office of Naval Operations.

126. (1) The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act Mar. 3, 1915.)

(2) This shall include the direction of the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the office of target practice and engineering competitions, the operation of the radio service and of other systems of communication, the operations of the aeronautic service, of mines and mining, of the naval defense districts, Naval Militia, and of the Coast Guard when operating with the Navy; the direction of all strategic and technical matters, organization, maneuvers, target practice, drills, and exercises, and of the training of the fleet for war; and the preparation, revision, and enforcement of all tactics, drill books, signal codes, and cipher codes. The orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of the duties enumerated in this paragraph shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy and shall have full force and effect as such.

(3) The Chief of Naval Operations shall be charged with the preparation, revision, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, naval instructions, and general orders.

(4) He shall advise the Secretary concerning the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy and prepare all orders issued by the Secretary in regard thereto, and shall keep the records of service of all fleets, squadrons, and ships.

"(5) He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features of all new ships and as to any proposed extensive alterations of a ship which will affect her military value, and all features which affect the military value of dry docks, including their location; also as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunition, fuel, stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

"(6) In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war he shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the department, including the Marine Corps headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans.

"(7) The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer.

"(8) He shall have two principal senior assistants, officers not below the grade of captain, one as assistant for operations and the other as assistant for material.

"(9) He shall ex officio be a member of the General Board."

I would define his duties and powers as they were defined in the provision which this committee put into the last appropriation bill, as it was originally reported.

I said I did not believe that the Chief of Naval Operations should act independently of the Secretary. If he acted independently of the Secretary, he might go contrarywise, and, of course, I would not agree to that. I am very sure, in my opinion, that whatever law is passed in regard to the Navy should be so detailed that it would be impossible for a Secretary coming in to change everything without the consent of Congress. We have had that trouble always, as everybody knows.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you would transfer the power by act of Congress from the Secretary to the officers under the Secretary?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When you take away from the Secretary the power to control or to change the actions of the subordinates, why have you not transferred the power from the Secretary to the subordinates?

Admiral FISKE. I did not advocate that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say you would have it so specified that the Secretary could not change it without authority of Congress.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, certain matters. Whatever is decided on should be so.

The CHAIRMAN. In whom would you vest that authority by act of Congress?

Admiral FISKE. I do not think I understand you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I might say here and point out that the law, for instance, gives the bureaus certain authority, and gives the commander in chief of the fleet certain authority. The law does that. The idea of that law, of course, Mr. Chairman, and of a great many of these laws is to prevent the Secretary, or even a higher official, from certain acts which they thought might not be for the public good.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you to name one thing that a chief of bureau can do without the authority of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. He can not do anything without authority from the Secretary of the Navy, and I do not want the Chief of Naval Operations to do anything without the authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, Admiral, when you say that the law shall define certain things?

Admiral FISKE. To be specific, then, I should say—and I forgot to put it in my last recommendation—that it ought to be in the law that there should be under the Chief of Naval Operations at least 15 assistants—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). That is a detail.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; but that detail is exactly what I am insisting upon.

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking about what authority you would give. Would you give any officer of the Navy, by law, authority which the Secretary of the Navy can not control?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; I testified to that a short time ago.

The CHAIRMAN. That simplifies the matter very much.

Mr. ROBERTS. That has been the contention all along. There has been no point in anybody's mind on that. There has been only one officer appearing before us that had a contrary view.

Mr. OLIVER. I think your question, Mr. Chairman, is very indefinite, as is also the answer. To what extent should the Secretary be permitted to control?

The CHAIRMAN. He said he should have supreme control. I asked if the Secretary was to be the supreme control, and he said "absolutely."

Q. Is he in favor of any limitations of that control being fixed by Congress?
A. Not as between the Secretary of the Navy and his officers.

Q. But your idea is that there are some well-established policies which the Secretary of the Navy ought not to change without the authority of Congress?

A. That is exactly what I mean. For instance, this provision itself of the bill. Before that was made law, the Secretary could or could not, I do not know, appoint a man to do something like this. But by law now he is prohibited, and the succeeding Secretary can not come along and say, "I do not care for Naval Operations at all," and wipe him off the slate. He can not do that.

Q. That is the creation of an office.

A. Yes.

Q. But pardon me, the succeeding Secretary of the Navy can come along and say, "I do not care for Naval Operations at all," and wipe him off the slate. He can not do that.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes, and that has been done.

A. That applies to every bureau in the Navy Department. There are sections of the statutes that relate to the creation of all the bureaus, and that they shall have such power and perform such duties as the Secretary may designate to them. We have never had any case where the Secretary has taken such action, except where we had, under the former administration, the Bureau of Equipment, a situation where they did not appoint bureau chiefs, that provision of the bill.

Q. The history of that, if you will recall, is that the law provided for a chief of the Bureau of Equipment, with a chief, and his duties were such as were assigned him by the Secretary of the Navy from time to time. The then Secretary of the Navy distributed the duties of the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and distributed the duties among other officers and left the office absolutely useless.

A. You are a little inaccurate about that. He did not take them away from the Chief. The office became vacant at the expiration of the time, he and the Secretary made another appointment.

Q. I think you are mistaken about that, Mr. Chairman.

A. No, I am right.

Q. I am quite certain they were distributed before the vacancy came.

A. No, they were not. There being no chief of the Bureau of Equipment, the Secretary distributed those duties among other officers and asked the approval of Congress, and we carried it by temporary enactment from year to year for several years, until we finally abolished it and permanently distributed them.

Q. Having read these regulations, I want to ask the admiral if paragraph 1 gives the Chief of Operations just the authority over the food, clothing, and the supplies and the bureaus that he thinks a Chief of Operations should have. I refer you to section 6. When the Secretary of the Navy, on the advice of the Chief of Staff, has decided on carrying out a certain program, he has given it to the bureaus, hasn't he given it to the Chief of Operations to carry out?

A. Yes, he has.

Q. That is exactly what I want to get in the law as a permanent basis. The staff is of as much importance in the administration of the Secretary of the Navy.

A. The details might much better be handled by the department with a fixed rigid law.

Q. But to take away from the department the right to regulate, to fix the scope of the staff. The objection I have to the present law is that it is not efficient. I am not criticizing its efficiency at all.

Q. To take from the Secretary of the Navy any power he has or might properly have, that I do not intend, and the Chairman of the Committee on the Secretary of the Navy is perfectly acquainted with the history of the bill. It was the fact that the bill was introduced by the Secretary of the Navy, came along and the bill was not passed. It was a bill to create a staff, and the place where it was passed was in the House of Representatives. I do not think I should have a bill that would be pulled out of the House.

Q. The bill is now a fixed law, and the duties of the staff are discharged, and the regulations of the department with a rigid law saying,

A. Yes, that is so.

Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know who the next Secretary of the Navy will be. It may be a man who will understand the importance of this Chief of Operations and continue his power. He may not understand the scope of it and may strip him of all these powers and leave it where we were when this organization started.

Admiral FISKE. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that all over the world, especially since 1870, when we became aware of what had been done by Prussia, there has been in naval and military circles an increasing realization of the importance of continuity in strategy, and that the danger of not appreciating it is really tremendous. In other words, in my humble opinion, this particular question we are now discussing is actually the most important question before the country to-day. The national life has hinged on this particular thing in a great many countries all during history. The general staff of Prussia brought about entirely a new state of things before the war with Austria in 1866, and when the war came along they tried their method and defeated Austria practically in three weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment ago you suggested as one of the things you insisted upon as material that there should be a limitation of not less than 15 officers at a time. I think the Secretary has assigned 14. How much materiality do you attribute to the difference between a reservation giving 14 unlimited and fixing a limitation of 15?

Admiral FISKE. The difference between 14 and 15 is simply of course that difference. That is all the difference there is in that. May I proceed to what I was leading up to?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. The war with France of 1870 brought up the same thing. Since that time all the nations except our own have been adopting that plan, and adopting it with utmost rigidity and insisting on it and seeing that it is followed. They go to the extreme in the navy of Germany and in the navy of Japan, which are the most efficient for their size, of having the Secretary of the Navy by law a naval officer. Those nations are poor and their navy to them is a very vital thing. They have to get every single cent's worth of efficiency out of a cent that they can get. That is the system they have there. I am not going to the extreme. I am simply pointing out the tremendous importance of that factor. It is absolutely impossible to have a general staff, and have it good, without doing something like that. It is easy enough to have a staff; it is easy enough to have anything; it is easy enough to have a Navy, but to have a good one is a very different matter. It is a very different matter indeed, and you have to strain every nerve to do it, because they are doing it. That is exactly what they are doing. The whole national life is back of that general staff in those countries.

The further we fall short of it, the further we will fall short of the efficiency of the Navy for its ostensible use. If we have a plan whereby every four years a new secretary will come in and change, not in detail, not the fitting of a boat or the appointment of a clerk, but the whole strategy of the Navy, we can never get anywhere—that is, not in comparison with these other navies. We may get along but not efficiently; we can not compete with them.

Mr. BRITTEN. Has not that been done in the past? Is not that the very thing that has been done in the past—changing from one system to another?

Admiral FISKE. It has been, and I am sure I am speaking what all naval officers feel; that if it is kept up, we will carry out the policy—that is our business. It is not our business to prescribe the policy; but it is our business to say, that, looking at it from the standpoint of efficiency, looking at it from the standpoint of strategy, this plan will work or it will not, and that we do need continuity.

Mr. BRITTEN. Is not that what the general staff is for?

Admiral FISKE. That is what the general staff is for. One reason that our construction corps is so good is because they follow that idea. We have a splendid construction corps. We have a corps of highly educated men, who started at the beginning and have been naval constructors all their lives, who make a specialty of it, and make a success of it; but we do not have strategists along that line. But the foreign navies think the strategy specialty is much more important, and much more difficult than the construction.

Mr. BRITTEN. Actually, from the fighting standpoint, is not the strategy just as important or more important than the ship itself?

Admiral FISKE. That is like asking which is more important, a man's mind or his legs. The strategy of the Navy is its mind. The general staff you may call the brain by which this mind acts on the body.

The CHAIRMAN. Just at that point; you are speaking of the foreign navies. Are they not given simply the power in general terms, or is their power limited and described and defined by precise regulations? Are they not created and given broad power in general language, and the general duties are left for the admiralty to work out and prescribe in detail?

Admiral FISKE. The Government, as I understand it, prescribes the policy and then they say, "Here is our policy; develop your strategy to fit our policy."

The CHAIRMAN. We have a policy and prescribe a general duty, but we have said to the Navy Department, "Carry out this policy," which they are proposing to do, meeting exactly what you say they should do.

Mr. BRITTEN. Just at that point may I offer a suggestion? Suppose there is a change in administration and a new Secretary comes in next year, and he decides this Chief of Operations idea is all wrong, and he wants to go back to the aid plan. The law has been passed which provides the Chief of Operations. The new Secretary comes in and says, "This Chief of Operations idea is all wrong from my standpoint, and I will not assign any men to that duty." The result is that the Chief of Operations will sit there alone, with nothing to do. Is not that true?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. That will not ever happen with any Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. BRITTEN. We have had Secretaries of the Navy who have been more radical than that.

The CHAIRMAN. When the law prescribes the duty and responsibility, the Secretary of the Navy will not defy Congress.

Mr. ROBERTS. You say that will never be done, but it was done, and you just cited the instance indirectly where the Secretary of the Navy and the President refused, when the vacancy came, to appoint a bureau chief.

The CHAIRMAN. They submitted the matter to Congress.

Mr. ROBERTS. Years afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they submitted it right at that time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Years afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. No; right at the next session of Congress.

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes; it was submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. We made temporary approval until we could work out a permanent system.

Mr. ROBERTS. Which was several years afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. But we gave a permanent system, and we carried it by act in the appropriation bill.

Mr. BRITTEN. The chairman of the committee was evidently in favor of the provision inserted in the last appropriation bill, because it left the committee with its unanimous approval, if I am not mistaken. It prescribed that the minimum number of aids to the Chief of Operations should be 15. The chairman reported that particular measure to the House unanimously, and supported it on the floor. He evidently has changed his mind very materially in the last year.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will permit the chairman to make a statement, he will say this: There was very little support on the floor, because it went out of the bill on a point of order. After the hearings were completed, and while the clerk of the committee was engaged in making up the bill, Mr. Hobson submitted it, just toward the close of our work, and we put it in. We had no hearings on it. I was in favor of the general principle, and I am now. I think it was a very valuable office to create. We put it in the bill, and had no opportunity to discuss it, and had no hearings upon it, but when it got on the floor it went out on a point of order.

Mr. OLIVER. What was the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. That it was new legislation in an appropriation bill. When the Senate restored it in a modified form in conference, we worked out the clause that is in the bill now, by a conference discussion among the members of the Senate and House on the conference committee.

Mr. BRITTEN. I may be mistaken in this, and if I am I hope Admiral Fiske will correct me, but I am told by certain officers in the department, who are supposed to know, that the provision that was incorporated in the bill was very largely your language, Admiral, and drawn by you. Is that true?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. The Secretary of the Navy has taken complete credit for that section, and I am very glad to have an expression from you in that particular regard. I do not know who offered it. The officers say Admiral Fiske drew it up in his own handwriting.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of the Navy has not, so far as I know, made any such claim.

Mr. BRITTEN. I would be glad to give you the press clippings that show that he did claim credit for that section.

Mr. KELLEY. Am I right in thinking the powers of bureau chiefs are provided in general language in much the same way that the power of this Chief of Operations is provided?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; only not so specifically. It says there shall be certain bureaus created, and they shall have such power and perform such duties as the Secretary of the Navy from time to time prescribes.

Mr. KELLEY. While this does in a way prescribe the duties, it only leaves them very broadly prescribed.

The CHAIRMAN. It prescribes the policy and the general duties.

Admiral FISKE. I feel it necessary to explain something that Mr. Britten said. I do not want to seem to give assent to a remark that he made, which was to the effect that the provision for the Chief of Naval Operations, as originally reported by this committee, was drawn up in my own handwriting. It was drawn up at my suggestion, and Mr. Hobson and I had several conferences while drawing it up; and finally, in framing the phraseology in which it was presented to you, Hobson and I had the assistance of six other officers.

Mr. KELLEY. Your objection to this language that is in the law now is merely that it limits the power of this officer to preparing the fleet, whereas you think it should be preparing the Navy for war?

Admiral FISKE. That is one objection; yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Is there some other specific thing you want to put in more in detail than that?

Admiral FISKE. Yes: I think for the same reason, that if Congress should decide to direct that this office be established it should also direct that he should have a certain number of assistants to prepare war plans and certain war-game apparatus for their use.

Mr. KELLEY. You think that at some time the Secretary might destroy the office by withholding a proper amount of help? Is that the thing that is in the back part of your head?

Admiral FISKE. Or, perhaps, the Chief of Naval Operations might get lazy.

Mr. ROBERTS. We have provided in the law that the Chief of Operations should be appointed not below the rank of captain, and that while holding his office he should have the rank, title, and emoluments of a rear admiral. In view of the fact that that same bill provided for three admirals to command fleets and in view of the fact that the legislation placed on the Chief of Operations the duty of operating the fleets, was it not a mistake to make the rank of the Chief of Operations as low as that of rear admiral? Should he not have been made an admiral?

Admiral FISKE. Are you referring to the rank which he holds after appointment or to the rank he had before?

Mr. ROBERTS. I am speaking of the rank which the Chief of Operations holds while he is Chief of Operations.

Admiral FISKE. Oh, undoubtedly.

Mr. ROBERTS. If he did not have that rank or did not reach it while serving. In the present instance the Chief of Operations, when he assumed his duties, was a captain, and he could be appointed under the law from that rank. Of course, when he came into office he immediately had the rank of rear admiral. which, had he not reached that rank lineally, he would have dropped when he left the bureau and he would have gone back to his rank of captain. But, in Admiral Benson's case, he reached the rank of rear admiral lineally, while holding the position of Chief of Operations, and what has appeared to me to be a little out of joint and out of harmony in a military organization is a rear admiral having charge of the operations of fleets that are commanded by admirals.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; there is an incongruity.

Mr. ROBERTS. To say the least, and, according to my understanding of a military force, it does not tend to the best efficiency?

Admiral FISKE. You are quite correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. And does not tend to the utmost harmony?

Admiral FISKE. That is quite correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. It appears to me that there should be another change in the law regarding the Chief of Operations in that respect.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I think so, too.

Mr. ROBERTS. That he should be given the rank of admiral while holding his position as Chief of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And then to go back to whatever his lineal rank might be when his term had expired?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just at that point, and not antagonizing your view at all, but to elucidate it, would you still continue the provision that a captain may be appointed to serve as Chief of Operations with the rank of rear admiral or admiral?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From what rank would you have the appointment made?

Admiral FISKE. Flag rank, sir. In my opinion, he should not be appointed to that position unless he had served successfully as a flag officer afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean unless he had had sea service successfully as a rear admiral?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And should not be appointed from the grade of captain?

Admiral FISKE. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. I was coming to that, Mr. Chairman; I was going to get the admiral's idea as to the lowest rank from which he should be appointed and his reasons for it.

Admiral FISKE. The duties of a rear admiral afloat are very different from those of a captain. A man may be a very good officer in a junior grade; he may be a very good captain even, and yet not at all good as a flag officer. The requirements, the mental attitude, and all of that, are quite different. A good many men have been good captains, but have not been good flag officers; and some men who have never been considered as amounting to very much have been intrusted with flag rank against, sometimes, the fears almost of their friends; and they have done beautifully; much better than men who had done better in the subordinate grades.

Mr. BRITTEN. Admiral, which is considered the most important position in the service below the Secretary, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet or the Chief of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Well, the most desirable position is that of commander in chief of the fleet; but the most important, I should say, is that of Chief of Operations. You can do more good or harm in that capacity than you can in the other; but, of course, the position of commander in chief of the fleet carries with it a great many things that are desirable.

Mr. BRITTEN. So that is an additional reason why the Chief of Operations should have the rank of admiral?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. While he is holding that most important position in the service?

Admiral FISKE. Precisely.

Mr. ROBERTS. Now, I do not know that I want to ask any more questions of you on this general staff of Chief of Operations matter, because I think we have your views fully, but perhaps I might ask you one general question, although it may be that you have covered it in various ways in your answers. What, in your opinion—and you have yourself been Chief of Operations or aid for operations and you had experience with the fleet—

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. I understand you have commanded a division?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; three different divisions of the fleet.

Mr. ROBERTS. What, in your opinion, is the most important function or agency in the Navy for the attainment of the highest efficiency of the fighting units in battle?

Admiral FISKE. Good strategy.

Mr. ROBERTS. And you mean by that a properly constituted general staff or bureau of operations, or by whatever name it may be designated?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; to carry it out.

Mr. ROBERTS. I understand your view to be that with the very best of material, ships, guns, and ammunition, and with the very best of men and officers, you could not hope to attain the very highest efficiency, when it comes to action, without a central guiding spirit.

Admiral FISKE. Precisely, yes; just as a man could not without a good mind.

Mr. ROBERTS. It would be a good deal like assembling all of the football stars of the country into one team and allowing each one to operate as he saw best without any central governing power and directing spirit.

Admiral FISKE. Something like that.

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Mr. BRITTEN. I believe you stated this morning that as aid for operations you were the intermediary between the Secretary and the General Board?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. You were aid for operations in December, 1914?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. The report of the Naval General Board in December, 1914, was the first report that was made public by any Secretary of the Navy, was it not?

Admiral FISKE. I am not clear whether they were made public the year before or not.

Mr. BRITTEN. I have here a copy of a letter written by the Secretary of the Navy which says that this was a brand new idea of his.

Admiral FISKE. If it had been in 1913 it would have been his, too. I am under the impression that the report in 1913 was also made public, but I am not sure of that.

Mr. BRITTEN. In December, 1914, the recommendation of the General Board was with it an estimate or recommendation for some 19,500 additional men in the service. I questioned Admiral Badger, who was the representative of the board who came before the committee, about that, and it appears that that recommendation for 19,500 additional men was taken out of the report of estimate that was made public. Is that correct? Have anything to do between the Secretary and the General Board in reference to that matter?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; naturally, I was the intermediary between the Secretary and the General Board.

Mr. BRITTEN. Did the original recommendation of the General Board, as submitted to the Secretary, embody a recommendation for 19,500 or thereabouts, of additional men for the service that year?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. You are positive about that?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. How did it happen that the report when published did not contain that recommendation for 19,500 additional men? In other words, what brought about its elimination from the report of the General Board?

Admiral FISKE. Well, the General Board concluded not to publish that part of the report.

Mr. BRITTEN. Well, the General Board does not publish its reports. They go to the Secretary of the Navy, and is it not true that after the Secretary of the Navy received the report that he sent word to the General Board that unless they took that part out of the report that suggestion as to personnel he would not make it public?

Admiral FISKE. The Secretary never took the report of the General Board. It came in, and struck out something and published it with that omission.

Mr. BRITTEN. No; he didn't take it, that is true; but a recommendation did come from the General Board with a recommendation that the enlisted personnel be increased by 19,500 additional men.

Admiral FISKE. It was 19,600 additional men.

Mr. BRITTEN. It left the General Board in that condition, did it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that recommendation a separate one, or was it embraced in the report?

Admiral FISKE. It was in the report.

Mr. BRITTEN. You say it was not stricken out by the Secretary, but it is not true that the Secretary refused to make it public unless that was taken from it?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. How did the Secretary bring about its elimination from the report? Now, it was in the original report—there is no question about that—and it was in the report that was made public. How did the Secretary bring that about? He could not strike it out of his own accord, but it was left out of the subsequent report made by the General Board, as published. Now, what brought that about? Did the Secretary go to the General Board and state that he did not want it in, or did he write them a letter, or did he send for you and talk to you about it, or just what was the transaction that brought about its elimination from the report?

Admiral FISKE. The transaction altogether took over a month. Finally, the report was sent to the Secretary, and I was told to take the report to the board and say that that part be left out.

Mr. BRITTEN. The Secretary told you to take it to the General Board and report to them that that part be eliminated from their report?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. Will you tell the committee whether or not the General Board immediately acted upon that, or did they discuss it first? You were ex officio a member of the General Board at that time, were you not?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. The board debated upon it and finally concluded that it was very desirable to have the report published for the education of the public and that even if that part was left out, the effect of the report in educating the public as to the necessities of the Navy would be very great, especially as there was a paragraph or two explaining the necessity for having enough men to man all the ships without mentioning the number.

Mr. BRITTEN. So the board decided that, in the interest of the service generally and especially as it would be establishing a precedent for publishing the reports of the General Board in the future, it would have a good effect on the service in that way.

that expert opinion would finally reach the general public, and that it would be beneficial in that way. For that reason they decided to accede to the Secretary's demand that their recommendation for 19,600 men be stricken from it?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. They evidently did not succeed in their desire to bring about future publication of their recommendations, because in July of the following year, or a few months later, they made a recommendation that was not made public until Henry A. Wise, Wood, Congressman Gardner, and four or five others got after the Secretary and forced its publication. Is not that true?

Admiral FISKE. I do not know.

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Mr. BRITTEN. The recommendation of the General Board for \$5,000,000 for aviation was cut to \$2,000,000 by the Secretary, or at least cut by the Secretary on the suggestion of the Chief of Operations, Admiral Benson, who practically took entire responsibility for the reduction before the committee the other day. Will you tell us, please, if \$5,000,000, in your opinion, is too much, and why? I will say to you before you start to answer that Capt. Bristol's estimate was over \$7,000,000.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; I remember that very well. His estimate was originally for \$13,000,000, was it not?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. When I was aid for operations, I became convinced, and I am still convinced, that the thing in which we are more backward than in any other thing is aeronautics; and I think it is a matter of common sense that in any large thing which is composed of a great many factors, we should look out for the weak point. No matter how fine and strong you are, if you have a weak point you want to look out for that, and in aeronautics I think we are weaker than we are in anything else. We have not a general staff; that is true, but we are on the way toward it and now we have something like it; that is, the Chief of Naval Operations—

Mr. BROWNING. Are we weaker in aeronautics than we are in battle cruisers?

Admiral FISKE. No; you are quite right there. But we can do more in a year in aeronautics than we can in battle cruisers. We are just as weak in battle cruisers as we are in aeronautics, but in one year we could do a lot in aeronautics, and we could not do much in battle cruisers. Now, that may not be all the time we want, but we may get into trouble when this war ends, and battle cruisers are not going to help us unless they are constructed and in the fleet. That is the thing that is going to take us the longest time, and it will be necessary also to train an enlisted personnel, which is going to take us quite awhile. Even if we started to-day it would be a long time before you could get your personnel enlisted, trained, and earning their pay aboard ship. But the thing that is most exciting the public is, I think, the fear of invasion. Of course, that is the most horrible thing that can happen to any country—to have its soil invaded by an enemy; nothing is so bad as that.

Now, to help us in that event we need a competent aeronautical corps and we need it right off. To do that we could get, in emergency, a lot of people from the outside. The Aero Club of America is doing a great deal, and is very much interested.

If we got 1,000 aeroplanes together and got them well organized—some of them large—to meet an attacking force, we would have aircraft that could drop large bombs and launch torpedoes and it would help to a great extent. You see, we could get ready to do that probably in a year. Then when it came to their landing the men to make the invasion, actually getting ashore, getting on the beach, getting their guns ashore, getting their ammunition ashore, and getting their food, and all of those things ashore, they would have reached the very ticklish period of their operations. If you had 1,000 aeroplanes, and they dropped bombs on those fellows, especially those in the boats, you would present an attack that they have not yet learned to answer. So I think aeronautics is the thing on which we can get to work quicker, and by which we can accomplish more than by anything else.

Admiral FISKE. As a basis on which to show the Secretary the necessity of preparing war plans in such detail that the Navy could take immediate action in case of war, I requested the General Board to give me its opinion as to the maximum time which I should state to the Secretary as the time within which, after declaration of war, the United States Navy should be ready to meet the enemy in a battle at sea. The General Board deliberated on this question during the greater part of an entire forenoon, and answered that maximum time allowed should be two weeks. I so informed the Secretary.

was unable to make any impression on him. After many conversations, and the submitting of different written memoranda, on November 5, 1914, wrote him a long letter, declaring in unequivocal terms that the Navy was wholly unprepared for showing that its unpreparedness might be divided into three parts; that is, lack of any staff for making and carrying out; inadequacy of personnel, both regular and reserve; and inadequacy of material. I handed this letter to the Secretary and he saw it in my presence. This is the letter which he subsequently denied having seen or heard of, but which he admitted later that he had seen, but forgotten. This letter could not be found in the Department's files, when the Senate asked for it in April, 1916; but it was found in them later, bearing the receiving stamp date of September 13, 1916. Despite my earnest warning, the Secretary in his report of December 4 set forth the preparedness of the Navy in general terms. One headline in his report was "Proof of the preparedness of the Navy." He gave testimony of similar purport before the House Naval Committee.

Realizing that the safety of the country was at stake, I suggested to Representative Hobson that he get me called before the House Naval Committee, as the official expert of the Navy Department on strategy, which includes, of course, preparedness. Hobson did so. In the course of my testimony I showed how wholly unprepared the Navy was, and, I believe, convinced the Naval Committee in a great measure. In my testimony, I gave certain figures showing the position and maneuvers of the German fleet in the autumn of 1913, in which dirigibles, aeroplanes, mine sweepers, and battleships operated in the fleet, and the fleet maneuvered according to strategic plans drawn up by the general staff; and I declared that it would take "at least five years" to get our Navy ready to fight off such a navy. Our Navy is not yet able to carry out maneuvers such as the German Navy carried on in 1913.

This is largely because of the absence in our fleet of battle cruisers, mainly because of our amazing backwardness in aeronautics. At the time that I was aid for operations, I strove to make the Secretary see the necessity for grasping the power that aeronautics held out to us. About a year I finally succeeded in getting a Director of Aeronautics established and Capt. Bristol put in the post. But scarcely I left my position than the division of aeronautics was abolished. Before going, Capt. Bristol, in 1915, recommended an appropriation of \$13,000,000. The Secretary cut it down to \$2,000,000.

In my testimony before the House Naval Committee on March 1, 1916, I pointed out that aeronautics gave us better opportunity than any other one thing for overcoming our unpreparedness quickly. Congress then raised the appropriation to three and one-half millions. After war had been declared by us, no appropriation for aeronautics was asked for till July, 1917. As a result, the Navy did little constructive work in aeronautics in the entire war. If my urgent recommendations had been carried out, we would have been able to send an aeroplane force to Europe in April, 1917, to have increased it rapidly, and to have carried out bombing attacks on the German submarines before they got away from their bases into deep water.

During the following month of January, 1915, I induced Representative Hobson to get the House Naval Committee to incorporate in the appropriation bill a provision for a Chief of Naval Operations, who should be given the authority and the staff necessary for preparing war plans and for putting the Navy in a state of preparedness, and be held responsible that those things were done. I drew up the phraseology myself with Hobson's assistance. The committee adopted the provision exactly as I had drawn it up with two or three unimportant changes in words and incorporated it in the bill. I beg leave to incorporate the House Naval Committee's report in the record.

This provision was described as follows in the report of the Naval Committee to the House dated January 16, 1915:

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS.

The committee recommends a provision whereby a new office of Chief of Naval Operations is created. This office is to be filled by an officer of the Navy on the active list, not below the rank of rear admiral, and appointed for a term of four years by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This officer, under the Secretary of the Navy, is to be held responsible for readiness of the Navy for War, and is charged with its general direction. He is to perform only such duties as shall be assigned him by the Secretary of the Navy, and such duties shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and is given the same authority regarding orders issued by him as is now given under existing law to the chiefs of bureaus of the Navy Department.

To assist this officer in preparing general and detailed plans of war, 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps are to be assigned for this exclusive duty. It is the opinion of this committee, after a most thorough investigation and mature deliberation, that the necessity for such an office exists in the Naval Establishment. At present there exists a General Board and the Naval War College, neither of which seem to be equipped for adequately performing this duty, nor have they sufficient officers under their jurisdiction to do this fundamental work of preparation of plans for war.

The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the General Board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and the material of the Navy are such that they have not time and opportunity to fully prepare and perfect this work, and it is therefore recommended by the committee that the proposed provision be enacted into law.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy retains absolute control over the office, and the Chief of Operations performs only such duties as are assigned by the Secretary, and all orders are issued under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

The principle of civilian control of the Navy Department is in no way affected by the provision recommended.

(The report of the committee above referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

[House Report No. 1344, Sixty-third Congress, third session.]

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

February 2, 1915.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. Hobson, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted the following report to accompany H. R. 21257):

The Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred H. R. 21257, a bill to create the office of Chief of Naval Operations and for other purposes, report the same favorably, with the recommendation that the bill do pass.

The bill provides for the creation of a new office in the Navy Department, to be known as the Chief of Naval Operations. This office is to be filled by an officer of the Navy on the active list, not below the grade of rear admiral, and appointed for a term of four years by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This officer, under the Secretary of the Navy, is to be held responsible for readiness

of the Navy for war and in charge of its general direction. He is to perform only such duties as shall be assigned to him by the Secretary of the Navy, and such duties shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and is given the same authority regarding orders issued by him as is now given under existing law to the chiefs of bureaus of the Navy Department.

To assist this officer in preparing general and detail plans of war, 15 officers, of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps, are to be assigned for this exclusive duty.

At present there exists a General Board and Naval War College, neither of which seems to be equipped for adequately performing this duty, nor have they sufficient officers under their jurisdiction to do this fundamental work for preparation of the plans of war. The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the General Board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and material of the Navy are such that they have not had time and opportunity to fully prepare in detail and perfect this work. It is the opinion of the committee that the necessity for such an office exists in the Naval Establishment.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy retains absolute control over the office, and the Chief of Naval Operations performs only such duties as are assigned by the Secretary, and the orders are issued under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy. The principle of civilian control of the Navy Department is in no way affected by the provision recommended. The tentative duties of the proposed Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants will be such that the work may be conveniently divided among nine committees or sections. The sections would probably be as follows:

The historical section, which covers the study and analysis of past campaigns.

The policy section, which studies the inherent interests of all nations and the policies which logically follow.

The strategic section studies the theaters of possible wars from every aspect and sources and means of supply for the military and naval forces.

The tactical section studies tactics, particularly in relation to strategy; determines and endeavors to insure that the tactics of the fleet are kept constantly up to date and conform to the character of the ships and weapons that will be used.

The logistic section studies the logistic aspects of the strategical and tactical plan involving the requirements as to supplies at the beginning of the war, during the war and the organization of transportation, and many other things incident to the auxiliary service, including the inspection of merchant vessels.

The organization section studies and devises plans of organization for war in order to secure the most efficient flow of authority, the best administrative and tactical grouping of the forces, detail of personnel for command, and the orders necessary for the execution of the various plans.

The mobilization section prepares and keeps always up to date plans for mobilizing for each of the various stations arising from conflict with possible enemies.

The training section studies methods for the training of the naval forces and devises strategical problems and tactical exercises involving combined maneuvers of battleships, auxiliaries, submarines, aircraft, and mining vessels.

The executive section sees that the plans devised are executed.

The importance of this work may be judged from the fact that Great Britain has a separate organization called "the naval war staff," composed of 39 line officers, a few staff officers, and about 31 civilian assistants; in Germany, by the admiral staff, composed of 22 officers, with 13 officer assistants, and a librarian; in Japan, by a general staff, which is immediately under the Emperor.

Such an agency as is hereby established in the Department of the Navy to coordinate and harmonize all parts of that establishment, prepare plans in detail, and supervise their execution, the committee believes is necessary for the effective or efficient accomplishment of the object for which the Navy exists, to insure our country victory in war. The committee unanimously recommends that the bill do pass.

The subjoined statements of Rear Admiral A. M. Knight, United States Navy, in an address before the Efficiency Society of New York, sets forth the importance of this legislation:

"The War College considers that every effort of the fleet and every effort of the department in connection with the fleet, should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the fleet.

"There is much about the Navy which is splendidly efficient, but as a whole it is far less efficient than it can and ought to be. Our ships are fine. Our officers are capable, industrious, and ambitious. Our enlisted men are the equals of those in other navies. But efficient ship and officers and men do not alone make an efficient Navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which coordinates their capabilities and directs their

efforts toward a common end, wisely selected, and very clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking.

"I come now to what is, perhaps, the most important part of my subject—the organization of the Navy Department, viewed from the standpoint of efficiency. There can be no question that the existing organization is inadequate and would break down under the strain of war. The administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels. It lacks the unity of purpose which would come from recognition of the fact that a navy have one excuse for existing, and only one—that it shall always be ready to strike on the minute and with every element of power concentrated behind its blow for the defense of the country.

"Do not misunderstand me. I am not telling you that our organization is wholly bad. I am telling you that it is inadequate. In many cases it works rather surprisingly well. But if you analyze these cases you will find that in so far as the results are good, they are so in spite of the system and because of some personal factor which has compelled efficiency. Moreover, and this is the crux of the whole matter, the cases with which we can deal at the present time are illustrations of peace efficiency, whereas the efficiency upon which our attention should be fixed unwaveringly is war efficiency: not because we are going to have war, but because we may have it, and because the one supreme duty of the Navy is to be ready for it if it comes.

"I suppose this relation of the Navy to war, whether possible war or actual war, has always been understood more or less clearly. But it is a singular fact that the organization of the Navy Department takes no account of it. War is the one thing for which no arrangement is made. There are seven bureaus in the department, each with clearly defined duties; but in all the elaborate legislation creating these bureaus and defining their duties there is not a word about the duty of keeping the Navy in readiness for war or preparing plans for war or conducting war after it begins. There would be a certain element of comedy in this if there were not so many elements of possible tragedy.

"There is a bureau in the department charged with the construction and repair of ships, one with the design of machinery, one with the preparation of ordnance, one with the direction of personnel, and so on; but nowhere is it said 'this bureau shall be responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war, for the preparation of war plans, and for the conduct of war.' This, then, is the last and great defect in the efficiency of the Navy. How shall it be remedied? The answer is, I think, by the creation in the Navy Department of a division of strategy and operations, preferably not coequal with the present bureaus, but superior to them and standing between them and the Secretary. This arrangement would be a recognition of the fact that all the activities of the present bureaus should lead up to the Secretary through a channel which coordinates them all and directs them toward war efficiency.

"I have explained that the defects in the organization of the Navy Department are a lack of coordination of authority, as a result of which the administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels, and a total lack of provision for planning and carrying forward the operations of war. It must not be supposed that these defects have escaped recognition or that no efforts have been made to correct them. The most successful of the efforts to secure coordination between the bureaus was the adoption during the last administration of a system of aids to the Secretary, who coordinated the work of the various bureaus, and who, when important questions were under consideration, formed a council upon which he could call for advice. The weak point about this system was, and is, that the aids have never been legalized by Congress, and therefore have no permanent status whatever. In spite of this, they are in a position to do much toward improving the administration of the department.

"The General Board was called into existence in 1900, by an order of the Secretary of the Navy to provide a body for the consideration of war plans and allied subjects. It has performed and is performing work of the very highest importance, but it, like the council of aids, lacks legislative sanction, although Congress has for many years past shown great interest in its work and not a little deference to its views.

"Another and a very important agency to which the Navy Department looks for a contribution to its work in strategy and other matters connected with preparation for war and the conduct of war, is the Naval War College at Newport. The War College has been in existence since 1884 and has been an important factor in the education of officers from the very beginning. For some reason, however, it has failed until very recently to command the full recognition which it has deserved from the Navy Department or even from the officers of the Navy. The present Secretary of the Navy visited the college shortly after coming into office, and, with an insight of which many naval officers have shown themselves incapable, recognized its possibilities for usefulness and pronounced himself as its friend. Since that time he has done everything to forward its work which could be dictated by the most thorough comprehension of its mission and its needs, and as a result of this generous support, both moral and

material. the college has taken its proper place as an institution for the training of officers for high command and for the development of the art of naval warfare. Thus the college is able to contribute something toward making good the lack of a strategic division in the Navy Department itself.

"You will see, therefore, that, although no law takes cognizance of the necessity for keeping the Navy ready for war, there are many agencies which cooperate toward that end—the council of aids, to which the Secretary would naturally turn in an emergency, the General Board, and the War College. These agencies are so closely in sympathy that they are able to cooperate harmoniously with each other and with the fleet, and this cooperation is having important and very valuable results. This does not change the fact that there should be—that indeed there must be—in the Navy Department itself and close to the Secretary a coordinating office to bring the efforts of these and other agencies to an administrative focus, bearing directly upon the efficiency for war. Such a coordinating office I have already sketched as a division of strategy and operations immediately below the Secretary of the Navy in authority.

"The creation of this office would provide a policy for the Navy, so far as the activities of the Navy itself are concerned, insuring unity of effort and shaping plans toward the end which we have recognized to-night as the proper end of all our efforts—preparedness for war."

Admiral FISKE. This provision was struck out on a point of order in the House. Subsequently, it was introduced into the appropriation bill again by the Senate, but with certain modifications suggested by the Secretary. As modified the provision read:

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, and who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.

It will be noted that although this provision as finally passed was a tremendous boon to the Navy, yet that it omitted to supply the Chief of Naval Operations with any staff for preparing war plans. It charged him with the preparation and readiness of plans, but provided no officers for making the plans. It is true that the Secretary of the Navy could, if he so desired, order officers to Washington for doing that work; but my intention in preparing the original draft was to make the ordering of these officers to Washington mandatory, because I realized that, if it were not done, officers would probably not be ordered.

It is absolutely necessary for me to declare here that, in bringing about the establishment of this new office, in which the Chief of Naval Operations would continue my work, but under very much better conditions, I was not working for myself, because I realized that it would give the Secretary the opportunity of superseding me by another officer; and I told a number of my friends that there was not the slightest chance that I should be made the Chief of Naval Operations.

During the time that had elapsed after the war had broken out in Europe the Secretary and I had had a number of unpleasant conferences with relation to preparedness, mainly in the matter of securing increased personnel and the signing of the administrative plan. The Secretary refused to do either, and a natural tension between us ensued. It is absolutely essential also, in the interests of the truth, for me to declare in the most positive terms that there was no unpleasant feeling on my part toward the Secretary personally, and that I have no reason to think that there was any unpleasant feeling on his part toward me personally. Our intercourse was always polite, and on the surface cordial.

For part of 1915 my position became extremely difficult. I knew that I could not stand it indefinitely, but Admiral Dewey insisted that I must stand it as long as I could. Finally I resigned on April 1, 1915. A year later--that is on April 3, 1916--the Secretary testified before the House Naval Committee that I was not in touch with the department and that I would have been asked to resign if I had not resigned myself. The reason why I was not in touch with the department was that I insisted on the signing of a general administrative plan and the establishment of some system like that which I had established later in the Office of Naval Operations. Yet both of these measures the Secretary approved of highly later, and it was one of them that the Navy was handled with whatever of success it attained in preparing for the war and afterwards in waging it. I was requested to the delay involved by the Secretary's insistence on a measure finally adopted.

In the report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1915--the summer of 1916--page 11, there is a large headline, "Better organization effected." Under that heading read as follows:

OPERATIONS--BETTER ORGANIZATION EFFECTED.

"In accordance with the naval appropriation act of 1914 provided that 'there shall be an Office of Naval Operations . . . who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation of plans for its use in war.'

"This details how that is being carried out, and then in the middle of the report says:

"The general plan, prepared by the General Board, for the preparation of the Navy for the Atlantic has been approved and each office and bureau under the Secretary has been assigned its proper share in the general scheme of preparedness. The Secretary reports the department may at any time become informed of the progress made to overcome them, and of the progress made toward a complete reorganization."

The Secretary appointed Capt. Benson as Chief of Naval Operations, and relieved me on May 11, 1915. At this time the Navy was not prepared for war, and I was sorry that the Secretary had appointed as my successor an officer who had had experience on the General Board or on the staff at the War College.

I returned to duty at the War College; but during the following year I was on leave, so that I spent the months of January, February, March, and most of April, 1916, in Washington. I had no touch with the Navy, and I knew that no officers had been sent to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the purpose of making general and detail plans of war, as the House Naval Committee had emphatically recommended; that no planning had been established in that office, and that, therefore, the progress toward preparation had been taken, except that the general plan had at last been signed.

I was intensely anxious that a planning division should be established in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, for making general and detail plans of war. I arranged that I should be called before the House Naval Committee, in order that I might urge upon them the necessity of directing that the 15 assistants which the committee had recommended in January, 1915, should be

I testified on March 24 and 36, 1916. The committee adopted my recommendation and incorporated it in the bill, but only in appearance and not in substance. In January, 1915, the House Naval Committee had recommended earnestly that to assist the Chief of Naval Operations in preparing general and detail plans of war, 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps be assigned for this exclusive duty; but in their recommendation of 1916 the provision relating to this matter read:

To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of the duties of his office there shall be assigned for this exclusive duty not less than 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps.

It will be noted that these 15 officers were simply for exclusive duty in the office of Naval Operations, but that it was not directed specifically that their duty should be exclusively in making war plans.

Of course, my whole endeavor had been to convince the committee that the exclusive duty of those 15 officers should be in making war plans, and it has always been my belief that that was the intention of the committee. I may be wrong about this, of course; but it is difficult to see why the committee should have gone to the trouble to direct that those 15 officers should be for the exclusive duty of assisting the Chief of Naval Operations in his duties, for the reason that it has always been the custom (with some possible exceptions) that the duties of an officer are exclusively in whatever office he may be assigned to. For instance, an officer ordered to duty in the Bureau of Ordnance is assigned for exclusive duty in that bureau, although the word "exclusive" is not used. Whether or not the change was intentional, or whether the change had been suggested to them by someone opposed to having a proper Planning Division, I do not know. But I do know that the change was most unfortunate.

The bill was signed and went into effect on August 29, 1916. Although the phraseology was ambiguous, the bill as passed made a new epoch possible for the Navy, because if the 15 assistants which the bill ordered had been assigned to the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war, as the House Naval Committee had urgently recommended in January, 1915, a fairly good war plan could have been developed by the time we declared war in April, 1917; provided, of course, that those 15 assistants had gone to work immediately and prosecuted their endeavors zealously. But 15 officers were not assigned to the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war.

In fact, as Capt. Laning testified to you, no Planning Division had been established even as late as March 3, 1917; for some days after March 3, 1917, the Chief of Naval Operations appointed a special committee to consider a paper prepared by Capt. Laning individually, that was, so far as he knew, the first attempt at a war plan that would meet the actual war situation. Up to that time, apparently, no Planning Division had been established. I understand, however, that one man, Commander Schofield, had been engaged in making some plans regarding the installation of armed guards on merchant ships, and other minor efforts.

Less than six months elapsed after the bill went into effect assigning not less than 15 assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations, before our relations with Germany were broken off, and only seven months and a half before we were actually at war. As this interval had not been utilized in developing a war plan to meet the actual situation, it was unavoidable that the Navy should enter the war without such a war plan, and, therefore, that it was caught unprepared to carry such a war plan into execution.

Passing now from the unpreparedness of the Navy when it entered the war to the subject of the strategic handling of the Navy during the war, Admiral Sims charges that the Navy Department violated the immutable principles of war in not applying its major effort in the actual theater of war. If Admiral Sims is wrong, then the teachings of the War College are wrong, and the campaigns of Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Washington, and the other great commanders were carried out according to principles that were wrong.

In order to see this matter from the correct point of view, it is necessary to realize that the history of war is a matter of careful record for more than 2,000 years, and that no other subject of man's activity has been gone into with such care or had such an amount of money, time, and mental effort spent upon it. The campaigns of the great commanders have been analyzed, and thousands of books have been written that show the causes of failure and success. From the study of these campaigns, certain principles and lessons have been evolved. These principles and lessons are taught to officers of mature age by the various war colleges in the various countries.

The first war college was the German war college, that was established by Moltke. It was because of the training which officers received from that war college that Prussia triumphed so easily over Austria in 1866, and over France in 1870. The Austrian Army and the French Army were not as armies distinctly inferior to the Prussian. In fact the French Army in 1870 was supposed by most people to be superior to the Prussian, and it was well known that the French generals had had more actual experience in war, than the Prussian. Nevertheless, the war plans of the Prussians were so much more virile than those of the Austrians or the French, that in each case Prussia advanced into the heart of the enemy country immediately and conquered it. In both cases Prussia left only a small force home to guard her there.

Similar strategy was exercised by the British admiralty in the days of Nelson and Napoleon; for the British Navy guarded the British coast, not by staying on the British coast, but by advancing to the coast of the enemy and preventing the squadrons and fleets of the enemy from uniting.

Similar strategy has marked the campaigns of every great commander from the days of the Egyptian Kings to the present time. On the opposite sides we see recorded a different kind of strategy, which I beg leave to call "safety-first" strategy. This safety-first strategy is the kind of strategy that one reads about in most of the wars of history, but it is not the kind that was exercised by Caesar or Napoleon or Frederick or Washington. Those great commanders always adopted a strategy that was very daring, and that usually began with an energetic attack against the enemy.

It can not be too clearly emphasized, however, that, in order to start in war with proper energy and effectiveness, a high state of preparedness must previously have been achieved. History shows by countless incidents that it has always been dangerous in the highest degree even to enter a war when unprepared.

That our Navy was unprepared when we entered the war, I think nine officers in ten would be glad to testify. To what extent this lack of preparedness accounts for the fact that our full naval strength was exerted for many months, it would be difficult to determine with precision. It may be that had the Navy been fully prepared for war on April 6, 1917, the efforts put forth by the Chief of Operations and his assistants and the bureau chiefs would have resulted in the weight of our naval effort being exerted at a much earlier date in the actual theater of war. Certainly, unpreparedness was, in some part, the cause of our dilatoriness in getting into the war with full strength, and whoever was responsible for the unpreparedness must bear a large share of whatever blame may finally be adjudged.

As the war is over, some may think our unpreparedness a matter of little moment now, and may bewail the injury to the prestige of the Navy caused by the fact of its unpreparedness becoming known to the public.

We must all realize, however, that we can learn even more from past failures than from past successes; and that the more clearly the fact is recognized that we missed disaster by only a narrow margin in this war, by reason of our unpreparedness, the less danger there will be of unpreparedness happening again.

The American Navy has made a good record in past wars, but no American wishes that it shall make a bad record in the next war, or that the Navy shall go down before the enemy in disaster and disgrace.

It becomes the Navy's duty therefore to realize and to declare as clearly as we can what was the reason of our unpreparedness, and how similar unpreparedness can be prevented in the future.

By this standard it is my duty to give my professional opinion in this matter, to say that I think that my opinion is the same as that of 9 in 10 officers of the Navy, and that my opinion is based not only on my personal observation but on a careful study of war.

The result of my experience and studies has been to convince me that immeasurably the most important single element in any naval or military organization is the man at the head; and that whether any organization be efficient or inefficient, good or bad, the main reason in either case is to be found at the head.

In all the historical events that I have analyzed and studied, the paramount importance of the personality of the man directing them has impressed me more and more. No matter who else was concerned in any undertaking that was really great, the man at the head has stood out so clearly as to obscure every other person and every other thing. In all the campaigns of Cæsar, 99 per cent of everything was Cæsar; similarly, the most important single cause of Germany's ruin was the Kaiser.

This means, in this special case of the United States Navy, that the reason why it was unprepared lay in the mental and temperamental characteristics of the man at its head, and of the policy which he, as a consequence of those characteristics, had pursued.

—As to the means whereby unpreparedness can be prevented in the future, I am forced to the conclusion that by far the most important step is for the public to insist that the man at the head of the Navy shall always be a man imbued with the spirit of the Navy, highly educated, open-minded, and acquainted with the principles on which naval preparedness is based, and by following which naval preparedness can be secured.

• The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, how could you make such a brilliant appointment, of such a man as you have described; how could you find a man who could be imbued with the spirit of the Navy, and who would have sufficient knowledge, who had not been connected with the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I think the public men of the United States, Mr. Senator, are pretty well known, and their characteristics are pretty well known. The President, of course, in selecting his Cabinet, in selecting his men, would realize that certain men have certain characteristics.

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply asking for information.

Admiral FISKE. Yes. Of course, I might say——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean a public man who had had some experience of naval matters; any such practical experience?

Admiral FISKE. Senator, that is a tremendously difficult question to answer, tremendously difficult. I think that it is a very important question, and very, very difficult to answer; very difficult indeed. I should leave that to wiser persons than I am.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think the condition of the Navy would have been in 1917 if you had not succeeded in having the office of the Chief of Naval Operations established, and had not opposed the policy of the Secretary of the Navy in the way your statement has indicated?

Admiral FISKE. I have often thought about that, Senator, and I have wondered. I have come to the conclusion, after a great deal of thought, that the Navy would have been in a state of demoralization. During the little trouble with Mexico, when I was aide for Operations, the weakness of the department organization showed up very clearly. Some of us had to stay there all night. We could not have stood it very much longer, and that was a very small affair. I had two assistants only, two lieutenant commanders, and the whole organization of the Navy was absolutely unable to tackle any situation more serious than that, and that situation kept us going as it was.

The office of Chief of Naval Operations as established gave the Chief of Naval Operations a very considerable staff, and legalized him before the Nation by the action of Congress, and gave him much more power to have things done than I had.

Equally important or nearly equally important was the existence of the administrative plans; because before we actually went into the war in April, 1917, this administrative plan had been in action then for pretty nearly two years, so that the system had got to going, whereby the Navy Department was kept continually informed of what was the condition of preparedness of the bureaus, each bureau, and not only of the bureaus as far as they were individually concerned, but the way in which the work of the whole department was divided up among them.

Now, if I had let things go in what would have been the easiest way for me, I suppose I would have stayed there until I retired in June, 1916, less than a year before the war was declared. By that time there would have been no organization in the department for doing much, and the very fact of my having yielded and not having tried to keep the Navy up would have been reflected among all the officers in the Navy, because I was at that time the principal officer of the Navy. I had the most responsible position of anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. As aide for Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; as aide for Operations, which afterwards, as you know, became the Chief of Naval Operations; and of course you realize that the Navy is a very artificial product, and what we call its morale and spirit must be kept up. Otherwise they will not do what you want them to do in time of war. The morale of the Navy is its spirit.

Now, somewhat different from morale, and yet very close to it, is discipline. The question of discipline is as old as fighting. A great many people think discipline means a system of punishment, whereby if somebody does something wrong he is punished. That is one part of discipline, it is true; but that is a minor part of discipline. The major part of discipline is what the War College calls the indoctrination of the Navy, whereby the system of authority is almost venerated, so that a man instinctively salutes his superior officer, without hardly knowing him. He thinks his superior officer is much better than he is, and that spirit has always been found necessary. The subordination of the individual has always been found necessary.

Now, I do not think that the plan of the Secretary would help that out, but just the reverse. He insisted on a great many things being done against the advice of his aids; that is, to a degree; that is, incorporating a system of education among the enlisted men, an excellent idea, and an idea that had been carried out very carefully by us always; but it was carried out by the Secretary to a degree which I think almost every officer in the Navy thought was so great as to be very injurious indeed to the discipline.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way?

Admiral FISKE. By taking up the time of the enlisted men with work that was not along the line of their professional duties, and by making them do these things when they knew and all the officers knew that their immediately superior officers; that is, the officers of the Navy themselves, were opposed to. So the Secretary of the Navy put all the officers of the Navy on the defensive in that way, by making them carry out before the enlisted men duties which the enlisted men knew the officers did not think were wise, to the degree to which they were carried. There was a great deal of time taken up on board the ships with that. That was one instance of it. The attempt to democratize the Navy was made by Camil Pellaquin in France, with results that were very deplorable there. Camil Pellaquin was the Minister of Marine of the French Navy, and I know it is the consensus of opinion of everybody that has ever written about it at all that the influence of Camil Pellaquin on the French Navy was awful, was ruinous, and that the French Navy has never recovered from it. I have never heard it denied that to democratize the Navy is not to improve its morale, but I believe officers of the Navy think it is just the wrong way to do,

Now, the War College has been the central source from which we have been getting all our ideas about the Navy, as a whole, for many years, and that War College has imbued the Navy with what we call a certain indoctrination, which has been found to be a very fine thing for cooperation, whereby everybody knows what we ought to do, and he will do it even if he does not get orders to do it. It is the kind of spirit that was maintained among Nelson's captains. It is said they were a band of brothers, and that they would do a thing even if he did not tell them to do it. Any system which comes in between the operation of that principle and endeavors to decrease the feeling which enlisted men have for their officers, or the feeling which junior officers have for their superior officers, which is the result of attempted democratization, is bad. A Navy or an Army must be a very different organization from any commercial or other organization, and if it is going to be efficient it has got to be handled along lines which are not democratic.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee some specific cases of attempts to democratize the Navy that resulted in a breakdown of discipline?

Admiral FISKE. I think that attempt which I just spoke of, to insist that all this time should be taken up with the study of arithmetic, etc.—studies which are not professional—I think that the general feeling which existed in the Navy, on account of the attitude toward that and toward high officers had that effect. Of course there has been no mutiny, but the feeling all through the Navy is that the morale of the Navy, the loyalty, the regard which juniors had for their superiors, has not been increased, but the reverse.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what was the effect on your own personal affairs of your pushing this campaign for preparedness and your attempt to inaugurate the system of the Bureau of Naval Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Well, of course I had to get out. That was the first thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you had to get out of that position?

Admiral FISKE. Out of that position.

The CHAIRMAN. Out of that position.

Admiral FISKE. I had to resign. I was not told to resign, but I knew perfectly well that that was the idea, and the secretary so testified on April 3, 1916, that if I had not resigned myself I would have had to get out, that I would have been asked to resign. Of course, I had to give up the best position in the Navy, and I was not on duty except at the War College all the rest of my time on the active list.

The CHAIRMAN. You were never actually chief of the Bureau of Operations. You were aid for Operations, but had to resign from that when the other office was created?

Admiral FISKE. Yes. Of course the Secretary's remarks about me in his testimony of April 3, 1916, especially in regard to Admiral Dewey not wanting me on the General Board, and that I would have been asked to resign—of course that officially discredited me, put me in as bad a position officially as an officer could be put in, and I have heard in a number of ways that that impression got abroad. Possibly I can illustrate it by a story.

A waitress in my family was asked by a young man in New York, a beau of hers, whom she was working for. She said she was working in the family of Admiral Fiske, and this man said "Admiral Fiske? Oh, that is the guy Secretary Daniels had to get rid of in order to get the Navy prepared?" Well, things like that, and I was officially discredited, that was all. I lost my position and was officially discredited. I was put in the position of a man who had gotten to the highest position in the Navy and did not make good and had to be fired.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of Secretary Daniels's statement about Admiral Dewey not desiring that you be put upon the General Board. In your book, *From Midshipman to Rear Admiral*, I think you stated that Admiral Dewey denied that he made any such statement as that attributed to him by Secretary Daniels.

Admiral FISKE. Absolutely, and Admiral Dewey said that to other people, too. That is all right. Everything in that book is correct. I am willing to stand by it.

The CHAIRMAN. But the statement was made by the Secretary of the Navy that Admiral Dewey had recommended that you be not put upon the board.

Admiral FISKE. Yes. The statement of the Secretary of the Navy before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, April 3, 1916, is found on page 3824 of the hearings. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will.

Admiral FISKE. I read from page 3824 of the hearings before the House Naval Affairs Committee:

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, When Admiral Fiske was before the committee, he was asked if Admiral Dewey had recommended him for appointment to the General Board, and he stated that he had; and he was then asked if he was appointed, and he said that he was not. I will ask you to give the committee your statement with reference to that, and, if he was recommended, if anything subsequently took place, and why he was not appointed on the General Board.

Secretary DANIELS. I do not recollect the date, Mr. Chairman, but some time after Congress had created the office of Chief of Operations Admiral Dewey said to me one day that he would like to have Admiral Fiske to go on the General Board when he was relieved from Operations. I told him I would consider it:

Mr. TALBOTT. What did you say, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DANIELS. I told him I would think about it. Later Admiral Dewey requested me not to put Admiral Fiske on the General Board. He said he wanted a practical man; that Fiske was too theoretical; and I did not put him on.

The CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Dewey later denied that statement?

Admiral FISKE. In the most positive terms. As I state in my autobiography, Admiral Dewey, not at my solicitation at all and without my previous knowledge, asked the Secretary in my presence to have me retained on the General Board after I had been relieved, and the Secretary said he would do so. Very shortly after that—I think the next day, or at any rate before I left—I reminded the Secretary of that and said, "Shall I tell the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to make out my orders to the General Board?" Secretary Daniels said, "Yes." Then I went and told the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation that the Secretary said to make out my orders to the General Board. The next day or so I got my orders, but instead of being to the General Board they were to the War College in Newport. Then I went to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and I said, "I told you that the Secretary told me to tell you to make

"to the General Board," and he said, "Well, that is my order, Admiral." Of course, I was very much surprised. I had been on the General Board with Admiral Dewey. He had always given me a "perfect" mark every time on my report. I had been with him at the Battle of Manila. He used to go his way very frequently to speak to me very kindly about my work. I was doing as aid for Operations. So I was very surprised when that statement was made, and I heard from someone that Admiral Dewey was denying it. So I telephoned to the General Board one day, to Admiral Badger, and I asked him if it was true, and he said, "Well, you had better come down and see Admiral Dewey yourself."

I went down to the General Board and went into Admiral Dewey's room and he was there with his aid, Lieut. Commander Benson. Admiral Dewey jumped out of his chair and came over and said:

"What is it? I never said it. No communication passed between me and Benson while he was on the General Board except when you were present, and I asked him to keep you on the board."

"That is all of that, sir."

THE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you have stated in your testimony that it was unfortunate that in choosing a man for the chief of Naval Operations a graduate of the War College was not chosen.

Why did you make that statement?

THE WITNESS. The War College was established for the purpose of training officers in just that kind of thing, in the operations of the Navy as a whole. A man ordinarily in the Navy does not get that training. As an officer below the rank of captain of a ship he is engaged in various detail duties aboard the ship. As captain of a ship he has nothing to do except with the ship. His responsibility for the ship is not for any one man. The hardest job I ever saw was as captain of a battleship. The War College, and to a somewhat degree, the General Board, bring a man into contact with the Navy as a whole as distinguished from a part of the Navy; by going to the War College and studying there, a man gets an entirely new point of view. You do not see this ship or that ship, or that man, or this corps or that corps, or this rank or that rank. You see a great, magnificent machine, the most magnificent machine that there is, a very complicated machine, all the parts put together and in exact adjustment under the control of the man at the head of it. Now, unless a man goes to the War College and gets that point of view, I do not know of any other way in the Navy where he could get it. Now there were a number of men suggested to the Secretary to be chief of Naval Operations, and some of them had had that training; and so, when Capt. Benson was chosen, who had not had that training, I think he was at a disadvantage. At the conference for a short time, what they call a conference, it was not possible that he could have gotten the view of the Navy. A man ought to have to occupy the position at the head of the Navy. For instance, the War College was under him. The organization of the General Board is very similar, and I do not see how it would be possible for a man to occupy that position and fill it without a thorough understanding, unless he had had that training.

Capt. Benson was the captain of the *Utah* in my division, and he was a good captain. I gave him fine reports. He wanted at that time to be superintendent of the Naval Academy. He would have been a splendid man for superintendent of the Naval Academy. After he left the *Utah*, however, he went on duty as commandant of the Navy Yard at Philadelphia, and I think a better training for the position he occupied as the head of the entire naval operations would have been obtained in the War College and General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that he had any special qualifications for the office of chief of the Bureau of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; he was a fine man, a fine gentleman, a fine character, industrious, straightforward, careful, very conscientious, but it had not occurred to me that he was to be appointed, and when the Secretary appointed him as my successor I was surprised, because it had never occurred to me that he would be the man who would be appointed.

The CHAIRMAN. When you devised the system of the Bureau of Operations, when you recommended it, what sort of a man did you suppose would be placed at the head of the bureau?

Admiral FISKE. The kind of man I was speaking of. For instance, the man I would have picked myself, if I had had the selection, would have been Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, except at that time I believe he had not got the rank of rear admiral; but he was that kind of a man, a man who had had that experience. Rear Admiral Knight would have been a very good man. I suggested him. He was the actual president of the War College; but I did not really suggest Admiral Knight seriously, because I did not think the Secretary would appoint him—was quite sure he would not.

The CHAIRMAN. But one of the essential qualifications would be that the chief of the Bureau of Operations should be familiar with naval strategy?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, that would be the first thing.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the first thing.

Admiral FISKE. I should think so. I should think that would be the first qualification.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Benson had no such knowledge as far as you know?

X Admiral FISKE. I have never known of his taking any interest in that branch of the profession. I knew him quite well, and admired him very much in many ways, but that particular thing was a thing that, so far as I knew, he had never devoted any thought to.

The CHAIRMAN. As aide for operations I assume you had a very close connection with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, yes; very.

The CHAIRMAN. In matters other than this question of the Bureau of Operations did you find that the Secretary attended to all matters that you took up with him with promptness?

Admiral FISKE. Not as a rule. There were certain classes of questions or matters, matters of personnel, matters of individuals, this person or that or the other—he was always very much interested in the enlisted men, of which I was glad. Anything connected with that he was always ready to listen to and ready to act on.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the increase in the personnel?

Q. Fiske. Oh, no; not the increase of the personnel. The reason, as it seems to me, was that the Secretary was very much interested in the enlisted man himself, and in his well-being—I think he was unselfishly interested—and I admired him for it, because every man needs somebody to help him, no doubt about that. He tried continually to make the enlisted man think we were not his overlords to too great a degree. Any question, even any personal question, he was always very glad to answer. For he seemed to me to have a curious characteristic of regarding the Navy as a whole. That impressed me all the time. He was for a long while after he first came into the department full of chaplains occupied him a great deal. But even that much in regard to their connection with the Navy as the Navy itself, of course, was fine. But he never seemed to think of the Navy as a whole, and, as far as I could make it out, it has seemed to me that he was always absolutely convinced in his mind that there never would be any war.

Q. After a while that it was not a good thing to say anything about war. He did not seem to be ready to start on any subject connected with war at all. He approached the subject from a different point of view. To bring up a subject in connection with something like that, would secure his interest, but if you brought up anything in connection with the efficiency of the Navy in the war, why that was not good. We must avoid that. I gave up using the word war as much as I could; but of course when things became, as I thought, rather dangerous at the time when I got through this project of the Chief of Operations, by that time I had to come out and inform him that I could that he had to do something, that we would be attacked and I wrote him a letter which was dated November 9, 1902, originally written on November 5, which letter is in my book, Senator, in which I thought I went into the matter carefully and very clearly; but to answer your question, it is difficult as a rule to get him to take any action whatever. He was polite. He would listen to you with the most untiring patience. He was always courteous, and then he would usually say, "Speak to me about this to-morrow, or next

Q. Was that true of ordinary routine matters?

A. Fiske. No, not routine matters. About routine matters he was good. He had a fine memory and was very good at all sorts of that. He was very good at routine matters.

Q. But that was not true of any suggestion of any

A. Fiske. No, nothing which suggested the use of the Navy in anything like that; but if you would bring up any routine matter he would act on that at once, and he was very industrious, he never gave and never lost his temper, a very nice man to deal with.

Q. After you retired from the position of aid for operations how long were you in the service before you were retired?

A. Fiske. A little over a year.

Q. What were your duties during that time?

Admiral FISKE. I was supposed to be on duty at the War College, but I just was there. I had been aid for Operations, and there was not really much I could do. The people at the War College were engaged on their own War College work.

The CHAIRMAN. After we entered the war, on April 6, 1917, were your services utilized in any way during the war?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in any way?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that true of most of the retired rear admirals?

Admiral FISKE. I do not know about most of them, sir. Of course there were a great many on duty. I do not know what proportion they bore to the entire number. There were a great many, of course, that were on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. In your book you refer to a letter on the unpreparedness of the Navy, which letter was submitted to the Secretary. Can you tell me anything about that letter?

Admiral FISKE. You mean my individual letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. I submitted that letter to him and he read it and gave it back to me, and then I returned to my office; and the same officers were there who were there when I left to go into the Secretary's office, as I recollect—Lieut. Commanders Cronin and Capt. Smith. They were there when I returned, and I told them that the Secretary had read it and made no comment on it, and I said, "I will speak to him again about it," and I put it on my desk; but I thought about it later and then thought, "Well, there is no use in doing that. It will not do any good." So I simply filed it. The fact of that letter was known to a good many officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that letter?

Admiral FISKE. I have no copy here. It is in my book. I am sorry I haven't it here. I did not think to bring it here.

The CHAIRMAN. That letter is included in your book?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that letter inserted in the record.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

(The letter is as follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 9, 1914.

From: Aid for Operations.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: The Navy's unpreparedness for war.

1. I beg leave, respectfully but urgently, to request the attention of the Secretary to the fact that the United States Navy is unprepared for war.

2. It is true that the United States does not expect to get into war in the near future and is not preparing for war. It is true that nothing could be more unwise than for the country or the Navy itself to become nervous about the condition of war into which most of the civilized world has been plunged. It is true that there is no cause for excitement, and it is also true that even the most timid person can give no specific reason for anticipating war with any given country at any given time.

3. It is also true, however, that the mere absence of actual certainty of coming war is no reason for neglecting preparation. Some persons assume that a disposition to make preparation evidences a state of alarm in the mind of the person who proposes to make preparation. Yet such an assumption is entirely illogical. Wise men and wise nations show their wisdom in no better way than by taking wise precautions against possible dangers. The prevalence of smallpox induces wise people to guard

against it by vaccination. They do not expect to be attacked by small-pox, but they think it wise to take precautions against it.

In the position which I have occupied for more than a year and a half as the Secretary of the Navy, it has been my duty to keep myself posted as I have been able, of the condition of the various nations in relation to that condition upon us, the strength of our Navy compared with that of the degree of probability of our being dragged into war. The condition all over the world is one of general upheaval. The state of peace in which the great powers maintained for many years with great success is at last upset. A conflict is going on, very few results of which anything probably can be foretold, however. I mean that it can be foretold that the conflict will be violent and also will be long, involving other nations now taking part, and followed, even after the war at present ended, by a series of more or less violent readjustments of boundaries, treaties, and agreements of every kind.

I should be an optimist who would expect that a state of general peace would last more than five years. During the next five years we must expect a great deal of disagreement between this country and other countries, and between this Government and others; periods like that preceding the war, needing only a casualty like the blowing up of the *Maine* to precipitate it.

As your professional adviser, and in the opinion of every naval officer I have talked, the United States is in danger of being drawn into a war to be in danger for several years. And when I say war, I do not mean the kind that we had with Spain, but war with a great power, carried on with the same spirit and in the same wholesale manner as that which is now going on in Europe now. It is true that I can not specify the country with which war is most probable, nor the time, nor the cause. But my studies of wars and my observations of conditions at the present time, convince me that if a war during the next five years, it will be accomplished only by the exercise of high diplomatic skill and rare good fortune.

It is not wise to base all our hopes of national safety on such a frail foundation. It is not wise to close our eyes to the dangers that confront us? Would it not be wise to look the dangers clearly in the face and take reasonable precaution to meet them?

When I compare our Navy with the navies which we may have to meet in war, I find it is unprepared in three ways:

First, an insufficient number of officers and enlisted men. The number of officers can not be increased—that is, the number of suitable officers—because it takes a long time to get a midshipman through the academy and several years afterwards to get him ready for service. But the number of enlisted men can be increased, and very much so. It has been said that in time of war we could add to our enlisted personnel the Naval Reserve and the Naval Militia. To my mind, this is a visionary thing to rest upon. We have been working to get a Naval Reserve and a Naval Militia for more than 30 years, scores of expedients have been tried, but the result has been no naval reserves at all and less than 7,000 in the Naval Militia. Possibly we may do better with the Naval Reserve in the future, but only possibly, not probably. All reasonable expectation must be based, and must be based, on the experience of the past, and the past shows us that to place dependence on the Naval Militia and the Naval Reserve is to place dependence on hope, not reasonable expectation. The men who depend upon for naval work on board our ships are men who are trained on board our ships, and wear the naval uniform. If we would expect reasonably to get a Naval Reserve in the future, we must train that we want enlisted men right now. To man the ships in time of war we need 19,000 more men.

Second, in which I find our Navy unprepared is in departmental organization. The ships are well organized and pretty well drilled, the fleets are well organized and very well drilled, but the department itself is neither organized nor drilled in any way. Perhaps this is nobody's fault, and may be attributed to the fact that the Navy has never had to fight a serious enemy. Certainly, not in 100 years. The country have naturally devoted their energy along the lines of commerce, and have not been confronted with any obvious military danger. In my opinion there is an obvious military danger at present, and the Navy should be organized to meet it. The organization which other great powers employ to meet this danger is known in English, and in many other languages, by the name of "general staff." In different languages, of course, the words are dif-

ferent, but the meaning is the same. In Great Britain it is called the "Board of Admiralty." This general staff has as its first duty preparation for war, and as its second duty the conduct of war when war comes. In making preparation for war the general staff makes war plans. These war plans are of two kinds—general and specific. The general plans are simply analyses of what should be the general conduct of the Navy in case of war; and the specific plans are plans in which the general plans are worked out in detail. Besides these general and specific plans, however, the general staff devises means whereby information regarding these general and specific plans shall be given to the various executive bureaus and divisions, corrected up to date, and whereby the various executive bureaus and divisions shall always be compelled to be ready to carry the various parts of those plans into immediate effect.

12. In directing the conduct of a war, the general staff, under the direction of the minister, sees to it that all information is kept up to date and supplied to the various commanders, and that all machinery for carrying out their decisions is kept in working order.

13. Our Navy Department has no machinery for doing what a general staff does. The closest approach to it is the General Board, which, as part of its numerous duties "shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war," and "shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign," etc. The General Board does carry out these duties but the plans that it makes are general and elementary. It exists entirely as an advisory board to the Secretary of the Navy. It is highly valuable; but, as its name indicates, it is only a "general board." It does hardly 1 per cent of the duties that a general staff would do. Having no executive authority and no responsibility, and being called upon to do a great variety of work, it has not the time to prepare specific plans, and has no means to see that even its general plans are ever carried out. If we compare our General Board with the general staff of any other country or with the Admiralty of Great Britain and when we see what those general staffs have been accomplishing during the past three months, we must become convinced that unless we go on the theory that we shall always have peace we shall be whipped if we ever are brought into war with any one of the great naval powers of Europe or Asia. We shall be like the lawyer who has not prepared his case when pitted against the lawyer who has prepared his case. We shall be as the French were before the Germans in 1870.

14. The performance of the Germany Army during the last three months is the greatest triumph of the human mind and the human will that has ever been accomplished. It is not the triumph of one mind or one will but the triumph of several million minds and several million wills, coordinated by a general staff with a degree of perfection that the world has never before seen. This pace being set, any navy not provided with a general staff is a navy not provided with "the most modern improvements."

15. The third way in which I find our Navy deficient is in training. This deficiency in training is due not to lack of spirit or ability but to a combination of the two preceding causes; that is, to insufficient personnel and lack of departmental organization to which must be added lack of small ships. I mean that because we have had not enough small ships to do work on the coasts of Haiti, San Domingo, and Mexico, because our ships have been insufficiently manned and because the Navy Department has had no general staff which would devise and carry out a progressive system of training, lack of progressive training has resulted. When I say lack of progressive training I mean lack of training such as the Germans and other nations have. I mean lack of training that secures a high degree of skill. If we are forced into war with a navy like Germany's or England's or Japan's, our training should be at least as good as theirs, or, rather, our skill should be. It is impossible for me or for anybody to compare exactly the skill of our Navy with the skill of other navies; but, on the theory that cause produces effect, we must admit that we have not had nearly so good a system to produce skill as other navies have. The developing of skill in the navies and armies of the other great powers is carried out with a vigor and persistency that we can not approach, and has been directed by an organized intelligence that certainly has no superior and probably no equal in any other branch of human effort.

16. The subject of the improper organization of our Navy Department was exhaustively analyzed by the Moody Board and afterwards by the Swift Board in 1909. Certain recommendations were made to remedy the evils that they found. These recommendations have not been carried out. They were, in effect, to establish a general staff, though the words "general staff" were not used. In my opinion, the failure to adopt those recommendations was serious and will invite disaster if a great war comes.

B. A. FISKE.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you afterward informed that that letter was not filed with the department?

Admiral FISKE. Some time in April, 1916, the Senate asked for a copy of that letter and also asked for a copy of a letter which the General Board was supposed to have written on the outbreak of the European war, August 1, 1914.

In regard to this letter that you are speaking of I received a telephone message from the Secretary's aide asking if I had a copy of it as a copy could not be found in the files. I said yes. They asked me to send a copy, which I did. The Secretary had that letter copied and transmitted to the Senate, with a letter which is also in my book, saying that he had not seen it and expressing surprise that I should have had a letter put in the department files without his knowledge and without his having seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that letter put in the record also.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

(The letter is as follows:)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
NEWPORT, R. I., August 1, 1914.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Withdrawal of battleships to home yards.

In view of the immediate danger of a great war in Europe, and in pursuance of its duties as laid down in paragraph R 167 (1) of the Navy Regulations, the General Board earnestly urges that the battleships be brought home, docked and put in perfect readiness, with the exception of the ships actually necessary in Caribbean and Mexican waters.

(2) The present situation in Europe is absolutely without precedent; not only in the vast extent and variety of the interests involved, but in the suddenness with which it has developed.

(3) It is not clear at this moment that any interests of the United States are threatened. Yet it would be rash to assume that there may not emerge from the extraordinary situation in which so large a part of the world has become unexpectedly involved some incident or combination of incidents fraught with danger to our interests.

(4) Our commercial interests are closely interwoven with those of every one of the great powers which are apparently on the verge of war. Our trade routes pass through the waters of those powers and terminate in their ports. Our privileges and duties as neutrals may easily become matters of misunderstanding and controversy.

(5) There are said to be 300,000 United States citizens now in Europe. Many thousands of them are claimed by European powers as liable to military service, and those who find themselves abroad may at any moment be arrested and imprisoned. As bearing upon this point, the following quotation from a press dispatch of July 31, is pertinent:

"Other Americans whose safety promises to be a serious matter are now naturalized citizens passing between Europe and the United States. Efforts may be made by European belligerents to arrest such people because of their nativity, regardless of their naturalization."

Should incidents occur as are here forecast, they could hardly be ignored, and this is only one of the many difficulties that may arise in connection with the interests, personal and commercial, of American citizens residing or traveling abroad.

(6) Another press report from Copenhagen of the same date suggests another source of complications if the report is authentic. The report is as follows:

"A German squadron, cruising off Langeland in the Great Belt, is stopping all vessels to investigate their nationality and the destination of their cargoes."

There is so little American shipping engaged in foreign trade that such procedure in the locality mentioned is hardly likely to affect American vessels: but what has happened in one place may happen in another. The United States would hardly permit its merchant ships to be overhauled by foreign men-of-war when no actual state of war exists, and the spirit thus manifested by the German squadron might cause acts in violation after war has supervened.

(7) In the event of a general European war, it is probable that foreign shipping will endeavor to register under the United States flag. The shipping then needed adequately to supply the war requirements of European nations will be enormous. Many questions of neutrality, or alleged breaches of neutrality, may, in the irritable condition of public opinion at home and abroad, result in strained relations; and notwithstanding all efforts to the contrary, may further result in the embroilment of this country with some country or countries of Europe.

(8) Again, the merchants of the United States will certainly endeavor to supply immense quantities of munitions of war, arms, ammunition, fuel, food, and other warlike supplies, with the resulting accusation that the country has become a base from which war is supported against friendly nations in violation of its proclamation of neutrality.

(9) There are other possible complications: Belligerents always tend to overstep their powers in executing the right of search; disputes will arise over the definition of contraband; and accusations of unneutral service will be brought against the United States traders and foreigners doing business under the United States flag.

(10) A serious possibility for the United States connected with a great European war lies in the changes of sovereignty in possessions on or adjacent to the American Continent that may result from corresponding changes in sovereignty on the Continent of Europe. We can not forecast the eventualities of such a war. Many indications exist that Germany desires a foothold in American waters, and it is well known that she does not concur in the Monroe doctrine. If Great Britain is drawn into war the German fleet will be neutralized as far as any danger from it to our interests in the immediate future is concerned. If she is not, and if the end of the war should find Germany stronger than ever in her European position and with her fleet practically unimpaired, the temptation will be great to seize the opportunity for obtaining the position she covets on this side of the ocean. We should prepare now for the situation which would thus be created.

AUSTIN M. KNIGHT.

Admiral FISKE. Then I wrote to the Senate pointing out the position in which this put me; and then the American Defense Society in New York wrote the President and brought this matter up, and the President wrote the American Defense Society and said that Mr. Daniels had said that he might have seen the letter but had forgotten it. This is also in my book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is also in your book?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then have that put in the record, and all matters connected with that.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

(The extracts from Admiral Fiske's book are as follows:)

My diary says:

"December 16, 1914: I suggested to Hobson over phone this a. m. that if he wanted to get straight news about the Army, he would get committee to call for Chief of General Staff. Hobson answered, 'A word to the wise is sufficient,' so I got word to-night to appear before committee to-morrow."

I spent that evening in my office with Lieut. Commander Madison, who was the officer on duty there that evening. We discussed the subject of my testimony and collected some papers which I could use to refresh my memory. Madison and I agreed that the Navy could not be got into the same state of efficiency as the German Navy for many years. I told Madison that I wanted to bring out that point very strongly, and we discussed what number of years I should state as the time required, knowing, as we both did, that it was a matter of doubt whether the political influences in the United States would ever permit the Navy to be as efficient as the German, and realizing that even if the politicians should all stand aside and permit a general staff to be established, it would probably take that general staff at least 10 years to train itself and train the Navy. We finally decided that I should say that it would take at least five years to get the Navy ready to fight a navy like the German effectively.

My diary says:

"December 17, 1914: * * * I was before the committee at Hobson's request nearly all day to-day, and never received more courteous treatment and more attention in my life—much to my surprise. I certainly startled committee when I told them it would take five years to get ready. Congressman Roberts took me to lunch

in Capitol restaurant and I asked him to ask me how long it would take to get Navy ready for war, and I told him I would answer five years. Roberts took the hint."

The Washington evening papers published most of my testimony, and I got several congratulatory messages over the telephone that evening. The first message I received was from my old classmate and roommate Dorn, who said that my action was the most splendid thing that had been done by any naval officer since the Civil War.

On my walk down to the department the following morning numbers of Navy officers, and Army officers as well, came up to shake hands with me and thank me. I got to my office at 9 o'clock and found several officers waiting for me. All were most enthusiastic, and each one thanked me as if I had done him a personal favor. About a quarter after 9 the Secretary's messenger came in and said the Secretary wanted to see me. All the officers became grave at once, and some of them said, "He is going to fire you." They all seemed to think this, and I know I did. I expected to be sent to some distant place like Olongapo in the Philippines.

The entries in my diary during the remainder of December refer mainly to the congratulatory letters and messages that I continued to receive regarding my testimony, and also to my efforts to establish a general staff.

December 27, 1914, Sunday: Called on Hobson in afternoon and explained why a general staff is absolutely essential, if one is to have a Navy of maximum effectiveness; though it is not necessary if one is to have merely a Navy.

January 3, 1915, Sunday: Had long interview in afternoon with Hobson at his residence, in regard to general staff, etc. I took many documents with me, and Hobson became thoroughly interested. We concluded that it might be better not to attempt to get through legislation for any modification of aid system, because Secretary would say present aid system is adequate and that it might be better to propose a new scheme, whereby an addition would be made to present system and additional means be provided to accomplish preparation for war. So I asked Capts. Knapp, Hood, and Oliver, and Lieut. Commanders Cronan, Madison and Knox to be at Hobson's at 8.30 a. m. We all met there in Hobson's study, and sat till after 11 p. m., when we adjourned. We agreed on program whereby Chief of Naval Operations is to be legislated for and to have 15 assistants."

The entries under head of December 27 and January 3 give the outlines of a good deal of work that Hobson and I did on those days and in the intervening week. The plan which we drew up was drawn up in the light of my knowledge of strategical requirements and Hobson's knowledge of congressional requirements. When the six officers arrived that evening, they came secretly because they were engaged on an exceedingly dangerous mission. I had expected more or less objection on the part of some of them to certain features of the bill as drawn, but I found that every one of them was enthusiastically in favor of it. We eight men went over the whole subject very carefully, and when we finally came to an agreement, the original memorandum that Hobson and I had planned had been changed but little.

During the discussion that evening it happened occasionally that some one would speak of the power and authority which I would have if the bill should pass. Whenever anybody made such a remark as that, I told him that, if Congress should authorize a chief of naval operations, I was absolutely certain that I would not be the chief of naval operations. I told them that I was positive that the Secretary wanted to get rid of me, but could see no opportunity or give any reason for it, because he knew that I was performing my duties to the satisfaction of the Navy, including Admiral Dewey; but that if a new office was established by Congress, the Secretary then would be perfectly free to appoint any one whom he wished. I told the company that I was like the well-known gentleman who sawed off a branch of a tree at a point between himself and the branch, except that that man did not realize what he was doing, and I did.

January 4, 1915: The six officers who met at Hobson's last night met in my office at 8.30 a. m. and we drew up on neat typewritten page the proposition agreed on. Hobson came to my office at 10.15 and took up the matter with Secretary. Hobson told me later that Secretary declared that if the bill went through he would "go home." How foolish. Now he has the chance to back it up and get back into good opinion of the country. Hobson came to our apartment at 2.20 and told me subcommittee—of which Padgett is chairman—passed the proposition unanimously. Hobson asked me to get him a brief with which to argue matter before full committee January 5. So Madison, Cronan, Dudley, Knox, and I met in my office from 9 p. m. till 11.15 p. m. and drew up brief, which Knox will leave at Hobson's house at 9 a. m. to-morrow.

January 5, 1915: Papers give large space and headlines to action of subcommittee. Dewey is delighted, and told me I might tell Hobson, which I did at 10.30 a. m. by telephone.

"January 6, 1915: Hobson telephoned me at 1 p. m. that full House Naval Committee agreed unanimously on incorporating in naval appropriation bill the provisions for a 'Chief of Naval Operations.'"

With the exception of Admiral Dewey, Hobson, and the six other officers, nobody knew that I or any other naval officer had any connection with this measure.

"January 7, 1915: Evening papers last night and morning papers to-day confirm news that House Naval Committee unanimously agreed to incorporate in naval appropriation bill the provision, 'There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations.' * * * The New York papers give great space and comment (sympathetic) to establishment—Bureau of Operation. New York Tribune is especially favorable, and the World, the leading Democratic newspaper, gives the project its first column of first page, headed 'Fixed Naval Policy Assured.' It must hurt Mr. Daniels very much indeed to see the World taking a stand so antagonistic to him."

When the naval appropriation bill came up before the House, the provision for a chief of naval operations was stricken out on a point of order, on the motion by Mr. Mann. This did not surprise us because Hobson had said at the start that it was liable to this fate, being new legislation added to an appropriation bill. Hobson said that he thought he could get the Senate Naval Committee to put it back in the bill; he added, however, that this would give an opportunity for the Secretary to modify the provision by recommending certain changes in it, though he thought that the Secretary would not oppose a provision that had been agreed to by the full House committee.

Hobson's prediction was verified in toto. The provision, as finally incorporated in the bill by the Senate Naval Committee, was made to conform to the suggestion of the Secretary. In its amended form it was passed by both Houses. It established the office of Chief of Naval Operations in a form which, though it omitted the 15 assistants for making war plans which Hobson and I had suggested, accomplished, nevertheless, a greater advance than any other naval legislation had accomplished in many years. Most officers said that it was as great a boon to the Navy as the act of Congress in 1880, which authorized the "new Navy" in the shape of the steel ships *Chicago*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, and *Dolphin*.

On March 24 and 26, 1916, I testified again before the House Naval Committee and made the strongest argument I could in favor of putting back into the appropriation bill the provision for 15 assistants, for making war plans, which had been left out in 1914. The subcommittee of the Naval Committee agreed to do this. When the matter came up before the full Naval Committee, the committee divided half in half, most of the Republicans voting yes, and most of the Democrats no. As the subcommittee had recommended it, and the full committee had not rejected it, the full committee had to pass it, though half of them opposed it.

This is the organization by which the Navy Department handled the Navy throughout the war. The excellence of the system is now admitted by everybody, including the Secretary.

The appropriation bill, as finally passed, contained the provision for the 15 assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations that had been omitted from the previous bill after having been included in the original draft of the House Naval Committee in the session previous.

The language of the bill is:

"Hereafter the Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving as such Chief of Naval Operations, shall have the rank and title of admiral, to take rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and shall, while so serving as Chief of Operations, receive the pay of \$10,000 per annum and no allowances. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there shall be assigned for this exclusive duty no less than 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps."

"The office of Naval Operations with the 15 assistants "assigned for this exclusive duty" constitutes a general staff.

Before I gave my first testimony, the personal relations between the Secretary and me had been friendly and pleasant, though we disagreed entirely as to the desirability of getting the Navy ready for war. Our disagreement on this point was extremely trying to me, for the reason that I liked the Secretary so much as a man. I appreciated his kindness of heart and his delicate refinement. I admired his steadfast adherence to the principles of Christian conduct which he professed, and I was continually tempted to cease from urging him to undertake a course of conduct against which he was resolved. But I often told him that I was the only man in 90,000,000

people to hold before him the military side of the Navy, and that I felt it my duty to resist. He always told me that I was right in so doing, and for a long while I thought that I was gradually impressing him with our dangers.

But his report of December 1, 1914, dispelled all my illusions on that point. I saw that I had not impressed him at all, and that the disagreeable and dangerous duty devolved on me of endeavoring to impress Congress and the people. Hence my testimony.

Beginning with the morning after my testimony the Secretary's manner toward me changed entirely. He was always polite, but a cold formality took the place of warm cordiality; disapproval was intimated in every way, though never expressed in words. But my period of misery had passed. I knew that I had done right, and that my testimony as the official expert of the Navy Department had roused a powerful minority to a realization of the peril of the Nation.

As I walked out of the shady corridors of the department building into the bright sunshine of the town, I said to myself that I thought I had been able to prevent any very great lowering of the efficiency of the Navy, and that I had had the great privilege of being able to do five things which would be of permanent benefit to it. These were:

- (1) Establishing the Division of Aeronautics.
- (2) Instituting strategic war problems for the fleet.
- (3) Proving that the country trusts Army and Navy officers more than it trusts any one else.
- (4) Making Congress realize the needs of the Navy more clearly than it had ever done before.
- (5) Establishing the office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Besides these, there were three other undertakings which I had not yet brought to a successful issue, but which I felt sure were in such a state that it was only a matter of a short time before they, also, would be accomplished facts. These were:

- (1) The establishment of some agency under the department for recognizing and developing new inventions. This was accomplished in the following summer by the establishment of the Naval Consulting Board, with Mr. Edison at the head. This differed from my plan mainly in being composed of civilians exclusively. My idea had been to have a naval officer with inventive ability to be the head, in order to steer the efforts of the civilians along the most advantageous lines.

- (2) The recognition of the possibilities of the diving-shell.

- (3) The putting into effect of the administrative section of the general war plan. Much more than any other one thing the refusal of the Secretary to sign this plan was the cause of the differences between him and me. Let anyone imagine himself in my position, and realize how I must have felt in knowing that the department possessed no means of knowing its degree of readiness for war, and that it could not know it until a certain paper had been signed, and until the methods which that paper provided for had been in operation for a considerable time.

The administrative plan was signed shortly after I gave up my position to my successor. That plan and the office of Chief of Naval Operations are the means by which the Navy Department got ready for war, and by means of which it operated during the war and has operated since.

The virtue of these two schemes were realized immediately after they were put into operation. This is proved by the following extracts taken from page 7 of the official report of the Secretary, made in the following December, 1915:

"OPERATIONS—BETTER ORGANIZATION EFFECTED.

"Upon my recommendation the naval appropriation act of 1914 provided that 'there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations * * * who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.' * * * A well thought-out plan, prepared by the General Board, for the preparation of the fleet for war in the Atlantic has been approved, and each office and bureau under the department has been assigned its proper share in the general scheme of preparedness. By reference to periodic reports the department may at any time become informed of defects, of efforts made to overcome them, and of the progress made toward a complete state of readiness."

It was mainly (almost wholly) because I urged the two measures which the Secretary described and praises that I had to resign my position as aid for operations.

I was surprised that the Secretary should state that the provision for a Chief of Naval Operations was made upon his recommendation.

My diary says:

"April 3 (1916): Secretary testified to-day. Roasted me in the afternoon; said I was not in harmony with department, and that he would have asked me to resign, if I had not done so.

"April 4 (1916): The morning papers give considerable space to the Secretary's attack on me. I held conference in forenoon and evening with Admirals Schroeder, Wainwright, and Osterhaus at Schroeder's house. We agreed best thing is for me to write to Naval Committee, requesting permission to appear and refute Secretary's testimony."

It had always been the custom for the Secretary of the Navy to be the first to testify before the House Committee, but on this occasion the Secretary was the last.

The following account of the Secretary's testimony is taken from the New York Herald, on April 4:

"Just before the hearings on the naval bill came to a close before the House Committee on Naval Affairs to-day Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, took occasion to bring about a final airing of his personal differences with Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, United States Navy, one-time aid for operations. Mr. Daniels, in answer to questions propounded by Representative Lemuel P. Padgett, of Tennessee, chairman of the committee, tried to impress the committee with the fact that Rear Admiral Fiske, in criticising the situation in the Navy and its lack of preparedness, was moved by personal grievances rather than by higher motives.

"One of the causes of differences, the Secretary said, was his issuance of the order barring wine from the officers' mess. Rear Admiral Fiske, he stated, had protested against this. Then, to cap the climax, he said:

"'Rear Admiral Fiske told me that if the officers were deprived of their wine they could take to cocaine.'

"The Secretary then went on to give further details of his relations with the rear admiral.

"RAISES ISSUE OF VERACITY.

"In one instance a direct issue of veracity was raised. Rear Admiral Fiske told the committee that he acted as the personal messenger of the Secretary when he sent word that he desired the General Board to suppress its recommendations with respect to increased personnel of the Navy.

"To-day, Mr. Daniels said:

"'I never told the General Board to do anything in my life.'

"The Secretary's broadside at the officer all occurred in the last few minutes of the hearing.

"Mr. Daniels also contradicted in some degree the statement of Rear Admiral Fiske with regard to his failure to be appointed to the General Board. The Secretary said it was true that Admiral George Dewey had recommended the appointment of the officer to the board, but he had afterwards changed his mind, saying he thought Rear Admiral Fiske too 'theoretical' for this post and that a more practical man should be appointed to it.

"The thing the Secretary wanted to emphasize most, it appeared, was his contention that the rear admiral's troubles with the civilian head of the department arose long before the question of preparedness became acute; that when Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger was about to retire Rear Admiral Fiske importuned the Secretary 'a dozen times' that he be made commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet; that when it was suggested that Rear Admiral Fletcher, now Admiral, might be available for the appointment of commander of the fleet, Rear Admiral Fiske stated that he would not desire the place and would refuse it if it was offered to him; whereupon, according to Mr. Daniels, the Secretary wrote and offered the place to Rear Admiral Fletcher and he was glad to accept the appointment.

"Also, the Secretary explained that the real issue between himself and Rear Admiral Fiske was whether the Navy should be operated under the ideals of the Old World or of America.

"'He told me, not once, but five times,' said the Secretary, 'that if we did not follow the principle of militarism and put men at the head of the Navy whose fathers and grandfathers had been naval officers, we would never attain any degree of preparedness.'

"April 5, 1916: New York Sun and World say editorially I must reply to Secretary. Herald has editorial taking my side against Secretary of Navy. I must defend myself. Fortunately, that is easy."

After my meeting with Schroeder, Wainwright, and Osterhaus I prepared a letter to House Naval Committee. We had a meeting the following morning, April 5, at which

I read my letter to them. They suggested a few minor changes in it, which I made. At their suggestion I handed this personally to the secretary of the House Naval Committee.

My letter read as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 5, 1916.

TO the NAVAL COMMITTEE,

House of Representatives,

Hon. Lemuel P. Padgett, Chairman.

GENTLEMEN: Referring to my testimony given before the Naval Committee on March 24 and 26, to the testimony given on April 3 by the honorable Secretary of the Navy and the editorials in this morning's issue of the New York World, Sun, and Herald, I beg leave to request your attention to the fact that the testimony of the Secretary has cast a serious cloud on mine.

For this reason I respectfully request permission to appear before the committee to explain certain occurrences concerning which I fear that the Secretary's memory had led him to do me great injustice.

According to all the papers that I have seen, the Secretary said that I told him that if naval officers were deprived of their wine they would take cocaine. It is true that I tried to persuade the Secretary not to prohibit wine and beer; spirituous liquors had been forbidden by law for 50 years. My arguments were expressed in a closely typewritten letter to him, four pages long, dated May 27, 1914, and covered many points. It would be necessary to read this entire letter to get a correct idea of what I told the Secretary. I should like to show a copy of the letter to the committee.

I did not know that my letter caused any unpleasantness between the Secretary and me. It caused no unpleasant feeling on my part toward the Secretary, because I felt that he was acting according to his convictions.

In the matter of desiring to be commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, I did make application for the command. Such an application was perfectly proper, as I had served successfully in command of three divisions at different times and was then aid for operations, which many officers thought a more important position.

I wish an opportunity, however, to convince the committee that I did not tell the Secretary that Fletcher did not want the command: the Secretary's memory leads him into error there. What I did tell the Secretary was that Fletcher had told me some time before that he thought the natural thing to do when Admiral Badger gave up the command was to give it to me, make Fletcher aid for operations, and then make Fletcher commander in chief when I retired, Fletcher being 18 months younger than I and my junior in rank.

I find the following entry in my diary on the date of April 30, 1914:

"Secretary of the Navy, in accordance with my request, telegraphed Fletcher asking him if he would like to change places with me."

Fletcher was then in Mexico in command of the first division, which I had commanded a year and a half before; and Admiral Winslow, my junior, also a candidate for the position of commander in chief, was also in Mexico, in command of the special service squadron. It will be seen that at my request I was to leave Washington, give up altogether my position as aid for operations and take a much lower place—a subordinate position in the fleet in Mexico as commander of the first division. Surely this was not pressing my claims unduly, but rather the reverse.

I find an entry in my diary of May 1:

"Fletcher answered above dispatch, saying that he would not like to become aid for operations, as he wished to succeed the present commander in chief."

I was greatly surprised but Fletcher has explained to me since why he changed his mind. It is needless to state that Fletcher's reasons were perfectly satisfactory to me.

I find in my diary under date of June 15, 1914:

"Secretary of the Navy told me the accounts published in the morning papers were correct; that he is going to make Fletcher commander in chief. I told him I could make no objection, that I had continually praised Fletcher as a fine admiral and that he could make no mistake in making Fletcher commander in chief."

I have never had the slightest ill-feeling about this episode, and I have told everyone to whom I have talked about it that if I had been in the Secretary's place I would have appointed Fletcher because he had made good in important practical work in Mexico. For many years Fletcher and I have been close friends, and we are so still.

As to my telling the Secretary, not once but many times, that "if we did not put men at the head of the Navy whose fathers and grandfathers had been in the service, we would never be able to obtain any degree of preparedness," I have never entertained such ideas; my father was a clergyman, and not one of my paternal ancestors for more than 400 years had been in the Army or Navy. My maternal uncle was in

the Navy, but he was killed at the age of 18; and my maternal grandfather was an Army officer in his early days, but resigned and went into the lumber business.

I do not remember any other Army or Navy relatives, and I am not a militarist or a believer in caste. What I did tell the Secretary was that countries like Germany and Japan have aims and ideals different from ours; that in those countries every man is in a measure military, as his father and grandfather were before him, and that such nations naturally have a greater military spirit and a greater military ability than nations like ours.

Referring to that part of the Secretary's testimony that bears on my testimony that the Secretary directed the omission of a recommendation of 19,600 men from the General Board's report of December, 1914, I should like an opportunity to convince the committee of the correctness of my recollections by showing the entries made in my diary at the time.

Very respectfully,

B. A. FISKE,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

"April 6, 1916: Navy League has ordered 2,500 copies of my 'Naval Strategy' and asked me to read it before the convention next month, and has put my name on program to read it. Of course, I am forbidden to speak at all on preparedness. So some one else will have to read it.

"April 7 (1916): New York Herald, Times, Sun, Tribune, and American, also Washington Post (doubtless practically all big papers) have long scare-head accounts of my letter to House Naval Committee, quoting it almost in full. * * * Lots of letters from friends about it.

"April 8 (1916): I received Mr. Padgett's letter, saying Naval Committee would not call me, but I may send copy of my letter of May 27, 1914, expostulating about the Secretary's wine mess order and he will print it in the hearings. So I wrote to Secretary, asking for a copy of it and wrote Padgett, telling him I had done so. Lots of congratulatory letters from friends.

"April 11 (1916): Representative Gardner in his Navy League speech ended, 'Bradley Fiske, I salute you as our Arnold von Winkelreid.'

"April 12 (1916): At meeting of Navy League this a. m., Col. Thompson, the president of league read a letter from Secretary of the Navy declining to permit me to read my paper on 'Naval Strategy,' published in March-April Naval Institute. Col. Thompson made eloquent speech denouncing Secretary's act, and was followed by W. S. Stayton on same lines, but bitter. Stayton was followed by Henry Reuter Dahl, the artist, in really an oratorical outburst—at the conclusion of which all the audience rose and cheered me. Mayor Lewis of Forest City, Ill., read my paper. When he started, Stayton asked audience to act as if he were Admiral Fiske, and they got all up and cheered again. Very nerve-racking to me.

"April 13 (1916): Morning papers devote considerable space and headlines to demonstration of cheers and hisses at Navy League yesterday. Senate yesterday p. m. adopted unanimously a resolution proposed by Senator Lodge 'directing' Secretary of the Navy to send to Senate General Board's letter of August 3, 1914, urging getting Navy ready and my letter to Secretary of November 9, 1914, reporting Navy unprepared for war. Papers mention it.

"April 15 (1916): Received from department a letter inclosing a photo copy of my letter expostulating against using the wine mess order. Took it down to Naval Committee with a letter of transmittal from me, and handed it to the secretary of the committee."

This letter was very long, and analyzed the whole sobriety question as related to the Navy. It dealt also with the letter from the Surgeon General, which seemed to me an insult to Navy officers, because it represented them as being much less sober than the enlisted men. My letter pointed out also that whatever lapses from sobriety occurred, occurred in almost every case when on shore leave, away from the restrictions of naval life, so that the Secretary's order would not affect the real trouble. It also predicted that the issuing of the order would not decrease drunkenness. My information is that this prediction has been fulfilled. In the middle of paragraph 10 was the sentence, "Another effect would be an increased temptation to use cocaine and other drugs."

"April 17 (1916): Called on Admiral Dewey, and he stated in the most emphatic terms that the statement to House Naval Committee made by Secretary of the Navy in his recent testimony to the effect that Dewey had asked Secretary not to keep me on General Board, as he wanted a practical man and not a theoretical man, was utterly in error. Dewey also told me that he was telling this broadcast. Several officers had told me of this."

The statement of the Secretary as printed in the official report of his testimony was as follows:

"Later, Admiral Dewey requested me not to put Admiral Fiske on the General Board. He said he wanted a practical man; that Fiske was too theoretical; and I did not put him on."

This statement surprised me for the reason that I had served twice on the General Board and Admiral Dewey had given me the mark 4 (the perfect mark) on every semiannual efficiency report; and his request that I be retained on the board after being relieved as aid for operations, had been made without any suggestion from me. Furthermore, he had put my name in a short list of officers whom he had mentioned for "heroic conduct" at the Battle of Manila and had taken occasion many times while I was on the board to compliment me on my abilities and conduct. So I was not surprised when I heard that Admiral Dewey was denying the statement attributed to him.

Finally, after several officers had told me that Dewey was denying it, I went to his office to ask him face to face if he had done so. When he saw me coming in at the door he rose from his chair (in the presence of his aid, Lieut. Commander Le Breton) and advanced toward me with both hands outstretched, saying, "Fiske, I never said it: I never said it. No communication passed between the Secretary and me about your staying on the board except when you were present, and you heard me tell the Secretary that I wanted you to stay."

[Chapter XL.—Unpreparedness letter, letter of President, and retirement.]

"April 19 (1916): * * * Telephone message from Secretary's aid said my preparedness letter can not be found. I sent a copy, which was copied and returned.

"April 23: All the papers (I believe) print my unpreparedness letter practically in full. Secretary transmitted it to the Senate yesterday with a letter, etc."

The Secretary's letter read as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., April 21, 1916.

To the SENATE:

I am in receipt of the resolution adopted by the Senate on April 12, 1916, calling for—

(1) A communication, dated August 3, 1914, from the General Board of the Navy warning the Navy Department of the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness.

(2) A communication, dated November 9, 1914, from Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, senior advisor to the Secretary, warning the Navy Department of the unprepared state of the Navy.

Upon receipt of this resolution, diligent search was made in the files of the department for the communications desired. That dated November 9, 1914, from Rear Admiral Fiske, is appended hereto. The chief clerk was unable to find it in his files, it having been withdrawn by an officer who "looked it up several times but could not find it." However, the copy herewith transmitted was furnished the department by Admiral Fiske at my request.

This communication was not furnished me, and I did not know of its existence until long after it was written. I find upon inquiry that it was filed with the chief clerk, without my knowledge that it had been written. Although Rear Admiral Fiske was in my office daily, he did not tell me he had placed the communication on file. His article was written after the estimates for the Navy, as required by law, had been submitted, and I was left in ignorance of its existence, while Congress was considering legislation for the increase of the Navy and actually enacting legislation which has secured the best organization the Navy Department has enjoyed in its history. I was greatly surprised when I learned that a communication deemed important enough now to be the subject of a Senate resolution was not considered by its author of sufficient importance for him to present in person to me, instead of depositing it, without acquainting me of his action, in the files of the Navy Department.

We are unable to find any communication such as that described in the resolution, from the General Board under date of August 3, 1914, though our files contained a letter of two days previous not bearing upon the subject mentioned in your resolution. I therefore addressed the following letter to Admiral Dewey, president of the General Board:

[Secretary's letter to Dewey.]

"APRIL 17, 1916.

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL DEWEY: I am in receipt of a resolution from the Senate requesting me to send a communication dated August 3, 1914, from the General

Board of the Navy, warning the Navy Department of the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness.

"I have made a careful examination of the files of the Navy Department and have not been able to find any such communication. If the General Board has such a communication of that date, won't you please send me a copy?

"Sincerely yours,

"JOSEPHUS DANIELS

"Admiral GEORGE DEWEY,
"President of the General Board,
"Washington."

In response to this inquiry I received the following letter from Admiral Dewey

"OFFICE OF THE ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY,

"Washington, April 18, 1916.

"MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am in receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, asking me to send you a communication from the General Board, dated August 3, 1914, 'Warning the Navy Department of the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness.'

"There is no letter or recommendation from the General Board bearing the date of August 3, 1914. I find, however, that on August 1, 1914, a special meeting was called at the request of Rear Admiral Fiske, aid for operations, to consider the withdrawal of battleships from Mexican waters to their home yards. A letter adopted at this meeting and bearing its date was signed by Rear Admiral Knight, senior member present, a copy of which is forwarded herewith.

"You will note that this is a confidential communication, and as it bears intimately upon our policy with regard to certain foreign powers I do not think it advisable that it should be given to the public.

"Sincerely, yours,

"GEORGE DEWEY.

"Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
"Secretary of the Navy."

It will be noted that Admiral Dewey states the communication of August 1, 1914, "bears intimately upon our policy with regard to certain foreign powers," and that he does "not think it advisable that it should be given to the public." In view of this statement of Admiral Dewey and of the fact that the letter of August 1, 1914, does not refer to "the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness," as stated in the resolution adopted by your body, it does not appear to be in the public interest to transmit the confidential communication of the General Board of August 1, 1914. No other report from the General Board touching preparedness has been received, except those published as appendices to my reports and in my hearing before the House Committee on Naval Affairs.

Respectfully,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

The SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C.

"April 29 (1916): * * * Army and Navy Journal has editorial, 'Admiral Fiske and the Secretary,' saying a naval correspondent says so and so—recounting facts stated by him, showing I did show Secretary the unpreparedness letter."

From Washington, I returned to the War College. Then I wrote the following letter:

UNITED STATES NAVY, WAR COLLEGE.

Newport, R. I., April 29, 1916.

To the PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE:

1. In a communication to the Senate, dated April 21, 1916, transmitting a copy of a letter dated November 9, 1914, to the Navy Department from me as aid for operations, the Secretary of the Navy makes the following statement:

"This communication was not furnished me, and I did not know of its existence until long after it was written. I find upon inquiry that it was filed with the chief clerk, without my knowledge that it had been written. Although Rear Admiral Fiske was in my office daily, he did not tell me he had placed the communication on file. His article was written after the estimates for the Navy, as required by law, had been submitted; and I was left in ignorance of its existence, while Congress was considering legislation for the increase of the Navy, and actually enacting legislation which has secured the best organization the Navy Department has enjoyed in its history. I was greatly surprised when I learned that a communication deemed important enough

"The subject of a Senate resolution was not considered by its author of sufficient importance for him to present in person to me, instead of depositing it, without consideration of his action, in the files of the Navy Department."

... Secretary, while as a matter of fact, I was always scrupulously careful to not permit to receive, or to remain under, any mistaken impression, or to be ... important matter, if I could prevent it.

and appeared in the New York Herald and in many other papers on and injured my reputation for fair dealing.

I respectfully request permission to appear before such persons and state facts which I and other officers remember very clearly.

are noted in my diary, showing that there has been a lapse of memory on the Secretary's part. In particular, I wish to show the two following entries in my diary:

... I showed Secretary paper I had written to him, stating Navy is not needed more men more training, and a general staff. He made almost no comment on paper though he read it carefully. During conversation, Secretary said, early April, 1913, etc.

... I showed Assistant Secretary a copy of my letter to Secretary on ... of the Navy, lack of training, lack of general staff, etc. He said, it ... would keep it, etc."

It is pertinent to the fact that, although the copy of the letter sent to the President November 9, while the entry in my diary was November 5, yet, the enclosed shows that the contents of that letter were the same as the contents of November 9. My recollection is that I kept the letter on my desk intending to take up the matter again with the Secretary, but finally decided merely to file it, and that a fresh copy was made. The date was changed by inadvertence, but no changes were made in the letter except some verbal alterations. Certainly no change was made in the character of the letter.

- like to prove by my diary that this letter was merely the con-
- clusion of a great many oral conversations carried on frequently after the
- which I repeatedly urged on the Secretary the peril of the country and
- to form a general staff, and more progressive training

As a matter of fact, it seems to me that it was wise to grant this request. I then ask you, as a matter of fact, to give as much publicity as was given to the letter of the Secretary.

BRADLEY A. FISKE,
Rece. Advisor, United States Army.

Q. I would that the Secretary should state that "the letter of August 1, 1914, stated the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness" and that the letter should urge it, and it was my recollection that it did so. The entry in my diary under date of August 1, 1914, confirmed me in this. I did not think it proper to cite this in my letter, however, as it would be questioning the veracity of the Secretary.

...the newspapers say that Vice-President Marshall gave my letter
...to be what I did with it, that Lodge defended my action, and
...and Lodge.

As to the Senator Tillman read my letter in the Senate and
 I am convinced that disappointed ambition, our good Senator
 New York Sun and New York World have agreed to publish
 it in its entirety. World is particularly strong.

Yours very truly,
 Wm. B. E. R. I am very glad to get your piece
 and the rest of the material.

1. The report must be printed with appropriate headlines - all capital letters written in large letters.

2. The report must be typed on the President's letter paper - must be on the letter paper of the Secretary of Navy and no other.

[illegible]

New York March 1940

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Source: The American Historical Association, *Proceedings of the American Historical Association*, 1900, pp. 1-2.

... request from the United States Senate, the Secretary of the Navy
... a letter written on November 9, 1911, by Rear Admiral Bradle
... *then and for Operation.*

Secretary of the Navy has stated that his aid for Operations filed this letter with the chief clerk of the Navy Department and did not show it to the Secretary. Admiral Fiske states that he handed the letter to the Secretary of the Navy as the latter was standing at his desk in the Navy Department, and he read it carefully.

An issue of veracity has thus arisen between Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. President, we respectfully petition you, in fairness to your Secretary of the Navy and fairness to a gallant naval officer, not to allow this matter to remain uninvestigated.

Admiral Fiske graduated from the Naval Academy in 1874; he has given 40 years' service to his country. When he served as navigating officer of the *Petrel* at the Battle of Manila, he was cited by his captain for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle," and by Admiral Dewey for "heroic conduct." His series of inventions have done more than those of any other man to place the United States Navy in a preeminent position. His telescope sight has been adopted by every navy in the world and is chiefly responsible for the improvement that has taken place in the naval gunnery since 1898.

Admiral Fiske is recognized throughout the service as the logical successor to Admiral Mahan. His writings on naval strategy mark him as the leading strategist in the United States Navy. His record, therefore, is one of gallantry in battle, coupled with faithful attention to the less spectacular duties of a naval officer in time of peace. Never before has there been a blot on his record. To-day he stands accused by your Secretary of the Navy of negligence and untruthfulness, for if he filed his letter on the unpreparedness of the Navy with the chief clerk without showing it to the Secretary he was culpably negligent of duty. This, he says, he did not do. We earnestly request that, without delay, you will order an investigation.

Very respectfully, yours,

C. S. THOMPSON,
Chairman Executive Committee.

"May 16 (1916): New York Times and World have editorials insisting that 'question of veracity' between Secretary of Navy and me be investigated."

"May 24: The newspapers publish a letter from President Wilson to the American Defense Society in reply to their letter of May 14, in which President quotes a letter from Secretary of Navy, saying he accepted my statement that I had shown my unpreparedness letter to him and he had read it."

The letter of the President read as follows:

"THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., May 22, 1916.

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 12th of May. I referred it to the Secretary of the Navy, and he has furnished me the following memorandum:

"Some days ago, in response to a resolution of the Senate, I transmitted to that honorable body a copy of a communication written by Rear Admiral Fiske in November, 1914. In transmitting the letter I stated that I had not seen it and did not know that it had been filed until long after it was filed with the chief clerk.

"In a recent letter to the Senate Rear Admiral Fiske stated that my statement showed a 'lapse of memory,' because he had presented the letter to me and I had read it. I have no recollection that this paper was ever presented to me or of reading it.

"Inasmuch, however, as Admiral Fiske states that he did show it to me before it was filed I of course accept his statement. It was his custom while aid for operations to present to me scores of papers bearing upon all naval matters. It is utterly impossible for any Cabinet officer in the multiplicity of papers presented to him to recall all of them.

"I had talked with Rear Admiral Fiske several times about the subject matter of the communication, upon which I had rather fixed views. But I did not, when my letter was written to the Senate, and do not now, recall that he had at any time committed his views to paper, presented them to me, or placed them on file."

Inasmuch as the difference referred to in your letter between the Secretary of the Navy and Rear Admiral Fiske is merely one of recollection of an incident which occurred in November, 1914, and inasmuch as the Secretary says that, while he has no recollection of having read the communication by Rear Admiral Fiske, he is willing to accept the Admiral's statement, the matter does not seem to me to call for any comment.

Very truly, yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

"May 25 (1916): Letter from Dr. Graeme Hammond says no need for apprehension about Jo."

During the preceding two years my wife's health had caused me great anxiety. The physicians did not seem to be able to locate the cause of her distress; but finally they declared that her system indicated a nervous malady.

"June 2 (1916): Admiral Benson made adulatory speech at United States Naval Academy dinner Annapolis last night about Secretary of Navy and telling the fine things he and Secretary had been doing during past year. Unprofessional.

"June 11, Sunday: * * * Leave Newport for New York to-night and bid farewell to my naval life.

"June 13: Retired to-day, 62 years old. Had a wonderful ovation from American Defense Society in big room of Great Northern Hotel, hung with flags, etc., during which I was presented with a book by the society, my name on outside in gold letters, etc., letter read to me, etc. I made a speech in answer, and then several photographers and 'movie men' took pictures of us."

The letter from the American Defense Society read as follows:

AMERICAN DEFENSE SOCIETY,
303 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK,
Office of the Trustees.

DEAR ADMIRAL FISKE: With sincere pleasure we hand you this album containing extracts from the leading papers of the country which should be of particular interest to yourself.

To have been instrumental in having justice done in this public way to a gallant and distinguished officer of the United States Navy is a source of satisfaction to the American Defense Society.

And may we say in conclusion that your dignified and courteous bearing in the trying circumstances of an extremely unpleasant experience has won universal admiration, and has increased, if that is possible, the high regard and esteem in which you are held not only by the members of the American Defense Society, but by millions of your fellow countrymen.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. H. CORR,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

JUNE 13, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell, do you desire to ask any questions?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes, I have some questions.

On March 25, 1917, did you address a communication to the Secretary of War in which you made the following statement: "I beg leave to express the hope that I shall be permitted to proceed with this work, as I believe that I can do more good in this way than in any other way"—in connection with some convention?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did then, on March 25, ask to be allowed to remain on the work that you were doing?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. March 25, 1917?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, you seem to have disagreed with the Secretary of the Navy in regard to his efforts to democratize the Navy, and you refer only to one particular matter, that of trying to give the enlisted man some opportunity to get an education. You objected to that, did you?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; only to the degree to which he carried it.

Senator TRAMMELL. You spoke of it in a critical way.

Admiral FISKE. To the degree to which it was carried.

The CHAIRMAN. To what degree was it carried then?

Admiral FISKE. There were orders issued prescribing the amount of time in the forenoon and afternoon to be devoted to this instruc-

tion, and a system was put into operation which most of the officers of the Navy thought was out of proportion to the good to be obtained, considering all the other duties which the officers and men had to carry out.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you remember how much time they were allowed for study during each day or during the period of a week?

Admiral FISKE. No; I do not remember the details, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not know?

Admiral FISKE. I do not remember the details. I did at one time.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you remember any other efforts on his part to democratize the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I have not at hand any distinct policies, but in general the feeling that I had and that I think others had was that this attitude was not incorrect but that it was carried to an undue extreme. It is very hard now for officers of the Navy to maintain discipline, as it is. It is very difficult, the most difficult thing possible, and I think the feeling was throughout the service, Senator, that the looking out for the enlisted men was carried to a degree further than was consonant with our idea of discipline.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you can recall any particulars of his abuse of the principle of looking out for the enlisted personnel, I should like to have you recite it.

Admiral FISKE. I would not call it abuse in any case, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said he carried it to an extreme.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, to an extreme.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would call that an abuse if he carried it to an extreme.

Admiral FISKE. Of course, it is a matter of definition. My idea of "abuse" would almost carry with it the idea of intention. I certainly do not think there was any intention on his part to do anything wrong, but the feeling was, I think, that that part of the work of the Navy was given a prominence out of proportion to the rest, and that for that reason other things had to be overlooked.

Senator TRAMMELL. Can you give us some more facts as to his carrying it to an extreme—something definite?

Admiral FISKE. I can not give any facts that I know of my own knowledge, no; I can not state any absolute facts along that line, except the one I am speaking of now in regard to what we thought was undue importance attached to the comfort and education of the enlisted men.

Senator TRAMMELL. And you think that that interfered with the discipline?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; I think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am sorry you can not remember something about the educational opportunities that he wanted to give these men.

Admiral FISKE. For instance, he appointed an aid for education. Now, that officer had an office next to mine. The idea of the aids had been to coordinate the work of all the various different activities, which were quite different, one from another. The Bureau of Steam Engineering, for instance, had very different work from the Bureau of Ordnance, and very different from the Bureau of Navigation, and very different from the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

one of the aids was to coordinate these, so as to let the aid have four men to deal with, instead of a great number. Now, the aid for material had to coordinate what we call the material bureau. That was along the idea which has been in the Army and Navy, especially since they have got up to date. The aid for education had duties which were along a specific line as specific as that of the Bureau of Construction, or the Bureau of Ordnance, or any other. It was not at all the work of an aid who has been accustomed to consider an aid, and as a matter of fact the aid for education did not as a rule take part in the councils of the department. His work was otherwise; but nevertheless, he gave to the man who had this position of aid for education, the same rank in the Navy Department as that for instance for the aid for material or the aid for personnel. I think that gives an exaggerated form that we thought his ideas of the education of the enlisted man took. I think that is an illustration of what

MR. TRAMMELL. Along back during those times did you not experience difficulty in getting enlistments to fill up your authorized personnel?

MR. FISKE. I will have to answer that question, Senator, by saying we were having no more difficulty than navies always have getting men. We always would eventually get them, but a new excess has been appropriated for it has always taken a length of time to get the men enlisted. Of course, I was the aid for personnel, but my recollection is that there was no great trouble. It took a little time to get them. I would not say it was a trouble.

MR. TRAMMELL. Don't you think that the fact that the men were considering entering the Navy knew that the enlisted personnel were given a good deal of consideration would encourage that going into the Navy?

MR. FISKE. I do, absolutely. I think that was a good thing to have that idea. I think that part of it was good.

MR. TRAMMELL. The idea of doing something for the enlisted men would not do any particular harm in keeping the Navy up to strength, would it?

MR. FISKE. No; that was a fine idea, only carried too far, that one of the members of the Council of Aides, the Aide for Education, will testify to-morrow, I think, and he had more experience in training the personnel than anybody else in the Navy. He was in favor of it, but we all thought it was carried too far, it was an extreme.

MR. TRAMMELL. Since you have entered into a discussion of equalizing of the Navy, I just want to get a little information. Are there any regulations of the Navy that forbid an enlisted man of the Navy from sitting at the same table with an officer in a dining place?

MR. FISKE. I trust not. I do not know of any. There was a man in the Army who was court-martialed, you may remember, a few years ago, up in Connecticut, for making an enlisted man happen to sit alongside of him in the theater get out. He was court-martialed and came very near being dismissed from service.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am glad that is not the custom, then, in the Navy. No such conditions exist in the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. Not that I know of. Would you mind repeating your question, Senator?

Senator TRAMMELL. My first question was, is there any regulation or custom that forbids an enlisted man in the Navy from sitting at the same table with an officer in a public eating place?

Admiral FISKE. Not that I know of, and I should be very sorry if there were any.

Senator TRAMMELL. Our views, then, on that are in harmony. Now, this plan that was adopted for the operations, was that along the lines that were recommended by you? I mean as finally adopted by Congress.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; with the change which I specified.

Senator TRAMMELL. You stated in your testimony, I think, that it was adopted in appearance, but not in substance.

Admiral FISKE. The recommendation as regards the exclusive duty, yes. In my testimony of March 24, 1916, I pointed out the advisability and the great value of having at least 15 officers put back, and I went into that at great length. It was finally put into the bill, and I thought for a long while that it was put in as I had suggested; but, as a matter of fact, instead of being for the exclusive duty of making war plans, it said for the exclusive duty of assisting the Chief of Naval Operations in his duties. His duties, of course, were multifarious, so they were not ordered for the exclusive duty of making war plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. The plan you originally suggested was that something on the order of the British Admiralty?

Admiral FISKE. Somewhat, but yet quite different.

Senator TRAMMELL. Along that line?

Admiral FISKE. The idea, Senator, was that war plans were very important things. Now, I had known Mr. Hobson for years, knew him when he was a young man. He is a graduate of the Naval Academy, graduated at the head of his class, a very brilliant man. I convinced Mr. Hobson of the desirability of having some legislation whereby no matter who was Secretary of the Navy, leaving out his personality altogether, there should be a machine made whereby a naval officer should be made responsible, just as the captain of a ship is responsible. The captain of the ship is held responsible for results. And the way this was framed was that the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible for the readiness of the Navy.

Admiral Mayo testified yesterday, as I see in the papers to-day, that the Chief of Naval Operations did not now have, under the law, the responsibility and power which he ought to have in order to be sure that the Navy would not, from any accident of any kind whatever lapse into unpreparedness, and that was explained to the House committee by me, and the House Committee on Naval Affairs made a very positive recommendation after long and mature deliberation.

Senator TRAMMELL. You are referring to Hobson, of *Merrimac* fame, and later a Member of Congress, are you?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time that you recommended additional enlisted men, do you know whether or not along about the same time the Secretary made a recommendation of some 14,000 or 15,000 additional enlisted men?

Admiral FISKE. I do not remember that. What date was that?

Senator TRAMMEL. I think it was probably in 1916.

Admiral FISKE. I am, of course, referring to the fall of 1914.

Senator TRAMMEL. This was within a few months, I think, after you stated that you had recommended 20,000 men.

Admiral FISKE. Of course, this recommendation was for adoption by the House. It was a recommendation to the Congress that met in December, 1914.

Senator TRAMMEL. You do not know what recommendation, if any, the Secretary made in regard to increasing the enlisted personnel at that time, and along about the same time that you were making that recommendation?

Admiral FISKE. The Secretary did not incorporate any general recommendation in his report. I do not remember the statement.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not remember what number he recommended, if any at all, about the same time you were asking for 20,000 men?

Admiral FISKE. Nineteen thousand six hundred.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I do not think, Senator, that he recommended any. I do not think he did. That would be in December, 1914.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did Admiral Benson, as chief of operations, call to his assistance officers who had been in the War College, or not? Do you know whether any of them were men who had been in the War College?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Some of his assistants had been in the War College?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, yes; very good men.

Senator TRAMMELL. On page 530 of your book I find the following quotation:

We did not have even a general staff, and the only man in the United States Navy who could remotely pretend to occupy the position of a naval strategist was myself. I occupied that position simply because I occupied the position of military adviser to the Secretary. I knew I was not fitted by training or experience for such a position, but I had had as much training and experience as anybody else in the Navy.

According to that statement you did not consider that yourself or anybody else was particularly qualified for the position of naval strategist at that time?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; I did not. In fact I was sure of it.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral FISKE. When I became aid for operations, in February, 1913.

Senator TRAMMELL. Prior to the time you went into the Navy Department in 1913. they had no chief of operations, or anything of the kind?

Admiral FISKE. They had the aid for operations.

Senator TRAMMELL. They just had the aid for operations?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. That had been the former plan?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. And your idea was that the plan which had been in effect all along prior to 1913 should be changed, in accordance

with the testimony you have given here to-day? That is, I mean you thought it should be changed according to your suggestions?

Admiral FISKE. Yes. The aid submitted was put into operation after many years of trial to have something of that kind brought about by many of the officers of the Navy, at the head of whom was Admiral Luce, and Admiral Mahan; and many others, but Luce and Mahan were the principal ones; and two boards had been appointed to consider what should be done.

As a matter of fact, nothing was done for a long time. The situation was that these various bureaus were established by law as advisers to the Secretary. Now, that system had worked pretty well when the Navy was small, when there were only a few ships, and when the mechanism of the ships was simple, and the whole machine was of a simple character; but as time went on, and armies and navies became more complex, and especially after the German victory in 1870, and they saw what a machine the military people of Germany had been about, then everybody else had to do something about it or keep out of war, or get licked; so that Admiral Luce, and afterwards Admiral Mahan and others, tried to have something brought about by which the difficulty could be overcome in a measure.

We realized we could not get any general staff, for the reason that the words "general staff" were entirely misunderstood. The idea had gotten abroad, and was in Congress, that a general staff was—well, they had different ideas. None of them knew what it was, but they thought that it was something awful; that it was something whereby the Navy or the Army could go off by itself, and they could raise Cain with the country, and so forth. But all that the general staff was, it was the same thing you have in every newspaper or any other commercial organization, everywhere; you have a man who does the same thing for you, who acts as your secretary, who finds out about different things and collects information for you so as to present the question to you in a simple form. Of course, we had to have a large staff, and to have it highly trained. We were afraid to call it a general staff, because we knew we could not get it and could not get anything through Congress for anything like it, so that Mr. Myer got up this scheme, which is almost identical with the scheme proposed by those boards, whereby four men, officers, for instance, would coordinate the various bureaus. For instance, one bureau would coordinate for the material bureaus.

Now, Mr. Myer did not think—I talked about it several times with him—and nobody thought, that that was final. All he wanted to do was to take that step.

The next step Mr. Myer wanted to take was to get that legalized by Congress, and he tried to do it, and he went out and could not do it. They would not legalize it.

Now, when I came into the job—excuse me, I should say the position—here, of aid for operations, especially after the experience in the Mexican War, I thought that the machinery was wholly inadequate to handle the situation even in that Mexican trouble; that we needed more men, needed more clerks and more everything, and especially we needed something to start on; we needed war plans and needed men to get war plans started. That was the main thing, to get war plans; to get some line of action lined out in advance, so that when you are up against war, you have something to go on.

I suppose you may have heard the story—I do not know whether it is true or not—but when France declared war against Germany in 1870 the news came to Berlin where Moltke was asleep, and they awakened him with the news, and he said, “You will find the plan in the top drawer,” and then turned over and went to sleep. That is what we wanted—something like that—because it was just as in the early days out West, the man who got his gun out first was the man that had the drop on the other. That was all we wanted; so that that was the reason I wanted it, not so much changed, but amplified.

Senator TRAMMELL. You found this condition when you entered the department in the early part of 1913, prior to the induction into office of Secretary Daniels, such that you thought there ought to be a good many changes made in the Navy Department; and that was prior to his induction into office?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, in the sense that I felt that the system of aids should be extended and more of a machine there to handle the work. But of course I thought that the aid system was very much better than anything that had gone before.

Senator TRAMMELL. You thought that the plan suggested by you would be an improvement over that?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course if you had not, you would not have suggested it. I do not think I have any further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your book on page 530, that the fact was that, fit or unfit, you were the official strategist of the Navy, and that you were not fitted by training or experience for that position. Does that mean that you were not in any way familiar with naval strategy?

Admiral FISKE. It means that I was not sufficiently familiar with it. My training had been inadequate for such a position as that.

The CHAIRMAN. And also the training of every other officer in the Navy had been inadequate?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you acting as aid for operations before Admiral Benson was made Chief of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Two years and three months.

The CHAIRMAN. During that two years and three months you spent a good deal of time studying naval strategy?

Admiral FISKE. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. So that by the time the bureau was created and the chief was appointed, you probably were better up on naval strategy than any other officer in the Navy? You had had some experience?

Admiral FISKE. Well, I ought to have been, Senator, by that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose duty was it to prepare a war plan? Was it entirely the duty of the bureau of operations or did the general board have any duty in it?

Admiral FISKE. You mean when I was in operations?

The CHAIRMAN. No, later on.

Admiral FISKE. The General Board is really under the office of Naval Operations, in fact, and in a sense the General Board was under me as aid for operations. Of course Admiral Dewey was at

that time the head of that board, but Admiral Dewey at that time did not do very much work in connection with the board. Of course he was the head of the board and we all almost idolized him, and anything he wanted, if possible, we would do; but he did not take part actively in the deliberations of the board and the making of war plans was a part of the General Board, but I consider myself responsible for it the same as if I had been on the General Board in charge of war plans. Admiral Wainwright held me responsible the same way, when I was aide for operations, I was responsible for; but the General Board was responsible for war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the responsibility under the plan that is now in existence in the Navy lies with the Bureau of Operations and the war plan?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; but as I pointed out, the word "responsible" is not in the law. It says it is charged with the preparation of war plans. Now, you may think that is a fine point. I suppose so, but I wish to call attention to the phraseology, nevertheless. The word "Responsible" is not there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Admiral FISKE. May I tell the Chief of Naval Operations that we may go home?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Thereupon, the subcommittee, at 12.20 p. m. adjourned tomorrow, Thursday, April 1, 1920.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE.

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building. Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fullam, will you take the stand and be sworn?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL W. F. FULLAM (RETIRED).

The witness was sworn by the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you state to the committee what positions you occupied in the Navy from the time of the beginning of the World War up to the present time, and will you also give the committee any information that you have about the preparation and conduct of naval activities during the war and before the war?

Admiral FULLAM. In 1915 I was ordered to command the Pacific Reserve Fleet, and I remained in command of the Pacific reserve forces from that time until the beginning of the war.

When the war began, the commander in chief of the Pacific was sent to the Atlantic with a part of the ships, and I remained in the Pacific as commander of the forces that were held there, and I retained that command throughout the war and until the 1st of August, 1919, coordinating with the Japanese and the British forces in patrolling the whole Pacific from Alaska to the Cape, my part particularly being the patrol from Alaska to the canal, but the Japanese and English commanders reporting to me their movements, as I was the senior officer in the Pacific, and I informing them constantly of the disposition and movements of my ships in order that we might all check German activities and rascalities over the whole Pacific.

Those were my duties, sir, from 1915 until I retired, practically, in 1919; and previous to that from 1913 to 1914—in February—I was one of the aids of the Secretary of the Navy at the Navy Department. In that way I was brought in touch with the administrative function of the Navy Department and with the trend of its policy, and kept in touch constantly until almost the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what the committee wanted to know.

Admiral FULLAM. I prepared a file to cover this subject, sir, and they are mostly personal letters, because I found from a year's experience at the Navy Department that official letters sometimes

were less effective than personal letters, particularly when the personal letters were written to officers with whom I was intimately acquainted, and whom I hoped I might support and encourage to help me in the work we all felt it was my duty to perform; and this file I submit, if the committee wishes it. Many of these letters are not in——

The CHAIRMAN. Are they letters to which you are about to refer in your statement?

Admiral FULLAM. Some of them I will refer to indirectly, but some of them I have in the file that I will read. Others, in addition to those, are filed here, if the committee wishes to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that where you refer to a letter in the file and do not give the letter in full in your statement, the letter had best go into the record. Of course letters that you give in full in your statement will not have to go in a second time.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those to which you make no reference, there is no necessity of filing, is there?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral FULLAM. I think we can decide that as we go on, sir.

Referring to this discussion as to the naval preparedness in the Pacific from 1915 to 1918, this file shows that immediately upon taking command of the Pacific Reserve Fleet on the 15th of October, 1918, I began to recommend, and to work with the idea of getting the Reserve Fleet ready for war.

The correspondence will show that I had a constant struggle to get anything really done by the Navy Department as regards a definite policy, and as regards the personnel needed to man these vessels. The letters tell the story and indicate the reasons for the vessels not being manned when war was declared.

My caustic letter of September 14, 1916, summed up the condition as to material and showed that if something was not done to co-ordinate all the bureaus and make them all get busy, the ships never would be ready.

This letter of mine awakened the department and brought about the order dated September 30, which made it possible to get a start on the repairs needed to put the material of these ships in a condition for war.

No legislation concerning personnel was advocated or pushed by the Navy Department except by Admiral Palmer who did his utmost, but whose hands were tied.

It will be noted that on October 19, 1917, about 6 months after war was declared the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the work done in getting these ships ready for war and testified as to the thoroughness of the work. I will read that letter now. (Reading):

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., October 19, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet, upon detachment.

Reference (a): Report of commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet, RLW/M, June 1, 1917.

1. Reference (a) has just reached the department, having been delayed in transmission to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

2. The department notes the energetic measures taken by the Pacific Reserve force prior to 1 June to make the vessels of the then Reserve force ready for war conditions.

... silent performance of these vessels since the mobilization of naval forces and the thoroughness of the preparatory work done by the Reserve force and ... desire to extend its commendation to all concerned.

W. S. BENSON.

... copies of that letter to all the officers who had been in command, and who had most zealously and faithfully ... in the effort to get these ships ready for battle from 1913, until the war began.

... battle fleet been required to act as a fleet in actual war ... these armored cruisers and other vessels originally in the Reserve Fleet would have been vitally necessary as scouts ... vessels in any naval engagement. They were about ... we had to act as eyes for the fleet. Without them ... fleet would have been practically blind, inasmuch as we ... cruisers, no modern scout cruisers, and too few de-

... the letters in this file are personal. Admiral Benson ... associate, and Blue, Palmer, Chase, Pratt, McKean, Laning, ... Taylor, Strauss, Earle, all of them chiefs or assistants in ... had been instructed by me when they were midship- ... Naval Academy. I was personally fond of all of these ... for this reason I could write to them forcefully and with ... expression.

... to testify to the high character, zeal, and ability of all of ... and to the belief that every one of them wished to pre- ... Navy for war and did their best to that end. But their ... They were helpless, for the simple reason that it ... the policy of the Navy Department to actively prepare, or ... preparations for war during the years between 1913 ... 1917. As a result of this policy of indifference the Navy ... ready for war in any respect organization, material, or ... This was not the fault of naval officers or chiefs of bu- ... They all did their duty.

... United States escaped disaster, as usual, in spite of its unpre- ... simply because the German and Austrian fleets were both ... with the exception of submarines, before we entered the ... because all maritime nations joined the Allies instead of ... themselves with the Central Powers.

Mar. 12, 1915, I officially requested orders to sea duty in the ... and on October 15, 1915, in obedience to orders, I took com- ... of the Pacific Reserve Fleet, which at this time comprises six ... cruisers, five of the largest and fastest protected cruisers in ... and a few smaller vessels.

... the exception of the *South Dakota* (flagship), *Milwaukee*, and ... which were anchored in San Francisco Bay in connection with ... these vessels were all at Bremerton and other stations ... elements of officers and men so small that they could not

... being no modern battle cruisers or scout cruisers and few ... destroyers in our Navy in 1915, the Pacific Reserve Fleet ... nearly two-thirds of the vessels which were available in ... of war for scouting and screening duty in connection with ... The importance of scouts, screening vessels, and fast light

cruisers was manifest to anybody who had an intelligent conception of the most fundamental principles of naval warfare. It was that without such vessels, properly manned and in condition to run at their maximum speed, the fleet would be practically blind and for this reason be imperiled, or at a great disadvantage in meeting a hostile fleet properly manned and organized. This weakness was the most serious, and the condition was aggravated by the fact that the Navy had a very small and wholly inadequate air service available for scouting duty, owing to the failure of the Navy Department to supply such a force even after the vital importance of the subject had been brought to the attention of the Secretary and earnestly emphasized by Admiral Fiske in my presence in 1913, when I was on duty as one of the aids to the Secretary of the Navy.

In view of this situation, it was manifestly my paramount duty to get the reserve ships away from the docks and make them ready for the important work that would inevitably be forced upon them. I had no orders or instructions to do this, but I did it of my own accord.

In further explanation of my policy and action, and to make plain my reasons for persistence as shown by me in the remarkable series of letters hereto attached, it is proper for me to emphasize the following points:

(a) I was convinced that we would be forced into the war for reasons well stated in Admiral Fiske's prophetic letter to the Secretary of November, 1914.

(b) I knew that the Navy was fatally short of men. The General Board, in 1914, had recommended 19,000 additional men, and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt had received a statement from the Bureau of Navigation that 18,000 men were actually needed to man the Navy.

(c) Notwithstanding this condition, the Navy Department failed to advocate an adequate enlisted force in 1915. It advocated a certain number of men, as I recall, but not more than half, if half of the number recommended by the General Board and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt. The constant addition of new ships increased the shortage. In this connection it is proper to state that, subsequently, in 1916, Admiral Fletcher stated that he needed 5,000 additional men in the Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral Knight, president of the War College, urged the House Naval Committee to increase the Navy by 25,000 men. That was in 1916.

(d) Furthermore, the necessity for the maximum effort by naval officers to secure preparedness was made perfectly plain to me by one year's experience in the Navy Department, February, 1913, to February, 1914, during which time the preparation of efficiency reports for the Navy for war appeared to be the last thing considered, notwithstanding the constant but vain attempts of Admiral Fiske to secure attention to vitally important measures as regards organization, personnel, material, guns, torpedoes, mines, and particularly aviation.

To my knowledge, he forgot nothing, sir.

With the exception of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the General Board nobody gave a willing ear to the seriousness of the situation and the Navy Department proper was exclusively busy with a routine of peace, totally indifferent to the possibility of a state of war being forced upon us.

(c) The gravity of the situation was increased in the summer of 1915, possibly before that, by the practical wrecking of the aid system of organization which was designed, intelligently, to coordinate the bureaus without in any manner interfering with their interior organization. This system had been adopted as a result of the report of the Mahan-Moody Commission as confirmed by the Swift Board. I happened to be the secretary of that commission, sir, and to know all about its work. The following were the members of that commission:

Mr. Justice Moody, of the Supreme Court, formerly Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Paul Morton, formerly Secretary of the Navy.

Judge Dayton, of West Virginia, who had served many years on the Naval Committee of the House.

Rear Admiral Evans, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

Rear Admiral Luce, founder of and first president of the War College, and recognized authority on naval organization, strategy, and tactics.

Rear Admiral Folger, formerly Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

Rear Admiral Cowles, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment; and last but first in knowledge of the subject.

Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan, the greatest authority on naval organization and strategy in this or any other country.

It is doubtful if a commission of more competent men was ever convened to consider and report upon an important administrative question. It so happened that I had served as secretary of the Mahan Commission in 1908 and was thoroughly familiar with its proceedings and with the opinions of Admiral Mahan, whose ideas dominated the commission in its work. The admiral was at the head of the subcommittee that formulated the aid system; he believed in it absolutely as the only solution of the problem; he sought simply to coordinate and group the bureaus, the general board, and other agencies in such a manner as to secure proper control and intelligent concerted action without wrecking any existing element and without in the slightest degree diminishing the power or authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

On the contrary, the ultimate and constant authority of the Secretary was loyally and clearly recognized, and the Admiral stated in one sentence the invulnerable principle that: "The Navy Department should be so organized that it could pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar in the machinery." This principle, so absolutely necessary to naval efficiency and preparedness, was violated by the wrecking of the aid system advocated by Admiral Mahan. The present Office of Naval Operations, the one and only modern and effective feature of our naval organization--and let me say right here that it is a splendid feature, recognized by all naval officers as being a splendid feature--resulted from a bill formulated by Admiral Fiske and the Hon. Richmond Pearson Hobson. Their scheme was, however, somewhat modified and injured thereby, in that the Chief of Operations is not given sufficient authority, or does not use sufficient authority to properly control and coordinate the bureaus, leaving the latter to work more or less independently, with no head and no well-defined policy. This fault was clearly

demonstrated in my vain attempt to get the Pacific Reserve Fleet ready for war, and this fact will be made plain in the correspondence hereto attached. It will be seen that Mahan's principle, "The Navy Department should be so organized that it can pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar in the machinery," was ignored, and that it was necessary to continuously jar every cog of the departmental machinery in order to get results in preparing our Navy for war or in operating it for several months after war was declared.

Five days after taking command at San Francisco I took the first step toward getting the reserve fleet away from the docks and preparing them for active service by writing the two letters following. I will read only a few paragraphs of each [reading]:

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,

San Francisco, Calif., October 20, 1915.

MY DEAR BENSON: I am sending you a copy of a letter just written to the Navy Department concerning the detail of apprentice seamen from the training station to the ships of the reserve fleet. This letter explains itself.

I am most anxious to keep these ships in good condition so that they may be ready when needed in the active fleet. The apprentices may be utilized for many duties that will relieve other men whose services are needed on board these ships, which are so shorthanded that the task of keeping them in all respects ready is no mean endeavor.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., *October 20, 1915.*

To: Navy Department (Navigation), Washington, D. C.

Subject: Detail of apprentice seamen companies from naval training station, to ships of reserve fleet at San Francisco.

1. The commandant of the training station at San Francisco has from time to time detailed companies of apprentice seamen for special duty on board ships of the reserve fleet in emergencies. The commander in chief believes this practice to be beneficial in every possible respect, not only to the apprentice seamen themselves, but to the ships also.

2. It is therefore respectfully recommended that this practice be continued and encouraged to the utmost. Should the department view it favorably, care will be taken that the routine instruction of apprentices will be continued on board with attention to every detail, not only as regards the academic part, but the professional part of their regular course of instruction. This plan will serve to somewhat broaden the training of the apprentices and make them more efficient for general service in the fleet.

3. Having commanded two training stations and being thoroughly interested in the subject of training men for the Navy, the commander in chief will give his personal attention to this matter and assures the department that the apprentices will benefit by this plan and at the same time the ships being very shorthanded, will receive much needed assistance in the work of keeping them in readiness for active commission on short notice.

W. F. FULLAM.

This was the beginning of a veritable fight that continued daily and unceasingly until war was declared in April, 1917. The story is told in the complete file of letters hereto attached and numbered serially. If the truth concerning the unpreparedness of the Navy in every detail is desired it can be found in these letters, inasmuch as

the conditions in the Pacific were practically duplicated in the Atlantic in every respect.

This scheme of utilizing apprentices from the training station was suggested as the only device that appeared to be possible in view of the shortage of navy personnel in the absence of sufficient personnel in the Navy. Strange as it may seem, however, this plan was at first disapproved by the Bureau of Navigation presumably because it might interfere with the educational and academic principle of making the Navy a "great university" instead of a primary fighting service.

In a letter dated November 20 (letter No. 3) I requested a reconsideration, and on November 29, 1915, the bureau with some reluctance granted my request with certain reservations by the Secretary (letters No. 4 and 5).

With the aid of the apprentices I moved my three ships to San Diego and immediately wrote to the department suggesting that all ships of the reserve fleet should be supplied with sufficient officers and men to enable them to move and join the commander in chief, thus testing them out and enabling me to prepare them for active service; and I requested information as to the department's policy.

In a letter dated February 10 (see letter No. 6) the department encouraged me very much by approving my suggestions and asking me for a "schedule of movements" to carry out the scheme.

On February 18 I addressed the following letter to all commanding officers as the most important step in preparing these ships for war [reading]:

SAN DIEGO, CALIF., *February 18, 1916.*

To: Commanding officers, all vessels, Pacific Reserve Fleet.

Subject: Increasing fighting efficiency of ships.

1. As it is desired to bring the ships of the fleet up to the highest possible standard of efficiency for service, commanding officers are directed to make a careful study of the present condition of the following installations on board their respective ships: (a) Guns and mounts; (b) gun sights; (c) fire control; (d) torpedoes, tubes, etc.; (e) searchlight and searchlight control; (f) radio; and to make such recommendations to the commander in chief as they see fit toward the improvement of the installations and their appurtenances, having in mind the fighting value of the ships.

2. Information is specially desired as to any recent improvements that have been made or authorized, such as the installation of new and up-to-date equipment, and as to the present state of efficiency of that now installed.

3. As much expedition as consistent with the subject is desired.

W. F. FULLAM.

That was to start my commanding officers to work with me; and start they did. Every officer out there worked his heart out, night and day, under very discouraging circumstances, to get those ships ready for war.

On February 19, 1916, the reserve fleet was short 600 men of reserve complement, as shown by the attached memorandum; shortage, with few officers on board, made it impossible for many of these ships to move. This memorandum is incorporated here showing the reserve complement of each ship, and the shortage.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be put in the record? Is it right here in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. It is in my file.

(Memorandum referred to is here printed in the record as follows.)

Enlisted men in the Pacific Reserve Fleet, on Saturday, Feb. 19, 1916.

| Ship. | Comple- ment. | On board. | Vacancies. | Excess. |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| Colorado..... | 313 | 231 | 82 | |
| Maryland..... | 313 | 376 | | |
| Pittsburgh..... | 313 | 128 | 185 | |
| South Dakota..... | 313 | 257 | 56 | |
| West Virginia..... | 313 | 216 | 97 | |
| Charleston..... | 260 | 191 | 69 | |
| Milwaukee..... | 260 | 221 | 39 | |
| Saratoga..... | | | | |
| St. Louis..... | 260 | 191 | 69 | |
| Albany..... | 120 | 101 | 19 | |
| Oregon..... | 296 | 255 | 41 | |
| Total..... | 2,761 | 2,167 | 657 | |

Total number of men short.....
Average per ship.....

Admiral FULLAM. On February 23, 1916, in reply to the department's letter of February 10, 1916, asking for suggestions, I forwarded a letter (see letter No. 7) giving at length a complete statement of the measures necessary to carry out my plans as well as the department's declared policy. Special attention is called to my letter, which is too long to quote in full. It will be noted that it covered every possible detail as follows: (a) Need of a permanent policy; (b) maneuvers and drills of all kinds at sea; (c) importance of supplying personnel; (d) absolute necessity for providing more officers in the Navy by increasing flag officers, captains, and commanders; promoting lieutenant commanders and lieutenants; graduating two classes from the Naval Academy; establishing a three years' course at the academy; largely increasing officers; employing retired officers; promoting chief petty officers, etc.

In paragraphs 11, 18, 22, and 26 the commander in chief specifically sought to awaken the department as follows. Remember that this was in reply to the department's request that I submit suggestions in reference to the carrying out of their own policy [reading]:

In the above connection, however, the commander in chief is constrained to admit that the success of the whole plan depends absolutely upon the assignment of a sufficient complement of officers and men to the reserve ships. If a sufficient complement is not provided the plan will assuredly fail. There is no alternative.

The question of personnel is so important and the effect of leaving ships shorthanded is so discouraging and depressing, despite every effort of a commander in chief to inspire zeal and interest, that it would be a neglect of duty not to invite serious attention to the matter—it is the one and only key to enthusiasm and efficiency in any fleet.

The commander in chief has done everything in his power in urging officers and men to a high standard of duty even with short complements and other discouraging conditions, there having been no tendency to encourage complaints or grievances as to existing conditions as to personnel.

The above letter was followed up the next day, February 24, 1916, by a letter to Admiral Blue (see letter No. 8) in an endeavor to impress him with the situation and the importance of really doing something. Paragraph 6 of this letter should be noted, as follows:

If Congress would do something and do it right away, we could get busy and do something. I am convinced that the suggestions made in my letter, if approved,

would secure several hundred junior officers within the next few months and give us enough captains and commanders to do naval work in a proper and dignified manner. This is the key to the whole situation, and if the Navy Department does nothing in this line all plans and schemes to improve the efficiency of reserve ships—not to say other ships—will simply remain on paper.

It is, perhaps, needless to say that no action whatever was taken by the Navy Department. Not one of the suggestions made in my letter was favorably considered. The Navy Department did practically nothing. It did not lift a finger nor initiate any measure to carry out its own policy as outlined in its letter of February 10. In other words, that letter remained a mere "scrap of paper"—nothing more. The department continued to shuffle the same old cards and accomplish nothing.

On March 6, 1916, the Bureau of Navigation addressed to me the attached letter [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., March 6, 1916.

DEAR ADMIRAL: Your letter of February 24 has been received. Rear Admiral Blue is on leave, therefore, I am answering it.

I regret we can not give you the officers and men necessary to put your excellent scheme into effect. There are no officers of the rank of commander available, and the only way to get officers below the rank of commander would be to take them from the battleships of the Atlantic Fleet, which, of course, would not be practicable. In regard to the men, we have got to provide crews for the *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, *Pennsylvania*, *Wainwright*, 12 submarines within the next six months: and in addition to that the Naval Academy practice squadron will have to be filled up, so the situation is rather hopeless from our point of view. However, we will do the best we can.

With kind regards, I am, very sincerely, yours,

J. H. DAYTON.

Admiral W. F. FULLAM, United States Navy.
United States Pacific Reserve Fleet,
U. S. S. "Milwaukee," San Francisco.

Special attention is called to this letter inasmuch as it declares that the Bureau of Personnel could not assist in carrying out the scheme of the commander in chief, which had been approved by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of February 10. In other words, Operations and Personnel did not or could not cooperate. There was no policy at the Navy Department which made it practicable for them to cooperate in manning ships in preparation for war. This letter admitted that there were not enough men or officers in the Navy to man the ships then in commission, and none forthcoming to man 3 new dreadnoughts, 7 new destroyers, and 12 new submarines. As stated in this letter the situation was in truth "rather hopeless." This condition confirmed the soundness of the opinion of the General Board, Admiral Fletcher, Admiral Knight, and others, that 25,000 more men were needed to supply the Navy.

On March 8 I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Benson [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., March 8, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I inclose for your eye a copy of a letter just written to Blue. I have been impressed during the past year or two with the fact that letters like this are not very much encourage and are often ignored or unanswered. Of course I do not want to nag people with letters and suggestions, but it is very easy to say nothing and do nothing in cases of this kind.

I am impressed with the need of a grand rally to create some real interest and enthusiasm all along the line. We need a surplus of officers and men just as quickly as

we can get them. If we could man all our ships and keep them moving, we will, at least, do some training of the personnel that will prepare us for an emergency.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM

Rear Admiral W. S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

On March 10 I addressed the attached letter to Admirals Blue and Benson [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
 U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP.
San Diego, Calif., March 10, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE (and BENSON): I am sending herewith a copy of a letter received from Tozer, who commands the *South Dakota*. It has several commendations and some information which I think you may wish to know.

It is a pity that we can not get officers and men right now to put these ships in commission and begin moving them about for training purposes. Is it not possible to get immediate legislation now along the lines of the personnel bill which will authorize immediately the employment of retired officers, double the number of gunners and boatswains, and authorize the immediate enlistment of men. These things would all put new life into the service afloat; everybody is anxious to do something, but many of them are inclined to throw up their hands and say, "What's the use?" We are powerless.

I shall try to do everything possible with the material at hand, and with the assistance of Andrews we can utilize apprentice seamen in a manner that will help tremendously in putting hope into these ships.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE, United States Navy,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. These letters were in 1916?

Admiral FULLAM. In 1916; yes. These last were dated March 10, 1916, one year—13 months—before we entered the war.

On March 20 I addressed a letter to Admiral Benson (see letter No. 9) repeating the suggestion to graduate midshipmen after three years. Special attention is invited to the last paragraphs of this letter, as follows:

The general feeling of satisfaction and hope inspired by the proposition to move these reserve ships indicates the great good that will result if you adopt a new scheme—use reserve ships to train men and young officers for the active fleet and by so doing keep the reserve ships moving. It is a knife that cuts both ways.

Why should we not get busy and adopt emergency measures in an emergency?

It is easy to sit still and do nothing—altogether too easy; and this is my reason for making these suggestions to you. Reserve ships alongside a dock deteriorate and all officers and men employed on board such ships deteriorate also. The whole thing is bad and it is time to stop it.

It is submitted that this letter to Admiral Benson outlined a scheme which could have been and should have been immediately adopted by the Navy Department as a practical means of preparing the Navy for war at no expense to the Government. And it is ventured that Admiral Benson would gladly have adopted the scheme, I am sure he would, had it been approved by the Navy Department which resisted all plans to shorten the course at the Navy Academy or to take any steps whatever to increase the officers of the Navy until war was actually upon us. In this connection attention is invited to Admiral Benson's significant letter of March 28 (read) in reply to mine (see letter No. 10), which concluded with the words "the effort

you are making to build up the readiness of the Pacific Fleet is appreciated."

I knew Admiral Benson appreciated those efforts.

No further evidence is needed to prove that the Navy Department took no steps whatever up to April, 1916, to provide officers necessary to place the ships of the Navy in condition for active service.

In the meantime, confronted with, and anticipating, the trying situation as regards men the commander in chief conceived the scheme and suggested to the Navy Department that apprentice seamen at training stations be sent to reserve ships after two instead of six months' training, their instruction to be continued on board ship. After being twice disapproved by the department, this suggestion was finally approved by the Bureau of Navigation, as stated by Admiral Blue in his letter of April 1. (See letter No. 11.) It will be noted that Admiral Blue stated that he was considering other suggestions of mine looking to an increase of officers, that a few more Warrant officers had been appointed, and asking me for further suggestions along these lines. It will also be noted that this scheme of assigning apprentices to ship after two months' training was only approved by the Secretary of the Navy with the understanding that the academic instruction would be continued on board ship.

On April 8 I addressed a letter to Admiral Blue concluding with the following paragraph:

I can not too earnestly impress you with the fact that a very bad condition exists as regards personnel, and the sooner you get the ships in full commission with complete complements of officers and men, the better it will be." (See letter No. 12.)

On April 10, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Benson a letter (letter No. 13) calling attention to the need for skilled men, torpedo personnel, and additional officers. Not a day passed, sir, that I did not write a letter to somebody.

Paragraph 4 of this letter merits attention:

I can not too earnestly impress you, my dear Benson, with the immediate necessity for training our personnel with all kinds of weapons. When I inspect the crews and note the youth of most of the apprentices, I can not but wonder how long it will take to develop them into material that will answer the requirements of war.

After emphasizing the need of an immediate increase of officers, the letter concluded as follows:

The effect upon the Navy would be electrical, and it would do nothing more than provide for emergencies of the next few years. Really, Benson, we must look ahead to do things quick. I inclose a copy of my last letter to Blue. I hope I am not nagging you. It would be easy for me to say and do nothing.

I am sure that Admiral Benson agreed with these suggestions, but he was powerless to overcome the inertia of the Navy Department, which gave little thought to preparing the Navy for war.

On April 12, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Blue a letter (see letter No. 14), from which the following is quoted:

I am at sea with the *Maryland*, training for target practice. A tour of the decks and turrets, with few men and hardly an officer in sight is impressive. For heaven's sake get officers and men as quick as you can and by every means in your power. We must train them for the future and do it now. * * * We should take a tremendous brace along all military lines and get every officer, every man, and every ship on the move and sheer up generally.

Admiral Blue wanted to do things, but he was as powerless as Admiral Benson to move the Navy Department to action.

On April 14, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Assistant Secretary Roosevelt concerning the "hearing" before the naval committee. Mr. Roosevelt was always anxious to forward measures for the fighting efficiency of the Navy.

Like his namesake of glorious memory, he seemed to regard the Navy as the first line of the Nation's defense, and he wanted to see it ready. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
Drill Grounds Off San Diego, Calif., April 14, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: I was delighted to read your "hearing," and to note what you said about personnel.

I inclose for your eye some correspondence with Blue and Benson on the subject of personnel, and the means of increasing officers and men just at present.

My suggestions about shortening the training of apprentices ashore, and getting them on board ship was turned down at first, but I am glad to say that Blue finally changed his mind, and we will now get these lads afloat and hustle them on practical work.

In my letter to Blue of March 16, I referred to suggestions made to Blue about getting more officers, and I am pleased to note that Blue is considering these questions also.

The sooner we get busy training additional officers and men the better it will be, and I hope there will be a steady improvement and no more backward steps in this respect.

Please believe me, faithfully yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Hon. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

The CHAIRMAN. What was Admiral Blue's position at that time?

Admiral FULLAM. He was chief of the Bureau of Navigation. I should have stated that.

I wrote to Mr. Roosevelt instead of writing to the Secretary of the Navy, although I had been the Secretary's aid for a year, and I did it because the Secretary himself, though he was most agreeable and kindly to me, and I was very fond of the Secretary of the Navy in the early days, and I hoped he would take the proper view of the Navy, yet I could not write to him about this subject, because I felt that he was not interested in it, and so I wrote to Mr. Roosevelt.

In May, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Blue a letter (No. 15) asking for more officers and concluding with these words:

I wish you would consider this plan promptly and let me know whether I am to bother myself with such matters as these any more. It is very easy to go along in the Navy and carry on a routine. It seems to me that now is the time to encourage everybody to think and try to do something.

It is pertinent to state right here that, to my personal knowledge, the Navy Department did nothing but carry on a routine—and a peace routine at that—at a time during 1916 and the first months of 1917, when war was practically inevitable. Not a move of any consequence was made to prepare the Navy for war. It is plain that naval officers who followed the same supine policy would have been guilty of criminal neglect of duty to the Navy and to the country.

On June 10, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Blue the letter No. 16, from which the following is quoted:

There is only one solution—get every ship filled up as soon as possible with officers and men and begin a thorough military system of administration and discipline with every attempt to infuse enthusiasm and spirit into everybody.

I have been in the department a year and I know the difference between plans on paper and the actual doings of officers and men in the fleet itself. The last counts most and tells the whole story. If we fail to recognize this fact we will neglect our first duty.

It is pertinent to remark at this point that if the department had any plans at all they must have remained on paper.

There was no evidence in the Pacific of any intent to prepare the Navy for war.

On June 17, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Benson.

I will say here, sir, that I have 12 flagships in the Pacific. I took one at a time, with my impedimenta and my staff, and went abroad and tried to key it up; and then I moved the whole outfit to another one and made a frantic struggle to get that keyed up. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., June 12, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I received your letter of the 29th and am delighted that the latest cruising schedule has been approved. Of course it has been my idea to get these ships and crews ready for active service—which is, I suppose, the first duty of the commander in chief of the reserve fleet. I have no complaints to make when ships are taken away from active duty.

I inclose for your eye copy of a letter to Blue. Of course the personnel and ships are very much tangled up, but we can not have efficient ships without a personnel—even reserve ships. That is why I am sending this letter to you.

I will not repeat what I have said about conditions on this coast.

I note that you have not answered or even mentioned my letter of May 13. Of course I regret this somewhat, and do not exactly understand your attitude or reason. It is not my desire to annoy you with letters or to take up your time unnecessarily and as soon as I know your attitude, both personal and official, I will know what to do in the future.

Personally, I believe in writing frankly and fully to the department concerning conditions as they are, and I never hesitate to call a spade a spade. It seems to me of late years there has been too much secrecy, too little frankness, and too little enthusiasm or cooperation, and things have run too much on a personal basis instead of with the idea of rallying everybody and utilizing everybody's brains and good will.

I have written letters to the department which I deemed and knew were very important, but they have sometimes been ignored completely. I think this has been the tendency of late years, and I think it is very unfortunate.

I wish to repeat that, in my opinion, unless there is a tremendous revival as far as the Navy is concerned, in the Pacific coast, a condition of war would find things in a state of absolute pandemonium and inefficiency—unreadiness instead of preparedness in every essential that counts in actual warfare.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

This letter was not intended as a criticism of Admiral Benson. It was a criticism of our departmental policy. Benson was my friend and classmate and I could speak to him with perfect frankness. It was for this reason that I wrote many personal rather than official letters. The latter were too often ignored, pigeonholed, and forgotten. It is pertinent to state at this point that the condition mentioned in the last paragraph of this letter, namely, "a condition of war would find things in a state of absolute pandemonium and inefficiency—unreadiness instead of preparedness in every essential that counts in actual warfare"—was fully realized when war was finally declared in 1917.

On June 15, 1916, I addressed the following official letter to the Navy Department [reading]:

FULL POWER RUN OFF,
San Diego, Calif., June 15, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Condition of reserve ships as to personnel.

1. The department is informed that on June 3 the five armored cruisers of the reserve fleet were short of their reserve complements by 286 men, an average of 57 men for each ship. The total shortage in the reserve fleet was 403.

That was the reserve complement. That brought the actual complement on board down below 30 per cent, I think, or about 30 per cent. [Continuing reading:]

2. There were about 400 apprentice seamen under training in reserve ships, but these men are inexperienced, and although they help with deck work, they can not fill the places of trained men, and they can not be rated until after the passage of the appropriation bill.

3. Every effort will be made to keep reserve ships in proper condition if possible with reduced complements, but these vacancies should be filled as soon as practicable.

4. This report is sent to Operations, inasmuch as the shortage of personnel affects the cruising efficiency of reserve ships.

W. F. FULLAM.

On July 5, 1916, the Bureau of Navigation addressed the attached letter to me. This was after efforts for nine months [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., July 5, 1916.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Replying to your letter of June 20, I regret that it is impracticable to send any additional officers to the reserve ships unless mobilization takes place and retired officers are ordered to duty and officers from shore are ordered to sea. Sincerely, yours,

VICTOR BLUE.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FULLAM,
United States Navy, Commander Reserve Force, Pacific Force.

This letter appeared to blast the last hope that officers would be supplied sufficient to keep reserve ships away from the docks. But the force commander determined to continue to fight with the officers available and with the assistance of 10 ensigns assigned to his ships at his request from the graduating class of 1916. Accordingly the force order of July 13, 1916, was issued to the commanding officers of all ships, demanding of them renewed exertions and a high standard of training and discipline with the existing personnel. (See letter No. 17; read.)

In the meantime the scheme suggested by me, of having apprentices in my ships, was being carried out and it was by this means, and by this means alone, that I was enabled to fairly drag four armored cruisers away from the docks at Bremerton and join Admiral Winslow and afterwards cruise on the Mexican coast with Admiral Caperton when war with Mexico was threatened in the summer of 1916. Both Admiral Winslow and Admiral Caperton gave me and my officers full credit for this accomplishment which, as shown by previous paragraphs in this letter, would never have been possible had the Navy Department been left to itself. It was accomplished in spite of every obstacle and every possible discouragement. I will not read that letter, but it told them to work all the harder and not to expect additional men or additional officers, because they would not reasonably expect it; we did not have them; and they must not get discouraged but must continue to work. That is the gist of it.

In the meantime the question of repairs and material readiness of these ships, as well as question of personnel, had been pushed with the bureaus and with Capt. Coontz at Bremerton and Capt. Bennett at Mare Island. Both of these officers and their assistants gave me every possible support, but I discovered that their hands were tied for lack of material or funds and because there was no policy at the

Navy Department concerning these ships, thus leaving the bureaus to act not at all or with no concert. On this connection attention is invited to Capt. Coontz's letter of July 24, 1916 [reading]:

COMMANDANT'S OFFICE,

Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., July 24, 1916.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, United States Navy,

Commanding Reserve Force, United States Pacific Fleet,

U. S. S. "Colorado," Care Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR ADMIRAL FULLAM: 1. I am just in receipt of your letter of July 10, 1916. I regret to state that owing to the shortage in machinists and shipfitters and the fact that we are very much cramped for funds, I found it necessary to request the department that the date of completion of the U. S. S. *West Virginia* be made August 26. The department has granted this request and so set the date. While we were about it, however, we found that we could complete all of her repairs by that date, including the directorscope, so that all that will be necessary to have her in final condition will be the installation of the catapult, which is due about October 15, 1916.

The *Saratoga* is suffering from the same conditions—lack of machinists and lack of funds, and these will continue until the appropriation bill passes. To-morrow we expect to lift the turrets of the *Saratoga* and determine the conditions as to her tracks, and will then be able to settle on a definite completion date.

The *St. Louis* got away the 21st for Honolulu. The *New Orleans* is at Sitka with the Naval Reserves, and the *Vicksburg* is ready to take the second batch out on August 10. From what the press states it looks as if the *Colorado*, *Pittsburgh*, and other vessels would shortly be available for taking out the civilians on August 15.

Starting up of new shipbuilding plants and scarcity of material have caused our recent troubles here, but we hope that they will soon end.

Sincerely,

R. E. COONTZ.

Capt. Coontz did his very best.

A vigorous correspondence had taken place between me and the commandants with their most cordial cooperation, and this continued up to the declaration of war, the only trouble being to get funds, labor, material, etc., all of which should have been provided in 1914 and 1915, before the stress of approaching war came upon the country. In other words, the delays in the fall of 1916 were the natural consequence of previous inaction by the Navy Department and its failure to act upon my repeated suggestions as to the value of these ships.

In the meantime, Admiral Blue had gone to sea and Admiral Palmer became Chief of Bureau of Navigation. He found the Navy short of officers and men with no adequate provision and no determined attempt by the Navy Department to supply the deficiency. On August 4, 1916, Admiral Palmer addressed the attached letter to me [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,

Washington, D. C., August 24.

To: Commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Completion of *West Virginia*'s repair period; preparations of that ship for joining the Reserve Force in cruising exercises.

1. The Bureau has, at present, the following commissioned officers on the ships of the Reserve Force:

| | | | |
|------------------|---|--------------------|----|
| Maryland..... | 7 | South Dakota..... | 7 |
| New Orleans..... | 1 | West Virginia..... | 4 |
| Pittsburgh..... | 8 | | |
| Saratoga..... | 1 | Total..... | 28 |

2. This gives an average of about five per ship. This is the maximum that can be allowed until the department releases sufficient personnel by placing ships out of commission.

In other words, I could only have, as a maximum, five officers on a 14,000-ton ship; and the only scout cruisers we had in the Navy, unless ships were placed out of commission. [Continuing reading:]

3. In the meantime recommendation is requested of the commander, Reserve Force, for nominations of officers from those ships of his command having more than five commissioned officers for their further transfer to the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga*.

4. There is no additional enlisted personnel available for fitting of the *West Virginia* and the *Saratoga*. It is requested that such men as are necessary be requested from the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

L. C. PALMER.

The hopelessness of the situation that confronted Admiral Palmer is shown by the fact that he could allow only four officers for each of my ships "until the department releases sufficient personnel by placing ships out of commission"; and he declared that no enlisted personnel could be made "available for fitting out the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga* at the Bremerton yard.

It is proper to state at this point that Admiral Palmer attempted to assist me, and he apparently made powerful efforts to get an increase of officers and men for the Navy, and to secure the graduation of midshipmen after three years at the Academy. But he, too, found his hands tied by the department's policy of inaction along these lines.

The instruction of apprentice seamen on board my ships, after two months at the training station, having enabled me to get the ships away from the docks I now requested the department to curtail the courses at the training stations to one month in order to expedite the preparation of my ships for war. But it was only with reluctance that the Secretary had curtailed the course to two months, and I was not surprised therefore to receive the attached letter from Admiral Palmer under date of August 28, 1916 [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1916.

To: Commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Training of apprentice seamen in reserve ships.

References: Your letter No. 486, WGG-S, of August 18, 1916.

1. The present course of two months' instruction at training stations can not be reduced unless congestion occurs at the stations, in which case your recommendations will be given careful consideration. The schedules of training of apprentice seamen in effect in your force meets the approval of the bureau, and your reports of the efficient aid this personnel has rendered the Pacific Reserve Force are gratifying.

L. C. PALMER.

In this letter it will be noted that Admiral Palmer appreciated the service rendered by training afloat.

The need of engineering officers in the work of preparing the armored cruisers for their maximum speed, which would be demanded under war conditions was urgent, and I accordingly addressed the following letter to the Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering to enlist his assistance:

SAN DIEGO, CALIF., September 4, 1916.

MY DEAR GRIFFIN: I wish you would personally glance over the attached correspondence, which explains itself.

I am sure you will not misinterpret my action, for I know that we are short of officers in the Navy; but there must be a few qualified officers in these armored cruisers or they can never be made ready for service.

It was only by persistence (after being turned down twice) that I got enough apprentice seamen on board to get these ships away from the dock. Having done so, I am now anxious to keep them in proper condition. This can not be done if they compel me to cruise too much and give me no engineer officers. I never cry for help if I am given reasonable support and authority.

It has been my ambition to get these six armored cruisers (including the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga*) into shape while training and developing their crews at the same time. I only ask for apprentices and a few engineer officers—that is all.

Bowen is now doing the work of about three men. If he can be relieved as engineer of this ship and can concentrate on his staff duty, we may accomplish something. It is an important matter.

Sincerely, yours,

W. P. FULLAM.

ROBERT S. GRIFFIN.

*Engineer in Chief, Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

Special attention is invited to the declaration: "There must be a few qualified officers in these armored cruisers or they can never be made ready for service." When it is remembered that six months before war was declared the only cruisers in the Navy that could make 20 knots sea speed were unmanned, unofficered, and unready for full-speed trials, the situation could only be considered most amazing in the annals of naval unpreparedness.

On September 7, 1916, I addressed the letter No. 18 to Admiral Palmer. Special attention is called to the following:

If these armored cruisers are to be ready when called upon—and they are the only cruisers we have—there are three things that must be kept in good condition: (1) Boilers and engines; (2) guns; (3) torpedoes. I assure you that I have struggled hard with this problem with the minimum of assistance as regards officers and men, and I shall continue to do so and to avoid bothering you all I can.

The failure of the Navy Department to supply personnel up to September, 1916, to man the fleet has been fully treated in the foregoing pages. It is now important to emphasize the neglect as to material and the failure to adopt any policy that would insure the material readiness of the armored cruisers for battle.

In September, 1916, all of the armored cruisers except the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga* had been fairly dragged from the docks at Bremerton, and with scant personnel these ships had been tried out and inspected by me to detect their defects.

Right here, to illustrate, sir, I prodded the captains of these ships so constantly that they were kept on the jump, and my letters to them, I was told, were called "ginger letters"; and it seemed to me that the injection of ginger was an excellent tonic at that time; and it is the only thing in the world that ever got those ships away from those docks. Sargent took the *West Virginia* out of that channel at Bremerton steering from the steering-engine room, and with no engine-room telegraph—a thing that I do not believe any captain in the Navy ever did before, and he ought to have a medal for it. But he got that ship out of there, and then together we found out what was the matter with her, and we sent her to another navy yard and fixed her up, and she was convoying during the war.

These defects were found to be serious. The boilers were in poor condition, the fire control, director firing, and other important features were incomplete, and constant correspondence with the bureaus and commandants had proved that there was no well-defined policy, no head whatever, no control of the work of getting these ships ready for war.

In desperation, after 11 months of unremitting work and correspondence, I wrote the attached letter to the department date of September 14, 1916 [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP
San Diego, Calif., September 14,

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Movement and employment of ships of Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.

References: (a) Operation's letter 27772-138 Op-11 of 5 September, 1916. (b)

2. Mobilization Plan. "comments and suggestions useful in perfecting this requested." (c) Force commander's letter 505 WFF-M of 28 August, 1916.

1. Referring to the above, the following suggestions are submitted with a view to the preparation of all armored cruisers for action and dependable service, at the earliest practicable date.

2. The *West Virginia* has been at the Bremerton yard off and on for years, and armored cruisers have been in reserve for extended periods during recent years, withstanding this fact, the *West Virginia* developed troubles during her recent repair trial; the *South Dakota* and *Maryland* may need to have their boilers overhauled in the near future, and the fire control, radio installations, and director firing systems are not yet installed in these ships—

And those things are absolutely necessary to meet an enemy when you will go down to the depths of the sea in the early part of the war. [continuing reading]—

the material for some of this work not being at hand.

3. It is not believed that the personnel of the navy yard or of the ships are to be blamed for this condition—it would appear that the system or policy is alone at fault. The force commander had been impressed with the zeal and energy of the personnel of the yard and the ships, but the personnel has been inadequate. At one time, Mr. Atkins, engineer officer on the staff of the commander in chief, commanded the *West Virginia* and one other armored cruiser—he was the only commissioned officer assigned to and responsible for two 14,000-ton ships. This illustrates the system which has been followed in the past. The result is logical. A decided change is necessary.

4. In suggesting a change, it is clear that correspondence must be free from circularity and consequent delay and inaction. The commander in chief, force commander, commandant of the navy yard, operations, navigation, engineering, and other bureaus may be involved in voluminous writing at cross purposes as regards material and personnel, and the date when these ships will be ready will be indefinitely postponed.

5. The following procedure is suggested:

(1) Decide on a policy regarding the armored cruisers.
(2) Consider and decide on the repairs of each individual ship.
(3) Assemble at once all material, boiler tubes, etc., necessary to complete each ship.

(4) Provide personnel to insure this work being properly done.

(5) Send ships to navy yard in turn as soon as the work can be pushed to completion.

6. In this connection with this subject, attention is invited to the correspondence hereto attached, especially to the letter and telegram from the commandant of the Bureau of Steam Engineering and to Operations.

7. If some definite plan is not adopted and pushed; unless there is some coordination; some one directing head, the armored cruisers will never be made ready for effective service—certainly not by August, 1917.

8. The force commander, supposing that these ships might be of some possible use pending the building of more modern cruisers has done his utmost to get them in cruising condition, and has made the necessary recommendations to this end. Being twice disapproved by the department, the suggestion to train apprentice men in these ships has been approved, and this plan alone made it possible for these ships to do duty on the Mexican coast. Crews of these ships have been almost entirely self-developed in this manner, and will continue to be without asking for help from men except when absolutely necessary. Few commissioned officers have been assigned; nearly all the officers being junior in rank or newly graduated ensigns. The limit of endurance has been demanded and the chances of possible success have not been forgotten.

9. This letter is not a complaint. It is intended as a statement of facts, or of conditions based upon experience with the reserve force, and it is submitted for such consideration as it merits.

10. Before considering the general policy recommended above, the following schedule of movements is submitted for immediate adoption or consideration in the absence of the commander in chief and with no opportunity to confer with him:

- (1) Dock the *Colorado* at once.
- (2) Send the *West Virginia* and *New Orleans* to Mexican waters to relieve the *Pittsburgh* and *Maryland*, if necessary.
- (3) Send the *South Dakota* to navy yard later on, at discretion of force commander in consultation with commandant, to have her boilers thoroughly overhauled and other work completed.
- (4) Following *South Dakota* send other ships as may be decided by the department.
- (5) In the meantime, rendezvous at San Diego when not in Mexico, for target practice, inspection, etc.

11. This letter concludes the recommendations which the force commander has to submit regarding the preparation of these ships for war.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copies to: Navigation; Commandant navy yard, Puget Sound.

I was junior commandant then to the commander of the fleet. My status as commander of the reserve fleet had been changed to that of "force commander," which placed me under the commander of the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was commander of the fleet?

Admiral FULLAM. At that time it was Admiral Caperton. As you see, that letter continues to pound on things just like that.

I said, you see, that this letter was not a complaint. This was official, and it told the Navy Department that they had no policy, and that they had no head getting these ships ready for war.

As a result of this caustic letter, which plainly condemned the department and its policy, the following order was signed by Admiral Palmer while acting as Secretary of the Navy, directing all bureaus to get busy and do something [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 30, 1916.

To: All bureaus; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commander Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet; commandant, navy yard, Puget Sound, Wash.; commanding officers of vessels listed:

Subject: Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet—repairs.

1. Instructions have been issued directing all authorized and necessary work be proceeded with at once on the *Colorado*, now at Puget Sound Navy Yard, and it is estimated that this work will require about two months, although no date of completion has as yet been set.

2. As soon as the *Pittsburgh* has completed target practice in the near future at San Diego she will be directed to proceed to the navy yard, Puget Sound, and upon arrival will be available for the performance of all authorized and necessary work, estimated to require about 50 days.

3. The *South Dakota* will arrive at the navy yard, Puget Sound, about November 30, when she will be available for survey and the performance of all authorized and necessary work.

4. The *Maryland*, upon the completion of target practice, will arrive at navy yard, Puget Sound, about November 30, when she will be available for the performance of all authorized and necessary work.

5. The *Colorado* and *Pittsburgh* should have all work completed by the time of arrival of the *South Dakota* and *Maryland*, and every effort will be made to accomplish the same.

6. Upon the arrival of each vessel and as soon as information is obtainable the commandant will recommend a date of completion.

7. The bureaus will take the necessary action to insure the prompt delivery of all necessary material at the navy yard, Puget Sound.

8. It is the department's desire that all work heretofore authorized or found necessary during the progress of present authorized jobs be completed as early as practicable on these ships, and when so completed that they will be in all respects ready for service at sea, with their director control, fire control, battery boilers, and engines complete in all respects and ready for active service with the fleet away from navy yards.

L. C. PALMER, Acting.

This letter was prepared in the office of operations in the department of material, which showed the efficiency of that office of material in the office of naval operations. It was the one agent and the only agent that could coordinate all these bureaus and get anything done. This letter was prepared there in the office of operations in the division of material. It was directed that all these offices and bureaus should get busy.

Under a proper organization this order should have been and doubtless would have been issued a year sooner. This letter conclusively proves that a directing and ever present controlling and coordinating military head is at all times essential to the efficiency and preparedness of a military service for war. If the Secretary will not or can not coordinate all agencies nothing may be done unless he leaves the department temporarily in charge of an officer vested with the Secretary's power over the bureaus—an officer who knows what should be done and who has the energy to do things.

On October 10, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Palmer [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
NAVY YARD, PUGET SOUND,
Bremerton, Wash., October 10, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: I was delighted with the order, which you signed which was dated September 30, directing all bureaus to get busy and put these armored cruisers in condition.

It was the first real military control of a hopeless situation in which all bureaus were working independently with no head.

I am doing my best to get these armored cruisers ready. All the officers are working overtime, and it is the saying now, "that if an officer wants a rest, he would ask transfer from the Reserve Force to the active fleet."

I hope you were not annoyed by my request for a few more officers. It was my duty to put the case before you. If I could get two junior lieutenants and one ensign for the *New Orleans* right away, she could relieve the *Maryland* in Mexican waters in about two weeks.

The *Maryland* has measles on board and they have been four months at Salina Cruz and Manzanillo, and I know from experience that this is too long to keep them there. Both the ship and the crew will deteriorate if they are not soon relieved and I have told Benson the same thing.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear ADMIRAL L. C. PALMER,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

With the signing by Admiral Palmer of the department's letter of September 30, 1916, we had the first glimmer of a departmental policy concerning the preparation of the armored cruisers for the war into which we entered six months later. And it is only the truth to state that the department would not have taken this action had it been left to its own initiative. It took this action only after 11 months of constant prodding and unceasing effort by the commander and officers of the Pacific Reserve Fleet. That was September 30, 1916, six months before we entered the war. I wish to bear testimony to the very important action and to the efficiency of the Division of Material.

Palmer did everything in his power to help. His hands were tied through no fault of his, as I believe the hands of every one of the officers in the Navy Department were tied, because the Navy Department had no policy and was not imbued with the absolute necessity of getting ready for war.

The department's final and tardy action gave some impetus and direction to the work of preparing ships in the Pacific. Nevertheless the work proceeded slowly, because of lack of material and funds due to previous neglect to anticipate such work.

The force commander continued to press matters and to emphasize once more the importance of personnel. In this connection attention is invited to my letter (see No. 19) of September 28, addressed to Admiral Palmer, and my letter (see No. 20) of October 11, addressed to Capt. Chase, in which the folly of employing young officers at training station teaching arithmetic was emphasized, when these officers were needed afloat.

On October 23, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Benson [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., October 23, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: Lieut. Commander Theleen, of the *Maryland*, has been sent to the hospital, and it is doubtful if he may return to the ship for a long time, if at all.

A lieutenant is now in command and doing executive duty also. They had had 48 cases of malaria within 2 weeks and have a large sick list now. As you know, I have felt that the *Maryland* ought to be relieved, and I still think it would be a very great mistake to keep her down there any longer than is absolutely necessary, and for this reason I hoped that the department could get two young officers to the *New Orleans* and let me send her south. She is a sheathed ship, and as you know she ought to be in those waters if possible.

It is a very pathetic state of affairs when we can not do the things in the Navy that ought to be done, especially when so little is needed to accomplish it.

I inspected the *New Orleans*, and she is in good condition in all the essentials.

The circular letter of September 30 encouraged me that I might succeed in getting these armored cruisers in shape. Of course you realize ships would never have gotten to Mexico at all had it not been for my insistence for manning them with apprentices. This is not a boast. It is a mere fact to say that this was accomplished after having twice been disapproved by Navigation; that is, those four ships were available in an emergency, but the Navy Department would not have made them so had it been left to itself.

After working the ships and personnel up to a state of some efficiency and enthusiasm, I should have now to have the personnel feel that they are not treated with consideration; that they are doing double duty with little reward.

I thought you would want me to let you know the actual conditions on the *Maryland*; hence this letter.

I am getting the *Colorado's* torpedoes into shape now, and when the *Pittsburgh*, *Maryland*, and *South Dakota* come here they will finish the work with theirs.

I shall peg away at this business until I find that it is hopeless or until I am told to take it easy, and let the department take all the responsibility, as it did previously.

I confess I am amazed that young officers should be kept at training stations teaching arithmetic when a ship like the *New Orleans* is helpless for the lack of two of them. Now, Navy will never amount to anything, Benson, when such absurd things are possible. I have several times made suggestions as to graduating midshipmen a little earlier, and doing something to relieve the present situation, but I have not even received the courtesy of an acknowledgement of such letters. As you know, classes were graduated ahead of time upon several occasions in the past, and as some of the officers tell me they seem to have done quite as well as those who stayed the full four years.

The last academic year is entirely practical anyway, and would be perfectly possible to employ midshipmen who were graduated in February that they would learn even more on practical lines than at the Naval Academy during these four months; and they could be required to pass a good stiff examination and have a course of study outlined for them should they leave the Naval Academy in February.

With the Naval Academy packed and jammed full, the graduating of the senior class in February would, it seems to me, relieve the situation somewhat.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Admiral WM. S. BENSON, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.

On November 21, I addressed the attached letter to the department, reporting that all ships of my force (except the *Saratoga*) had been forced away from the docks at the navy yards. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE.

U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP.

Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., November 21, 1916

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Navigation).

Subject: Personnel and employment of ships of the reserve force, Pacific Fleet

1. With the departure of the *New Orleans* from the navy yard, Puget Sound, it is proper to state that all ships that were in the reserve force when the present commander took command about one year ago are either in active service or have done cruising duty in Mexican waters.

2. The activity of the reserve force in the Pacific has been made possible by the training of about 1,200 apprentice seamen, who have been distributed among these ships or assigned to active ships after completion of their training.

3. It is proper to state that the four armored cruisers could not have been sent to Mexico during the difficulties on that coast last summer, and the *West Virginia* and *New Orleans* could not have been made available for their present duties in Mexican waters, had it not been for the system of training apprentices in the reserve ships on this coast.

4. Strict orders have been given concerning the uniform and the military training of men; and preparations will be made to supply a full deck complement to the *Saratoga* as soon as repairs to that ship are so far completed that men can be properly berthed and employed on board.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copy to commander in chief.

On November 30, 1916, I addressed the attached official letter to the department concerning the vital importance of thoroughness in repairing the boilers and machinery of the armored cruisers. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,

U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,

Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., November 30, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations):

Subject: Boilers and machinery of *Maryland*, *South Dakota*, and *San Diego*.

1. In view of the fact that the armored cruisers will be the only scouts available for the fleet for several years to come, it is the duty of the force commander to earnestly recommend that the boilers and machinery of the above-named ships be placed in absolutely dependable condition during their next overhaul, in order that they may be ready to make their maximum speed whenever occasion demands.

2. It is submitted that false economy as regards retubing boilers and overhauling machinery might be fatal to the efficiency of these ships in an emergency, and subject the crews to possible and unnecessary danger.

3. It is believed that the *Colorado*, *Pittsburgh*, *Saratoga*, and *West Virginia* will be dependable as far as their boilers and motive power are concerned, and it therefore remains to place the *San Diego*, *Maryland*, and *South Dakota* in similar condition in this vitally important respect.

4. This matter is brought to the attention of the department at this time in order that there may be no failure to have all these cruisers in perfect condition should mobilization be required next summer.

W. F. FULLAM.

Attention is invited to letters No. 21 to No. 26 to and from the department, concerning personnel and material matters between December 12, 1916, and January 24, 1917. It will be noted that the two letters from the Secretary's office indicated more activity and that the Secretary's letter of January 24, 1917, gave to the force commander the first real proof that his efforts had been appreciated and that the department was "doing all that it can do toward the end you seek."

As proof of the continued and zealous work by the officers of the Reserve Force to expedite the preparations for War, attention is invited to the attached circular order issued by the force commander, February 15, 1917, only two months before war was declared. [Reading:]

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 15, 1917.

To: Commanding officers all ships Reserve force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Concentration on important work.

1. The force commander assumes that all commanding officers are attending to the following points, but it is desired to emphasize them:

(a) Concentrate upon work directly affecting cruising efficiency, sea endurance, and man-of-war duty.

(b) Do not ask for, and if possible stop, all alterations and other work not essential to the above.

(c) Avoid the employment of a single navy-yard workman except upon jobs that are absolutely necessary; and cooperate with navy-yard authorities in this respect.

(d) Perfect as far as possible the organization for and conduct with all possible thoroughness the military instruction of the crew.

(e) Anticipate demands for a sudden call for the distant cruising for which these ships were intended.

2. Everybody must be made to realize that full complements of officers and men may not be available.

Officers were not excused for crying for help. [Continuing reading:]

Now is the time for everybody to hustle and do double duty without complaining.

4. This letter will be read in confidence by the commanding officer to all officers on board, and they will be required to quietly instill these ideas into their men, and inspire them to show what they are made of, and to exhibit a proper spirit—a thing that our men always do when appealed to in emergencies.

W. F. FULLAM.

I did not know what minute war might be declared, and I did not want to write a public letter, but I asked them quietly to give this to the officers and men.

On March 24, 1917, believing that war was imminent, I sent the attached radio concerning the importance of immediately recruiting the reserve force, and received the next day the department's authority to begin recruiting. My letter and the authority of the department are as follows. [Reading:]

MARCH 24, 1917.

From flag *Pueblo* to Secretary of the Navy, via N. P. G.

In view of the need of men in the Reserve Force, will the department authorize me to stimulate recruiting on this coast by stating to the press over my signature the number needed to fully man ships? I am advised that the result may be excellent. Request telegraphic reply. 14224.

MARCH 25, 1917.

From: Bu. Nav. to commander Reserve Force, via N. P. G.

14424: You are authorized to publish the fact that the President has signed an Executive order calling for an emergency increase to 87,000 enlisted men. Give widest publicity. You are authorized to state number of men needed in your force and to enlist and retain on board men to fill vacancies. 12525.

When war was declared in April, 1917, the force commander then cruising in Mexican waters, addressed the attached letter to the commander in chief, Admiral Caperton. [Reading:]

To: Commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Preparation of armored cruisers for battle.

1. After experience of a year and a half, with the aid of a zealous staff in getting the armored cruisers in a condition for war, the force commander, from a feeling of interest in this matter, submits the following suggestions from a sense of duty.

2. The regular target and torpedo practice as planned by the force commander for these ships for the fall of 1916 and the spring of 1917 was interfered with by conditions beyond control, and the inability of the Keyport station to render proper assistance prevented proving the torpedoes of the *South Dakota* and *Frederick*.

3. Many men have been transferred or discharged from these ships since the last target practice, and a very large percentage of the men recently added to the ships' companies have therefore never seen a gun fired.

4. The complements of officers as provided for war conditions will doubtless be somewhat short, and many of them will be inexperienced and by no means up to a desirable standard.

5. It follows from the above that it may require at least six months' strenuous training to prepare the armored cruisers for battle against ships that have been properly trained.

6. To do this, it is of the utmost importance that each of these ships should have target practice with great guns, even if it may be necessary to simulate this practice at sea and fire all the guns in the daytime, simply for the purpose of giving the crews some experience and opportunity to observe. It is also of the utmost importance that they should all have an opportunity to fire their torpedoes and overhaul the plants.

7. For this reason it is suggested that these ships, as they become available, should each be based on San Diego for a short time until they can have all this practice, and at the same time place their crews on the rifle range for instruction with the rifle and revolver.

8. It is for these reasons, as well as in consideration of efficient service on the Mexican coast, that the force commander has emphasized the importance of a patrol of yachts and small cruisers in Mexican waters in order that armored cruisers may be made and kept at all times ready for the serious emergencies of war and be prepared as regards their batteries, engines, and boilers for extreme speed and battery efficiency to meet a serious emergency at short notice.

9. It is assumed that any German cruiser that might gain the sea would be manned and officered by highly trained personnel. If the only fast armored cruisers in the Navy are to be prepared to chase and attack such a ship, they should have officers of ability and skill and crews that are trained to successfully land the first salvo. This is a very serious matter. Such an engagement is more probable than an engagement between battleships at the present time. Such a contingency should be the one to anticipate first of all, and such ships should be prepared for it, even at the expense of ships that may not have a chance to fight at all as long as the British fleet exists.

10. Armored cruisers in Mexican waters deteriorate rapidly, and, standing by constantly night and day in a warm climate, their crew soon becomes more or less enervated and listless. It is no place to train a fighting ship for battle, nor to keep its material in condition for a supreme test. In the event of a submarine menace, such a ship may be needlessly sacrificed.

11. If war with Mexico is not anticipated nor contemplated, therefore, it is my duty to emphasize the fact that armed yachts are of more use than armored cruisers on the Mexican coast to-day.

12. I am sending a small power boat, the *Paxinosa*, by courtesy of the owners, to investigate the report of a radio station at Angeles Bay. This is an object lesson.

13. It is assumed that these comments will be considered to be as respectful as they are intended to be and as practical as they are believed to be by an officer now on the Mexican coast.

W. F. FULLAM.

Serious attention is invited to this letter, especially to paragraph 9, in which it is stated that if one of these ships met a German ship which was fully manned it would have been in a very embarrassing position. In this connection it is pertinent to state with all emphasis that whereas all the armored cruisers except the *Saratoga* were not at sea, only one of the six—the flagship of Admiral Caperton—could be said to be ready for battle or for the strenuous conditions of war. With the exception of Caperton's flagship, these six vessels were underofficered and undermanned, with largely untrained crews. When it is remembered that the war had been in progress nearly three years it was to be expected that all enemy vessels were fully officered and manned and thoroughly trained. The battle of Jutland had

demonstrated the high degree of fighting efficiency of the German fleet.

In view of these facts and conditions no man has the faintest glimmer of intelligence concerning modern naval warfare and the vital importance of quick and accurate hitting in the initial stages of a naval battle can resist the conclusion that the armored cruisers of our Navy, officered and manned though they were with a personnel unequalled, we will say, in intelligence, patriotism and bravery by the men of any navy in the world would nevertheless have been at such a fatal disadvantage due to their lack of training that a battle at this time with enemy vessels manned with trained and seasoned crews could only have resulted in inevitable defeat for our ships. To claim the contrary would be to exhibit a degree of ignorance and bombast of which any American citizen or naval officer should be ashamed. It was a condition of complete naval unpreparedness for war as far as the scouts and screening vessels of the Navy were concerned.

I then wrote to the department about the completion of the *Saratoga*. On May 2, 1917, while at sea in the U. S. S. *Pueblo*, and knowing that the *Pueblo* would soon be required in the war zone, I wrote the attached letter concerning the completion of the armored cruiser *Saratoga* still under repair at Bremerton. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO" FLAGSHIP,
PASSAGE, CERROS ISLAND TO SAN DIEGO,
May 2, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations) (Material).
Subject: Completion of *Saratoga*.

1. I am informed by the commandant of the Bremerton yard, under date of April 3, that he has been embarrassed for lack of funds to provide for the completion of the *Saratoga*.

2. In view of the department's confidential message "10028," and assuming that this ship may be ultimately under my command, I earnestly suggest that every possible effort be made to put her in readiness for efficient service at the earliest possible date.

3. As soon as she comes under my control an attempt will be made to drill and train her personnel to the highest state of military efficiency.

W. F. FULLAM.

The *Saratoga* was completed and became my eighth flagship in the fall of 1917. It is proper to state at this point that I at all times assisted the department by gladly sending every ship I could possibly spare into the Atlantic. Upon the receipt of a letter from Admiral Benson, October 1, 1917, that he regretted taking the *Saratoga* from me, I promptly answered his letter which is herewith attached. [Reading:]

October 8, 1917.

MY DEAR BENSON: Your letter of October 1 at hand.

(Of course, I personally regret leaving the *Saratoga*, my eighth flagship—but "War is hell," and we must recognize it.)

I understand the situation perfectly. If the Japanese Navy, Australian Navy, and the few English cruisers on the coast of South America are active, they should practically prevent the possibility of raiders or submarines getting around either cape into the Pacific. And, therefore, there is no reason why ships like the *Saratoga* should not go to the Atlantic, where the demands are clearly paramount.

In the meantime, I will keep the few ships here in the best possible condition, by sending them to the navy yard frequently; and with the patrol scheme in Mexico, I can hold the situation down.

I can use colliers and even the oil barge, if necessary, to guard our interests in those ports.

I can see that if all the South American Republic stampede over to our side, as they may do, the Germans can find no bases for their operations in South America; and we will only have to circumvent them in Mexico and Central America.

With good consuls and a well-organized secret service in Mexico we can checkmate them here, with the aid of these small ships.

I have ordered the *Oregon* to San Diego and will make this my headquarters, as it is the only place under the circumstances.

I shall remain on board the *Saratoga* until after her target practice and will inspect the submarine and training station at San Pedro next Thursday; and will shift to the *Oregon* on Friday, October 12.

I do hope our Government will consider the Mexican situation and put the screws on all German rascality, and make German merchants in Mexico squeal. They are making money at our expense and using it to help Germany.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Admiral W. S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

I was anxious to send troops to the war.

On October 19, six months after we entered the war, Admiral Benson addressed to me the attached letter of appreciation of my work on getting the armored cruisers ready for war.

This ends the story of the preparation for war in the Pacific during the two-year period from October, 1915, to October, 1917.

It is proper to state in this connection that while I had served as second in command under Admiral Winslow and Admiral Caperton, from June, 1916, to May, 1917, part of the time the work of preparing the armored cruisers and other large vessels in the Pacific devolved entirely upon me inasmuch as all these vessels except the one flagship of the commander in chief were directly under my command. Admiral Winslow and Admiral Caperton received from me the most loyal support at all times and they both gave me credit for the work our officers did.

In conclusion, it may be claimed that the following facts are established by the evidence in this correspondence:

(a) The Navy Department did not take the initiative in preparing the armored cruisers for war either as regards personnel or material.

(b) It was only after the lapse of 11 months constant effort, and after my caustic letter of September 14, 1916, that the bureaus of the Navy Department were coordinated and a policy adopted.

(c) The few armored and fast cruisers in our Navy would have been of great value if our battle fleet had been called upon to meet a hostile fleet in war. Every one of these ships should, therefore, have been in instant readiness with a full crew trained when war was declared. Otherwise the fleet could not act offensively and it was at a grave disadvantage on the defensive in having no scouts or screening vessels. Unpreparedness in this respect was inexcusable.

The following subjects are briefly handled in separate files to demonstrate the complete unreadiness of the Pacific forces for war. I present first the following memorandum. [Reading]:

1. Aviation in the Pacific before and during the World War.
2. Neglect of the Navy Department to prepare and develop an adequate aviation service for war in 1917, after Admiral Fiske had urged the Secretary of the Navy to establish a bureau of aeronautics in 1913.
3. Inadequate air service during the World War.

4 Importance of aviation for a scouting duty with the fleet, especially in the absence of battle cruisers, scout cruisers, and because of the unpreparedness of the armored cruisers of our Navy.

1. In the first part of my statement concerning the unpreparedness of the armored cruisers for war it was emphasized that the battle fleet of the United States was blind for the lack of battle cruisers and scout cruisers, and for this reason the preparation of all armored and fast cruisers for scouting service was of vital importance, especially in view of the fact that our aviation service was totally inadequate to furnish seaplanes as an adjunct in scouting work in war operations. It is important, therefore, to take up the subject of aviation in connection with the conduct of the war.

2. In 1913, while I was serving as one of the aids to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Fiske, in my presence, called the attention of the Secretary to the immediate necessity for a bureau of aeronautics. The admiral advocated this step as the best and most economical means for the defense of the Philippines against invasion, as well as an auxiliary measure for the protection of our own costs. In his effort to impress the Secretary with the importance of this subject, Admiral Fiske laid before the Secretary the illustrations and sketches of organization and material in the aviation bureaus of European nations.

3 Notwithstanding Admiral Fiske's efforts, which continued unremittingly until his retirement from the Navy Department in 1915, comparatively little had been accomplished in aviation before the declaration of war, and, as a result of this failure to act during a period of four years, we had only 45 trained aviators and a pitifully inadequate service in July, 1917, three months after we entered the war.

Three months after we entered the war we had only 45 trained aviators.

The CHAIRMAN. In the whole Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. In the whole Navy. That is the official statement from the Navy Department, in which it demonstrates its wonderful—and they were wonderful—efforts to expand that service after the war was on top of us. Then they did hustle, and our aviators, a few of them in Europe, did wonderful work. They could not help it. Naval officers do not know how to neglect their duty. [Continuing reading:]

4. Capt. Bristol, who had been appointed director of aeronautics, exerted himself to the utmost, but his hands were tied. His estimates in 1916 were cut down by the Navy Department from \$13,000,000 to \$2,000,000, Congress ultimately increasing the appropriation to \$3,500,000, a sum, however, which was sadly insufficient.

5. There was no Navy aviation service whatever on the Pacific coast previous to the declaration of war, and no preparation for the prompt organization of such an important element in offensive and defensive warfare in the Pacific or elsewhere.

6. Several months after we entered the war, a young lieutenant reported to me at San Diego, Calif., and informed me that he was directed to organize a school for the elementary instruction of officers in the mechanical and other details of aviation, and that an aviation field was to be developed on North Island in San Diego harbor.

This young officer, Lieut. Spender, United States Navy, with few qualified assistants, pushed his work with all possible zeal and energy. But progress was very slow for lack of funds and want of careful plans. In the spring of 1918, nearly a year after we had been in the war, despite Lieut. Spender's efforts and through no fault of his, so little had been accomplished in the building of the aviation station that I had called the attention of the Navy Department to the situation, and Capt. Laning, Assistant in the Bureau of Navigation, who came to the Pacific on an inspection tour, sent a telegram to the department stating that conditions were not satisfactory and that unless immediate steps were taken there would be no means nor facilities for training officers and men at San Diego for months to come.

7. Ultimately a beginning was made, a few seaplanes were supplied, and training was pushed in 1918 with the limited material at hand. Very few of the aviators from San Diego got to the war zone, and very few seaplanes were available for use with our naval forces in Europe. I was personally informed by one of our aviators, and I think he was one of those who went on a cruise across the Atlantic—he was one of the best ones—that he flew the first American-built seaplane in Europe July 13, 1918, four months before the armistice was signed, and five years after Admiral Fiske had urged the Secretary of the Navy to establish an aviation bureau to develop this important service.

Now, I know that he made that statement—that he personally flew the first American-built seaplane in Europe in July, 1918. We flew planes that we got over there, before that, of course. I would not like to make any statement here that could not be substantiated. I only want to make the statement that that statement was made personally to me by the man who said that he did it. [Continuing reading:]

8. The record made by our aviators in the war zone was worthy of the highest praise. But the failure of the Navy Department to act promptly upon the recommendations of Admiral Fiske during the years from 1913 to 1917, resulted in a pathetically inadequate naval air service in the first year of the war. Had the Admiral's plans been approved by the Secretary, and had Capt. Bristol's estimates and suggestions been accepted, the Navy might have sent an air force to the war zone sufficiently strong at the beginning of the war to have attacked the enemy's aviation bases and interfered seriously with their submarine campaign.

9. The officers and bureaus of the Navy Department were in no sense responsible for our unpreparedness in aviation. The responsibility rested with the Secretary of the Navy, who cut the estimates and prevented the full development of this important element of naval warfare during the years preceding the declaration of war.

10. The naval air station at San Diego is still in process of building, nearly 18 months after the armistice was signed. Its present equipment and the number of planes now available are totally inadequate for effective cooperation with the fleet in war operations or for the defense of the Pacific.

11. When war was threatened with Mexico in 1916, Admiral Winslow was ordered with his whole force to the west coast. I accompanied him as second in command.

I had orders to prepare for possible hostilities with Mexico. I had three ports that I was required to stand by to take. [Reading:]

An aviation squadron would have been of the utmost importance at that time, but there was not a single seaplane on the Pacific coast for service with Admiral Winslow's forces; three years after, the importance of this adjunct had been brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy by Admiral Fiske.

Those seaplanes might have saved a great many lives if we had been forced ashore.

I present next this memorandum with regard to unpreparedness of ships from the Asiatic station and from Honolulu passing through the Pacific for the war zone. [Reading:]

UNPREPAREDNESS OF SHIPS FROM THE ASIATIC STATION AND FROM HONOLULU PASSING THROUGH THE PACIFIC FOR THE WAR ZONE.

1. It was my duty as the senior officer in the Pacific not only to fit out my own vessels for war, but to provide as far as possible for the needs of all vessels passing through the Pacific for duty in the war zone.

2. There were a number of such vessels—the *Cincinnati* and *Galveston* from the Asiatic station, the *Schurz* and *Gulfport* from Honolulu, and the *Alert* and *Albatross*, which had not been under my command.

3. I inspected these vessels and found them unready for war in every respect. They were woefully short of officers and men, and many of these ships had not had target practice or opportunity to train their crews for battle.

4. I stripped my own ships to supply officers, petty officers and men, as it was my manifest duty to do in order to contribute to the readiness of ships bound to the war zone. I did these things without orders or authority from the Navy Department; but both Admiral Palmer and Capt. Laning of the Bureau of Navigation heartily approved my action.

5. Fully recognizing the ability and zeal of the officers and men on board these vessels, it is the simple truth to declare that they were so short of personnel and so untrained for battle that had any one of them met an enemy vessel of the same class properly manned and trained its defeat would have been inevitable. It was a pitiful condition of unpreparedness. It was another proof of the great good fortune of this country that the German Fleet was bottled up, without a cruiser upon the sea. It is to be devoutly hoped that the United States will not again owe its safety to the fact

that its enemy is completely blockaded by the fleet of Great Britain or any other friendly power. It is time to recognize the truth—even as regards naval matters. Attention is invited to the letters hereto attached concerning the unpreparedness of the vessels mentioned above.

I desire also to read the following letters [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. "Oregon," Flagship, December 3, 1917.

MY DEAR GEORGE:—Thank you for your letter of the 30th. The K boats and the *Atilla*—*Gulfport*, *Schurz*, *Alert* and *Nanshan*—got away. The *Nanshan* will return from Acapulco and the *Alert* will return from Balboa, unless her orders are changed. Thank you very much for hustling things.

We will now concentrate on the *Savannah* and N boats, and I realize that you are doing everything possible to expedite their departure.

I have directed the division commander of the N boats to make all preparations necessary for their cruise. I am surprised at the small amount of Diesel engine oil and lubricating oil required by the N boats at Acapulco. The K boats required a great deal more.

I have granted the request for the N boats to proceed to San Diego, without convoy, but will stand by to help them with the *Yorktown* in case anything happens.

I can well understand your difficulties with all active officers detached. We will have similar conditions in the ships of my force. We are training reserve officers for cruising duty.

I shall write a letter to the department to-day concerning the project to make improvements and alterations in the *Brutus* and *Nanshan* and will send you a copy of the letter.

After departure of the *Savannah* and N boats there will be a small force remaining for us to keep in cruising trim.

Thanking you again,
Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. HARRY GEORGE, United States Navy, Retired,
Commandant, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Vallejo, Calif.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the name of that officer?

Admiral FULLAM. Capt. George, a very efficient and able officer; and the work that he did out there was wonderful.

Then I wrote a letter to Capt. Pratt, one of my officers and a very dear friend of mine [reading]:

DECEMBER 16, 1917.

MY DEAR PRATT: I inclose copy of a letter to Palmer, concerning the *Cincinnati*. It explains itself.

While I intended always to hustle ships on their way to the east coast, I consider it most important to put them in as good shape as possible as regards material and personnel before leaving here.

I am stripping my ships of petty officers and commissioned officers of the regular Navy whenever they are needed for ships going to the Atlantic.

When the *Galveston* arrives I will try to put her in good shape also.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. WM. V. PRATT, United States Navy,
Office of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

I wrote that letter to Capt. Pratt and addressed it to the Office of Naval Operations because I wanted them to realize that I was helping. They were helping me at that time, in December, 1917, and everything was going with speed. I wrote the following letter to Admiral Palmer [reading]:

DECEMBER 16, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: The *Cincinnati* has arrived. She is short of officers and of men too.

I have made tentative arrangements to detach two or three regular line officers from the *Yorktown* and three of the best reserve officers from the *Oregon* and send them to the *Cincinnati*.

I will also fill the *Cincinnati's* complement of petty officers and men from my ships so that she may start from here with a good crew.

I assume that you wish me to do this and I am proceeding with the plan to send regular officers, in excess of those absolutely necessary in my ships, to duty where they are absolutely needed.

The *Cincinnati* has been underway constantly for a month and her engines and boilers need careful attention.

The engineer force has had no rest or liberty, and I deem it absolutely necessary that she shall stay here about a week before proceeding. It will save time in the end.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER, United States Navy,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S.—I assume that the *Galveston* may need officers and men also and I will do my best to supply her needs.

The *Yorktown*, having an excess of regulars, will be called upon to supply officers for the *Galveston* as well as the *Cincinnati*.

I wrote the following letter also to Capt. Laning [reading]:

DECEMBER 23, 1917.

MY DEAR LANING: When the *Cincinnati* arrived I found she needed assistance as regards personnel.

Brumby had made a quick trip, only stopping for coal, and he needed officers at once.

I transferred two regulars from the *Yorktown* and three reserve officers from the *Oregon*, which cheered him up.

I advised Brumby to discharge or transfer all short-time men who enlisted on this coast.

I gave him 14 petty officers, 8 signalmen and radio men, and 40 seamen, second-class, which filled his complement.

He was greatly encouraged, and said that he was better off than ever before.

The engines needed overhauling before leaving San Diego, and the crew, especially the engineer department, deserved liberty.

She has several propeller blades and about 20 tons of spare boiler parts stowed on her deck. While this does not interfere with the guns, it would be desirable to ship it from Colon to the States by collier or merchant vessel, if there is any chance of the *Cincinnati* being required to meet an enemy.

Brumby informed me that the ship had not had target practice recently and that a long interval had elapsed between the last two practices.

I would suggest that the ship be thoroughly inspected upon her arrival at Hampton Roads before she is assigned to the war zone.

Upon the arrival of the *Galveston*, will take account of her needs also.

There are two more regulars on the *Yorktown* who can be sent to the *Galveston*, if she needs them. I think that will bring all my vessels down to their authorized allowance of regular officers, and we will immediately train the personnel to obtain the best standard possible.

Orders have just come to detach the *Alert*, instead of her coming back here from Balboa. She has two officers—a gunner and a reserve officer—on board whom I sent to her to help out during her cruise to Balboa. We strive to please.

I send this to you because I suppose Palmer is overloaded and I thought you would bring the matter to his attention.

Very sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Commander HARRIS LANING, United States Navy,
Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

I have here another letter that I wrote to Capt. Laning. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. "*Oregon*," Flagship, January 12, 1918.

MY DEAR LANING: Thank you for your letter of January 4.

Your previous letter to me concerning the *Nanshan* and *Brutus* was perfectly well justified, and I appreciated it.

I was perhaps more disgusted than discouraged. If the department does not let me handle things out here it will get into a mess sooner or later.

The *Galveston* came in yesterday, and we are giving her everything she needs. I did not hesitate to strip the ships of rated men to supply the *Galveston's* needs, and I required the submarine base at San Pedro to send two machinist's mates and aoppersmith, because we can fill our vacancies out here much easier than *Galveston* can.

I have taken all the *Galveston's* short timers on board the *Oregon* and *Vicksburg*. I hope most of them will reenlist.

Chadwick needed two watch officers badly, and he was below the complement assigned him by the bureau.

With these transfers of two regulars from my ships we will be about down to our final complement as fixed by the bureau.

It has been my policy to do my utmost for every ship leaving this side for the Atlantic, both as regards material and personnel.

Always sincerely,

W. F. FULLAM.

I present another memorandum, on the following heads:

1. Unpreparedness as regards torpedoes in the Pacific.
2. Difficulty of testing torpedoes of armored cruisers due to lack of personnel.
3. Lack of facilities at Keyport, the only torpedo station in the Pacific.
4. Submarines leave the Pacific for the war zone with no torpedoes or guns for offensive or defensive use.

The memorandum is as follows:

1. Early in 1916 the force commander took up the work of putting the torpedoes of the armored cruisers into condition for effective use as fast as personnel and facilities could be obtained.

2. It was found that this work was greatly hampered by the lack of personnel, and the department was asked to supply both officers and men.

3. It was discovered that the torpedo station at Keyport was lacking in facilities despite the zealous action of the commanding officers, Lieut. Commander Jenson and Lieut. Canaga who succeeded him.

4. There was no air pump at Keyport, and in testing the torpedoes the station was dependent upon the presence of an old torpedo boat to supply air. When this boat went to Bremerton for repairs all torpedo work was stopped. This was a great handicap.

5. The armored cruisers were undergunned in comparison with the battle cruisers and other vessels of the German Navy. Under some conditions, therefore, the skillful use of their torpedoes might have somewhat lessened the handicap of our ships in battle with the scouts of the enemy. At all events it was a duty to put their torpedoes in proper condition if they were to remain on board these ships.

6. There was shortage of torpedoes in the Pacific for the supply of new destroyers and submarines, and for this reason these vessels sailed for the Atlantic in many cases without any torpedoes or guns on board. It was fortunate for them that the German Navy was bottled up by the Grand Fleet of Great Britain, unless it can be demonstrated that an American ship with no weapons and with an untrained personnel can defeat an enemy properly armed and trained.

7. Owing to the insurmountable difficulties in the Pacific not more than one-half of the torpedoes of the armored cruisers had been properly proved and tested when war was declared. This was wrong, no matter whether these torpedoes were kept on board these ships or were sent to submarines or destroyers.

8. Attention is invited to the letters hereto attached, which suffice to explain the situation in the Pacific.

I wrote a number of letters concerning this. I do not think I will read them all. Here is one to Admiral Benson, dated May 25, 1916 [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 25, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I have ordered the *South Dakota* and *Oregon* to proceed to Portland for the rose festival in accordance with the department's wishes.

You will realize that these ships are very short-handed, both as regards men and officers. Williams on the *Oregon* is a commander, and Tozer is the only other commander I have in the reserve fleet.

I suggested that Tozer be ordered to take the *South Dakota* to Portland and from there to San Francisco, and that he then return by rail to Bremerton.

I consider it very wrong to order young lieutenants, who have never commanded any kind of a ship, however small, to take command of a 14,000-ton armored cruiser—some of them with inturning screws—and expect them to take the full responsibility of a captain in the Navy and to navigate their ships on the Pacific coast with short-handed complements.

Of course, they have done it thus far and they deserve great credit. I hope, however, that this condition may not be long forced upon them.

We should all be ready and willing to tackle any job in an emergency, but the time has about come, it seems to me, to stop requiring things that are practically impossible without providing the means. We have about reached the limit in attempting to do things without the facilities for doing them.

I shall send you very soon a report on the torpedoes of the armored cruisers. This report will show that many of the torpedoes have not been fired in years and others have not been fired at all. This is a serious matter.

Of course, torpedoes can not be handled by people who don't know anything about torpedoes.

There are reasons, therefore, for supplying these armored cruisers with enough officers and men to keep them in cruising condition and keep their guns and torpedoes ready for war. The climate and conditions at Bremerton and the custom of lying alongside the dock will prevent success. The plan outlined will, I think, make success possible.

I will continue to keep things going until the department can furnish the officers and men that are needed.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish some of these other letters which you have not read, to be put in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. It might be well to have them there as a matter of future reference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; we will put them all in.

Admiral FULLAM. They are of no use to me.

Here is another letter on this matter of torpedoes of May 27, 1916 [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 27, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I am inclosing for your eye copies of two letters received from Bradshaw.

These letters will give you some information which I think you should have concerning affairs of the reserve fleet. I especially call your attention to the lack of facilities at the Keyport Station for handling torpedoes. This is a matter of prime importance. We should have a station out there that is perfectly equipped to do this work expeditiously and thoroughly. All our ships that are so deficient in speed and gun power should have their torpedoes in perfect condition because these might help them out in an emergency.

I hope you and Blue, therefore, can eventually assign skilled torpedo officers and men to every ship that carries torpedoes. I shall emphasize this matter as much as possible with the personnel I have.

I will send copies of these letters to Blue for his consideration. I assume that you and Blue want to be in touch occasionally with actual conditions out here, and trust that I am not nagging you.

I wish to commend in the highest terms the manner in which Bradshaw has acted as senior officer present at Bremerton. He deserves great credit, and I shall give it to him on his report of fitness.

I truly hope that you may approve my last cruising schedule so that I may get the armored cruisers in proper condition. To be sure, they are not powerful ships.

but they are the best cruisers we have, and we will have no others for sometime to come, and in time of need they would be of some use.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral W. S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Here is another letter to Admiral Blue [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
 U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 27, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I am sending you copies of two letters from Bradshaw, because they contain information which I think you should have.

I am very anxious to do my duty in getting these ships in condition for active service. They are not very powerful, to be sure, but they are the best cruisers we now have or will have for some time to come, and we should put them in perfect condition.

I consider that the torpedoes of these ships should be absolutely reliable and that the personnel should be such as to give confidence in the torpedoes. In time of need these ships, with such inadequate gun power and speed, might find their torpedoes of great use, if they were skillfully handled. For this reason, I hope the bureau will ultimately see to it that every ship carrying torpedoes has a skilled personnel to handle them.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE, United States Navy.
Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The Battle of Jutland shows that the ships that had torpedoes used them; they fired torpedoes, often, when they were suddenly confronted by an enemy's ship at short range, in the fog and mist that they had in the North Sea; and the torpedo was a very useful weapon.

I made a report to the Navy Department on May 31, 1916, upon the subject of torpedo work, which is as follows [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
 U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 31, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations, target practice and engineering competitions).

Subject: Torpedo work of ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet.

1. There are 40 Whitehead Mark V, Mod. 4, torpedoes in the armored cruisers attached to the Pacific Reserve Fleet—8 on each of five ships: The *Colorado*, *Maryland*, *Pittsburgh*, *South Dakota*, and *West Virginia*.

2. Attention is invited to the attached table showing the last date on which each torpedo was fired, reason for firing, result of shot and number of shots to date.

3. The *Colorado* received her torpedoes July 8, 1913, practically three years ago, and none of them have ever been fired except to test fit in tube, April 21, 1915, almost two years after receipt.

4. The *South Dakota* received her present outfit of torpedoes July 17, 1913. Four of them have never been fired; the other four once each, for test, and one of them functioned.

5. It is considered absolutely essential for the sake of the efficiency of these ships that they be given suitable personnel, and afforded opportunity to test and prove, at least, all torpedoes on board, and to keep them in an efficient condition.

• W. F. FULLAM.

I wrote another letter to Admiral Blue on the same subject, which is as follows [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., June 5, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I am very glad we are to get some midshipmen for the armored cruisers in the reserve fleet. "Small favors thankfully received," and I will try to prescribe a routine which will be of benefit to these young men.

I shall be greatly encouraged if commanding officers and a few officers of junior rank are supplied later on in order that the work of training apprentices, and the projected civilian practice cruise, may be properly done.

The junior officers have handled these ships extraordinarily well, but I am sure you realize that it is a heavy responsibility to put upon them, and if anything should happen there would be severe criticisms.

I am trying hard to insure that important elements of man-of-war efficiency—machinery, battery, and torpedoes—are made ready in these armored cruisers.

The battery and the machinery may be satisfactorily attended to, but the torpedo question is more difficult. We are doing all we can with the personnel available, and I will continue to utilize the services of the officers and gunners' mates who are qualified to handle torpedoes. I hope, however, that special effort may be made to at least put one officer and one or two expert gunners' mates on ships that have torpedoes also that we may be sure of getting them in fighting trim.

The *South Dakota* and *Maryland* are working with torpedoes now at the Keyport station, and I shall direct the *Colorado* to overhaul hers and be ready to fire them as soon as she reaches Keyport. The *Pittsburgh*, in the meantime, will make preparations to test her torpedoes also.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE, United States Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Also I wrote a letter to Admiral Caperton dated March 7, 1917, just as he was about to leave [reading]:

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., March 7, 1917.

MY DEAR CAPERTON: While the *Perry* is undergoing repairs at Bremerton there is no air compressor at the torpedo station and it is impossible for the *Frederick* and the *South Dakota* to prove their torpedoes.

It has been my policy to have ships employ their time to advantage while at Bremerton, particularly as regards testing and proving their torpedoes. It is amazing that the Navy Department has not equipped that station in such an important respect. It would have been a very simple matter to install an air compressor there.

I have represented the matter to the Navy Department and hope you will also give it a push. I assume that you have no destroyer available at present to send there while the *Perry* is being repaired. Meanwhile the *Frederick* and *South Dakota* are helpless with their torpedo work.

I will not read the rest of that letter, it is in my file.

Then there is a memorandum on the shortage of small-arm and machine-gun ammunition in the Navy from September, 1917, to March, 1918 [reading]:

1. Attention is invited to the attached letter from Admiral Benson dated September 20, 1917, forbidding all target practice with machine guns, rifles, and revolvers in the Navy owing to the shortage of ammunition.

Attention is invited to the attached letter from Admiral Plunkett dated March 14, 1918, removing the restriction upon the expenditure of machine-gun and rifle ammunition, but continuing the restriction as regards revolver ammunition.

3. From this it will be seen that for six months during the war, from September 1917, to March, 1918, tens of thousands of enlisted recruits must have entered the Navy and served afloat and ashore without even having pulled the trigger of a revolver rifle, or machine gun. The assertion is ventured with confidence that many thousand enlisted men of the Navy never fired a single shot, even at target practice, with any weapon, large or small, during the World War.

4. The shortage of small-arm ammunition was admittedly of less importance than a shortage of shells for big guns in the Navy. It is understood, however, that there was a perilous shortage of 14-inch shells for our first-line dreadnaughts, and that the contracts for these shells were held up for some time at the Navy Department. Such a condition, if it existed, crippled the battle fleet and imperiled the country.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, September 20, 1917.

To: Commander in chief, Force Commander, Division Commanders, Commandants of Naval Districts, and Bureau of Ordnance:

Subject: Expenditures of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes.

1. Expenditure of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes, for pistols, rifles, and machine guns, will be suspended until further orders.

2. A small amount of unserviceable ammunition has been issued to small-arms ranges for the purpose of training recruits. This firing may continue until ammunition supplied is exhausted, when firing will be suspended until such time as the department is able to allot ammunition for target-practice purposes.

W. S. BENSON.

Then there is the letter from Admiral Plunkett, dated March 14, 1918, which is as follows [reading]:

MARCH 14, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet; commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet; commander, Division 2, United States Pacific Fleet; Commandants, naval districts:

Subject: Expenditure of ammunition for small-arms target practice.

1. The following letter from the Bureau of Ordnance is quoted for the information of the service, and the recommendations contained therein are approved:

MARCH 9, 1918.

To: Chief of Naval Operations:

Subject: Expenditure of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes.

Reference: (a) Office of N. L. Letter OP-P-W (1-157) 27832-340 of September 30, 1917.

1. Reference (a) suspended the use of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes, for pistols, rifles, and machine guns until further orders.

2. Recent large deliveries of .30-caliber ball cartridges, model 1906 (Springfield rifle ammunition) relieved the shortage of this type of ammunition and the bureau is now in a position to fill out ships' and shore-stations' allowances. It is recommended therefore, that the order suspending the use of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes be rescinded in so far as it applies to rifle and machine-gun ammunition.

3. As the shortage of pistol and revolver ammunition is still acute, it is recommended that the use of this ammunition for target-practice purposes continue to be suspended until larger supplies are received.

RALPH EARLE.

2. Ammunition for small-arms practice is furnished directly to the following ranges:

Navy rifle range, Camp Logan, Ill.

Navy rifle range, Great Lakes, Ill.

Navy rifle range, Wakefield, Mass.

Navy rifle range, Peekskill, N. Y.

Navy rifle range, navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa.

Navy rifle range, Cape May, N. J.

Navy rifle range, Glen Burnie, Md.

Naval Academy Rifle Range, Annapolis, Md.

Navy rifle range, Virginia Beach, Va.

Navy rifle range, Mount Pleasant, S. C.

And for men sent to these ranges for practice, no supply of ammunition need be furnished from their ship or station.

C. P. PLUNKETT,
By direction.

So that for six months we could not have any target practice with small arms. Here is another memorandum on shortage of guns in the Pacific and in the Navy [reading]:

MEMORANDUM.

1. Shortage of guns in the Pacific and in the Navy.
2. Removal of 3-inch guns from the armored cruisers.
3. Removal of intermediate battery from battleships in the Atlantic Fleet.
4. Shortage of guns even as late as September, 1918.
5. Inability of the Navy Department to supply guns of 4 inches and above to ships in the Pacific to safeguard them against a possible German raider.

First. Immediately upon the declaration of war about two-thirds of the 3-inch guns were removed from all the armored cruisers in the Pacific, and it is believed that the same was done in the Atlantic, and that many of the intermediate battery guns were removed from the second-line battleships to be utilized in merchant vessels.

Second. The removal of these guns from fighting ships somewhat diminished their offensive gun-fire in meeting submarine and destroyer attacks. As a war measure it was most unfortunate. Had our fleet been called upon to fight at sea, it would have somewhat lessened the chances of victory. A study of the Battle of Jutland will suffice to demonstrate this fact.

Third. It is only fair to say, however, that the removal of some of the intermediate battery and 3-inch guns, especially those on the lower decks which would, for this reason, have been of little use in a heavy sea, was justified and doubtless recommended. But the fact remains that in fair weather the volume of fire of these ships was quite materially reduced.

Fourth. After sending every available vessel from the Pacific to the Atlantic, the turret guns of the brave old *Oregon* were the sole defense against a possible well-armed raider in the Pacific. For this reason it was my duty to ask that a few guns of 4-inch and heavier calibre be supplied to certain vessels under my command to meet possible emergencies; particularly at a time when Germany was reported to be trying to fit out some special raiders with special endurance, who might get into the Pacific.

These guns could not be supplied in September, 1918, for reasons set forth in the attached letters from Capt. Laning and Admiral Earle.

These facts confirm the recent statements of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, that he was compelled to spend many millions without authority of Congress to supply guns imperatively needed by the Navy.

Fifth. The responsibility for shortage of guns could not be laid to Admiral Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. It was not the policy of this country to prepare for war.

I have the following letter:

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., September 11, 1918.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Please do not consider that any letters from you ever bother me; I have been the loser by not hearing from you.

The bureau will do its best to provide heavy batteries for the *Brutus* and *Nanshan* when funds for the same become available. At the present writing there are such a large number of vessels in the overseas trade that are not armed that I do not expect to be able to send any guns of 4 inches and above to the Pacific coast until next spring at the earliest.

Spring of 1919. Six months after the armistice, before any guns would be available for the Pacific.

The bureau would certainly assist in the matter of building a magazine at San Diego should the Chief of Naval Operations so authorize.

As for rifles and machine guns, the production is not anywhere near up to the demand. In other words, we are training men for the Navy and Army faster than we can turn out rifles for them.

I will speak to Leahy, Director of Target Practice, about the rifle range on the Pacific coast and see what he has to offer.

I regret that I can not answer your letter in a more satisfactory manner, but I am unable to do so. Really, there seems less and less hope of immediate betterment because of the labor conditions throughout the country.

With kindest regards, I remain,
Most sincerely, yours,

RALPH EARLE.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, UNITED STATES NAVY,
U. S. S. "Oregon," Municipal Dock, San Diego, Calif.

I have a letter from Laning dated the same day. He said that he had been in conference that day with Admiral Earle. [Reading]:

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., September 11, 1918.

My DEAR ADMIRAL: I received your letter dated September 4 bringing with it an inclosure, a copy of your letter to Admiral Earle. I have been in on a number of conferences with regard to the gun situation and I am very much afraid that it will be impossible for Ordnance to change the batteries of those ships at the present time. As a matter of fact the demand for guns is so heavy that Ordnance is not yet able to equip more than a few of the vessels going to the war zone, so no matter how advisable it may be it is still less possible to send guns elsewhere.

The gun problem is the most serious thing confronting us. I am sure that everybody would only be too pleased to fix those ships up the way you recommend but I am sure no one would think it the best thing to do at this time when all the available guns are needed for use against submarines.

Sincerely, yours,

HARRIS LANING.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, *United States Navy,*
Municipal Docks, San Diego, Calif.

There is another file of letters which are confidential because they refer to matters in regard to coast defense, that ought not to be made public, but I suppose that if you wish them——

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want them to be included in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. If they could be considered confidential——

The CHAIRMAN. It would be better to leave them out of the record.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes. I will abbreviate the reading of this letter [reading]:

1. This file shows the effort made by the commander of the reserve forces on the Pacific to get proper coordination between the Army and the Navy on the Pacific.

2. It will be noted that the first letter was written on the 17th of February, 1917, nearly two months before the war was declared, but that the correspondence was not concluded until 19th of October, 1917, about six months after the war was declared.

In other words, I corresponded for eight months trying to get coordination.

3. During this time things were in a more or less unsettled and chaotic state despite the efforts of the division commander.

4. There appeared to be hesitation at the Navy Department to adopting any real thorough system by which responsibility would be fixed and definite action demanded.

5. The objection by the Navy Department to permanent and properly organized "joint boards" in each port appeared to be the main stumblingblock.

6. There seemed to be fear that these boards of Army and Navy commanders would assume too much authority; but assumption of authority and definite plans to use authority and use it quickly was the secret of the whole matter, and the letter to Capt. Marvell of September 27, 1917, gave the division commander's ideas on this subject in no uncertain words.

7. It was not deemed sufficient by the division commander that boards and conferences should be "informal" or by "mutual consent" but that such boards and such conferences should be decidedly authoritative in order that they might be held responsible in their cooperation and in their defensive measures.

8. This subject is one of interest for the present and the future if we are to be at all times properly prepared for war.

9. The art of going to war "informally" has not been studied at our Naval War College and has not been justified as a sound national policy by Admiral Mahan or other well qualified authorities.

10. War must be considered as a decidedly "formal" and serious business. Our next enemy may so consider it, in which case the United States will be at a very serious disadvantage if we adhere to the "informal" attitude in organization and preparation for war.

11. The Army and Navy must work in harmony, and with perfect coordination, offensively and defensively, if we are to be victorious.

12. Organization costs nothing. It demands no appropriation by Congress. It is economical and prevents chaos when war comes. It conserves Mahan's principle "The organization of the Navy Department should be such that it may pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar in its machinery."

13. The maintenance of an Army and Navy involves the appropriation of hundreds of millions annually. This taxation is not justified unless both the Army and Navy are at all times ready for war, and prepared by perfect organization to instantly cooperate. The thoughts of officers should be fixed constantly upon this subject. This is the best way to occupy their minds in time of peace. They should be compelled, not forbidden, to study and advocate this policy of organization. It is their first duty. The Secretary of the Navy should reward and encourage officers who work on this line rather than those who simply carry on a peace routine with no anticipation of war. The people of this country should demand perfection of organization in the Navy and at the Navy Department.

14. The United States can not wisely pursue the gentle policy of "informality" leaving our enemy to strike with "formal" and well-organized force. We must not be so wonderfully kind and chivalrous as to leave our coasts with an "informal" defensive plan, thus giving the initial advantage to an unchivalrous enemy who is ready to take advantage of us.

15. On the 5th of February, 1917, being then in San Francisco with my flagship, believing that war was inevitable and that I might possibly be left in command in the Pacific I wrote to Capt. Chase, Assistant of the Chief of Naval Operations informing him of the need of immediate defensive plans in the Pacific; that the Army and Navy were not as yet prepared to coordinate; that "I am conferring with the military authorities and with Capt. Gilmer"; that "I send this information because there must be cooperation; and similar conditions may exist at other seaports."

16. This began a correspondence which continued for eight months—from two months before the war until October, 1917. The letters in the attached file tell the story. They should not be published. They are numbered serially. (See letter No. 1.)

17. The next day, February 6, I wrote an official letter to the department on the subject of cooperation at San Francisco. (See letter No. 2.)

18. On February 17 I wrote an official letter concerning a conference with Gen. Sibert, commanding the coast defense of the Pacific, and Capt. Gilmer, the commandant of the twelfth naval district. At this conference the subject of cooperation of the Army and Navy was thoroughly discussed, the need of immediate organization was manifest, and we unanimously recommended the formation of permanent, local "joint boards" of Army and Navy officers at each seaport to prepare and perfect defensive plans concluding with the words: "A procedure of this kind would serve to meet the emergency of sudden war without confusion or delay at any time." It is submitted that this plan merited immediate consideration and adoption by the Navy Department. (See letter No. 3.)

19. On February 20 I wrote to the department giving an account of another conference with Gen. Sibert, Capt. Gilmer, and the master of pilots of San Francisco. At this meeting, held on board my flagship, we got under way and steamed out to sea and back again to observe and discuss the existing defensive measures.

As a result of this experiment our previous opinions were confirmed and it was demonstrated, beyond question, that a radical change was demanded. (See letter No. 4.)

20. Under date of February 14 the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the force commander in answer to his letter of February 6. (See letter No. 5.)

21. Under date of February 27 Admiral Benson replied to my letters expressing satisfaction with our conferences at San Francisco. In this letter, however, there was no answer to my suggestions regarding joint boards. The department seemed to be satisfied that the existing regulations which directed commandants "to confer with Army officers" would suffice. (See letter No. 6.) I was greatly disappointed that the recommendations made by me and Gen. Sibert were not approved. In our estimation—and we were in the spot—existing regulations were not sufficient and a definitely carefully organized board at each seaport was a necessity.

22. In the meantime, while awaiting definite action by the Navy Department, upon my recommendation for thoroughness of organization, the soundness of my recommendations was conclusively demonstrated. On May 19 a sergeant at Fort Rosencrans reported three submarines off San Diego. This report caused great alarm. I did not for an instant believe that German submarines were in the Pacific, but nevertheless I sent two small vessels down to the coast to investigate, and warned all vessels, including the two Japanese cruisers at San Pedro. I had no authority to do more.

23. Confusion reigned at San Diego. The defensive measures were inadequate and there was poor cooperation of Army and Navy agencies. On May 20 the Navy Department sent a radio message to the force commander asking for an explanation of the lack of coordination at San Diego. To this radio the force commander, in reply sent the attached letter to the Navy Department.

Confidential.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. "OREGON," FLAGSHIP,
May 22, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Functions of commander, patrol force, and cooperation between Army and Navy on Pacific coast.

References: (a) Operations' radio 11020, May.

Inclosures: (1) Orders of patrol force commander; (2) correspondence concerning cooperation and local joint boards; (3) letters of May 2, May 9, and May 12.

1. Concerning the above subject and references, attention is invited to the following statements, and to the copies of letters, which are attached hereto for convenience of reference:

AUTHORITY COMMANDER PATROL FORCE.

2. The force commander wished to assume all responsibility that properly belonged to him on this coast, without overstepping or interfering with other commanders afloat or ashore.

3. It will be noted, from the copies of "orders" hereto attached, that the force commander is under the command of the commander in chief and that his authority is strictly limited to the ships of the patrol force. The coast torpedo force, the ships of the coast and the naval districts are independent of the Pacific patrol force.

NAVAL DISTRICTS.

4. A skeleton organization of the twelfth naval district, under mobilization orders, and dated March 23 was furnished the commander, reserve force, by Capt. Gilmer at my request, but this organization has been greatly modified by the detachment of the *Oregon*, *Annapolis*, *Yorktown*, *Hull*, *Hopkins*, and *Bear*.

5. No report of changes in the organization, no information concerning the ships or patrol boats now available or concerning the duties of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts, or as to the question of cooperation with the Army and the Pacific patrol force have been made known to me.

TWELFTH DISTRICT PATROL AT SAN DIEGO.

6. The *Yorktown* was originally designated for the twelfth district patrol service at San Diego. Upon her assignment to the Pacific patrol force on May 2, I did not detach her immediately, but sent the following radio in order that she might remain and turn over her duties in the twelfth district before leaving San Diego:

"SAN DIEGO.

"From: Commander, patrol force.

"To: *Yorktown*.

"Continue present duty until further orders 13108."

7. Under these orders the *Yorktown* remained at San Diego until May 12 before sailing for Honolulu to carry out orders of Navy department. Thus the *Yorktown* was permitted by me to remain at San Diego from May 2 to May 12—10 days—during which time the naval district duties were performed and transferred.

COOPERATION WITH ARMY.

8. Attention is respectfully invited to the attached letters which show that the commander, reserve force (now commander patrol force) initiated the consideration of "cooperation" in his letter of the 7th of February and emphasized its importance in other letters to March 24, inclusive.

DANGER FROM RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES.

9. These dangers are and have been discounted by the force commander, but the message from the commander at Fort Rosecrans on May 19 was so worded that immediate action was imperative on account of the presence of Japanese cruisers at San Pedro and the tows en route from Honolulu. There was no alternative but to send the *Shaw* and the *Iroquois* on the patrol to the southward.

POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE OF SUBMARINES IN PACIFIC.

10. The presence of German submarines in the Pacific now, or in the future, is believed to be extremely improbable.

11. However, in the absence of mines and nets, considering the composition of our naval forces to-day, and noting the record of performances of modern submarines, it is believed that a bold submarine commander, choosing his time, could enter the harbors of San Diego, San Pedro, or San Francisco, at night, sink any vessels at anchor there and escape to sea with little chance of being sunk.

FUTURE DUTIES OF PACIFIC PATROL FORCE.

12. Referring to my radio, and to letters of May 2, May 9, and May 12, and to Operations' letter of May 12 and radio of May 21, hereto attached for convenience of reference, the following points have not been settled:

(1) Officers for *Oregon* (letter May 9).

(2) Are Perry and Lawrence to be permanently attached to patrol force under my command (letter May 9)?

(3) New name for *Angel* (May 9).

(4) "Policy" of department as to "Mission" patrol force (May 9).

(5) Recognition signals (Radio May 11 and 17).

13. It is assumed that none of the vessels of coast guard and Fish Commission will be assigned to the Pacific patrol force.

14. This letter is written in order to bring the following questions up to date:

(1) Cooperation with Army.

(2) Cooperation with coast defense districts.

(3) Defense and patrol against submarines.

(4) Recognition signals between United States, Japanese, and English cruisers to avoid possible danger.

15. The force commander in flagship, San Diego, will leave San Francisco about June 1 to take part in and direct patrol to Honolulu and to inaugurate itinerary of patrol force approved by Operations.

16. The question of possible changes in organization to secure better or more complete cooperation between the various commandants and commanders, Army and Navy, on the Pacific coast is left to the consideration of the department, pending which the force commander will confine himself to the limits defined by his present orders.

17. The radio—Operations' 11020—carried the possible construction that the commander, patrol force, was informed of, or in some measure responsible for, cooperation or action at San Diego in connection with the submarine incident May 19. It is hoped that he will be freed from responsibility concerning that matter.

W. F. FULLAM.

This letter showed the need of better cooperation between the Army and Navy. It proved that the recommendation of "Local Joint Boards" was practical and necessary, and that there should be one directing head in the naval defense of the Pacific.

The Navy Department ultimately approved, in part, the suggestions of the commander, patrol force, and placed him in general charge of all naval districts.

There is a clipping from one of the newspapers attached to this letter. I will just leave it there.

Meantime, I had been at sea, cruising, and I could not coordinate defensive measures in the different seaports when I was at sea. I told the department that the organization must be independent of me, because I must go to sea sometimes. I wrote this letter explaining it, and that brought a letter under date of May 26 from the department, putting me in general charge of the naval district. I did not receive that letter for a month or so, because I was at sea [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1917.

To: Commander, Patrol Force, Pacific Fleet.

Commandant Twelfth naval district,

Commandant Thirteenth naval district,

Commandant Fourteenth naval district.

Subject: General supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts by commander, patrol force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Due to the long extended coast to be patrolled, the varied conditions that exist in the different districts, and the great distance from Washington; and in order to insure a uniformity of action in the various districts, the commander, Patrol force Pacific Fleet, will assume general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts.

2. This supervision must not be construed to displace the organization of the naval districts within their districts. It is hoped that as a result of this action more coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat will be effected.

3. Acknowledge receipt of this letter.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Thus, three months after my letter on the subject of coordination, and six weeks after the declaration of war the Navy Department took the first real step toward a proper organization in the Pacific, and stated "It is hoped as a result of this action that more coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat will be effected."

The force commander: covered that this order placing him in general charge of the naval districts in t with certain limitations of authority, was by no means sufficient to secure effecti in the organization, and he accordingly wrote the following letter to the department under date of June 16th. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION TWO,
U. S. S. "OREGON," FLAGSHIP,
U. S. S. "SAN DIEGO," FLAGSHIP.

June 16, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations.)

Subject: Policy as to coordination of defensive forces in the Pacific.

References: (a) Commandant Twelfth naval district, radiogram 13015 and my reply thereto (letter No. 109 W. F. F.-S. (101) of June 16.

(b) Commander Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet, letter No. 825 W. F. F.-M. of February 17, 1917.

(c) Commander Reserve force, Pacific Fleet, letter No. 846 W. F. F.-F. of March 1, 1917.

(d) Radiograms 11020, 16020 and 21220 (May).

Inclosures: (5) Copies of above references.

1. The attention of the department is respectively invited to reference (a) and to the force commander's reply to the same. Attention is also invited to references (b), (c) and (d).

2. In view of the fact that previous recommendations as contained in the above references have either not been acknowledged or favorably considered by the department, the force commander hesitated to intrude with further suggestions concerning this subject, and had no intention of doing so until, the receipt of reference (a), which constrains him to once more invite the attention of the Department to the importance of complete cooperation and coordination of defensive forces—Army and Navy—on the Pacific coast.

PRESIDENT CONDITIONS.

3. The following is a statement of existing conditions as far as they are known: the force commander:

(a) The commander in chief is absent in the Atlantic and can not therefore, control or promptly or effectively coordinate with naval forces now in the Pacific.

(b) The commander, patrol force, by the terms of his orders, is under the command of the commander in chief, and his authority is strictly limited to the few ships of his own force.

(c) Commandants of naval districts make occasional reports to the force commander as senior officer present, but the latter is not informed as to the details of conditions and activities in the several districts.

The commander, submarine force, Pacific Fleet, is independent of the commander, patrol force, as regards the movements and disposition of his vessels. He merely reports their movements as they are made.

(e) The commander, patrol force, is not informed as to the intention of the War and Navy Departments concerning the placing of mines, if they are to be placed in an emergency for the defense of harbors on this coast, nor as to the condition of defense nets, if such are to be provided at any time.

4. The patrol force available at present consists of four ships—the *San Diego*, *Yorktown*, *Marblehead*, and *Vicksburg*. The destroyer *Perry* will be available June 20, the *Patrol* about July 16, and the *Saratoga* and *Lawrence* in the latter part of July.

5. There have been various reports of raiders in the South Pacific, near the Central American coast, and in the vicinity of Honolulu. These reports have neither been credited nor ignored by the force commander.

6. As far as known at present there is no imperative need of vessels on the Mexican coast, nor in Central America, but past experience indicates that the patrol force must anticipate the necessity for cruising in these waters from time to time.

7. The force commander is not definitely informed as to the future permanent stationing of the submarine force on the Pacific coast, but he has been led to believe that it is contemplated to mobilize all these vessels at San Pedro. The 12-inch guns of the *Cheyenne* were last fired in November, 1915.

8. There appears to be no reason, at present, to expect any hostile act of Germany in the Pacific.

COORDINATION.

9. It appears from the above that there is not at present any thoroughly organized coordination or cooperation of the naval forces in the Pacific, nor between the naval and military forces and naval districts, as far as is known to the force commander.

10. It is manifest that with no offensive operation by Germany there is no present cause for anxiety and therefore no immediate demand for a coordination of defensive forces in the Pacific.

11. It is proper, however, to remark that a complete organization of defensive forces that would insure perfect coordination of effort in the event of actual hostilities in the Pacific would cost nothing and would perhaps serve the excellent purpose of a practical and interesting lesson or drill in preparedness to meet any situation that might arise at any time in the future.

EMERGENCY MEASURES.

12. In the event of any emergency, or to prepare for one, the following are a few suggestions that might be considered:

(a) Place all naval forces and districts on the Pacific under one coordinating head.

(b) Instead of concentrating all submarines at San Pedro, distribute them for defense as follows:

Send the H boats to Puget Sound.

Retain the F boats at San Francisco.

Detail the new L boats for the defense of San Pedro and Santa Barbara, the commander of the submarine force to visit each station in turn, and each small division

his force being provided with local barracks, or with a suitable mother ship merely for the living quarters of the crew.

(c) Purchase and arm a sufficient number of tugs, small vessels, etc. (that may be of permanent use to the Navy) for harbor patrol and for Mexican patrol service.

(d) Provide nets and give practice in placing them in channels, if they are not to be permanently placed.

(e) Plant mines and accustom commerce to the rules that would govern in an emergency.

(f) Arrange for the defense of Greys Harbor and Willapa Bay.

(g) If practicable send three or four of the older reserve battleships to the Pacific to be used with the Oregon as floating batteries at Puget Sound, Willapa Bay, San Francisco, San Pedro, and San Diego.

12. It is assumed that the few seagoing cruisers of the Pacific patrol force must be employed in the sea patrol of the coast, the Gulf, and the outlying islands of the Pacific. They can not well be depended upon exclusively for harbor patrol.

13. In the event that the department should reconsider the project for local joint boards as suggested in reference (b), and (c)—or at least for such a board in the special case of the Pacific coast—it is suggested that Capt. T. M. Potts, of the inspection board, who visits various ports on this coast, and who formerly served on the general board and on the Army and Navy Joint Board, at the Navy Department, might, in addition to his present duties, serve as member of a coordinating joint board for the Pacific, to be composed of three members, as follows:

1) Army officer commanding coast defenses (representing department commander and War Department).

2) The senior naval officer afloat in the Pacific.

3) Capt. T. M. Potts, representing the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts and the Navy Department's policies as to harbor and local defense.

14. It is believed that a board constituted as above might serve a very useful purpose on the Pacific coast, where the conditions, at such a distance from Washington, are very different from those on the Atlantic coast.

15. In view of the possible need of additional cruising and patrol, or barrack, vessels in the Pacific, it is suggested that no more ships suitable for such purposes be transferred to the Shipping Board. From observation of the *Loongmoon*, recently towed from Honolulu to Seattle, she appeared to be available as an excellent auxiliary cruiser.

W. F. FULLAM.

Special attention is called to this letter which once more emphasized the importance of local "joint boards" as the key to the defense of each seaport.

The necessity for board has been conclusively demonstrated at San Diego by the appearance of the whales. Under the department decision a lieutenant on the retired list was in charge of all naval activities at San Diego. He was engaged in many other duties—recruiting, inspecting, in charge of coaling station, etc. He was young and inexperienced and although zealous and energetic he could not reasonably be expected to handle such a situation in cooperation with colonels and generals of the Army.

The force commander, therefore, suggested that Capt. Brotherton, commanding the naval training station who had been on duty on the general board should be made senior officer present at San Diego and should confer with the military commandants. This was approved by the department.

In the meantime, in the absence of more definite instructions from the Navy Department, and without waiting longer for action concerning the principle of joint boards I gave instructions to commandants of districts to proceed, and attention is invited to letters No. 7 to 15 inclusive in the attached file which show the action taken by the boards thus organized.

On August 17, 1917, I addressed the following letter to the commandant of districts to emphasize the importance of cooperation between the Army and Navy. [Reading:]

U. S. S. "SARATOGA," FLAGSHIP.

August 17, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts.

Subject: Cooperation between the Army and Navy in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts. General supervision of the naval districts by the commander division two, United States Pacific Fleet.

Reference: (a) Secretary of the Navy's letter No. Op.-9-B, 24514 of 26 May, 1917.

(b) Chief of Naval Operations' letter No. Op.-11, 28754 of June 12, 1917.

(c) Chief of Naval Operations' letter No. Op.-11, 27838 of July 28, 1917.

Inclosures (four):

1. The attention of the commandants of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts is called to the above references hereto attached, from which it will be seen that the commander division two, United States Pacific Fleet is directed to exercise "general supervision" over the naval districts with the view to "coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat."

2. It is not necessary to emphasize the importance of this matter. An organization mutually agreed upon to secure proper coordination and cooperation between the Army and Navy costs nothing and will enable both military and naval forces to render the most effective service possible in case of any emergency in the Pacific.

3. The fact that there are no enemy forces in the Pacific at present and that hostile operations appear to be remote would not excuse a failure on our part to prepare for and anticipate every probable war condition that might be forced upon us at short notice at any time in the future.

4. With a view to the complete review and understanding of this subject your attention is invited to the following letters included in the attached file:

Letter from commandant thirteenth naval district No. 2943—N. D. of June 28, 1917.

Letter from commanding officer North Pacific coast, artillery district, to commandant thirteenth naval district No. 267—D3 of July 1, 1917.

Letter from commandant, twelfth naval district No. 6308-7-(14-LG) and its inclosures.

5. The key to the whole problem of coordination will be found in the local joint boards in each district. In this connection the action of the commandants of the twelfth and thirteenth naval districts as detailed in the above correspondence is in all respects approved, and the general plan therein outlined will be adhered to by the naval districts on the Pacific, the commandants by mutual agreements with Army commanders making such changes and adopting such measures as may be required to meet conditions from time to time.

W. F. FULLAM.

I deemed this letter of great importance.

Not long after issuing the above instructions to the commandants in the Pacific I was amazed to receive the following letter from office of Naval Operations, addressed to the commandant, twelfth naval district, August 20, disapproving of the formation of local "joint boards." [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., August 20, 1917.

Op-14-S 8-17.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commandant twelfth naval district.

Via: Commander division two, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.

Reference: Commandant's letter 6309-1-(14) of August 9, 1917, with inclosures.

1. The receipt is acknowledged of the above references.

2. The regulations for the naval districts require that the Army and Navy authorities on duty in the naval districts shall cooperate with one another to obtain the best results in the defense of the district. Article 77 of the Regulations authorizes this cooperation.

3. The department, however, does not desire that any board by the name of "joint board" be established for this purpose. It is considered that the regulations are sufficiently elastic and mandatory to permit of and require the closest cooperation between the Army and the Navy, and it is considered that this cooperation should take place without the necessity of having any formal board to carry on the work.

W. S. BENSON.

After eight months correspondence this letter appeared to indicate disapproval of the one most important of all suggestions that I had made to secure real coordination in the Pacific. Being in a quandry concerning the department's real attitude I wrote the attached letter of August 25 asking the department if it approved or disapproved my instructions to the commandants of Naval Districts. [Reading:]

U. S. S. "SARATOGA," FLAGSHIP,
August 25, 1918.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.

References: (a) Operations letter, Op-14-s 8-17 24514J-22 of August 20, 1917.

(b) Commander division two, letters No. 375 W. F. F.-S of August 17, 1917.

(c) Operations letter, Op-9-B 24514 of May 26, 1917.

1. Referring to reference (a), forwarded through the Commander, second division, to the commandant of the twelfth naval district, it is proper to state that the term "joint board" as used by the commandant of the twelfth district, and by the commander of the second division in his letter of 17 August (reference b) is only a term of convenience. It was not intended that these so-called "local joint boards" should be "formal," but it was especially provided that they were to be informal in character and that the Army and naval officers, commanding in each district, should occasionally meet by mutual consent to consider all matters requiring cooperation between them.

2. In other words, it was the intention simply to emphasize the importance of the provisions already authorized by regulations. It was not expected that these so-called "joint boards" should exercise any independent authority, but should merely be the medium through which the commander of the second division could exercise general control over the naval districts and bring to their attention matters that might be of importance, both to the Army and Navy in an emergency.

3. It is not clear to the commander of the second division how there can be cooperation between the Army and Navy, or how "more coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat will be effected" (as stated in paragraph 2 of Operations' letter of May 26, 1917, reference (c) in which letter the commander of the patrol force was given general supervision of the naval districts) unless Army and naval commandants occasionally meet and discuss matters of offense and defense.

4. It is therefore requested that the commander of the second division be informed without delay if the instructions given by him to the commandants of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts in his letter of August 17, 1917, reference (b) are approved or disapproved by the department. If these instructions are disapproved by the department, they will be immediately canceled.

5. It is hoped, however, that these instructions will be approved, as it is believed that they are designed to secure cooperation in the only manner that is possible, and in a manner that does not in any way violate the letter or spirit of the regulations, as referred to in reference (a); it being remembered that the term "joint board" was a mere term of convenience, that these boards had no independent authority and that the officers were to meet by mutual agreement, whenever occasion appeared to require discussion of any subject.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copy: Commandant twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth Naval District.

On the same day, not wishing to take any chances concerning the department's approval of my previous instructions to the commandants, I wrote the following letter, August 25, directing the commandants to conform to the department's letter as regards "joint boards." [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. Saratoga, Flagship, August 25, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.

Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.

References: (a) Operations' letter Op-14-s 8-17 24514J-22 of August 20, 1917, to Commandant twelfth naval district (copy inclosed). (b) Commander Division 2, letter No. 412 WFF-F of August 25, 1917 to Operations (copy inclosed). (c) Commander Division 2, letter No. 375, WFF-S of August 17, 1917, to commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.

Inclosures: 2.

1. Your attention is invited to Operations' letter reference (a) and to my reply thereto, reference (b), copies herewith inclosed.

2. You will be, in all respects, governed by reference (a) and will so construe my letter of August 17, reference (c) that there may be no conflict between its requirements and those of Operations' letter.

W. F. FULLAM.

On August 27 the department addressed a letter to me confirming its letter of August 20, in which it disapproved of "formal joint boards," and expressing its desire that instead of these boards, naval commandants should keep in very close touch with officers of the Army. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., August 27, 1917.

Op-14-s:25

28754-8-27

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: General supervision of naval districts by the commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.

References: (a) C. N. O. letter 278383-127 of July 28, 1917. (b) Commander Division 2, letter 279-1120 of August 17, 1917. (c) C. N. O. letter to commandant twelfth Naval District 24514 J-22 of August 20, 1917.

1. The department does not consider that it is necessary to have formal joint boards for the purpose of cooperation between the Army and Navy officers, but it does consider that it is necessary for the commandant and his subordinates to be in very close touch with the officers of the Army and the various coast defenses.

W. S. BENSON.

On September 5 in obedience to the department's orders I again addressed to the commandants a letter telling them that the department did not deem "formal joint boards" to be necessary but that the department preferred the commandants to keep in "very close touch with Army officers." [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. Oregon, Flagship, September 5, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.

Subject: General supervision of naval districts by the commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.

References: (a) Operations letter Op-14-s-8-25 28754-827 of August 27, 1917 (copy inclosed). (b) Operations letter 278383-127 of July 28, 1917. (c) My letter No. 279-112 of August 17, 1917. (d) Operations' letter to commandant twelfth naval district, No. 24514J-22 of August 20, 1917.

Inclosure:

1. Your attention is invited to reference (a), copy inclosed, to which you will strictly conform, taking particular note that while "formal joint boards" are not considered necessary by the department, "it is necessary for the commandant and his subordinates to be in very close touch with the officers of the Army at the various coast defenses.

W. F. FULLAM.

Thus, in September 1917, after eight months correspondence the division commander in his earnest attempt to secure an effective working organization to insure coordination of the Army and Navy in the Pacific found himself practically where he started on February 18, 1917. The Navy Department disapproved of formal boards that might really accomplish something, and preferred a "close touch" between officers of the Army and Navy whatever that may mean. But it did not satisfy me. I wanted to get closer than a "close touch."

In desperation, therefore, on September 27, 1917, the division commander addressed the following letter to the Navy Department,

closing a complete file of the eight months' correspondence. (leading)]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
September 27, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Letter of commander Division 2, No. 375 of August 17, 1917; cooperation between Army and Navy on the Pacific coast.

References: (a) Operations' letter Op-14-2 9-18, 27383 of September 19, 1917. (b) File of letters beginning February 17, 1917 to August 25, 1917.

Enclosures: 16 (reference b).

1. Referring to reference (a), letter No. 375 of August 17 should read, "No. 378 of August 17," copy of which has been previously forwarded to the department, and which is also contained in the attached file.

2. For convenience of reference and in order to properly review the whole subject, file of letters, that have passed between Operations and commander Reserve Force, commander patrol force, commander Second Division and commandants of districts, hereto attached.

3. The correspondence explains itself. It will be noted that the present commander of the Second Division began to consider the question of cooperation between the Army and Navy of this coast in February, 1917.

4. The use of the term "joint board" appears to have been unfortunate, and to have created a mistaken impression at the Navy Department. It might better have been called "Joint Conference between Army and Navy commandants."

5. In the correspondence with the commandants of naval districts, suggesting these conferences or "informal joint boards," it was recognized by all that they were informal; that they had no independent authority; that the commandants were subject to higher authority and to the War and Navy Departments.

6. These meetings, or conferences, of Army and Navy officers, by mutual consent, were considered the only possible means of discussing conditions in each port or district. Without such meetings or conferences, and in the absence of any plans agreed upon between Army and Naval commandants, cooperation and coordination would not, and could not, be possible.

7. Another important point to remember in this connection is the changing of commandants, which has, in some cases, been quite frequent. These changes in personnel manifestly require occasional meetings to secure continuity in the mutually agreed upon procedure, to be adopted at any port in an emergency.

8. The commander of the Second Division has made every possible effort to rightly interpret and conform to the wishes of the department, especially as outlined in letter post B, 24514 of May 26, 1917, signed by the Secretary of the Navy.

9. A consideration of the correspondence will make plain to the department the existing conditions. The commander of the Second Division considers it his duty, not only to himself but to the department, to state that he is by no means satisfied with the present organization, or with the means that have been taken or authorized to secure effective coordination of Army and Navy forces on this coast in the event of actual hostilities or any serious emergency. It is believed that this organization is not sufficiently definite; that it is not closely knit; that responsibility is not placed; and that the whole subject deserves careful review and serious consideration.

10. Attention is invited to my letter of July 11, 1917, concerning conditions at San Diego, and to Chief of Naval Operations' letter Op-14 s 7-20 27772-197 of July 21, in which the section commander at San Diego is placed in charge of all naval activities float and ashore, etc. This officer is a lieutenant on the retired list, whereas officers of the rank of captain in the Navy and colonel in the Army and other grades higher than that of lieutenant in the Navy, are commanding various posts in this vicinity.

11. In conversation with these various heads, it has been clearly demonstrated that there is no well understood plan of cooperation, no agreement as to the part each should lay claim to for instance—in the event of an emergency, requiring coordination. On the contrary, it would appear that there is decided bewilderment, concerning the whole matter.

12. The division commander realizes that he, himself, would doubtless be cruising the sea, and that an emergency affecting the different ports must be met by the coordinated action of Army and Navy authorities on shore at each port. The division commander furthermore realizes that the War and Navy Departments may have made plans unknown to him, and that they may be perfectly satisfied and have confidence in the arrangements already made and outlined in existing regulations, concerning naval districts and Army coast defenses.

13. In conclusion, the division commander once more regrets if the term "joint boards," as used, has been misconstrued at the department and invites attention to

1. Your attention is invited to Operations' letter thereto, reference (b), copies herewith inclosed.
2. You will be, in all respects, governed by referee letter of August 17, reference (c) that there may be ments and those of Operations' letter.

On August 27 the department addressed its letter of August 20, in which it disap boards," and expressing its desire that instead commandants should keep in very close to Army. [Reading:]

N
OFFICE C
Washing

Op-14-s:25
28754-8-27

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: General supervision of naval districts by the co Fleet.

References: (a) C. N. O. letter 278383-127 of July 28, sion 2, letter 279-1120 of August 17, 1917. (c) C. N twelfth Naval District 24514 J-22 of August 20, 1917.

1. The department does not consider that it is necessar for the purpose of cooperation between the Army and Ni sider that it is necessary for the commandant and his sub touch with the officers of the Army and the various coast c

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC
U. S. S. Oregon, Fla

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth nav
Subject: General supervision of naval districts by the comm Fleet.

References: (a) Operations letter Op-14-s-8-25 28754-827 , inclosed). (b) Operations letter 278383-127 of July 28, 279-112 of August 17, 1917. (d) Operations' letter to co district, No. 24514J-22 of August 20, 1917.

Inclosure:

1. Your attention is invited to reference (a), copy incl strictly conform, taking particular note that while "formal j considered necessary by the department, "it is necessary for t subordinates to be in very close touch with the officers of t coast defenses.

Thus, in September 1917, after eight months division commander in his earnest attempt to : working organization to insure coordination o Navy in the Pacific found himself practically wl February 18, 1917. The Navy Department disa boards that might really accomplish something "close touch" between officers of the Army an that may mean. But it did not satisfy me. I w than a "close touch."

The department therefore on September 27, 1917

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his letter No. 413 of August 25, in which commandants are cautioned to rightly interpret all directions given by the division commander in pursuance of his order to assume general control of naval districts.

W. F. FULLAM.

Special attention is called to this letter, which emphasized the following points:

- (a) That the organization in the Pacific was ineffective.
- (b) That the condition at San Diego was chaotic, bewildering, and absurd.
- (c) That the division commander might be called upon to cruise at sea at any time, in which case the boards or conferences of the Army and Navy officers at seaports would be vitally important.

On the same day, September 27, I addressed the attached letter to Capt. Marvell, who I understood had charge of naval district matters in the Office of Operations. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION TWO.

U. S. S. "Oregon," Flagship, September 27, 1917.

MY DEAR MARVELL: I received your letter of September 19, asking that a copy of my letter No. 375 be sent to you. It appears that this letter should have been No. 378, and that you already have a copy of it.

In order to clear up the whole subject, I sent to Operations to-day a complete file of the correspondence. I must confess to you that I am completely mystified as to the real attitude of the Navy Department in this matter, and I wish that Operations would take me more into its confidence.

It must be plain that we can not coordinate or cooperate without occasionally meeting, discussing, and planning; and it seems to me that the more cordial the relations between Army and Navy commanders in any district, and the more often they confer and plan together, like officers of a single service for instance, the more complete our cooperation will be.

I am greatly disappointed that my efforts since February have apparently resulted in so little good. If organization is not thorough and complete it fails inevitably. From personal observation out here and from my conversation with all the different officers, it is my opinion that the organization here on this coast is painfully incomplete, and that real war conditions would result in more or less confusion and chaos.

I realize that there is practically no war in the Pacific and no need of serious alarm, but I consider this an excellent opportunity for a good practical drill in organization and preparedness for war on this coast.

I believe that my letter of August 25 to the commandants will make clear to them that the department objects to "formal joint boards," and they will put such a construction upon my letter of August 17 that it will not conflict with the wishes of the department.

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. GEO. R. MARVELL,
United States Navy, Office of Naval Operations.

These two letters appeared to at least partially awaken the Office of Naval Operations to the true conditions, and it accordingly addressed to the division commander a letter dated October 9 expressing qualified approval of his views [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 9, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander, Division 2.

Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.

References: (a) Op-9-B 24514, of May 26, 1917; (b) commander, Division 2, letter 524 of September 27, 1917.

1. Referring to paragraph 9 of reference (b) the commander of Division 2 states that he is by no means satisfied with the present organization, etc. Previous orders relative to the organization of naval districts contained in the regulations for naval districts and in correspondence between the two departments provide for joint action and cooperation of the Army and Navy authorities in each district.

2. Reference (a) places the commander of the Patrol Force, Pacific Fleet, in general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts in order that a more satisfactory development of the organization of these naval districts might be insured and satisfactory cooperation obtained between the forces afloat and the forces ashore.

3. The commander of Division 2, therefore, has the power vested in him by reference (a) to insure the satisfactory working of the present organization of the west coast.

4. Referring to remarks on the use of the term "joint board," the department desires that this term be not used, as it is already utilized to designate a definite board now established.

5. The department concurs with the opinions of the commander of Division 2 expressed in paragraph 6 of reference (b).

W. S. BENSON.

On October 19 the division commander addressed the following letters to the department and to the commandants of districts outlining a plan of action which would tend to secure coordination by the Army and Navy in each district [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
October 19, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Cooperation between the Army and the Navy.

References: (a) Operations' letter No. Op-14-Sm-D 10-6, 27383-139 of October 9, 1917.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of Operations' letter, reference (a), concerning the above subject.

2. The instructions contained in this letter will be most carefully observed and the division commander believes that he will now be able to bring about a hearty and effective cooperation between the Army and Navy commandants in the naval districts and at different ports on the Pacific coast.

3. It will be thoroughly understood that the conferences between Army and Navy officers will be informal and the officers of both services must very carefully conform to the instructions from the War and Navy Departments, respectively, in the formulation of any plans to meet possible emergencies.

4. Although there is no present cause for concern these conferences will be mutually instructive to the officers concerned and each service will realize the better how to cooperate with the other. It will be an excellent practical study and drill.

W. F. FULLAM.

OCTOBER 19, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.

Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.

References: (a) My letter No. 524 WFF-F of September 27, 1917.

Operations: (b) Operations' letter Op-14-Sm-D 10-6 27383-139, of October 9, 1917, to commander Division 2; (c) My letter No. 615-WFF-S of October 19, 1917, to Operations.

Inclosures: Three (copies of above references).

1. The attention of commandants of districts is called to the above references, and they will give to this subject renewed and immediate attention, with a view of securing, or perfecting plans for, complete and hearty cooperation with the Army officers commanding coast defenses or other units within the various naval districts.

2. Commandants will immediately invite conferences with Army commandants and acquaint them with the contents of the attached letters, and invite their cooperation in the formulations of plans that will best utilize whatever facilities now existing on this coast to meet any possible emergency.

3. It is important that each commandant of the Army or Navy shall most carefully consider and conform to whatever instructions he may have received from the War or Navy Department, concerning the subject of coast defense, in order that any plan agreed upon may not conflict in any manner with the wishes or instructions of superior authority. The questions to be discussed have been referred to in previous communications on this subject from the commander of the second division, and need not be repeated in this letter.

4. It is suggested that two plans be discussed: First, the means to be taken to utilize present facilities and recognizing actual conditions in the Pacific and the improbability

his letter No. 413 of August 25, in which commandants are cautioned to rightly interpret all directions given by the division commander in pursuance of his order to assume general control of naval districts.

W. F. FULLAM

Special attention is called to this letter, which emphasized the following points:

- (a) That the organization in the Pacific was ineffective.
- (b) That the condition at San Diego was chaotic, bewildering, and absurd.
- (c) That the division commander might be called upon to cruise at sea at any time, in which case the boards or conferences of the Army and Navy officers at seaports would be vitally important.

On the same day, September 27, I addressed the attached letter to Capt. Marvell, who I understood had charge of naval district matters in the Office of Operations. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION TWO.
U. S. S. "Oregon," Flagship, September 27, 1918.

MY DEAR MARVELL: I received your letter of September 19, asking that a copy of my letter No. 375 be sent to you. It appears that this letter should have been No. 378, and that you already have a copy of it.

In order to clear up the whole subject, I sent to Operations to-day a complete file of the correspondence. I must confess to you that I am completely mystified as to the real attitude of the Navy Department in this matter, and I wish that Operations would take me more into its confidence.

It must be plain that we can not coordinate or cooperate without occasionally meeting, discussing, and planning; and it seems to me that the more cordial the relations between Army and Navy commanders in any district, and the more often they confer and plan together, like officers of a single service for instance, the more complete our cooperation will be.

I am greatly disappointed that my efforts since February have apparently resulted in so little good. If organization is not thorough and complete it fails inevitably. From personal observation out here and from my conversation with all the different officers, it is my opinion that the organization here on this coast is painfully incomplete, and that real war conditions would result in more or less confusion and chaos.

I realize that there is practically no war in the Pacific and no need of serious alarm, but I consider this an excellent opportunity for a good practical drill in organization and preparedness for war on this coast.

I believe that my letter of August 25 to the commandants will make clear to them that the department objects to "formal joint boards," and they will put such a construction upon my letter of August 17 that it will not conflict with the wishes of the department.

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. GEO. R. MARVELL,
United States Navy, Office of Naval Operations.

These two letters appeared to at least partially awaken the Office of Naval Operations to the true conditions, and it accordingly addressed to the division commander a letter dated October 9 expressing qualified approval of his views [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 9, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commander, Division 2.

Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.

References: (a) Op-9-B 24514, of May 26, 1917; (b) commander, Division 2, letter 524 of September 27, 1917.

1. Referring to paragraph 9 of reference (b) the commander of Division 2 states that he is by no means satisfied with the present organization, etc. Previous orders relative to the organization of naval districts contained in the regulations for naval districts and in correspondence between the two departments provide for joint action and cooperation of the Army and Navy authorities in each district.

2. Reference (a) places the commander of the Patrol Force, Pacific Fleet, in general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts in order that a more satisfactory development of the organization of these naval districts might be insured and satisfactory cooperation obtained between the forces afloat and the forces ashore.

3. The commander of Division 2, therefore, has the power vested in him by reference (a) to insure the satisfactory working of the present organization of the west coast.

4. Referring to remarks on the use of the term "joint board," the department desires that this term be not used, as it is already utilized to designate a definite board now established.

5. The department concurs with the opinions of the commander of Division 2 expressed in paragraph 6 of reference (b).

W. S. BENSON.

On October 19 the division commander addressed the following letters to the department and to the commandants of districts outlining a plan of action which would tend to secure coordination by the Army and Navy in each district [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
October 19, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Cooperation between the Army and the Navy.

References: (a) Operations' letter No. Op-14-Sm-D 10-6, 27383-139 of October 9, 1917.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of Operations' letter, reference (a), concerning the above subject.

2. The instructions contained in this letter will be most carefully observed and the division commander believes that he will now be able to bring about a hearty and effective cooperation between the Army and Navy commandants in the naval districts and at different ports on the Pacific coast.

3. It will be thoroughly understood that the conferences between Army and Navy officers will be informal and the officers of both services must very carefully conform to the instructions from the War and Navy Departments, respectively, in the formulation of any plans to meet possible emergencies.

4. Although there is no present cause for concern these conferences will be mutually instructive to the officers concerned and each service will realize the better how to cooperate with the other. It will be an excellent practical study and drill.

W. F. FULLAM.

OCTOBER 19, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.

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Inclosures: Three (copies of above references).

1. The attention of commandants of districts is called to the above references, and they will give to this subject renewed and immediate attention, with a view of securing, or perfecting plans for, complete and hearty cooperation with the Army officers commanding coast defenses or other units within the various naval districts.

2. Commandants will immediately invite conferences with Army commandants and acquaint them with the contents of the attached letters, and invite their cooperation in the formulations of plans that will best utilize whatever facilities now existing on this coast to meet any possible emergency.

3. It is important that each commandant of the Army or Navy shall most carefully consider and conform to whatever instructions he may have received from the War or Navy Department, concerning the subject of coast defense, in order that any plan agreed upon may not conflict in any manner with the wishes or instructions of superior authority. The questions to be discussed have been referred to in previous communications on this subject from the commander of the second division, and need not be repeated in this letter.

4. It is suggested that two plans be discussed: First, the means to be taken to utilize present facilities and recognizing actual conditions in the Pacific and the improbability

of any serious enemy operations on this coast: second, a plan that would be necessary and the facilities and means that would be demanded in the event of enemy forces appearing on the Pacific coast.

5. The study of this subject will manifestly be of mutual benefit to officers of the Army and Navy in each district, and officers of each branch will the better realize the functions of the other and be the better prepared to cooperate.

6. It is suggested that these meetings by mutual consent be designated as "Army and Navy conferences," such and such a district or port; that these conferences should be informal; that they be held from time to time, whenever there is a change in the personnel or when conditions require a modification of the plans agreed upon; and that minutes of these conferences be kept, in order that there may be some continuity in the study and treatment of the subject.

7. In order that there may be no conflict with the War and Navy Departments, it is suggested that copies of the plans agreed upon be forwarded to the War and Navy Departments, through the department commander, and the commander, Second Division, Pacific Fleet, respectively.

8. It is not deemed necessary to refer to details in this letter, as it is believed the commandants and commanding officers in the different districts are thoroughly prepared to handle this matter successfully and with attention to every practical demand that would be forced by a state of war. It is the intention of the division commander to forward to each district copies of the plans outlined in all other districts, in order that each commandant may profit by the study and special features emphasized in all other districts.

9. It is requested that the proceedings of the conference first held, after the receipt of this letter, and the plans formulated thereby be forwarded to the division commander at the earliest practicable date.

W. F. FULLAM.

In concluding this remarkable account of eight months' vain effort by the senior naval officer in the Pacific to secure an effective organization and proper coordination of Army and Navy forces, it is proper to summarize as follows:

(1) The important recommendations made by the senior Army and naval officers on the Pacific coast were not approved by the Navy Department and were practically ignored for weeks.

(2) The appearance of three whales, mistaken for submarines off San Diego May 19, 1917, demonstrated the inadequacy of the Navy Department's organization, proved the lack of coordination of Army and Navy forces, and had more influence in bringing the Navy Department to act than the official report and recommendation of a rear admiral backed by the opinion of a brigadier general, made three months previously.

(3) Army commandants in the Pacific at all times showed a desire to cooperate with the Navy and entered into the plan of joint boards with enthusiasm, as shown by the correspondence in the attached confidential file. The Navy Department objected to a closely knit organization in the Pacific, and insisted that conferences should be "informal" rather than mandatory. This action practically forced the division commander to revoke or modify his orders and it decidedly lessened his authority or threw doubt upon it. The effect was most unfortunate.

(4) The reliance of the Navy Department upon its regulations proved to be ill-considered. Regulations alone never have and never will secure efficiency in the administration of war afloat or ashore. There must be personal action and thoroughness of organization with definite orders as to the exact part that each unit is to play. Without such explicit orders, and without a carefully prepared plan the Army and Navy can never coordinate effectively and the safety of the United States in war will be jeopardized. An

“informal” organization, with the mere direction that Army and naval officers shall “keep in close touch,” will not suffice. As well might we rely upon Navy Regulations alone to secure efficiency in our battle fleet.

(5) The objection of the Navy Department to local joint boards of Army and naval officers was inexplicable. I have been informed, however, that the Navy Department did not favor any real joint organization with the Army for offensive and defensive purposes, and that the Navy Department discouraged, if it did not forbid, meetings of the joint board in Washington during the one or two years before the war. I am not personally cognizant of this fact, but it came to me from a reliable source, and if true, it would explain the department's action toward joint boards in the Pacific in 1917. It would appear, therefore, that the Navy Department, and not the War Department, objected to this means of securing proper coordination. That is a matter I wish to leave for somebody else to investigate. But I am informed that the importance of the joint Army and Navy board is now recognized, and it is to be hoped that it will play a very important rôle hereafter in providing a proper system of coast and harbor defense for this country.

I was told that the Navy Department apparently was afraid that the Army and Navy joint board in Washington might meddle with questions of preparation for war, and therefore they did not want it to meet; and that the officers on it were afraid to push the matter, because they were afraid that the board would be abolished if they did meet. That, I say, is my information. I believe it, but I can not swear to it.

The invulnerable principle must be recognized that there shall be organization—definite, authoritative, and complete—or there will be chaos. There is no alternative. The Navy Department did not itself perfect, nor permit anybody else to perfect, a thorough organization on the Pacific coast between February, 1917, and October, 1917. The appearance of three whales off San Diego made the need of a new organization very plain. The existing machinery did not work. There was no head, no board of Army and Navy officers to control the situation, and there was no plan. Confusion was inevitable.

In conclusion, it is manifest that perfection of organization with due recognition of local authority in offensive and defensive measures, is peculiarly important on the Pacific coast, 3,000 miles from Washington.

In concluding this statement regarding the preparedness of the Navy for war as regards both personnel and material, it is only proper to state that the officers and men of the Navy were and always have been individually ready for war; that the unpreparedness of the Navy for war in 1917 was not primarily the fault of any officer or officers, but that it was due to the fact that the Navy Department as a whole declined or failed to adopt policies which demanded, or even permitted officers to prepare the Navy for its duty as a fighting machine.

That the officers and men of the Navy, both regular and reserve, did their whole duty with great gallantry and devotion is admitted by everybody, and that they contributed loyally to the winning of

the war is also beyond question. That the bureau chiefs were in no sense responsible for the lack of preparedness of the Navy Department, and that they accomplished wonders as soon as their hands were free, can not be denied.

That we escaped disaster was plainly due to the fact that the enemy's fleet, with the exception of submarines, had been driven from the seas before we declared war against Germany. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that we had no naval war in the full sense of the word. No admiral led an American fleet into battle. Not one American ship fired a single gun at a German ship, and not a German ship fired a single gun at an American ship, with the exception of a few engagements between German submarines and our destroyers, armed merchant ships, and small craft, and noting the gallant little fight made by our subchasers at Durazzo. It was a war without naval battles.

In other words, there was, strictly speaking, less sea fighting than in the war with Spain, and the Navy of the United States was not fully tested as to its readiness for battle nor as to the adequacy of all its units to meet the emergency of war had Germany's fleet been free to take the sea against us.

Escaping as we did by our great good fortune, in that the German fleet never appeared after the Battle of Jutland in June, 1916, it is the duty of every naval officer who realizes the actual condition of our unpreparedness to tell the truth upon the occasion of the investigation of the conduct of the war by a coordinate branch of the United States Government, in order that the people of this country may no longer be deceived and that the United States may not again be threatened by the inexcusable failure of the Navy Department to prepare the fleet in all respects for sudden war at any time in the future.

The time has come to face the facts and to ask this question: Was the fleet of the United States, with all its units and auxiliaries; with its available supply of ammunition, torpedoes, mines, and submarines; with no battle cruisers, no scout cruisers, and with a pitifully inadequate force of scouts and destroyers; with an air service composed of only 45 trained aviators; with its ships largely manned with green, untrained men and reserve officers of little naval experience; was this fleet so constituted even though its officers and personnel were unexcelled in the world for bravery and devotion to duty, was this fleet in all respects in readiness in the spring of 1917, or at any time during the World War, to line up for battle against the German fleet with a fair chance of victory, taking into account the cold facts as shown when the British fleet met the Germans at the battle of Jutland? The commanders in chief of our fleets must gravely consider the facts and answer this question with solemn regard for the consequences. If we were in all respects ready to defeat the German fleet as it existed at Jutland in June, 1916, the Navy Department may claim the credit for our preparedness; if we were not in condition to beat the German fleet in April, 1917, the Navy Department alone is responsible for neglect to prepare for that battle during the four preceding years.

The articles for the government of the United States Navy, found in the Revised Statutes—laws passed by Congress to fix the duties

and responsibilities of officers of the Navy—contain the following provision:

That a commissioned officer of the Navy, being in command of a fleet, squadron, or vessel acting singly, who neglects when an engagement is probable, or when an armed vessel of an enemy or rebel is in sight, to prepare his ship for action; or does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to vessels of the United States or their allies when engaged in battle, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge.

But a naval officer's duty does not, or should not, begin and end in battle, nor in time of war. He has duties and responsibilities before the war and before the battles begin. And it should be clearly understood that any officer of the Navy who sits supinely or subserenely idle and indifferent when an armed enemy nation with an efficient fighting navy is in plain sight (and has been for years), and fails with energy to prepare and to urge others to prepare his country's navy for war, when he knows or should know that it is unprepared in every respect, is unworthy of his cloth; that he is neglecting his first duty, fails to measure up to the standards of the American Navy, and is deserving of a more severe punishment than a captain who fails to prepare a ship for battle. The neglect in time of peace to prepare the great Navy of a great nation for battle imperils the whole country, and for this reason the offense is the more reprehensible.

The experience of the past demonstrates clearly, if we probe for the facts, that in throttling and ignoring officers of high rank who are seeking zealously and patriotically to prepare the Navy for war, the real truth concerning the Navy may be suppressed, the public may be deceived, and as an inevitable result the Navy may be placed in a condition of unreadiness involving danger of humiliating and disastrous defeat, or that it may fail to put forth its best efforts in affording "all practicable relief and assistance to our allies" when engaged in war.

The Navy of the United States was not properly prepared for war in April, 1917. The question is, Shall such a condition be permitted to exist again in the future?

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you were one of the Secretary's aids at one time. Will you state how long you served in that capacity?

Admiral FULLAM. I was ordered to Washington in February, 1913, as aid to Mr. Meyer. I was aid for inspections under Secretary Meyer, and I was his aid for about a month, and I observed his general policies. In fact, I had known Mr. Meyer personally and he knew that I had been on the Mahan Commission for the Navy Department organization, and that I was familiar with it, and he had consulted me and written to me to get all information about the work of Admiral Mahan and of that commission.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you were his aid for about a month?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes; about a month.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not go out of office on March 4?

Admiral FULLAM. When that change took place I became one of the aids for Mr. Daniels, and I remained his aid from the 4th of March until about the middle of February of the next year; first, as aid for inspection, and then afterwards Mr. Daniels sent me over as aid for personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me anything about Mr. Meyer's general policy as regards the administration of the department?

Admiral FULLAM. As I say, Mr. Meyer took a very serious view of the utilization of the Navy Department to prepare the Navy for actual war. He always encouraged all naval officers to study the subject specially, and that is why, I think, he had me ordered down there, because he knew that I had been associated with Admiral Mahan, and his first idea seemed to be to recognize that the Navy was the first line of the Nation's defense.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Secretary Daniels's general policy?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I regret very much to say that Secretary Daniels did not take the same interest in the preparation of the Navy for war. He regarded it—he was greatly interested in many things that were good, but, generally they did not affect the preparation of the Navy for war, or stimulate officers to exert themselves. The question of fighting efficiency, getting down to the awful conditions of fighting, were not pleasant, and he gave no encouragement to it at all—none at all. As an instance of that, when war was threatened in 1913 with a certain foreign power, I got very much wrought up about it. I was aid for inspections or personnel then, and I drew up a memorandum of things that I thought ought to be immediately done; oh, anybody would say that they should be done. But I did not take that to Mr. Daniels at all. I did not want him to know that I drew it up. I was one of his official family, but I did not feel encouraged to take it to him, because I had seen Admiral Fiske take papers like that to him, and he would not pay any attention to it.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do with it?

Admiral FULLAM. I did not tell the aids that I did it. I did not want anybody to know that I had written it. I took it to Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who usually—always—took a lively interest in the Navy and in the cooperation of the Navy with the Army; and I was encouraged to go to him frankly, as I wanted to do with the Secretary. We all wanted to gather around the Secretary as a man and a brother, and we would have been only too happy to do it, for the glory of the Navy and to help him, and he would have had all the credit—every bit of it. But I could not. I took it to Mr. Roosevelt.

I remember that memorandum; I can repeat the items of it. I said, "Mr. Roosevelt, do you approve this?" He read it over, and he said, "Yes; every bit of it." I said, "Will you take that as yours, and do not mention my name as ever having written it, and do not let anybody know that I wrote it, and will you present it to the Secretary of the Navy this afternoon?" He said he would, and he took it in there, and I remember so well that he sat down in his chair, and he put this paper on the desk of the office between his feet, and he read off from time to time the items; and, coming from him as a civilian to the Secretary of the Navy, it had some effect, and some of those things were done. Among them was a very important suggestion to get the few submarines we had across the Isthmus by building a cradle and getting them across by rail, because the canal was not finished.

Another item was to get all the naval officers on the retired list and on inactive duty assigned to shore duty, so that the active, physically perfect men could go to sea; and it seemed that from this a rather amusing situation took place. The Bureau of Navigation was so rattled at getting a suggestion to really do something—I do

not hesitate to say so—that they assigned this duty of assigning retired officers to duty to a picked-up board of three comparatively young officers. I was told this afterwards by Capt. French, who in the Pacific was one of my flag captains.

They picked up a board of young officers, and they tackled this job. They were unfamiliar with the personnel of the Navy; they did not know the names of these retired officers; they did not know the names of the officers, even on the active list, who were practically incapacitated; and their recommendations were very amusing. They had a one-legged captain, who was on the retired list, ordered to command a battleship. They had officers who were out here in St. Elizabeth Insane Asylum and at Las Animas and at other places assigned to important duties, and the thing was impossible. It had to be completely revoked. I knew Admiral Luce intimately. I loved that old man, because he never dreamed or thought of anything but the Navy and its preparation for the emergency for which it exists; and when I would tell him about these things he would say, "Oh, Fullam, you can not help it. The United States always goes to war in a very casual sort of way." This reminded me of it. This was just an instance.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that coming from a civilian this recommendation had some effect. Do you mean by that that the Secretary resented suggestions made by officers of the Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. I would not say that Mr. Daniels resented them. He was one of the most agreeable men personally that I ever had anything to do with.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not pay any attention to it?

Admiral FULLAM. He did not think the naval officers—he did not want to give admirals much authority, and I can not tell you how it hurt us. He did not trust us. He did not take our advice, and realize that we were citizens of the United States just as he was, and that it was our life to do that thing and to help him to do it. It was a very trying situation, and I never would have stayed there and suffered if I had known that he was going to continue in that attitude. And that uncovers a very trying situation that naval officers were subjected to. We would support the view of Mr. Meyer's policies with great enthusiasm, because they were directed toward the preparation of the Navy for war. It was not, to him, a political matter at all, or anything else; it was to prepare the Navy for war. How could I, the next day after Mr. Meyer left office and I became Mr. Daniel's aid, view with equal enthusiasm and zeal policies that destroyed and smashed everything that Mr. Meyer had attempted to do or did do? It is impossible, unless a naval officer can turn his coat in 24 hours and say one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow; say yes when the Secretary says yes and say no when the Secretary says no. It is impossible. And as soon as I found out that that position was going to be permanent, I got out of the Navy Department as quick as I could. I applied for duty at sea. I would not have stayed there for a thousand dollars a month in addition to my pay. It was impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that Secretary Meyer's policies were not based on politics, at all. Were Secretary Daniel's based at all on politics?

Admiral FULLAM. I ask you withdraw that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Now, Admiral, you stated that you were the secretary of the Mahan-Moody commission.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee, briefly, the facts in regard to that commission?

Admiral FULLAM. I know all about it; and to me it was the most wonderfully illuminating experience of my whole life, and I look back to it with more joy and satisfaction than anything else I have had to do since I have been in the Navy. Explaining that, I will just say that before the Spanish War, when Mr. Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy I became intimately acquainted with him, and one day he asked me—he was usually curious, and asking people—what I thought was the one thing of all others that was most necessary to secure an efficient Navy. Well, that was a pretty terrific question to ask a lieutenant; but I was 43 years older than many Senators, and I had been at sea a good while, and had been around the world; and I said to him that I thought that the most trouble was that the Navy was handled too much from the beach and not enough from the sea, and it greatly amused him, and he gave one of those characteristic grins; and two weeks later, after he got back to Washington, he told me to write him—he reminded me of this conversation and asked me to write him—and I wrote him 20 pages. I never wrote anything that delighted me so much in my life; and he never forgot it. And so, in 1908, about 10 years after this remark, although we met frequently, and he never forgot to mention it, he made me secretary of this board on reorganization of the Navy Department, and I knew that I was going to be secretary a month before, and I took there from the office of Naval Intelligence sketches of all the organizations of the great navies of the world Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and ours, arranged in blue prints, with a file for each member of this commission, and I took there the report of the Essher commission, appointed to reorganize the British War Office after the Boer War. This Essher commission report is a classic. Everybody who wants to know anything about War or Navy Department organization, in fact every citizen of the United States who is interested in the Army or the Navy, ought to read that report. That report, strangely enough, recommended for the organization of the British Army practically the same organization that they had in the British Admiralty, because they said that that organization was wonderful; that it had carried Great Britain through every war, and that it, to their minds, was the best guide for the organization of their Army. I had that ready for the members of the commission and I gave to Admiral Mahan all those things.

Then Admiral Mahan, Mr. Paul Morton, and Admiral Folger were made a subcommittee to draw up an organization, and I was with them; they made me an assistant of that subcommittee, though I really was secretary of the whole committee. So they drew that up; and then they asked Admiral Mahan to write a little monologue on the subject, and he used that expression, that the Department of the Navy should be so organized that it can pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar of its machinery; and the admiral did not wreck anything in the Navy. He kept every agency in our Navy just as it is to-day, but he only grouped them under this aid

they could work together like a band of brothers—material, and other agencies; and he said to us that that was the way for our country; and he said to us, the whole thing recognized, fundamentally, the supremacy of the civil power and the responsibility for providing that nobody should ever for one instant forget that officers of the Navy must recognize that fundamental principle of our Constitution; and he recommended one more aid—that had been used by Secretary Meyer; he recommended the fifth aid, who, he said, should be the final and the confidential adviser of the Secretary of the Navy in all technical matters in preparation for war. This officer, he said, should stand by the Secretary, to keep him informed of everything, keep nothing back, to give him everything from the other aids, see that he knew everything; and that this aid, being in touch with the Secretary and knowing the policies of the United States Government and the Navy's policies and wishes, would in time of war, if the Secretary ordered, stand ready to go to sea and take command of the whole fleet, as Admiral Jellicoe did just before the World War in 1914 with the British fleet. I remember that so well.

REPORT. Sir, was brief, but it was an outline and splendid; and I went with Admiral Luce after the other members went away, and I put it up, and they all signed it before they left except Justice Brandeis and when I had finished it I took it to Justice Moody at the Supreme Court and he signed it and told me to take it to the President. I took it to the White House. Mr. Roosevelt glanced at it—it was short, but he was delighted. And he remembered his previous discussions and conferences with me, and he said, "Well, Captain, we have driven in an entering wedge that may result in the day when the Navy may be controlled in some measure from the shore instead of entirely from the beach"; and he gave me one of those big, hearty smiles that I think all Americans love to think about.

CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that report?

MR. FULLAM. No, sir. I have it, but not here. I have it at home.

CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish that to the committee to put in the report?

MR. FULLAM. It is buried deep under boxes of my impedimenta at Annapolis. It ought to be obtainable at the Navy Department.

CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us where we can get it at the Navy Department?

MR. FULLAM. I am sorry to say I can not. I think I can get it. It is a very brief thing. Mr. Meyer made me tell him that, and then he took this report—he did not want to be bothered with it—he brought up the subject and he gave that to a board of officers presided over by Admiral Swift, and they considered the thing in great detail, and then practically approved of Admiral Swift's and Mr. Moody's commission report, and that is why Mr. Meyer put it in force and effect; but he had no authority of Congress, so before the aid system was never legally authorized, and it was ineffectual for that reason.

CHAIRMAN. Are the navies of any other countries controlled and mastered by civilian heads?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir; and, to my knowledge, the French Navy and the British Navy have civilians at the head. I do not know so very much about the French Navy, though I had studied it at that time; but they have had their troubles, worse than we have at times. I remember one case of a statesman, Camille Pelletan, who had charge of the French Ministry of Marine. I have here some very brief accounts of the results of his administration, which I think should be known. [Reading:]

Camille Pelletan's administration was disastrous to the navy. And yet he was a patriot, animated by the best intentions. Unfortunately, almost all his ideas were contrary to a good organization of the navy department, where so many out-of-date and incomprehensible traditions survive. He left his department in chaotic disorder.

This letter then goes on—it is in the archives of the Office of Naval Intelligence that you can find this thing. He says here:

The navy is succumbing to a double anarchy—anarchy at the top, due to an out-of-date organization of the central services of the ministry, which has permitted politics to reduce in a few years all the services to a state of complete impotency and irresponsibility; anarchy from below, due equally to the intrusion of the political element into our dockyards, thanks to which intrusion the dockyards have ceased to be able to build and maintain the fleet.

Speaking of Camille Pellatan as Minister of Marine of France in *Les Marines Française et Allemande*, 1904, the author states that the distinguishing characteristic of M. Pelletan's régime is "an increased tendency to lessen the combatant corps, to lower its prestige, to belittle it in the minds of the enlisted men and the public."

The name of democracy has been invoked to explain this merciless war on the spirit of discipline and duty; it was pretended that it was desired to make the navy democratic. It is one of the most daring jokes that a minister has ever permitted himself to play. Between demoralization and democratization there is an abyss.

Those things can be found in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and that is why the French Navy was wrecked. And it never recovered. An official examination into its history since that time—it is sad. I say this with regret, but perhaps I ought not to fully say that. They have tried hard. But when you wreck an organization and get wrong principles insidiously into it, it takes a long, long time for that organization to recover.

And another explanation for the reason the French Navy went to pieces was the lack of recognition of the fact that naval officers have a right to say something about the navy.

American naval officers are citizens of the United States. Now, this writer is a captain in the French Navy, and he writes this article. He says:

It seems to me to be a propitious time to make at least one seaman's voice heard in the passionate debate now going on about the principles of naval warfare. It is curious, indeed, to note the officers are vainly to be sought among the many spokesmen of the two opposing parties, which are daily strengthened by new recruits and sit in judgment on a technical question of vital concern to the Nation.

Unless it can be shown that naval men are incompetent to discuss their own profession, we can not admit that they alone should remain silent in regard to the principles which ought to govern the constitution of the fleet.

There is much to be done in France in the way of freeing the voices and pens of naval officers from the strict rules which limit them in the great field of discussion of naval affairs. The English Government sets us a very good example in this respect, as it always does where naval matters are concerned.

This is a French officer writing this [continuing reading]:

At the very moment when a few years ago we gave to certain officers, with extreme parsimony and under many restrictions, authority to hold conferences in the name of

the Naval League, Admiral Charles Beresford was uttering loud protests and complaints on professional subjects in the journals and at public meetings without any attempt on the part of the Admiralty to interfere in the slightest degree with his freedom of speech.

Such an attitude is justified by the importance which the British Admiralty has always attached to the education of public opinion in regard to all maritime questions and also by the very clear perception that the ideas expressed by an officer, however important, commit no one but himself and have only the exact value which people are willing to give to them.

There is no doubt that we must attribute to the fixed rule of silence, imposed even now upon our experts, the unfortunate fact that in our country first principles are constantly being questioned and the same sterile discussions are periodically renewed.

Now, that is the opinion of a French captain about the bad effects of smothering and throttling naval officers, and it is my duty to say right here that when a system like that takes place in a republic it is not consistent. If an admiral in the navy is told that he can not say that 2 and 2 make 4, it is a decree. It is not democracy; it is autocracy. And if the president of a war college is reprimanded severely for writing a paper and reading it at a dinner—I heard it read; it is a classic; it is a paper that Admiral Mahan would have subscribed to instantly, and he was reprimanded with great severity. I deplore that such things can be possible, because those officers ought to be called by the Secretary of the Navy to surround him, and he ought to discuss matters with them.

The CHAIRMAN. What letter are you referring to now—from the president of the War College?

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, in 1915, in the early months of 1915, Mr. Daniels wrote to me and to Admiral Knight and asked us to attend as representatives of the Navy a society dinner in New York City and to address that society, as they wished. I did not want to go there. I had my own job, and speechmaking, to me—I do not like it. I do it when I am compelled to. But I went, and when they called on me I spoke extemporaneously. Admiral Knight prepared a paper, but did not. I knew he would cover the serious subjects of the Navy, as he always did everything with wonderful language, and he is a man of quick intelligence, and I knew he was going to have a paper; so that I spoke extemporaneously. I spoke first and then he read his letter, and it was one of the finest things I have ever heard. It was just on a line with Admiral Mahan's work and with all his writings, about the organization of the Navy Department and the control of the Navy that would make it ready for battle, and it was dignified, it was classical.

I was amazed a few days later when Admiral Knight came to see me at Annapolis and told me that he had been raked over the coals, and he felt so badly—he was afraid that he was going to be court-martialed for reading that letter.

Then I had to send my notes on to the Secretary. Fortunately, my remarks were more or less jocular, and more or less on the human side, and the Secretary returned them to me without comment.

But I felt that when admirals of high rank, who have been 40 years in the Navy are not permitted to speak at all about the service in which their whole life has been spent, and where their energies are concentrated, it is not democracy, sir; it is autocracy. It is bad.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not on the subject, Admiral, of a civilian head of the Navy, but you have cited the question of Admiral Pelle-

tan. In general, do you think that having a civilian head of the Navy in France and England has worked out badly for those countries?

Admiral FULLAM. It has entirely worked badly in France, but not because of having a civilian there. Look at England. The First Lord of the Admiralty is a civilian. They never have had any trouble there, because that civilian recognizes that the British Navy is the first line of defense of the empire, and that the empire will go to smash and ruin if the Navy is not administered properly. And he has a serious realization of the terrible responsibility that rests upon him; and furthermore, he can not, under the laws that control the constitution and the direction of the Navy, give direct military commands, or control very important matters, without consulting with his connections, the sea lords of the Admiralty, who go to sea. He must consult with them; and as a practice, they work together.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring now, to the Secretary of State for the Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. No, the First Lord of the British Admiralty. Now, there is an amusing case in point. An Englishman recently told me this. This is his statement that I quote, and I think he is right; that it was accurate. He said one time Mr. Goschen, whom you will all remember, who has had a very important rôle—I think he was ambassador to Germany, was he not, before this war—he was one of the ambassadors just before this war to one of the great powers, a distinguished statesman of Great Britain, was temporarily free from political or from governmental duty or assignment, and they made him First Lord of the Admiralty in recognition of his abilities and his statesmanship; and he had, as it happened, never taken the slightest interest in the Navy, or never been associated with the Navy. It was not a matter that was particularly congenial to him. He had been a statesman in a broad sense. So it caused some merriment in the British press that Mr. Goschen should be made First Lord of the Admiralty, they remembering Pinafore, and they said funny things; and among other things—this Englishman told me this only recently—Punch said,

"Mr. Goschen
Has no notion
Of the motion
Of the ocean."

But it did not matter whether he did or not, because he called to his assistance, and to coordinate with him, officers who had made British naval history for 50 years; and they knew about "the motion of the ocean," and they knew how to make the British navy—to bring it to such a condition that it would defend the British empire, and therefore no harm resulted, and that is all there is about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think it is a question of the character of the civilian head more than anything else?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, men differ. All men do differ in their ideas.

I want to emphasize one thing, that not one naval officer in a hundred in our Navy would wish to have a military man—a naval man—as Secretary of the Navy. We want a civilian. We want him, why? Because we are citizens of the United States, and we are loyal to the fundamental principles. Nobody in this Nation is more loyal to our principles of government than the Army and Navy offi-

ers, of the regulars, because that is bred in their bones; and I would not for an instant see an officer there. But we do want a man who will utilize our brains, and rally us around him, and say, "Come on, now: let us all get together and work for the Navy."

Admiral Fiske said one or two things here yesterday I want to speak of. He did not know about that educational scheme. I would like to say one or two words about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I was about to ask you about that.

Admiral FULLAM. Because Admiral Fiske was pretty busy with a good many other things, and that was my job.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you prefer to finish to-day, Admiral, or come back again? We would like to finish to-day if we can.

Admiral FULLAM. I can finish in 5 or 10 minutes. I do not wish to prolong my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two other questions to ask you, and probably Senator Trammell has some questions; so that if you will go ahead, very well.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir. I was aide for personnel, and I knew that Mr. Daniels wanted this educational scheme put in force, and I thought it was useless to oppose him. I did not think it wise to do so. And, furthermore, there was a great deal of good in it; so that I outlined a scheme to carry out his general plan, and particularly emphasizing the professional spirit, in order that all men in the Navy might make themselves eligible for promotion, and go along up the list; and in my draft I made the academic instruction optional with each man after he left the training station, except for men who were illiterate. But when I presented this draft the Secretary insisted that they should all be forced to go to school, whether they wanted to go or not. Now, this did not induce men to go into the Navy. It would tend to drive them out; because there were many men between 17 and 25 who did not want to go to school, who had been to school; so that I think it did harm. But I insisted that the general scheme, particularly when you took into account the professional part of it, might do no harm, and we had better let it go through, and I pushed it along and helped Mr. Daniels to. But if he had not been extreme about it, it would have worked. But it was so emphasized that the officers of the Navy had to look upon that as the principal duty of the Navy; and therefore, it hurt the Navy, it hurt the morale of the Navy, in the minds of men and officers, in that the minds of men and officers, instead of being directed towards getting ready to fight—it was a university. And it was harmful. And where is it now? The aide for education has folded his tent and gone, and the whole system is a dead letter in the Navy. It was extreme; that is all.

I went to Scranton, Pa., and investigated the correspondence schools, and that, I thought, was a good thing because it encouraged men aboard ship to study. That did not require men to attend school; but they could study. The commanding officer was asked to give them a place where they could study. That was an excellent plan. In other words, I tried to make the Secretary see that education was nothing new in the Navy. Admiral Luce 40 years before started education in the Navy. There were three admirals in the Navy who graduated from the apprentice system. But when the men became older, from 17 to 25 years of age, it was not so necessary. We had all these vocational schools. We had education to

burn in the Navy. There was no discovery of something new there at all; nothing. It was nothing new.

And about the democratizing of the Navy, I talked to the Secretary about that. I told him he was mistaken, that there was no aristocracy in the Navy; that there was nothing of that sort; that officers loved their men, and were ten times more solicitous of their men than an employer in civil life is of his; that I had seen officers put under suspension because they did not have a boat's crew put in rain clothes before they left the ship when rain was probable, or because they did not save dinner for the gig's crew when they were away from the ship. And the men of the Navy, why, we stood together all our lives. Admiral Huse jumped overboard not long ago and saved the life of an enlisted man—an admiral of the Navy. They are doing it all the time. Why, sir, I would rather be in a street car or in any public place with enlisted men of the Navy than with nine-tenths of the civilians in this country.

Those charges of caste and aristocracy hurt the Navy. The officers felt hurt. There is no sense in it. And when you hurt the feelings and cut down deeply into the feelings of officers, it causes what? Resentment, enmity, permanent resentment, and permanent enmity, and that does hurt. It hurts the morale. It does something that ought never to be done. No, sir; there is no caste, sir, or aristocracy. There are traditions that were established by John Paul Jones and Decatur, perpetuated by Farragut and Porter and Sampson and Dewey and Mahan and Evans and Brownson and Schroeder and Wainwright, and men like that. And if you call that caste or aristocracy, the more you have of it the better for the Navy and for this country; and when you wreck it, you will wreck the Navy just as sure as there is a God in heaven.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony you have said several times that you could not get anywhere on account of the inertia of the Navy Department. Do I understand that that refers to the Secretary or to the officers of the Navy or to the bureaus of the Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. Now, sir, I do not want to be too personal.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but it is necessary for the committee to know this.

Admiral FULLAM. But I do think it is my duty now to tell the truth, because it is a national question; it is not a personal question; nor have I any personal feeling—please, I want to emphasize that.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not to bring out any personal feeling, but to find out where the hold-up was.

Admiral FULLAM. I do not believe that an officer of the Navy on duty at the Navy Department at any time has intentionally failed in or neglected his duty. Duty is a passion with him. It is the life of every man in the Navy. I know it, because it so happens that I have instructed, myself personally, and been in contact with, every officer in the Navy from the lower numbers on the admirals' list nearly down to the bottom. Thirty-one different graduating classes of the naval academy have come under my inspection and instruction, and I have bothered them, somehow or other, during one year or two years at the naval academy; and I know what they are made of, and I know that they all do their duty and are obedient. Obedience is instinctive, and they would never think of violating it. I do not think that our failure to prepare for war—I know it—was due to

nothing with the Navy Department; our Government did not weigh—did not consider the subject of preparation for war, and they discouraged its consideration by everybody at the Navy Department. I saw Admiral Fiske go there day after day and try to get the Secretary to do something; and how he could have stood it I do not see, month after month. No attention was paid. It could not be done. It was impossible; until that office of Chief of Operations was forced upon the Secretary. Mr. Holson told me just the other day that he took that to Mr. Daniels, and when Mr. Daniels looked at it he said, "I will fight that. If that is adopted, I will go home." And for that reason the Naval Committee of the House was moved, I think, to change it in one or two very important matters, unfortunately, and that was war plans. If it had not been for Mr. Holson and Admiral Fiske that office of Operations would never have been organized. I can not conceive of the department taking any initiative. It did not take for the organization of that office of Operations after Mr. Holson presented the plans. Holson told me that they had to meet in his house in secret, and to call officers, like Admiral Knapp, to be there to meet them, so as not to let the Secretary know about it.

That is a pathetic state of affairs, and it was done by an officer who was about to be dismissed from the Navy Department. In his determined and zealous desire to see that the Navy was safeguarded he went up there with Holson, and they got their heads together and made that organization, and that organization of that office of Naval Operations is the only thing that saved the day for the Navy in this war. It was a splendid thing, and those officers did splendid work, all of them. Every one of them did splendid work. I can not make it clearer than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have no complaint to make about inertia or lack of cooperation on the part of any officer of the Navy or any department of the Navy in any plans for the government of the Navy that you came across during the war?

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir. On the contrary I believe those officers all wanted to do it; but, sir, they have gotten down to this point. There is a dangerous idea getting around that you have got to efface yourself; that you have got to agree absolutely with somebody else; and that is going to ruin the Navy if you keep it up. If you establish the principle that a man has got to be subservient, almost servile, almost to efface himself, and say yes, and not dare to express himself the inevitable result of that is that you will put mediocrity itself upon a pedestal, and you will throw ability and zeal into the discard, and you will hurt the Navy if that system becomes embedded in the Navy Department. Officers must be assigned to duty not by reason of their subservience, but by reason of their ability, and they must be ready to leave any job and go to sea, to leave any important job on shore where they may have a palace, and take two rooms and a bath, if necessary, to go away, when they find that it is planned to do something that will injure the Navy and not prepare the Navy for war.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Keyes, have you any questions?

Senator KEYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, I have a great deal of respect for naval officers, and I want that understood. I think taking them as

a whole, they are very capable, and they are a very patriotic and very efficient set of men; but I gather from your testimony that the naval officers are practically infallible, and that the civilian officers are responsible entirely for any neglect that occurred in the operation of the Navy in the carrying on of the war; is that correct?

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said every naval officer did his duty.

Admiral FULLAM. Well, no, sir; I hardly——

Senator TRAMMELL. I understood you to say that. At least, your statement would carry that inference with it.

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I am sorry if it did. I am speaking now under the pressure of feeling, because it is a very serious situation; but I will emphasize it, that I do not believe that men in civilian life in any profession take duty and obedience as seriously as naval officers do, and I do not believe they do their duty as well.

Senator TRAMMELL. Well, of course that is a matter of opinion. I have found that the people connected with the Navy—and I have a great deal of respect for them—were human, just like anybody else.

Admiral FULLAM. That is right.

Senator TRAMMELL. And I have occasionally run up against some fellows of a bad character filling pretty important positions in the Navy, and I think you find them there as well as you find them all through life. You do find them all through life; and you can not pick out and throw the cloak of infallibility around naval officers and say that everybody else is all wrong. The Navy officials themselves have clashes, and have differences of opinion, and I think you are entitled to your opinion; but I do not think that a civilian is to be reflected upon merely because he might maintain an opinion different from that that a naval officer might have. I have a great deal of respect for the Navy, and no doubt you have a fine lot of men and officers; but I have not found them all absolutely infallible, nor have I found them all absolutely tiptop when it comes to business or official duties. I have had some experience and observed some of them.

Admiral FULLAM. I agree with you.

Senator TRAMMELL. If that was not true, you would not have to court-martial some of them now and then.

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have a great deal of respect for them; but I am just trying to——

Admiral FULLAM. Please do not let me seem to carry the point that far, to assert that all naval officers are better than all civilians at all. We are appointed to the Navy by Congressmen. We can not get there without a Congressman appoints us; and if there are any incompetents they were appointed by some member of Congress or a Senator, or the President. We can not get into the Navy in any other way.

Senator TRAMMELL. A Congressman or a Senator is liable to make a mistake, and somebody that was a great deal wiser than a Congressman or a Senator made a mistake once, and got a Judas mixed up with his organization; but because they make a mistake is not any reason——

Admiral FULLAM. I tried to make it very clear that I respect the civil power absolutely. I do not think anybody in the world respect-

the coordinate branches of our Government so much and has such a sentimental feeling of loyalty for them and respect for them as naval officers have.

Senator TRAMMELL. I know, you stated that before in response to question of the chairman; you said that none of the naval officers were responsible for anything that had gone wrong at all. That was the substance of it.

Admiral FULLAM. They could not be responsible because they cannot control policies, and they can not get money, and they can not get men, and they can not get guns, and they can not get torpedoes, and they can not get small arms, and they can not get anything to do anything with themselves. They carry on the routine of their duty, and the most that I wanted to do, sir, was to say that their functions should be recognized, and that an admiral 40 years of age should be regarded as having probably a better idea of the Navy than any man in civil life, however distinguished he might be—some admirals. That is all; because they concentrate on that. That is all, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not question that at all, and I think you have done a splendid work; from your recital of your work here I think you have done a splendid work; I am impressed that way; but you have a Secretary of the Navy, and our Constitution and system of government so provides, now he might make mistakes by exercising some judgment himself, but he has either got to do one of two things; he has either got to be a rubber stamp and carry out the will of the naval officers, or else he has got to be a man who stands four corners to the wind and exercises some judgment himself. He has got to be one or the other.

Admiral FULLAM. We want a strong man. We love to serve under strong men. I do not want to have anything else.

Senator TRAMMELL. The fact that a Secretary might disagree with a naval officer—

Admiral FULLAM. A naval officer, yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is no particular reflection upon the Secretary or no particular reflection upon the naval officer. Each one of them has his province and duties to perform. Now, the naval officer might have made a mistake in that instance, or the Secretary, I do not know which. It is testified here in some cases, that a naval officer has made some mistakes, probably, in some instances, and probably the Secretary has made some mistakes. So that we are all more or less subject to fallibility.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. We are all, I suppose, striving for the proper end, from our viewpoints.

Now, in the question of recommendations and suggestions, you were very energetic and made quite a number of recommendations in regard to the Pacific Fleet; but while it seems that they were not always approved of, I did not hear you read any letter rebuking you or reprimanding you for making suggestions.

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, no.

Senator TRAMMELL. You had that right, did you, to make suggestions and recommendations?

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Just as you did?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Secretary did not object to that, even if he did not happen to agree with you?

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, no; no.

Senator TRAMMELL. The men under you, I suppose, were authorized to make recommendations to you, were they?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir; they were invited to do so.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not always approve of them, though, did you?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I do not remember of anybody making any recommendation to me that I did not approve, because they were all working on one job, with innate intelligence.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is your policy, then, as a rule to approve recommendations made to you by subordinate officers?

Admiral FULLAM. There is nothing in the world that gives me so much joy as to approve and encourage my subordinates and to make them feel that I am using every ounce of brains they have got in their heads.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is very proper, but if you approve of everything they do, do they think that you are exercising every ounce of brains in your own head?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, Senator, I will leave them to say.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you accept what they say every time?

Admiral FULLAM. I will leave them to answer that question for me. If they think I have not got the brains, all right. I will not speak of my own brains.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said you were utilizing and accepting every ounce of brains they had; and you also said you always approved of their recommendations. You take those two statements and it would indicate that you were letting them govern and control so far as their recommendations were concerned, and you were not exercising your own brains.

Admiral FULLAM. Well, Senator, I have made a mistake in bringing that up. I think my brains have been pretty thoroughly occupied.

Senator TRAMMELL. I know they have, but I am just taking what you say. I do not question but what you are a very intelligent man and a very efficient officer. I am confident of that. But I am just taking your statements. I do not know a thing about the Navy, but I have observed a good many naval officers that when they had recommendations made to them by subordinate officers they did not always approve of them. They disapproved of more or less of them, and I thought they were exercising a proper prerogative in disapproving of them.

Admiral FULLAM. Quite right. I think I have disapproved of some recommendations. That is a very general statement, you know. But young men, who have not had much experience, you have got to be a little careful about them. If you take a man who has been to sea for 20 years or longer, and possibly been all over the world, and has had opportunities for observations, his opinions as a rule are pretty nearly right.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then another thing you said in regard to Secretary Meyer. Do you remember what all he did in regard to

up the Navy and building up the personnel and officers, and of the Navy, during his administration? What great progress during his administration toward preparing the Navy for

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I was with him only a month, Senator.

Mr. TRAMMEL. You were pretty familiar with the Navy. He made great preparations for war and lay plans throughout his administration for putting the Navy in a state of preparedness

Admiral FULLAM. He initiated the most important thing in his administration. You can not do anything without an organization. He realized that. He could not appropriate money.

Mr. TRAMMEL. If the present Secretary had found the Navy in a state of efficiency and in a thoroughly prepared condition for war in accordance with what you advocate, we would probably have been a good deal better prepared than we were, would

Admiral FULLAM. Yes. As I say, Mr. Meyer could not get everything he wanted. I do not want to talk about Congress, but really, honestly, I think Congress has been a little derelict.

Mr. TRAMMEL. I think Congress has had a great deal to do

Admiral FULLAM. I am sorry there was one thing, Senator, that I would like to bring out, that the Council of National Defense was suggested by members of the Navy—I think Capt. Hill of the Navy and others strongly suggested it, to bring all the civil departments of the Government together on policies—national policies and national defense—and that would have been a wonderful thing if it had been carried out. There was only one representative of the Navy and one representative of the Army, I think, on that suggested Council of National Defense, so that the supremacy of the civil power was maintained.

The vast majority of the council were civilians, and the members were perfectly willing to have it that way; and that would have coordinated all Government agencies to prepare the country for war.

CHAIRMAN. I think that will be all, Admiral.

The subcommittee adjourned until Tuesday, April 13, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

LETTER NO. 1.

OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET.
U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP.
San Francisco, Calif., November 15, 1915.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I am greatly obliged to you for having written to the department concerning the assignment of apprentices to this fleet, and I regret that I cannot approve their going to San Diego. I will write to him and see if I can modify the orders.

It is desirable to send to the ships going to San Diego apprentices who had nearly completed their course and let us graduate them there; that is, the apprentices who might not be compelled to return again to the station. If such an arrangement could be made, I should be delighted, but of course I do not suggest you with propositions of any kind.

The fleet generally has so many advantages that I should think the department should operate them.

I hope you have noted no ill effects as far as the apprentices are concerned.
Hoping to see you before many days. I am,
Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral. United States Navy.

Capt. PHILIP ANDREWS, United States Navy.
United States Naval Training Station,
San Francisco, Calif.

LETTER NO. 2.

UNITED STATES NAVAL TRAINING STATION.

San Francisco, Calif., November 19, 1915.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Referring to your letter November 15, in regard to apprentices for the reserve fleet ships, I will see if it is possible to send apprentices who have nearly completed their course of instruction and let you transfer them later, but I am very much afraid that the refusal of the bureau to allow them to go from the station on account of your uncertain itinerary will prevent my doing it. I should be very glad to do it for we have too many men here to berth and handle. I have succeeded in getting the bureau to let me rate men after five months who are found qualified and I got rid of about 200 men to the *Maryland* and *San Diego*, but I must take back the three companies which you have before you sail, probably about December 1 and that will crowd us up.

The service on the ships that the apprentice seamen have had, and most of it has been on reserve ships, has been of the greatest benefit to them, and I think all of the ships have taken a great deal of interest in completing their instruction, as I have always found them much improved by these experiences on shipboard. I notice particularly the very excellent routine of instruction which the *Oregon* has prepared of which Capt. Reeves sent me a copy. By keeping a record of the individual men and marking them constantly it is possible to determine, even without an examination here, whether the men are qualified for advancement and whether they can be considered as having completed their instruction.

I shall try to drop on board to see you Saturday morning when I go to call on Admiral Winslow.

With kind regards,
Sincerely, yours,

PHILIP P. ANDREWS.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, United States Navy,
U. S. S. "South Dakota," San Francisco, Calif.

LETTER NO. 3.

OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., November 20, 1915.

To: Secretary of Navy, Navy Department (Navigation), Washington, D. C.

Subject: Detail of apprentice seamen to ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet.

Reference: (a) Bureau of Navigation's letter No. 5549-618-N6th, of November 4, 1915, to commandant United States Naval Training Station, San Francisco, Calif.

1. Referring to the question of utilizing apprentice seamen from the training station on board the ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet and to the acting chief of bureau's letter of November 4, 1915, I beg to invite the attention of the bureau to the inclosed letter from the commandant of the training station and the comments concerning the benefit to the apprentices from this employment.

2. While I do not wish to importune the bureau, nor to question its decision in this matter, I request its reconsideration for the following reasons:

(1) If apprentices who have nearly finished their course are sent to the reserve ships before they go to San Diego these men may be transferred to ships of the Pacific Fleet any time when they call in at San Diego, or they may also be transferred back to San Francisco by ships of the Pacific Fleet, which visit this port from time to time.

(2) The *South Dakota* is ordered to return to Mare Island some time after the 1st of January to have her 8-inch guns replaced, which will offer an opportunity for bringing back to San Francisco any apprentice seamen who may have been assigned to the ships at San Diego.

(3) The apprentice seamen are not only benefited by this arrangement, but the ships of the reserve fleet are, by this means, kept in better condition in every respect.

is my opinion that with the cooperation of the commandant and of the bureau this will result in very great good, and the bureau is assured that the commander in chief will take especial measures and conform to such general instructions as to prevent embarrassment or trouble to the bureau in case the commandant of the training station is authorized to continue the present assignment as outlined in his letter, with inclosed.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 4.

[Bureau of Navigation—First indorsement.]

NOVEMBER 29, 1915.

Commander in Chief, Pacific Reserve Fleet.

Subject: Detail of apprentice seamen to ships of Pacific Reserve Fleet.

Reference: C-in-C's letter 97-WFF-V 11-20-15.

The detail of apprentice seamen to ships on the Pacific coast prior to their completion of the full course at the training station has been taken up with the Secretary of the Navy. Such detail has had his approval in cases of short and definite cruises; and, in addition, the course at the training stations has been shortened to five months in the case of especially apt and recommended men; a further extension of these details shortening of the course does not receive the approval of the bureau.

Please return all papers.

VICTOR BLUE.

LETTER NO. 5.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., November 30, 1915.

Subject: Commanding officers *Maryland*, *South Dakota*, and *Oregon* (via Commander in Chief Pacific Reserve Fleet.)

Subject: Apprentice seamen.

Reference: (a) C. O. *Maryland*, letter 11-21-15; (b) C. O. *South Dakota*, letter 11-23-15; (c) *Oregon*, letter 11-23-15.

The bureau notes with satisfaction the uniformly good reports of the apprentice seamen detailed temporarily on board the vessel under your command, and has already authorized a continuance of this policy in short and definite cruises.

VICTOR BLUE.

Copy to commandant training station, San Francisco, Calif.

[First indorsement.]

U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,
NAVY YARD,
Mare Island, Calif., December 9, 1915.

From: Commander in chief Pacific Reserve Fleet.

To: Commanding officers *Maryland*, *Oregon*, and *South Dakota*.

1. Forwarded.

2. Commanding officer *South Dakota* please return papers.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 6.

365-29

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 10, 1916.

Subject: Schedule of movements of Pacific Reserve Fleet during the present year.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF,

Pacific Reserve Fleet.

1. It is the department's policy to have two vessels (never less than one) of the Pacific Reserve Fleet at San Diego during the continuance of the exposition.

2. The department assumes that the commander in chief would wish to have his flag on one of the vessels at the exposition.

3. In order that the vessel of the fleet may surely be kept in readiness and that the department may at all times be assured of this readiness by actual tests of their cruising ability, it is directed that a schedule of the movements necessary to carry out the policy laid down in paragraph 1 be submitted, the schedule to arrange that each of the vessels of the Pacific Reserve Fleet in turn shall proceed to San Diego and remain for such period as the commander in chief may desire and then be relieved by her successor.

4. Conformity with the above paragraph will assure the vessels being put in the best condition, that their officers, crews, and organizations will be adapted for actual service and will permit the commander in chief to inspect them and will give their officers and crews a trip to the exposition.

5. The above plan will provide for the annual cruising called for in the department's policy letter in reference to reserve ships and will enable the commander in chief and the department to ascertain how fully and completely that policy is being carried out.

6. A new docking schedule, which will conform with the above-requested schedule of ship movement, will be submitted.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

• LETTER NO. 7.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MILWAUKEE," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., February 23, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Schedule of movements of Pacific Reserve Fleet during the present year.

References: (a) Department's letter No. 28365-29, dated February 10, 1916; department's circular letter No. 10265-13, dated December 3, 1915.

Inclosures:

1. The department's letter of February 10, concerning a schedule of movements of ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet, is carefully noted.

2. The plan outlined in this letter, together with the requirements of the department's circular letter of December 3, 1915, will, if properly carried out, put new life into the Pacific Reserve Fleet and insure the readiness and efficiency of all ships for any duty that may be demanded.

3. In conformity with the letter, reference (a), the following tentative schedule is submitted for the consideration of the department:

NOTE.—The department failed to provide the officers and men necessary to carry out its own program or to comply with the Navy Regulations concerning the readiness of reserve ships. This letter recommended a permanent instead of a temporary policy.

It will be noted that this schedule gives the ships, in turn, a two months' cruise from Bremerton to San Diego.

RESULTS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.

4. Each ship spends four days at San Francisco going south and four days going north, to give liberty, make necessary transfers of officers and men, take on board or send to training station apprentice seamen, or to transport any Naval Militiamen or civilians who may be assigned to naval training by the Navy Department.

5. Each ship will remain about six weeks at San Diego for "military drills;" gunnery training; "some form of elementary target practice;" "annual fleet maneuvers" as may be prescribed; "exercises under way in a group" under the commander in chief; a four-hour (or longer) full-speed trial of engines under forced or natural draft, as may be necessary; thorough inspection by the commander in chief.

6. It is not believed that the requirements of the department's letter can be met by a shorter cruise than two months. The schedule provides that from two to four ships (usually three) shall be at San Diego during the year, and this number is necessary for "maneuvers in groups" by the commander in chief, and to supply the officers necessary to secure proper and thorough inspection by the commander in chief. It is hoped therefore that this schedule will be approved, as it will conduce to the success of the whole plan.

ADVANTAGE OF A PERMANENT POLICY.

7. The presence of these ships at San Diego, and the constant cruising from Bremerton to San Diego with stops at San Francisco, will prepare all ships to join the active Pacific Fleet at any time, and to transport officers and drafts of men to and from San Francisco for all ships.

8. It is submitted that a schedule of this kind providing for a cruise along the coast to the three important seaports of the Pacific should be made permanent—not simply during the exposition—in that it will conduce to the lasting efficiency of the fleet for reasons that are manifest; in other words, there should be a permanent, not a temporary, policy in this respect. The climatic conditions of southern California will conduce to success in training and fleet work.

FULL REQUIREMENTS OF DEPARTMENT'S LETTER.

It is stated that the following are the most important requirements of the department referred to above: (1) "Complete readiness" of each ship to perform its duties in war"; (2) "sufficient trained petty officers and men" to "maintain" and to be "ready for efficient service after a short shake-down at military drills"; (3) "exercise underway, singly or in group," (4) "readiness of all machinery"; (5) "readiness for annual fleet maneuvers"; (6) "target practice annually"; (7) readiness "for active service at any time."

The department required much and withheld everything necessary to accomplish this. This was all on paper. Nothing was done to help the commander to get results.

It is stated that the above requirements of the department's letters are very important and absolutely necessary to secure readiness of reserve ships for war.

NECESSITY FOR SUPPLYING PERSONNEL.

In this connection, however, the commander in chief is constrained to state that the success of the whole plan depends absolutely upon the assignment of sufficient number of officers and men to the reserve ships. If a sufficient complement of the policy will be a success; if officers and men are not provided, the policy will fail. There is no alternative.

The following table shows the number of officers and men at present on board the Reserve Fleet and, in red ink, the minimum number of officers and men of each rank that could possibly meet the important demands noted

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS AND MEN REQUIRED.

It is stated that, not counting the *Saratoga*, 7 additional commanding officers, 10 additional junior officers, and 26 additional warrant officers are needed, as well as 100 men to fill the reserve complements and to give each ship 4 additional officers, exclusive of the commanding officer, 4 boatswains and 4 additional watchmen, etc., and 3 machinists for engineering and mechanical

It is considered practicable or safe to attempt to carry out the proposed plan with the officers and men.

RANK OF COMMANDING OFFICERS.

In regard to the rank of the commanding officers, it is submitted that each important reserve ship should have the commanding officer who would be needed in war. Officers of lesser rank should not be assigned as a matter of policy. In case of war would throw upon the commanding officer of a reserve ship a responsibility and confront a commanding officer of a ship in full command of the reserve ship must quickly attain efficiency with a crew made up of untrained men untrained for the duties of that particular ship.

Proper rank is required for other reasons. It is demonstrated by the fact that the reserve fleet that captains and commanders are not only needed in war efficiency on board ship, but they are needed every day to maintain discipline and to carry on routine work, courts, boards, and other duties in proper manner. The commander in chief has been confronted with unfortunate conditions in discipline and routine have been caused by placing junior officers in command of big ships. At one time Lieut. Comdr. [Name] of the staff of the commander in chief, did additional duty in command of the largest ships of the fleet—the *Pittsburgh* and *West Virginia*—and was the only officer on board these two ships.

It is stated from the above that the number of junior commissioned officers required to fill the reserve complements of 10 ships is only 15 junior officers, which is more than the complement of one armored cruiser in full complement. It would not appear to be an extravagant demand if it will secure the readiness of the ships.

IMPORTANCE OF PERSONNEL.

The effect of personnel is so important and the effect of leaving ships without proper personnel is so degrading and depressing, despite every effort of a commander in

to inspire zeal and interest, that it would be a neglect of duty not to invite serious attention to the matter—it is the one and only key to enthusiasm and efficiency in any fleet.

INCREASE OF COMMISSIONED AND WARRANT OFFICERS.

19. In connection with this general subject of providing necessary officers, and having in mind that a new personnel bill is to be formulated, it is most respectfully submitted that an increase of flag officers is needed, inasmuch as many captains are now doing rear admiral's duty; that a large increase would provide commanding officers and promote and reward lieutenant commanders and lieutenants of long service; that a large increase of boatswains and gunners would promote worthy petty officers now in service and thus provide junior watch officers for ships in reserve; that the graduation of the two senior classes at Annapolis in June would further add available junior officers.

20. The project of graduating midshipmen after three years has been previously suggested to the department, and it is to be noted that the curtailment of the course at Annapolis at this time, to meet an emergency, could be compensated for at some future time by giving to all midshipmen who may be graduated prematurely a suitable post-graduate course in the future when practicable.

21. As a further means of supplying officers in the emergency that now confronts the Navy, it is most respectfully urged that the law which forbids the employment of retired officers except at their will and at a lieutenant's pay, should be repealed at once, and that all retired officers who are available should be assigned to active duty on shore or elsewhere in order that a large number of officers now on the active list may be ordered to service with the fleets.

22. The above suggestions are submitted as a means of putting new life and hope into the personnel of the Navy while increasing the efficiency of the naval service in every respect.

LETTER NO. 8.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MILWAUKEE," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., February 24, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I am forwarding herewith copies of correspondence concerning the future policy and movements of the reserve ships. This correspondence explains itself, but I wanted to send a copy to you because of the paragraph concerning the employment and training of apprentice seamen, Naval Militia and civilians who are to be given instruction, etc.

I hope you will give my suggestions consideration. If the scheme as outlined is carried out, we can cheer things up out here and get all ships and the personnel in proper condition and secure enthusiasm in place of a condition of depression and discouragement.

I hope the law forbidding the employment of retired officers except on a lieutenant's pay may be repealed at once. It should never have been passed, and at the present time we need every retired officer who is fit for duty, and all such officers assigned to active duty should have active-duty pay.

Please note that the whole scheme depends on the assignment of a few more officers and men in this fleet. They need not be all assigned now but month by month during the next six months in order that the ships may move in turn.

If the department will give me a chance, I can cheer things up out here and the whole effect along the coast will be very good. It seems to me that the number of officers and men needed to secure this object is so small that it is well worth the effort and trouble necessary to get them.

If Congress would do something and do it right away, we could get busy and do something. I am convinced that the suggestions made in my letter if approved would secure several hundred junior officers within the next few months and give us enough captains and commanders to do naval work in a proper and dignified manner. This is the key to the whole situation and if the Navy Department does nothing on this line, all plans and schemes to improve the efficiency of reserve ships—not to say other ships—will simply remain on paper.

If this plan is approved, I can get the ships of the reserve fleet into splendid condition, taking them out for some form of elementary target practice, tactical maneuvers, etc., and thus keep them tuned up. For this reason I have made the plan so that there may be not less than two ships in addition to the flagship at San Diego. This

number is necessary to supply officers for target-practice work and inspection, and if the department will approve the plan as it stands, I will agree to deliver the goods.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE.

United States Navy. Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

Navy Department. Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 9.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,

U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,

San Diego, Calif., March 20, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: After writing to you of my disappointment in getting some news from Dayton that he could not supply officers sufficient to move my ships, I was delighted to get a copy of his letter of March 11 in which he promised to arrange for enough officers to bring the *Pittsburgh*, *Colorado*, and *Charleston* south on the dates proposed in the schedule; and that he will later on provide personnel to carry out the entire scheme.

I hope you will approve the schedule, and I assure you that we will make no complaint about little things, for I realize that Navigation is doing the best it can.

In the meantime we will be as self-reliant as possible as regards enlisted men, and with the aid of apprentice seamen, our troubles will be greatly lessened. Andrews is helping me very much and we are working in complete harmony. The scheme of instruction I have adopted will soon whip the apprentices into shape.

I realize the main difficulty is with officers; and we should do something to solve that problem.

In connection with the suggestion to graduate two classes from the Naval Academy in June, please give your earnest consideration to the following:

The subjects covered in the first class year are as follows: Seamanship, ordnance, navigation, steam, electricity, languages, physiology and hygiene. All practical.

If you will give me 100 midshipmen who have been three years at the Naval Academy, I will guarantee to put them through a practical course in all these subjects on board reserve ships, and at the same time they would help us to keep these ships away from the dock; I am sure that with the cooperation of the academic board a plan could be easily outlined by which all midshipmen after three years at Annapolis could receive practical instruction which would bring them up to a standard practically as good for work afloat as that given during the first class year.

Should this scheme be considered, you will note that the number of officers on duty at Annapolis can be considerably reduced, which will be another gain for the fleet.

This plan would increase the output of the Naval Academy 25 per cent and would greatly help us during the next few years, after which we could return to the four-year course at Annapolis.

I can see no difficulty in carrying this out, for we might consider the last as a practice cruise, and the midshipmen need not be commissioned until the end of this cruise; in other words, they would be required to qualify in all these subjects before receiving a commission.

The post-graduate course could in time supply any deficiency caused by the adoption of this plan with certain classes during the next few years.

The general feeling of satisfaction and hope inspired by the great proposition to move these reserve ships indicates the great good that will result if you adopt a new scheme—use reserve ships to train men and young officers for the active fleet, and by so doing keep the reserve ships moving. It is a knife that cuts both ways.

Why should not we get busy and adopt emergency measures in an emergency?

It is easy to sit still and say and do nothing—together too easy—and this is my reason for making these suggestions to you. Reserve ships alongside a dock deteriorate, and all officers and men employed on board such ships also deteriorate. The whole thing is bad, and it is time to stop it.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral W. S. BENSON,

United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S.—I inclose herewith a letter from Tozer. Please glance at the concluding paragraphs.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 10.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 28, 1916.

MY DEAR FULLAM: I have received your various letters in regard to the condition in the Reserve Fleet, and particularly with reference to the personnel, and every effort is being made to carry out the schedule outlined.

It was with considerable reluctance that we decided to take the *Milwaukee* as the relief of the *Iris* and the *Charleston* as the relief of the *Annapolis*. The shortage of personnel is such, however, that it seems a waste of good material to keep officers and men in such vessels as the *Iris* and the *Severn*. By utilizing them for the purposes that we have, and keeping the personnel fairly well up to the number allowed, these vessels which are really fighting units, can be kept in much better readiness for service, and it gives us more men and officers toward keeping the other vessels of the reserve fleet in better shape. It seemed to me to be the very best arrangement that could be made to help the present situation.

I note what you say in regard to the detail of additional warrant officers. In regard to the graduating of the two classes from the Naval Academy, for obvious reasons the Naval Academy is a topic that I do not take up with the Secretary unless I am called upon by him for an expression of my opinion. Whatever my feelings and ideas may be on the subject, I shall certainly try to avoid any suggestion for action that could in any way give anyone grounds for suspecting any personal interest or motive in so doing.

Hoping that the whole matter will work out satisfactorily and assuring you that the effort you are making to build up the readiness of the reserve fleet is appreciated. I am,

Very sincerely, yours,

W. S. BENSON.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM,
United States Navy. Commander in Chief Pacific Reserve Fleet,
U. S. S. "Maryland," Flagship, San Francisco.

LETTER NO. 10.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., April 1, 1916.

MY DEAR FULLAM: Last week I returned from a two week's leave, and since then have been doing some business along the lines of your correspondence with me.

You will be gratified to know that your fleet will get all apprentice seamen from the San Francisco station who have completed two months of training, that they will not have to return to the training station.

The same thing will be done with apprentice seamen at the other training stations. They will be sent to the Atlantic Fleet.

The Secretary permitted me to do this with the understanding that the instruction would be continued afloat.

Again, the Secretary approved my recommendation to appoint an additional number of boatswains and gunners. In consequence, all who passed the examinations last year have been appointed; this gives us 17 gunners, 7 boatswains, and 2 machinists additional. You have several of them and can make use of them.

I will put you on a better basis in regard to officers as soon as we can get the new class of ensigns. How would you like to have a number of them for watch duty on your cruising ships? That would be valuable experience for them.

During this period of shortage of officers, what would you think of so changing the curriculum at the Naval Academy as would permit of sending the second class to sea on regular cruising ships and returning them to the Academy for examination at the end of a year to complete the first-class year there—the academic board to prescribe the course of studies to be followed during the year at sea, and in which they would be examined upon their return? This, I believe, can be done under present laws.

That part of the course could be confined to navigation, ordnance and gunnery, seamanship, and engineering, and be entirely practical in its nature and systematically laid out. These young men, of course, would perform regular duties as junior officers while on board ship.

I would be glad to receive from you suggestions along these lines.

Very sincerely, yours,

VICTOR BLUE.

LETTER NO. 12.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
 "U. S. S. MARYLAND", FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., April 8, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: Referring to your letter of April 1, I hope I did not misunderstand your meaning in the last two paragraphs. I understood that the curriculum could not be changed for the first three years of the course, but at the end of the second class year, but after three years at the academy each class should go to sea and spend its first class year in the fleet, returning to Annapolis for its final examinations and graduation. In other words the Naval Academy course proper would be three years, the last year being devoted to a cruise and to strictly practical work.

I hope you will push this through before you leave the bureau.

I can not too earnestly impress you with the fact that a very bad condition exists as regards the personnel, and the sooner you get the ships in full commission, with complete complements of officers and men, the better it will be.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
*United States Navy, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
 Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

LETTER NO. 13.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
 U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif.

MY DEAR BENSON: Winslow conferred with me concerning a relief vessel for the *McCulloch*. I advised that the *Charleston* remain at San Francisco until May 12, at which time, you will note, the *Albany* should arrive there according to the cruising schedule. If you approve this plan, the *Albany* may remain indefinitely at San Francisco for neutrality duty, and the *New Orleans* may relieve the *Albany* with the Naval Militia. The *Charleston* can leave San Francisco May 12 for any other duty. It seemed to me that this was the best solution of the problem. I am more than anxious to have the ships of the reserve fleet ready for any duty at any time.

We hope to have target practice for the *Maryland* this week. And I shall make every endeavor to have the torpedoes of all ships tested in turn at the Keyport station.

We are unfortunately short of skilled personnel in connection with torpedoes. This is a serious matter because in time of a war the torpedoes of these vessels, if properly used, might do some execution which their light batteries could not do.

I can not too earnestly impress you, my dear Benson, with the immediate necessity for training our personnel with all kinds of weapons. When I inspect the crews and note the youth of most of the apprentices, I can not but wonder how long it will take to develop them into material that will answer the requirements of war.

I wish I could see you personally and talk to you freely on this subject. I am sure the Navy Department realizes that we have hard work to do and should begin at once.

I was encouraged by Blue's last letter concerning the practical scheme for midshipmen to spend the last year of their course in the fleet. The increase of warrant officers is also welcome, but we do need proper captains and commanders right away. I would like to see the whole list of lieutenant commanders promoted to-morrow, with a good increase in admirals, captains, and commanders. The effect upon the Navy would be electrical and it would do nothing more than provide for the emergencies of the next few years. Really, Benson, we must look ahead and do things quick.

I inclose a copy of my last letter to Blue. I hope I am not nagging you. It would be easy for me to say and do nothing.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM S. BENSON,
*United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
 Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

P. S.—I have talked with Winslow about the coal situation here, and I understand this station will be supplied at once. We ought to have a good surplus of coal here at once. I have instructed all my ships to fill up at Bremerton and San Francisco because of the shortage at San Diego. This might hamper our movements seriously.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 14.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET.

U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., April 12, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I was glad to get the two circular letters regarding (1) the training of apprentices in this fleet, and (2) the advancement in rating of enlisted men.

These are timely and cheering and will help things.

I am at sea with the *Maryland* training for target practice. A tour of the decks and turrets, with few men and hardly an officer in sight, is impressive! For Heaven's sake get officers and men as quick as you can and by every means in our power. We must train them for the future, and do it now.

I answered your last letter promptly and fully. The Navy Department should correspond with officers afloat and welcome their suggestions. The department should wish to know the worst. Perhaps it does—I certainly hope so.

I have heard rumors of your going to sea before long. If you do, I truly hope your successor will be one to whom we can write and confide. He should be carefully selected. If not, the Navy will go to the devil in double time.

I am never pessimistic by nature, but I am convinced that the situation as regards lack of personnel, etc., is critical; that laxity, discouragement, and demoralization are too prevalent; that discipline is not good, and that we should take a tremendous brace along all military lines and get every officer, every man, and every ship on the move, and cheer up generally.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,

*United States Navy Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

LETTER NO. 15.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET.

U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 8, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I inclose herewith copy of a letter and plan just forwarded to Benson.

All ships will be provided with sufficient apprentices to fill their complements and enable them to move by August 19 if you will give us only a few more officers.

I hope the department will carefully consider all the suggestions I have made in this plan.

You will note the parts that deal with personnel. If adopted, this scheme would ease up on the Naval Academy and enable the department to educate midshipmen in a practical manner and at the same time get all our ships tuned up.

I wish you would consider this plan promptly, and let me know whether I am to bother myself with such matters as these any more. It is very easy to go along in the Navy and carry on a routine. It seems to me now is the time to encourage everybody to think and to try to do something.

Respectfully, yours,

W. F. FULLAM

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,

*United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

LETTER NO. 16.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,

U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., June 10, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: Thank you for your note of June 3 concerning torpedo officers. Of course, I knew that Mr. McMorris and Mr. Hibbs were well qualified, but you see I have five armored cruisers that carry torpedoes and I naturally feel that it is a duty to bring the torpedo element up to the proper standard, and this, of course, can not be done without a good personnel.

I suppose the torpedo boats and submarines will have the first call, but when officers are available for this work I hope to get them.

I am trying to emphasize all "military" elements in these ships by giving as much as possible to target practice, etc.

I can not too earnestly impress you with the fact that we need a tremendous military revival as regards the personnel of the Navy. From my observation out here I do not believe the standard has ever been so low as it is to-day. There are not officers enough to administer discipline properly and to secure a proper mental attitude on the part of the enlisted men. I consider that there is laxity and slackness everywhere and that a large percentage of our personnel is absolutely unprepared to meet the emergencies of war. Many of the apprentices are very young and we can not expect them to reach a high standard in a few weeks or months, particularly if ships are not kept cruising and drilling constantly.

The few officers in this fleet appear to be working very hard, but I will not hide my head in the sand like an ostrich and refuse to see things or to realize the truth as regards the conditions out here, for I consider them precarious in the extreme.

There is only one solution—get every ship filled up as soon as possible with officers and men and begin a thoroughly military system of administration and discipline with every attempt to infuse enthusiasm and spirit into everybody.

I am glad to know that there is some chance of getting an increase of the upper grades in the appropriation bill, and I deplore the fact that the law which discourages the employment of retired officers has not been repealed so that we could get additional active officers in the fleet at once. It is also very unfortunate that another class can not be graduated in September to supply immediate needs. They could be given a postgraduate course a few years later, but we need them right now.

I have been in the department a year and I know the difference between plans on paper and the actual doings and conditions of officers and men in the fleet itself. The last counts most and tells the true story. If we fail to realize this fact, we will neglect our first duty.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 17.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Salina Cruz, Mexico, July 13, 1916.

To: Commanding officers, all vessels, Reserve Force, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: General instructions concerning personnel, etc.

Reference: Force Order No. 10.

1. The attention of commanding officers is called to the requirements of Force Order No. 10 concerning the training of apprentice seamen, and to Circular Letter No. 410 of July 5, concerning personnel, care of machinery, boilers, etc.

2. Every effort will be made to strictly conform to all the requirements of these orders in order that the efficiency of ships, and particularly the personnel, may be improved as much as possible.

3. It is desirable that all seamen, ordinary seamen, and apprentices shall be taught to pull a good oar, and in order to accomplish this result pulling boats will be used daily whenever the weather and other conditions permit.

4. The officers of the deck and the petty officers of the watch on the forecastle will be required to stand a very strict heel and toe watch and a sharp lookout night and day.

5. All midshipmen who join reserve ships will be assigned watch duty on deck, and commanding officers will require of the midshipmen the strictest attention to every duty, and will prescribe a routine for the industrious employment of their time that will secure progress in practical naval subjects. It is important that these young men shall be started right.

6. A thoroughly military system will be enforced with attention to every principle and tradition of naval discipline. Smartness will be demanded at all times, and laxity, carelessness, inattention to little things, etc., will not be tolerated.

7. Commanding officers will see that all officers under their command are impressed with the importance of the subjects covered by this order.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 18.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., September 7, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: I am glad you sent a few officers to the *Oregon*. All ships in reserve here have cruised a good deal, and Operations evidently intends to keep them cruising. I am glad of this because they will be kept in better condition, and they serve as excellent training schools for the large number of recruits you will soon have.

The shortage of competent officers in the armored cruisers has been precarious times, and I have feared that some disaster might take place. I have cautioned them to navigate with great care and to give strict attention to boilers and machinery.

If these armored cruisers are to be ready when called upon—and they are the only cruisers we have—there are three things that must be kept in good condition: Boilers and engines; (2) guns, and (3) torpedoes. I assure that I have struggled hard with this problem with the minimum of assistance as regards officers and men, and I shall continue to do so and to avoid bothering you all I can. However, I earnestly advise you to turn your attention to the Pacific. The Mexican trouble may not be settled for some time, permanently, to come, and the war plan distinctly states that the Navy's rôle on this coast will be more important than on the Atlantic, because there are more ports here, and a longer coast line to blockade or seize.

I have advised Operations to complete the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga* as soon as possible and put the *New Orleans* on a cruising basis. All these ships are important and may be made very efficient for future emergencies. Lieut. Bowen, my staff engineer, who is also engineer of this ship, is now overworked. He is a hustler, and the efficiency of these armored cruisers will develop largely upon his being free to inspect their engineer departments frequently and searchingly.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 19.

PASSAGE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., TO BREMERTON, WASH.,
September 28, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: Referring to the telegram I sent you to-day concerning officers for the *New Orleans*, you must bear and forbear with me for the following reasons, as I have been and still am trying to do something for the good of the fleet:

(1) The armored cruisers are now and have been cruising. Each one has covered about 6,000 miles and has been on active duty in Mexico.

(2) We are required to have target practice, torpedo practice, and steaming trials. These tests require officers to prevent accidents and disaster.

(3) These are the only scout cruisers we will have for three or four years to come. Unless they are made ready the fleet will remain blind.

(4) These ships are now training apprentices for the fleet in addition to their work. We have trained 1,100 apprentices for the fleet in the past few months.

(5) As commandant in Newport in 1909 with from 800 to 2,000 apprentices and with the *Mercedes*, *Constellation*, *Cumberland*, and *Boxer* I had three commissioned officers—no more—for three years. To-day Johnson has nine commissioned officers and the two biggest ships, the *Mercedes* and *Cumberland*, have been sent away.

(6) In 1913 at Chicago, I had three commissioned officers. To-day Moffett has six. It was my experience at both of these stations that warrant and chief petty officers handle apprentices and train them better than commissioned officers.

(7) I see that Dayton has seven commissioned officers at Norfolk—more than twice as many as I had at Newport, although the *Mercedes* at Newport was "receiving ship" also.

I am sure you will pardon these comparisons and forgive me for saying that if you will give me on-half the excess of officers at these three training stations over what they had a few years ago, I will keep these six ships going, make them ready for business next spring, and train apprentices as well or better than at the training stations.

I need four more officers now—three for the *New Orleans*, and an engineer officer for this ship, so that Bowen, the force engineer, can do his proper duties—duties which

very important. I will not ask for any more officers for the present, but the *Saratoga* will need six or seven more in the spring, and each armored cruiser should have more when available.

If the department will help me, I will guarantee to have six armored cruisers in one condition for mobilization next summer.

Note the number of officers in ships of the battleship fleet, and I believe that each of them could spare two or three junior officers for ships that are so short handed. In fact, I believe young officers are falling over themselves in the battleships, standing no watches, and not learning very much. Chief petty officers on the battleships could take many of the stations and do many of the duties now assigned to junior officers in fire control, etc., until we get more officers for such work.

In conclusion, Palmer, please consider the necessity and wisdom of graduating the present first class in February. Make preparations to do so now—at once. The first year is entirely practical, and if you will send these young men to the fleet—each of them with a sextant of his own—and put them on watch and make them hump themselves, they will learn more than by remaining four months at the academy, and will help out the fleet in this emergency. I will guarantee to put some of these young men through a course on these ships that would make officers and men of them. This is no idle boast.

Excuse me for saying so, but this is the time to break away from cut-and-dried systems and do something. The Naval Academy is overcrowded and the course there could be cut down to three or three and one-half years for a few years to come, training graduates at sea and giving them a postgraduate course several years later when opportunity permits. This plan, if adopted, will give you 200 young officers in February which will help the fleet tremendously. I earnestly advise you to do it. I will cheer things up.

I could have had a soft snap out here had I accepted the situation and said and done nothing.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral PALMER,

United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 20.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., October 11, 1916.

MY DEAR CHASE: Thank you for your letter of the 5th.

I am glad you understand me, and I hope that you and Benson will not be annoyed by my persistence. If you do not trust me and help me when I need help, my task will be hopeless.

Getting the armored cruisers to Mexican waters was a good thing, but they must not stay there too long. The *Maryland* should come north at once, and it is my duty to impress you with this fact.

One junior lieutenant and one ensign for the *New Orleans* is all I ask. I can send a boatswain from the *Colorado* and a gunner from the *Maryland*, and with them *Canagua* can relieve the *Maryland*, leaving here about October 18. In other words, two young officers will give the *Maryland* a relief and prevent harm to the ship and to the morale of the crew.

I deplore the fact that young officers must be kept at training stations for academic work in such emergencies as this. Can not the Secretary be induced to drop the academic instruction temporarily? Has the condition been made known to him? It was only by persistence that I got the course at training stations cut down to two months. Had it not been for this no armored cruiser could have gone to Mexico. And now they are practically being punished instead of rewarded for good work.

It is not alone my idea that there are more officers or young officers in the active ships than are needed at present. Many officers agree with me that some of these young officers could be spared to supply needs like these in the Pacific. It is my experience that chief petty officers and warrant officers are not fully utilized nowadays in the battle fleet. If they were, some of the young commissioned officers could be spared to meet other demands, at least temporarily.

I have made a casual inspection of the *Saratoga*; and shall inspect the *New Orleans* this week.

I am trying hard to get six armored cruisers ready for war service by June 1—the only cruisers and scouts we have for the fleet. It is an up-hill job, but I can do it with little encouragement.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 25.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., January 11, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Length of time to repair *South Dakota*, *Frederick*, and *Huntington*.

Reference: Commandant, Navy Yard, Puget Sound, let. 35611-C, RMG-Ly, dated January 6, 1917.

1. Referring to the letter above referenced, the force commander regrets that the time of completion of the *South Dakota* has been extended from March 10 to May 15, that the *Frederick* may not be completed until June 15, and that the *Huntington* can not be handled at the navy yard, Puget Sound, prior to May 15.

2. It will be noted that the *South Dakota* reached Bremerton November 29, 1916, and she will have been there 5 months and 11 days if not completed until May 15; that the *Frederick* reached Bremerton December 30, 1916, and will have been there 5 months and 15 days if she is not completed until June 15.

3. The force commander does not wish to importune the department nor to officiously interfere with its policies or with the details of navy-yard work; but in the attempt to get the armored cruisers on the Pacific into cruising condition at the earliest practicable date the force commander, after months of effort, finds the present situation extremely discouraging.

4. It is submitted that there must be a decided lack of facilities, labor, or money available at the navy yard, Puget Sound, if an armored cruiser can not be properly overhauled in less than six months.

5. From observation it is not believed that the difficulty rests with the personnel of the yard.

6. If it is the desire of the department, therefore, that the armored cruisers be prepared for war service at an early date, it is respectfully suggested that the navy yard, Puget Sound, be immediately supplied with the necessary funds, material, and laborers, and that special efforts be made to complete the *Frederick* and *South Dakota* not later than March or April, respectively, in order that they may be available for Mexican service, and that the *Huntington* may reach the yard at an earlier date than that set by the commandant.

7. In the same line it is suggested that every effort be made to anticipate the early completion of the *San Diego* as soon as that ship reaches the navy yard, Mare Island.

8. In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that the inability of the navy yards on the Pacific coast to handle expeditiously the repairs to the few ships of the Pacific Fleet demonstrates the need of serious attention to a condition which is, to say the least, precarious.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copies to D-in-C, Comdt., Puget Sound; Comdt., Mare Island.

LETTER NO. 26.

In reply address the Secretary of the Navy and refer to No. 28365-49.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 24, 1917.

To: Commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Length of time to repair *South Dakota*, *Frederick*, and *Huntington*.

Reference: (a) Commander reserve force letter No. 751-WFF/M, January 11, 1917.

1. Receipt of the above reference is acknowledged.

2. The department notes the desire of the commander, reserve force, to have the repairs to the ships of his force completed at the earliest possible date, which desire

are the weakest of the cruisers as regards boilers, all the others, including the *Albatross*, being in far better condition in this respect.

This letter is written with the assumption that it is the department's desire that our cruisers shall be in dependable condition for war service and ready to attain maximum speed on or before June, 1917. If there is failure to thoroughly overhaul them at this time, the fleet will be crippled for lack of dependable scouts for three years.

It is therefore recommended that no efforts be spared to place the *Frederick* and *Albatross* in absolutely reliable condition.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 23.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., December 22, 1916.

DEAR PALMER: I noted with delight that in your "hearing" you advocated graduation of a class in February and another in June, and the three years' course a time to come.

It is the only solution of the problem to get more officers in this emergency, and I noted most keenly the report that the Secretary opposed this plan.

The situation out here is perilous, in my estimation.

And the change in the course at the training station from two to four months.

It will cripple my force again. I wrote to Senn about it and will not bother you with repetition. Please be assured that suggestions of mine are made with the desire for some assistance and that I do not wish to annoy or bother you.

We may have good reasons for changing back to the four months' course, and if the change is greatly expedited we may not suffer so much out here after all. You will hear before long.

With the season's greetings and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 24.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., January 7, 1917.

DEAR PALMER: I have read your annual report and your hearing, and I congratulate you.

He had asked for officers and men in the beginning as you have done, and if we needed them, he would have saved his reputation, and also saved us from a very precarious condition of affairs.

It is desirable if your plan to graduate midshipmen in February and in three months is not approved.

Midshipmen were graduated after three years, with certain rules regarding their conduct and studies during the next two years to come, each one taking a sextant course, and all being compelled to stand watch on the forecastle or quarterdeck of the ship at sea as in port, their shore liberty regulated within reasonable limits, and soon become of great service to us on board ship, and their ultimate professional standard would not be lowered—in fact, I believe it would be improved.

We will get a lot of young officers right away, officers of senior grades could be put in higher duties, where their services are sadly needed.

We would employ certain retired officers ashore, for there are many who could do so to advantage, and relieve active officers of lieutenant's rank and above.

We are suffering on this coast for officers of rank. There are not enough for the administration of discipline, and for courts and boards, etc. Retired officers could be utilized for permanent courts at various places.

Now you realize that the condition regarding officers out here is precarious. I am sure you are doing the best you can, and I note that you have recently ordered of our force.

10. The above conditions should be considered in case it is anticipated that the armored cruisers may be required to "keep the sea" and to maintain their speed in emergencies. If they are to be relied upon for constant and efficient scout duty it would seem that their engine-room personnel should not be only completely filled but that there should be at least a few surplus men in certain ratings.

11. The force commander realized that the Bureau of Navigation may have reasons and for retaining men on board receiving ships to provide drafts for the Asiatic station for other reasons, and, similarly, there may be reason for returning to the four month course at the training station.

12. The armored cruisers at present have a few men in excess of the old reserve complements, but if the new complement of 50 per cent is to be authorized, there will be vacancies in the Reserve Force.

13. The department has doubtless decided upon the duty to be performed by the armored cruisers in an emergency and also upon the policy to be followed in providing them with officers and men.

14. The force commander is merely bringing this subject to the attention of the department in order that actual conditions and necessities may be made known in time to prevent these ships going into active service with insufficient officers and men and with untrained crews that may be found unequal to the demands made upon them, if they are confronted with serious responsibilities.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 28.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., March 4, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: I have just read your "hearing" before the Navy Committee on the need of officers and men and the necessity for graduating midshipmen after three years at Annapolis.

This is just a line to congratulate you on your splendid presentation of the whole matter. It is a pity that it was not done long ago, before you came to the bureau. I can not see how your argument can be resisted, and I should think that the Navy Department and every officer in the Navy would stand firmly behind you in your splendid efforts.

Unless we get officers and men and get them quickly, we can not properly prepare our ships for serious work and still less can we expect to have crews and officers ready for the new ones that are coming on.

I will not take more of your time.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER, UNITED STATES NAVY,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 29.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., March 9, 1917.

MY DEAR CHASE: I suppose Benson is overwhelmed with manifold duties, and although you are being kept out of mischief, too, I want to suggest that a permanent policy should be decided upon concerning the armored cruisers pending the building of better ships to take their place.

In my struggle to get these ships into condition for effective service (and it has been an unceasing struggle for a year and a half) the following facts have been made plain:

(a) The armored cruisers will not be sufficient unless arbitrary orders are given by somebody to provide them with what they need, as soon as practicable.

(b) They will never be dependable unless they are kept cruising away from the yard, so that their defects can be noted.

(c) The case of the *West Virginia* proves the above.

The personnel of these ships must slightly exceed fifty (50 per cent) per cent, and especially in certain ratings, to keep machinery in condition for maximum speed. The loss of the *Milwaukee* was due to inexperienced and bad seamanship of officers of the junior grade.

Three armored cruisers will be ready by April 7—*Pueblo*, *South Dakota*, and *Merick*; three others will be ready June 1—*Saratoga*, *Huntington*, and *San Diego*.

When these six ships are all ready for service, I earnestly recommend that not less than four of them be kept together at all times under the personal eye of the force commander, for constant inspection, limited cruising, target practice, drills, and routine administrative work to keep them tuned up and to keep their personnel properly disciplined.

The remaining two ships may be assigned to assist the active fleet in Mexico when needed.

I hope, Chase, that Operations will consider the above. I don't want to bag the department, but I do want to help keep these armored cruisers ready for the important work that might be demanded of them, and I am convinced that it can be done if the plan outlined above is approved.

It is of prime importance that four of them be kept together as a division at all times. That will keep material and personnel in the best possible condition. When the ships separate from each other and from the force commander's control, deterioration begins.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. VOLNEY O. CHASE,
United States Navy, Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 30.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE.

U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., March 25, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: I inclose for your eye copy of a circular letter just issued to my ships.

I am trying hard to arouse some military enthusiasm, and heaven knows we need it.

We are doing all we can to stimulate recruiting with baseball teams and the assistance of the enlisted men. The apathy of the people on this coast, however, is amazing.

I fear you may have been irritated by my taking up the personnel with operations. But, My dear Palmer, ships can't operate without men, and I thought under the present organization of the Navy Department, and particularly at a time like this, that operations would coordinate with bureaus. For this reason I have sent nearly all of my official letters through operations.

I have worked very hard in my attempts to get these ships ready for war. My correspondence with the department for a year and a half has shown one constant, never-ending struggle. Reviewing it now, I feel that I have deserved some credit, but I have received very little evidence that my work has been properly appreciated. Of course, I haven't worked simply to win the department's approval, but rather from a sense of duty, and because I like to do things; and when I know I'm right I will insist on doing things in the face of every discouragement.

I am well supported by the officers of the reserve force.

Of course, we will have to work mighty hard to train our crews when mobilization takes place. We all welcome the job.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Rodman, will you take the stand?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HUGH RODMAN, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you any statement to make about matters that are pertinent to this investigation?

Admiral RODMAN. I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And in that statement will you give an account of the official positions held by you prior to the war and during the war?

Admiral RODMAN. I am not quite sure whether I have that in my statement, sir. I can very easily do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would add that in making your statement.

Admiral RODMAN. I prepared this statement, gentlemen, that I might read it, that I might get the sequence in the order in which I would like to lay my evidence before you, and prior to reading my written statement I wish to assure this committee that I am here solely at my own request and on my own initiative, I am here purely from a sense of duty, to defend the good name of the Navy. I shall make my statement for this purpose alone, without malice, with no ulterior motive, and only for the reasons which I have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go further, I want to state that it does not seem to me that the good name of the Navy is at issue.

Admiral RODMAN. I hope not.

The CHAIRMAN. All of us want to defend it.

Admiral RODMAN. I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. No one could have more interest than this committee, all of whom are members of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, in the Navy; but as I have repeatedly sated, we are not here to settle differences between officers of the Navy, or between

I believe to be the general sentiment of the Navy to the indiscreet and injudicious methods which he has employed in setting forth his views.

Admiral Sims's letter was very indiscreet—this, I believe, is the general opinion—it was that which, no doubt, brought about this investigation. Naturally, in defending his actions he has tried to make good by attempting to make it appear that his remarks were pertinent only to the first months of the war. To my mind it covers a wider field; his indiscretions lay primarily in the tone, wording, and phraseology of his letter, and very particularly in his breach of confidence by making public an intimate and confidential conversation which should have been held sacred. Had his letter been less indiscreet, had he omitted reference to conversations which, as I have said, he should have held sacred and confidential, had it been couched in moderate terms, such as are usually used in official correspondence, had it been less antagonistic, it would no doubt have followed the usual course of such communications, received due consideration by the proper authorities, and doubtless some good would have come from it. His mention and the subsequent publication of a certain admonition which he states he received prior to his departure for London no doubt has had its effect upon the cordial relations which heretofore existed between us and one of our closest allies. In every expression of opinion which I have heard concerning it, both in and out of the Navy, it has received the deepest censure.

His status in London, as I understand it, was that of a liaison officer, which later was combined with the duties of naval attaché there. His title as "Commanding United States naval forces in European waters" is particularly misleading. He was in reality a subordinate part of Naval Operations, with his office in London; he was its advanced agent; his was the relay office for all communications between Washington and the forces in the field. He did not personally direct the movements of our fighting ships in the war zone, as the public so generally believes. For example, every operation of the battleship force under my command was ordered and directed by Admiral Beatty, of the Grand Fleet, of which my command was a part. I served under Admiral Beatty's command throughout the war. I understand that the destroyers based on Queenstown were operated under Admiral Bayly, of the British Navy; that Admiral Wilson directed the movements of ships in and out of the French ports; that the ships of Admiral Strauss's command that laid the North Sea mine barrage were routed and protected by the Grand Fleet, and that the fighting ships in general operating in the war zone had their movements directed by some one other than Admiral Sims.

I would like to explain briefly a little more to the committee as to the operation of our convoys. Without going into the details, I have an idea that when our convoys were organized—I mean the transports—there was assigned to them their fighting force for protection; that a convoy would be routed from New York or Hampton Roads by Operations. They would be directed to proceed, we will say, to a point "A" in mid-Atlantic. Now, this information concerning the convoys would naturally be cabled to Admiral Sims in London, who would immediately inform the British Admiralty, and

also inform the officer, we will say, if it were going to a port in France, who was there, Admiral Wilson. It was then the duty of those officers who controlled the destroyers to meet them at a designated point, to afford them protection against the submarines, and on their arrival close to the coast of France Admiral Wilson would direct the naval vessels that would go out to meet them and bring them safely into port. I say this because I believe that Admiral Sims did not direct our convoys.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with the convoy system?

Admiral RODMAN. Nothing at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is simply your idea of it?

Admiral RODMAN. Just my opinion, sir.

My conception of his duties was that he was in London as a central office, or advanced base of operations, to help coordinate our combined interests, to collect and forward information, to make recommendations, to look out for our correspondence, supplies, stores, personnel in European waters, and to approve or disapprove his subordinates' requests or recommendations in a limited degree, referring to Washington the major ones, in his discretion; but all under the immediate supervision of the Chief of Operations in the department in Washington.

Reasoning from a standpoint of experience I would naturally infer that when Admiral Sims sent his communications to the Navy Department bearing upon policy or any other subject, that they would have received due consideration the same as from any other officer, and that the most important would have been submitted to the General Board of the Navy for its opinion. This board consists of the older and most experienced officers. It has neither administrative nor executive duties, but acts solely in an advisory capacity. And so, it seems to me, that unquestionably his communications would have received proper consideration, and that action would have been taken in accordance with the best advice offered and that which was considered best by operations. There is no doubt that when those officers who were intrusted with the policy of the Navy, had formulated an opinion, it was laid before the Chief of Operations, who was not only influenced but very largely governed by the advice of technical experts, i. e., officers of the Navy Department.

The policy of the department is largely influenced by the advice of this board, which amongst other duties assists in preparing all general war plans. These plans are formulated but modified from time to time, as new conditions arise to warrant it. To imply anything to the contrary shoots wide of the mark. I know, from experience, from having been a member of this board just prior to the declaration of the war, that my statement is correct; that there were plans and policies in existence anticipating the possible advent of our entering the war, and that they were no doubt modified as I have stated. There was probably not one single nation engaged in this great World War but which had to revise every plan that it had previously made. Admiral Sims's recommendations to the department looked to just these same ends.

One might infer that he considered himself the sole source of information, and that in consequence his every recommendation should have been instantly approved. It is true that all of the maritime

allied countries were constantly communicating direct with the department through their embassies in Washington. It is a fact that foreign allied naval attachés were in daily direct communication with our Navy Department, setting forth their desires, interests, and policies of their home countries; therefore Admiral Sims could not, by any manner of means, have had a thorough knowledge of the varied requests and propositions set forth. It was unqualifiedly the mission of our department to consider all such questions and act accordingly; as there were multitudinous recommendations and interests to be considered, many of which were interdependent with our own or pertained solely to their individual needs, all of which had to be combined, and decisions be rendered accordingly.

There is also no question but that Admiral Sims was in a most advantageous position for making recommendations and that they would have had great weight—and no doubt they did—particularly after the Allied Council was formed and he became a member; but I refer more particularly to the period prior to this and to which he himself refers in his letter. Possibly, in his earnest endeavors he has arrogated to his office more importance than was actually the case; and implies that his recommendations to the department should have received immediate and unqualified approval. I do not agree with him in the principle laid down that all recommendations from juniors to their seniors should follow this course. For example, I once made the request to him as my senior, that the British destroyers that were assigned by the Grand Fleet to my division of battleships as our screen—I mean that every time battleships went to sea on both sides, there were a number of destroyers to act as a screen against submarines—be replaced by the newest type of American destroyers that were being sent for work in British waters, giving my reasons herefore. He disapproved it. I never for a minute resented it, recognizing that he being my senior that this was his privilege; yet he implies that just the contrary should have obtained when he made recommendations to his senior, the Chief of Naval Operations.

I have an idea that the war was not fought and won in London alone. In spite of what Admiral Sims may think, unqualifiedly the only place for the direction and administration of the Navy's policy was in Washington, delegating to others abroad, and commanders in the field, such authority as should properly belong to them. My experience was that this was the case.

I do not for one minute wish to detract one iota of my opinion that Admiral Sims rendered most conspicuous and valuable service to the Navy during the war.

I can say that I know of no officer who was more conspicuous in this war, and who rendered better service, than Admiral Sims.

In this he is held in the very highest esteem; but I do wish to impress upon this committee that the only logical place in which our Navy could possibly be directed was in Washington, and that officers who were there, and legally responsible, were the logical ones to do so. To have moved our whole administration to London, even though 3,000 miles separated it from the scene of hostilities, would have been a serious blunder. The whole responsibility of winning this war was not placed upon the shoulders of Admiral Sims in his London office; the Navy Department could not surrender to him all of its power and responsibilities.

The motive which prompted this public investigation is veiled to me under a smoke-screen of words, and I can not for the life of me see but that it will discredit the work of the Navy in this war, which I know has been most creditable. It has already had its effect upon Congress, to say nothing of the public.

The CHAIRMAN. To what motive do you refer, Admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. It would be very hard for me to explain, Senator. I think that I have tried to show that beforehand. What I am trying to show is that it would have seemed to me the logical thing for an officer to have kept his letter in the hands of the department. The fact that it has been given publicity, I know from talking to a great many people in civil life, has brought about this question. "Well, what is the matter with the Navy?"

The CHAIRMAN. My question was meant to develop the question of whether you meant to accuse this committee of having any motive.

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest degree, sir; not in the slightest. I would not do such a thing, sir. Even though Admiral Sims states that he did not desire this publicity, I am still of the opinion that if he himself did not desire it and had used his best endeavor to have prevented it, it might have been avoided. But the impression left on my mind, by giving his letter all this publicity, and the evident effort throughout to discredit the Navy is that it may have been the intention to give the impression that he had most of the responsibility for running this war, and that the department fell down upon its job because it did not follow his advice. This at the expense of the good name which the Navy so justly deserves. This whole affair to my mind savors of ill-advised criticism against the Navy. I refer to his criticisms before, and since the investigation has been under way. But still, since the investigation is under way, let us hope that some good may result from it, and I think that it will.

Another deep impression that is made upon my mind is, that, though praise is bestowed upon its officers and men, that there has been laid bare before this committee by some of the witnesses every possible point which is derogatory to the Navy—I refer to that more particularly in preparedness, which I will come to later—without stating the thousand and one good ones which should redound to its credit, and that they have attempted to sustain their argument by documentary evidence.

Throughout this war, and during my entire naval service, I have never found it necessary to refer to documentary evidence to establish and convince anyone of acts on my part. For example, I believe he has stated that the division of battleships which I commanded for a year or so in the war zone was not prepared when we entered the war. That it was not homogeneous. I wish to state from having been in the Atlantic Fleet from the time the United States declared war, that never in my forty odd years of service, most of which I have spent at sea, and in the latter part in the North Atlantic Fleet, never have I seen such preparedness and efficiency as obtained in our battleship fleet as at the beginning of, and during, the war. No ship has ever, in my experience, been absolutely efficient; nor will there ever be one whose commanding officer will conscientiously state that it is 100 per cent so. For this reason every officer who has pride and interest in his command will always strive for greater efficiency. No ship will ever be in absolutely perfect condition for no other reason

han that from its complicated design, from the multiplicity and complexity of its machinery and constructive features, it will always require certain repairs, alterations, and improvements to keep pace with new and important inventions and improvements, and for its maintenance and upkeep.

The personnel of our ships must of necessity from time to time be changed, and since the operation and efficiency of our ships depends upon team work, it requires constant drills and exercises to promote and insure maximum efficiency. One of his references to my division was that it was not homogeneous in reference to its guns; that different ships had different calibers. True, yet he knows full well that this has not the slightest bearing upon the reason for the selection of those individual ships which constituted my division to go on foreign service with the British Grand Fleet; that it was based solely upon the fact that they were coal burners and that coal as fuel for these ships, instead of oil, could best be supplied while actively engaged in British waters, and that he himself so stated to the department. This statement of his, to my mind, therefore, beggars the main point at issue. He further states that prior to their departure from the United States that they were unprepared and had of necessity to be docked before leaving. Also true in part, and for this reason. He well knows that in general all of our ships are docked periodically at about nine months' intervals; that it would be absolutely impracticable to dock every ship in our fleet for cleaning their bottoms and thus increasing their speed at much shorter intervals. He further must know that there is never a time on any ship when some minor, and sometimes major, repairs, alterations, or installations are not necessary, and that it is absolutely impossible to keep every ship in our Navy absolutely perfect at all times. I have not the slightest hesitancy in saying that the ships of this division at the time mentioned, in particular, were in a very high state of efficiency, and, while they were sent to our navy yards for a few days prior to sailing, it was only to put on the finishing touches while in dry dock and clean their bottoms so there would be nothing left undone to reach the maximum state of efficiency for the work in which they were about to engage.

The first knowledge to reach me that I was to command this division, composed of ships none of them under my command at the time—that was because the number of coal burners had to be selected—was while I was on board Admiral Mayo's flagship on a certain afternoon. Realizing that it necessitated shifting several flag officers and other details before leaving his flagship, by his permission I immediately sent signals giving information and orders for movements, so that they might proceed to their home yards for docking, cleaning bottom, and a final grooming before their departure for the war zone.

Three weeks later we joined the British Grand Fleet, which had been in the war for three long years, at Scapa Flow, in the Orkney Islands, to the north of Scotland. It was a matter of pride that we were at once able to coordinate and cooperate with them intelligently, without the slightest hesitancy, friction, or misunderstanding. We adopted and could use their signals, radio, secret codes, and other communications—and, gentlemen, that is one of the hardest problems we have in the Navy—and could efficiently execute their tactics

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and maneuvers and conform to their war plans. This was put to test when within three days of our arrival a signal was made for ships to be ready to proceed to sea in two hours for active service in the North Sea, and we reported ready when the time came that we were ready.

From that day to the end of the war we took part in every major operation in the North Sea and some independent smaller ones. There was never a time but that we were ready when called upon. We could always steam full speed, maintain our position, and receive nothing but the highest praise, not only from the British admirals, officers, and men, but from those of our own Navy who visited us.

I might further say, gentlemen, I hate to speak of the divine aid that I command, for it seems to me that I might seem to be trying to laud myself, which I am not, in the slightest degree, but our ships were maintained in such a high degree of efficiency that the British Admiralty made inquiries of us as to our methods, with the possible view of adopting them in the British Navy, for their ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a very good point to bring out.

Admiral RODMAN. Let me truthfully add that without taking the slightest credit to myself as the commanding officer, but giving it to the officers and men, where it belongs, and to the years of preparation in the American Navy, that, put it as modestly as I can, the American squadron was fully equal to any of the Grand Fleet.

Assuming that these ships were unprepared when we received order to go, as some have testified, and that in the short period of three weeks when we joined the Grand Fleet, that we were prepared (and we unqualifiedly were), it must be ascribed to divine interference, for it could not possibly have been accomplished by human hands alone in that short time.

While our ships were in active service in the war zone they were visited by Messrs. Butler, Padgett, Kelley, and others of the House Naval Committee. They are personally familiar with our conditions, and it would be most interesting for you gentlemen to have any one or all of them give you their personal views which were obtained in such close range.

Congress gives us our ships, personnel, and the money for the maintenance of the Navy. No matter what the Navy may recommend, nor the department recommend, we are bounded by this limitation. Nor does it follow that the minute an appropriation is made that the Navy instantly receives the full benefit. If Congress should see fit to maintain our fleet at its full war strength in times of peace, there would never be any question of its preparedness and readiness when war is declared. I mean that it takes time to build ships, it takes months and years to do so. It takes time to increase and train the commissioned and enlisted personnel. Yet, at the beginning of the war, the Navy had so far profited by previous appropriations that I have no hesitancy in saying from having been in the fleet, and having been in it for some years, that never have I seen such efficiency and preparedness as obtained at that time.

I might diverge for a moment and say that I refer particularly to the ships that I know more about—that is, the battleships—and do realize that around this nucleus of the old Navy, we were immediately able to expand to fully 10 times its then strength—not in capital ships, but in hundreds of others, and in the personnel, and that

were still able to do our work so that it has met with nothing but admiration and commendation. Again I say, if this be not preparedness, I do not know the meaning of the word.

Efficiency and preparedness in the Navy is never a matter of days. It is a matter of months and years. I might liken it to an athlete or to a pugilist who after months of training must strip for action and, if the latter, put on his gloves before the coming battle, but whose preparedness has attained by weeks and months of training. Or to a race horse who is not prepared for the race, by simply putting on his bridle, saddle, and final grooming before running, but whose training has extended over weeks and months. And just so with our ships, which require months and years to reach a proper standard of efficiency.

There is another point that I wish to emphasize and use an old expression that Admiral Sims has used that "Hind sight is better than foresight." Even so, I have already previously stated in public that so far as my command was concerned in this late war, that had I to live it over again I would not change it in one iota. Let me further state in reference to our actions in this war, that there can never be any great commercial enterprise, whether it be a manufacturing concern, a great railroad system, bank, or anything else, but that if those who are most intimately connected with its managements could look back over the passed years of experience, would say that if they had it to do over again they could do to better advantage. Gen. Goethals, with whom I was intimately associated at Panama for two years as marine superintendent of the canal, has stated that had he to build the canal again he could not only do it in a better manner, but that he could better have carried into execution many of the plans that were submitted during its construction. And possibly this same principle pertains to the Navy and its administration, particularly in war time. Unqualifiedly mistakes were made as there are in every great and highly technical enterprise which combines such a multitudinous number of interests which have to be coordinated, and there always will be mistakes under like circumstances.

There will always be difference of opinion in any body of men who are intrusted with the execution of great enterprises and who have the responsibilities pertaining thereto, particularly when there are so many and such varied requests, interests, and recommendations, all of which are more or less interdependent, and which have to be combined into a homogeneous whole, as there are in the Navy. For example, the very highest tribunal of our land or any other country, our own Supreme Court, has just rendered a decision of 5 to 4 in a most important case. Is it any wonder, then, that our Navy Department, and those intrusted with its policies and plans and their execution, may have found good and sufficient reasons for not following blindly the recommendations of just one single officer?

In looking back at the Navy's part in this war, and prior to the time that Admiral Sims made this charge, I had heard nothing but the very greatest praise and approbation on the part of the public, and those of us who served in the war, and were familiar with its workings, for the part which the Navy had taken. Having devoted my whole life to it, I was proud indeed to feel that this organization to which I belong had met with general approval from everyone,

and that its operations had been so highly satisfactory and meritorious.

I would refrain from mentioning personalities, but let me say with the deepest sincerity, that no one could have had more cordial relations in every sense of the word than those which existed between Admiral Sims and myself in the war zone. As a classmate of mine and a life-long friend, at the conclusion of this war he was pre-eminently conspicuous among the officers who had rendered the most valuable service. I regret exceedingly for the Navy's reputation sake, that it was through his instrumentality, directly or indirectly, that this investigation was instituted with its resultant publicity, but I hope and believe that some ultimate good may be obtained.

The Navy doubtless made mistakes during the war, but the methods and means which have been employed in attacking it will of necessity leave prejudice in the minds of those who are not familiar with the Navy and its organization. There is many a charge that is made against an innocent man; but the very fact that such a charge has been preferred, even though the accused may be proved to be perfectly innocent, leaves a bad taste in the mouth, and what may have been a spotless reputation is often besmirched by the fact that the accused was brought to trial. This, in my opinion, is exactly what this investigation spells to me. In Admiral Beatty's speech to my division when we were leaving for home, he remarked: "Now that the fighting is over, the talking will begin." Surely no truer prophecy was ever made, and I might add, of writing, too.

After the Spanish War, no matter how well Admiral Dewey may have done his work at Manila Bay, nor what the Atlantic Fleet accomplished at Santiago, both of which combined to eliminate the Spanish fleet, we had the Sampson-Schley controversy, which directly or indirectly detracted from the well-deserved reputation of the Navy. And now we have the so-called Sims controversy or investigation, which does the same thing, regardless of what the Navy accomplished.

I repeat that the Allies won the war. This was their mission; nor can anyone deny, who is fair-minded, but that the American Navy did its full share in helping to attain this end. I wish to reiterate that I have not one single document nor record of any kind, class, or description to substantiate my statement, nor have I ever felt it necessary in my service of 45 years to keep any files or records to do so. I am simply trying to lay before this committee my views in general of what the Navy accomplished, and its preparedness, and can not, for the life of me, see how any unprejudiced person in or out of the service can take any other view than that which I have tried to lay before you.

It is easy for anyone to sit on the side lines and criticize; it is a far more difficult proposition for those who are intrusted with the execution of plans and policies to carry them out with the means at their disposal, when they have an active command in time of war. When a war is ended, even though victoriously, the critics and historians have no hesitancy whatever in pointing out how much better it could have been done, not infrequently stating just how, in their opinion, it could best have been accomplished, and to back their

opinion and air before the public what they had recommended or would have done themselves and produce documentary evidence in substantiation.

No doubt the great leaders in this war in the field—Marshal Foch, Sir Douglas Haig, Gen. Pershing, Admiral Beatty, Lejeune of the Marines, and others—will come in for their fair share of adverse criticism from the literary critics. No doubt the same class of writers will attempt to show how the French, British, and American forces, afloat and ashore, were in a chaotic condition, unprepared, and made a mess of it. But those of us who were fortunate enough to hold active commands in the field of hostilities, no matter how humble or small a part we may have taken, have a different view, and are more apt to feel that even if we were not like Ivory soap, 99 $\frac{1}{8}$ per cent pure, that we still did our fair share toward winning this war.

Now, gentlemen, in looking back over the various testimony and the investigation which has been held, I have a recommendation to make. I believe that it would be for the best interests of the Navy that we might avoid mistakes in future, to intrust the Chief of Naval Operations with the responsibility of preparing plans for any future work, and to keep the Navy in a State of preparedness; and, more important still, to give him the authority to carry them into execution when war is declared, following the policy that is laid down by the Federal Government. That is all, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible, do you?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; and have the authority——

The CHAIRMAN. The law does not provide that he is responsible for all——

Admiral RODMAN. I believe not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the original intention of Congress, I believe, to provide that the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible, but at the instigation of the Secretary that word "responsibility" was taken out.

Admiral RODMAN. I think he should have the responsibility and the authority, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you some further questions a little later about that question, about the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral Rodman, you are a very high officer in the Navy. You are in command of the Pacific Fleet, I understand.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are on oath before this committee.

Admiral RODMAN. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. You are on oath before this committee.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want it to be understood from your statement that you consider that the United States Navy was in a thorough state of preparedness at the beginning of the World War, or at the beginning of our entrance into the war, at the time of our entrance into the war?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; not by any manner of means. No navy will be absolutely prepared. The British Navy was not

thoroughly prepared. It never will be thoroughly prepared. But I say, sir, that so far as the limitations that were placed upon us by the appropriations and Congress, and what it gave us, we were in a very high state of preparedness. There were certain of our ships that were lacking. We lacked types of vessels that we should have had, and some of our ships were not, possibly, as well prepared as they might have been; but, in general, the battleship fleet was in a high state of efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that even considering the fact that the World War began in 1914, and had been going on——

Admiral RODMAN. Three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly four years.

Admiral RODMAN. Three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically three years, when we went into the war; you think they were in a reasonable state of preparedness when we went in, all things considered?

Admiral RODMAN. My statement shows conclusively that the battleship fleet was, so far as my force was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some further questions to ask you about that force later on.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Your relations with Admiral Sims you have stated were entirely satisfactory during the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Most cordial; as cordial with Admiral Sims as with any man in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. You never had any controversy with him?

Admiral RODMAN. Not the slightest with him, or with any other man that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. You were under his command?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you say that he was not really the commander in chief on the other side, or that that idea is misleading.

Admiral RODMAN. I said that the title, commanding United States Naval forces in European waters, might be misleading; meaning by that, that the public might think that—I am referring a great deal of my testimony to the public, I am free to admit—they might think that Admiral Sims directed the movements of our warships. It was to emphasize that fact that I stated this title might be misleading.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was your superior officer on the other side.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How were you assigned to the British fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. By the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you went over?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims interfere in your operations?

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest.

The CHAIRMAN. Or limit your initiative in any way?

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest, sir. No one could have been better in every way, shape, and form than Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your position in the war such that you can testify at first hand to the questions brought up in Admiral Sims's testimony?

Admiral RODMAN. I have never read it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything, from personal observation, about the convoy system, and about the question of sending destroyers to the other side?

Admiral RODMAN. Very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Or about the question of sending tugs?

Admiral RODMAN. Very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Or about the state of affairs there on anything else?

Admiral RODMAN. No; I do not. I was not in the position to, except what I read in the public press, I know very little about it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your statement is made up from observation, from what you knew yourself and what you saw over there, and what you have read and gathered in general during the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you assigned by the department to take a division of battleships to the North Sea?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it was in the latter part of November, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. In November, 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you sailed immediately?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not remember the time. I should say it was about 10 days or 2 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you do anything during those 10 days or 2 weeks——

Admiral RODMAN. I do not get that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have to do anything in those 10 days or 2 weeks toward getting your ships in condition to go over?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral RODMAN. There were a number of minor repairs, docking and cleaning bottoms. Then we naturally filled up with stores and coal and everything to the utmost capacity that we could carry——what all ships do just prior to leaving port for any extended voyage.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given any plans or policy, by the department, before you went over?

Admiral RODMAN. None whatever. I was simply directed to follow a designated route, and I followed that route and found myself amongst the British Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. No policy or plan for the conduct of the war?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know of any such plan?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I did not need any. I was to go over to splice out the British Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom were you to report to over there?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not remember. I will tell you the incident. When I arrived, I reported in the usual naval fashion, my arrival, to the department. That is a cut and dried affair.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you report to Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. And then I got a telegram from the department "In future send all your reports and communications direct to Admiral Sims;" so that I was placed under Admiral Sims's command by a telegram from the department.

The CHAIRMAN. After you had gotten over there?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. It was explained to me before I left the department, by Operations, that I was going over to splice out the British Grand Fleet. A verbal order is as good to me as any other kind, you know. I knew what I was going for.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department give you any instructions to govern your actions after you were on the other side?

Admiral RODMAN. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that rather embarrassing to you?

Admiral RODMAN. Not to me. I knew what I went for. Never the slightest embarrassment.

The CHAIRMAN. Just what did the department tell you to do when you went over there?

Admiral RODMAN. I could not repeat the words. I had an intimate conversation with the Acting Chief of Operations. The chief, I think, was abroad. He simply said, "You are designated to take this command, to go over and splice out—and strengthen the Grand Fleet in their operations against the German main force. Why, Senator, I did not have to have any more instructions than that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were told to report to the head of the British Grand Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. I did report to the head of the Grand Fleet, and reported my arrival to the department. I had my orders.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral RODMAN. They left it to me to report to the Grand Fleet. That was my object in going. They supposed they could trust my judgment, or they would not have sent me.

The CHAIRMAN. You were simply told to go over and report to the Grand Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your position in the Grand Fleet satisfactory?

Admiral RODMAN. Very highly so, sir. I was in command of what they called, under that designation, the six battleship squadron. It was one of the two important squadrons of the Grand Fleet. Technically, I think, they called them the fast wings. I was put in command of the left end of the line, and the fifth battle squadron had the other end of the line when we went into action.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the rank of the other commanders of battleships?

Admiral RODMAN. There were three of them. The commanders of all the other squadrons were admirals or vice admirals. I was a rear admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims recommend you for the position of vice admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, I think that was——

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department approve that recommendation?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why not?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not rather embarrassing to you to hold a lower rank than the others?

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest. Sometimes I commanded the British admirals and sometimes they commanded me. It de-

pended upon the nature of the work which we were doing. We strengthened the force. I took my rank in accordance with theirs.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it usual for an admiral to serve under a rear admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. I have never seen it, in my life.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said some of these others served under you, when they were admirals?

Admiral RODMAN. I should have stated that they were rear admirals. I used "admiral" in the sense in which we use it. I was then commanding British rear admirals who were some of them junior to me and one senior. Admiral Alexander Sinclair had some light cruisers when we were sent out on certain service, but that difference in rank he waived. The officer in command of the battleship force was originally the one to command the other ships. There was no embarrassment there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have under you officers ranking higher than rear admirals at one time or another?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been higher than a rear admiral would you have had higher command, probably?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. When they sent out small detachments we were sent in rotation. For example, sometimes it was our duty to carry convoys from the British ports to the Norwegian ports and back, and then we would have to have sufficient strength to prevent the Germans from getting in their work. They do these things in rotation. When my turn came I would not be at all surprised, although I do not remember, if there were possibly little changes made in the British officers to make the squadron commanders juniors to me, so that I might command when I went out.

The CHAIRMAN. In the testimony before the committee on the question of naval awards, Secretary Daniels intimated that he would have preferred to have had the American battleships not under British orders, but as a separate and independent unit. In your opinion would it have been better to have established a separate divisional command of these battleships?

Admiral RODMAN. You mean the battleships I commanded over there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I could only have operated intelligently and efficiently under the Grand Commander-in-Chief, regardless of his nationality.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any trouble with the Commander of the Grand Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Never in the slightest. Our relations were the most cordial on earth. They were brotherly, almost.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had any trouble, what would you have done? Would you have gone to Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. That is a hypothetical case. I never had it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what the procedure there would have been, and where you would have gone.

Admiral RODMAN. I should have sent my communication to the Department through Admiral Sims, unqualifiedly.

The CHAIRMAN. To the department through Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could he have changed you over, ordered you to another duty, if he had wanted to?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know, sir. That is not an evasive answer, in the slightest. That just reaches the point that I do not know whether his authority would have extended that far, or whether the department would have stood for it. I do not know. I rather imagine he would have had the authority. If I had misbehaved or done anything wrong he would have had the authority.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are not entirely familiar with how much authority he had as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in European Waters? If you are, I would be very glad to have you tell me what the limit of authority was?

Admiral RODMAN. I am afraid, if you are trying to get me down to exact limitations, you will get me over my depth. I would rather he would tell you that himself. He knows.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that his position was entirely misunderstood; that he had practically no authority over there.

Admiral RODMAN. I do not think so. I would be very glad to read you what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not think I said so. I think I said that he did not direct the movements of the fighting ships. I would be very glad to read you what I said, or let you read it yourself. I will say this, sir, that there was never a time when there was the slightest difficulty of any character, class or description raised between Admiral Sims and me, if that will cover it.

The CHAIRMAN. I can not locate the place in your statement, but I refer to your statement that his position as commander in chief over there was generally misunderstood.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I said that it might be misleading to the public. At least, that was my intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is your statement. [Reading:]

His title as "Commanding United States naval forces in European waters" is partially misleading. He was in reality a subordinate part of Naval Operations with his office in London;

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; my idea was this. The public—now, just notice that I refer to the public, and this is intended for the public. The public think——

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony, Admiral, is for this committee.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; but I am trying to explain to the public at the same time, sir, if I may, and what I was saying there was for the public.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the public have different opinions from this committee?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know, sir. They get some mighty curious ones, sometimes.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently.

Admiral RODMAN. And they form very queer conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that your division of battleships during the war was an integral part of the British Navy, as Secretary Daniels has stated?

Admiral RODMAN. He has used that statement himself. My statement was, on another occasion, that it was an integral part of the Grand Fleet. It was just as I imagine that General Pershing's

army was an integral part of the allied forces on the west front, under Marshal Foch.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not keep up, always, its independent character as American?

Admiral RODMAN. Absolutely; and we were praised for it by the British themselves. The commander in chief or some other admiral admired the fact that we never lost our Americanism in the slightest degree.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they were practically "brigaded" with the British, to use a military term?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, if you can use that term. We were a squadron of the Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. But you kept up their Americanism all the time?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes. And every bit of our work, and everything about our ships down to the smallest part, from the ground floor up, was American.

The CHAIRMAN. And there never was any question in your mind or in anybody's mind, that you were an independent American unit?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir, never in the world, not in the slightest degree in the mind of anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were only under the operational direction of the British commander in chief?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, certainly, sir. He had nothing to do with our interior management or upkeep, or anything of that kind—nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your general view about the advisability of the unity of command in a situation such as that you were in the North Sea?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it is the only way to work, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the only way to work?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. I think that was shown, sir, by all of our allied forces, so far as I know, being united under the general command of Marshal Foch on the French front.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the condition of the battle-ships assigned to your command, when you took them over, was excellent?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In every way?

Admiral RODMAN. Well, you could find fault, if I were to say yes, but I would rather put it in general. Yes, sir, they were. They were ready to go into action.

The CHAIRMAN. How about their proficiency in gunnery?

Admiral RODMAN. The gunnery reports will give you a very good contrast. I do not remember the scores, but it was excellent from what it had been. You must remember that our gunnery is like anything else. It started in the very simplest forms, has built up through the number of years; and let me give Admiral Sims the very greatest credit of anybody in our Navy for giving us our form of gunnery; and I think everybody is deserving of the very greatest credit for building up our gunnery. That was progressive. I could not give you the scores, but I think it was excellent. I hate to speak of the ships I commanded because people may think that I am egotistical, but I can say furthermore, I can give you one instance in which the commanding officer of the *King*, which was the ship that towed the targets when we went out to target practice, told some of our officers afterwards that our target

practice there was the best that he had ever seen. I think that is going some on efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. What report did you make to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet as to gunnery proficiency?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not get that.

The CHAIRMAN. What report did you make to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet as to gunnery proficiency of the ships under your command?

Admiral RODMAN. Are you speaking of the *Texas*, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking generally.

Admiral RODMAN. Are you leading up to where the *Texas* come over? I am rather anticipating that, am I not?

The CHAIRMAN. I should prefer to speak of that later.

Admiral RODMAN. The rest of the ships were excellent, but the *Texas* was rotten when she arrived, and for this reason—compared with the others. I asked for the *Texas* to come over as a replacement ship, the idea being that if any of the four that I had should break down, I should want an old ship to replace, and I asked for the *Texas* because she was a sister ship to the *New York* and was a coal burner. Now, the *Texas* unfortunately had been grounded in the previous summer or autumn, and when she was hauled off at Brooklyn she was carried to the navy yard at New York, and there she staid, and that does not spell efficiency when a ship has to stay in the navy yard some three or four months. They had had no chance whatever.

There is another thing—this is of no interest, I think, to the committee, but it will explain why her training was poor—the *Texas* had been the most efficient ship in the Navy, and flew the pennant at her masthead both in seamanship and gunnery, but when she came over there she had much deteriorated. When we went out to target practice over there we had to have all the mines swept out and we had to have a screen on both sides in order to go out, and I found that on the *Texas* at that time they were still thinking too much of competition; they were still competing. I said to the captain, "You must forget that competition idea and go in for war purposes"; and I explained to them what I meant; and I can say almost unqualifiedly that when the *Texas* recognized that she was not there competing, but for war purpose, she went ahead; and so much so that I gave the captain special commendation. The operation was excellent when she realized and had an opportunity to pick up.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any report to Admiral Mayo before you went abroad about the gunnery condition of the fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Before I went?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. I think probably you refer to a report I made after I went.

The CHAIRMAN. You made none before?

Admiral RODMAN. We all made reports, but I do not recall any report. I mean, each commanding officer or flag officer makes a report on target practice. I remember no special report I made to Admiral Mayo, but I did make one after I arrived, making certain recommendations, and I got a pretty sharp letter from him. I do not think it was written by him, but by the gunnery officer, and it was a pretty sharp letter, and I placed it under the Rodman filing system; I put it in the waste basket where I thought it belonged.

The CHAIRMAN. A communication from the admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; and I think he was glad of it. I have not a closer friend in this world than Admiral Mayo.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your recommendations that you made at that time?

Admiral RODMAN. I have no idea. I can give you a very brief description of what the thing was about. I made certain recommendations about target practice, as they appealed to me from the experience which I had gained in the war zone. I recited these conditions and made certain recommendations that the Atlantic Fleet immediately do thus and so. I have forgotten what they were. I think it gave offense, and it offended the gunnery officer; and it did not amount to that [witness snapping his fingers].

The CHAIRMAN. What was the basis of it?

Admiral RODMAN. That was such a little thing I would not bother with it if I were you, Senator. It is really trifling. That has no bearing on this question.

The CHAIRMAN. It has nothing to do with the efficiency of gunnery or the ships?

Admiral RODMAN. If I said no it would not be true. Everything had a bearing. But it did not amount to that (witness snapping his fingers), that letter. I have not thought of it since.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the ships in your division were efficient in every way.

Admiral RODMAN. The *Texas* was not when she arrived, for the reasons I have stated. She was immediately afterwards, when they realized conditions, just as good as any of the rest of them; and I have told you the reason, because she was left up in the navy yard about six months and did not have an opportunity to go out and practice.

The CHAIRMAN. Your recommendations had nothing to do with any ship except the *Texas*?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no fault found with any of the other ships at all?

Admiral RODMAN. I think not, sir. We write those reports and state the conditions that arise. No—I do not know what you have got up your sleeve. It is something that I do not know anything about.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a question of my having anything up my sleeve. I want you to give me information, Admiral Rodman.

Admiral RODMAN. The ships were excellent. Of course they were not perfect.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you made a certain report yourself.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which excited a call-down from Admiral Mayo; and yet you are not willing to give me those recommendations that you made in that report.

Admiral RODMAN. I will answer you just as willingly and as truthfully as I possibly can, but I say that matter was trifling. It is one of those things that go and come, from time to time and does not amount to a hill of beans.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get a copy of those recommendations and submit them to the committee, and then they can see whether they were trifling or not?

Admiral RODMAN. Senator, I stated that I have never kept any files in my life. I have no more idea where that letter is than the man in the moon, except that I put one of them in the wastebasket. I will explain it to you. I have no hesitancy in doing it.

We have target practice at stated intervals. Each officer, captains and admirals, makes a report. Sometimes they give praise, and sometimes they make recommendations. Sometimes they find fault. It is a mere routine affair.

When the *Texas* arrived I saluted her. I called her captain over and her gunnery officer, and gave them the mischief for firing as they did, in the methods that we generally use in target practice. The exact conditions were that I gave them on this particular occasion, if I remember, each five rounds per gun per turret. I naturally supposed that they would fire under war conditions, and let off all the salvos instantly; but they did not. Their salvos were poor—very poor. If I remember, she took maybe—I supposed she might have fired all these salvos in three minutes—I do not remember the time. She may have been six or seven minutes. The salvos were ragged, I saw that their minds were focused still on making a score and making everything hit. There may have been a little trouble with the personnel. They were still focused on the target practice and winning the pennant; and then I told those officers to get over that competition business, and shoot trying to fire all their guns at all times, and fire them instantly. That was the gist of it, so far as I remember. That letter made no impression on me.

The CHAIRMAN. And it simply referred to that one ship and not to the others?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. I think I mentioned that thing to my officer, to my aid, this morning—I mentioned that very letter, saying that after considering it awhile, I wrote an answer. It was based on my recommendation as to target practice, and calling my attention to the fact that I had violated some of the rules on it, and my answer was a reference to the fifteenth chapter, first verse, of Proverbs. That was, "A soft answer turneth away wrath." That was my indorsement on it.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the effect on the fleet or removing large numbers of the personnel for merchant ships gun crews?

Admiral RODMAN. That was bad. It decreased for the time being the efficiency of the battleships, but as I remember the conditions, in the days of neutrality the State Department made a decision that would warrant armed gun crews going on what had been merchant ships, now turned into transports. There was an immediate necessity of getting these ships to sea. They did not at that time anticipate that the American battleship fleet would immediately go into action. It was a part of the policy, therefore, to take those gun crews and put them where they could do the most good, to man the guns on the transports. At the same time we took the other ships and took in recruits as fast as we could, and trained them up in their places. That is where I said the Navy expanded to about 10 times its original size, and that was a part of the expansion.

The CHAIRMAN. That would naturally hurt the efficiency while the training was going on.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, it would; but it would increase the efficiency of the ships we put them on.

The CHAIRMAN. Later on?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the names of the ships that went over with you?

Admiral RODMAN. The *New York*, the *Wyoming*, the *Florida*, and the *Delaware*.

The CHAIRMAN. And later the *Texas*?

Admiral RODMAN. And later the *Texas*; and then I think, still later, the *Arkansas* came.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been in command of these ships before?

Admiral RODMAN. Not immediately. I had once commanded the *New York* as captain.

The CHAIRMAN. She was your flagship?

Admiral RODMAN. I say I had commanded her as captain.

The CHAIRMAN. You had commanded her?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; and then when I went over I again took the *New York* as flagship.

The CHAIRMAN. Had these ships operated before as a division?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or as a squadron?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; but we never had the slightest difficulty in operating them, as soon as I took command. They had operated in other divisions. It is not hard to go from one division to another. That does not amount to a hill of beans.

The CHAIRMAN. Had they operated together?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; but they operated as perfectly as ships can operate together, when they came together.

The CHAIRMAN. That answers the question.

Admiral RODMAN. I wanted to qualify it so you could understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they of uniform type?

Admiral RODMAN. Do you mean were they exactly sister ships?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, were they the same type of ships?

Admiral RODMAN. They were near enough in type to operate together.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically at the same speed?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; they were approximately so. They would all average $21\frac{1}{2}$ knots. There may have been a knot and a half or a knot difference, but that is nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that the fact that they came from different divisions and were of different types would injure their efficiency at all?

Admiral RODMAN. I said positively that it did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims stated in his testimony that for four months previous to your departure to Europe the question of sending a battleship division to reinforce the Grand Fleet had been under discussion. Had you received any information of this during this time?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had never heard it discussed?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. I never heard, as I told you, until one afternoon I was called up and told that I was to have command. That is the first I heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know of any general plan, war plan, prepared by the department, at all? Were you shown any war plans in any way?

Admiral RODMAN. With reference to me going over?

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the general conduct of the Navy

Admiral RODMAN. Nothing whatever, sir; except as a member of the General Board. They were discussed before the board at times.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you leave the General Board?

Admiral RODMAN. About the time war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. And at that time had the General Board prepared a war plan?

Admiral RODMAN. We had a number of them. I could not tell you in detail what they were. There are other members of the board who can tell you better than I. Admiral Badger, for instance, can tell you about that better than I. I was a junior member of the board. My work on the board, although I was cognizant of all the work, was not in connection with the war plans, and I paid no attention to that. My work there was of a different character.

The CHAIRMAN. But there were some war plans that were actually prepared?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, yes, sir. Mr. Senator, there is no nation in the world, bar none, that does not make plans. I do not care how good or how bad they were, they were there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever see any of them?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know. They kept them locked up, as I understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever hear of them later in the war, or were they put into practice?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You never heard of their being used?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I do not know a thing about them.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any trouble in your service in the Navy in getting approval of your recommendations to the department while you were in the North Sea?

Admiral RODMAN. In general, none.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations to the department?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not be surprised if I did, sir, but I do not recall. I am not trying to evade answering your question, Mr. Senator, but I do not remember anything. I recall once that I recommended that we have some American destroyers as our screen. I wanted to educate up our destroyer force to their work that they would have to do with our battleships, and I thought that our American destroyers were larger and better able to stand the weather, which was frightful in the North Sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make some other recommendations that you know of?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I suppose I made hundreds of them. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you make them?

Admiral RODMAN. In the usual form.

The CHAIRMAN. Through Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. Through Admiral Sims, and he could approve or disapprove of them as he saw fit.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any one—where he disapproved of any of your plans?

Admiral RODMAN. Nothing to amount to anything. We were working in accord on all measures and plans. There was nothing to amount to anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You recall no plans or recommendations that you put up to the department that were disapproved?

Admiral RODMAN. None that I remember, but if you have any there I can tell you about them.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had made recommendations, and you do not remember about them, and they were not followed out, would it have been up to Admiral Sims and up to the Navy Department?

Admiral RODMAN. Admiral Sims would first have put his indorsement upon them and sent them on to the department—he always did. If I had disagreed—and I did not—with Admiral Sims in any way, I would have exercised a privilege that belongs to all officers. You have the right, if a senior officer disapproves, to still have your recommendations forwarded to a higher authority, and if I had found any fault—and I did not—with any recommendations I had made to Admiral Sims, in the way they were treated, I would have requested the courtesy—the privilege which was due me—to send it up.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you had made your recommendations and Admiral Sims had approved of them and the Navy Department was against them, the Navy Department would have been responsible and not Admiral Sims, of course?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly. They were the highest authority. They were the supreme court.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you put up to the department any plan for docking facilities for your battleships, based on the assumption that your battleships were to be sent to the United States to be docked?

Admiral RODMAN. At first, yes; and then I found out they could be docked abroad, and I made arrangements with the British to have them docked in British waters, so that they would not have to be sent back to the United States. I made plans when I first went there, contemplating sending them to the United States; but when I found out I could do it abroad, we followed that plan and did dock them abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department turn you down before you took up the proposition of docking them abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. I say honestly, sir—and I am not evading—I have no idea. I remember the circumstance, the fact, that we did dock abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not remember the department turning down your plan of docking them in this country?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I do not remember the action that the department took in that case. I mean I do not remember the sequence of events. I only know that we did dock them abroad, which was the logical thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the fleet was in a high state of efficiency—the battle fleet was in a high state of efficiency—when you were an officer of the fleet, before you went abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the beginning of the war—at the time of the beginning of the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean that it was in a high state of efficiency as a fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I would confine myself to saying that the battleship fleet was. I stated previously, sir, I think, that some of our types, other types, of vessels were not efficient. For instance, now, you must know that I am generalizing as any naval officer would who had been in the Navy all his life, without, as I say, having documentary evidence. I do not believe our submarines were up to the standard. I can tell you why. When we first started building submarines—and we must revert back to a number of years ago—we built small ones. We did not know any better. We have built many a vessel not worth the powder it would take to blow it up, as we started. But as we learned more about submarines and what they might accomplish, we began building larger types. I remember quite a discussion once in the General Board as to the minimum size. And then Congress took it in hand, if I remember right, and—of course it was on my side—made a provision that they should not be less than 800 tons. Now, I think that is why our earlier submarines were not efficient. It was because we did not know their value, and the ones we built were too small, and they were not a proper type, and there was a misconception in the views of naval officers as to just what they might accomplish; and what led to the larger types was that we soon learned that the Germans were building submarines that could keep the seas. I do not think we had contemplated their keeping the seas, but as long as the German submarines could keep the seas, it was, like everything else, progressive, and when we learned these lessons, then I think toward the latter part of the war we devoted our attention to the larger and better type.

Now, as to their efficiency and their state of preparedness, whoever was in command of them can tell you about that better than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. How many battleships were there in the Atlantic Fleet when you were serving there, and before you were ordered abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. Just before the war?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is, in Force No. 2.

Admiral RODMAN. You mean the dreadnought type?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes—well, the fleet with which you were——

Admiral RODMAN. I think there were eight. I can get you the data on that. I think there were possibly eight dreadnoughts and eight or nine of the older type, like the *Connecticut* and the *New Jersey* type; and then there were the old, old type, the crab fleet, as we called them, like the *Kentucky*, that did not amount to anything.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean of the actual battle fleet as distinguished from the reserve?

Admiral RODMAN. I think approximately 16.

The CHAIRMAN. Sixteen?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And for a fleet, a properly prepared battle fleet, how many destroyers would we need?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I do not know, sir. I think that the General Board has laid down some rule, that for each battleship we should have so many destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. It should be at least four?

Admiral RODMAN. It should be at least that.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you have when you were serving in European waters?

Admiral RODMAN. Eight, for four battleships. But, Mr. Senator, let us not get into that, because that will depend upon the nature of the work you are going to do. It will vary from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about for a fully equipped battle fleet. I want to find out whether this battle fleet which you say was so efficient as a battle fleet was——

Admiral RODMAN. I would like to confine myself to the battle ships. There was nowhere near the number of destroyers they should have had.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many you should have had?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not remember; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you had nowhere near as many as you should have had?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have half what you should have had?

Admiral RODMAN. I would rather not try to say. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know how well prepared the battle fleet was.

Admiral RODMAN. I can give you more than that. We were very much in need of destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you several questions, if you do not mind answering. The fleet was deficient in vessels, to a great degree; in battle cruisers, in light cruisers—how many light cruisers did you have?

Admiral RODMAN. I could get you a list, and you could get that in two minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to know about the battle fleet. You are an old fighter——

Admiral RODMAN. I am not so much of a fighter.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a fleet of light cruisers and submarines, and——

Admiral RODMAN. Why do you not get that from the General Board? They will give you the exact data right off the reel, of what we ought to have had and what we did have. I can not recall those things right in my mind's eye. I can only say in general that we ought to have had a greater number of destroyers. We had nowhere near enough. We ought to have had 20 or 30 light cruisers and 6 battle cruisers, and we did not have them. So that the fleet was short of all these kinds of vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did not have enough of those types of vessels?

Admiral RODMAN. Not near enough.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the fleet was not complete?

Admiral RODMAN. No fleet is ever complete.

The CHAIRMAN. No fleet is ever complete?

Admiral RODMAN. Never.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you regard any fleet as of any value as a fleet without them?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly. The fleet would be more efficient if it had all the types.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be practically as efficient as a fighting unit without those vessels?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it would put up a pretty good scrap, if it ever had a start.

The CHAIRMAN. And your opinion would be that while these other things are useful and helpful, they are not useful in a battle fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not say.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I gathered.

Admiral RODMAN. Well, you gathered it wrong. You would have to have all the types.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think it could still have performed its duty as a battle fleet without——

Admiral RODMAN. If you are driving at the fact——

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know the facts. I am asking for information.

Admiral RODMAN. I will have to give it to you from my side, too, you know. If you are driving at this, if you think that the German fleet, if it had got mixed up with the British Grand Fleet and had any success, could still have licked the Atlantic Fleet, you were never more mistaken in your life. It would never have done anything with them. They would have wiped it off the face of the earth. I will tell you why. If those two fleets had come together, even presuming that it had not been a complete victory for the Grand Fleet, they would have done a great deal of damage to the German fleet, and the Huns would never have stood up against the Atlantic Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. We have now before the full Naval Committee the question brought up of building ships of all kinds.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; that is the building program. That is why I was referring to the general board.

The CHAIRMAN. Then these ships are not necessary?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not say so; never, in the world. I say unqualifiedly we should have all these types, battle cruisers and light cruisers, etc. I am so glad, Mr. Chairman, to find that you know that we need them, and I hope you are going to give them to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you do need both, but I think that the battle fleet needs them also.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, certainly; but just because we did not have them, we were not going to crawl in our hole and pull the hole in after us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but would you have been very much of a fleet? You do not answer that very clearly, Admiral.

Admiral RODMAN. I am afraid that I do not. I am trying to, but you have got me muddled, all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given these ships when you were on the other side? Were you given destroyers?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; I was given eight destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. And light cruisers?

Admiral RODMAN. I was given eight British destroyers to screen the American battleship force, and every time I went into the North Sea, and each time we went north, the whole British fleet, including every type of vessel, not only the battle cruisers and light cruisers, but we had sea-going submarines and air ships, and I do not know what all—we had the whole thing go out.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar, generally speaking, with the composition of the British and German fleets as they met at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir: only from general reading. I could not give you the exact data.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are fairly familiar with the battle of Jutland—the details?

Admiral RODMAN. Fairly so, from what I have heard from the Britishers, themselves, and from what I have read.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what would your definition be of a fleet that is in all respects ready for battle, against a fleet like the Germans' in 1916?

Admiral RODMAN. We should have all the types of vessels that were necessary, and have time to train them and the men to man them.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to battleships, what units would be necessary?

Admiral RODMAN. Exactly those I have mentioned; the battle cruisers, light cruisers, sufficient destroyers, that we now have, and possibly in an increased number, battleships planes, and their number of auxiliaries, together with the fleet, and there should be one or two ships for carrying airplanes. That, in general, is about what we need. We have got fine ships, Mr. Senator, there is no question about it. The battleships we have got are a fine type of ships. Why do you not ask me about their state of efficiency now, and I will tell you that it is very poor.

The CHAIRMAN. I will come to that later on. Would it be proper to state that a fleet composed only of battleships and destroyers, no matter how efficient and ready for war, would be a proper fleet for a battle like the battle of Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly not. Our fleet had nothing but the battleships and a few destroyers. Still, what was left of the German Battle Fleet, it would have put it out of commission if it had ever started to come across.

The CHAIRMAN. If it had already disposed of the British Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. It could not. That is a hypothetical case. Never in the world. The British Fleet was double their strength.

The CHAIRMAN. You are stating your opinion.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I know it. The British Fleet would have cleaned them off the face of the earth.

The CHAIRMAN. No: but I say, if they had disposed of the British Fleet and come over here after a certain length of time, would we have been prepared to meet them?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; not fully.

The CHAIRMAN. Then a fleet is not ready for battle if it has not got scouts and screening vessels and seagoing submarines and air service and destroyers?

Admiral RODMAN. You should say it is not prepared for its maximum efficiency, but it still has right considerable fight in it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not properly prepared as a battle fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor is it in all respects fully prepared if these ships are not fully officered and manned?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; the more trained officers and men you have, the better the ships, everyday in the week.

The CHAIRMAN. How about our Navy when war was declared was it fully officered and manned?

Admiral RODMAN. I believe not; not as well as it should have been. I believe we were a little shy of men about that time.

The CHAIRMAN. A little shy?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. I do not know how much; possibly 10 to 20 per cent; something of that kind. That was very clearly demonstrated, because I remember before I went abroad, just at the time we increased the complements of ships; I might explain by saying that the old complements of ships contemplated having at all times a certain number of men for certain purposes in the engine room. We always had a full turret's crew; but just prior to that time we only had half enough men to man our secondary batteries, thinking that if we were engaged on the starboard side, we had enough men, and then we could shift them over to the port side. Later that was changed, and the department decided to give us full complements for all our secondary guns. When they went abroad realizing that I might need more men than usual, I asked for an increase on that, and I think I had 10 or 15 per cent more men than were used in our other ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the department put itself out to give you the best possible complement of officers and men that it could for foreign service?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; not a bit of it. There was not a change made in any of the officers or men on board of the ships; not one. They gave us a lot of recruits that were not trained. They had sent numbers of our men around to the merchant ships for manning the guns, and what men I had with me were not trained when I started, by any manner of means. Some of them were raw recruits.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything yourself about the reserve ships, whether they were thoroughly manned when you went abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know, or they were not?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether there were enough men to man them and officer them?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine there was a great scarcity of officers and men. I imagine that if you took the men out of the Navy at that time to man anything else than the naval ships, there was a great scarcity.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Admiral Palmer testified there were over 2,300 officers in the Navy, and the need was for 6,000.

Admiral RODMAN. His information is infinitely more accurate than mine. Whatever he said was perfectly true, no doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what vessels in the Navy were available for scouts and screening vessels with the battle fleet in January, 1915?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I can not recall those things. Please do not think that I am evasive, Mr. Senator, but I have not thought of those things.

The CHAIRMAN. No; you have said that you have no documents, and of course nobody can remember all these things.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was notorious that there were too few, at that time.

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know about the word "notorious." It might be a fact that they had too few, but I do not know whether there was anything notorious about it.

The CHAIRMAN. It was well known?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, yes; it might have been well known, and it might not have been notorious.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not get the distinction, but I am glad you do. Were these scouts and screening ships fully manned and officered in April, 1917, when we declared war?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine they did not have anything like the men and officers on them, but I do not know. I imagine not.

The CHAIRMAN. There were some of these vessels with the fleet, of course, at that time?

Admiral RODMAN. You are still asking me something about things I do not know anything about.

The CHAIRMAN. It was your fleet.

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I thought that you were asking about the reserve fleet, now.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I am asking you about the scouts and screening vessels. I want to know whether there were some of those vessels with the fleet, or whether it was purely a fleet of battleships and destroyers?

Admiral RODMAN. I think I can say, unqualifiedly, so far as I know, it was, almost. There were very few of those other ships. It was almost altogether battleships and destroyers. But Admiral Wilson can tell you about that, better than I can, because I think he was in command of a squadron of scouts and cruisers. He knows and I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Secretary stated in his 1918 report that the Navy was ready from stem to stern when the war was declared, in April, 1917, would you say that that was so?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How was it not ready?

Admiral RODMAN. It did not have sufficient types and numbers of vessels and trained personnel to make a complete fleet along the line you were just asking me just now. The fleet was not complete.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was not in an efficient state for battle?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; what we had could put up a pretty good scrap. But if you were to go into an engagement, if you waited until everything was complete and you had absolutely everything, you could make mighty little headway. I suppose there is a necessity in every engagement and every battle ashore or afloat, there are many things that are not complete; but that does not keep a man from very frequently winning a victory.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was not ready to run up against a fleet such as came out from Germany to fight the battle of Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not say that until I saw the figures on both sides. I always had an idea that we would give the Germans a pretty good scrap. The principal fighting force of a fleet is the battleships, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. As I remember, in the battle of Jutland Admiral Jellicoe stayed behind with the battleships, and Admiral Beatty was in front with the battle cruisers and light cruisers?

Admiral RODMAN. Very briefly, so far as I remember from my information, without going into the harrowing details, if that would represent the German fleet in column [indicating on table], which is the fighting formation, Admiral Beatty in his battle cruisers sighted the German fleet coming in that direction [indicating], just as I bring my hand, and when he had gotten contact, he had to turn, and make a turn here [indicating], and it was in that turn that some of his ships were sunk. He then took position off the leaders of the German fleet and picked up the battle, leading them up to here, where the British fleet was in command of Admiral Jellicoe.

The CHAIRMAN. But in front of Admiral Jellicoe's command were all of these screening vessels, were they not?

Admiral RODMAN. There must have been destroyers and light cruisers, I should think.

The CHAIRMAN. We had no battle cruisers?

Admiral RODMAN. No; no battle cruisers and no light cruisers; and our scouting vessels, which is our source of information among other things, would have been very scanty indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we would have had to do away with all Admiral Beatty's part of it, and it would simply have meant that the battleships would have been attacked by the German fleet, and we would have had an insufficient number of destroyers to screen them?

Admiral RODMAN. Under that condition which you have mentioned there, we would have been shy of the information. It was Admiral Beatty's duty to report what he saw to the battleship fleet, which we are always trying to get into action. Not only was Admiral Beatty scraping to beat four of a kind, but he was sending information back; and without information we would be very much behind in picking up the movements.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that our fleet was as well prepared as the British Grand Fleet in 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine that just at the beginning of the war they were in very much better position than we and better prepared from the fact that they did have the types of vessels that we should have had but did not have; but from what I was told when I was abroad they were far from being in a thorough state of preparedness when the war started.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you that. I am asking, in 1916, when they met the German Fleet at Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. Would you please ask that question again? Were they prepared then——

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you whether you thought our fleet in 1917 was as fully prepared and provided as was the British Fleet to meet the German Fleet at any time in 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. Not by any manner of means, for the reason that the British Fleet had the types of vessels that we did not have, and they had a war experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Then their personnel was in good shape at that time?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; I think their personnel was in fine shape. You must remember that there was not a day but that all ships in the war zone were profiting by the experience of the war and making changes right straight along.

The CHAIRMAN. And was our Navy profiting at the same time by the experiences of the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; unqualifiedly. They may not have gotten the maximum benefit, but I have never seen more energy and more preparation. We were acting to the best of our ability.

The CHAIRMAN. They were studying on the other side, as the Army was, studying up naval conditions?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine so.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, prior to our entrance into the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly they did. We had officers in the British Fleet, since I come to think about it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the British Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; Capt. Symington. I do not know how many more. He was in one of the British battle cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether those officers, before the war commenced, some time before the war commenced, were arriving back home?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think that we had men studying the submarine situation and the various battle situations that might come up on the other side; but you do not know?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I imagine that we had; but I can not give you that information.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no information?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I do not recall; but I imagine we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, do you consider the organization of the Navy Department as now existing satisfactory?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What changes would you suggest other than the ones you spoke of?

Admiral RODMAN. None other, sir. I am not very familiar, Mr. Senator, with the intimate organization of the Navy Department, because I never had anything to do with it. There are other officers who probably know more about it than I, lots of them, in fact, who have been in the department. I think, very generally speaking, sir, that with the recommendation I made in regard to the Chief of Operations being given more responsibility and the authority, repeating that recommendation, that the continuation of the General Board as it exists is most important. Beyond that I have no recommendations to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that a civilian Secretary of the Navy who has never studied or had experience of naval warfare could reasonably be expected, without expert advice and assistance, to prepare a navy or a fleet for battle?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He would have to depend almost altogether on expert advice?

Admiral RODMAN. I should think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And would probably have to follow that advice in order to get good results?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the Chief of Naval Operations should be authorized to exercise throughout the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, through naval commanders, such supervision over all activities of the Navy as is required to secure coordinated action?

Admiral RODMAN. Will you repeat that question, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that the Chief of Naval Operations should be authorized to exercise through the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department and the naval commanders, such supervision over all activities of the Navy as is required to secure coordinated action?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; there will be times, possibly, when the State Department might require the services of a vessel, and the Secretary of the Navy might be more in touch with the national policy, and he might direct the Chief of Naval Operations in that respect. But so far as carrying out war plans is concerned, and in the matter of preparedness and in the execution of the plans, I think it should be intrusted to the Chief of Naval Operations, as I have said.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in a centralized control over the policies and plans?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And decentralization of authority and responsibility over the execution?

Admiral RODMAN. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, give the authority to execute to the subordinates as much as possible?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. What would be the use, if he had responsibility, of making preparations, what would be the use if he could not execute them?

The CHAIRMAN. What should be the general authority of the Chief of Naval Operations in time of peace?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not avoid that question, but I am not very good at that sort of thing. I would rather make my general statement, if you would allow me, and let those who are more familiar with the technicalities of the department, and who are gifted in writing regulations and that sort of thing, answer on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You state, in general, that the Chief of Naval Operations should have responsibility for the plans?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would also apply to time of war?

Admiral RODMAN. I think he should be also given authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the point; if he has responsibility he ought to have the authority.

Admiral RODMAN. He ought to have it. He has not got it. In other words, they should be hand in glove.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same thing would apply to time of war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. Now, I would not for a moment imply that the Chief of Naval Operations would be so independent that he could do just what he wants. You must remember that our Government would have to be run throughout as it was in this war.

through all the industries and the whole country following the Federal policy, and this policy would be told to the Chief of Naval Operations, and he then would execute that part of it which relates to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo brought out that question of the general policy which the Navy should be kept thoroughly familiar with in order to know what steps to take.

Admiral RODMAN. He is a very level-headed man.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with that?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; anything that Admiral Mayo would recommend. I think he is one of the most level-headed men I know.

The CHAIRMAN. You would give him a general indorsement?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, I would. He is a very level-headed man. He is a fine man.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in a planning division under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it needs 15 men?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know whether it takes 15 or 50. That is a detail I do not know. I imagine that I would not put any limit on that. I would let the Chief of Operations say as to that. He would not take any more than are necessary or take any less. He would take the officers who have ability in that line and take the number required. I would not limit him to any number. That is not like saying that there is going to be a great general staff. It is like where a man is assigned to one trick of duty. A man would be planning and after a certain number of years he would be assigned to other duty. I would not put a limitation there.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not put a limitation?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not provide for the number of men?

Admiral RODMAN. I would simply say that he be authorized to have detailed sufficient officers to properly constitute a planning section. In other words, that he is so——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you provide that those officers who are serving in the planning section should do that and nothing else while so serving?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not think so. That would be the principal duty. When an officer is assigned to duty there is a multiplicity of duties that come in, and my experience has been that when an officer, to use a slang expression, has been given a job, he is expected to devote a maximum amount of his time to that work, and that is what would happen if a man was detailed to the planning section.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Chief of Naval Operations was given the responsibility and authority, which you say you approve of, would he not have to have men who would spend most of their time on that in the planning section?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; if he was a regular naval officer I would say if he spent as much as three years there he then ought to go to sea. That is our general policy throughout. We have a number of specialists in the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite true, but I mean while he is serving with Operations he should do that in the planning section, and nothing else?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; he should devote his attention to this.

The CHAIRMAN. And nothing else?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. After your experience and observation in the war, preparing for it, do you think it would be advisable to retain intact and without change the present organization of the Navy Department or to repeat the policies and methods of handling the Navy that prevailed in 1914 and 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. I would recommend the change that I have already recommended, that we have a Chief of Naval Operations with the responsibility and the authority that I have already stated. That, I think, would make the remedy all right.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that would take care of the personnel?

Admiral RODMAN. You are getting me over my depth again. I honestly do not know very much about the organization as to the relations of the chiefs of bureaus to the Chief of Operations, but I rather imagine that if there were a Chief of Operations he would be responsible for the personnel, just the same as he is for material and preparedness and everything else. He does now have something to say in those matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further suggestions to make, Admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That would be of help to the committee in formulating any plans?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That may come up later on?

Admiral RODMAN. I would be very glad if I could be of any assistance, to come again before the committee, but I have no recommendations to make now.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any recommendations at any time to make, I would be very glad if you will write me a letter and give any suggestions that you might have to make.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Ball?

Senator BALL. I have not any. You have covered the ground very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman of the committee asked you a hypothetical question in regard to a Secretary of the Navy who had no assistance in the way of naval officers and no advice from naval officers, and so on; as to whether or not he would be capable of preparing plans, and I think you probably properly said that he would not. Is that the condition we have in connection with our Navy?

Admiral RODMAN. No; not as I understand it. The plans for the conduct of war, as I understand it now, are in the hands of the Chief of Operations. Also the General Board, in my time there, would prepare plans. These would be approved or disapproved by the Chief of Operations who would refer these plans to the Secretary, and the Secretary could approve or disapprove them.

Senator TRAMMELL. He could approve or disapprove; but as a matter of fact, this hypothetical question that the chairman asked you did not reflect the conditions that exist in our Navy, because

s I understand in our Navy the Secretary has a great army of naval officers around him making these plans, making suggestions and recommendations, and they very largely furnish the details—the naval officers themselves. Of course he might disapprove some of the suggestions, but he has the advantage of their advice and suggestions?

Admiral RODMAN. Unqualifiedly.

Senator TRAMMELL. And they are given liberty, and have the right, to make recommendations?

Admiral RODMAN. I will even go further and say that all plans and recommendations are formulated by technical officers, and are submitted to the Secretary.

Senator TRAMMELL. The question was asked you about the preparedness of our fleet in 1917 and that of the British fleet. Would it be presumed that the American Fleet would be quite in the prepared condition that the British fleet would, when they had been in war three years and we had not been in war for three years?

Admiral RODMAN. No: our fleet would not be quite so well prepared, for the reason that during that three years of war they had learned by experience that they could make a great many changes and improvements on what they thought was best prior to the war; and be benefited by the same experience when we went into the war, to the best of our knowledge. We were still prepared, but we made a number of changes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is not that the story of war over and over?

Admiral RODMAN. I think so, absolutely.

Senator TRAMMELL. That there are emergencies, and the experiences of the war made necessary new preparations?

Admiral RODMAN. Absolutely.

Senator TRAMMELL. If the war went on for 15 years, during the fifteenth year there very likely would have to be something done that was not necessary the first year, to meet the same conditions of war?

Admiral RODMAN. You profit by experience, and in no place could you profit by it more than by being in contact with those who had been serving for three years.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you have sufficient general knowledge of the Navy and its operations to know whether or not, beginning some two or three years before the entrance of the United States into the war, the Navy Department was active in trying to build up the efficiency of the Navy?

Admiral RODMAN. In general, I assume that it was. I have never seen them yet when they were not. I think the officers who are stationed in the department, who have made a life work of it, so far as I know they are very conscientious, and they would work up, doing all that they could to build it up. When it comes to an opinion about what should be had and what should not be had, we are largely dependent upon Congress, as you know. As I have stated in my statement, we are bounded by that limitation.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is it not a fact that the building program was largely increased, and an effort for increasing the personnel of the Navy was in progress a year or two before we actually entered into the war?

Admiral RODMAN. I think so. As I remember, at that time—gracious, it comes and goes! I can not remember those things in

detail. I know just of late—well, I will say in the last 8 or 10 years—there has been a tremendous increase in the Navy; and in the war, as I stated, the Navy was expanded eight or ten times, more or less.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have been questioned more or less on expert matters. Admiral Sims in his testimony before the committee stated that through the failure of the Navy Department to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during the first six months of the war, and previous unpreparedness, the war was prolonged for four months, causing the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping and of 500,000 lives, and the needless expenditure of fifteen billions of dollars. Have you any views upon that statement?

Admiral RODMAN. That is statistical, is it not?

Senator TRAMMELL. As to whether it is correct or not?

Admiral RODMAN. It is no reflection on Admiral Sims, but there is an old saw to the effect that there are three kinds of lies, "Lie, damn lies, and statistics." I think that is hypothetical entirely. No, sir; I do not think that any fair-minded man could ever say that the American Navy was ever responsible for any loss of tonnage or loss of lives. Now, if I understand the conditions to which that question there pertains, it possibly refers to the submarine attacks on allied shipping.

Senator TRAMMELL. That seems to have been his principal point, that on account of failure in supporting them——

Admiral RODMAN. I have no conception of those figures whatever, nor could I possibly, before any jury or before a committee and under sworn testimony, give positive evidence as to facts and as to figures, but I do not believe there is a particle of truth in that statement; not that Admiral Sims was not perfectly conscientious and may not have thought so. It may have been his interpretation. I will tell you why. Let us assume that there were a certain number of vessels of the Allies engaged in trying to get the submarines. Our percentage of that number, if we had sent every ship that was available for submarine combat, to the infested area, would have been only a small percentage. I do not know what, but it is small. Ten per cent of that amount of shipping, and that amount of lives that were lost by the submarine menace—give us 10 per cent of it, if you like, maybe; but let us make it out proportional to the number of ships that you have sent there, and that statement ought to be knocked into a cocked hat. That is my opinion. I have no figures.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think this represents any statistics. It just represents the Admiral's views.

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know anything about the number of ships or the tons, but on the face of it I do not think that statement will hold water, a bit. I had seen that statement, before I came here, and I thought it was a hypothetical case, and a good deal of imagination.

Senator TRAMMELL. How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. Nearly 45 years.

Senator TRAMMELL. Have you been at sea during most of the time during the 45 years of your service?

Admiral RODMAN. I left the Naval Academy in 1880, and I have been about 30 years at sea.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated, in regard to the question plans, that what knowledge you had was gained while you were connected with the General Board; that you had no general war plans furnished you when you assumed command and went abroad. Were your duties such and was your service such at the time that it was necessary for you to carry along in your pocket a copy of the general war plans in regard to other activities, other than those you were commanding yourself?

Admiral RODMAN. No; there was no occasion to furnish me with any war plans, or any other. I had a verbal order, or rather an intimate conversation. When information is to be conveyed, it is immaterial to me whether it be written or verbal or any other way. I was told what I was to do, and I did it the best I could. I did not need any plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. In your long experience and knowledge of naval affairs you do not consider it any particular neglect of duty that you were not furnished with other plans other than those connected with your particular operations, do you?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; it was a matter of no importance to me, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were advised, so far as matters of importance to you were concerned, in connection with your command?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; I had the same instructions and orders—whatever you may call them—that anybody else would have had under like circumstances, I suppose, in any army or any navy in the world. I had instructions to go over and join the British Fleet. I can not see that there was anything more necessary.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your instructions were sufficiently explicit and intelligent, with your intelligence, to carry them out, so that you went ahead and fulfilled the mission required of you?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not say that I fulfilled it; I had a try at it.

Senator TRAMMELL. So far as you know, you fulfilled it?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; the ships went across according to the verbal order.

Senator TRAMMELL. Were your instructions written or verbal instructions?

Admiral RODMAN. Both. The method of doing it was that I was called up to the Chief of Operations, and, naturally, there were a thousand and one things to be talked over. These we talked over, as is always the case, just as any gentleman might go to his subordinates and talk after giving his instructions, and when I was ready I was given my written instructions to leave on a certain date and go across.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not even told whom you would be under when you got on the other side?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I think the idea was, there was a little question about detaching us from the Atlantic Fleet for this reason. There are always a number of returns in relation to a number of subjects that would naturally go to the commander of the battleship fleet, and that was purely technical. It had no bearing on the conduct of the war; not a particle.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that you did not agree with Admiral Sims's testimony that the failure to send ships over, and assistance, prolonged the war a certain length of time?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not say that, sir, I think. I said that I think his statement is incorrect. I do not think that we should have laid at our doors the responsibility for the loss of a number of men and that tonnage. That is what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you disagree with the figures of Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; I disagree with the fact that we as Americans and in the American Navy were responsible for the loss of whatever amount——

Senator TRAMMELL. Five hundred thousand lives and 2,500,000 tons of shipping.

Admiral RODMAN. Most decidedly; positively not.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he was stating it too high?

Admiral RODMAN. Let us assume that that number of men and that amount of tonnage were lost. That is a fair assumption. I assume they were. There were others in the war besides us, and there were others combating the submarine menace, and I think that refers to that. Now, we could not possibly, under any conditions, have sent more than 5 or 10 per cent of the vessels that were then or were to be engaged in combating the submarine. Give us 10 per cent of that number, and you will give us our fair allowance in any conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any particular knowledge about the submarine situation, or about the convoy situation?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or any about the matters in Admiral Sims's testimony?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. Any officer in the service has a good general idea of what was going on; but, while I was in the North Sea, I dare say I knew less about what was going on than you gentlemen here at home, who had the papers. I knew very little. And as to the other branches of the work, I had very little knowledge, except in a general way, as to what our destroyers were doing about submarines, etc. I knew only in a general way. I had no particular knowledge. I was not in a position to have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell spoke about the building program which was started in 1916.

Admiral RODMAN. That was——

The CHAIRMAN. That building program has not been carried out yet.

Admiral RODMAN. I think I recall in that case that there was such a pressure brought to bear upon dockyards and shipyards—I mean our navy yards as well—that it was considered inexpedient to continue building capital ships, and it was thought best to devote that space to the smaller types. I think that gives the idea.

The CHAIRMAN. When, in your opinion, did war with Germany seem probable, so far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral RODMAN. I thought, right from the very beginning of the war, we would be getting into it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you certainly thought so after we had given the German ambassador his passports, in February, 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And during all that time, with war imminent, it was up to us and to the Navy Department to do everything in its power to get ready and prepare for it?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir, unqualifiedly. That is what they were there for.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to this statement of Admiral Sims's, if the Navy Department had complied with his request and had sent the ships over he asked for and the personnel and other things he asked for, do you think it would have been helpful in stopping the submarine menace?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly, sir; I think that all the assistance that we could have given, and the sooner it would have been given, all the better; but I doubt those figures, adding four months to the war; and I will tell you why. I have talked that over, naturally; we talk everything over. You can not put your nose outside of a building that somebody does not talk with you about something. I have talked that over with other officers and that statement seemed to me so preposterous that I went to some of the older officers and to all that seems ridiculous. Really, it seems ridiculous. That is the opinion I have heard from older officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything more, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman has asked you if you had advice in regard to convoys and other lines of activity?

Admiral RODMAN. None whatever. I knew nothing about that. It was not within my province.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was there any necessity or reason for you to know anything about that, so far as your efficiency in command was concerned?

Admiral RODMAN. Not the slightest.

Senator TRAMMELL. In carrying out the duties required of you?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; it was a different field of operations entirely. I had nothing in the world to do with it, no more than you had. You are speaking, of course, of the Atlantic operations?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, would it not have been the greatest piece of mere folly for them to have been advising you every time they were going to make some new change in regard to convoys; a waste of your time entirely?

Admiral RODMAN. I would have gone crazy if they had done so.

Senator TRAMMELL. When you had nothing to do with it?

Admiral RODMAN. There was no occasion to remind me what the convoys were doing. It was no business of mine.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator has mistaken the purport of my question. I simply wanted to find out if the Admiral had any special expert knowledge of the facts.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I had nothing to do with convoys or with the operations down off the south of England. Instead, Mr. Senator, of making war on submarines, I will tell you very frankly I had to get out of the way of them; and whenever we saw one we got out of the way as fast as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. On this question of prolongation of the war, as a matter of fact did not the question of when we got our ships there have a great deal to do with the question of whether the war was ended, and when it would be ended?

Admiral RODMAN. I have heard a good deal of hearsay evidence on that subject, and also in talking with the people here in Washington,

and there will be better testimony than mine on this score. There will be positive testimony, and mine is only a poor opinion.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not, as far as the question of transporting troops and transporting supplies, the Navy, so far as its connection with that, met all the requirements when they were ready to transport troops?

Admiral RODMAN. I have heard that they did. I have heard a great deal of praise showered on the Navy, and I am very much prejudiced in favor of it. I suppose my statement might be considered prejudiced. I thought they did pretty well, and the Army said so, too.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, Apr. 8, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Pittman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Wilson, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Wilson, have you a statement to make about matters pertaining to this investigation?

Admiral WILSON. If the committee pleases, I have a brief paper that I would like to read. It has principally to do with my work, and what the Navy did during the war of which I am personally cognizant.

The CHAIRMAN. Before going ahead with that statement will you tell us about the positions that you held in the Navy during the war or immediately before the war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; that is covered in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, proceed.

Admiral WILSON. Because of the nature of my services prior to and during the war, I believe I am able to give first-hand information to the committee on the subject under consideration, especially on the following:

- (1) The condition of the fleet just prior to the outbreak of war.
- (2) The organization of the patrol force; its object, organization, and the plans adopted prior to and immediately after the declaration of war.
- (3) The routing and escorting of convoys carrying a great part of our troops to France, together with their stores and supplies.
- (4) The work of a successful and important part of our naval forces overseas—the United States naval forces in France.

SERVICE PRIOR TO THE WAR.

In order that the committee may be informed of the prior service spoken of, I give it briefly:

In 1904, after the completion of a cruise of over three years, during which, in turn, I was the executive officer of a gunboat;

I fully believed that both representatives felt they had successfully accomplished their mission; that they were more than pleased with their reception by the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the flag officers concerned; and were especially impressed with the hearty manner in which the responsible officers of the Navy Department had showed their desire to cooperate and thus further the cause against the common enemy.

At a further conference the next morning in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, plans were drawn up for the cooperation of the forces of the three countries in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, and steps taken for the immediate detachment of certain vessels from the fleet with a view to sending them overseas and for some of the Navy colliers to transport certain supplies and stores badly needed by the French Government.

In consequence of the agreement arrived at in the conference, a modification of the organization of the patrol force was made, in which our area was extended, it now being from the headlands of the Atlantic coast of the United States to the fiftieth meridian and from Nova Scotia to and including the West Indies, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea, as set forth in the campaign order as follows:

PATROL FORCE, UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "*Olympia*," Flagship, April 17, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 2.

FORCES.

- (a) Northern patrol. Capt. Jones. Squadron 1.
- (b) Nantucket patrol. Capt. Twining. Squadron 2.
- (c) Chesapeake patrol. Capt. Morgan. Squadron 6.
- (d) Southern patrol. Capt. Oman. Squadron 5.
- (e) Gulf patrol. Capt. Johnston. Squadron 4.
- (f) Caribbean patrol. Capt. Anderson. Squadron 3.
- (g) Supports. *Olympia*, *Columbia*, *Charleston*.

1. The area assigned to this force has been extended to include a portion of the Caribbean heretofore supervised by the French.

2. This force will furnish maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces.

3. (a) Northern patrol: Guard area between lines bearing 90 from Cape Sable and 100 from Sankaty Head. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.

(b) Nantucket patrol: Guard area south of northern patrol to line bearing 110 from Absecon Light. Base, New York and Newport.

(c) Chesapeake patrol: Guard area south of Nantucket patrol to line bearing 110 from Cape Hatteras. Base, Hampton Roads.

(d) Southern patrol: Guard area south of Chesapeake patrol to line bearing 107 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.

(e) Gulf patrol: Guard area of the Bahamas south of Southern patrol north of latitude 23 and west of meridian 75, and the Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.

(f) Caribbean patrol: Guard area south of Gulf and Southern patrols, and the Caribbean west and north of a line from the Panama-Colombian boundary to the west point of Jamaica; thence along north coast of Jamaica, south coast of Haiti, Porto Rico, and Santa Cruz, through Anegada passage, and thence 84 degrees. Base, Guantanamo, Canal Zone, and St. Thomas.

(g) Supports: *Columbia* at Hampton Roads; *Charleston* at St. Thomas. Be prepared to operate at high speed on short notice as far as meridian 50. Keep full of fuel.

(h) Use every means to capture or destroy enemy submarines sighted. Cooperate closely and constantly with the commandants of naval districts in adjustment of area of operations, in exchange of information, and in routing outgoing and incoming merchant vessels. Tenders are available for repairs within their capacity. Effective noon, April 25. Proceed then. Use 75 time.

4. Tenders: *Dirie* at Key West; *Panther* at Newport.

5. Flag on *Olympia*. vicinity New York. Cipher as indicated.

H. B. WILSON.

Of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on station by April 16. Thirteen more joined by April 20. On this latter date 18 had not reported; 5 of these were Coast Guard vessels being fitted out for service in the Navy; others were still on foreign stations and some were undergoing extensive repairs.

Within a month of the organization of the patrol force, vessels began to be detached by order of the Navy Department for service in European waters.

I would like to add right there that the first two batches of destroyers that left the coast to go abroad had not yet been assigned to patrol forces. They were still with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. They went from the fleet and not from the patrol force?

Admiral WILSON. They had not been assigned to the patrol force yet. They were with the fleet.

On April 26, 1917, four destroyers (*Cassin, Cummings, Benham, and Aylwin*) were detached.

On May 1, 1917, 24 destroyers were detached: *Roe, Perkins, Terry, Sterrett, Walke, Monaghan, Warrington, Patterson, McCall, Jarvis, Fanning, Ammen, Paulding, Drayton, Trippe, Beale, Jenkins, Duncan, Allen, Wilkes, Shaw, Burrows, Parker, and Balch.*

On May 16 all destroyers remaining with the patrol force were detached.

On May 30 the *Birmingham, Charleston, and St. Louis* were detached for convoy escort.

Yachts purchased were fitted out and assigned to the patrol force. At this time—May 30, 1917—the force consisted of 22 active vessels and 8 other ships undergoing repairs and being fitted out.

On July 4, 1917, the *Albany, Cleveland* and *Raleigh* were ordered to fit out for convoy escort.

On July 7, 1917, *Chester, Yankton, Des Moines, Sacramento, Marietta, Birmingham, Machias, Paducah, Castine, Wheeling* and *Nashville* were ordered to fit out for foreign service.

These latter vessels were to comprise a force which was to be based on Gibraltar under my immediate command.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AT GIBRALTER.

On August 18, 1917, I arrived at Gibraltar on the U. S. S. *Birmingham* and for about two months commanded our forces based on that port, where, under the senior allied commander—a British rear admiral—our vessels protected commerce in the Western Mediterranean; in the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar and escorted convoys between the Mediterranean and Great Britain.

There were in October, 1917, 21 United States vessels attached to the Gibraltar detachment. These vessels performed valuable and important service to the allied cause as so expressed by the senior allied commander.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES ON FRENCH COAST.

On November 1, 1917, I assumed command of the United States patrol squadrons based on the French coast. On January 14 all the activities of the Navy in France were placed under my command

I fully believed that both representatives felt they had successfully accomplished their mission; that they were more than pleased with their reception by the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the flag officers concerned; and were especially impressed with the hearty manner in which the responsible officers of the Navy Department had showed their desire to cooperate and thus further the cause against the common enemy.

At a further conference the next morning in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, plans were drawn up for the cooperation of the forces of the three countries in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, and steps taken for the immediate detachment of certain vessels from the fleet with a view to sending them overseas and for some of the Navy colliers to transport certain supplies and stores badly needed by the French Government.

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 - (e) Gulf patrol. Capt. Johnston. Squadron 4.
 - (f) Caribbean patrol. Capt. Anderson. Squadron 3.
 - (g) Supports. *Olympia, Columbia, Charleston.*
1. The area assigned to this force has been extended to include a portion of the Caribbean heretofore supervised by the French.
 2. This force will furnish maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces.
 3. (a) Northern patrol: Guard area between lines bearing 90 from Cape Sable and 100 from Sankaty Head. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.
 - (b) Nantucket patrol: Guard area south of northern patrol to line bearing 110 from Absecon Light. Base, New York and Newport.
 - (c) Chesapeake patrol: Guard area south of Nantucket patrol to line bearing 110 from Cape Hatteras. Base, Hampton Roads.
 - (d) Southern patrol: Guard area south of Chesapeake patrol to line bearing 100 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.
 - (e) Gulf patrol: Guard area of the Bahamas south of Southern patrol north of latitude 23 and west of meridian 75, and the Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.
 - (f) Caribbean patrol: Guard area south of Gulf and Southern patrols, and the Caribbean west and north of a line from the Panama-Colombian boundary to the west point of Jamaica; thence along north coast of Jamaica, south coast of Haiti, Porto Rico and Santa Cruz, through Anegada passage, and thence 84 degrees. Base, Guantanamo, Canal Zone, and St. Thomas.
 - (g) Supports: *Columbia* at Hampton Roads; *Charleston* at St. Thomas. Be prepared to operate at high speed on short notice as far as meridian 50. Keep full of fuel.
 - (h) Use every means to capture or destroy enemy submarines sighted. Cooperate closely and constantly with the commandants of naval districts in adjustment of areas of operations, in exchange of information, and in routing outgoing and incoming merchant vessels. Tenders are available for repairs within their capacity. Effective noon, April 25. Proceed then. Use 75 time.
 4. Tenders: *Dixie* at Key West; *Panther* at Newport.
 5. Flag on *Olympia* vicinity New York. Cipher as indicated.

H. B. WILSON.

Of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on station by April 16. Thirteen more joined by April 20. On this latter date 18 had not reported; 5 of these were Coast Guard vessels being fitted out for service in the Navy; others were still on foreign stations and some were undergoing extensive repairs.

Within a month of the organization of the patrol force, vessels began to be detached by order of the Navy Department for service in European waters.

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On April 26, 1917, four destroyers (*Cassin, Cummings, Benham, and Aylwin*) were detached.

On May 1, 1917, 24 destroyers were detached: *Roe, Perkins, Terry, Sterrett, Walke, Monaghan, Warrington, Patterson, McCall, Jarvis, Fanning, Ammen, Paulding, Drayton, Trippe, Beale, Jenkins, Duncan, Allen, Wilkes, Shaw, Burrows, Parker, and Balch.*

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On May 30 the *Birmingham, Charleston, and St. Louis* were detached for convoy escort.

Yachts purchased were fitted out and assigned to the patrol force. At this time—May 30, 1917—the force consisted of 22 active vessels and 8 other ships undergoing repairs and being fitted out.

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These latter vessels were to comprise a force which was to be based on Gibraltar under my immediate command.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AT GIBRALTER.

On August 18, 1917, I arrived at Gibraltar on the U. S. S. *Birmingham* and for about two months commanded our forces based on that port, where, under the senior allied commander—a British rear admiral—our vessels protected commerce in the Western Mediterranean; in the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar and escorted convoys between the Mediterranean and Great Britain.

There were in October, 1917, 21 United States vessels attached to the Gibraltar detachment. These vessels performed valuable and important service to the allied cause as so expressed by the senior allied commander.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES ON FRENCH COAST.

On November 1, 1917, I assumed command of the United States patrol squadrons based on the French coast. On January 14 all the activities of the Navy in France were placed under my command

I fully believed that both representatives felt they had successfully accomplished their mission; that they were more than pleased with their reception by the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the flag officers concerned; and were especially impressed with the hearty manner in which the responsible officers of the Navy Department had showed their desire to cooperate and thus further the cause against the common enemy.

At a further conference the next morning in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, plans were drawn up for the cooperation of the forces of the three countries in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea and steps taken for the immediate detachment of certain vessels from the fleet with a view to sending them overseas and for some of the Navy colliers to transport certain supplies and stores badly needed by the French Government.

In consequence of the agreement arrived at in the conference, a modification of the organization of the patrol force was made, in which our area was extended, it now being from the headlands of the Atlantic coast of the United States to the fiftieth meridian and from Nova Scotia to and including the West Indies, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, as set forth in the campaign order as follows:

PATROL FORCE, UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "*Olympia*," Flagship, April 17, 1917

Campaign Order No. 2.

FORCES.

- (a) Northern patrol. Capt. Jones. Squadron 1.
- (b) Nantucket patrol. Capt. Twining. Squadron 2.
- (c) Chesapeake patrol. Capt. Morgan. Squadron 6.
- (d) Southern patrol. Capt. Oman. Squadron 5.
- (e) Gulf patrol. Capt. Johnston. Squadron 4.
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1. The area assigned to this force has been extended to include a portion of the Caribbean heretofore supervised by the French.

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with the title commander United States naval forces in France in which capacity I continued until January 30, 1919.

Our mission in France was—

- (1) To safeguard United States troop and store ships.
- (2) To cooperate with the French naval forces.

The general nature of the United States Navy's work in France is shown in a memorandum dated August 29, 1918, prepared for the House Naval Committee upon the occasion of their visit to Brest, which is as follows:

I took this memorandum because I recognized it as partly an official paper, which I had already presented before the committee.

Memorandum:

For: Chairman House Naval Committee.

Subject: United States Naval forces in France.

MISSION.

Our mission is (a) to get American troops and supplies for these troops safely to France, protecting them from mine and torpedo; (b) to turn the transports and store ships around as quickly as possible, and to escort them through the submarine zone on their return trip; (c) to cooperate with the French in the antisubmarine war.

We have taken as our most important duty that of assuring that American troops entrusted to the care of the Navy shall be landed in France safely.

The success of the United States Navy in this war will be measured by the success with which it fulfills this trust.

FORCES.

The first vessels of the United States Navy arrived in France on July 4, 1917, and consisted of eight yachts. Since then the force has progressively increased, and now have 28 destroyers, 5 torpedo boats, 15 yachts, 9 mine sweepers, 3 repair ships, plus a considerable number of United States naval vessels carrying coal for the Army between Cardiff and ports on the west coast of France, 5 tugs and 2 steam lighters.

There are 736 officers and 7,970 men attached to these forces, exclusive of aviation.

ORGANIZATION.

For the purposes of administration, the coast of France is divided into districts corresponding with the French naval districts, with headquarters at Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort; there being a United States naval officer with rank of captain or rear admiral in command of each district. He is charged with the maintenance of such vessels as may be based in his district and with the safeguarding of shipping in coastal waters. He will direct the operation of the air stations in his district.

At Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort naval bases have been established with facilities for repairing, supplying, and refueling our vessels and for maintaining personnel. All of the vessels of the force are based at Brest, with the exception of nine mine sweepers which are based at Lorient, and five yachts and a tug at Rochefort. The mine sweepers have been very successful in safeguarding shipping in the approach to St. Nazaire and the yachts in the Rochefort district escort convoys in and out of the Gironde River through the submarine zone.

The actual operation of the vessels performing escort duty is controlled from the Flag Office in Brest.

COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH.

There has developed splendid cooperation between the American and French navies. The French have shown every disposition to assist us to the extent of their ability, and there is no disposition on their part to hamper our work in any way. They have permitted us to take complete charge of the handling of the American troopships convoys and of most of the storeship convoys.

Ten of our smaller yachts and the five torpedo boats operate under the French in coastal convoy escort. This protects convoys running daily along the coast North and South, including a large number of vessels in the coal trade between Cardiff and French ports.

I would like to inject there that that large number of vessels in the trade between Cardiff and the French ports refers largely to the vessels supplying our Army. It took a great quantity of coal.

There are eight groups of escort vessels handling this convoy, of which we furnish six and the French five. In appendix (a) it will be noted that of the organized convoys this has been the most successful as regards protection from submarines.

I have not the appendix available now to insert here.

The facilities of the French navy yards are at our disposal but, unfortunately, these facilities are inadequate even for the French Navy after four years of war. This is because, in 1914, the workmen from the arsenals were sent to the front, and the arsenals themselves were largely converted into munition plants. As a result, they lack mechanics, and their machine tools are worked out. We found it necessary, therefore, to provide our own facilities for repair and maintenance of our vessels.

COMMUNICATIONS.

A communication system of American telegraph and telephone lines is about completed, by means of which all our bases, port officers, and air stations are tied together. These lines have been built for us by the United States Army Signal Corps. All the changes in this system are manned by American personnel.

By means of radio we are in constant touch with conditions afloat and with our vessels. In the flag headquarters at Brest and in each district headquarters a constant radio watch is kept, which gives us complete and instant information of all calls from vessels in the areas in which we operated.

By means of distant control apparatus we operate the French high power radio stations under an arrangement by which the air is cleared for our purposes on demand. As a result, the time of getting messages through to our ships at sea has been reduced from one hour to two minutes.

The development of our telegraph communication has included a direct wire to London, by means of a cable laid across the English Channel by the Army, and a cable across the mouth of the Gironde River laid by the Navy to permit communication with London, at which place our westbound convoys from the Gironde are assembled.

PORT FACILITIES.

We found, upon arrival, that there was no fuel oil storage on the west coast of France except at Brest, where there was a capacity of only 7,000 tons. In order to provide for our oil-burning destroyers and for the oil-burning troop and store ships, we have increased the tankage at Brest to 28,000 tons, and will, within a few months, have 10,000 tons tankage each at Lorient, La Pallice, and Furt (in the Gironde). A further extension of the oil storage at Brest to a total of 50,000 tons is planned. All of these tanks have been erected by enlisted men of the Navy from material sent from the United States.

The French have turned over to us storehouses at Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, in which are maintained stocks of supplies for our vessels. At Brest we have at the present moment a supply of provisions for 7,000 men for four months. We have increased the cold storage at Brest from 350 tons to a capacity of 750 tons.

In the beginning, the operations of our vessels were handicapped by lack of fresh water in nearly all of the French ports. This condition has been corrected at practically all the ports, either by the United States Army or United States Navy by the construction of water works. At Brest, for example, the Navy, by means of a pipeline 4½ miles long to Trinite Valley, has tapped an ample supply which will be available by September 15 and the United States Army have established a water supply from the head of the Penfeld River to the Port du Commerce.

United States naval hospitals have been established at Brest and Lorient, and an emergency hospital is to be constructed at Bassens near Bordeaux. At Pauillac, a hospital has been fitted out by the Red Cross and turned over to the Navy. The hospital at Brest is a 250-bed unit which has, however, accommodated 600 men. It is a building formerly occupied by a Carmelite monastery. The hospital at Lorient, recently completed, has 50 beds.

During the recent advances of American troops at the front, operating teams from the hospital at Brest have been sent to assist the Army at the front, where they have done splendid work.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE.

There are appended charts showing the improvement in the submarine case as between the month of July, 1917, and the corresponding month of this year. It will be noted that there has been a marked reduction in sinkings in all areas where American vessels have been operating; that is, west of Ireland, west of France, in the Mediterranean. This is due in large part to the protection that is now given to convoys. There are, however, two significant conditions. Enemy submarines are being destroyed more rapidly than they are being constructed, and shipping is being launched at a greater rate than it is being destroyed. (The charts are available.)

There is no doubt but that the submarine situation no longer can affect the outcome of the war, and there is no doubt but that the answer to the submarine problem is found in the depth charge. It is only within the present year that depth charges have been used extensively. Hitherto, our destroyers carried but few of them, and they were used sparingly. Now, whenever there is an indication of the presence of a submarine, a barrage of from 20 to 40 depth charges is laid, and the tactics of the depth charge barrage have been worked out so successfully that a destroyer which sights a submarine within a distance of a mile has a fair chance of either destroying or disabling the submarine.

SHIPPING.

The troop and cargo movements into French ports during the present year are shown in the following table:

| Month. | Cargo. |
|---------------|---------|
| 1918. | |
| January..... | 240,000 |
| February..... | 280,000 |
| March..... | 298,000 |
| April..... | 307,000 |
| May..... | 457,197 |
| June..... | 884,471 |
| July..... | 971,800 |

During the month of July, 1918, the distribution of this work between the ports

gangs of stevedores, and it has been considered unnecessary that the Navy duplicate their organization. In this connection it should be mentioned that close cooperation exists between the Army and Navy. Once a vessel is discharged from the Army, it is turned over to the Navy, and we endeavor to get her safely through the sea on her westbound voyage with a minimum loss of time.

It is frequently the case that transports are taken to sea again on the day following, or on the second day following their arrival. The *Leviathan* is a case in point. This vessel was, on her first few voyages, routed to Liverpool; it being considered that she could not be handled in any port in France. Due to her great draft it was necessary that she arrive and sail within a period of five days at the time of the lunar tides, which occur once a month. Missing this date it was necessary for her to remain for the next full moon with the corresponding tides. Her value as a troop transport was greatly reduced by this loss of time in port. She now comes to France, lands between ten and eleven thousand troops with their equipment, takes 4,500 tons of coal, 2,000 tons of water, and sails again the second or third day after her arrival.

It requires constant supervision to assure that vessels lose no time in port. A loss of a few hours may cause a vessel to miss a convoy, and thereby lose days before the next convoy. Due to the urgent demand for shipping, it has been necessary in many cases to send vessels to France with machinery in bad condition and with inexperienced personnel. There has been in the case of cargo ships a great amount of repair work necessary to prepare these vessels for their return trip across the Atlantic. This is accomplished by United States Navy repair ships and repair bases which do work on all American ships, regardless of classification, whether they be Shipping Board ships, chartered Army transports, or Navy vessels. Inasmuch as the United States Army and United States Navy have acquired control of practically all port facilities for repairing, ballasting, fueling, and supplying shipping, it has been necessary for us in the interest of the common good to take charge of all American shipping in these respects.

United States naval port officers have been established at practically all the ports reached by American vessels, namely, Cherbourg, La Pallice, Royan, Pauillac, Bordeaux, St. Jean de Luz, and Marseilles. It is our endeavor as soon as an American vessel first drops anchor in French waters to have her boarded by a United States naval officer who gives the master all the necessary information as to his future movements, charts, hydrographic notices, and necessary assistance as regards repairs, care of sick, fuel, and supplies. The port officer has the ship under constant supervision throughout the time she remains in port, and is charged with the responsibility of getting the ship out of port at the earliest possible moment. Inasmuch as the charter of a vessel may cost \$4,000 a day, it is evident that an efficient port officer will save the Government his year's pay several times a month.

SALVAGE.

One of the lessons of the war has been that many vessels, though seriously damaged by mine, torpedo, or collision, may be brought to port if prompt and proper effort is made toward their salvage. For this purpose, two American tugs are maintained at Brest on two hour's notice, ready to proceed to the assistance of ships in distress, and British tugs are similarly sent out from the Scilly Islands, as well as French tugs from Brest and Lorient.

The wrecking steamer U. S. S. *Favorite*, with a complement of skilled wreckers, is maintained at Brest for salvage work. There are now at Brest under repair two vessels, the salvage of which was very creditably performed. The *Westward Ho*, torpedoed 315 miles from port, was abandoned by her crew and in an apparently sinking condition. Men from the U. S. S. *Noma* and U. S. S. *May* boarded her, raised steam in her boilers, started her pumps, and backed her into port, assisted by tugs; her fore-castle nearly awash.

That ship had on board one of the most valuable cargoes that came to France. It was just at the time of the drive, and she was loaded in part with Lewis machine guns; and we saved every bit of the cargo of that ship except a little in the fore hold, and the repairs were made by the Navy and we sent her to sea.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the language of your report that you made to Congress?

Admiral WILSON. That is the language of the report I gave to the naval committee. Of course, I have a great deal more information, but this was a part of this report which was dated August 29, 1918. [Continuing reading:]

The *West Bridge*, struck by two torpedoes and with her well decks awash, was towed a distance of 400 miles into Brest by two American, two British, and one French tug. When she reached port there remained about 1 per cent of her original buoyancy.

WORK OF THE VESSELS OF THE FORCE.

Too much credit can not be given the officers and men of this force for their efficient and efficient performance of difficult and dangerous duty, under conditions which have frequently been most trying. They have their equals in no other Navy to lack of a sufficient number of destroyers for the work in hand, it has been necessary to drive these vessels to a much greater extent than we had believed possible when they are at sea two-third of the time.

The following table shows the distances steamed during the past two months by the vessels from which records are available:

| Destroyers. | Miles steamed. | |
|-----------------|----------------|-------|
| | June. | July. |
| Conner..... | 5,902 | |
| Cushing..... | 6,043 | |
| Drayton..... | 4,750 | |
| Ericsson..... | 6,468 | |
| Fanning..... | 6,232 | |
| Flusser..... | 4,457 | |
| Lamson..... | 5,220 | |
| Little..... | 5,698 | |
| Monaghan..... | 800 | |
| McDougal..... | | |
| Nicholson..... | 6,853 | |
| O'Brien..... | 5,206 | |
| Preston..... | 5,102 | |
| Reid..... | | |
| Roe..... | 5,200 | |
| Sigourney..... | 7,118 | |
| Tucker..... | 5,474 | |
| Wadsworth..... | 5,617 | |
| Wainwright..... | 5,198 | |
| Warrington..... | 5,804 | |
| Winslow..... | 6,398 | |

In the storms of winter they frequently have returned to port with masts and rigging gone, but with the officers and crew cheerful and asking to go out again after a short sleep.

The vessels engaged in coastal convoy escort have handled their convoy, frequently contain from 20 to 30 ships, through the dangerous coastal channels, frequent fogs and treacherous currents, with remarkably small losses.

AVIATION.

United States naval aviation stations have been constructed by naval personnel at various points on the coast of France as follows:

| Name of station. | Number of planes. | Number of officers. | Number of men. |
|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| <i>Seaplanes.</i> | | | |
| Dunkerque..... | 32 | 40 | |
| Treguier..... | 18 | 34 | |
| L'Aber Vrach..... | 24 | 34 | |
| Brest..... | 24 | 58 | |
| Ile Tudy..... | 24 | 34 | |
| Le Croisic..... | 24 | 34 | |
| Fromentine..... | 24 | 58 | |
| St. Trojan..... | 24 | 34 | |
| Arcachon..... | 24 | 58 | |
| <i>Dirigibles.</i> | | | |
| Guipavas..... | 2 | 16 | |
| Palmboeuf..... | 6 | 16 | |
| Rochefort..... | 2 | 16 | |
| Gujan..... | 2 | 16 | |
| <i>Kite balloons.</i> | | | |
| La Trinite..... | 6 | 14 | |
| Brest..... | 6 | 14 | |
| La Pallice..... | 6 | 14 | |

operation of these stations is the protection of ships on the coast of France within range of action, and their locations have been chosen with particular reference to the approaches to the important ports.

These stations are now practically completed, some of them are actually operating, and planes are arriving in large numbers.

In addition to these a station for training aviators is maintained in Moutchic and a flying and repair base has been established at Pauillac.

H. B. WILSON.

ROUTING AND ESCORTING CONVOYS THROUGH WAR ZONE.

The continuing the escort for United States troopship convoys was provided by the fleet on Queenstown. As the number of destroyers assigned to our forces was increased we gradually took over the escort of these convoys. The number of troops handled under the different conditions is shown in the following

United States troops transported direct to west coast of France.

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| From Nov. 1, 1917 (the date I took command)..... | 47,931 |
| From Dec. 1, 1918 (of the latter number)..... | 1,004,826 |
| For which forces furnished escort through submarine zone, assisted by pilot waters by naval forces in France, for..... | 175,211 |
| For which forces, assisted by naval forces in France, furnished escort through submarine zone and further assisted through pilot waters for.... | 122,914 |
| For which forces in France furnished escort through submarine zone and assisted through pilot waters for..... | 667,932 |

These forces in France in addition routed and escorted through the dangerous and danger part of the storeships coming to the west coast of France with supplies.

In the case of convoys escorted by the naval forces in France, the routing was effected in the following manner:

From the London office we received information as to the time that convoys were to pass through certain positions well to the westward of the zone of normal submarine activity. After the receipt of this information all routing and protecting, and the preparation and issuing of operation orders to insure destroyers meeting the convoys on the high seas to escort them clear of all other convoys, were left entirely and entirely by the forces under my command.

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CONCLUSIONS

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(3) That from the moment war was declared the entire Navy—the department as well as the fleet—entered into the prosecution of the war with the greatest energy, and its accomplishments deserve the commendation of the Nation.

(4) As soon after the declaration of war as practicable—in fact within four days—we were in conference with the accredited representatives of the British and French Admiralties, and as soon as we learned from the naval representatives of our associates the manner in which we could best cooperate, immediate and efficient steps were taken to send our available ships overseas.

(5) A great part of our Army was safely transported 3,000 miles across the sea by the Navy, and no soldier or passenger embarked on a Navy transport during the war was lost through the efforts of the enemy.

(6) Naturally “hindsight” may discover many things that might have been done better, but when we consider that the Navy expanded six times its former size in ships and eight times in officers and men; when it accomplished so many big things that seemed almost impossible; when we consider what it did do; the things it did not do the mistakes it made are so relatively unimportant that they are hardly worth considering in comparison. Results are what count.

(7) That our naval forces from the start cooperated in a most successful manner with the naval forces of our associates in many portions of the seas; and by their splendid and efficient work materially aided in shortening the war and in this manner saving untold life and property.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all of your statement, is it?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you say in your statement that you have no hesitation in saying that no nation on the approach of war has had a force of battleships more nearly prepared for battle than the battle fleet to which you were attached.

Admiral WILSON. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that do you mean that the fleet as a battle fleet was more nearly prepared?

Admiral WILSON. No; I referred to the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. You referred to the battleships as having been prepared?

Admiral WILSON. Having been the captain of a battleship, that is what I know about, and all I can speak of is what I know.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are also in a position to speak about the organization of the fleet, and whether as a fleet it was prepared or not.

Admiral WILSON. What we had given to us was in good condition.

The CHAIRMAN. And that consisted of what?

Admiral WILSON. Battleships and destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there an adequate number of destroyers to make up a well-prepared battle fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Not from our present knowledge. We thought we had quite a number at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think you had sufficient at the time?

Admiral WILSON. Never; never had sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the personnel of the battleships and of the destroyers sufficient?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and excellent.

The CHAIRMAN. And well trained?

Admiral WILSON. Splendid.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other ships attached to the fleet, such as would ordinarily be attached to a battle fleet? I refer to light cruisers and antisubmarine vessels and scouting vessels of all types?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; because we did not have them in the service.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring now to force No. 2?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was our main defense?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And which was naturally in better condition than any other force would be.

Admiral WILSON. That is the only force I know about, and I can say that was in excellent condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about Force No. 1?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From what you have heard about it, was that in good fighting condition?

Admiral WILSON. I can not remember what I heard, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no recollection of hearing anything about that?

Admiral WILSON. Well, I suppose I did, but I did not pay much attention to it. My time was taken up on my own ship. The captain of a battleship does not have much time to give to other things, if he attends to his work properly.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you assigned to the command of the patrol force of this country?

Admiral WILSON. I was detached from the *Pennsylvania* on the 8th of March, and immediately took up the duty of preparing the force. That was the 28th of March, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The boats that were given you, they were taken from the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Most of the ships that were given to me had been under the command of Admiral Mayo, the commander in chief of the fleet. One was on a foreign station, one cruiser, I remember that was assigned to me was doing duty at the time in the Mediterranean. A large number of the destroyers came from the fleet. The coast guard vessels came from the Coast Guard. That is all I want to say.

The CHAIRMAN. After the destroyers were taken from the fleet, it left the fleet with very little screening protection, I presume.

Admiral WILSON. The number of destroyers asked for by Admiral Mayo remained in the fleet. I do not remember the number.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the fleet, after these forces of yours had been taken away from it, was in condition in case the German fleet should break through and should come over in an effective condition—would you say that the battle fleet was in condition to meet them?

Admiral WILSON. We did not worry about the German fleet coming over.

The CHAIRMAN. I know——

Admiral WILSON. We were thinking about submarines coming over.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but I want to know whether the fleet was, in your judgment, sufficient to meet a German fleet that was thoroughly equipped?

Admiral WILSON. I guarantee that after the German fleet came across 3,000 miles and appeared on our coast, we would have given them a good drubbing.

The CHAIRMAN. But I want to know whether, according to the rules of naval warfare, the fleet was in a condition to meet the German fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Theoretically; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was not in the condition that the English fleet was in when it met the Germans at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. The English fleet was in better condition when it met the Germans at the battle of Jutland than it was in when war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think our fleet, when war was declared in April, 1917, was in as good condition as the English fleet in August, 1917?

Admiral WILSON. What we had was.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; what we had.

Admiral WILSON. I have no comment to make on anything we did not have, because that is not my job.

The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that the whole world had been at war for nearly three years, and there was a probability of our being dragged into the war; in spite of that fact you would not say that we were as adequately prepared in April, 1917, as the English fleet was when they met the Germans in the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. You know we were not able to prepare anything to speak of, because a few months before we entered the war the majority of our people voted on the question that they approved that we had not gone to war, and we could not take any steps looking to war under such circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that that was the verdict of the people in the November election?

Admiral WILSON. I take it, from my reading, and as a citizen, that it was. I am not speaking as a naval officer; I am speaking as a citizen in regard to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the Navy Department——

Admiral WILSON. I do not know the Navy Department, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that officers of the Navy, I will say, thought that we were not going into the war?

Admiral WILSON. I personally thought we would surely get into the war; but I saw, at the same time, that a great many of our people, and the majority of them, had spoken in November, and it was doubtful when that time would arrive, if ever.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you think, after the German ambassador was given his passports, that there was any doubt about our going into the war?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, the night that the German ambassador was given his passports our fleet was on that night and from that night, on a war basis.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by on a war basis?

Admiral WILSON. We acted just the same as if we had been at war.

The CHAIRMAN. You did everything you could to speed up preparedness?

Admiral WILSON. Ah! No, we were prepared at that time. All the ships that were with us were prepared for war.

The CHAIRMAN. The individual ships?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, these ships that you took over when you were put in charge of the patrol in American waters, were they all in good condition and adequately prepared for war?

Admiral WILSON. They were serviceable for war, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they in as good condition as you would expect them to be in in ordinary times?

Admiral WILSON. Taking into consideration their age, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they as well manned, as to personnel?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Trained personnel?

Admiral WILSON. They were efficient.

The CHAIRMAN. They were efficient.

Admiral WILSON. And did their job, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about their doing their job. What was their job?

Admiral WILSON. I read you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but briefly, their job was to guard against submarines on the coast?

Admiral WILSON. And patrol areas to protect commerce, and to be prepared to meet the enemy's submarines and destroy them.

The CHAIRMAN. And while you were on this side did any submarines come over to this side?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; and that is the reason we went to the other side. The force was organized with that idea. I will say that the force was so organized that if submarines did not come to our coast it could be moved to the war zone.

The CHAIRMAN. And the plan of patrolling our coast was given out later?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those vessels went abroad?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; the decision to send them having been rendered five days after we went to war.

The CHAIRMAN. Five days after the 6th of April?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; on the 11th of April, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The decision was made then to send them abroad?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when were they sent abroad?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when were the first ones sent abroad?

Admiral WILSON. The order was given at once—the order was given the next day to send the first division abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. The first division consists of destroyers?

Admiral WILSON. I think there were six.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did they sail, do you know?

Admiral WILSON. They sailed as soon as prepared, after they received their orders to prepare to sail.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the force was in a good state of preparation?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, Mr. Senator, you can not take a ship that is going 3,000 miles across the ocean, like a destroyer, and start her off like a railroad train, just like that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was necessary to be done to prepare her?

Admiral WILSON. You have got to clean her bottom; you have got to overhaul certain little conditions and things about her ma-

chinery; you have got to fuel her and fill her with stores, and such things. Those ships that were going over had to go in as good condition as possible; as good as we could make them on this side. It is no easy trip for a destroyer to make a 3,000-mile cruise across the ocean and to come onto the other side prepared for work, as they did. It showed in the end the advantage of it, because when they arrived they were ready for business.

The CHAIRMAN. Could not that all have been done between the 2d of February and the 1st of April?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; you can not clean a ship's bottom on the 2d of February and sail on the 1st of June.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not clean a ship's bottom on the 2d of February and sail on the 1st of June?

Admiral WILSON. You can not clean the bottom of a ship on the 2d of February and have her in the best condition to sail on the 1st of June.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but you stated, did you not, that these vessels were sent over very soon after the 11th of April, and that they needed to have their bottoms cleaned?

Admiral WILSON. They what?

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that they were sent over very soon after the 11th of April, and that they needed to have their bottoms cleaned.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, if you were acquainted with the details of the requirements of a ship——

The CHAIRMAN. I am just taking your own testimony, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. If you were acquainted with the details of a ship, you would recollect that when you start out on a cruise you put them in as good condition for that cruise as possible by doing such things as cleaning the bottom, filling them with stores, looking over odds and ends of machinery, and otherwise putting them in spick and span order, so that they will stand the wear and tear of the trip. I will say that the ships were in good condition, except for finishing touches, and you always put finishing touches on before you start.

The CHAIRMAN. You filled them with stores when you started out?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you clean the bottoms?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You got orders on the 11th of April?

Admiral WILSON. On the 11th of April.

The CHAIRMAN. And they started when, within a month from that time?

Admiral WILSON. I do not know when they started, but very shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. Very shortly after that?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You cleaned their bottoms in that short time?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. That does not take long.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you say if you had started to clean their bottoms on the 2d of February, they would not have been ready on the 1st of June?

Admiral WILSON. I say if you cleaned a ship's bottom on the 2d of February and you wanted to start on the 1st of June, you would

have to do it all over again, and you could not start because you would have to do it all over again on the 1st of June.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not your testimony. I understand you now.

Admiral WILSON. That was my intention.

The CHAIRMAN. How often do you have to clean the ship's bottom?

Admiral WILSON. We try to do it, for the protection of the material, not less than once in nine months. We try to do it once in six months. The cost of cleaning the ship's bottom is more than paid for by the fuel saved. The saving in the expenditure of fuel more than pays for the frequent cleaning of the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if these ships had been cleaned on the 2nd of February, or in March, they would have been in good condition to go over until August or September?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; they could have gone at once. They would not have had to have anything done when we arrived on the other side. They would have taken only time to fix up, then. Mr. Senator, I can assure you as a naval officer who was in close communication and conference with all that was going on, that there was no time lost in cooperating with the forces on the other side, when we learned that that was something that would be advantageous to the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. But the testimony of other witnesses——

Admiral WILSON. I can not help what other witnesses have testified. I know what I am saying, sir, and I also say this, that when the information was presented to the Navy Department by the accredited representatives of the two principal admiralities of the world there was no urgency stated, no dire need was stated. I remember the officer himself saying "If you only could send, to show the flag;" and at that time, within two hours of the time, it was stated what we would do, and the Secretary of the Navy said "We accept that in principle," and immediately, at the next conference, the order was issued, what we should send; the order was given in detail; and from that moment there was a regular procession going over. Now, it was not anybody on the other side that put the tip here that that was what was wanted. The tip was here in Washington long before that officer ever communicated, or in fact got onto his job.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say you were in position to know.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you knew all about the matter?

Admiral WILSON. I was at the conference in which the decision was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed when Admiral Sims made his recommendations about sending ships over?

Admiral WILSON. I know the day that Admiral Sims arrived in London.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you were informed of all of the messages that Admiral Sims sent over?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I was informed on no message of Admiral Sims; but I take it for granted that Admiral Sims did not send any message before he arrived in London and communicated with the people whom he was sent to communicate with.

The CHAIRMAN. And he did communicate with them?

Admiral WILSON. I imagine he did.

The CHAIRMAN. After he communicated with them, were you informed of his communications?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you act on them in any way?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I know nothing about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of Admiral Sims's communications?

Admiral WILSON. All I know was that the decision was made before he communicated, because he could not have communicated until after he had arrived there, and that decision was made prior to his arrival.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say that there was a meeting—a conference—in Washington between the Secretary of the Navy and a number of the flag officers of our Navy, and a British Vice Admiral representing the British Admiralty, and a French Rear Admiral representing the French Admiralty?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; that is the conference I referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that at that conference the subject under consideration was the coordination of the naval forces of the three countries?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you state that one of the representatives—I take it that is one of the foreign representatives?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Stated in the course of his remarks that we should send one destroyer over there, if nothing more, that the flag might be shown.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; I stated that. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. That was about the middle of April, 1917?

Admiral WILSON. The 11th of April, 1917, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. The 11th of April, 1917?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many tons of shipping were sunk by the submarines during that month?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the testimony has shown that there were about 800,000 tons sunk during the month of April, 1917, the greatest amount of shipping that was sunk during any one month of the war. Does it not seem to you that this representative of the British Navy, or the representative of the French Navy, whichever he was, that came over and said practically that if we sent a destroyer over for moral effect, that would be sufficient——

Admiral WILSON. He did not say that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not say that?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; he did not say if we sent one over it would be sufficient; but he said, "If nothing more, send one in order that the flag may be shown."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you stated before that they did not express any dire need for help or state that there was any urgency about it.

Admiral WILSON. That is what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it not strike you——

Admiral WILSON. I can not help what was going on on the other side. I only know what was going on at the conference.

CHAIRMAN. Does it not seem remarkable, in view of the great ships to take care of the submarine situation and the great of the submarine, that that statement should have been here?

Mr. WILSON. I do not know, sir.

CHAIRMAN. And in addition to that——

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Senator, have you any doubt in your mind the statement was made?

CHAIRMAN. No; I do not question your veracity in any way, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. But I am asking you if it was not a remarkable statement that such a statement should have been made, and if it was made to think that we should have taken that as a basis for not sending ships over, rather than a statement of our accredited agents who were over there?

Mr. WILSON. We did not take that as any statement that we should not send them. On the contrary, it was from that moment that we should send everything we could; and we did.

CHAIRMAN. Then you did not give much credit to the statement of the foreign representatives?

Mr. WILSON. We gave lots of credit to them; but it showed apparently that there was not such dire need and great urgency. I put that in my paper here is to counteract anything—saying that the department, or those who were directing affairs in the department, were derelict in their duty.

CHAIRMAN. And do you feel yourself that there was not dire need at that time?

Mr. WILSON. Oh. Hindsight we have now; that is all. We find nothing about that then. Instead of finding fault with anyone in our country on what was done on the 11th of April, they should be very thankful——

CHAIRMAN. What we are trying to do is to find out the mistakes made in the war so that those mistakes can be corrected in the future.

Mr. WILSON. You can rest assured, sir, that there was no mistake made on the 11th of April, 1917.

CHAIRMAN. We have simply your testimony for that, and it is corroborated by other witnesses.

Mr. WILSON. I was present at the conference.

CHAIRMAN. And you are giving your testimony about a general statement of general policy.

Mr. WILSON. No; I am only giving testimony about what took place on the 11th of April.

CHAIRMAN. Do you not think now that if we had sent antisubmarine vessels over at an earlier date than we did send them, it would have had a great effect?

Mr. WILSON. We could not have sent antisubmarine vessels any faster than we did, unless we had done things prior to a declaration of war, which the policy of our country did not justify the doing.

CHAIRMAN. You feel very sure of it?

Mr. WILSON. I feel sure about it. I feel very sure about it. I do not find any fault for any mistakes made by the United States.

States Navy on the breaking out of war, I feel proud, and I feel sure it was onto its job.

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody feels proud of the Navy. There is no question about that.

Admiral WILSON. I feel sure that it was onto the job at the start.

The CHAIRMAN. If we can find mistakes that have been made and can find ways of preventing those mistakes in the future, is it not a good thing for the country and for the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely; but you do not need to worry, there is no need for any citizen of our country to worry; and to those questions are being studied and those mistakes are being studied by the brightest minds in our Navy, and the lessons will be learned from them. It does not need anybody who wants to make a little stir to come down and bring things to a focus. It will all be done in a calm, quiet way, by the brightest minds we have got in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. The Congress of the United States has a perfect right to go into these questions and get all the information, and it will and will do so.

Admiral WILSON. I am not questioning that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There must be no question about that.

Admiral WILSON. I am not here for any pleasure of my own.

The CHAIRMAN. You are here because you were summoned by the committee.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and it is my duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely.

Admiral WILSON. My conscience is absolutely clear in everything that the Navy has done and what I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you assumed command of the patrol forces on the United States coast did you receive from the department any policy or any general plan of operations?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To govern the conduct of your forces during the war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. I have laid before you the two orders—campaign orders which covered our whole mission and plan and everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider those general plans or special war plans?

Admiral WILSON. Why, Mr. Senator, there could not have been any more plans than what we drew up and what we made and what had already been prepared when I got into the Navy Department and take up my duties; and these were the result, all made out, ready and the day war was declared I went to the job, and as soon as the printing machine could print them they were printed in numbers and sent out to the individual ships, and they got on their way.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the plan of patrolling our coast?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; that is, what I speak of as the plan to meet the enemy on our coast was planned well ahead and organized and handled accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a comprehensive war plan, so far as you know, to cover the whole field of operations?

Admiral WILSON. I know nothing about that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were never shown any such plan?

Admiral WILSON. I have never been attached to the organization that had charge of such work.

The CHAIRMAN. Your force was organized before war was declared, or immediately afterwards?

Admiral WILSON. It was organized, sub rosa, before war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. And what time before the war was declared?

Admiral WILSON. As soon as I could get there. We arrived in port from the West Indies, I think, on the late afternoon of the 27th. My orders came by wire on the 28th. I immediately made an order and nominated the commanders of the different squadrons, organized our forces; each one of the commanders went back to his station ready for the call. I arrived in Washington, and the moment war was declared off I went. Orders went to these commanding officers as soon as the printing press could print the orders, and out they went, and in a short time the number of ships I mentioned were on stations. I think it is a remarkably good piece of work, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. After you went abroad were you in sufficiently intimate touch with the relations between Admiral Sims and the department to give first-hand information——

Admiral WILSON. Not a word do I know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. About his testimony?

Admiral WILSON. Not a word do I know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. And his relations with the department?

Admiral WILSON. Not a word?

The CHAIRMAN. Not a word?

Admiral WILSON. My time was fully occupied in other ways.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your orders when you were sent abroad? To whom were you to report?

Admiral WILSON. I was ordered to report upon my arrival to Vice Admiral Sims in London, which I did by wire.

The CHAIRMAN. And were you under his authority when you went over there?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; from the time I arrived until I left I was under his command.

The CHAIRMAN. Under his command?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that at Brest you had coaling capacity of 750 to 900 tons, I think.

Admiral WILSON. Tankage for 7,000 tons of oil.

The CHAIRMAN. You also referred to coaling capacity.

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I never touched upon that.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you increased the coal storage at Brest from 350 to a capacity of 750 tons?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, we never had any trouble with coal, sir. The reason that the amount on hand was no larger was due to the small space in the French arsenal, but the Navy had no trouble about supplying vessels with coal.

The CHAIRMAN. How could the *Leriatan* take on 13,000 tons of coal there?

Admiral WILSON. She never took on 13,000 tons. She took on 4,500 tons of coal, sir. This coal that I speak of there, that 350 to 750 tons of coal, was our own coal. When we needed more we had the unlimited capacity of the French. I imagine that most of

that 4,500 tons of coal sometimes might have come out of their coal pile, and then we would just chalk it up, and next time take it out of ours.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically you had no coal supplies?

Admiral WILSON. What?

The CHAIRMAN. Practically you had no coal storage?

Admiral WILSON. The allied corps had coal storage.

The CHAIRMAN. There simply seemed to be a discrepancy in the testimony that I wanted to straighten out.

Admiral WILSON. You understand that now; that is only our own little pile of coal there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When did you receive orders to proceed to Gibraltar, Admiral?

Admiral WILSON. I left, sir, on the 8th of August, 1917, on the U. S. S. *Birmingham*, and if I remember correctly I arrived at Gibraltar on the 18th of August, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. What plans were given you to follow after you got to Gibraltar?

Admiral WILSON. The plans consisted of directing me to report to Admiral Sims. He then furnished me with a mission and a campaign order which directed me to cooperate with the senior allied commander, who was a British rear admiral, which I did; and thus our work was performed.

The CHAIRMAN. A British admiral was in command of the allied forces?

Admiral WILSON. He was senior to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And you kept up your independence as an American organization—as an American unit, there?

Admiral WILSON. In everything else except operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. And of course the admiral consulted me frequently, even with regard to the operations. But—well, I will not say what I was going to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the arrangement satisfactory?

Admiral WILSON. Officially; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Officially?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you do not think it is necessary to go into any personal matters?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I would not want to say what I would have to say, and have it taken down on paper.

The CHAIRMAN. What reports did you make concerning the situation at Gibraltar to this commander of the forces?

Admiral WILSON. What is that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. What report did you make?

Admiral WILSON. I made weekly reports to the force commander in London.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, objecting to the way things were going?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, there was nothing to object to, sir. You misunderstand me. There was nothing to object to. As I have said in my statement, when we left, the British rear admiral, the senior allied commander, spoke most highly of the work of the forces that had been under my command, when I left.

The CHAIRMAN. The British had a larger force there?

Admiral WILSON. I doubt it, sir. I know that when we arrived we certainly were welcome, especially when the four old-type torpedo boats came around from China, boats that we thought were played out years and years ago. They were very welcome when they arrived here. Anything that could make any headway at all and drop a depth charge was of value in the war. Some vessels were of more value than others.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know which country had a majority of the naval forces?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. It did not make any difference. They all worked together.

The CHAIRMAN. And the system that was adopted was as good as it could have been, or do you think it would have been better to have acted under a separate operational command?

Admiral WILSON. It would have been impracticable to have had any other organization in Gibraltar.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never considered that your vessels became an integral part of the British Navy in any way?

Admiral WILSON. Not in Gibraltar; no, sir; although you understand, Mr. Senator, that the vessels that I commanded were operated by the senior allied commander. Just the same——

The CHAIRMAN. But that was the general course with the allied fleets?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if we had had a senior commander he would have been the operating head?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. When you get to France, when you get to the next duty of mine, I will go into that further with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Who assigned you to duty on the French coast?

Admiral WILSON. My orders came from the force commander in London.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; to whom I reported in Paris, and then went afterwards to London to study the situation from that end, and then to Brest; arriving on the 1st of November, 1917, when I took command.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your relation to the French admiral commanding there?

Admiral WILSON. Splendid.

The CHAIRMAN. You were under him in operations?

Admiral WILSON. He was the senior allied commander; and I invite your attention, Mr. Senator, to page 26 of my statement here, and to this statement therein. [Reading:]

The force is organized and operated as a distinct American unit. From the date I assumed command, November 1, 1917, to the end of the war, the United States Navy in France, while it completely and in the most friendly way cooperated with the French Navy, was, by full agreement with the senior allied naval commander, organized, operated, and handled as a distinct American naval force under the direct and immediate command of an American rear admiral.

This situation was quite different in Brest, because the American effort consisted in bringing troop ships east and sending empty troop ships west, and in bringing cargo ships east and sending empty cargo ships west; so that after my arrival in France I took that up with the French naval officer corresponding to me, Vice Admiral

Sereur, and we came to an agreement which was drawn up—that, of course, all under the senior allied commander, technically—that I should handle all east and west bound American ships, both troop and cargo.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you should provide cargoes for them?

Admiral WILSON. I should handle them, sir—do the work.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell me what the work was?

Admiral WILSON. The work consisted in doing everything in bringing them into the zone and taking them out again. I always furnished the senior allied commander, Vice Admiral Moreau, a copy of the orders, as a matter of courtesy; and of course, any time at all he could have stepped in and stopped or changed my plans, but it was never done. I never could imagine any more cordial or friendly relations than there were the whole time I was in France between the French Navy and our Navy. It in every way cooperated, and always to the best interests of both and of the allied cause.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, these transports and supply ships that came over were started from this side; and who had charge of the starting of them? Admiral Gleaves, was it not?

Admiral WILSON. I do not know, sir. I imagine Admiral Gleaves had charge of the transport force. Whether he had anything to do with the cargo vessels I do not know. I think that when Capt. Pratt comes before you he will be able to give you all that information.

The CHAIRMAN. You yourself had cargo vessels as well as transports?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; but I only got them when they got a little westward of the submarine zone, what was called the destroyer rendezvous.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. These vessels were sent over there, were they coaled for the round trip in this country?

Admiral WILSON. In some cases. In other cases they neglected to do it on this side, probably in the hurry, and we often had to furnish coal and oil from Brest for cargo ships, and some of them could not carry sufficient to make the round trip, and we had to supply those.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they provisioned for the round trip when they started?

Admiral WILSON. Often we gave them provisions, too.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you were notified from America when they started?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; America sent the message to the London office, and it was there relayed through there to me, when there was a convoy coming to the coast of France.

The CHAIRMAN. And they told you when the convoys came so that you could be on the lookout for them?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; the message would be made up about a convoy, and the message would be sent to us, the time that the vessels would cross the standard meridian. That standard meridian I do not mind telling you now—it was kept very quiet then—was 30° west longitude. The message gave the time, date, number of ships, speed, and latitude crossing that standard meridian. That was sent to us, and after crossing the standard meridian where they should head for Ushant, the north coast of France, Bailleul, or the mouth of the Garonne, and we would know by radio communication

through the Azores Islands whether they were on schedule time or not, whether they were going to cross this meridian on time. We would make our allowance on account of bad weather, and they even had to turn around so that they would not be ahead. We had to estimate to send destroyers to meet those ships, so that they would be clear of submarines. We would send our destroyers out under Operation's orders, timing the sailing of a convoy from the coast of empty ships, in order that they might take them safely to sea, and then meet troop ships; and they always met the troops ships early in the morning, and then during the daylight they would all spread out in a scouting line and sweep down.

It is no easy job to pick up a convoy of ships on the high seas. It looks large in a river, but they are a small dot in the ocean. We picked them up and immediately took charge—that is, I can not say we took charge, because the senior officer present is always in charge, but they would notify the senior officer of the course to steer, which he would be told to take, and then they would generally make a radical change, sometimes to the southward, and sometimes not so much to the southward, and sail in under orders we would give them. All the time we were in communication with them if we wished by radio, and they were ordered not to communicate unless necessary, except to inform us that they had made contact, and then we would just say, "Contact," broadcast. If during the time we were coming in, it was necessary, we would catch a certain destroyer by radio, and tell him to take a course A or course B, an arbitrary course that we had laid out, and bring them on the coast where we had ships laid out as light ships, and bring them into harbor.

The great advantage of having our destroyers handle them was that our men knew the ports, and we could come right into port when they were handled by destroyers from their ports. They knew nothing about France, and otherwise we would have to send ships out to convoy them in. We have had as many as 3 convoys come in on one day with over 40,000 men, one convoy consisting of 13 ships, one right after the other coming through the war zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Coming in different convoys.

Admiral WILSON. Leaving at different times at home and at different speeds, coming in. I tell you, it was a relief when we would get them in. Our office never closed, night or day. It was always open from Sunday night to Sunday night, with continuous communication, continually receiving reports referring to submarines, where they were operating, and utilizing the information for diverting the convoys against submarines. There was never a question of taking anybody through a safe place. It was always just knowing where they were by information, when they would report themselves, and dodging them.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very interesting, Admiral, and it is giving the committee a good account of it.

Admiral WILSON. I could talk to you for an hour on that subject, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had entire charge of the vessels that performed convoy duty?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You said, however, that you were under the admiral in command of the forces in European waters.

Admiral WILSON. He was the force commander.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not interfere with you in any way?

Admiral WILSON. He did not operate them. He gave me instructions and held me responsible for the execution.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no friction about the execution?

Admiral WILSON. Not a particle. I just obeyed orders. My Senator, there is a Senator from Kansas who came over one time and came through the war zone, who knows about what was going on. If you are much more interested, ask him. He was very much—

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember his name. I know that he came in, and I never saw anybody more pleased, in my life, when he got in. I think he is from Kansas.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, in establishing the general organization of the forces in Europe, did Admiral Sims consult you?

Admiral WILSON. How is that?

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Admiral WILSON. Admiral Sims never consulted me on anything except to tell me what I should have, and what the mission was to carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not order you to London for a conference on the organization of the forces?

Admiral WILSON. Of the forces in France; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In France?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And not in Europe?

Admiral WILSON. In France.

The CHAIRMAN. And the organization that you agreed upon was satisfactory?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, perfectly. It had to be.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the organization you operated on?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; the organization we agreed upon was one he set down. The senior officer gives you your orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the fuel and repair facilities at Brest adequate? You have stated, I think, that they were not, in France.

Admiral WILSON. Would you like me to go into that in detail?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I do not think that it is necessary; in a general way.

Admiral WILSON. I could only explain it in detail, sir. That is one of the questions that I had been hoping you might ask me.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; if you have any information I would be glad to have it.

Admiral WILSON. I will say at the start that the facilities on the French coast of course never became adequate, but with good management we had no trouble in carrying out our work. Our chief trouble in France was a lack of forces with which to do the work, and I recommended a number of times that our forces be increased in order that we might be able to perform better work, the better work which would consist in giving more protection to troop ships, cargo ships, to turn them around more quickly; because the turn-around of a ship meant just so much more tonnage available from the United States.

In these recommendations I always held that Brest was the place which our naval forces should have been based to handle the American effort, and on that subject, since you have asked me a question, I have a little memorandum that I would like to give you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral WILSON. Of the ports in France, Brest is the one nearest the United States. In the outside harbor there is an unlimited anchorage space for large vessels. There are a number of channels leading into Brest from the Bay of Biscay, all of which could be easily closed to enemy vessels by mines. On the other hand, channels for vessels are so numerous that in case of the enemy mining some of them, there were invariably others which were open to both large and small ships.

Queenstown is about 250 miles north and west of Brest. Vessels based on Queenstown on going to sea to meet an incoming convoy had about the same distance to go until they met the convoy and left it in a French port, as did the ships based on Brest, but after leaving the convoy they had to steam some 250 miles to return to their base, and while there was always some possibility of meeting enemy submarines during this passage, as compared with the duty of escorting convoys, the time was not usefully employed. Furthermore, due to the extreme degree to which all escort vessels were worked, it was necessary to keep them usefully employed as much of the time as possible, and to give them all the remainder of the time to upkeep of material. Therefore, the time taken in going from Brest to Queenstown was time wasted.

Almost without exception, destroyers which went west from Brest to meet incoming convoys, and to escort them to the coast of France, escorted to the westward empty ships. Destroyers which left Queenstown to meet troop convoys sailed to the westward without escorting empty ships on this passage. This method, I am sure, prevailed during the war. Whether or not it prevailed during its entirety I do not know. It is obvious, however, that a ship operating by this method was performing far from a maximum amount of useful work.

It is true that development of the port facilities of Brest was necessary, and this development was carried on. As an example, there was a fuel-oil storage capacity at Brest when we arrived of about 7,000 tons. By the end of September, 1918, there was capacity for 28,000 tons. Even without this increased capacity, we were able to keep such destroyers as we had filled with fuel, and, in addition, at times supplied fuel to destroyers based on Queenstown when they arrived in Brest from escort duty short of fuel, and also many troop ships and cargo vessels.

The question of shortage of fuel oil could always have been met by bringing an additional tanker, as necessary, into Brest in one of the frequent convoys which came to that port.

In the testimony of Rear Admiral Sims on March 23, referring to United States destroyers in European waters, he stated:

* * * so that on our advice from the other side we concentrated our destroyers as far west as possible so that they would be handy to their own bases. We put them at Queenstown first because the facilities for repairs and refueling with oil were better there. Brest was better strategically, and as fast as we could increase the storage facilities there for oil we took them there, until finally we had 28,000 tons of oil there, and we sent them there and our destroyers were almost exclusively used for that purpose.

Admiral WILSON. He was the force commander.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not interfere with you in any way.

Admiral WILSON. He did not operate them. He gave me instructions and held me responsible for the execution.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no friction about the execution?

Admiral WILSON. Not a particle. I just obeyed orders. Senator, there is a Senator from Kansas who came over one time came through the war zone, who knows about what was going on. If you are much more interested, ask him. He was very much interested.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember his name. I know the one who came in, and I never saw anybody more pleased, in my life, who got in. I think he is from Kansas.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, in establishing the general organization of the forces in Europe, did Admiral Sims consult you?

Admiral WILSON. How is that?

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The CHAIRMAN. Very well; if you have any information I would be glad to have it.

Admiral WILSON. I will say at the start that the facilities on the French coast of course never became adequate, but with good management we had no trouble in carrying out our work. Our trouble in France was a lack of forces with which to do the work, and I recommended a number of times that our forces be increased in order that we might be able to perform better work, the better work which would consist in giving more protection to troop and cargo ships, to turn them around more quickly; because the time around of a ship meant just so much more tonnage available to the United States.

These recommendations I always held that Brest was the place for our naval forces should have been based to handle the effort, and on that subject, since you have asked me a question, I have a little memorandum that I would like to give you.

CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. WILSON. Of the ports in France, Brest is the one nearest the United States. In the outside harbor there is an unlimited space for large vessels. There are a number of channels leading to Brest from the Bay of Biscay, all of which could be closed to enemy vessels by mines. On the other hand, channels are so numerous that in case of the enemy mining them, there were invariably others which were open to both small ships.

Queenstown is about 250 miles north and west of Brest. Vessels from Queenstown on going to sea to meet an incoming convoy had the same distance to go until they met the convoy and returned to a French port, as did the ships based on Brest, but after meeting the convoy they had to steam some 250 miles to return to Brest and while there was always some possibility of meeting submarines during this passage, as compared with the duty of escorting convoys, the time was not usefully employed. Furthermore, to the extreme degree to which all escort vessels were kept was necessary to keep them usefully employed as much of the time as possible, and to give them all the remainder of the time of material. Therefore, the time taken in going from Queenstown was time wasted.

Without exception, destroyers which went west from Brest to meet incoming convoys, and to escort them to the coast of France, returned to the westward empty ships. Destroyers which left Brest to meet troop convoys sailed to the westward without returning empty ships on this passage. This method, I am sure, was used during the war. Whether or not it prevailed during its entire duration I do not know. It is obvious, however, that a ship operating in this method was performing far from a maximum amount of work.

It is true that development of the port facilities of Brest was necessary and this development was carried on. As an example, there was no fuel-oil storage capacity at Brest when we arrived of about 1917. By the end of September, 1918, there was capacity for 100,000 tons. Even without this increased capacity, we were able to keep our destroyers as we had filled with fuel, and, in addition, we applied fuel to destroyers based on Queenstown when they returned to Brest from escort duty short of fuel, and also many troop and cargo vessels.

The question of shortage of fuel oil could always have been met by sending an additional tanker, as necessary, into Brest in one of the convoys which came to that port.

In the testimony of Rear Admiral Sims on March 23, referring to the operations of destroyers in European waters, he stated:

So that on our advice from the other side we concentrated our destroyers as possible so that they would be handy to their own bases. We put them there first because the facilities for repairs and refueling with oil were better there. It was better strategically, and as fast as we could get them there for oil we took them there, until finally we had them there and our destroyers were almost everywhere.

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on that much oil, and we might have been worried about it. It never happened. I used to worry about it; but I learned then that this worrying business does not do much good.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the repair facilities at your disposal sufficient to take care of the repair of transports?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, we repaired ships that were badly damaged by torpedoes that you could drive a truck through the side. We repaired ships that had only 1 per cent flotation when they arrived in port. We repaired ships that had the whole bottom knocked off of them, that had the whole bottom out of them. They were brought in by our salvage vessels. I always went on the theory with regard to our force over there, that there was no limit; there was the limit, and we would do everything that was put up to us and make our best effort; and fortunately we always succeeded.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those repairs made by the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; by the American Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. And not by foreigners, at all?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. The French had turned their arsenals there practically into a munitions plant. Of course we had the benefit of their shops and everything they could do in that way, and the drydock.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do about the docking and the repairing of destroyers?

Admiral WILSON. We had several good docks in the French arsenals that we used for the purpose. All major repairs for destroyers, what we called overhaul, were made in England, as also to the Queenstown destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. They were docked in England, you say?

Admiral WILSON. The overhaul; at what we called the overhaul period—general overhaul.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any adequate docking facilities in France for that?

Admiral WILSON. As to the *Mount Vernon*, when she was torpedoed we brought her into the French dock and put her in the dock, heeled her over to the side, and repaired her and went over her bottom, in cooperation with the French.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as a general rule, they were docked in England?

Admiral WILSON. Not docked, but they were sent there for overhaul. Repairs we did ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. The docking was done in France?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the general carrying out of your duties in France, were you given the necessary initiative in the discharge of your duties by Admiral Sims?

Admiral WILSON. A free hand. I was only told to make good.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any time embarrassed by the activities of officers sent abroad by the department without your knowledge?

Admiral WILSON. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any time embarrassed by the activities of officers sent abroad by the department without your knowledge?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did not report to you?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. I often had people come in, but they never bothered me.

ne 15, and troop convoys turned over to me. The first of our convoys reached the coast of France on June 18.

The practice had been to bring regular troop convoys to France about every 10 days (escorted by Queenstown destroyers) with a fast group in between (generally handled by vessels based on Brest) but the flow of troop convoys was speeded up, and after the whole charge of such convoys had been transferred from Queenstown to Brest, five separate troop convoys, in addition to merchant convoys arriving in the same period, were met and escorted to France in safety in a period of nine days. And what is also important to note is that by this increase to our force we were able to speed up turning ships around for home—and tonnage at this time was in great demand for transporting troops and stores. Each day saved counted for much. Then again we were able to give much better protection to our convoys.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is very interesting, Admiral. Now, will you tell me about the fuel and repair facilities at Brest—whether they were adequate?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, I just read that, sir. They were never adequate, the whole time I was there, but they were sufficient with good management to do anything that the American Navy wanted to do on the coast of France.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations about increasing those?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes; I went ahead and did them. I increased them four times. The oil tanks came from the United States and were erected by the American blue jackets.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations through Admiral Sims?

Admiral Wilson. Every communication I ever made to the Navy Department went to and through Admiral Sims. I never wrote an official letter nor a personal letter all the time I was abroad to anybody connected with the Navy Department that did not go through the force commander's office, except once I wrote to Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, something about his boy, who was a lieutenant under my command.

The CHAIRMAN. What action did Admiral Sims take on your recommendations?

Admiral WILSON. He approved the recommendation, and sent it on to Washington, and in consequence we got the material to erect the tanks.

The CHAIRMAN. The department followed your recommendation?

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely, sir. I do not know of any recommendations that I ever made that were turned down, except the recommendation to try to get more ships.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the repair and fuel facilities were supplied as they were needed, were they?

Admiral WILSON. Just as fast, I guess, as they could send them to us, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there was no trouble about fuel and supplies at Brest?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we never had an adequate amount. I was worried at times. For instance, if a tanker was coming to Brest and outside of Brest she was torpedoed, we might have been counting

on that much oil, and we might have been worried about it. It never happened. I used to worry about it; but I learned then that this worrying business does not do much good.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the repair facilities at your disposal sufficient to take care of the repair of transports?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, we repaired ships that were badly damaged by torpedoes that you could drive a truck through the side. We repaired ships that had only 1 per cent flotation when they arrived in port. We repaired ships that had the whole top knocked off of them, that had the whole bottom out of them. They were brought in by our salvage vessels. I always went on the transport with regard to our force over there, that there was no limit; the money was the limit, and we would do everything that was put up to us and make our best effort; and fortunately we always succeeded.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those repairs made by the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; by the American Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. And not by foreigners, at all?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. The French had turned their arsenal there practically into a munitions plant. Of course we had the benefit of their shops and everything they could do in that way, and the drydock.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do about the docking and the repairing of destroyers?

Admiral WILSON. We had several good docks in the French arsenal that we used for the purpose. All major repairs for destroyers, what we called overhaul, were made in England, as also to the Queenstown destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. They were docked in England, you say?

Admiral WILSON. The overhaul; at what we called the overhaul period—general overhaul.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any adequate docking facilities in France for that?

Admiral WILSON. As to the *Mount Vernon*, when she was torpedoed we brought her into the French dock and put her in the dock, heeled her over to the side, and repaired her and went over her bottom, in cooperation with the French.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as a general rule, they were docked in England?

Admiral WILSON. Not docked, but they were sent there for overhaul. Repairs we did ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. The docking was done in France?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the general carrying out of your duties in France, were you given the necessary initiative in the discharge of your duties by Admiral Sims?

Admiral WILSON. A free hand. I was only told to make good.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any time embarrassed by the activities of officers sent abroad by the department without your knowledge?

Admiral WILSON. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any time embarrassed by the activities of officers sent abroad by the department without your knowledge?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did not report to you?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. I often had people come in, but they never bothered me.

The CHAIRMAN. The department did send officers over to investigate?

Admiral WILSON. Not to investigate me.

The CHAIRMAN. To investigate naval conditions, I say; who were not to report to you, did they?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember anybody except the Chief of Operations, sir. He came over there and looked around. Admiral Mayo came and looked around—my commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall any officers sent abroad under orders by the department, who were not ordered to report to you?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; nobody embarrassed me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that anybody was sent over who was not ordered to report to you?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims in his testimony referred to the tendency of the department to demand full and detailed explanation of all recommendations before approval. Were you required by the department to explain in such detail any of your recommendations?

Admiral WILSON. I was not required by the department, because I made no recommendation to the department; but I was required by Admiral Sims, to whom I made my recommendations, to do the same thing. That, I think, is general, that when you make a recommendation, if you are putting it up to a person to make a decision, you ought to give him full data. I never felt that that was anything wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulty in getting authorization to establish barracks on shore for the housing of personnel?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we did that ourselves. We took some old French barracks, with permission from the French admiral, and we took any old material we could get around the place to do that and did it ourselves. We had a fine outfit there in an old chateau.

The CHAIRMAN. You made recommendations to Admiral Sims about that?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we did not make any recommendations. We did it ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. You did that without any recommendations?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the American naval forces contributed materially, do you not, to winning the war?

Admiral WILSON. I know they did.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about that?

Admiral WILSON. No question about it; and I have had many, many prominent French people tell me the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has asked a number of questions of officers about the question of reorganizing certain plans in the Navy, and we would like to ask you a few questions in that regard.

Admiral WILSON. May I say something before you start, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. I said in my statement that I had read the summary of recommendations by Admiral Mayo on the subject of the policy of reorganization, and that I was heartily in accord with that and if I made any further answers, if I made any further replies to any of your questions, I could not go any further.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but Admiral Mayo at the request of the committee is coming back later to present a plan of reorganization.

Admiral WILSON. I would like to wait for that plan, and I would probably be just as much in accord with him in that as I am already, because Admiral Mayo is a man in whose judgment I have the greatest confidence, and if he is going to present any plan, I would like to see it before I took it upon myself to present any plan.

The CHAIRMAN. But the committee would like to get the ideas of number of officers in the Navy in order that they might have definite plans to go ahead on.

Admiral WILSON. I always felt that the answer was right there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And we have confidence enough in you, Admiral, to ask you to give us some of your ideas.

Admiral WILSON. All right, sir; go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. In the first place, do you consider that the organization of the Navy Department as at present existing is entirely satisfactory?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. May I say how I think it is wrong?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want you to give.

Admiral WILSON. I think that the Secretary of the Navy should have a naval advisor, now called the Chief of Naval Operations; that he should be the adviser to the Secretary on all matters of preparation of the Navy for war and be held responsible for the execution of the plans. I do not for one instant mean that this officer who is Chief of Naval Operations shall in any way take the place of the Secretary of the Navy. I realize that the Navy would be not properly administered if a naval officer were Secretary of the Navy. Such a person, if he were Secretary of the Navy, would naturally be a political naval officer, and I do not think he would be near as successful as Secretary of the Navy as a civilian. But the civilian who is Secretary of the Navy having selected by his own selection the naval adviser, should place responsibility upon him, and naturally give him the authority that goes with the responsibility. I do not, again, mean for one instant that this naval adviser shall in any way mix in and try to do the job of every chief of bureau. I am informed. I think correctly, that on the breaking out of the war, I think by mutual consent, the Chief of Naval Operations and the bureau got together and cooperated in a very efficient manner during the war. Now, if in war time they got together by mutual consent and cooperated for efficiency in war, I say that the law should be such that in peace times they will have the same cooperation, in order that they can be prepared for war. Now, as to details, I know no more about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the Chief of Naval Operations should have the responsibility of executing the plans. Should he have the responsibility of drawing the plans?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. He has now the authority for the preparation of plans.

The CHAIRMAN. He should have the responsibility?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; he should have the responsibility of drawing the plans and getting the Navy ready for war, and the responsibility of the execution of the plans; and the man who has responsibility for a thing should have the authority that goes with it. I do not mean for a moment that this man should take the place of the Secretary.

the Navy. I recognize that it is the salvation of the Navy to have a civilian at its head, and if the Secretary of the Navy is not satisfied with his naval adviser, he can get another naval adviser. He is not held down to that one; because this man would be his own confidential man, charged with responsibility, and the law should be made such that the work that was done during the war by cooperation will be made the practice during peace times.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in general, you do not think that a civilian Secretary who has never studied or had experience of naval warfare could be reasonably expected, without the advice of some such man who has had experience, to prepare a navy or a fleet for war?

Admiral WILSON. Are you referring to the present Secretary of the Navy, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; I am just speaking in general. In general, a civilian Secretary of the Navy needs the advice and assistance of an expert naval officer?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. To draw up plans?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. The man appointed Secretary of the Navy has not got to have any naval knowledge to be an administrator. That is what you want, an administrator, there as Secretary of the Navy; a man who handles policies, on good terms with Congress, and such things as that. I do not think it was ever expected, and I do not think any Secretary ever expected to go down and do the details and say how war should be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. Plans for military operations should be drawn, of course, by military experts?

Admiral WILSON. I think every one recognizes that, sir; even the Secretary of the Navy. The trouble with this business is that it is not the system, it is the individual, and if he gets in there and tries to make his job too big at the expense of anybody else, and not to the best interests of the service and everybody concerned, they ought to get somebody else who can keep within his limits, and keep happiness here, and not discord.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in a centralized control of responsibility and a decentralized authority over the execution of plans?

Admiral WILSON. I do not understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in a centralized control of general policy?

Admiral WILSON. I believe in a centralized control of getting ready for war and carrying on war. I do not think this man ought to be meddling with—

The CHAIRMAN. Then, after the plan is made you believe in the department having authority to carry out their particular plans?

Admiral WILSON. Exactly; not meddling with navy yards and trivial things of that sort. He ought to be on big things. He never ought to get down to the level.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you say, in general, about the preparedness of the Navy at the beginning of the war? Would you say that it was adequately prepared from stem to stern?

Admiral WILSON. Senator, I never saw it any better prepared. Of course, as Admiral Rodman told you yesterday, you could never get 100 per cent efficiency; but I have been going along from a boy until my age, now, and I think I can say with great certainty that every year I have seen better results and more preparedness.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are prepared to state that you think the Navy was prepared from stem to stern at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, well, that is just an expression.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am asking you.

Admiral WILSON. Well, now, you know even Admiral Wilson, from the position he occupied, is not in a position to answer that question, and no one officer is able to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you decline to answer the question.

Admiral WILSON. I say I am unable to answer the question, and I decline nothing. But I want to say, Mr. Senator, that the force I was attached to was in a fine condition.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not the question, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. I know it was not. I am not able to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. Yes; I would like to ask Admiral Wilson the question: You made the statement, as I got it, that the Navy was on the job from the start.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEYES. Now, would you mind telling us what time you had in mind as the time of the start?

Admiral WILSON. Well, the force I was attached to, sir, received the order and went south after Christmas. We were carrying on our evolutions and maneuvers and target practice and everything the same as we always did, and we continually have maneuvers on the war basis, and from the time that the German ambassador was given his passports the fleet was handled as if on a war basis, and when we came north the force I was attached to was in excellent condition. I went to the Navy Department and took the patrol force, and the force I had there were on their toes from the start. I went to Gibraltar, and I went to Brest, and I have been fortunate, probably, in seeing nothing but successful performances of the work assigned to different people. I knew nothing about, and know nothing about, the administration of the Navy Department at that time, if you refer to that. I was at sea.

Senator KEYES. When you referred to the Navy being on the job you had no reference to the Navy Department?

Admiral WILSON. When I say the "Navy," I mean the fighting force.

Senator KEYES. You did not refer to the Navy Department at all in making that statement, did you?

Admiral WILSON. I referred to the fleet.

Senator KEYES. That is what I wanted to find out.

Admiral WILSON. Well, I will change it and say that the fleet was on its toes from the start, or, say, in 1916, and has been so ever since, and I know about what was going on here. May I say this: You asked Admiral Rodman something about the fleet at the present time. May I read a little memorandum that I prepared when I called the admirals and captains together in conference to get their views of conditions at the present time, in order that I might have such a memorandum in case I came up here and was asked the question? It is my point of view, but it is a point of view that meets with favor by all my senior officers down below.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Rodman took the ground that information about the fleet at the present time should be given confiden-

ally, and yesterday afternoon he appeared before the full Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate and gave us a talk on that.

Admiral WILSON. Anything that I have to say here is nothing but what everybody can hear.

The CHAIRMAN. It, of course, has nothing to do with the purposes of this investigation?

Admiral WILSON. But you asked me what the condition of the fleet was to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. Now, I have another fleet, and I would like to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I said at the time it has nothing to do with that. I should be very glad to hear it if it has nothing in it that should be kept private.

Senator PITTMAN. I am perfectly sure that the admiral knows what is important, and he knows more than we do.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection. Have you any objection, Senator?

Senator BALL. I would be glad to hear it. I think it has a bearing on the future.

Admiral WILSON. It is not to be expected that following the demobilization which took place between the signing of the armistice and the 1st of January, 1920, the fleet would be in the condition it was during the war and during the period immediately preceding the war.

At the present time the material condition of the battleships is, as a whole, good. Judging by the previous high standard insisted upon in the Navy, the material condition of the battleships has somewhat deteriorated and is even, perhaps, still slowly deteriorating; but if the fleet can hold our present enlisted personnel as a nucleus around which to develop, we will soon reach our low ebb and begin to improve. To do so, however, it is essential that we hold what we now have.

When the fleet sailed for southern waters—and I would like to say that I have down there 8 dreadnaughts and something over 30 destroyers and an aviation force and submarine force—when the fleet sailed for southern waters, 10 knots was considered the maximum sustained speed which the battleships could maintain, and as a result of the two months' work subsequent to that time it mounted considerably. The oil burners can of course sustain more, but further training, development, and hardening of the newly recruited firemen is necessary before coal-burning battleships can increase this speed. This process is, however, continuously going on.

The morale of the fleet has steadily improved since leaving home. The reason that I wanted to give you this, Mr. Senator, is that we hear so much about the Navy being all shot to pieces, and everything going to pot, and everybody lying down on his job. This naval personnel that I have in the force down below do not know what it is to lie down on a job. They do not know any argument that is going on. They are only attending to their business.

The cruise has been beneficial. A schedule is being followed which will accomplish much and yet takes into consideration the large number of untrained men. This schedule is such that it is believed

that more can probably be accomplished than was originally contemplated, and that nothing planned will be left undone.

As an example of the recent development, the eight battleships held a 4½ power trial on March 4, which resulted in their averaging over 17 knots, the highest speed of about 17.8 knots being made by the *Delaware*. During this trial conditions improved continually and the speed during the last hour was the highest of the entire trial.

Many of the officers, particularly the watch officers, are young and inexperienced. The watch officers themselves are almost without exception of the classes of 1916 and subsequent.

The same is true of the men. As an example, 52 per cent of the crew of one of the battleships are less than 19 years old. These men make splendid material for ultimate development, but by reason of their age and inexperience, require more supervision and training than did the men we had prior to and during the war.

As it is essential that we retain the older men still remaining in the Navy, it is absolutely necessary that a pay bill be definitely passed in the near future in order to hold them.

The morale of the fleet is surprisingly good. The Navy will always do, and endeavor to make the best of things. The fleet has, due to an unbroken record of success and victory, throughout its entire history, come to expect that no matter what happens to the Navy—its first line of defense (and the Navy is proud of its title)—it will find a way to accomplish its mission. While the spirit and determination of the older officers and men is as firm as ever, the country must realize that they have nearly reached their limit. They feel that they are in the position so often portrayed by a paper cartoonist, "When a fellow needs a friend."

We had a big reserve of efficiency, with a fine personnel, but we have drawn heavily upon it of late.

My only object in bringing that to your attention is to counteract the statement that the morale of the Navy has gone to pieces, that the Navy is all shot to pieces, and so on. In fact, the only thing now is to increase the pay of the men. They are doing splendidly, but the married ones have their troubles. With the demand for outside for enlisted men with the experience our men have, they get three times the pay outside. You do not realize, sir, the value of these men that we are losing. Millions of dollars are involved there. Take the electric plant of the *Pennsylvania*, a \$1,000,000 plant, and because they do not increase the pay of the enlisted men on the 1st day of July she will have 14 per cent of her electric plant look out for.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you brought this matter up.

Admiral WILSON. I do not think the people realize how the morale and morale is affected by that; and at the present time we have got to the place where a fellow needs a friend.

The CHAIRMAN. With the consent of the committee, after we have heard Admiral Fletcher to-morrow, I am going to call Admiral Wilson to Washington, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation—

Admiral WILSON (interposing). Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To come before this committee and to give some information about the present personnel conditions of the Navy and the question of pay in the Navy.

Admiral WILSON. That is the one question. That is the only question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a very important matter for us to get something on.

Admiral WILSON. That is the only question that exists to-day, the pay of the men. Of course everybody wants more pay, but it is vital with us.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you fully about the importance of settling that matter.

Have you any questions, Senator Pittman?

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to ask one or two questions.

Admiral Sims has charged before this committee that the Navy Department, through unpreparedness and delay in sending to Europe the ships that were available, prolonged the war four months, thereby causing the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, 500,000 lives, and need-expenditure of \$15,000,000,000. I ask you, in your opinion, based on your experience and knowledge of this war, is that charge true?

Admiral WILSON. I do not believe this to be true. On the contrary, I believe that our naval forces from the start cooperated in a most successful manner with the naval forces of our associates in many portions of the seas, and by their splendid and efficient work materially aided in shortening the war, and in this manner saving old life and property, as stated in my conclusions.

To further show the faulty reasoning of Rear Admiral Sims, I ask attention to that part of the testimony before the committee contained in a memorandum prepared in the London office on August 1918, for the information of the House Naval Committee. At that time we had about 300 vessels of all kinds in European waters. The memorandum states in part that "of all the total craft operating against enemy submarines in British and eastern Atlantic waters, the American patrol force constitute less than 5 per cent of the total number."

If, after 16 months of effort, we had less than 5 per cent of the total forces operating against the enemy (as the Naval Committee is informed), it is not probable that during the first six months we could have aided with more than 2 per cent of the total allied forces, and I fail to see how such a small percentage of the total number of vessels operating against the enemy's submarines could have had serious influence upon the duration of the war or upon the loss of life and shipping.

The CHAIRMAN. You think, however, that it had a certain effect, do you not, Admiral?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. I say the opposite. I say, sir, that I believe that our naval forces from the start—and I say this here, fully recognizing that I am under oath, and from my experience and everything—I believe absolutely that our naval forces from the start cooperated in a most successful manner with the naval forces of our associates in many portions of the seas, and by their splendid and efficient work materially aided in shortening the war, and in this manner saving untold life and property.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, if we had been able to get ships there sooner than we did, it would have been a good thing? Whether we could have done it or not, it would have helped, would it not?

Admiral WILSON. I do not think that the Navy is ever satisfied with the word "ample." They would always like to have a little more in their sleeves.

Senator PITTMAN. It was sufficient?

Admiral WILSON. But I think we would have had no fear of any other Navy besides the British Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. That is very wise, in regard to the use of that word "ample," because we have other appropriation bills coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would have been true in April 1917, if the British Navy had not cooped up the German fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, we never gave that one thought because I knew that after that German fleet had made an attempt to get through the British fleet it would not have taken much to fix it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you depended on the English fleet as the real safeguard.

Admiral WILSON. Of course, I guess everybody did.

The CHAIRMAN. And our fleet was not prepared to meet the German fleet at that time if it had had a free exit and could have gotten over here?

Admiral WILSON. I never stopped to think about that, because I knew that was never going to happen.

Senator PITTMAN. But you have already stated that if the German fleet had come 3,000 miles over here, the victory would have been ours.

Admiral WILSON. I was not worried about their fleet coming 3,000 miles across the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would have been true with the English fleet over there, if the German fleet had met the English fleet, at that time?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, or any other time. After you have traveled 3,000 miles across the ocean with those vessels, and have a fellow there ready to snap you as soon as you get there, you are not in very good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Then for purposes of defense—and I presume that would be the only way we would go to war—why do we need these lighter vessels?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Chairman, you must never ask a naval officer what he is going to do on the defensive. He only does that when he is up against it. We always have our studies on offense.

The CHAIRMAN. But I assume that the war will not be a war of aggression on our part.

Admiral WILSON. No; but after you decide on war, we are not going to sit around and wait for the other fellow to come to us. We are going to hit him.

The CHAIRMAN. For purposes of defense you do not think that we need any of these adjuncts of the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. I never looked into the subject of defense. That is only a last resort.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course these are matters that are of great importance to the committee on the question of appropriations for the future.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, may I make a suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Admiral WILSON. If Congress wants to have a Navy, and if they will always approve the recommendations of the Navy Department.

Admiral WILSON. We adopted the convoy plan in ample time. I was in Gibraltar when the convoy plan first started, and at the time that the convoy plan started from Gibraltar, do you know what the convoy from Gibraltar was? They went out and took sometimes 20 and 30 ships to England. One little coast guard cutter was the escort for the convoy. When you have such little things as that, all that that escort did was to navigate convoy up the coast, and take it into port.

The CHAIRMAN. But the testimony of others is that the convoy system was a very important system.

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And that it had a great deal to do with the winning of the war?

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And the testimony is that it was not adopted as soon as it might have been.

Admiral WILSON. How about England? She did not adopt it until long after the war started?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony showed on that that if we had been able to cooperate with our vessels she could have adopted it sooner.

Admiral WILSON. I do not think that you have heard all the testimony on that yet.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be.

Admiral WILSON. When you have heard all the testimony you may change your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. But no one man decides that fact.

Admiral WILSON. Oh, that is what I think. There has been an effort to make an impression that one man decided it, and I do not think that is fair.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had testimony from other officers, and we are asking you for yours.

Admiral WILSON. I am giving it to you pretty straight.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours is one part of the general testimony.

Admiral WILSON. I am giving it to you pretty straight.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours is only the opinion of one officer.

Admiral WILSON. I have given you first-hand information, too, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We are getting information from all sides, and of course when we have all this information we shall weigh these things.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Giving due weight to every part of it.

Admiral WILSON. O, Mr. Senator, I hope you will give due weight to everything that is told you here.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what we shall do.

Admiral WILSON. I hope so, sir. I hope it will be given.

The CHAIRMAN. What we are working for is the good of the Navy.

Admiral WILSON. Well, Mr. Senator, I believe that it would have been good for the Navy if you had shut up shop after the first few days. It would have been better.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, that is not within your province to decide.

Admiral WILSON. I know, but I just said that was my opinion, that is all.

engineer and one a naval constructor), with a commander as member and recorder, conducted all acceptance and final trials of our new vessels, and in addition made periodical inspections of our vessels in service. As representatives of the Navy Department in connection with contract work, our recommendations were made only after the most careful consideration, and always met with the approval of the Navy Department. This work often brought me in personal contact with the Secretary of the Navy. I soon learned that he had confidence in the board's professional judgment and that it would have his staunch support, which it always did have during my tour of duty.

In 1915 I think it was in 1915—two members of the board and myself, together with the aid for material, were called in conference with the Secretary of the Navy to discuss trials of submarines with a view to the improvement of the boats and the early delivery of those for which contracts had already been let. The members of the board made several suggestions which were approved. The board had been having differences with contractors at time of trials of submarines. The results of the conference indicated to us that the board could count on the full and active support of the Secretary in such matters, and conditions improved greatly—all to the gain and advantage of the Government, and especially the Navy.

Senator KEYES. You do not think that answers my question, do you?

Admiral WILSON. I think that answers the question in this way: that I believe that that part of the Navy I was attached to at sea was well prepared: that the only thing I know about the Navy Department was the work that came under my cognizance on the board of inspection, which was submarines, and that was the result, that we made suggestions on the improvement of them, which were carried into the future types. We made suggestions as to the speeding up trials, and getting the boats into service, which did some good, for the Navy.

Senator KEYES. I hoped to get your opinion, but I have not got it.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, I am placed in no position to give an opinion.

Senator KEYES. You have been giving us opinions, and said that you were very glad to, and I hoped that you would give us one more.

Admiral WILSON. I have based every opinion I have given on my information and things that I was cognizant of. You are going to have officers come before you who handled those matters in the Navy and who can tell you more about it than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you have told us about the condition of the fleet at the beginning of the war, that is of force No. 2. Do you know how many battleships there were in that fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Sixteen.

The CHAIRMAN. How many destroyers were there?

Admiral WILSON. When we came north in the latter part of March—

Senator PITTMAN. That was in 1917?

Admiral WILSON. In 1917; we came north in formation, and with plans laid in case we should meet the enemy. I remember the formation well. I remember we had quite a screen of destroyers around us. The number I can not tell you.

(4) Second, as to the accusation that we should have immediately sent all available small craft to the war zone to combat the submarine. The reasons for this course of action at first sight appear plausible and attractive. They strongly appeal to the impulse for the initiative and the offensive and are in accordance with sound military principle to strike quickly and overcome the enemy. I will not enter into a discussion of the merits of this phase of the controversy, but content myself with the following observation: In the summer of 1916—the summer previous to our entry into the war—a German submarine demonstrated its ability to pass through the war zone, cross the Atlantic Ocean, enter a port of the United States, return to Germany without refuelling on this side, and, incidentally, to sink a number of valuable merchant ships in plain sight of our own coast line.

(5) Let us assume for a minute that immediately upon the commencement of war the United States had sent to Europe all available small craft capable of fighting the submarine menace, leaving wholly unprotected our long stretch of coast line and the adjoining ocean covered with thousands of unarmed ships with their valuable cargoes. Let us further assume that under these conditions several German submarines had appeared in this rich field of operations, as they did subsequently appear, but too late.

(6) As to the alarm that would have been caused in this country had such a situation occurred and the influence it would have had in again sending our small craft across to fight the submarine menace in the war zone, you gentlemen can form as accurate an opinion as any military or naval expert.

(7) In reference to the accusation that “if all of our antisubmarine forces had been immediately sent to the war zone it would have resulted in the saving of 2,500,000 tons of shipping.” The calculations upon which this statement is made are founded upon a hypothetical condition, and, like all such methods of reaching a conclusion, the results are unsatisfactory, not being susceptible of proof. Equally so, if you attempt to expose the fallacy of the calculations in this method of reaching a conclusion, it is unsatisfactory to the opposing view, not being susceptible of proof on a basis of facts. Without entering into an academic discussion and challenging the various assumptions that must necessarily have been made, I may assist the committee in arriving at an estimate of the value and credibility of the statement through a shorter route by placing the problem in this form:

It has been stated that the maximum American forces that could have been sent or were sent to the war zone to combat the submarine were about 5 or 6 per cent of the combined total force.

If the American forces consisting of, say, 5 per cent of the total force combating the submarines could have saved 2,500,000 tons of shipping, as claimed, then how many million tons should have been saved by the allied forces consisting of 95 per cent of the total force?

(8) I will now make some comment from a viewpoint as a member of the General Board of the Navy upon the statement that “We entered the war with no well-considered policy or plans.” The criticism that we have no adequate war plans has often appeared. There is no doubt but that, in the minds of many officers well qualified to know, our plans for conducting foreign wars are far from being

is complete as they should be, and we have given much less attention to this subject than is believed to be the case in foreign countries. Nevertheless, we have collected a great deal of data upon this subject and many plans have been made and are on file, and to show you that we are not so badly off as has been made to appear, it may be of interest for the committee to know that nearly two years before our entry into the war the General Board prepared a comprehensive war plan for conducting war against a central power of Europe. This plan covered every phase of naval operations under the assumed conditions of war. It deals with the mobilization, organization, and composition of the fleet, its disposition and employment, maps and strategic positions, employment of auxiliaries and submarines, protection of the coast, bases of supplies on our coast and the West Indies, routes across the Atlantic, enemy's forces and probable course of action, etc. This war plan with its statistical data and modifications of details from time to time to bring it up to date comprises nearly 300 pages of typewriting. Rear Admiral Badger of the General Board, who, I understand, will appear before you, can give you more detailed information upon this subject if desired.

(9) I will now continue my testimony as seen from the viewpoint of a member of the War Industries Board, and what I am now going to say from this viewpoint leads up to an estimate of the value and credibility of the accusation in reference to the Navy's responsibility for the prolongation of the war and consequent sacrifice of so many lives.

(10) When this war came upon us it was soon found that the Government machinery for conducting the affairs of peace was entirely too small and inadequate for conducting a great war. As you know, it was through legislation enacted by Congress that various so-called "war boards" were created to meet the emergency. Of these boards the War Industries Board was entrusted with the work of producing through the resources and industries of the country the necessary supplies and manufactured material required for carrying on the war. The total productive and manufacturing capacity of this country was astonishingly inadequate to meet requirements. It became necessary for the Government to take charge of or exercise control over all raw materials in the country, such as coal, fuel, oil, iron, steel, copper, zinc, nickel, and other materials entering into manufactured products. It became necessary to mobilize and control practically the entire industrial capacity of the country in order to meet the requirements of the war. The facilities and capacity of every manufacturing plant were known and the location of every machine tool in the country was tabulated. Many manufacturing plants were required to curtail their output for civil use and devote their energies to the manufacture of guns and shells and ammunition. When a plant in Detroit or Buffalo or Providence was unable to complete a rapid-fire gun or shaft for a submarine chaser on contract time through inability to obtain a proper size of lathe, a telegram would go to Knoxville or Springfield or Chicago that machine tool (blank) in the Standard Iron Works was commandeered; express immediately to blank manufacturing company, Providence, R. I.; signed, Priority Board. I mention these details to inform this committee how this country had to curtail the wants of a great civil population and to strain every

nerve to equip our Army to get to the battle front at the earliest possible date. After our industries were completely mobilized they would not have been able to reach their maximum productive output until the spring of 1919—two years after the commencement of the war. It was not until this date, the spring of 1919, that we would have been able to have fully equipped and supplied the Army that was contemplated to be placed in France. You will thus see how completely the creation of an army was dominated by the output of our factories at home, and I will refer to this subject later.

(11) With your permission I would like to digress here a little from the continuity of my statement and refer to the work of the Navy in connection with the War Industries Board. In the creation of this board there was called to Washington some of the ablest men in this country and experts from practically every line of industry. Commencing with such men as Judge Robert M. Lovett, Mr. Robert Brookings, Mr. Daniel C. Willard, and others, and culminating in a completed organization under the directing genius of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, I regard the task of these men and the industrial experts associated with them in mobilizing and directing the industries of this country to obtain the maximum output for military and naval requirements in the minimum amount of time as one of the greatest achievements of the war.

(12) In my association with these men of affairs and of business I heard from all sides the most complimentary references to the efficiency with which the officers of the Navy Department carried on their work from the business point of view. It was frequently remarked that the able officers at the head of the material bureaus of the Navy Department, Admirals Griffin, Taylor, Earle, McGowan, Braisted, Gen. Barnett, and others, always knew what they wanted, how much they wanted, when they wanted it, and, still more, how to get it. These bureau chiefs had their representatives on practically every industrial committee of the board and their assistants never lost a point in furthering the ends of their bureaus.

(13) In this connection I would like this Senate Committee to know that one of the first acts of the Council of National Defense decreed that all material entering into the construction of destroyers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries, and other craft intended for operations against submarines and everything required by the Navy to combat the submarine menace should take precedence over every other military or naval requirement of the war. There was never any wavering from strict compliance with the policy throughout the war.

(14) I will now revert to the question of war supplies, with the view of emphasizing the fact that in the conduct and progress of the war the action of our military and naval authorities was determined by and practically dominated by the output of war material from our factories. You will understand that my ideas upon what follows are given from a point of view overlooking the general progress of the war rather than from the necessarily more limited military or naval point of view.

(15) Two years or more before the termination of the war more than one military expert of Europe expressed the conviction that the war would be decided on the western battle front in France. This opinion was given in the face of activities of apparently great and determining importance covering the whole theater of the war, from

has the recommendations drawn up by the best minds we have in the Navy, then I think they will do no wrong; but when we are without trying to be in any way offensive—made up of cynical men—endeavor to say what we shall have except on question of policy, then I think they get mixed up.

CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as we are going to have Admiral Washington here to-morrow to talk to us about personnel, if it is convenient to you I would like to have you postpone leaving Washington until after he has testified.

MR. PITTMAN. I would ask that the Admiral also be invited here to-morrow to hear Admiral Washington's testimony.

CHAIRMAN. Yes.

ADMIRAL WILSON. All right, sir.

CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral.

The committee will now adjourn.

Reupon, at 12.30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, April 9, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I did not consider it probable; but I did consider, of course, that it was possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that it was so very possible that it was advisable to take steps to have our Navy thoroughly prepared?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is a question of policy, Mr. Chairman, that the department and the administration deal with, and I, of course, am always an advocate of taking steps to be prepared for war, at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to find out the feeling of the officers of the Navy after the outbreak of the World War, whether it was probable or not that we would get into the war, and I have asked you what your opinion was at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not think at that time that it was probable, although I fully recognized that it was possible that we might be drawn into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think that it was so very possible that we should prepare in every way for it?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, in regard to preparation for war, that requires years. The preparation for war consists in building battleships and battle cruisers and building up a fleet, and it covers years of time. Now, after you have got your fleet, with the fleet that you have got the question of preparing for war is only a question of a few months, the time required to dock the ships and mobilize them and get them together and see that the repairs are up to date; that is, to utilize and assemble all material that you already possess in the fleet, and in addition, seeing that the complements of ships are up to date. All of that is a question of a very short time.

The CHAIRMAN. I find that the record is of no value, Admiral, unless the questions which I ask are answered.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I want to know whether or not at the time you thought that war was so imminent that we should prepare the Navy for it. You can answer that by yes or no.

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think——

Senator TRAMMELL. I think the Admiral ought to be allowed to answer the question in his own way.

Admiral FLETCHER. The question hinges on what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether extra precautions should have been taken at that time to prepare the Navy for war on account of the war being on.

Admiral FLETCHER. Not at the time, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first look upon the war, as far as we were concerned, as imminent?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not think that it was imminent until, I should say, around about 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. What part of 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was the latter part.

The CHAIRMAN. Towards the latter part?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And after that you did think that it was imminent, and that we should do everything to get ready.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any report to the department or to the Secretary with regard to the steps which should be taken to prepare for such an event?

Admiral FLETCHER. As I remember, I was a member of the General Board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after you had left the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; and they sent several communications to the Navy Department pointing out and recommending steps that should be taken in anticipation of war. I do not know exactly what action was taken by the Navy Department, except that I remember a return indorsement on one of them, that these recommendations of the General Board were approved, and would be carried out as far as possible. These recommendations were in accordance with the general war plan that I have referred to in my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was a report of the board. Did you, personally, make any report to the department or to the Secretary?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I was a member of the General Board and I personally made no report to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. You personally made no report.

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the recommendations made to the General Board to assure greater preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. There were no recommendations made to the General Board by anybody that I can remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the General Board called on to draw up a plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can not state that accurately, but my recollection is that they were asked for recommendations. I think Admiral Badger will be able to give you full information on that.

The CHAIRMAN. These recommendations that were made by the General Board, were they approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what action was taken by the department, except, as I say, on one indorsement, on one of our recommendations that came back from the department, in which it stated that all these recommendations of the general board were approved by the department, and steps would be taken to carry them out as far as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What were those recommendations?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I can not specifically state them. But they are on record.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get a report of those recommendations so that we can put them in the record?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; they are on file in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish us a copy?

Admiral FLETCHER. Admiral Badger will be prepared to give you all those recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get a copy to put in the record here.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You state they were approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. This one that I know of. The others, I do not know what action was taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this one you speak of. I would like to have that go into the record here, if possible.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I will see that that is——

The CHAIRMAN. You will see that that is furnished to the stenographer?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Taussig in his testimony referred to your report of the spring target practice in the spring of 1915, when you were in command of the fleet, and in that you called attention to the deplorable personnel conditions of the fleet. Do you recall such a report?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I recall the report in which I pointed out that the complements of ships were not up to modern requirements, and we were quite short in personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on your report?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I know that the thing was thoroughly discussed here in Congress and taken up and investigated by committees of the House, and what action was subsequently taken by Congress I could not state, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the matter remedied while you were in command of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. I left so soon after that, that it was impracticable to have remedied it in that short time. We did not have the personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that report?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have not a copy myself, but it is on file in the Navy Department, and I think it has been printed in public documents here in the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what the substance of it was, and how far the personnel was lacking?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can only make a rough estimate. As I remember, the battleship fleet, as it was composed at that time, was about 5,000 men short of what would be required for an efficient modern complement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, 5,000 officers and men?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. I am not sure that the officers could be included in that, but that would be a very small item.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the battleship at that time comprise?

Admiral FLETCHER. It comprised—I am speaking from memory only—16 battleships and about 20 destroyers, and a number of auxiliaries in the shape of supply vessels, colliers, tugs, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Any submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; we had about 12 submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Any light cruisers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; we had a cruiser squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. As part of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. As part of the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other screening vessels?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; those represented the general types. We did not have any fast scout cruisers or general scout cruisers or vessels of that type at that time. The fast battle cruisers which would more nearly approach to the class of battleships were not in commission with the fleet at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. We did have some fast armored cruisers at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think we had some in commission in the Pacific, but not actually employed with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you did make a report about the personnel, and that you do not know what action was taken in regard to it, because you left the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what was the final action taken by the department or by Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. In your hearings before the House Naval Committee, on March 2 and 3, 1916, you called attention to the great shortage of personnel, and pointed out that there was little or no reserve available for the manning of ships not in commission with the fleet, did you not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken by the department to meet the conditions which you outlined?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that you made that report would indicate that no action was taken in regard to your report of the year before 1915, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, if my testimony referred to conditions at that date; but as I remember it referred back to the date upon which I made my report. The record will show on that.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations for increases in the personnel were made by the General Board?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that about that time the provisions to that time—I am not sure, but I think that the General Board made some recommendations relative to the total personnel that would be required to properly man the fleet, and the necessary reserves that would be required.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you repeat that, Admiral? I did not get it.

Admiral FLETCHER. We had made recommendations in regard to the shortage of personnel, and had recommended an increase which would cover this shortage and supply sufficient reserves. I do not remember just what number they recommended, but it was something like 15,000 men. Of course, that included the 5,000 which I had pointed out as short in the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these recommendations approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what action was taken on that. Mr. Chairman. I was not in the department at that time, nor had I any duty in connection with it, as I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not recollect the action that was taken?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not recollect. I know the matter was discussed in Congress and in the committees of the House; but the final outcome of it I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether the Secretary of the Navy approved the recommendation of the board in making his recommendation to Congress?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know. I was not a member of the board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. If it was not done, you do not recollect why it was not done, whether it was because of the Secretary not recommending it, or because Congress turned down the Secretary's recommendation?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I am not familiar with that phase of it. I was not here at that time. But I assume all of that is on record, some place, because the thing was thoroughly discussed, as I saw by reading the press reports.

The CHAIRMAN. What plans, other than the old mobilization plan, had been prepared by the Navy Department before April, 1917, to govern the action of the Navy in the event of a war?

Admiral FLETCHER. The plans for making war are in the hands of the Chief of Operations, under his direction. I do not know what plans were made in Operations. I have nothing to do with them. It was as a part of the General Board we made a number of specific recommendations to the department which practically consisted on supplementary war plans as relating to this particular phase of war, and were in pursuance to the general war plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you made a war plan which was drawn up to meet the situation which actually developed in 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. We made recommendations to them that covered—that practically amounted to a plan of operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And your recommendations had to do with the question of submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not remember just what specific recommendations we made in regard to submarines; but, as I say, those papers can be placed before you.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the General Board at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I was on the General Board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a fact that the question of submarines was one of principal importance in making any such plans, as far as our naval forces were concerned?

Admiral FLETCHER. I would not say that the question of submarines was one of principal importance, one of the principal forces that could be brought into play at that particular phase of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. At the outbreak of the war. The condition that we were confronted with, more than anything else, was the submarine menace, and of course our submarines—it was not clearly seen at that time just what part they could play; so that I do not think that we necessarily made any specific recommendations with regard to submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Although it was the critical menace at that particular time in the whole situation?

Admiral FLETCHER. In regard to recommendations against enemy submarines?

The CHAIRMAN. I referred to the use of our Navy against the enemy's submarines.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; we made recommendations. I remember there were some 18 or 20 specific steps that we should take, and it referred to the patrol of our coast, protection against submarines, utilization of small craft, employment of yachts for that purpose, and the outfitting and equipment to send against submarines, and various other steps.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board consider it probable that our naval forces would be restricted to warfare of this kind in general?

Admiral FLETCHER. They did not consider that our main fleet at that time would probably be called to fight a battle at sea with the German fleet, but that the special employment would be directed against the submarine menace with our small craft.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what information were the recommendations of the General Board based?

Admiral FLETCHER. Based upon their general knowledge of conditions and the progress of war and the form that it was taking.

The CHAIRMAN. Simply on general knowledge?

Admiral FLETCHER. On general lines; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any reports from officers who had been over to investigate the matter on the other side?

Admiral FLETCHER. The General Board recommended that officers be sent over there to get in thorough touch with the situation and give all necessary information. This was in addition to the regular machinery for doing that through the naval attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. You had previously made the recommendation to the General Board—or, that was in your plans?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was made just previous to or at just about the time that hostilities were threatened.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; in the spring of 1917; in February, to be more exact. Two or three months before the commencement of hostilities.

The CHAIRMAN. And were such officers sent abroad to study the situation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Such officers were sent abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. About that time; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they brought back reports that you acted on when you made your plans?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; the plans were not made on their special reports. The plans were made on information much broader than their special reports; but I do not doubt, if there is anything in their reports that bore upon these subjects, it would naturally—

The CHAIRMAN. That is, they had made reports before you issued your plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that those reports were of such a character as to affect the plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what officers were sent over to study the submarine situation, as you say, about February 10?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not. I remember that we recommended that Admiral Sims and Admiral T. S. Rogers be sent abroad, with assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims went over after the outbreak of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. My impression is that he was sent over there before hostilities commenced, before the outbreak of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, before the outbreak of war?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are correct.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Rogers go over?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think he went over. He had an important command in the fleet at that time, and he was not sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any other officers who were recommended for this duty?

Admiral FLETCHER. We did not recommend any other officers specifically by name, but by rank.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know whether any such were sent or not?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I did not consider it probable; but I did consider, of course, that it was possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that it was so very possible that it was advisable to take steps to have our Navy thoroughly prepared?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is a question of policy, Mr. Chairman, at the department and the administration deal with, and I, of course, am always an advocate of taking steps to be prepared for war at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to find out the feeling of the officers of the Navy after the outbreak of the World War, whether it was probable that we would get into the war, and I have asked you what your opinion was at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not think at that time that it was probable, although I fully recognized that it was possible that we might be drawn into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think that it was so very possible that we should prepare in every way for it?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, in regard to preparation for war, that requires years. The preparation for war consists in building battleships and battle cruisers and building up a fleet, and it takes years of time. Now, after you have got your fleet, with the fleet that you have got the question of preparing for war is only a question of a few months, the time required to dock the ships and overhaul them and get them together and see that the repairs are up to date; that is, to utilize and assemble all material that you already have in the fleet, and in addition, seeing that the complements of the ships are up to date. All of that is a question of a very short time.

The CHAIRMAN. I find that the record is of no value, Admiral, in the questions which I ask are answered.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I want to know whether or not at the time you thought that war was so imminent that we should prepare the Navy for it. You can answer that by yes or no.

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think the Admiral ought to be allowed to answer the question in his own way.

Admiral FLETCHER. The question hinges on what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether extra precautions should have been taken at that time to prepare the Navy for war on account of the war being

Admiral FLETCHER. Not at the time, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first look upon the war, as far as we are concerned, as imminent?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not think that it was imminent until, I should say, around about 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. What part of 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was the latter part.

The CHAIRMAN. Towards the latter part?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And after that you did think that it was imminent, and that we should do everything to get ready.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any report to the department or to the Secretary with regard to the steps which should be taken to prepare for such an eventuality?

Admiral FLETCHER. As I remember, I was a member of the General Board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after you had left the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; and they sent several communications to the Navy Department pointing out and recommending steps that should be taken in anticipation of war. I do not know exactly what action was taken by the Navy Department, except that I remember a return indorsement on one of them, that these recommendations of the General Board were approved, and would be carried out as far as possible. These recommendations were in accordance with the general war plan that I have referred to in my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was a report of the board. Did you personally, make any report to the department or to the Secretary?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I was a member of the General Board and I personally made no report to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. You personally made no report.

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the recommendations made to the General Board to assure greater preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. There were no recommendations made to the General Board by anybody that I can remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the General Board called on to draw up a plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can not state that accurately, but my recollection is that they were asked for recommendations. I think Admiral Badger will be able to give you full information on that.

The CHAIRMAN. These recommendations that were made by the General Board, were they approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what action was taken by the department, except, as I say, on one indorsement, on one of our recommendations that came back from the department, in which it stated that all these recommendations of the general board were approved by the department, and steps would be taken to carry them out as far as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What were those recommendations?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I can not specifically state them. But they are on record.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get a report of those recommendations so that we can put them in the record?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; they are on file in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish us a copy?

Admiral FLETCHER. Admiral Badger will be prepared to give you all those recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get a copy to put in the record here.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You state they were approved by the department.

Admiral FLETCHER. This one that I know of. The others, I do not know what action was taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this one you speak of. I would like to have that go into the record here, if possible.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I will see that that is—

The CHAIRMAN. You will see that that is furnished to the stenographer?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

PITTMAN. The record will disclose the fact that whenever any subject and another Senator said that he would like to ask questions on that before going to another, I desisted at once.

CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon; I think you will find that that sort happened. The original plan was carried out.

PITTMAN. Does the Chairman object to my questioning him?

CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that put off until later.

PITTMAN. It is apparent why you object to it.

At that point Admiral Fletcher temporarily left the stand. At the conclusion of the testimony of Admiral Washington, Admiral Fletcher resumed the stand.)

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL F. F. FLETCHER—Resumed.

CHAIRMAN. Admiral, had any plan been discussed before our entry into the war for sending antisubmarine craft to the war?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. I did not know just what were sent.

CHAIRMAN. I say, had any plans been discussed as to sending antisubmarine craft?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. We discussed it in the General Board and made recommendations pertaining to that subject in regard to sending the craft over.

CHAIRMAN. When did you make those recommendations, do you recall?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. I think it was just previous to and subsequent to our entry into the war.

CHAIRMAN. That is, you kept on making recommendations at various times?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. We made a number of different recommendations pertaining to that subject.

CHAIRMAN. To whom did you make those recommendations?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. To the Navy Department.

CHAIRMAN. To the Secretary or to the Chief of Operations?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. Those communications are addressed officially to the Navy Department.

CHAIRMAN. To the Navy Department?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Do you recall when the first one was made in regard to submarines?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. No, I can not tell you accurately, but I think the first ones were made in February. Another one was made in March—

speaking only from memory—and I remember that one was made in the early part of April, shortly before war was declared.

CHAIRMAN. And that was the final plan that was made by the General Board about the submarine situation?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. I do not remember how many were made subsequent to that. As I said before, I can not answer these questions in detail because my duties about that time were transferred over to the War Industries Board, and I only had general connection with the work of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, modifications would have

Admiral FLETCHER. Modifications would have to be made

The CHAIRMAN. As conditions came up. But what I know was, was that the plan in the Navy, and was it sent to the different bureau chiefs, and to the various fleet commanders of the Navy could act as a homogeneous whole?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; that plan made provision for that we could use our forces at any time, or to suit the various phases that war might assume.

The CHAIRMAN. And the bureau chiefs, and the higher officers of the Navy were aware of this plan, and were made acquainted with it so that they could act under it, were they?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I could not say. That was a matter of execution which I had nothing to do with. I assume that they all had it, if it was necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know whether they did or not?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never came across any instance where you found that plan especially in operation?

Admiral FLETCHER. We have a rule in the department—speaking from memory now—that the chiefs of bureaus are required to make frequent reports as to the condition of their bureaus, pointing out all the shortages.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, yesterday we suggested that we would like to have Admiral Washington come up here to give us some information about the personnel of the Navy, and with your permission, we will let him take the stand now, and then put you on the stand soon as he has finished; and of course we will put your statement in consecutive form.

Admiral FLETCHER. I will be very pleased to, Mr. Chairman. Before leaving the stand, I would like to make a statement. I am aware that my answers in regard to many of your questions as to what conditions were around the department, are not satisfactory. As stated in my testimony, my duties during this war were principally concerned with the War Industries Board which took up practically all my time, so that I am not as familiar with all those details upon which you questioned me as you will find Admiral McKee and other officers whom you will call before you.

Senator PITTMAN. Just one question before you go. Did not the Navy Department and the naval officers do everything in their power with the money that Congress furnished them to do with?

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Senator; I want to finish my own set of questions before you take up yours, if you have no objection. That was the order we agreed upon. We are simply putting Admiral Washington in here in an emergency case.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, when we had our first meeting, it was agreed that each one of the committee should finish his cross-examination before interruption. We started and proceeded upon that line, when, at your instance, the committee thought they should finish one subject at a time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and you refused to adopt that plan.

Senator PITTMAN. No; I was compelled to adopt it.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon, you refused to adopt it. You did not adopt that plan. In every case we finished with the cross-examination before the other side went on.

PITTMAN. The record will disclose the fact that whenever any subject and another Senator said that he would like to questions on that before going to another, I desisted at

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The CHAIRMAN. Was a general plan to govern antisubmarine operations ever drawn up in the Navy Department so far as you know—a general plan which the department was to use?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know that there was any general plan prepared in Operations. I do not know that any general plan would be required under those conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. You simply made general recommendations from the General Board?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know whether those recommendations were adopted or not, and whether there was any general plan based on those recommendations?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, I can not tell you in detail what steps were actually taken. My knowledge is confined to that indorsement which said that the department had approved these plans and they would be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. And up to the time that war was declared such a plan was based simply on general information and not on the special reports of any officers who had been sent over to examine the European situation in regard to submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Well, those recommendations were all based upon our knowledge of the situation of the war at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Your general knowledge of the situation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Based upon all knowledge and all information that we could collect.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you had any special reports from any special officers that you sent over to find out about the situation, and you stated that you recommended that Admiral Sims and Admiral Rogers be sent over to look into the situation.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral Rogers was not sent over. Admiral Sims was sent over immediately before the commencement of the war, and as far as you know, he made no recommendations to the General Board which were used in making up plans, did he?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; he made no recommendations to the General Board directly. All his recommendations would be made to the department, naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. To the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. And referred to the General Board for use. But these plans and these recommendations or these communications to the department were based upon all knowledge that could be obtained up to that time from reports of naval operations.

The CHAIRMAN. That could be obtained from the available information that you had on hand?

Admiral FLETCHER. All available information.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not essential in warfare that all operational plans be based upon full information and a full consideration of the situation by the responsible person?

Admiral FLETCHER. Certainly; as full information as it is possible to obtain.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel that such information and such discussion with the heads of the allied navies was possible in Washington?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Without having anyone in the field?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I think the more sources of information at you have, of course the more valuable it is; and the more accurate our information is apt to be.

The CHAIRMAN. And the most accurate information would come from the field, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Very probably. It depends somewhat upon conditions. Our sources of information are through the different departments of the governments abroad, and particularly through our naval and military attachés, or through the foreign embassies.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that that information and the discussion that you had with the heads of allied navies here in Washington and what you got from your naval attachés, was of more importance than what you got from Admiral Sims?

Admiral FLETCHER. Undoubtedly. At the same time, Admiral Sims's information was very important, and a great deal of dependence was placed upon it. But that was not the only source of information.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel that these other sources were of more importance than his information?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I will not say that they were more important. They are all equally important, according to the character of the information and the details and the accuracy of it. They have all got to be taken into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet the General Board had recommended that Admiral Sims go abroad to investigate the submarine and anti-submarine conditions?

Admiral FLETCHER. Their recommendations included more than that. Their recommendations included that an officer be sent—I am speaking only from memory—to get in touch with the Allies—the military or naval forces of the Allies—and to get any information that was of value, and to see what steps we should be prepared to take in case we entered the war. That is my recollection of the general tenor of the instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not a sound policy have required that all detailed operational plans should be drawn up in the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the detailed plans?

Admiral FLETCHER. The detailed plans for carrying out any general instructions in the war zone would be made in the war zone, naturally. The execution of some general plan which was turned over to the commander in the war zone for execution, or the details of that execution, the plans necessary to carry it out, would be there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the detailed plans for operation would be conducted in the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; just like the commander-in-chief is ordered to engage the enemy in battle. All the details of that battle would have to be planned out by the commander-in-chief, and all the details of execution would have to be made by him; but that would be all under the general plans prepared in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. And the recommendations for the carrying out of the detailed plans would naturally be up to the officer in charge of the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; they would not be apt to interfere.

The CHAIRMAN. Was a general plan to govern antisubmarine operations ever drawn up in the Navy Department so far as you know—a general plan which the department was to use?

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The CHAIRMAN. But you just said that the detailed plans should be in his hands.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, the detailed plans should be in his hands.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I say; and you agree with that.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, in general; but it depends very much upon the conditions. If I would take a specific case I could more clearly explain just where the work of the department ends and where the execution by the commander in the field begins.

The CHAIRMAN. Wherever the recommendations of the commander in the field could reasonably be followed as to detailed plans, it should be the policy of the department to follow them, should it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. If it does not interfere with their general plans and the policy; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the policy followed in regard to action taken on recommendations made by Admiral Sims?

Admiral FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, as I said before I was not connected with the detailed plans or the execution or carrying out of those plans; but that information can be gotten from the officers in the Navy Department, and I was very little associated with that, had practically nothing to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. In a general way were not Admiral Sims' recommendations on all important matters ultimately adopted by the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, when he makes recommendations, of course the Navy Department would naturally take them into consideration and attach great importance to them, and I have no doubt but what they would carry them out as long as they did not interfere with their general plan or their general policy of carrying on the war.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that the department adopted these recommendations proves that they were sound in the judgment of the department, does it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say it did; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If that was so, what justification was there for the delay of the department in acting on them?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what delay you refer to.

The CHAIRMAN. The delay in carrying out the recommendations of Admiral Sims; for instance, about the sending of ships over there, and sending tugs over, and not supplying him with personnel, and other matters.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; I assume that that delay, if there was any delay, was purely a matter of policy in the methods that the department may have adopted and approved of, in carrying on the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if his recommendations were not sound, why should the department have adopted them; and if they were sound, why should not the department have adopted them as soon as possible?

Admiral FLETCHER. If they approved his recommendations, I assume that they acted upon them. I do not know the particular conditions to which you refer.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the Admiral's letter of January 7th and the various things that he touches upon in that letter, are you not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; yes. Now, do you refer to his recommendation that the Navy Department should have sent immediately to the war zone all available small craft in this country? I do not think that the department approved that, so far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. He made specific recommendations, and those specific recommendations I think that Admiral Sims shows in practically every case were followed by the department, but at a later date during the war.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what importance is the time element in warfare?

Admiral FLETCHER. It is often very important. Many times it is of vital importance.

The CHAIRMAN. As a general rule, it is of vital importance, is it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; not vital, but sometimes vital; but as a general rule it is of great importance.

The CHAIRMAN. On important matters, as a rule it is vital, is it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I agree to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the critical character of the submarine campaign in 1917 recognized by the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was recognized as a very important factor in the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall how many tons of shipping were sunk during the month of April, 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am speaking from memory when I say that I think it was about 500,000 ton—600,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN. It was 800,000 tons.

Admiral FLETCHER. I will accept that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what was the cause of the delay in sending antisubmarine forces over as Admiral Sims had recommended?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I know nothing about the execution of the operations. That was entirely in the Navy Department, and the Bureau of Operations; but I called attention to the subject in my statement there as to the desirability of sending all our antisubmarine craft away from this coast, leaving it entirely undefended.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that the defending of this coast at that period of the war was of more importance than the sending of as many craft as we could over to the other side to stop the submarine menace over there where it actually existed?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think I have given an answer to that in my testimony, and I am quite willing to repeat that now as an answer to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Well——

Admiral FLETCHER. It is a conditional matter, and the conditions I stated there in my testimony to this effect, that the question arises, shall we send all our small craft at once to Europe and leave our own coast entirely unprotected, or shall we just wait until we find out the development of the war, what phase it is going to take, how important it is, and how much risk we should take?

The CHAIRMAN. But at that particular time, Admiral, when these requests were being made, during the month of April, 1917, 800,000 tons of shipping were being sunk, and that was the maximum month during the whole war when shipping was being sunk by submarines.

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Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Admiral FLETCHER. That had reference to the old organization before we established a Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. When you had an aid for Operations?

Admiral FLETCHER. When we had an aid for Operations and an aid for Material and an aid for Personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated: "While the general staff features of the organization would be made effective by the modifications in that law which I have suggested." That was in regard to the new method?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing reading): "There are other features in the organization of the Navy Department which, in my opinion, do not conform to the general principles of sound organization."

To what other features did you refer?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know just what I had in mind then, but the general idea that was in my mind was to establish a Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but that——

Admiral FLETCHER. Around which the organization of the Navy Department would be built, and that the staff part of it should be under control so as to meet the military requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall what other features there were that you spoke about, particularly at that time, that you were alluding to particularly at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I do not recall the connection with that quotation you have just made.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any other matters in regard to the organization that should have been changed?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can explain, in a general way, Mr. Chairman, what you wish me to say in regard to the organization of the Navy Department. I must say that I am prejudiced in favor of the Meyer organization as tentatively put into effect by Secretary Meyer. There was appointed a commission about that time, known as the Moody Commission, to study the question of organization of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the commission on which Admiral Mayhan served?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. There had been so much dissatisfaction about the organization of our Navy Department that this commission was appointed to make recommendations, particularly with reference to the general principles of sound organization as applied to naval establishments. They gave a thorough study to that, and laid down the general principles that should be followed.

Subsequent to that there was appointed the so-called Swift Board, which made a thorough study of the organization of the Navy Department, of the organization of every navy department in Europe, and sent an experienced officer over to Europe to study at first hand the working of every organization in the countries of Europe, and based upon the Moody Commission report and all the information available, they got up the so-called Meyer plan of organization. You may know the general principle. It was to establish a Chief of Operations responsible for the operation of the fleet in war and in peace, a chief of material who should be responsible for the condition and the preparation and the maintenance of

the material of the fleet, and after that was finished, it was turned over to Operations. They had complete control. And the other feature was a chief of personnel, who had similar duties in regard to personnel, and a chief inspector. So that this organization would relieve the Secretary of the Navy of a thousand details which he is tempted to carry out himself; and in principle he deals with these four principal units.

The present organization, the essential feature of it, I believe, is found in the Meyer plan, that is the establishment of a Chief of Operations. The so-called chief of material, I think, now is under Operations as a subordinate officer who deals with the various bureaus of the department, and in the same way the personnel is handled. I understand that there is a difference of opinion amongst officers in the Navy as to whether the Chief of Operations should handle the bureau work through a subordinate in his office, or whether he should do it through a chief of material who is over the heads of all the bureaus, who is responsible for the coordination of their work, and who deals directly with the Chief of Operations. There is a difference of opinion on that subject, and I believe that either plan will work well, although personally I am inclined to favor the organization which places the chief of material as responsible for the whole question of material, so that the Chief of Operations, instead of having to deal with all these separate bureaus, will deal with one single man; and the same way with the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we hope that this committee will be able to do something that will be for the ultimate good of the Navy. Now, the other day Admiral Mayo in his testimony made some suggestions about changes in the organization of the Department, or stated, at any rate, that there were remedies that could be applied to the present organization, and I asked Admiral Mayo to come back at a later period before this committee and submit his views about a general plan for the reorganization of the Navy, if it seemed to him necessary. I have spoken to several other officers and have asked them to do the same. We should like very much to have you, if you think there are matters that should be changed in the organization of the department—and it is inconceivable, in a war like this, that new matters should not come up where changes should prove to be necessary—we should like very much to have you come before us at a later period and submit any plans that you may have in this respect; and among the other officers that we would like to have come will be Admiral Badger, who is chief of the board, and Admiral McKean, and Admiral Knight; and we think we shall ask the Assistant Secretary of the Navy if he will submit anything; provided that they have ideas about any reorganization. And we shall also ask the Secretary of the Navy to submit any plans that he may have.

Now, this committee, it is needless to say, is not made up of experts on naval matters, and my idea and the idea of several of the members of the committee with whom I have talked, is that the best thing to do would be, after we get these different recommendations, if the facts seem to warrant it, to suggest the appointment of a commission such as the Moody Commission, to which you have referred this morning, a commission of the experts on

naval matters, civilian experts such as were included on the mission, and I believe, and I hope that the committee will with me, that if we do that, a plan for reorganization, if it is to be necessary, will be drawn up which will be of great value to the Navy of the United States.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that would be of great value, especially as we have just gone through a war; and if there are defects and changes necessary, they should show up now better than at any other time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. Admiral, was any general plan adopted for coordinating the operations of the various bureaus of the department that you know of?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can not answer that, Mr. Chairman. I am not familiar with the detailed workings of the department for six or seven years.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know of any such plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not know of any.

The CHAIRMAN. If such a plan had been in existence, would you not have seen it?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I would not come in contact with it in the work that I have been doing the last three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon whom rested the chief responsibility for coordinating the operations of the bureaus?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am not speaking from accurate knowledge, but only from general impressions and hearsay. I think that the work of the bureaus is now coordinated by an aid for material under the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And the aid for material coordinates the activities of the bureaus and the chiefs of bureaus?

Admiral FLETCHER. The Assistant for Material is his title.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not "aid," but "assistant" for material?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; and he is acting under the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any difficulties that arose during the war on account of any lack of coordination?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have heard of none.

The CHAIRMAN. And you observed no delays, you stated, during the war, any faults of organization?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony before the House committee in 1916, you stated that you had appointed boards to recommend complements for battleships, and as a part of their report recommended large increases, on the ground that the efficiency of a fleet depends on such increases. Were these increases authorized, do you know, before our entrance into the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. My impression is that the complements were increased before we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not have any accurate knowledge about it?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have no statistics on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have been the one responsible if this was not done?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible.

ers, who is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to personnel, would be the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

THE CHAIRMAN. The light forces that we had in the Navy at the beginning of the war were in a state of unpreparedness, were they not; light cruisers and armored cruisers and vessels of that sort?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. So far as I know, they were in good condition.

THE CHAIRMAN. They were in a good state of preparedness?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. So far as I know. I was not familiar with the details of that.

THE CHAIRMAN. But you do not know?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. No, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. And you do not know of any efforts that had been made to put these vessels into condition before the war?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. I can not give you facts on that, Mr. Chairman, but it is my general impression that all those ships connected with the fleet were in good condition.

THE CHAIRMAN. And there was plenty of personnel for them?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. No; I can not say that. I was not familiar with the data in regard to the fleet at that time. My information that I refer to there in the testimony dates back to 1916.

THE CHAIRMAN. I am asking you now about matters at the beginning of the war.

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. At the beginning of the war? I can not give you facts on that.

THE CHAIRMAN. So that you are not familiar with the personnel conditions or the material conditions of the Navy at the beginning of this war?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. No, sir; not at that time.

THE CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any particular efforts to secure additional personnel that were made?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. I know nothing except from general hearsay, that the Navy was always making great efforts to get more men enlisted.

THE CHAIRMAN. In general, Admiral, if the Navy was not prepared at the beginning of the war, on whom would rest the responsibility for the lack of preparedness?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. I suppose it depends upon wherein the defect occurred. If it occurred in any particular department, such as personnel or material or lack of ships, the officer charged with that department is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for all defects and shortages of the Navy.

THE CHAIRMAN. Then, as far as the law allows him——

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. As far as the law allows him.

THE CHAIRMAN (continuing). The Secretary is responsible?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. He is responsible.

THE CHAIRMAN. For unpreparedness?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. And I suppose I might go further and say that Congress is responsible for the general policy of building up the Navy and making the appropriations.

THE CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar, generally speaking, with the composition of the British and German Fleets when they met at the battle of Jutland?

ADMIRAL FLETCHER. In a general way; yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. You are familiar?

naval matters, civilian experts such as were included on that commission, and I believe, and I hope that the committee will agree with me, that if we do that, a plan for reorganization, if it is found to be necessary, will be drawn up which will be of great value to the Navy of the United States.

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Admiral FLETCHER. I can not answer that, Mr. Chairman. I am not familiar with the detailed workings of the department for the last six or seven years.

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The CHAIRMAN. But you do not have any accurate knowledge about it?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have no statistics on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have been the one responsible in case this was not done?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for everything; and the subordinate officer having charge of such

matters, who is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to personnel, would be the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

The CHAIRMAN. The light forces that we had in the Navy at the beginning of the war were in a state of unpreparedness, were they not; the light cruisers and armored cruisers and vessels of that sort?

Admiral FLETCHER. So far as I know, they were in good condition.

The CHAIRMAN. They were in a good state of preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. So far as I know. I was not familiar with the details of that.

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The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The Secretary is responsible?

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Admiral FLETCHER. And I suppose I might go further and say that Congress is responsible for the general policy of building up the Navy and making the appropriations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar, generally speaking, with the composition of the British and German Fleets when they met at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral FLETCHER. In a general way; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are fami

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what is your definition of a fleet that is in all respects ready for battle against a fleet like that of the Germans in 1916, at the date of the battle of Jutland; that is, in May, 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. In May, 1916?

The CHAIRMAN. What is your definition of a fleet that is in all respects ready for battle against a fleet like that of the Germans in May, 1916; that is, what units are necessary in addition to battleships?

Admiral FLETCHER. In addition to the battleships there should be units of battle cruisers, equal to and preferably superior to that of the enemy; there should be scout cruisers equal or superior to that the enemy possesses; and there should be destroyers more numerous than those of the enemy; and there should be submarines as strong and powerful and as numerous as those of the enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. Should there be light cruisers?

Admiral FLETCHER. There should be light cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Should there be armored cruisers?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know the particular conditions of that battle called for armored cruisers. The composition of every fleet, to be effective against the enemy, is based entirely, almost, upon the composition of the enemy's fleet. If the enemy has battle cruisers, you have got to have them. If he has not battle cruisers, it is not absolutely essential that you should have them in order to obtain a superiority. The composition of your fleet, and in the building up of the Navy, depends entirely upon what the possible enemy may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that a fleet composed entirely of battleships and destroyers, no matter how efficient they might be, was ready for war or battle against a fleet like that of the Germans at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral FLETCHER. That would not be sufficient. They would be at a great disadvantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that a fleet was ready for battle if it has no scouts and no screening vessels and no submarines and no air service, and a very few destroyers?

Admiral FLETCHER. It would not be at all ready, under modern conditions of war. It would not be fitted to carry on a war.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be ready for war if its ships were not fully officered and manned?

Admiral FLETCHER. It would not be ready.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not state, of your own knowledge, whether the Navy of the United States was fully officered or manned in 1917, when war was declared?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say here that I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding in regard to the expression "Is the Navy prepared for war?" You can answer that by saying yes or no, and either answer will be correct, depending upon what you mean. If you say "Is this country prepared for war, and has it a Navy large enough to overcome the enemy?" I would say no. But if you asked "Is the Navy as it is constituted and built up under the appropriations of Congress, ready for war," I would say yes, as far as it goes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but you can not say that a battle fleet is a prepared and ready battle fleet unless it is filled up with all of its necessary units, can you?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; that is the point that is subject to two interpretations. You see, our fleet is composed now of battle cruisers and submarines and destroyers as well as battle ships; but it has no battle cruisers and other fast scout cruisers like other navies of the world have, and if anybody asked you "Is our fleet ready for war," I would say yes, as far as it is constituted. But the country is not ready for war in that it is not a properly built up fleet, being short in battle cruisers and other elements that go to make up a fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if you are going to say that it is ready for war, you mean that it is ready as far as the available resources of the country allow it; and if it is short of destroyers and the country has destroyers to supply their places, and the country or the department does not supply their places, then it is not ready as a battle fleet; and the same with regard to other units; is that correct?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. That is according to your understanding?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; when the testimony has been given here, saying that our fleet was ready for war, what was meant by that was that our fleet, as far as it goes, was prepared for war.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that the individual ships of the fleet are prepared?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; and the individual units of ships, and the combinations of ships, as far as it went; but I do not think that those officers who so testified meant to say or to imply that our Navy was built up and was complete in every respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you mean that there were no other vessels in the United States that would be used in an ordinary navy for screening, vessels that could have been in the fleet but were not with the fleet? Because the testimony has shown as to the battle fleet that it consisted entirely of battle ships and of a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If there had been other vessels in our Navy that could be used for screening vessels, and that were not used for screening vessels because they were not in a state of preparedness, would you still say that the battle fleet was in a state of preparedness and ready for war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I should say that if we had cruisers that could have been put immediately into the fleet and ready to fight with us, that we were not fully prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same way with destroyers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. But of course when we are not at war, we must necessarily keep a large percentage of the fleet in reserve or at navy yards. We can not afford either financially or through a lack of personnel, to keep our whole forces mobilized.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would hardly say that while you have a battle fleet out presumably prepared for battle, that this battle fleet itself should be kept in reserve, would you?

Admiral FLETCHER. In time of peace, yes. But, of course, when war is declared, as soon as you are permitted to after diplomatic relations do not interfere, why, of course you must try to bring out every resource that you have got.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, from February 2, 1917, certainly. In April 2, 1917, every effort should have been made to build up the battle fleet as completely as possible, and all vessels that could have been of use in building up a battle fleet should have been put in the fleet, should they not, if possible?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To make it a prepared fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. To what event in February do you refer?

The CHAIRMAN. When passports were given to the German ambassador.

Admiral FLETCHER. And that it became inevitable that we were going into the war?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will agree that it was inevitable then that we were going into war.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I would say, if I was confronted with a condition of that kind, of course I would make every effort to get ready for war; but I do not know just how far our diplomatic correspondence made it inadvisable to take any steps toward hostilities. That is always a very important factor in the commencement of war.

The CHAIRMAN. You personally do not know what ships were available for scouting or screening at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, would you say that the Navy of the United States was in all respects ready for war in April, 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. As constituted, and as fast as a ship in reserve could be gotten out and put into operation, it was prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Could be gotten out after what date; after the date of the declaration of war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I should say after the war became inevitable.

The CHAIRMAN. But you stated some time ago that war became practically inevitable after the latter part of 1916.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, that is in the opinions of outsiders, but that is a matter for the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the opinion of the men in the Navy Department who were the ones to determine about preparing the Navy.

Admiral FLETCHER. The probability of war, Mr. Chairman, is a matter that the administration, the President of the United States, is better informed about than we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if you did not prepare the Navy for war, it was the fault of the administration?

Admiral FLETCHER. For war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And of the Secretary of the Navy? Because he was the one directly to effect it.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Secretary of the Navy, of course carries out the policy of the Government, and if the policy of the Government is not to prepare for war, of course he is not responsible for the date when they commenced the preparations, as a matter of policy. But after the policy of the country decides that we should commence to prepare for war, then that preparation, of course, is up to the Secretary of the Navy and the officers under him.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated this morning that our Navy was as well prepared as any other navy at the time of the outbreak of the war. You mean as the British or the French Navy in 1914?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is right; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we had as many screening vessels in proportion to the size of our Navy, for instance, at that time, as the British?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That were in an active state of preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. That just brings up a question, what is meant by the term "prepared." We are not prepared in battle cruisers, and in the number of scout cruisers, and in other elements of the fleet which we should have, you see, to be on an equality with the enemy; but so far as our fleet was constituted it was prepared for war just as well as any other navy in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Admiral, I think you have stated that when you were in command of the fleet and you came up from southern waters, you had some screening vessels with you at the time, did you not?

Admiral FLETCHER. We had what?

The CHAIRMAN. You had some screening vessels with you?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That shows that there were some screening vessels in our Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there not a great many screening vessels out on the Pacific coast that were not in active commission when war broke out?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore we had them, we had them in our Navy, but we did not have them ready to use. Therefore we were not ready as far as we could be.

Admiral FLETCHER. We did not have any men to put on board of them. Congress had not appropriated money for the men.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore we were short of personnel?

Admiral FLETCHER. We were short of personnel; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the circumstances? Other witnesses have already gone into that, about the shortness in personnel at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not know at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the circumstances in regard to the recommendations by the department, and the recommendations by the Secretary of the Navy to Congress about that?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not know about that question.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, do you think that our battle fleet at the beginning of the war, in April, 1917, would have been able to meet and to overcome the German fleet that fought at the battle of Jutland, if they had met in mid-ocean?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think they would have, without difficulty. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. If the German fleet was fully equipped with screening vessels and submarines and everything of that sort, you think our fleet would have been able to defeat them with nothing but battleships and destroyers that we had?

Admiral FLETCHER. We had a superior battle force to what the Germans had at that time, and I think that in an open contest at sea we would have been superior to the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not regard the screening forces that they had as of any great value as an adjunct to the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, no; I am just regarding—all those auxiliaries, you see, are advantages that are of use in leading up to the battle; but when you come to the final battle conditions, you put battleships right against battleships, and then it is a question of gun power.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but might not the battleships be destroyed by submarines or other methods, before you came to battleships against battleships?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes, of course; and we had submarines at that time. But it is very difficult——

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the battle fleet as it was constituted, and it had no submarines. and it had nothing but battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you say that you think that that fleet of battleships accompanied by a few destroyers could have overcome the German fleet as it fought the British at the battle of Jutland with all the screening boats and other auxiliaries that they had?

Admiral FLETCHER. Now, Mr. Chairman, it is a very difficult matter to answer a hypothetical question of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. I would simply like your opinion.

Admiral FLETCHER. I can tell you, in a general way, that our fleet as constituted in 1917——

The CHAIRMAN. Our battle fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Battleships; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Our battle fleet: you mean the battleships and destroyers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; we were inferior to the German fleet in regard to battle cruisers and in regard to other types of vessels, but we were superior to them in other ways; and, on the whole I think that in a battle at sea we would have been superior to the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think, then, that the screening vessels were not of any great consequence?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think so; of great consequence.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not quite follow you. You say they are of great consequence? Do you mean that we had such a preponderating superiority of dreadnaughts that we could have overcome that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, it depends so much upon the conditions that it is difficult to answer. I can answer it in a general way, that I believe that our fleet at that time was just as powerful as the German fleet, considering everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was more powerful in battleships and less powerful in destroyers and had not the screening vessels?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But we were so much better in battleships that we were better than they, on the whole?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And so that, if we had met in midocean, the victory would have been ours?

Admiral FLETCHER. When it came right down to an actual duel that our forces would have been superior to theirs. Now, all these things that take place preliminary to that, it is too difficult to formulate any plan unless you lay down specific conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. How would we have been able to screen our battleships, for instance in a fog, at night, or anything of that kind? How would we have been able to screen the battleships with what we had?

Admiral FLETCHER. In the same way that Germany would screen hers, by destroyers and cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but we had no cruisers. I am talking about the fleet as it was constituted.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, as mobilized?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; simply with the battleships and destroyers. I said that right along.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Well, we could have had a number of cruisers there with our fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about that. I am not talking about what we might have had or would have had. I am talking about the fleet as it was actually constituted, made up, as a battle fleet, of battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. I must admit, Mr. Chairman, that it is a little confusing.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think so. I have stated that over and over again, right along. I have particularly spoken about the fact that we had only battleships and a few destroyers; and you have stated, I think, that it would not make any difference that the fleet consisted of only those ships. Your testimony will show that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that his testimony will show that. The testimony will show that he said it would make some difference. I insist on confining it to the Admiral's answers, and not trying to make it appear that he said something different from what he did say.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony will show clearly that I was speaking about the fleet as it was then, such as I am speaking of now.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think you are trying to make it appear that all they had was what they had assembled there when they did not expect to have a fight. If they had expected to have a fight, they could and would have had some more destroyers and cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the time in April, 1917, when the war broke out. May I ask, how many cruisers did we have available on the Atlantic coast at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say, in answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, under the conditions that would bring us in contact with the German fleet off our coast in the ocean, that we had enough cruisers and enough destroyers and enough submarines and enough auxiliaries of the various types——

The CHAIRMAN. Then will you give me the make-up of the Atlantic fleet at that time—of the battle fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. That they were available on this coast.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the vessels that were with the fleet at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, that is, not with the fleet, We consider a vessel with the fleet if it is within call.

The CHAIRMAN. That were mobilized, with the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because I have asked you, and all the others, and I think that they all say the fleet consisted simply of battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And none of these other vessels.

Admiral FLETCHER. We may have cruisers up in Boston and cruisers down in Charleston, and within a few hours call of the fleet, and we call that being with the fleet, in that sense; if they are where they can be assembled and be with the fleet on short notice.

Senator PITTMAN. The chairman wants to know whether one unit of our fleet could lick the whole German fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Not one unit; two units.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think, had the Germans come over here with what force they would have had when they crossed the ocean, we would have been at no disadvantage, at that particular time.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you, if they met in midocean, with equal advantage.

Admiral FLETCHER. If we had been at no disadvantage?

The CHAIRMAN. No disadvantage; that is, if we had gone out simply with battleships and destroyers. Nobody else has testified that any larger number of our fleet was ready except battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. We would not have gone out if no others were within call.

The CHAIRMAN. We would not have gone out?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is, if the cruisers were not ready and manned and prepared, they could not have gone out.

Of course, if they were not with the fleet. I think I see the point you are making, that on the outbreak of war we were not fully mobilized; that there were not enough men, and a great deal had to be done to actually engage in hostilities. I agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, was our battle fleet prepared; and when we came to sift it, so far as we have been able to tell, it was prepared with battle ships and destroyers, but in no other way was it fully prepared.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what I wanted to find out was whether the fleet, so prepared, with simply battle ships and destroyers, could have held its own against the German fleet, which was perfectly prepared. It is a perfectly simple question.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Well, I will say "yes" to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You will say yes, that it could?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions?

Senator BALL. No.

Senator KEYES. I have none.

Senator PITTMAN. I have some questions that I want to ask the admiral.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THOMAS WASHINGTON, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Washington, yesterday, in the course of the hearing, Admiral Wilson made a statement about the personnel of the Atlantic Fleet, and after his statement I suggested that I thought it would be appropriate for you to come before the committee and give us any information that you can about the present condition of the personnel of the Navy, and we would be very glad to hear from you on that point.

Admiral WASHINGTON. The demobilization since the armistice has been going on very rapidly, and Congress passed certain laws which gave the enlisted force inducements and reasons for getting out, and naturally we were desirous of discharging and letting go back to their regular vocations all of those whom we could spare. We demobilized from about 500,000 down to the present number of about 104,000.

This bonus of \$60 which Congress authorized for these men who accepted their discharge was an inducement for them to leave the service and not to return. Had it been the other way we would not have been so badly off. The only way in which these discharged men could accept it was to accept their discharge, leave, get the \$60, and go home; and, of course, the wages outside were such that the probability of their return became less and less as the 30 days or 60 days went on, the result being that all our old-timers, that is, the reenlisted, continuous-service men—not all of them but a great percentage of them—like the reserves and others, took advantage of it and left us. We had to expand our recruiting efforts greater than they have been before, and we have more men now engaged in recruiting throughout the country, probably double or treble the number, and with very poor success. The reason for that is that the wages outside are necessarily, under present circumstances, very much larger; and in the matter of the seafaring part of it, the Shipping Board and the Army Transport Service pay men for a similar class of work anywhere from two to three and one-half times the amount that the Navy pays. These men, naturally, under those circumstances, will not come back to us.

The situation as to officers has been affected in the same way. We have had thousands of applications for discharges of officers. I say thousands, with full knowledge of what it means. We have accepted a total of about 1,450. Of these officers some, but not many of them, were Naval Academy graduates. We have kept that down to the lowest limit possible.

There are now pending about 88 applications for resignation. The number of resignations is, I am glad to say, decreasing; but with a limited number such as we have, about 2,850 graduates of the Naval Academy, the loss of 150 to 200 is a very great factor to us, and we can not fill up the line of the Navy other than through the Naval Academy. The regular Navy now consists of 4,301 officers line and staff combined. Since the armistice the resignations of 439 regular officers have been accepted. There are a total of 124 of whom 88 are line officers, now pending. If these are accepted, there is no question but that many more will come in, and the only deterrent is either not to accept them, or to accept them as slowly as possible.

Of officers temporarily commissioned in the regular Navy, that is warrant officers, civilians, and enlisted men who were commissioned in the temporary Navy, and who could, if they had so wished, have held on to their commissions, over 11,300 have resigned from the line alone. These officers were in the grades of lieutenant, lieutenant junior grade, and ensign. They could have held these commissions if they had so desired; but the inducements were greater outside than the Navy offered them, so that they left us. Many of them were very excellent men, whom we were very desirous of keeping; but on a comparison between the conditions in the Navy and on the outside, it would seem that two-thirds of the officers who were commissioned into the regular service from sources other than the regular Naval Academy source, resigned in order to accept civilian employment, 200 of the medical officers of the regular service have resigned and the Medical Corps is to-day probably worse off than it has ever been.

It may be accepted as a fact that naval officers are not paid enough to induce them to remain in the service under present conditions, and in order to insure any rate of competency it will be necessary to pass some sort of a pay bill. That not only applies to the officers, but it applies tenfold to the men. Under present rates of pay, you can, of course, get officers in the lower grades, of ensign and junior lieutenant, officers of a kind; but they are not the officers we wish to keep and to promote on up through to higher grades.

None of our ships at the present time can be considered well officered. I think I might say that not one in the service is properly officered to-day, and not one can be considered as properly manned.

The condition is worse than it probably ever has been in the history of the Navy with reference to officer and enlisted man personnel. Officers of mature age, who have families, unless they have independent means, can not, under present circumstances, leave until they are assured of some employment outside, and for that reason we are holding the married ones more extensively than the single ones, who go out with no other ties to bind them.

Practically all the officers feel keenly their present financial condition. Increased rank, due to war promotion of all officers of over eight years' service, has made an increase of pay of from 11 to 15 per cent. This increase has been effective only since July 1, 1918, and has afforded utterly inadequate relief.

Prior to 1918 the last material raise of pay that the officers had was in 1899.

In general, the officers are in straitened circumstances, and are getting deeper and deeper involved. This can not result in effective service.

Most of the younger officers who are young enough to entertain the idea of accepting outside employment, are devoting their spare time in endeavoring to obtain this employment, and I have no doubt but if the resignations of those now pending are accepted, we will have a good many applications from others coming in right afterwards. At the present time the Secretary is holding up all of those who have had less than eight years' service. On the 1st of July we will have a large number of those 8-year men who will complete their service—of the class that graduated eight years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. The policy is to allow those who have had more than eight years service to resign if they see fit to do so?

Admiral WASHINGTON. The policy is, and my effort has been, to induce them to stay, and when they have come up to talk to me about it, I have held out the hope that something would be done, and in a short time they could probably get on their feet again. That has been my personal effort with them, because the Navy at the present time has practically one-half of the allowed number of officers, of Naval Academy graduates. It is just about one-half. We are allowed 5,449, and we have about 2,820; and we have this large number of resignations, about 88, now pending, which will practically reduce us to less than one-half; and that has been after four years to build it up from the Naval Academy. The Naval Academy will not fill up the line of the Navy for 10 years under the present circumstances.

In the matter of desertions among enlisted men it has become within the last six months appalling, and it has affected a class that we have never had show up that way before; that is, the petty officers and chief petty officers. During the last six months of 1919 there were 4,666 desertions from the Navy. Among these were 1,057 petty officers and senior rated men, of whom 60 were chief petty officers. We have never had a condition like that before. It has been a rare thing, indeed, that a chief petty officer would desert; but they are going now at the rate of so many a month.

During January of the present year there were 898 desertions, including 103 petty officers, of whom 13 were chief petty officers.

In February the number was smaller, due no doubt to the fact that the Atlantic Fleet was in southern waters, where desertion is very difficult; that is, there was no chance for them to leave the ship. Had they been north, I have every reason for believing that desertions would have been greater than in January. The total for the month of February, however, was 765, including the desertions of 60 petty officers, of whom 7 were chiefs.

I do not think that the history of the Navy will afford a condition of the enlisted personnel to parallel anything like that.

During the present year, 1920, the loss by expiration of enlistment of trained men will be, by actual expirations, 16,931, and of that 16,931, from the present outlook, I do not think we are going to get 10 per cent to stay with us.

During the year 1921 there will be 30,814 whose enlistments will expire, and if conditions continue, it may be that we will not get any of them. The result will be that we will have the Navy possibly 90 per cent manned by men on their first enlistments, and from those first enlistment men we have to make up our petty officers and chief petty officers.

We have at the present time, roughly, 101,000 men in the Navy. Of those nearly 70,000 are on their first enlistment—recruits. Now, if we add to that 70,000 these 30,000 who go out in 1921 and the 16,000 who go out in 1920, the present year, we will have left with us about 65,000 men who will have had less than three years' service in the Navy to-day. It is impossible to run efficiently a Naval Establishment on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. You will lose most of your best men?

Admiral WASHINGTON. We lose all of our best men. I do not say all of them, but we lose so many that I can almost say it is all. The reenlistments are very small.

These men write, and their families write, the most appealing letters to let them out; that they have not got enough money to support their families and they can not do it. They come to me daily, and the number of letters will probably run up in the hundreds every day.

In addition to that, you gentlemen probably know about the number that appeal to you.

We discharge daily an average of probably 30 on the requests of Members of Congress because of dependency. We examine each one of these cases, go into it as thoroughly as we can, and we do not let them go unless the dependency is shown to exist subsequent to their enlistment, or unless something for which this man is not really responsible has occurred since enlistment; and then we invariably let him go. I will read to you from the last two or three days' daily reports. I have only brought three with me, I see. Here is the one of March 25. We had 49 desertions. We discharged 161.

On April 6 there were 6 desertions and 77 discharged.

On April 7 there were 52 desertions and 124 discharged.

So that the Navy has shown since July of 1919 a rapid going down hill. It has been to a large extent due to desertions. The number of recruits that we get in just about balances the number that are discharged for one reason and another. It has hung around 101,000 to 104,000 now for about three months. The recruits that we get are not comparable in ability, capability, and development with what we had prior to the war. It is getting a little better in caliber now, but the good men are not coming into the Navy at \$32 per month. Most of our enlistments—practically 80 per cent of them—are for two years, because the men will not come for longer periods.

Now, I will take these reports I have just read to you, beginning with the one on March 25. These reports were picked up at random from the reports on my desk as I left.

Out of 91 recruits 70 enlisted only for two years. We can not develop a man—the best in the world—in two years and get any good out of him.

On April 6, out of 121, 61 of them were for two years, and only 1 of them was for four years.

On April 7, out of 74 recruits 54 were for two years and 3 for four years.

That has been the general run of them. I do not think the two, three, and four year ratios will in any manner change. They are practically holding at 75 to 80 to 85 per cent of two-year men. That means that we can not really send these men on a foreign cruise. We give them four years' training at a training station, and we are tempted to send them on a foreign cruise. If we sent them to a foreign station, we would have to bring them back within six months after they had arrived on the station, because of expiration of enlistment. The sole cause of this, or rather the cause of 95 per cent of it, is the low rate of pay which these men get. The department has repeatedly written to both committees of Congress and called attention to this going-down-hill condition of the enlisted personnel, once on August 28, to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs; on the 9th of September—

Senator TRAMMELL. What year; last year, 1919?

Admiral WASHINGTON. 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House?

Admiral WASHINGTON. No; of the Senate. On the 9th of September we wrote to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House, and on the 13th of November again to the House, and on the 20th of December to the Speaker of the House, and on the 13th of February to the Chairman of the House committee, and in these letters we endeavored to express to them—to the two committees—the unfortunate condition in which the enlisted personnel was getting.

I would not be so very much concerned about it if these desertions were not taking place from the petty officers. A petty officer of the Navy leaving us, disguising himself, and going into the Shipping Board or the Army Transport Service, can always get from three to four times the amount of clear pay that he would get from the Navy. He leaves us, and he goes alongside of a transport within 50 yards of him, and his pay is trebled. We can not increase our pay except by act of Congress. The other branches of the Government service, such as the Shipping Board and the Army Transport Service, to which I refer, have lump-sum appropriations, and they therefore can change their rates of pay to agree with the existing conditions.

In the foreign services they have realized this condition since the war, and all of the important foreign navies have raised the pay of their services from one and one-half to two and one-half times, and, as I understand it, they have done it largely with money borrowed from this country.

The reenlistments among the old men are practically nil. They are so small that they are practically negligible, and, furthermore, they are not the most desirable men who reenlist with us. The best men can get better jobs elsewhere.

The number of enlistments, notwithstanding the greatly increased efforts that we make throughout the country, has been going down since the armistice, beginning with January, 1919. We began voluntary enlistments in December of 1918, so that I have taken my figures from 1919. Our reenlistments have gone down from well up into the thousands to the present time, when the figure is only 813 for a month—that is, 813 out of a Navy of 104,000. That is an awful showing. The number of desertions has increased almost from month to month. The largest number of desertions was in December—1,035. The number for March—last month—was 882. The number of two-year enlisted men was 29,834, as against 2,126 for three years.

The number that we are giving their discharges to for one cause or another, but always sufficient and good, that is principally family dependency, was in January over 3,000, in February about 2,100, and in March about the same number, 2,400.

Now, in giving those discharges I have endeavored throughout to keep it down to the lowest limit possible, because we need the services of these men. We have brought them in at the Government expense and we have given them four months' training at the training stations; and yet I have got to let them go, because of the strong appeals of their families and dependents. We have stopped enlisting men who have any dependents, so far as we can find out at the time of enlistment; but many develop afterwards, and we have to let them go.

I think we let go possibly something about 30 per day on account of applications of Members of Congress from their districts.

The officer personnel has gone down not to as great an extent as the enlisted men, not in the same ratio; but as officers are harder to get and it takes longer to train them, the general effect has been much worse than that in the case of the men. We are at the present time short of regulars in the line of the Navy, 2,638 officers, 414 doctors 98 dentists, 380 supply officers, 57 chaplains, 155 constructors, 23 civil engineers. In other words we are short 3,765 officers, and we have got a total of about 4,300 left. We have afloat on the different ships in the dreadnaught class, 954 officers. We should have about 1,500.

On the predreadnaughts we have got 444. We should have about the same number, 1,500 there.

On the armored cruisers we have 207. They need about 1,200.

On the gunboats they have 60. They should have 150.

On the destroyers they have 875; they should have about 1,800.

On the submarines they have 269; we need about 400.

Those are line officers I am speaking of now.

The staff are proportional. I am just referring to the number of the line we need.

The Naval Academy this year will turn out about 290 officers, and resignations will pull that down to somewhere in the neighborhood of 200. At the present time we are short in the enlisted force, the authorized enlisted force, 68,529 men.

The monthly loss—that is, the loss by discharges in excess of recruits—is about 440.

On their first enlistment, on the 1st day of March, their first four-year period, there were 79,471 men out of a total of 101,911. In other words, we had about 21,000 men who had served in the Navy more than four years, and of these 21,000 men there are practically not more than 15 per cent of them reenlisting.

We polled one of the ships a short time ago, to get the petty officers who would be discharged within the next six months or a year, and out of the total number of petty officers on board that ship there was only one who announced his intention to reenlist. That was on one of the dreadnaughts.

I have here, if the committee wishes to hear it, the proportion of men forming the complements of these ships. It is very unsatisfactory reading; it is all adverse.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think it is necessary in order to get a general idea of the conditions. I think he has given us a pretty good general idea of the deplorable conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can sum it up in a general way, I think that would be enough.

Admiral WASHINGTON. I can sum it up in a general way, or I can read off some of these figures to show the unfortunate condition that we are in with reference to them.

In the Pacific Fleet—that is under the command of Admiral Wilson—the percentage of complements by ratings which will be left on board that squadron on the 1st of August, 1920, is shown here. I have taken one battleship as a sample, and that will be a fair sample of the rest of them, to give you an idea of how the petty officers will run after August 1, when their discharges take place, the balance of

those petty officers will be discharged before July 1, 1921. That is by the expiration of the enlistment of the rest of them—but on August 1, 1921, of boatswain's mates, first class, there was 61 per cent; boatswain's mates, second class, 30; coxswains, 22; gunners' mates, first class, 5 per cent; second class, 6 per cent; third class, 16 per cent; turret captains, 86; quartermasters, first class, 16 per cent; second class, 32 per cent; third class, 56; seamen, 21 per cent, seamen, second class—that is, new recruits—23 per cent (that is where we make up as much as possible for the deficiency); chief electricians, 70 per cent; electricians, first, second, and third class, average about 20 per cent; radio men, 47 per cent; carpenters, about 30 per cent; shipwrights, 93 per cent; shipfitters, 69 per cent; plumbers and fitters, 25 per cent; painters, about 50 per cent; chief machinist's mates, 67 per cent; machinists, first and second class, 60 per cent; engine men, about 35 per cent; water tenders, about 70; boilermakers, 80 per cent; blacksmiths, 25 per cent; coppersmiths, first class, none; second class, 37; firemen will run about 60 per cent.

That is typical of that battle fleet to-day. Our battleship fleet to-day we have manned by about 70 per cent of a crew, and we have destroyers turned over to us almost from week to week, and many of them probably have not more than two to four or six men on board. We have not got the men to put on to keep the machinery in order.

The CHAIRMAN. And about what percentage of officers?

Admiral WASHINGTON. We have just slightly above one-half of the number of line officers allowed by law.

Big destroyers should have six line officers, and that would require, roughly, about 1,800 officers. Our total of Naval Academy graduates to-day is about 2,120.

The CHAIRMAN. And the percentage of officers that the battle fleet has?

Admiral WASHINGTON. The percentage of Naval Academy officers is about 60 per cent. I did not figure it out, but that is small. We try to keep at least three Naval Academy graduates on each big destroyer, and fill up the complement by taking former warrant officers, or from the reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the pay in foreign navies is from one and one-half to two and one-half times what it was before the war.

Admiral WASHINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ours is how much more than it was before the war?

Admiral WASHINGTON. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the war?

Admiral WASHINGTON. I do not think it is anything. We have not had any raise in pay since 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The bills that are before Congress provide for an increase in pay. Do you think they would have the effect of stopping these desertions in the Navy and getting enlistments in the Navy?

Admiral WASHINGTON. It is the only way. You can take this table graphically represented here, and show the effect. When it seemed that Congress was going to pass a bill in December, you can see how the enlistments and reenlistments went up [indicating on table]; and then when the issue was sort of side-stepped, you can see

how it went back. You can see that curve there, which indicates how more favorable action was anticipated by the men.

At Bay Ridge, N. Y., we had some 1,200 to 1,400 men whose enlistments had expired or were about to expire. We are allowed to keep them two months. There were men there who had been 12 years to 16 years in the Navy, and we tried to get them to stay on the score that Congress was about to pass a bill for them so that they could make both ends meet; and these fellows held on there and that station was more or less crowded by these men waiting; and I intended to put them on Admiral Wilson's fleet in January. When Congress adjourned in December without any action several hundred of these men immediately asked for their discharge and it was given to them. We could not break faith with them. Others held on in the hope, that as we had stated, something would be done early in January to better their condition. January came and passed, and none of them went; and then the desertions began, and the desertions came of chief petty officers; and as I stated before, that is the most appalling feature of that to-day, to lose those petty officers in the way they are going. It hurts the morale. It has such a bad effect on these new men coming in, to see a petty officer or a chief petty officer, men who have been in the Navy from 8 years to 16 years, leaving it; and we do not get these men back. Rarely, indeed, does a chief petty officer come and surrender himself, and it is not really right, under the circumstances, to try to chase them up and punish them. The human side of the thing enters pretty largely into it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have shown us very largely and conclusively the critical condition of the personnel of the Navy, and your idea is that the remedy that must be applied and should be applied at once, is the increasing of the pay of both officers and men?

Admiral WASHINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we can not be too quick about doing it?

Admiral WASHINGTON. Mr. Chairman, it ought not to be delayed an hour. I am holding out inducements to these men from day to day, almost, to stay, in the hope that Congress is going to do something. As I said before, about 1,400 of these men, as I recollect, were willing to hold on. They are old-timers and they were holding on at the receiving ship in New York, with the hope that by December, before the adjournment of Congress—and we had every reason for hoping that—a bill would be passed. I let the information go out very generally, because I had been informed by the members of the House committee that that bill was very likely to go through before the Christmas recess. Those men were willing to stay and ship over and go south with Admiral Wilson's fleet.

The 1st of January came and no action, and the fleet went south and they were separated from their families, and their Navy pay is not enough to meet their expenses, and they naturally asked for their discharge, and it was given to them. And then, to make matters worse, the comptroller rendered an opinion to the effect that those men who went out of service and then reenlisted with us could not get the \$60 bonus that Congress gave them, so that by going out and leaving us as they did, they got \$60 to start with, and that is where I say that this \$60 bonus is an inducement for those men to leave. They have at least had \$60 to start in life with.

I can get many of those men to come back, I think, and if they come back within 60 days they will get the benefit of their previous service, which is a matter of great importance to them; and I believe they will come back, many of them, and it is the only outlook I have that is favorable at this time. I do not believe that the recruits we are getting are going to develop into proper naval men under four years' service, and 70 to 80 per cent of those men are two-year men, and we can not train a man in two years and make a chief petty officer of him.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, gentlemen?

Admiral WASHINGTON. I believe that the only solution of this personnel matter is to have immediate action on the pay bill. It must be taken if we are going to hold the men. A man will not stay with us for \$32 when the Shipping Board or the Army Transport Service will give him \$100 plus his subsistence.

I do not know whether the committee is aware of the different rates of pay which the Navy has to compete with, because it is quite illuminating. I have a few of them here. First, take the apprentice seaman. That is when we enlist a man for the first time, and we give him \$32.60 a month. That man can go to an Army transport or to a Shipping Board vessel and he immediately gets \$75, and then he gets \$1.50 to \$2 a day for subsistence and other expenses. I am sorry that I have not the complete tables here.

A seaman, second class, which is the next rating, gets with us \$35.60. With the Army Transport Service and the Shipping Board he gets \$100 plus his allowance.

In the engine room, boiler room, or fire room force we start them in the first rates at \$48.70. They start them at \$130 a month.

A ship cook with us, a first-class man that is qualified and has been with us possibly 4, 8, or 12 years, we try to retain him at \$52. They immediately start him at his initial employment at \$135.

A chief commissary steward with us, who is a man who has been probably 4 years to 16 years in service in the Navy, is started at \$83. The Shipping Board and the Transport Service start that same man at \$135, and in addition to that he gets allowances which figure up to some \$60. In other words, he gets more than three times his Navy pay. And those people bid for our trained men. I believe if the Congress were to pass a bill, at least so far as the men are concerned, I believe that this condition in the enlisted personnel would be immediately cured.

Admiral Wilson shows that on one of the battleships in his fleet 62 per cent of the crew are only 19 years of age. Now, that is the best we can do. They are mere boys.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Bureau of Navigation and the Secretary of the Navy have been urging this raise in Congress, as I understand; have you?

Admiral WASHINGTON. They have urged it in writing and urged it in person. The Secretary himself made recommendations as far back as last November, and since then he has followed them up by three letters to the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee and to the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, and there were others.

Senator TRAMMELL. He recommended increased pay both for the officers and enlisted men?

Admiral WASHINGTON. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. The remedy, then, is for Congress to pass a pay bill increasing the salaries for both officers and enlisted men? That ought to correct this, in your opinion?

Admiral WASHINGTON. That is the only thing, so far as I can see, that will have an immediate effect, and I believe that that effect will be strictly beneficial. The pleas that come in to me from day to day there—and they run up into the scores—are heart-rending on the part of these men. They are separated from their families and their families are away at home, and they can not make both ends meet. Their wives are at work, and they can not even make all that is necessary, under those circumstances, and it appeals to me to such an extent that almost invariably I let them go. It is better to have fewer men, possibly, that are contented, than a lot of men that are discontented; but you can not let them all go.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any recommendations as to legislation as to bonuses or terms of enlistment that you would make now, or is this other the critical question?

Admiral WASHINGTON. This is the critical question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would not interfere in any way with the present law?

Admiral WASHINGTON. No, sir; I think that if Congress will pass the measures that are now before the House and Senate conferees. I believe that the problem will be to a considerable extent solved. At least, it should be tried. The conditions are approaching a condition almost that portends disaster. We have not got now, to-day, a ship that is thoroughly and efficiently manned. Well, that is possibly putting it a little strong.

Admiral WILSON. That is right.

Admiral WASHINGTON. But there is not a vessel in there that is manned as we would have her manned if it was possible to do otherwise; but the circumstances are such that you can not do otherwise, and the whole difficulty lies, I think, with Congress' inaction on that measure. These men have been in the service anywhere from 4 to 20 years, and they can not stay any longer.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say that I had a talk yesterday with the Secretary of the Navy about our plan to have Admiral Washington come before us, and he heartily approved of the plan.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other questions, Senator?

Senator BALL. No.

Senator KEYES. I have none.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Admiral Washington, for the very valuable information you have given us.

Admiral WASHINGTON. Not at all, sir. I would like to insert in this record these valuable tables, which I have not referred to, but which I think will be very illuminating on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The tables referred to are here printed in the record as follows:)

Officer personnel, Mar. 1, 1920.

| | Allowed regular and temporary until June 30, 1920. | Allowed regular and temporary for 137,485 enlisted men. | Regulars in service Mar. 1, 1920. | Temporaries in service Mar. 1, 1920. | United States Naval Reserve Force on active duty. | Shortage of regulars Mar. 1, 1920. | Shortage of regulars Jan. 1, 1920. | Average monthly loss from Jan 1, 1920, to Feb. 28, 1920. |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Medical..... | 6,800 | 5,499 | 2,827 | 2,438 | 864 | 2,672 | 2,638 | 17 |
| Dental..... | 1,393 | 1,167 | 734 | 366 | 196 | 433 | 414 | 10 |
| Supply..... | 213 | 179 | 114 | 29 | | 99 | 98 | 1 |
| Boat repair..... | 816 | 660 | 286 | 387 | 96 | 374 | 380 | 3 |
| Boat repair..... | 171 | 144 | 87 | 11 | 17 | 57 | 57 | |
| Professional..... | 10 | 10 | 10 | | | | | |
| Instructor..... | 340 | 275 | 129 | 152 | 39 | 146 | 155 | 4 1/2 |
| Chief engineer..... | 136 | 110 | 85 | 10 | 32 | 25 | 23 | 1 |
| Total..... | 9,879 | 8,044 | 4,272 | 3,393 | 1,244 | 3,806 | 3,765 | 36 |

Service of Regular officers since commissioning.

| | |
|------------------------|-----|
| 40 years and over..... | 44 |
| 35-40 years..... | 46 |
| 30-35 years..... | 94 |
| 25-30 years..... | 135 |
| 20-25 years..... | 267 |
| 15-20 years..... | 672 |
| 10-15 years..... | 779 |
| 5-10 years..... | 920 |

| Employment. | Line. | | Staff. | Chief warrant. | Warrant. | Reserve. | Total. |
|-------------------|----------|------------|--------|----------------|----------|----------|--------|
| | Regular. | Temporary. | | | | | |
| Sea: | | | | | | | |
| Feb. 1, 1920..... | 1,928 | 1,805 | 1,216 | 59 | 858 | 539 | 6,405 |
| Mar. 1, 1920..... | 1,924 | 1,785 | 1,219 | 60 | 833 | 475 | 6,296 |
| Shore: | | | | | | | |
| Feb. 1, 1920..... | 777 | 675 | 1,130 | 114 | 425 | 752 | 13,873 |
| Mar. 1, 1920..... | 773 | 649 | 1,123 | 113 | 410 | 747 | 13,815 |

1 Does not include officers in hospitals, on sick leave, or waiting orders.

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Readnoughts..... | 954 |
| Redreadnoughts..... | 444 |
| Armored cruisers..... | 207 |
| Gunboats..... | 60 |
| Destroyers..... | 875 |
| Submarines..... | 269 |
| Prospective gains, Naval Academy graduating class of June, 1920..... | 290 |
| Losses, Feb. 1 to Mar. 1, 1920: | |
| Deaths..... | 7 |
| Resignations..... | 14 |
| Dismissals..... | 5 |
| Desertions..... | 1 |

Naval enlisted personnel, Mar. 1, 1920.

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Allowed by law up to July 1, 1920..... | 170,000 |
| In service Mar. 1, 1920 (from daily reports, file room)..... | 101,471 |
| Shortage..... | 68,529 |
| In service Feb. 1, 1920 (from daily reports, file room)..... | 101,911 |
| Total recruited and received for February..... | 3,227 |
| Monthly loss..... | 440 |

Quality of men in service Mar. 1, 1920.

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------|
| First enlistments | 79.47 |
| Reenlistments | 22.00 |
| Apprentice seamen, about | 28.00 |
| Seamen, second class, about | 24.00 |
| Messmen branch, about | 7.00 |
| Desertions, Feb. 1 | 7.00 |
| Discharged, February (not up to standard) | 1.25 |
| Number in trade schools, about | 4.70 |
| Graduated since Jan. 1, 1920 | 5.00 |

Employment.

| | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| At sea : | | |
| Mar. 1, 1920 | | 66.12 |
| Feb. 1, 1920 | 65,862 | |
| Under training : | | |
| Mar. 1, 1920 | | 15.73 |
| Feb. 1, 1920 | 15,786 | |
| At shore establishments : | | |
| Mar. 1, 1920 | | 14.57 |
| Feb. 1, 1920 | 14,277 | |
| Replacements : | | |
| Mar. 1, 1920 | | 5.38 |
| Feb. 1, 1920 | 5,986 | |
| From ships and station reports | 101,911 | 101.47 |
| Dreadnoughts, predreadnoughts, armored cruisers, cruisers, gunboats, destroyers, and submarines | | 41.10 |

(At 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow Saturday, April 10, 1920, at 10'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Fletcher, will you resume the stand? Senator Pittman, you have some questions, I believe, to ask Admiral Fletcher.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL F. F. FLETCHER—Resumed.

Senator PITTMAN. In virtue of the way the cross-examination seems to be drifting, and the statement of the chairman with regard to the purposes of the committee, I wish to read the authority of the committee in this investigation. The resolution adopted constituting this committee for this last investigation reads as follows:

That the subcommittee heretofore appointed to investigate the matter of awards made by the Navy Department for distinguished and heroic services be, and it hereby is, authorized and directed, on making its reports on the matter referred to, to investigate and report on the matters referred to in the letter of Admiral Sims to the Navy Department in criticism of its action touching operations during the war, introduced before the said subcommittee.

The chief charge in the letter of Admiral Sims touching operations during the war was to the effect that the course of the Navy Department delayed the war four months, and caused the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping and 500,000 lives, and the needless expenditure of \$15,000,000,000. In your opinion, is that true?

Admiral FLETCHER. In my opinion that statement is without any foundation upon facts, and is wholly without value.

Senator PITTMAN. The cross-examination by the chairman yesterday seemed to have two purposes; in the first place, to establish the inferiority of our Navy, and in the second place, to establish that at some particular period of time prior to the war the Navy Department had not done exactly what it ought to do. What was the Navy's chief problem in carrying out this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. The chief problem of the Navy was to see that we got an Army across the Atlantic into France, where the war would be terminated on the western battle front.

Senator PITTMAN. The chief problem, then, was transportation?

Admiral FLETCHER. The chief problem was to afford transportation to our Army across the Atlantic.

Senator PITTMAN. What Army did we have on the beginning of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. We had a comparatively small Army: very insignificant as compared to the requirements of this war.

Senator PITTMAN. Were you present at any conference with Admiral DeChair with reference to the necessity for the immediate transportation of food supplies to the Allies, or to England?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not remember any conversation upon that specific point, except that we discussed in general the conditions with which we were confronted at that time when he was over here, and I think that was just a short time before we entered the war.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you make any effort to ascertain what length of time England could hold out with the food supplies she was then receiving?

Admiral FLETCHER. That matter was discussed, because in my estimation that was a very important point. Of course, I naturally wanted information upon that. I was upon the committee appointed by the Government to receive the English commission headed by Mr. Balfour, who brought over from England all the latest information as to the situation and the conditions and requirements. I remember of having a conversation upon that subject, of just how long England could hold out against the submarine menace. It was a very important point, and I think it had been very carefully considered. The information that I received was to the effect that if the submarine menace had continued as serious as it was at that time, England would have been able to have held out until the following March; that is, the March of 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the principal object of your making that inquiry of the English authorities?

Admiral FLETCHER. It bore on this fact, that it gave some indication as to the urgency of what we ought to do under those conditions.

Senator PITTMAN. Of course there was an urgency for us to get into the war as fast as we could, was there not, Admiral?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not quite catch that.

Senator PITTMAN. I say there was an urgency that we should throw all the forces we could into this fight as soon as possible!

Admiral FLETCHER. That we should throw all the forces we could into the fight?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. And that we should do everything we could in our power, to stop the submarine menace at the earliest possible date; but in doing so you must weigh the risk that you take as to the gain that you obtain from it. In other words, it depends upon how urgent the situation is and just how far, in this particular case, you should leave your own shores entirely unprotected.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, Admiral, there were a great many things we were required to do all at once, and in many cases we had to determine which was the most urgent, did we not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Exactly. It was a question of judgment and policy.

Senator PITTMAN. In your opinion, what was the greatest problem that our Government had to face in its preparation to win this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. I would say, to throw all our energy into combating the submarine menace, which at that time was the most critical part of the war on the sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did our Navy Department do that?

Admiral FLETCHER. As far as I know, they did. I do not know just what they did, because I was not connected with the operations of the fleet.

Senator PITTMAN. Was the preparation of an army one of our chief problems in this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. The creation of a trained and well-equipped army in France was, to my mind, the great problem of the war, and the mission of this country.

Senator PITTMAN. And you have already outlined in your testimony the tremendous obstacles that were to be overcome in the creation of that army?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, as I understood your conclusions, the chief obstacle to the creation of that army was the lack of production?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is correct. There were other causes, such as the time required to train the men. But that did not come under my direct observation.

Senator PITTMAN. There had to be places to house them and places prepared in which they might be trained, which bore on the question of production?

Admiral FLETCHER. And of training; yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. I gathered from Admiral Sims's testimony before this committee that he is of the opinion that all the naval operations should have been directed from London. What is your opinion in regard to that?

Admiral FLETCHER. I will say that that is an erroneous opinion, and to my mind impracticable.

Senator PITTMAN. Why do you think it is impracticable?

Admiral FLETCHER. Because the military or naval operations of a country depend very much upon the policy of the country; and, furthermore, it must be directed from some central source; that is the advantage of situation, grasping the whole theory of war, and all that is required, and should not be viewed from any one point of view; that for a military or naval officer in the field, so to speak, he is there to carry out the policy—the military operations required by the policy—of the Government, as directed by the Navy Department.

Senator PITTMAN. During my cross-examination of Admiral Sims touching the policy on the beginning of the war, of the Navy Department in protecting our own coast, I suggested that that was a technical question upon which the naval experts might differ, and the Admiral said that it was only a matter of common sense; that we might know that this coast was not subject to an attack, and there was no such intention. Now, what is your opinion in regard to that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I will agree that it is a matter of common sense and good judgment.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to know what your judgment is in regard to the policy that was pursued on the beginning of the war of protecting our own coast?

Senator PITTMAN. What Army did we have on the beginning of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. We had a comparatively small Army: insignificant as compared to the requirements of this war.

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Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I will agree that it is a matter of common sense and good judgment.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to know what your judgment is in regard to the policy that was pursued on the beginning of the war of protecting our own coast.

Admiral FLETCHER. My opinion is that we should have sent all available small craft that we could reasonably spare from this coast across to fight the submarine menace; but I think it would have been a very bad policy to have left this coast without any protection before we saw what phase this problem would assume, and I think that if we had left our coast entirely unprotected, and several submarines had appeared off our coast, it would have been very unfortunate; that the slight delay that may have been—if there was any—was of very minor importance as compared to the disaster that might otherwise have occurred.

Senator PITTMAN. Germany did possess submarines that she could have placed on this coast at that time, did she not?

Admiral FLETCHER. They did have submarines that they could have sent over here and it was incomprehensible to all the naval men on this side as to why she did not send them.

Senator PITTMAN. If she had sent over submarines right on the beginning of the war to our coast, what might have been the effect of it if our coast had been unprotected?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I think it would have caused, to put it mildly, great consternation in this country, and would have had a very unfortunate influence upon subsequent operations. You could imagine that had we sent all our small craft abroad, and had the German submarines then appeared, they would have had to have been called back from across the Atlantic; and I doubt that this country would have been satisfied to have again sent them across the Atlantic without a great deal of difficulty. It would have delayed our subsequent operations.

Senator PITTMAN. It is very probable that Germany was very well informed as to our actions on this side at the beginning of the war. is it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. There is no doubt about it.

Senator PITTMAN. And if we had denuded our coast of protection. Germany would have known it?

Admiral FLETCHER. I believe she would, unquestionably.

Senator PITTMAN. And she would have been more apt to have sent her submarines over in that event than in the condition that actually existed?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. So that I think your answer, then, explains what you mean by saying that it was a matter of common sense.

You state that in your opinion we should have spared all of the destroyers that we could to meet the submarine menace. Did we do so, in your opinion?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not go into that problem in detail at the time, but my general impression is that we took prompt steps toward sending destroyers over there in the course of the first few days, within the first month or more of the commencement of hostilities. But you can get that information, I think, from Admiral McKean.

Senator PITTMAN. We have had some testimony on that, of course.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Mine is only general.

Senator PITTMAN. Was there any extensive enlargement of the Navy prior to 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. I beg your pardon?

Senator PITTMAN. What I am getting at is, the cross-examination here seems to attempt to arouse a criticism that our Navy was not large enough.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is proper for the Senator to impute a motive in the cross-examination.

Senator PITTMAN. I naturally thought that you had some intention, and if that is not it, I do not know what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your lookout.

Senator PITTMAN. I am looking out. The opinion I gathered from the cross-examination—and of course if I am wrong the chairman can correct me—was that it was an attempt to develop the fact that the Navy Department had been derelict in its duty in not having a larger naval force upon the outbreak of this war. Now, that is what I was getting at. You have already testified that it takes years to build up a Navy. Do you know, prior to 1916, what progress there was made toward building up the Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. The progress that we made in building up the Navy has been determined absolutely by the appropriations by Congress.

Senator PITTMAN. In 1916, I believe it was, the General Board of the Navy recommended certain increased personnel for the Navy, and under date of November 9, 1916, placed the number of men we should have during the fiscal year 1917 for all requirements, the smallest number, at 67,000, and in 1917, with a full complement for all ships ready for service in 1917, and the minimum number for shore stations, that we should have 74,700.

Subsequently the board revised those figures to 67,865. In other words, the General Board of the Navy reported almost a double increase in personnel at that time, as I take it.

On October 10, 1916, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation made the following report to the Secretary of the Navy:

Appreciation of the immediate needs of the service has been shown to be nationwide, and in the recent naval appropriation bill Congress carried out the wishes of the people by enacting legislation of far-reaching importance. This includes a provision for an immediate "authorized enlisted strength" of 68,700 men and 6,000 apprentice seamen, a total of 74,700. Preparation for the future was not neglected and the same bill authorized the President in emergency to increase the authorized enlisted strength to 87,000. It is evident that Congress considered the present needs of the Naval Service in deciding on this number at this time, as the usual additional allowance of apprentice seamen, 6,000, would provide for an actual enlisted strength of the Regular Navy of 93,000.

It is interesting to note that the above figure closely approximates the bureau's preliminary estimate of 93,957, which provides for the number of enlisted men (including average sick allowance) necessary to fill the billets in 1921, the year of completion of almost all of the present program. From 5 to 10 per cent should be added to this for increased complements and working surplus, and the authorized enlisted strength should be increased to this number in time for the necessary recruiting and training.

In your opinion does not that indicate that the recommendations of the General Board were put into force by Congress in 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am speaking only from memory, and my general knowledge that the General Board recommended something like an increase of 30,000 men, and by act of Congress they increased the personnel of the Navy by 28,000 men, about, I think, August, 1916.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; so that at that time the personnel of the Navy was in good condition?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Was the personnel of the Navy continued in good condition until we entered the war in 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think it was considered in good condition. The active personnel engaged in operations afloat were well trained and well drilled and up to a high standard.

Senator PITTMAN. In 1916 the General Board recommended a Navy program; did it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I believe they did.

Senator PITTMAN. That program involved a great increase not only in the personnel of the Navy but in the ships of the Navy, did it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. The program, I think, that you refer to, is what is known as the five-year program, and that provided——

Senator PITTMAN. Which Congress made the three-year program out of? That is the one I refer to.

Admiral FLETCHER. A three-year program?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. And that did provide for quite a considerable increase.

Senator PITTMAN. Our Navy protected to its full capacity and ability the transportation of food and materials and soldiers to the allies, did it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. That was the duty and the obligation of the Navy in the war—the chief duty and obligation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Under the conditions of this war, that was the principal objective of the Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. And without regard to the advisability of whether we should have had a larger Navy or not, the Navy we did have fully performed its services?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I think that is a correct statement.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that I have any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman has made a statement as to what the principal charges were in the letter of Admiral Sims to the department, and I would like to insert in the record here section 78 of Admiral Sims's letter, which sums up the charges that are made in this letter of Admiral Sims. I think it will appear very evident that there are other matters contained in the letter besides the charge that the war was delayed for a specific period.

(The section of the letter referred to is here printed in the record as follows:)

78. The above brief account of the manner in which our naval operations were conducted clearly shows that the following grave errors were committed in violation of fundamental military principles; and it is manifestly desirable that such violations should be avoided in the future:

(1) Although war with Germany had been imminent for many months prior to its declaration there were nevertheless no mature plans developed or naval policy adopted in preparation for war, in so far as its commander in Europe was informed.

(2) The Navy Department did not announce a policy until three months after war was declared—at least, not to its representatives and the commander of its forces in Europe.

(3) The Navy Department did not enter whole-heartedly into the campaign for many months after we declared war, thus putting a great strain upon the morale of the fighting forces in the war area by decreasing their confidence in their leaders.

4) The outbreak of hostilities found many important naval units widely dispersed, and in need of repairs before they could be sent to the critical area.

Destroyers arriving in the war zone had been cruising extensively off our seaboard and in the Caribbean, and when war was declared were rushed through a brief and inadequate preparation for distant service.

(5) During the most critical months of the enemy submarine campaign against the allied lines of communication the department violated the fundamental strategical principle of concentration of maximum force in the critical area of the conflict.

(6) The department's representative with the allied admiralities was not supported during the most critical months of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could have been supplied.

(7) The department's commander in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his principal subordinates and was not even consulted as to their assignment. A fundamental principle of the art of command is here involved.

(8) The Navy Department made and acted upon decisions concerning operations that were being conducted 3,000 miles away, when the conditions were such that full information could not have been in its possession, thus violating an essential precept of warfare that sound decisions necessarily depend upon complete information.

(9) Instead of relying upon the judgment of those who had had actual war experience in this particular warfare, the Navy Department, though lacking not only this experience, but also lacking adequate information concerning it, insisted upon a number of plans that could not be carried out.

(10) Many of the department's actions so strongly implied a conviction that it was the most competent to make decisions concerning operations in the war zone that the result was an impression that it lacked confidence in the judgment of its representative on the council of the Allies and its responsible commander in the "field."

It is a fundamental principle that every action on the part of superior authorities should indicate confidence in subordinates. If such confidence is lacking, it should immediately be restored by ruthlessly changing the subordinate.

(11) "To interfere with the commander in the field or afloat is one of the most common temptations to the Government—and is generally disastrous." (The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan.)

The Navy Department did not resist this temptation, and its frequent violation of this principle was the most dangerous error committed during the naval war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you have stated that our coast was subject to attack by German submarines at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that therefore it was necessary to keep vessels over here to protect our coast; and that it would have been inadvisable to have sent them abroad, because later they would probably have had to be brought back to this country. Now, Admiral Sims in his recommendations explained to the department that the critical place where the submarines should be attacked by our Navy, and the critical place that should be defended by our Navy was over on the other side, and he took the ground that we should send our ships over—all available ships—as soon as possible, in order to handle the situation over there. His recommendations were not immediately followed. Subsequently, however, they were followed, and his recommendations were adopted. Does that not indicate to you, Admiral, that he was right, and that the people on this side who had charge of the plans of the department were wrong?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I can not say that that necessarily follows. It is so easy to say that if you had done something else, things would have been different, and better. I can readily understand how Admiral Sims, from his point of view, which was necessarily limited under the conditions which surrounded him, would do, as you state, and as he recommended, would put them all right where they could carry out his ideas, on the task that confronted him immediately; but I do not think that, reviewing the whole broad situation, that was a correct view.

The CHAIRMAN. But the department subsequently adopted his plans.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And his recommendations.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we won the war.

Admiral FLETCHER. As the war developed, we saw and could readily determine the probability of submarines coming to this coast, and we very rapidly developed a defense to meet them, and as rapidly as we developed that defense every available craft we could operate here was sent abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, you say that if we had sent these ships over very early in the war Germany would then have undoubtedly sent more submarines over to this country to attack our shipping over here, and that that would have caused us to bring back our ships from the other side. If that is true, why did not Germany send some submarines over here so as to prevent our sending ships over there?

Admiral FLETCHER. As I stated before, it was incomprehensible to us why she did not do it, and the only reason we can assume for her not doing it was because we retained enough craft on this coast to provide against any contingency of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not do it; and if you judge from events Admiral Sims's recommendations were right, were they not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think not. I can not agree with that view.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have not heard an explanation why not.

Senator PITTMAN. We did not send all our ships over there.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that in your opinion operations should not have been directed from the other side. I think you mean by that that the general plan should be dictated from this side, and that the carrying out of the operations should be made on the other side. Is not that so?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is right; yes, sir. The carrying out of the details of the plan should be left, as far as practicable, to the superior officer in the field of operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you not think that the recommendations of the superior officer in the field of operations, about ships that he would need to carry out his detailed operations, should carry very great weight?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the chief problem was to get a thoroughly equipped army over on the other side.

Admiral FLETCHER. That was the chief mission of this country in the war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the only way to do that was by transporting them over to the other side, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. That was a very important feature.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an essential element of their being on the other side?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would give it as your opinion that those troops should be thoroughly trained on this side before they were carried over?

Admiral FLETCHER. They should be trained as far as practicable, and the amount of training that they would receive would depend upon the urgency of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are not a military expert as far as land troops are concerned?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not attempt to maintain that?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I am speaking only from a general point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Admiral FLETCHER. I would say that the amount of training that our troops received on this side depended upon the urgency with which they were needed on the other side. If the situation became very urgent, of course we would send them over with less training than we would like to give them.

The CHAIRMAN. And an equally important item, so far as those troops are concerned, would be the feeding of them, the supplying them with provisions and whatever they needed while they were over there, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is very essential, particularly in war.

The CHAIRMAN. It is equally important with carrying them over?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that anything that would delay the transportation of the troops, if they were otherwise ready, or that would prevent us supplying them after they got over there, would essentially tend to protract the war, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Naturally, yes, sir; that would. Any delay in getting our Army over there, speaking generally, would cause a prolongation of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you say you do not think that the failure to send ships over or to follow out Admiral Sims's recommendations, prolonged the war a single day?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that because the troops were not in your opinion ready to go over at that time in large numbers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Were not equipped and not supplied. I repeat that we could have sent a million men over there four or five months sooner than we did, and they would not have constituted an army.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the most effective work that the Navy did during the war, in general?

Admiral FLETCHER. The most effective work, I should say, was combating the submarine menace, the protection of the transportation of our troops across the Atlantic, and the laying of the North Sea barrage. Those were the three outstanding features.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think they did a good deal to combat the submarine menace?

Admiral FLETCHER. A great deal; yes, sir. They did very active and very efficient work.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think, after they took hold over there that that had a great deal to do with checking the losses on account of submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. A great deal to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you not say, therefore, that the sooner they got at it the better?

Admiral FLETCHER. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in view of the fact that during the first two months of the war the submarine losses were greater than at any

other time during the war, if we had been able to send ships over there it would have done a great deal to cut down those losses, would it not as it did later on?

Admiral FLETCHER. It would have done a great deal. The sooner we got into it, of course, the more shipping would have been saved. But, in addition to our getting into it, there are a great many other features that tended to decrease the submarine menace, besides the active operations of our forces.

The CHAIRMAN. But that had a great deal to do with it, had it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. It had a great deal to do with it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall when Mr. Balfour was over here? You referred in your testimony to Mr. Balfour's visit to this country. Do you recall when that was?

Admiral FLETCHER. I was appointed on a committee with Assistant Secretary Long of the State Department and Gen. Wood representing the Army, to go to Halifax and receive the commission, and I was with that commission several days; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am speaking from memory, but I think it was in March, 1917. I will have to verify that date.

The CHAIRMAN. April, 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. It must have been April, Mr. Chairman, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk with him personally, at that time—with Mr. Balfour?

Admiral FLETCHER. I had some conversation with him, but only of a general nature; nothing of a specific or of a detailed character that pertained to naval matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not bring out, when he was over here, the extreme importance of the putting down of the submarine menace? Was that not one of the principal things that he was advising our country upon?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct. That is my impression, that that commission did emphasize very strongly the importance of the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say that England could have held out with the supplies that she had on hand, until the following March? I do not want to quote you incorrectly.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, that is correct, except as to limiting it to the supplies on hand. It not only included the supplies on hand, the supplies in reserve, the supplies in the warehouses and the stores, but it included the supplies of the harvest that was coming on in the next year, it included the supplies that could be gotten through the submarine zone, the war zone, and all the imports that would come into the country for the next year.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you mean if she could bring her supplies in without interference from submarines, she could have kept up?

Admiral FLETCHER. It meant that in spite of the loss of shipping that was taking place, a certain amount of supplies could always be gotten into England until the shipping was reduced——

The CHAIRMAN. What do you base that on; upon what losses per month?

Admiral FLETCHER. I presume that was based upon what was taking place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What rate was that?

Admiral FLETCHER. About 800,000 tons, I think, a month.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the rate of loss of 800,000 tons per month, you think that England could have kept up until the following March?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. A short time ago we had Mr. Hoover before us, and I think Mr. Hoover was fairly familiar with food conditions at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And he said, "It is obvious that the war would have come to an end in almost a month if the supplies were cut off."

Admiral FLETCHER. If the supplies were cut off the war would come to an end very promptly.

The CHAIRMAN. That England had no supplies, practically, on hand and that would enable her to go on; that she depended entirely upon the supplies that she got in from the outside.

Admiral FLETCHER. And upon what she could have raised during the summer.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with a conference which was held in this country, where the officers, the representatives of the foreign Governments, were here?

Admiral FLETCHER. I was present at that conference which took place in the room of the general board, and at which were present the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Operations, the admiral representing the English Government, Admiral Browning, and Admiral Grassot, of the French Navy, Admiral Mayo, and several other officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall anything that happened at that conference?

Admiral FLETCHER. I recall in a general way that there was a discussion of the situation as it existed at that time, and as to what steps we could most effectively take to aid the Allies, and I recall particularly the discussion in reference to the situation in the Atlantic and the North Atlantic and the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, and that we arranged then and there what part of the patrol of the ocean we should take and the part assigned to the French and the part assigned to the English.

We also discussed the question of convoy and how best the ships to carry supplies could be protected, whether by single armaments, or by convoys. That is what I remember, in general, of the conference—the ground that it covered.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether anything was said about the gravity of the submarine menace at that time, and whether any demand was made on us that we do everything we could to help out?

Admiral FLETCHER. We discussed the submarine menace in general but no stress was laid upon the gravity of it in that conference. It was generally recognized that that was a very important and serious matter to deal with, and I think that the steps that were taken subsequently in detail to carry out our general ideas were taken by arrangement with the Chief of Operations and in conference with these officers. That I can not tell you in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was not looked on as a particularly important part of the conference—that question?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not that, except in a general way.

The CHAIRMAN. In his testimony the other day Admiral Wilson said, referring to this conference:

Before the conference ended, the Secretary of the Navy turned to the visiting flag officers and told them that he had noted the facts and suggestions given in the communications from their admiralties which they had read; that they could inform their admiralties that our Navy Department "accepted them in principle," and agreed that vessels of our Navy would be sent overseas to cooperate with the naval forces of our associates.

These communications, as I recollect them, while suggesting the manner in which our Navy could best help the Allies, and stating their needs as to types of ships, did not express any dire need for help or great urgency for it.

You agree with that statement, do you?

Admiral FLETCHER. As I have just said, we discussed it in general but there was no particular stress laid upon the urgency of the case as regards submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. In his testimony of March 30, 1920, Admiral Mayo states—and the admiral was present at that meeting, was he not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Admiral Mayo and Admiral Wilson, as I remember it, were present at this conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Rear Admiral Mayo testified as follows:

At this conference Vice Admiral Browning explained the mission of his force, and read a communication from the British Admiralty interrogating the representatives of the United States as to the nature of the assistance the United States Navy was prepared to render, and stating the desire of the British Admiralty for assistance especially in antisubmarine craft. Rear Admiral Grasset explained the mission of his division and requested that the United States assist in the patrol of the Caribbean.

Admiral FLETCHER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the language of the statement in Admiral Mayo's testimony?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate that they called very special attention to the submarine situation, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not very especially, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. I have read it.

Admiral FLETCHER. But they did call attention to it. Now, I recall—I am speaking only from memory, I made no notes at that time—I think that the French did ask, and all they asked for was 12 vessels, small craft, to go to the coast of France.

The CHAIRMAN. But the British were the ones that were handling the submarine situation principally on the other side, were they not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Principally; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, whatever the French were doing was practically under the British?

Admiral FLETCHER. Principally; but it also included the French coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; under British command everywhere, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. It centered around the British Isles more than it did in the other theaters of war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The allied naval command was British, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. The allied naval command?

The CHAIRMAN. Was under the British?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other side, in European waters; in war-zone waters?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. I think the commands were independent; but that they coordinated with each other to a common end. I do not think that the French Navy was placed under British command at all. It was entirely independent, and so was the Italian Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically as ours was?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; it was not placed under the control of the British as ours was.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir. Admiral Wilson can tell you more accurately than I can; but that was my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony does not quite agree with Admiral Mayo's, then, about the importance that was laid upon the submarine menace at this conference.

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think that my testimony differs very much, Mr. Chairman; but we did recognize the importance of the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. The Admiral states in his account of this meeting, and of the communications from the other side, that Admiral Browning, who, of course, represented the British, read a communication from the British Admiralty interrogating the representatives of the United States as to the nature of the assistance the United States Navy was prepared to render, and stating the desire of the British Admiralty for assistance especially in antisubmarine craft.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an account of the statement of Admiral Browning?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I will accept that statement of Admiral Mayo. That accords entirely with my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore that was a very important matter, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I always recognized the submarine menace, as I said before, as a very urgent and important matter.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was brought before that conference that it was a question of great importance?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; it was brought before that conference, and certainly considered.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, if there was any delay in sending ships over that were needed, upon the recommendations of Admiral Sims, and if there was any delay following his other recommendations—any delay that could have been avoided—on whom would the responsibility rest?

Admiral FLETCHER. If there was an unnecessary delay?

The CHAIRMAN. Any unnecessary delay; yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. In sending our craft abroad when they were not needed on this coast, the responsibility for that is fully up to the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Navy Department—this particular question that we are discussing refers to the question of the operations of the fleet. It would come under that general head.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a question of policy, rather, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Of policy, and the operation of the fleet; yes, sir. And that, of course, would be up to the Chief of Operations and

the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Navy and his advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. But the ultimate responsibility under the organization now would be with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. The ultimate responsibility would be with the head of the department; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made certain statements to-day, Admiral, about the question of the personnel of the Navy.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall want to look over your statement on that matter, and it is probably that at some future date the committee may want you to come before them again to explain certain matters connected with your statement.

Admiral FLETCHER. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And also any other matters, of course, that may occur to us at the time.

I have already spoken to you about submitting recommendations for any plans you may have for a necessary reorganization.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to that, not because I would not be interested in it—

The CHAIRMAN. Object to what?

Senator PITTMAN. I am going to object to the preparation of any plans for the reorganization of the Navy Department, on the ground that it is beyond our jurisdiction. I read the resolution upon which this subcommittee was created. My only objection to it is that I desire to complete this work that we are doing, and if another subcommittee is to be appointed, it may be very well to do that. I am not passing on that question. That is a matter for the general Naval Affairs Committee to determine. But we have certain specific duties to perform, and there seems to be an effort, or rather an inclination, to get away from that and to drift off into another subject. This will be the third time we have drifted away from the subject, and I raise the point of order. Of course I know that it will not be decided favorably at the present time, but I am going to take it before the full Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, so that we may be able to make a report upon the subject which we were appointed to consider and report on, and not have it interminably dragged out all summer, dealing with subjects that we are not authorized to consider.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall undoubtedly, Senator Pittman, report on the matters which we are authorized to act upon here; but I consider that it is entirely a part of that report, if we find anything that should be remedied in the organization or in any other way in connection with the department, and I consider it entirely proper for us to make recommendations; and I consider that it will be of great help to us in making such recommendations if we could get expert advice from expert officers in the department.

Senator PITTMAN. I will just read once again, here, to support my protest, the language of this resolution:

To investigate and report on the matters referred to in the letter of Admiral Sims to the Navy Department in criticism of its action touching operations during the war.

Now, you can see, if this committee is going into the question of the reorganization of the Navy, I will be deprived of the privilege of

ere. because I have other matters to perform during the rest of the year.

CHAIRMAN. I do not think we will decide, probably, how the committee is to be reorganized, but I think it is entirely germane for us to make recommendations by expert officers in the department; and I do not conceive of anyone who has the best interests of the Navy at heart wanting to head off any such recommendations.

SENATOR PITTMAN. I do not want to head them off.

CHAIRMAN. If our report is to be of real value, we want to get all the information we can, and hear all the objections we can; and in line with my suggestion.

SENATOR PITTMAN. I understand, but there is no use in ducking the matter that is before us on any patriotic theory.

CHAIRMAN. I do not think we are ducking the issue, because we are going to report on all those other matters as well.

SENATOR PITTMAN. We would be under the suspicion that we have ducked enough of this subject and want to get into another. As a matter of fact, I think it is a good idea to report on this subject and let the chairman recommend to the full committee with these suggestions, and then have another subcommittee formed. The subcommittee here is not the whole Naval Affairs Committee, there may be some of the members of that Committee who are more qualified to act than we are on that broad subject.

CHAIRMAN. Certainly; but what we proposed to get is the testimony from experts as to what will be the best thing to do, and I do not think that we need to fear the suspicion that we are not going into the matter as thoroughly as we can.

SENATOR PITTMAN. I shall certainly make my protest.

CHAIRMAN. You can make your point of order.

SENATOR PITTMAN. I do.

CHAIRMAN. I take it you have no objection to our counting Senator Ball as being present, although he is not here to-day, and to voting for him.

SENATOR PITTMAN. No; I have no objection at all, except that there is doubt but what we are expanding the thing away beyond our authority, and not only that, but I think all of us have served rather badly in this long drawn-out matter, considering the benefits that have been derived, and I, for one, desire to be relieved of any further participation of this matter after this matter is terminated. I think it is perfectly fair that any member of this committee, after termination of his duties under this authorization should be permitted to perform other senatorial work, and I am not going to act on the committee beyond its authority, and certainly, if another committee is created I shall present my excuses why I should not.

CHAIRMAN. Do you object to the hearing of these officers about the desirability of a reorganization?

SENATOR PITTMAN. No. I would be charmed to hear from them at any proper time and under proper authority. I should like to have them at dinner, and I would like to hear every one of the British admirals and every one of the French admirals on this subject. There are many interesting things in regard to this war in naval matters and if I had nothing else to do I think I could enjoy myself for 12 hours upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. You can make your objection before the committee. You suggested that we go ahead, I think, Senator?

Senator KEYES. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would be glad to have the chairman cite his authority for going into the question of investigating the plans for reorganization of the Navy, under the authority granted to this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are here to investigate the charges made in the letter of Admiral Sims, and having investigated the charges made in the letter of Admiral Sims it seems to me entirely pertinent for us to make recommendations, and we can best make those recommendations after we have had advices from expert officers in the department.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think the scope of our authority, though, embraces the question of reorganization of the Navy, and that is what we are going into, when you request the expert opinions of different naval officers as to their ideas of reorganization of the Navy. That has nothing to do with Admiral Sims's criticisms of the charge that the war was not properly carried on by the Navy Department. I do not think it has anything to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not agree with you, gentlemen, and I do not think you will carry your point about not having these reports.

Senator PITTMAN. I am perfectly confident we will not carry it here.

The CHAIRMAN. I am perfectly confident that you will not in the full committee. However, you have made objection, and we will put the matter to a vote, and those in favor of asking Admiral Fletcher to appear with suggestions for a reorganization will say aye. I understand you have no objection to our counting Senator Ball's vote?

Senator TRAMMELL. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. If the chairman feels perfectly confident that Senator Ball would vote that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I have already talked with Senator Ball upon the matter.

Senator PITTMAN. Then of course there would be only a delay if we objected.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Have you any objection, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. I have no objection to inquiry or investigation being made into the opinions of different naval officers as to their ideas of reorganization of the Navy, because we want to better the service if it can be bettered; but I do not think it is within the province of this committee under its authority under this resolution, and the subcommittee was never designated for that purpose. That is the reason that I vote against it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further, Senator?

Senator KEYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral Fletcher, and you may be excused.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; thank you.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON—Resumed.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask to have two corrections made in the record of my testimony of the other day.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state them?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. On page 2197, in the answer to the fourth question from the top; the question and answer read as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of Admiral Sims's communications?

Admiral WILSON. All I know was that the decision was made before he communicated, because he could not have communicated until after he had arrived there, and that decision was made prior to his arrival.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have to see the record, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. The reason I wanted to correct my answer was, I thought that I was right, but I looked it up, and I find the meeting took place on the 11th, and Admiral Sims arrived in London on the 10th; and his first communication was dated in London the 14th.

The CHAIRMAN. It is simply a question of verifying the fact as to the dates?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. I said there in my cross-examination—not in my main testimony, or I would have had it a little better—that the decision was made prior to his arrival. It was made a few hours after his arrival.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. Then on page 2204 of the typewritten record, the fifth question, there is a rather serious mistake. In the original manuscript of my statement, I spoke of "cold storage," but when it was copied by the typewriters in the department an error was made, so that it was made to read "coal storage," in the several copies furnished to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That accounted for my questions about coal storage, then.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and that is what I was confused about. I remembered that we had a little coal there. I looked it up and found that mistake out. Therefore, I wish to make the answer to the question read:

We never had any trouble with coal. My statement refers to "cold storage," and not "coal storage."

You asked me this question:

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you increased the coal storage at Brest from 350 tons to a capacity of 750 tons?

I said that we never had any trouble with coal; and then I turned to my aid, who was sitting beside me here, and he looked at the copy before him, and the word in it was "coal," and he became confused; so that my statement refers to "cold storage," and not to "coal storage." That corrects the whole thing and makes it look right.

The CHAIRMAN. Put something in your statement there to the effect that it was a clerical error.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; I have made my statement here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Admiral, you stated in your testimony that as president of the board of inspection just prior to the war you were acquainted with the condition of the United States vessels, and that the Navy so provided by Congress was ready for war.

Admiral WILSON. I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can you state that the vessels available for scouting and screening duty with the fleet were ready and manned in all respects for war?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, no, sir; they were not.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, how do you say that the Navy as provided by Congress was ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. Well, they were ready when they were called upon for use. They did not keep them going all the time. The gunboats were doing duty in the West Indies. As I told you, one of the cruisers was on duty in the Mediterranean, and some of our vessels were coast guard vessels. In my statement, sir, I take up the question that war was declared on April 6, and of the forces assigned to me, or I should say assigned to the patrol force, of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on station by April 16.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I asked you definitely whether the Navy as provided by Congress was ready for war on April 6, and you have stated that the Navy was ready for war.

Admiral WILSON. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I ask you if you can state if the vessels available for scouting and screening duty with the fleet were ready and manned in all respects for war?

Admiral WILSON. They were not all manned, but they were ready for war.

The CHAIRMAN. In what respects were they ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. They were ready as ships.

The CHAIRMAN. But without crews?

Admiral WILSON. Without crews, probably some of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, they were of no value until the crews had been provided?

Admiral WILSON. No ship is of any value until the crew is on board.

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer my question.

Admiral WILSON. I am answering you.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would give direct answers to my direct questions. I find that on going over the record some of the answers are not as clear and succinct as they should be. In order for your testimony to be of any value, we have got to have direct answers to the questions asked.

Now, will you name the vessels in the Navy in May, 1917, that might have been ready for scouting and screening duty?

Admiral WILSON. I will name the ships that were assigned to the patrol force in the mobilization plan of March 21, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. And in doing so, please state whether they were ships that could have been used for scouting and screening duty in each case, please.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. The *Olympia*, scout; *Chester*, scout cruiser; the *Des Moines*, cruiser; the *Androscroggin*, coast guard vessel, scout; the *Birmingham*, scout cruiser; the *Sacramento*, gunboat; the *Ossipee*, coast guard, cutter; the *Dolphin*, gunboat; the *Chenango*, cruiser; the *Gresham*, coast guard vessel; the *Tacoma*, cruiser; the *Denver*, cruiser; the *Seneca*, coast guard vessel; the *Cleveland*, cruiser.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the *Cleveland*, an armored cruiser?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; a cruiser.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not named any armored cruisers?

Admiral WILSON. No armored cruisers were assigned to my force. The *Raleigh*, cruiser; the *Onondaga*, gunboat; the *Albany*, cruiser; the *New Orleans*, cruiser; the *Apache*, I think a Coast Guard vessel.

In addition to these vessels I know we had in the service about eight armored cruisers. I could not say from memory what duty they were performing at that date, except that I remember there were two or three in the Pacific, and that there was one in the Mediterranean.

Now, the vessels that I have named from the mobilization sheet refer to the part of my statement in which I say that of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on station by the 5th of April, 13 more joined by the 20th of April, and on the latter date 18 had not reported, and that 5 of these were Coast Guard vessels being fitted out for service in the Navy, while others were still on foreign stations, and some were undergoing extensive repairs. I have no data to go into any more detail about it. I suppose that can be found from the Division of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you Chief of the Board of Inspection?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, I was president of it.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties as Chief of the Board of Inspection?

Admiral WILSON. We inspected all ships for material, upkeep, and reported on what we thought were necessary repairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Of ships of the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Of ships of the Navy, which we were ordered to inspect by the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, he assigned particular ships you were to inspect?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not inspect the ships generally, of the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. I got around pretty well to all the ships on the Atlantic coast.

The CHAIRMAN. On the Atlantic coast?

Admiral WILSON. Most of our ships were on the Atlantic coast.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the inspections on the Pacific coast?

Admiral WILSON. The ships on the Pacific coast were inspected by a subboard, the papers of which came to our office.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they were to report to you?

Admiral WILSON. In that general sense.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you should have had, and probably did have, a report on all of the vessels of the Navy, no matter where they were?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; and I think we had a pretty good report and a pretty good idea of what they were. In addition to that, we inspected and ran the acceptances and final trials of all new ships on contract work.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, can you give the committee, for insertion in the record, a full statement of all of the ships of the Navy at the outbreak of the war, and of the degree of preparedness that they were in, both as to material and to personnel?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I can not; but it can be done, up in the Division of Operations, very well, sir. I have got other duties now that occupy me——

The CHAIRMAN. Have you not records that show your reports at the time the war broke out or at the time——

Admiral WILSON. This board of inspection made individual reports, so far as the Material Division of the Navy Department was concerned, the aid for material, when I was on the board of inspection, was my chief, Admiral Winterhalter, afterwards transferred to Admiral McKean. I think Admiral McKean could give you that from reports.

The CHAIRMAN. But you can not give that yourself?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; not in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not personally know?

Admiral WILSON. Ah!

The CHAIRMAN. If you personally know, you can give it to us now.

Admiral WILSON. But you are going back now and trying to trip me up on the question of what I said about the preparedness.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the information. The committee is not trying to trip anybody up, and we do not care for such accusations.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I ask you if, of your personal knowledge you can tell me about the ships in the Navy which could have been used for scouting and screening duty with the fleet at the beginning of the war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I have a number of questions to ask you about it.

Admiral WILSON. I have told you the names of the ships.

The CHAIRMAN. You have given all of those with which you are familiar?

Admiral WILSON. I have given you all of the ships which I think were available. There may be others. If I should take the reports of the chiefs of the bureaus, I might find more. But all that I have with me to-day is this report on the mobilization of the patrol force.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "available," you mean ready?

Admiral WILSON. No, I mean that were built.

The CHAIRMAN. That were of a nature to be used as scouts or screening vessels?

Admiral WILSON. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. The list that you have given comprises all the vessels in the fleet—in the Navy—that at the outbreak of the war which in your opinion could have been used for scouting or screening duty?

Admiral WILSON. I did not say so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I asked you.

Admiral WILSON. I said it comprises a list of the ships that were mobilized in the patrol force.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I asked you.

Admiral WILSON. I am not able to answer your question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not able to answer it?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; in detail; because I have forgotten what ships—that has been three years ago, now, and I do not remember the names of all the ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you stated the other day that the reason that there were not sufficient scouting and screening vessels with the fleet was because Congress did not appropriate for them.

Admiral WILSON. Why, to come right down to a straight answer—

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; you can not by any reason call these vessels scouting and screening vessels, in the sense that it is applied to.

The CHAIRMAN. Which vessels?

Admiral WILSON. That I have named.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not?

Admiral WILSON. Scouting and screening; they are only slow vessels. Battleships move at high speed these days. The only three vessels in all that force that an Admiral would care to have along with him for scouting and screening, that we had in service there, were the *Birmingham*, the *Chester*, and the *Salem*. They made high speed.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *St. Louis*?

Admiral WILSON. I do not think the *St. Louis* is very speedy.

The CHAIRMAN. What is her speed?

Admiral WILSON. I have forgotten; 22 knots. But she is hard on coal burning. She is a killer of the people down below in handling coal, and very hard to get at.

The CHAIRMAN. And as far as speed is concerned, a 22-knot vessel would be of use?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; but that is what she is put down for. I do not know how lately they have gotten 22 knots out of her.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *Charleston*?

Admiral WILSON. The *Charleston* is a cruiser.

The CHAIRMAN. How about her speed?

Admiral WILSON. I imagine she is about the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *Columbia*?

Admiral WILSON. The *Columbia* is in my command now, and she is used for carrying the captain of the train around, the man who has charge of the auxiliaries and supply.

The CHAIRMAN. What was her speed?

Admiral WILSON. It was very good at the time she was built; but she would noway make that now. She is a very old craft.

The CHAIRMAN. What was her approximate speed at the time of the outbreak of the war?

Admiral WILSON. If I threw my flag on board of her, of course she could make—I guess she is good for 16 knots.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *Minneapolis*?

Admiral WILSON. The *Minneapolis* is in the same class. I suppose they could get 16 knots out of her.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the time of the outbreak of war, the same?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, I suppose so.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *New Orleans*?

Admiral WILSON. I have forgotten the *New Orleans* and the *Albany*. So, I have given you those names. I read you the *New Orleans* and the *Albany* off of this list of mobilization.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can not carry that all in my mind. I simply want to know, what was the speed of those boats?

Admiral WILSON. They are of pretty good speed. We took them at the time of the Spanish War. I suppose they are 20-knot boats.

The CHAIRMAN. We had about 8 armored cruisers?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; the armored cruisers were some of them in the Pacific, and one in the Mediterranean, and they took such large

numbers of men to man them that they were held in reserve. I inspected them materially, and they were in pretty fair shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you not say that the eight armored cruisers and the *Chester*, the *Birmingham*, and the *Salem*, the *St. Louis*, the *Charleston*, the *Columbia*, the *Minneapolis*, the *New Orleans*, and the *Albany*, 18 ships in all, were the best if not the only loose cruisers available for sea-going scouts at that time?

Admiral WILSON. Exactly. I say that.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of those vessels with the battleship forces when war was declared?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. No, I take that back. I do not know. I know that in the mobilization plan of March 21 there was a large part of what you speak of there assigned to the patrol force, and I gave you the names.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were with the battleship force.

Admiral WILSON. I say, a part of that with the commander-in-chief's fleet; I mean Admiral Mayo's fleet. He was my commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Which of those armored cruisers and which of those other ships I have spoken of were with you as a part of the battleship force?

Admiral WILSON. Oh. None.

The CHAIRMAN. None?

Admiral WILSON. You mean before I went to the patrol force?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean just before the outbreak of the war.

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember that any were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any or all of these ships that had been provided by Congress, ready and fully manned for battle?

Admiral WILSON. Not fully manned; but they were ready if manned.

The CHAIRMAN. They were all ready?

Admiral WILSON. They were ready if manned.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you mean, manned?

Admiral WILSON. They were ready from a material point of view. I had nothing to do, as president of the board of inspection, with putting enlisted men on the ships. All I did was to inspect them to be put in commission, or to be put in full commission or in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Whereabouts were they stationed, do you know?

Admiral WILSON. As I said before, some of the armored cruisers. I think three or maybe four, were in the Pacific, one was in the Mediterranean, and I do not remember about the others. You could get all that from the Navy Department, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not with the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. With the fleet? Oh, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore, although these ships has been provided by Congress, they were not with the fleet, and it was not through lack of action on the part of Congress that these ships were not with the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately before the war?

Admiral WILSON. But they were mobilized as soon as we went into war.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the Navy was not willing to act solely on the defensive. Do you think that the fleet as a whole was



in readiness to cross the Atlantic or to meet the German fleet in the middle of the Atlantic?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And make as good a showing against it as the British did at the Battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. No; for the reason that the British had a very much larger force than ours would have been, in fighting ships.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in comparison to the size of our forces, you think they were in equally good condition to meet the Germans as the British were to meet the Germans in the Battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. They were large enough in size to meet them.

The CHAIRMAN. They were what?

Admiral WILSON. They were large enough in numbers to whip them.

The CHAIRMAN. Without any screening vessels?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, screening vessels are not of much use to you when you get into contact—when you get into a duel. They are useful in getting you there and getting you into your proper formation.

The CHAIRMAN. Would they not have been somewhat of a help if we had had them to help us get there?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, they are very desirable, but because you have not got them are you going to lay down when you meet the enemy?

The CHAIRMAN. Not lay down, but it is a great drawback not to have them?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; exactly, and that is the reason we want to get them now. There have been some appropriated for, and if we get them we will be in very good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you state these vessels that I have spoken about, at the outbreak of hostilities were not ready for battle?

Admiral WILSON. Except personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a rather important item.

Admiral WILSON. Every vessel. I had nothing to do, sir; mine was material—president of the board of inspection.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, we are not accusing you of anything.

Admiral WILSON. Oh, I do not expect anything like that. I do not feel that I am guilty of anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is accusing you, Admiral, of any dereliction in your duty.

Admiral WILSON. No; I know they are not. I do not want you to.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if they were not in condition, you could not say that the whole Navy, as it existed in April, 1917, was ready for battle, could you?

Admiral WILSON. Well, sir, if we kept every craft——

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you a direct question, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. I will have to answer that in an indirect way, if you want any answer at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to answer it so that I can have a direct answer.

Senator PITTMAN. I think it is very unfair to an admiral in the Navy, from whom you are trying to get information——

The CHAIRMAN. I want something direct and definite.

Admiral WILSON. Let the question be read, Mr. Senator. I will give you an answer.

Senator PITTMAN. There are some questions, you know, that can not be answered directly by yes or no.

The pending question was read by the stenographer, as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. So that if they were not in condition, you could not say that the whole Navy as it existed in April, 1917, was ready for battle, could you.

The CHAIRMAN. Why, Admiral, if a component part of the Navy was not ready, of course the whole Navy was not.

Admiral WILSON. I can not answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. That is, by yes or no?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; I would be silly if I gave a yes or no answer to a question like that, and have it printed and go out to the service of my fellow officers to read, that I answered a question like that yes or no.

Senator PITTMAN. I think the chairman ought to appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you accusing the committee of asking you silly questions, Admiral?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; but you are not technical enough to understand it. My brother officers would consider it silly if I answered yes or no to that. It is not readily recognized that the Navy, doing their duty to the country and to the taxpayers, can not keep every craft we have, at all times, during peace, up to top notch in regard to personnel. But on the threatened outbreak of the war—which actually occurred on the 6th of April—then everything went with a “biz,” as I told you, and we started off and put in everything we had; and anything that had any speed at all, and could drop a depth charge, was valuable.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if a certain important part of the Navy was ready, and from your testimony I gathered that they were not ready for battle. Then I asked you whether you could say as a general thing, that the whole Navy was ready for battle.

Admiral WINSLOW. I could not give you an answer that would be satisfactory to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can not see but what that is perfectly plain English, Admiral, and it is a perfectly simple question to answer.

Admiral WILSON. I regret that I am unfortunate in not being able to answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I think, the other day that in your opinion the whole Navy was ready for battle.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and I repeat that.

The CHAIRMAN. You will repeat that?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted.

Admiral WILSON. Oh; but you said battle.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you for battle.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; but you asked me the other day if it was ready for war, and I said yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But not for battle?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, no; you take a ship and put her in commission, and go out for battle. There is a celebrated case like that in the Revolutionary War—when they were not ready, the crew had not

been trained, but they took the chance, manned the vessel and went out, and down they went. Suicide!

The CHAIRMAN. And the fact of some of the vessels having been laid up at the navy yards, vessels which were important for work in the fleet, that they were not manned, and that there was not sufficient personnel to man them, would not interfere with the statement that the whole Navy was ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; because you as a Senator would not give the Navy enough money to man everything we had.

The CHAIRMAN. That has nothing to do with my question, Admiral. Now, you are familiar with the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. Only the small bit that I read, sir, and I have not been able to get much. I have been waiting until we got something from both sides, so that I could put things together and study them up.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the English battleships do any considerable amount of execution in the battle?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What ships did?

Admiral WILSON. Battle cruisers, at first. The Germans were never keen or anyway anxious to get those two battleship forces together. They would have been silly if they had.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the English battleships attempt to get up to the front?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, I think they made every effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any attack made on them by the German torpedo boats?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; and they were protected by their own torpedo boats—their own destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the battleships do when they were attacked by torpedoes?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember, exactly. I remember one time they turned away from the destroyer attack. I remember that, on one occasion; which is a proper maneuver. It depends on what protection they had.

The CHAIRMAN. A battle is hardly a question of maneuvering. It is a pretty serious question.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; a very serious question; and it is so easy for anybody to criticize what was done then by that British admiral, with all that responsibility upon his shoulders, I think he is a remarkable man. People that do not go to sea do not know what it is, especially when you get in a little mix up.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would say that a large number of destroyers were of considerable value to a fleet fighting even against battleships?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes, sir; destroyers. We want all we can get. I have now 8 battleships and about 32 destroyers down south, and our allowance is 54. I think we have about 32 destroyers. I think I said that yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo stated in his testimony as follows:

However, it should be pointed out that this fleet was lacking in types of vessels essential to efficiency, such as battle cruisers, scout cruisers, light cruisers, and fleet submarines; and, furthermore, there are none even now available.

Admiral WILSON. I am in accord with that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of that, in spite of the fact that there were not sufficient destroyers with the fleet, you think that they were in a condition to go abroad and to fight, to go out in the middle of the ocean and fight the German fleet as it was at that time, and to be more effective than the German fleet?

Admiral WILSON. I said that I would go across the ocean and fight the German fleet, and we would whip her.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt you would go across.

Admiral WILSON. No, but anyone would.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, any officer would. They would do anything in the world to whip the enemy. That is the tradition of the Navy, and a splendid tradition; no doubt about that.

Admiral WILSON. Thank you, sir. I recognize, as well as anybody else, that the more of the accessories, of the auxiliaries, and everything like that you have, the better off you are; but any man who can not play the game until he has got everything perfect, I do not count him worth much.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything else, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Admiral, Admiral Mayo testified in effect that his fleet was in the best state of preparedness that it had ever been in. Is that your opinion?

Admiral WILSON. That is my opinion. From all my experience in the Navy, I have never seen the force as it is, as constituted, in better shape than it was in the spring of 1917.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I will read into the record at this time Admiral Mayo's statement about preparedness of the fleet, which appears on page 1451 of the typewritten record:

When the active fleet arrived in Hampton Roads about the first of April after its training period in Cuban waters, it was in the best state of preparedness that it had ever been, and there was a feeling of confidence in the personnel of being able to cope with any emergency; the personnel was however on a peace basis and the transfer of trained personnel for armed guard and other duty was already being felt in a decrease in efficiency. The destroyers that were first despatched to the war zone, though they were assigned to operations for which they had not been especially trained, showed the effect of their general training by the efficiency with which they at once entered into their new duties.

However, it should be pointed out that this fleet was lacking in types of vessels essential to efficiency, such as battle cruisers, scout cruisers, light cruisers, and fleet submarines; and, furthermore, there are none even now available.

Admiral WILSON. The Admiral is also talking about crews and destroyers, after war has been declared.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

Admiral WILSON. May I leave town, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m, the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, April 12, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Niblack, have you a statement to make about matters connected with this investigation?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL A. P. NIBLACK, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Admiral NIBLACK. My official interest in this investigation is in its historical aspect as a whole rather than a controversy which deals with specific charges limited to a certain period, for Admiral Sims, in a statement as to the period of the war covered by his letter of January 7, states that "the period which it covers is almost wholly concerned with those critical months immediately preceding our entry in the war and the first year, or less, of our participation in the war," and later he corrected this testimony to say "my entire letter of January 7, 1920, refers to this early period of the war, practically all of it refers to the first six months, hardly any of it refers to anything out of the first year, 1917."

As Director of Naval Intelligence in the Division of Operations, Navy Department, I also have charge under my office of the "Office of Naval Records, and Library," which is maintained under the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation. One of the items of this appropriation reads:

Toward the collection or copying and classification, with a view to publication, of the naval records of the war with the Central Powers of Europe, including the purchase of books, periodicals, photographs, maps, and other publications, documents and pictorial records of the Navy in said war, clerical services in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, and other necessary incidental expenses, \$20,000: *Provided*, That no person shall be employed hereunder at a rate of compensation exceeding \$1,800 per annum.

The point of view which I therefore wish to lay before this committee is that historical facts rather than opinions are important. I am not here to defend any person, but am defending the United States Navy, which is now under fire, not of its enemies, but of its friends.

In connection with the work of collecting and classifying the naval records of the war with the Central Powers of Europe I am in a

position to be informed as to the magnitude and scope of the efforts and activities of the Navy Department and the United States Navy during the war. As I served as a member of the General Board for several months and 10 days before our declaration of war, and went to sea on April 7, 1917, when the fleet was mobilized, serving in command of a division of four battleships and part of the time of a squadron of eight battleships on our coast, until October, 1917, and, moreover, as I was then transferred to the command of Squadron 2, Patrol Force, and of the United States patrol squadrons based on Gibraltar from November, 1917, to the conclusion of the war, I am in a position to bear first-hand testimony of a personal nature to some of the matters which Admiral Sims has brought before this committee in his letter.

While in the battleship fleet, the squadron I commanded was charged with the organizing and the duty of intensively training the men of the engineer's force of the Navy, as testified to by Admiral Grant, and as commander of the patrol forces in the Mediterranean I cooperated in the antisubmarine operations in protecting the vast amount of merchant shipping which passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, representing one-fourth of the total allied tonnage of the world. I therefore have first-hand information as to the means employed for the protection of this shipping and the merits of the much-discussed convoy system for merchant shipping which Admiral Sims says was one of the principal things which enabled the Allies to win the war. I also became familiar at first hand with the performance at sea of the armed guards on merchant vessels and have since become familiar with the historical data on file. From my own personal experience I can bear testimony to the great things which were accomplished by our Navy from the very outbreak of hostilities until the war was won, although I know little of my own knowledge of what is claimed the Navy Department does not do. I was in London in November, 1917, and received my instructions from Admiral Sims at the same time Admiral Benson arrived on his first visit, which marks the time when Admiral Sims says his troubles were more or less over, because he ceased to be almost alone in London and got an adequate staff, which a year later consisted of a total personnel of 1,200 at his headquarters including the following officers and civilians on his personal staff:

| | Officers. | Civilians. |
|----------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Force staff..... | 5 | |
| Planning section..... | 4 | |
| Operations section, convoys and miscellaneous..... | 3 | |
| Operations section, antisubmarine..... | 7 | |
| Secretarial and personnel section..... | 8 | |
| Aviation section..... | 50 | |
| Ordnance section..... | 4 | |
| Legal section..... | 2 | |
| Medical section..... | 5 | |
| Material section..... | 10 | |
| Disbursing section..... | 5 | |
| Repair section..... | 3 | |
| Intelligence section..... | 13 | |
| Communication section..... | 68 | |
| Scientific section..... | | |
| Marine detachment, headquarters, London..... | 2 | |
| Special temporary duty, London..... | 26 | |
| Duty in London, but not with Navy..... | 3 | |
| United States Naval Hospital, London..... | 5 | |
| Duty American Expeditionary Forces, France..... | 4 | |
| Total..... | 227 | |

On the 20th of November, 1918, just after the armistice, Admiral Sims issued an order to the commanders of all bases in Europe and to the commanders of all forces, air stations, and principal port areas, to prepare a historical sketch of the activities during the war. This order was as follows:

1 The department, sometime since, directed the force commander to undertake preparation of an official history of United States naval activities in European waters during the war, not to interfere in any way with the prosecution of the war. It has been wholly impossible of accomplishment owing to lack of adequate properly equipped staff, and this is so even under present circumstances.

2 It is extremely important that as much as possible toward preparing such a history be done before the present forces and bases are demobilized and officers who have been engaged in the various duties are separated from the records and files.

3 It is therefore desired that each base and separate detachment undertake at once a brief general historical sketch of its activities from the time it was initiated to the present. It is thought that a general sketch covering the principal activities and the difficulties encountered can be prepared in a short time and with much less delay now than later. Where war diaries are accessible, the work would be comparatively easy.

4 In addition to this sketch all statistical data that can be compiled before demobilization should be submitted covering the following subjects:

1. Number of ships engaged by periods.
2. Engagements with the enemy.
3. Commendable service.
4. Number of ships escorted.
5. Other classes and character of duty (tabulated).
6. Casualties; material and otherwise.
7. Data showing volume of administrative work, communications, and so forth.
8. Financial statistics.
9. Statistics concerning number of inexperienced personnel handled. Changes in personnel.
10. Any other statistics or compilations which will give a correct idea of the amount of work involved in our operations abroad.

5 It is realized that there have been many important questions involved in the work of the Navy abroad, particularly in difficulties encountered and surmounted, which are not matters of official record. All such questions should be brought out in some way in the historical sketch above mentioned.

The commanders of all the various units in the naval forces in Europe have submitted the required historical sketch, copies of which are now on file in the historical section, with the sole exception of Admiral Sims himself, who has never submitted any report to the department of the operations of the forces as a whole, similar to that submitted by Gen. Pershing to the War Department, nor has he submitted any personal narrative except such as has appeared in the World's Work, and as expressed in his letter of January 7, 1919, is now the subject of this investigation.

On July 28, 1919, the Navy Department wrote a letter to Admiral Sims asking him to write the history of the operations of the United States naval forces in European waters, and of all of our activities in Europe and our relations with European admiralities, not merely a technical report but an account that would give the American people a clear conception of what was accomplished and form an important part of the history of the war.

Admiral Sims replied, in a letter dated July 30, 1919, the closing paragraphs of which are:

"It would, of course, be wholly impossible for me to undertake it even if I gave up my position at the War College and devoted my whole attention to it, and this for the simple reason that I have no capacity or aptitude for such work.

However, I do not know of any officers in the United States Navy who is sufficiently experienced as an historian to do this work. The literary side of it alone is

of the highest possible importance, and the job as a whole could be done creditably only by competent historians acting in collaboration with naval officers. I would not attempt, myself, to put out anything for the public to read which had not had the benefit of such literary advice.

I think you will recognize from the above brief summary of the situation that we can not hope for anything satisfactory unless this whole matter is taken up in a methodical way and put in the hands of competent people who are given the assistance and facilities that would be required.

As I have only \$20,000 for next year to get together the facts as to this war, and as this committee is not limited in its expenses, I am glad it has the opportunity of getting the facts out of Admiral Sims and others. The proper perspective to write the real history of the war can only come with time and study, and this committee is apt to get more personalities and opinions than it does historical facts. In the sequence of events, the "critical months immediately preceding our entry into the war" are characterized by Admiral Sims as being worthy of special investigation. It is an interesting historical fact that Admiral Sims became president of the Naval War College on January 7, 1917, and left on his mission to England on March 28, 1917, during which entire time he was a member of the General Board and attended at least one of the monthly meetings. My services on the General Board covered exactly this same period, with a week before and a week after, and I, therefore, share with Admiral Sims the responsibility for any neglect in the critical days of 1917 in formulating any plans or making any recommendations looking toward our entry into the war. Neither Admiral Sims nor myself had been on duty in the Navy Department for many years prior to the critical days of 1917, but it should be noted that the General Board is the board of the Navy Department charged by law with the following duties:

1. The General Board shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy as to the disposition and distribution of the fleet and of the reinforcements of ships, officers, and men of the Navy and Marine Corps.

2. It shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign, including cooperation with the Army and the employment of all the elements of naval defense, such as the Naval Militia?, Coast Survey, Lighthouse Service, Coast Guard, and merchant vessels, and shall constantly revise these plans in accordance with the latest information received.

3. It shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and ratings of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increases as may be requisite) to be submitted annually to Congress.

4. It shall advise the Secretary of the Navy concerning the location, capacity, and protection of fuel depots and supplies of fuel, and of navy yards and naval stations; also in regard to the establishment and maintenance of reserves of ordnance and ammunition and depots of supplies; and shall advise as to the delivery of provisions and stores of every kind required by the fleet.

5. It shall consider and report upon naval operations, maneuvers, tactics, organization, training, and such other subjects as the Secretary of the Navy may lay before it.

There is nothing in the records of the General Board to show that Admiral Sims made any suggestions as to preparation for war, but the records do show that he participated in only one discussion, and that was the location of a naval base in the vicinity of Narragansett Bay. On the other hand, the General Board was working continuously on programs and plans of various kinds, which Rear Admiral C. J. Badger can tell you all about.

On February 4, 1917, the General Board had submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations a special war plan entitled "Steps to be

taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers."

On March 6, 1917, the General Board recommended that our fleet be recalled from Cuba by March 15 and assembled in Chesapeake Bay.

On April 5 the General Board submitted to the department a report on "assistance the United States can give the Allies upon declaration of war." It will be noted that while the law places the responsibility for the formulation of plans upon the General Board, the responsibility for the adoption of these plans and their enforcement rests upon the Navy Department, as the General Board is without executive authority. If the testimony before this committee can be made to fix that responsibility, it can not be fixed on the General Board.

Prior to the outbreak of the war a proposition was submitted by the General Board to the Chief of Naval Operations recommending that we invite naval representatives of the Allies to come to Washington, and a proposition was made to send the following naval officers to London and Paris:

London: Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, Capt. W. V. Pratt, Commander Yates Stirling, Commander F. H. Clark, Lieut. F. A. Daubin, Lieut. G. L. Caskey, Lieut. S. C. Hooper, Naval Constructor E. S. Land.

Paris: Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers, Capt. H. H. Hough, Commander D. F. Sellers, Lieut. H. H. Crosby, Lieut. Wadleigh Capehart, Naval Constructor H. G. Gilmor.

However, before this suggestion was made or acted upon Admiral Sims had been secretly sent abroad with his aid, Commander Babcock, and no additional officers were sent. Admiral Sims in his testimony says:

It is due to Admiral Benson alone that I was given the opportunity to serve in this war as commander of the forces abroad. He said his insistence upon this assignment had brought upon him the enmity of pretty much all the senior officers of the Navy.

Admiral Sims was the logical man for this position, as he himself admits and this testimony verifies. On April 28 he was ordered to command the destroyers and on June 14 was made force commander, with headquarters in London.

On April 10, 1917, a few days after the declaration of war, Vice Admiral Browning, of the British Navy, and his staff, and Rear Admiral Grasset, of the French Navy, arrived in Washington and had a session on April 11 with the General Board, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations being present. Vice Admiral Browning stated that the British Navy had had the task for three years of patrolling the Atlantic coast of North America from Halifax to Panama, and suggested that the United States Navy take over this patrol, thereby releasing a great number of British ships for duty in the war zone. This was agreed to and immediately done. He also suggested sending two or three destroyers to England as an evidence of good intentions, stating that of course our fleet naturally would not be willing to part with or weaken its screen of destroyers. On the strength of this suggestion a few days later arrangements were made for the dispatch of a division of six destroyers, which arrived in Queenstown on May 4.

We come now to the actual declaration of war. Whatever the plans were, or whatever any plans ever are, the execution depends upon resources at hand and the magnitude of

presented. Whatever may be assumed to have been the mission of the United States Navy at the outbreak of the war, the problem the Navy had to face was the unrestricted submarine campaign announced by Germany in violation of the terms of international law in February, 1917, which ultimately caused our entry into the war, and which presented an entirely different problem than that which had existed for the Allies previously in the war. The sudden realization that the Navy had to be responsible for the safe transport to Europe of an Army of 2,000,000 men with millions of tons of supplies and munitions presented a problem which might well stagger the imagination. It, however, being at once evident that there was little chance for our fleet to have to encounter that of the enemy on the high seas, the fleet became available for training the thousands of officers and men to meet these new demands.

The first and most important demand was providing additional crews for the crews of ships in reserve and for the armed guard gun on merchant vessels, which alone required over 7,000 men; to provide crews for the interned merchant ships and other vessels acquired by purchase or charter for naval transports over 45,000 men were required; for the antisubmarine vessels, consisting of yachts, destroyers, subchasers, and various kinds of patrol vessels. Thousands of officers and men for the mine force to lay the great North Sea mine field; thousands of officers and men were required; finally, to take over the American merchant marine, built and building, as organized Naval Overseas Transport Service (N. O. T. S.), which was strong when the war ended, many officers and men were required. This will be explained later.

Providing and training these officers and men became, then, the great problem for the Navy to solve during the first six years of the war. To conduct this training it was necessary to expand old training stations in the United States, to build new ones, and to put all the old battleships of little fighting value into commission, and, as previously stated, this required thousands of officers and men.

As, on April 1, 1917, the personnel of the United States Navy consisted of 4,377 regular officers and 877 reserve officers, 1,109 reserve service, and 62,677 regularly enlisted men and 1,109 reserve, a total of 5,154 officers and 63,776 men, it can be readily seen that the task of training was prodigious, because going to sea is a new occupation and bears little relation to what the average shore know much about.

The question of a reserve created and fostered in time of peace is too well demonstrated to need elaboration. We did not have such a reserve at the beginning of this war, and the Navy had to create one. However, the war history of the United States from its colonial days, is a continuous story of war-time extravagance and injudicious peace-time economy. The pendulum swings to and fro, and now that the whole world is in ferment and war is possible we are going to sleep again.

Unquestionably, on July 1, 1917, the outlook was far from reassuring, but at least a big start had been made along the line of defense, and we had smacked of the offensive. By July 1, 1917, we had 10 destroyers operating from Queenstown as a base, and we had 4,594 regular officers and 3,344 reserve in service in the Navy.

26,260 enlisted men and 32,379 reserves, or a total of about 8,000 officers and 158,600 men. The additional officers and men, after July 1, 1917, were largely absorbed in manning the transports to the Army across, the German interned ships, the purchased merchant vessels, and above all, the newly constructed cargo ships which not enough is known to the public, or at least realized in relation to their operation by the Navy. These particular supply vessels, or cargo ships, were organized into what was known as the Naval Overseas Transport Service, or the N. O. T. S. Eventually, nearly every merchant vessel under the American flag was regularly commissioned in the Navy with officers and crew of the Regular Volunteer Navy, but the N. O. T. S. did not really get going until January 1, 1918.

When the armistice was signed, on November 11, 1918, the N. O. T. S. fleet consisted of 347 ships in actual operation and 106 other ships ready to be turned over to the Navy as soon as crews could be provided and the ships fitted out. This made a total of 453 ships credited to the N. O. T. S. Of the 31,186 officers and 99,696 men in the United States Navy on November 11, 1918,, 45 per cent was absorbed in shore activities at naval stations, naval bases, training stations, aviation camps, etc. Those at sea abroad the 40 battleships, 9 armored cruisers, 23 first, second, third class cruisers, 7 monitors, 95 destroyers, 15 torpedo boats, 13 submarines, 13 tenders to torpedo vessels, 28 gun-boats, 5 regular transports, 5 supply ships, 1 hospital ship, 22 regular fuel, 14 converted yachts, 51 tugs, 37 mine sweepers, 4 special type, 300 submarine chasers, 43 transports for American troops, 147 N. O. T. S. carrying supplies, or a total of 1,441 regular commissioned naval vessels manned and operated by the Navy, not including yard craft and the various tenders to all the naval stations and naval bases on shore. On the cessation of hostilities there were approximately 81,000 officers and men serving in Europe. This represented only about 15 per cent of the total naval personnel. This has to do with the question of what the United States had to do on the outbreak of war, and that was to intensify the additional men needed. This was done also by the patrol on the coast under command of Rear Admiral H. B. Wilson, who had relieved the British patrol. At the time we entered the war the British were using a patrol system of patrolling various areas distinguished from the convoy system, and the placing of guards on board was then understood to be the best policy for the protection of single ships in conjunction with the use of convoys.

It has been frequently stated before this committee that keeping patrol squadrons on our coast in the first few months of the war was justifiable. As indicated, they were originally assigned to this duty at the request of Vice Admiral Browning. In the early part of the war the forces were undergoing thorough organization, and assisting in training additional men, and when the call came for ships to inaugurate a convoy system, these ships were sent to escort convoys to France and the Mediterranean. This may not have been the best arrangement, possibly, but the ships were better fitted and organized for their peculiar services by the delay. The first of Admiral Wilson's ships arrived in Brest on July 3, 1917, and the first of

Admiral Wilson's ships arrived in Gibraltar on August 6, 1917, which was four months after war was declared.

In discussing the convoy system it is necessary to understand the difference between the "convoy" and the "escort." The "convoy" means the group of merchant ships or troop ships which are sent together in formation, while the "escort" means the men-of-war which, due to their armament and speed, are able to form a screen around the convoy to protect it from attack by raiders or submarines.

Before we entered the war and up to the time the convoy system got in working order, the Allied losses in merchant tonnage were as follows:

| Year. | Ships. | Tonnage. |
|------------|--------|----------|
| 1914..... | 67 | 1,310 |
| 1915..... | 685 | 2,377 |
| 1916..... | 1,310 | 4,434 |
| 1917..... | 2,377 | 8,310 |
| Total..... | 4,434 | 8,310 |

By the adoption of the convoy system it was expected:

(a) That a relatively small number of escort vessels could protect more ships if they were in convoy than in any other way.

(b) That ships in convoy could not be visited and sunk by bombers as were single ships.

(c) That ships in convoy would not be attacked by gunfire from submarines.

(d) That convoys, being few in number, would be difficult to find and consequently fewer attacks could be made by torpedo.

(e) That in the danger zones near ports where submarines were to lay for convoys the escort by antisubmarine craft could be made strong as to make the risk to submarines very hazardous.

The escort of cargo convoys to and from the United States and from the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean consisted usually of only one man-of-war, whose principal function was to regulate the radio communication and prevent the ships from straggling. It would have been futile to have regarded the escort as able to keep off a raider except where battleships were used. The great advantage of the convoy was that the ships arrived in the danger zone collectively and at a definite time, where an adequate danger zone escort could be assembled, which was fitted with depth charges and was in such numbers as to make the chances of a submarine extremely small if it attempted to attack the convoy. The point to wish to emphasize and elaborate is that with the slow-moving cargo ships the virtue of the convoy system was entirely dependent upon the efficiency of the danger zone escort at one of the terminal points and not in the accompanying vessels during the voyage. This remark must be qualified when we speak of the Mediterranean, because the entire Mediterranean was a danger zone, and therefore the escort had to be as heavy as there were ships available to assign to this duty, generally only two-thirds of what was required.

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the size of our Army in Europe and the time of its arrival there depended on merchant tonnage, not only for the transport of troops, but for the transport

supplies. The ratio of troop tonnage to cargo tonnage was 15 to 85; therefore the vastly larger number of ships required for supplies emphasizes that the protection of cargo ships was really the vital question.

From July, 1917, to November, 1918, inclusive, our Army in 628 ships of various types sent 5,706,551 tons of cargo to France and England in the service of supply to the American Expeditionary Forces. I mean, that is War Department. It has nothing to do with the Navy Department. That is the Army on its own ships, which we had nothing to do with, ships of various types, sent 5,706,551 tons. A great deal of this cargo was carried in Army transports, but it remains for the historical section to develop the actual statistics as to how much of this cargo—this is Army cargo—actually came across in convoys, but only part of it did.

Admiral Sims states that our failure to send all of our antisubmarine vessels to the war zone immediately on the outbreak of war resulted in prolonging the war four months. A study of the vast problem of protecting the cargo ships of the Allies will show that the number of protecting vessels which we might have sent, and did not send, to Europe at once was so small that the results could not have been materially different. In a statement made in London in 1918 Admiral Sims stated that we had only 3 per cent of the antisubmarine forces in Europe that the Allies had.

I want to say that that figure of 3 per cent applies to the early part of the war. Afterwards the statistics were shown to be 6 per cent, finally; but this is the figure for the period we are discussing.

It is difficult to figure that with a maximum of only 3 per cent we could have shortened the war so greatly as four months; moreover, the small increase in the number of escorting vessels which we sent over between July and October could not have resulted materially in increasing the amount of protection furnished the cargo-ship convoys, since it is here pointed out that the protection in the way of escort to the cargo ships was of the very scantiest character. It has been repeatedly stated that the size of our army in Europe depended as much upon the amount of cargo we could transport as upon the number of men we could furnish, and I do not think in discussing the convoy system we realize how little protection was given the cargo ship as compared with that lavished upon the troop convoys, whereby no troop transports were sunk, whereas the loss of cargo ships was very considerable, as will be shown.

Admiral Sims himself testified that nobody had had any previous experience in the form of submarine warfare which the Germans sprung, and "if we could have imagined it we would have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, if we could have persuaded Congress to give us the money." Certainly the patrol squadrons, made up as they were, of the older gunboats, Coast Guard vessels and yachts, were a poor substitute for destroyers as escorts, but this brings out one vital point in the discussion which has come before this committee as to the convoy system in general.

I think we are apt to exaggerate the effect of the convoy system in lessening the number of sinkings, because I think we should take into consideration, as Admiral Mayo also points out, the employment of new and offensive measures through the use of depth charges, mystery ships, airships, kite balloons, the laying of mine barrages,

the firing of torpedoes from allied submarines, combined with the use of organized patrols fitted with listening devices and hunting the submarine systematically.

At the outbreak of war, in August, 1914, Germany had only 28 submarines, but she built 340 additional ones during the war. As there were about 200 of these submarines put out of action during the war, it transpires that there were 168 submarines available for service at the time the armistice was signed. The average stay at sea of a submarine was about 27 days for the U-boats and 20 days, or less, for smaller types, of which one-third of its time was spent in going, one-third in operating, and one-third in returning to its base, and the trip generally resulted in the sinking of from 6,000 to 10,000 tons of shipping. It is estimated that each enemy submarine averaged about 40,000 tons of shipping sunk before it itself succumbed to attack. The sinking of submarines was, however, not attributable to any one method employed against them, but was the result in pretty equal proportions of the various means employed against them.

But before dismissing the question of the convoy system, it is well to consider the question of the armed guard ships.

Our allies allotted only one gun to each merchant ship with only a trained gun pointer and sight setter, relying on the rest of the ship to furnish the rest of the gun crew, but from the start we furnished two guns to our merchant ships and full crews, amounting to some 20 or more men, together with radio operators and signalmen in addition. The commander of this armed guard on each ship was either a chief petty officer of great experience or a regular commissioned officer of the Navy.

There were 384 cargo ships of the American merchant marine during the war which had armed guards furnished from the enlisted personnel of the United States Navy to man the two guns with which each ship was fitted. Of these ships 2 were sunk by the gunfire of enemy submarines, 1 was sunk by bombs placed on board, and 33 were sunk by enemy torpedoes. I do not think that from this data we are justified in saying that it was futile to arm ships, because statistics show they drove off 113 submarine attacks by gunfire. That is a rather strong statement. I do not know that they actually drove them off. They had encounters in which they used their guns, and they escaped. Of course the chances for such ships to use their guns when sailing in convoy were not good, and it was of more importance for the ships which went singly. One very important phase of the discussion of the convoy system which has been entirely overlooked is that during the entire war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to Gibraltar, and this was the one escorted by the U. S. S. *New Orleans*. This convoy was dispersed by heavy weather, and was not regarded as entirely successful, because the ships came into Gibraltar subsequently singly. All the rest of the million tons of shipping which crossed from the United States to Gibraltar went across as single ships, going "on their own" as it were. These ships depended on their armed guard gun crews, and were independent of the convoy system. They actually encountered submarines, but they relied on their guns for protection.

As practically all of the ships came across the Atlantic to Gibraltar unescorted, I sent the following cablegram on May 24, 1918, to the several authorities concerned:

Strongly recommend American merchant ships carrying armed guards and sailing from United States for Italy be fitted with a few depth charges prior to sailing. Such ships capable of acting as escorts to slower convoys. Am representing to Malta with cooperation of Admiral Grant and Italian liaison officer here undesirability sending such ships in slow convoys in Mediterranean where value of their speed is lost through zigzagging. Sinking of *Tyler* good illustration. Malta fixes speed at 13 knots or sailing independently. My opinion ships which can make 11 knots much safer independently than with slow convoys unless utilized as escorts and allowed to zigzag.

This recommendation of mine was not approved, but Vice Admiral Halthrop at Malta cabled as follows:

United States vessels over 11 knots speed, when well armed, may be sailed independently without escort between Gibraltar and Genoa and Marseille.

This was in accordance with the wishes of American merchant captains who preferred to take chances zigzagging as single vessels rather than joining the slow convoys, the theory being that the longer time they were at sea the more danger they were in.

The convoy system required that ships be assembled and dispatched from some definite port. The four great Atlantic ports were Hampton Roads, New York, Halifax, and Cape Sydney (Cape Breton). Every 8 or 16 days a great convoy was dispatched from these ports, escorted across the Atlantic by a battleship or cruiser to protect it from an enemy raider, to be met on the European side by a danger zone escort of destroyers to fetch it into port. Ships bound for the Mediterranean were, however, dispatched singly to Gibraltar, also ships from the Cape of Good Hope, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro were assembled singly at Terra Leone or Dakar and dispatched to Gibraltar. When by the Admiralty order of July 22, 1917, the convoy system was applied to the Mediterranean, Gibraltar became the principal convoy port of the world, with about one-quarter of all the allied tonnage touching there to be formed up into convoys in every direction. Before this date nearly every available ship had been pretty well utilized in escorting convoys to Northern Europe, it was a great task to scare up enough escort ships to send to Gibraltar.

The date of the inauguration in the Mediterranean is when the British admiral, on July 22, 1917, telegraphed to Gibraltar to commence collecting British and allied cargo ships with speed of between 10 and 11 knots bound for ports in the United Kingdom with view to forming them into convoys, and on the 27th of July, 1917, the first regular convoy consisting of 14 ships with an ocean escort sailed from Gibraltar for the east coast of England, and thereafter these convoys sailed every four days from Gibraltar for ports on the east and west coasts of England alternately, and sailed from England for Gibraltar at regular periods from Falmouth and Milfordhaven. As previously stated, the first American man-of-war for escort duty arrived in Gibraltar on August 6. As fast as our ships arrived they were assigned to duty with allied vessels as escorts to convoys and as danger-zone escorts. The American ships differed from other nationalities based at Gibraltar in that other nationalities were employed almost exclu-

took also practically all escort work in the Atlantic between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. For instance, of the ships which sailed between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom during the entire war, 200 of them, or almost 90 per cent, totalling and representing 12,000,000 gross tons, were escorted solely by American escort ships from our forces based on Gibraltar. This point is important because it made my headquarters rather than Malta. There was a further reason for choosing Gibraltar because of the enormous number of unescorted merchant ships which arrived singly in Gibraltar from the United States.

This has to do with the importance also of each ship having an armed guard on board, as this whole traffic was independent of the convoy system. The total number of ships convoyed in the Mediterranean traffic by American forces amounted to about 100,000 tons bound for Mediterranean and Far Eastern ports, such as the American Army through Marseilles, French forces in North Africa, allied forces at Salonika, British forces in Egypt and Palestine, and the entire supply of Italy. According to tentative figures from the historical section our cruisers and warships based on the United States escorted only 82 convoys other than troop convoys in the Atlantic during the entire war. The participation of the United States Navy in the convoy system seems historically to have begun about one month later than when that of the Allies began. This was important in its bearing on the charge that the delay of the United States Navy in sending ships across prolonged the war.

It has been officially stated in a publication compiled in the commander's office in London that:

In general transports were assigned a destroyer escort, which was as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.

In some cases of particularly valuable transports, the escort was twice as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.

As only 15 per cent of the vessels in Atlantic convoys carried troops, it was desirable, so far as practicable, to route troop transports in special lanes. As cargo convoys did not pass. This greatly increased the safety of troop transports, as it practically forced submarines to concentrate their efforts in the attack on cargo vessels (comprising 85 per cent of the shipping) passed.

If a German submarine took station in a troop-transport lane and remained for weeks without sighting a troop convoy. This failure to find troop lanes forced the submarine into cargo lanes and so gave a lesson to the protection of troop convoys. If the submarines had known the positions of the troop lanes and had concentrated on them, they would have found a regular number of ships, all of high speed, hence difficult to attack. Furthermore, they have encountered a destroyer escort three times as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.

Having taken the foregoing steps for the protection of troops, it is certain that submarines would be forced to confine their attacks to cargo vessels, and this was borne out by the experience of the war.

This statement really shows more the advantages of the convoy system, because with the high speed of the destroyers and of the destroyer escorts the speed element was also present. Unquestionably the cargo ships bore more the brunt of the submarine attacks than the troop ships. In the four years of war the British merchant fleet had much more experience in submarine attacks than the United States. In the four years of war the British merchant fleet had 14,000 merchant ships of 7,819,240 gross tons and had 14,000 on the roll of honor.

I would like to add there also that they had 1,518 on the roll of honor.

It is very difficult to give accurate figures for the losses of American merchant ships during the war, because of the transition stage from unarmed merchant ships to armed guard ships and then to N. O. T. S. vessels. Roughly speaking, prior to our entry into the war we lost ships of 67,815 gross tons. After we entered the war we lost 125 merchant vessels of 225,865 gross tons. In addition to these, there were lost 13 N. O. T. S. cargo ships of 67,020 gross tons, thus making total of 159 ships of 360,700 gross tons.

Admiral Sims cabled the Navy Department on June 22, 1917, saying:

As previously reported, convoys are in successful operation from the Mediterranean to Hampton Roads.

I merely wish to point out historically that while it is true that on June 10, 1917, the first experimental convoy was dispatched from New York to England, the next convoy, which was the first regular, was not dispatched until June 27. His cablegram of the previous day, June 21, 1917, is a lucid explanation of the situation. He says that "the convoy system is merely a plan that obliges a submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchantmen." This is, however, an important point of view which is apt to be overlooked, and that is, with the slow-moving cargo ships in convoy with escorts made up of yachts, gunboats, and a heterogeneous group of vessels, the escort was powerless to prevent the sinking of at least one cargo ship, and what they could hope for was that if the submarine showed its presence by torpedoing the ship, the most the escorts could do was to drop depth charges and keep the submarine down and therefore from sinking a second ship. No cargo ship that could make 11 knots was put in convoy for this reason, and she was considered much safer, even in the Mediterranean, by going on her own and zigzagging, and, moreover, much of the success of the escorting of cargo vessels in the Mediterranean was due to the absence of submarine activity, due to the measures taken to limit their activity.

It was not until the introduction of the new measures that it was possible to introduce finally, in the share of enumerated activities of the Navy in the war, the question of the Naval Overseas Transport Service, which was really not established until January 1, 1918, after which Admiral Sims has discussed, because I think it has bearing on how hard the Navy was pushed in other directions by the demands made upon it by Admiral Sims.

The N. O. T. S. service, as it was called, was assigned 73 vessels and was established, to be regularly operated with complete crews of officers of the reserve force and enlisted men of the Regular Navy and the reserve force. Of the original number, 16 were for transport stores for the American Expeditionary Force, 12 for Navy account for transporting supplies to the naval forces operating in European waters, and 5 were named to be put in commission as soon as practicable. Before the armistice was signed, 16 ships had been assigned to the Army account as cargo vessels, and the Navy to carry supplies to the Army overseas. Every merchantman that the American vessels which carried troops to Europe was manned by the Navy, but few knew there were so many merchant ships carrying cargoes, also manned by the Navy. It was when a merchant ship, having an armed guard, was taken over by the Regular Navy to include the armed guard in the complement

took also practically all escort work in the Atlantic between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. For instance, of the 225 convoys which sailed between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom during the entire war, 200 of them, or almost 90 per cent, totalling 4,269 ships and representing 12,000,000 gross tons, were escorted both ways solely by American escort ships from our forces based on Gibraltar. This point is important because it made my headquarters Gibraltar rather than Malta. There was a further reason for my being at Gibraltar because of the enormous number of unescorted American merchant ships which arrived singly in Gibraltar from the United States.

This has to do with the importance also of each ship having an armed guard on board, as this whole traffic was independent of the convoy system. The total number of ships convoyed in local Mediterranean traffic by American forces amounted to about 4,245 ships bound for Mediterranean and Far Eastern ports, supplying the American Army through Marseilles, French forces in North Africa, allied forces at Salonika, British forces in Egypt and Palestine, and the entire supply of Italy. According to tentative figures in the historical section our cruisers and warships based on the United States escorted only 82 convoys other than troop convoys across the Atlantic during the entire war. The participation of the United States Navy in the convoy system seems historically to have begun about one month later than when that of the Allies began. This is important in its bearing on the charge that the delay of the United States Navy in sending ships across prolonged the war four months.

It has been officially stated in a publication compiled in the former commander's office in London that:

In general transports were assigned a destroyer escort, which was about three times as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.

In some cases of particularly valuable transports, the escort was ten times as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.

As only 15 per cent of the vessels in Atlantic convoys carried troops, it became desirable, so far as practicable, to route troop transports in special lanes through which cargo convoys did not pass. This greatly increased the safety of troop transports and it practically forced submarines to concentrate their efforts in the areas through which cargo vessels (comprising 85 per cent of the shipping) passed.

If a German submarine took station in a troop-transport lane he might have remained for weeks without sighting a troop convoy. This failure to find shipping in troop lanes forced the submarine into cargo lanes and so gave a large measure of protection to troop convoys. If the submarines had known the positions of these lanes and had concentrated on them, they would have found a relatively small number of ships, all of high speed, hence difficult to attack. Furthermore, they would have encountered a destroyer escort three times as strong as the escort protecting cargo vessels.

Having taken the foregoing steps for the protection of troops, it was practically certain that submarines would be forced to confine their attacks almost exclusively to cargo vessels, and this was borne out by the experience of the war.

This statement really shows more the advantages of escorting troops than of the convoy system, because with the high speed of the transports and of the destroyers the speed element was also a great factor. Unquestionably the cargo ships bore more the brunt of the war and had much more experience in submarine attacks than any man-of-war did. In the four years of war the British merchant marine lost 3,141 merchant ships of 7,819,240 gross tons and had 14,000 men killed.

I would like to add there also that they had 1,519 officers and men on the roll of honor.

It is very difficult to give accurate figures for the losses of American merchant ships during the war, because of the transition stage from chartered merchant ships to armed guard ships and then to N. O. T. S. vessels. Roughly speaking, prior to our entry into the war we lost 21 ships of 67,815 gross tons. After we entered the war we lost 125 merchant vessels of 225,865 gross tons. In addition to these, there were lost 13 N. O. T. S. cargo ships of 67,020 gross tons, thus making a total of 159 ships of 360,700 gross tons.

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I want to introduce finally, in the share of enumerated activities of the Navy in the war, the question of the Naval Overseas Transport Service, which was really not established until January 1, 1918, after the period which Admiral Sims has discussed, because I think it has a great bearing on how hard the Navy was pushed in other directions than by the demands made upon it by Admiral Sims.

The N. O. T. S. service, as it was called, was assigned 73 vessels when it was established, to be regularly operated with complete crews of officers of the reserve force and enlisted men of the Regular Navy and the reserve force. Of the original number, 16 were for Army account to transport stores for the American Expeditionary Forces, 52 for Navy account for transporting supplies to the naval forces operating in European waters, and 5 were named to be put in commission as soon as practicable. Before the armistice was signed 213 vessels had been assigned to the Army account as cargo vessels, manned by the Navy to carry supplies to the Army overseas. Everyone knows that the American vessels which carried troops to Europe were manned by the Navy, but few knew there were so many merchant ships carrying cargoes, also manned by the Navy. It was

of the ship, so that the armed-guard character of the special detachment was entirely lost. These considerations are important because of the difficulty in giving statistics for merchant marine ships, armed-guard ships, and N. O. T. S. ships, as they merged from one into the other. At the time of the armistice there were approximately 4,158 officers and 28,047 men on board of N. O. T. S. vessels and 514 officers and 1,128 men of the N. O. T. S. service at shore stations, making a total of 4,672 officers and 29,175 men in the N. O. T. S. service at the close of actual hostilities. Of these, only 12 were regular naval officers, the remainder being reserves, of which four-fifths were commissioned from green material. The latter, however, almost without exception, had been graduated from training camps and obtained a good deal of their first seagoing experience when they joined the ships. Of the enlisted men, however, some 18,000 were regulars and 11,000 were reserves, so this indicates why the dilution was not as great as may have been inferred. The average complement of the N. O. T. S. vessels during the war was 11 officers and 70 men.

Admiral Sims inserted in his testimony as addendum the following telegram from the Navy Department, which he received on July 10, 1917:

The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of the department in relation to cooperation of our naval forces with those of our allies. "After careful consideration of the present naval situation taken in connection with possible future situation which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies: First, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters; second, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war; third, the realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no wise be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleet; fourth, the conception that the present main military rôle of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will be, generally speaking, two classes of vessels engaged—minor craft and major craft—and two rôles of action, first offensive, second defensive; fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph four, the department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need; sixth, pursuant to the above general policy the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaires in any number not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint allied admiralities which would not involve a violation of our present State policy; two, its unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but cooperating unit when after joint consultations of all admiralities concerned the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it; three, its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations."

In commenting on this Admiral Sims says:

I wish here merely to state that the policy, as herein stated, is only to be judged by actual results in carrying it out, and they speak for themselves. I particularly wish to stress the point that this first definite statement of policy was received on July 10, a few days over three months after we had declared war, as stated in my original letter of January 7. The astounding features of this policy, however, were that, while it stated our intention to cooperate to the fullest degree, still such cooperation was con-

ditioned upon, first, an adequate defense of own waters, and second, the future position of the United States after this war was finished. I am wholly unable to conceive of any war policy, particularly in a world war of this nature, which was certain to exhaust all participants, with the possible exception of ourselves, being based upon the requirements of any possible future war.

I wish to say that in my opinion history will demonstrate and has demonstrated that this policy, as above outlined, actually resulted in what we all know to have been the successful termination of the war, with the United States retaining a commanding position, which it now does, and when Admiral Sims says that the war was certain to exhaust all participants, with the possible exception of ourselves, he leaves out of consideration a number of the Allies and other associated powers who were not exhausted by the war, namely, Cuba, Brazil, China, and Japan.

Admiral Sims, in his testimony, says:

I am convinced that our failure to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during these first six months unnecessarily jeopardized the whole war. In my opinion it resulted in lengthening the war by several months through the increased losses in merchant shipping that resulted therefrom. I believe that this failure, combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous and the few months subsequent to our declaration of war probably postponed victory four months.

This, in my opinion, is the contention for which Admiral Sims's whole testimony stands. Historically, however, it is manifestly impossible in the few months preceding the outbreak of any war to prepare on a large scale for war without precipitating the war, which is the great argument in favor of preparedness. Whether in the few months subsequent to the war adequate steps were not taken by the Navy Department is a matter for careful and painstaking inquiry, and the testimony I have given is merely data which shows the wonderful way the naval personnel responded to its responsibilities once that war was declared. The elements which entered into the collapse of the German offensive were so numerous, so varied, and so incapable of sweeping generalizations that it is impossible, historically, to accept Admiral Sims's offhand statement.

Mr. HOOVER stated in his testimony:

The length of the war is one of the most complex questions that one can go into, as it embraces the question of land operations and the collapse in Germany of hundreds of factors that may have had something to do with bringing the war to its end and which broke down the morale of the German army, etc.

This indicates that the question is a complex one.

It is believed that a possible valuable result of the investigation now being conducted by this committee may be the development of means for accurately fixing responsibility for preparation for war, such as the present personnel situation, which is admittedly much worse than it was prior to our entry into the war.

This can be accomplished by the enactment of legislation which will make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for making to the Secretary of the Navy such recommendations regarding building program, personnel, material afloat and ashore, and plans for national defense as will maintain the Navy in an adequate condition of preparedness to meet any probable enemy; and which will also make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for the execution during peace and war of all plans that have been approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But their personnel was not such that they were in battle condition at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were not intended to be, because they were equipped solely for the purpose of training engineers. They had been maintained in condition to be used to their maximum capacity in case of battle.

The CHAIRMAN. But at the outbreak of the war they were not in actual condition for battle service, were they?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were not equipped with modern fire-control or director firing, or many of the other adjuncts of modern battleship equipment; but they were meant to do their very level best for what they were worth, which was very slight.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not have the personnel to go into battle, did they?

Admiral NIBLACK. They did not; and in my statement I stated that it was necessary to train a great many men originally to put in commission some of the ships that were in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. The first duty of those ships was to be in condition, as I remember one of the witnesses stated, as a fighting force, and second as a training force?

Admiral NIBLACK. At first it was as a fighting force, when I first joined.

The CHAIRMAN. And later that was changed?

Admiral NIBLACK. Later that was subordinated, taking a reasonable chance that the German Fleet had been knocked out sufficiently in the battle of Jutland not to risk a general fleet encounter, that we were justified in using the ships for the important problem with which the Navy was face, which was to expand ten times.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were to be used in a secondary way as a fighting force?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were, because they were kept always having target practice for that purpose. They had limited deck force, and merely enough men to man the guns, because they were loaded up with engineer force for training. We went to sea constantly with the fleet and went on with our training just the same, with the engineers. We went through all the motions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no special knowledge about the fighting force of force number two?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were engaged in training men, I guess; and all of us were engaged in training radio men and signal men for the armed guard ships. I wish to state that the problem that the fleet encountered on the jump was armed guards for merchant ships, and that problem was dumped right onto the fleet. I got the engineer part of it only. I did not have to train men except for radio. I had radio schools on board all the ships I commanded.

The CHAIRMAN. That was even prior to the war, was it not? I am talking about the taking away of men from the ships of the Navy for the armed guards. That was done before the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. That was done before the war. It was begun before the outbreak of war.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Admiral Mayo testified that it was begun at that time.

Admiral NIBLACK. It was done while the ships were still in Guantanamo.

The CHAIRMAN. Please let me finish my question, for the record.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo has stated, I believe, that before the outbreak of the war the personnel on his ships was being diminished in order to put armed guards on merchant ships.

Admiral NIBLACK. While the fleet was still at Guantanamo men and officers were sent north from the fleet to compose the armed guards of important, fast merchant ships like the *St. Paul* and the *St. Louis* and various other American ships.

The CHAIRMAN. About what date?

Admiral NIBLACK. February. I was cognizant of it as being a member of the general board.

The CHAIRMAN. That is February, 1917?

Admiral NIBLACK. February, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony, Admiral, you state that on February 4, 1917, the General Board had submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations a special war plan entitled "Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the central European powers"

Can you tell me what became of that war plan?

Admiral NIBLACK. Whether this paper is on file or not in the department, I am unable to state.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that plan with you?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have not. I have no copy, but I presume the general board has.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get it?

Admiral NIBLACK. I will see if it is available; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And will you give it to the committee? I would like to put it in the record.

Admiral NIBLACK. Admiral Badger will come before the committee, and he can answer that question specifically. It was February 4.

The CHAIRMAN. If possible, I would like to get a copy of that report. I would like to see it, myself, before Admiral Badger comes before us.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if you can furnish it to the committee so that we can put it into the record, I would like to have it.

Admiral NIBLACK. I will do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman has suggested that it might be a secret report. Will you furnish it to the committee, and then we will take the proper steps about putting it in the record?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me what became of that report?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on it?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it a war plan in connection with a war with any specific power?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was suggesting that—it was a general plan of procedure of the department, recommending that we do certain things in view of the outlook. It was at the time of the unrestricted sinkings by submarines, which made it very probable, or possible, that we would be drawn in.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral NIBLACK. February 4, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time it was perfectly evident that we would be drawn into the war, was it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was not, apparently, to a lot of people.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not to you?

Admiral NIBLACK. I thought so.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you thought so at any time prior to the period after the outbreak of hostilities?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was twice naval attaché in Germany. I was not asleep. I came from there just before the war, so I knew the situation pretty well.

The CHAIRMAN. You were stationed in Germany just before the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I came back in July, 1913; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know, then, whether that was used as a general war plan throughout the Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. This was not, in a sense, a war plan. It was a suggestion as to steps to be taken. A general war plan is a moving target. It is drawn up and then amended from time to time to suit conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there was any general war plan or not?

Admiral NIBLACK. Oh, yes; I know that well. Certainly there was.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that drawn up?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was drawn up when I was a boy, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. It was drawn up when you were a boy?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think so, sir. I have been familiar with it ever since.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any changes made in it since you were a boy?

Admiral NIBLACK. I made many in it, myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that was——

Admiral NIBLACK. I mean to say there is nothing new about a war plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a general war plan?

Admiral NIBLACK. Ever since we had had a Naval War College we have been studying the art of war, and they have been drawing up plans. We used to make them at the War College and then turn them over to the General Board. Now they are in Operations.

X [I want to call attention to this question. No war plan was worked out much that was drawn up prior to February 4, 1917, because the whole plan was based on fights between battleships. Battleships are the backbone of the Navy, and we had always gone in for strong battleships, battleships whether we got anything else or not. Our battleships were not given great speed, but they were given heavy armament and great gun power in order to have to run away from anything, but so that they could go where they wished and everything else would have to move off unless they wanted to get in trouble. The general idea had been, battleships that everybody would be afraid of. All of our plans were based on battleships, and when the unrestricted sinkings, which nobody dreamed of, took place, I point out in my testimony that a complete change in everybody's ideas took place. We saw then that we had to man the ships with armed guards, to provide escorts for convoys; that we had to put our own crews and officers on board transports in order not

to trust to merchant captains to go into convoys; because they had no training. The problem as it faced us on February 4 is n by the fact that the General Board says such measures were to ken, because the whole aspect of the war was completely changed. ie Allies themselves were not prepared for war, with all the war had been in, on February 4, 1917. They could not be prepared use unrestricted sinking was unheard of. Nobody dreamed that e would be unrestricted sinking. It bouleversed the whole d. Nobody knew what to do, exactly.

he CHAIRMAN. Then this special war plan you speak of, submitted February 4, 1917, did not cover that sinking of ships?

Admiral NIBLACK. I never said that it was a war plan. I said it entitled "Steps to be taken to meet a possible war with the tral European Powers." I did not say it was a war plan.

he CHAIRMAN. Your testimony calls it a special war plan.

Admiral NIBLACK. Where do I say that?

he CHAIRMAN. Look on line 1.

Admiral NIBLACK. It says "Steps to be taken."

he CHAIRMAN. There is the language used, "Special war plan." as using your own language, Admiral.

Admiral NIBLACK. That was to meet a special phase of it; the uation on February 4. It was not a war plan. I mean to say that had a war plan, but that was not our war plan. Our war plan was battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. By February 4 did they know about the conditions that they could submit a special plan for them?

Admiral NIBLACK. By February 4 we knew about the unrestricted sinkings. We knew there was something else, and we had been getting ready for it.

The CHAIRMAN. This covered the unrestricted sinkings?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes; it was as to steps to be taken.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was a war plan for that particular purpose?

Admiral NIBLACK. Steps to be taken to meet the situation, because fter all a war plan, Mr. Chairman, is a general scheme which is accompanied by all the information necessary to change the plan if ou have to; because it is all based on information.

The CHAIRMAN. At all times in getting up a general, war plant you could want to take all the things you had before and add to them?

Admiral NIBLACK. Chapter 1, section 1, page 1, paragraph 1, of the Naval Regulations, says that the Office of Naval Intelligence "shall urnish intelligence on all the operations of any body or organization. That is all based on information.

The CHAIRMAN. So that on February 4 when you put in this special plan it was to be added to the plan that you already had before, and the two together made up the war plan that you had at that time?

Admiral NIBLACK. It made up for the change in situation due to the unrestricted sinkings.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I say that with what you had before, that made up a war plan that we had in the department then?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, certainly; because a war plan is a plan to meet any situation at a given time. It varies from day to day; it varies from time to time. A war plan is not a canned object, or something that is finished. It is a product that goes on from day to day, based on information, and it is subject to change.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to February 4, 1917, and between August, 1914, and February, 1917, had the war plan, or the plan that was on hand in the department, been changed in any respect?

Admiral NIBLACK. You see, I would not possibly know that, because it is secret, in the first place, and all done there, and I had no reason to seek to modify it, because I was not in a position to do so.

I would like to make one explanation, if you please, about the difference between troop transports and cargo transports, because it is very vital that speed was the great protection to the troop transports; the speed of the destroyers and the speed of the transports themselves. No ship was allowed to be a transport that could not make 15 knots. A submarine could not see an approaching convoy far enough off to get into position and stay there with these fast ships zig-zagging, because it was too perilous, and the speed itself was the protection to the convoy, and the zig-zagging was a protection because the submarine could not have the nerve to put itself close enough to a zig-zagging boat like that, going at high speed, and run the risk of being run down; to a certain extent it had that element of speed in it. And, further than that, the speed of an escorting ship was a fearful thing to a submarine, because these escorting ships were very fast, and they carried depth charges, and they could reach the spot where the submarine was and drop depth charges on it before it could reach a safe distance in submerging.

The cargo ships were slower and their escorts were slow ships anyway, because those escorts were maintained by danger zone escorts, bringing the ships into port, which was the main thing; and if cargo ships were attacked, the most those escorting ships could do would be to move over as fast as they could in the general direction of where the submarine was, and drop depth charges. In my opinion the depth charges had more to do with upsetting the morale of the German submarines than anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you one or two more questions about the war plans. Do you recall any other special plans submitted by the General Board excepting the recommendations that appeared in your testimony on page 8?

Admiral NIBLACK. There were three. I do not recall them, but Admiral Badger, who is coming before this committee, as I understand, knows about, in a general way, for any number of years back, all of the recommendations of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what was done with the "Report on assistance the United States can give the Allies upon the declaration of war"?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not recollect that paper thoroughly. I left on the 7th of April, and I did my best to render assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee a copy of that report on assistance the United States can give the Allies upon the declaration of war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I will see what I can do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the General Board makes its plans and makes its reports to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral NIBLACK. It does.

The CHAIRMAN. And he, in turn, makes a report to the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral NIBLACK. And the Secretary himself may ask directly for a report. The Naval General Board is advisory in its functions, and

even can, at the request of any bureau, investigate questions and make report.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chief of Naval Operations suppress the report, if he sees fit?

Admiral NIBLICK. The Chief of Naval Operations is himself, ex officio, a member of the General Board, and attends meetings frequently. I suppose anybody could do anything in that line, if they were so inclined. It is rather a dangerous proposition, but I suppose it could be done.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to know was, in the general organization of the Navy would it be advisable for the Board to report to the Secretary of the Navy instead of reporting through the Chief of Naval Operations, who might be voted down by a majority of the Board in making the report?

Admiral NIBLACK. Do you mean to amend the law?

The CHAIRMAN. To have the law amended, yes. I do not know that it would. I simply wanted your opinion about it.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think that under the law now the Chief of Naval Operations is charged with certain duties, with which the law charges the General Board in a certain sense, and in that way the General Board is now an adjunct of Operations more than it was previously; but to what extent the recommendations of the General Board are heeded by the administration or by Congress depends very largely on how well it suits their policy of the moment. It does not alter the General Board's duty in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony you suggest that legislation might be an advantage which would make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for making to the Secretary of the Navy such recommendations regarding building program, personnel, material afloat and ashore, and plans for national defense, as will maintain the Navy in an adequate condition of preparedness to meet any probable enemy, and which will also make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for the execution during peace and war of all plans that have been approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral NIBLACK. You see, the law says that the General Board has certain responsibilities in preparing these plans, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible—should share the responsibility. Specifically what I mean is that the administration may have a program based upon expediency, upon the financial outlook, or upon the next election, or whatever you choose. That does not alter the duty of the General Board to prepare a plan. If Congress is willing to accept its share of the responsibility for turning down the General Board, there ought to be on record what the General Board recommends, and that is through the Chief of Naval Operations in this case, in addition to what there is in writing from the Secretary of the Navy, concerning the administration's plans. I think many of the recommendations of the General Board are impracticable, because we have not got the money, or it does not suit the book, etc. But that does not alter the duty of the General Board. The Navy Department does work all right and has worked all right. The bureau system is a splendid system, and has stood the test of war. The bureaus provided us with everything that we asked for, more or less, and I think that the bureau system is sound in every way. Personally, I never wanted to see it particularly modified except to be

materially controlled in the recommendations they made, by the central, responsible person, the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do think that the General Board and the Chief of Naval Operations should have the responsibility so that they would be entitled to present their views to Congress as well as those of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think if Congress would be willing to stand for it; but I do not think that Congress would love that, sir—that thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get your ideas.

Admiral NIBLACK. I would like that very much. I think we would like to see that, very much, that when anything is turned down, when any recommendation is turned down, the responsibility is just as clear as daylight.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would think that the Board should report to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think that the Chief of Operations should be the responsible person, and that his recommendations should go hand in hand, in writing, at the same time that the Secretary of the Navy goes, to the Senate Committee and the House Committee on Naval Affairs, so that we would know where the responsibility really rested in the end.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your testimony that it is difficult to figure out how Admiral Sims could state that our failure to send all of our anti-submarine vessels to the war zone immediately on the outbreak of war resulted in prolonging the war four months, that with a maximum of only 3 per cent, we could have shortened the war so greatly as four months.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir; I think that was later on, that it was 5 or 6 or 7 per cent, as testified by Admiral Sims in his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Later on it was 6 or 7 per cent?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In April, 1917, the submarine sinkings amounted to 800,000 tons, I believe: and when did we first commence to help the submarine situation?

Admiral NIBLACK. Six or eight days after the outbreak of war they started the first division of destroyers across. We had only about 50 destroyers, you must remember, all told.

The CHAIRMAN. They arrived and took part the 1st of May?

Admiral NIBLACK. The 1st of May. But when they first went over it is very important to note that the work they undertook was the patrolling of certain areas. The Allies were committed to the patrol system, of having areas patrolled by ships, which patrol system broke down and the convoy system was adopted: not suddenly, but piecemeal. The great proposition to the convoy system came from the captains of the merchant vessels themselves. They did not feel that they could sail their ships in convoy. Impossible things were done during the war. Our own division of battleships went over and joined the British battleship fleet, the Grand Fleet, and went to sea under conditions that everybody in the British Navy and in our Navy regarded as impossible, to keep the position in thick weather, with the strong currents and with the screens and all; but just as soon as they tried it, it worked. It is pretty hard to say what is impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that shortly after our force went over and assisted in the submarine situation, the submarine situation became less acute?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, that is what you call a coincidence. It was due to the adoption of the depth charge.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was due altogether to the adoption of the depth charge?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have testified in my testimony that the sinking of submarines can not be laid to any one cause, because some were sunk by kite balloons, or by airships, where they dropped the depth charge in the vicinity of the submarine where its situation was betrayed. Some of them were sunk on the surface at night. No one thing was solely responsible for success. Some were hunted by little motor launches, with listening devices, which dropped depth charges on them. It was everything, the science of war in every direction closing in on the submarine. What the main thing was is immaterial.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you not think that the addition of our forces had a great deal to do with stopping the submarine menace?

Admiral NIBLACK. I certainly do. We brought the best listening devices and the best depth charges, and a number of improvements in regard to the submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore would you not say that the sooner we could have gotten our forces over, the better?

Admiral NIBLACK. The sooner we could have gotten our forces over the better, provided we decided to send them over; but as you see, in the end, the maximum was only 15 per cent of our personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you not think they did more than that proportion; if they were 3 per cent in practice, do you not think they did more than 3 per cent of the work of checking the submarine menace? That is not my idea of what the Navy did during the war.

Admiral NIBLACK. I certainly do. And, moreover, I call attention to the fact, and in my testimony, that at the very time that Admiral Sims was saying we had only 3 per cent of the antisubmarine forces that were in Europe, 90 per cent of all the shipping that was going between Great Britain and the Mediterranean, which meant the supply of the Far East and everything else, was escorted solely by American ships under my command at Gibraltar. Of course, that is 90 per cent, because you have got to bring the thing down, now, to percentages. But this is that one phase of it. Statistics can be made to prove almost anything, if you work them right.

The CHAIRMAN. And any advantage in sending those forces over, if the plan could be followed out, would have been greater, would it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have no doubt. I would have been glad to have gone over much sooner, myself, Mr. Chairman; but that is not the question. The question is absolutely a question of statistics.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but that is the question I am asking you.

Admiral NIBLACK. The question is one of statistics. I say, and others have said, that that statement of Admiral Sims is indefensible historically. I would be very glad to help my friend Sims out on it, but I can not.

The CHAIRMAN. Other witnesses have testified in a different manner.

Admiral NIBLACK. But they have not given any statistics; they have not given any data.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is simply a question of weighing the evidence.

Admiral NIBLACK. That is all I ask you to do, sir, because I am very glad to get any testimony that helps us out in the historical section. All this testimony means more than \$20,000 in value to the historical section, because we will use it. I am very glad we have taken this method of arriving at the real history of the war. I hope the report of this committee will help us out in the historical section in placing responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that it will. You state in your testimony that during the entire war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to Gibraltar, and this was the one escorted by the U. S. S. *New Orleans*.

Admiral NIBLACK. The *New Orleans*.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course a great many convoys were escorted to France, were they not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I said that as far as the Army cargo or supply ships were concerned I could not get the data; but I did say later in my testimony that there were 82 escorted convoys of cargo ships, as far as our records show, from the Mediterranean.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the reason there were so few to Gibraltar was that it was so far away from the German base that it would have been harder for them to operate there than farther north.

Admiral NIBLACK. Submarines were operating in the Mediterranean from the Adriatic and from Germany both. The Austrians had a naval submarine base at Pola and also at a port called Cattaro, and the Germans also had a big base at

After the war I went into the Adriatic and I visited those three ports. The activities there were enormous in regard to ships. The Germans shipped submarines down in sections and put them together there.

The CHAIRMAN. Were many of the submarines of the Germans lying in wait around the Straits of Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. Never.

The CHAIRMAN. Never?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were too afraid. That was the neck of the bottle. The system of the German submarines was to submerge, stop their engines, and come in with the current. The current runs out through the straits on the top and comes in at the bottom, and all that a submarine had to do was to submerge and stop her engines and come in with the current, and the patrol would pass over them listening, but as they were not using their machinery it was rather difficult to hear them; and they never, during the entire war, made an attack on Gibraltar. They were anxious and willing enough to get through without any trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. You state in your testimony:

Historically, however, it is manifestly impossible in the few months preceding the outbreak of any war to prepare on a large scale for war without precipitating the war, which is the great argument in favor of preparedness.

Admiral NIBLACK. I will say further than that, what I have not said before, that prior to the outbreak of this war it was announced policy of the administration. Congress then did not question that we should by word or thought be neutral, and we were cautioned

and we were not permitted to prepare for war openly. What we could do in the general board, and whatever we could do——

The CHAIRMAN. That was up to the time of the declaration of war?

Admiral NIBLACK. Up to the time that war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, not of the general war, but the time of our going into the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, up to the time of our going into the war. That is entirely a matter of policy of the Government. That, I understand, was the policy of the Government at the time. I think it would have been very difficult for the Navy to have gotten authority to do things that might have been judged advisable to do; but, on general principles, the argument for preparedness is to be ready, to make the preparation before the war. But I want to explain one thing very definitely, and that is that the Navy is always on a war footing. Its transition from peace to war is very slight.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would say, on account of the fear of precipitating the war, that we were not justified during the time——

Admiral NIBLACK. That war or any war.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). From 1914 until the declaration of war, in making any open preparation for war?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is generally accepted as a pretty good action. But, in addition to that, we were prevented by the policy of the Government at the time; and now it is the policy of the Government—the avowed policy of the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. And you rather approve of that?

Admiral NIBLACK. I approve of anything that is preparedness for war. I am not involving myself in a discussion as to the policies of this Government, and I am an adviser of the Government in my official capacity, and I can give this committee any information it wants; but I am not prepared to state that we behaved badly before the war, or that we behaved well. I can give you the facts and the committee can judge of the results.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would not reply “yes” to my question?

Admiral NIBLACK. I would not reply “yes” to your question, and would not reply “no,” because I do not know what the question is aiming at.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not obliged to know what the question is aiming at. You are a witness before this committee.

Admiral NIBLACK. Is the question, “Do I approve of the policy of the Government”?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve of the general policy that the Government adopted before the war of not allowing anything to be done to prepare for war, on the ground that it might precipitate war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not think it would have made much difference in the declaration of war in this particular case, whether we prepared or not, because I do not think we had very much to say, ourselves, about entering the war.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your testimony that at a meeting at which Vice Admiral Browning of the British Navy made a statement, he also suggested sending two or three destroyers to England, as an evidence of good intentions, stating that of course our fleet could not be willing to part with or weaken its screen of destroyers. What was the principal purpose, was it, of Vice Admiral Browning's appearance over here?

Admiral NIBLACK. I gather it so, from the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at that meeting?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was not at that meeting. I was just simply speaking of the General Board's view of the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know anything personally about that?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know anything personally, except what has been testified in a general way before the committee; and Admiral Wilson said that there was one officer—the trouble was, the conversation was general.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have nothing personal to testify to about that?

Admiral NIBLACK. No, sir; I have nothing to testify.

Senator TRAMMELL. In regard to those plans that were recommended on February 4, 1917, Admiral, your language is that you submitted special war plans; and then you designate the title of the plans.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not mean to state, of course, that it was a general war plan, at all? It was just what you said it was: it was a special plan on the question of submarines?

Admiral NIBLACK. On the question of unrestricted sinkings.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said: "That was a special war plan entitled 'Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers.'"

You did not mean to convey the idea that it was a new general plan, but it was dealing with that general subject?

Admiral NIBLACK. Dealing with unrestricted sinkings; the problem presented by the change in the method of warfare by the Central Powers.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated that the Navy Department has had war plans from time immemorial, practically?

Admiral NIBLACK. Since the establishment of the War College, in 1888.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; but that these plans were not a canned proposition, but that they had to be changed and altered upon conditions as they changed, and to meet the emergencies as they arose. But, as a matter of fact, they did have plans—war plans!

Admiral NIBLACK. Oh, yes; they had war plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, you were in command at Gibraltar. Did you cooperate with the British there?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely. We consolidated with them.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you have any pretty general latitude in your command there, or did somebody else furnish you all the details?

Admiral NIBLACK. I operated under a general mission of the forces in Europe, and operated under whoever happened to be the senior naval officer present.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did Admiral Sims frequent your post there—your command there—during the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. He never visited Gibraltar during the war, and nobody visited Gibraltar during the war; that is, in the way of official inspection.

Senator TRAMMELL. So far as you were concerned, you were in command there—did you cooperate with the British, whoever was in command of the forces?

Admiral NIBLACK. The allied forces in the Mediterranean were under the command of Admiral Gauchet, of the French Navy at Corfu. To that extent I was under him. Vice Admiral Calthorp, at Malta, was in charge of the Mediterranean convoy system, and to that extent I was on the staff of Vice Admiral Calthorp, because there was a Japanese rear admiral, an Italian rear admiral, and a French rear admiral at Malta, and I should, under the general scheme, have been at Malta; but I did all my voting as a member of the commission at Malta by letter and by cable, and the necessity for my being at Gibraltar was due to the fact, as I say, that we had an Atlantic convoy system as well, and that was more directly under the Admiralty in London as a general proposition, and therefore Gibraltar was the half-way point. That is why I had to make Gibraltar my headquarters to cover all the ground.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is all the questions I want to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive your orders for European duty?

Admiral NIBLACK. The 28th of October, 1917, and I was detached within 24 hours and ordered to report to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the character of your orders?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was ordered to proceed to Gibraltar, after I had reported to the General Board, and assume command of the forces there, and report to the senior officer present.

The CHAIRMAN. At Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. To the senior officer in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Through Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. My orders at first were not to report to Admiral Sims, but implied so, because it said, "Report to your immediate superior in command for duty." Admiral Sims would have been my immediate senior in command in London.

The CHAIRMAN. No specific orders to report to Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. No specific orders; but subsequently, at my own request and in consultation, it was agreed that I would go by way of London in order to familiarize myself with the situation, and I arrived in London in November, and received from Admiral Sims the general instructions which he gave to all of his forces, which I have here and which I can embody in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had not gone to London, would you still have had to report to Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely; no question about it. But the advantage in going to London was that I spent time in the Admiralty offices to familiarize myself with the submarine situation and the convoy system, and talking to the convoy officers, so as to be perfectly in accord with the entire system; and I did the same in Paris, and it was a very valuable thing to have done and a very important thing to have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you left this country, did you receive full information from the department as to the department's plans and policies?

Admiral NIBLACK. I received orders—I familiarized myself with the situation in Paris as regards our forces abroad, and the sinking situation, the situation as regards submarines sinkings, and as regards the convoy system and the general idea.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what you did, but I say, did you receive from the department full information about its policies and plan for that work?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; I received orders to command a particular force.

The CHAIRMAN. With no specific information about any plans or policies of the department?

Admiral NIBLACK. No specific plan about any policy or forces, except as embodied in the instructions I got in London from Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you receive any full instructions from the department about your mission?

Admiral NIBLACK. Only in the short time, several days, that I was in Washington, I familiarized myself with the situation. but I got no definite orders as to how I was to conduct the war, personally. I was simply to cooperate.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose operation orders were the forces under your command?

Admiral NIBLACK. Admiral Sims's.

The CHAIRMAN. Operation orders, I asked.

Admiral NIBLACK. Operation orders?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral NIBLACK. Largely my own; and in conference with the Mediterranean officers. The convoys were under the regulations of the senior convoy officer in the Mediterranean, that is, Admiral Calthorp.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this situation satisfactory?

Admiral NIBLACK. Entirely so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your forces, the forces that were under your command, become, therefore, an integral part of the British Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. Not in the slightest degree.

The CHAIRMAN. You never lost your identity as a separate organization?

Admiral NIBLACK. On the contrary, when Vice Admiral Calthorp came to Gibraltar to inspect our forces I had to invite him especially to inspect mine, and he was very willing and very pleased to do it but he did not assume that he had any right to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any objection to this policy of unity of command, and did you ever make any report on it?

Admiral NIBLACK. No. There was something in London about a unity of command in the Mediterranean, but it had nothing to do with my forces. It was rather a general question of the French, Italian, and British and Japanese forces, in a general way. It had no reference to the convoy system or to my forces, which were actively cooperating.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make a report on it?

Admiral NIBLACK. None at all; only to ask what it was all about: just a personal letter to ask what the unity of command was about.

The CHAIRMAN. A personal letter to whom?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think it was to the force commander. It did not concern my forces at all. We were in the convoy business, and this other was the question of the emergence of the the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* in a raid in the Mediterranean.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any action taken on this report you made?

Admiral NIBLACK. I did not make any report. Nothing was done——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on this personal letter you wrote?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; no action was taken about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Which country had the greatest number of naval forces at Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. The British had about 60,000 tons of naval shipping at Gibraltar, and we had about 33,000 tons, but we had a great many ships, because our ships were relatively small.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been preferable to have kept the American forces as a completely separate and independent unit at Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. Oh, no; no, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have had a bad effect upon the cooperation against submarines during the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. It would. We had at Gibraltar what was called a hat pool, and every morning at a conference the Italian, British, and French officers present drew out of the hat the ships that were available and distributed them for escort work, and if we would enter a ship to sail and something would happen, we would have to substitute another.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the plan work satisfactorily?

Admiral NIBLACK. Beautifully.

The CHAIRMAN. In your general opinion, what is your opinion of the unity of command in a war such as this?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not think that the unity of command ought to be distributed around among a number of people.

The CHAIRMAN. You say this worked satisfactorily at Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes; there and in every place. But the question is whether the unity of command is local or general. They had a unity of command in France when they put Gen. Foch in command. They did not have it before that. It was a very desirable thing, and it worked beautifully.

There is a difference between a command and a task. A task is to do a certain piece of work which you have a force for. Now, who is the directing power in that case is a different matter. As I explained to you, our forces were in the Mediterranean area under one set of orders and rules and methods of procedure and everything, which were determined at Malta by this commission, which I was relatively a member of, but the meetings of which I never attended, but voted by letter or cable. On the other hand, the Atlantic convoys were on an entirely different system, and they were regulated more or less from London, except the convoys to the United States. For the west Atlantic convoys and ships which went back to the United States we had a convoy system which we ran from Gibraltar.

The CHAIRMAN. That general plan of unity of command was all right so far as you were concerned?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a fundamental military principle which is perfectly sound, naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you allowed satisfactory initiative by Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he interfere in any way with the administration of your forces?

The CHAIRMAN. That was what you did, but I say, did you receive from the department full information about its policies and plans for that work?

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The CHAIRMAN. That general plan of unity of command was all right so far as you were concerned?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a fundamental military principle which is perfectly sound, naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you allowed satisfactory initiative by Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he interfere in any way with the administration of your forces?

Admiral NIBLACK. Not except to help me. He interfered often to help me, and I needed it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Senator PITTMAN. Have you the instructions of Admiral Sims to you when you reached London?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have.

Senator PITTMAN. I wish you would read them.

Admiral NIBLACK. One is Campaign Order No. 1, of August 1. That was before I came. That did not really affect me. Then there is Force Instructions No. 1, dated August 11, 1917, which had gone out by the time I arrived.

Then I have Force Instructions No. 2, of September 22, 1917, in which the general mission was "cooperation with allied forces and destruction of enemy forces. Immediate mission: (1) Conservation of allied and neutral shipping. (2) Saving of life."

Then he gave his doctrine and his policies and routines.

Then on October 6, 1917, came Force Instructions No. 3, which did not affect my forces very much, as it had to do with duty free stores and gifts for United States naval forces operating in European waters. It was a customs house order, more or less.

Then came Operation Orders No. 2 (Campaign Order No. 2) of November 10, 1917.

Then his Operation Order No. 3 (Campaign Order No. 3) of April 2, 1918, which merely said:

The senior United States naval officer in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

Senator PITTMAN. You have given the substance, then, of the instructions given you by Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I move that they be put in the record in full.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

(The orders referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
August 1, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 1.

Forces:

- (a) Destroyer flotillas based on Queenstown, Vice Admiral Sims.
- (b) Patrol squadrons operating on French coast, Capt. Fletcher.
 - (1) Based on Brest, Capt. Fletcher.
 - (2) Based on Bordeaux, commander to be designated.
- (c) Patrol squadron based on Gibraltar, Rear Admiral Wilson.

1. Enemy submarines operating against allied line of communication.
2. These forces operate under direct military control of senior allied commanders present, in accordance with general policies of force commander as set forth in "General instructions."

3. (x) The senior United States naval officer afloat in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

(y) The force commander shall be kept informed of military operations performed or contemplated and state of military readiness for any possible duty of which the forces in question are capable.

4. Keep force commander informed of supplies needed from United States sufficiently in advance for necessary arrangements being made.

In the absence of United States supplies, make direct request on allied base facilities and obtain and submit to the force commander, through his staff representatives, periodic summary of financial indebtedness thereby involved.

5. Address, "Force Commander, 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W." Official cable and telegraph address, "Simsadus, London." Staff representative France, Capt. R. H. Jackson, Ministry Marine, Paris." Telegraph address, "Jackson Marine, Paris." Use codes and ciphers as directed from time to time. In absence of contrary instructions, communicate via allied official codes to insure secrecy. Utilize allied official mail routes.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral, Commanding.

Copies to Secretary Navy, Operations, 1; commander in chief, 1; *Melville*, 40; patrol squadron commander, Gibraltar, 20; staff office, Paris, 50, for ministry of marine, patrol squadron commanders, bases, naval attaché, Paris; naval attaché, London, 1; Rome, 1; Madrid, 1; British Admiralty, 1.

FLAG SECRETARY.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
August 11, 1917.

Force instructions No. 1.

Subject: Organization and communications.

1. The official designation of these forces is "United States naval forces operating in European waters"; they constitute a task force of the Atlantic Fleet. The flag officer commanding the forces is officially styled the "Force commander" and shall be so addressed in official communications.

2. The U. S. S. *Melville* is designated as the force flagship.

3. Destroyers and parent ships based on Irish ports are officially designated by the Navy Department as "United States destroyer flotillas operating in European waters." Yachts and trawlers based on French ports are officially designated by the Navy Department as "United States patrol squadrons operating in European waters," under the immediate command of Capt. W. B. Fletcher, United States Navy. Cruisers, gunboats, Coast Guard cutters, and destroyers based on Gibraltar are designated by the Navy Department as a patrol squadron and are under the immediate command of Rear Admiral H. B. Wilson, United States Navy.

4. Repair and supply bases at Brest and Bordeaux and communication office at St. Nazaire are in course of establishment under command of the senior officer of forces operating on the French coast.

5. A group of destroyers with parent ships based on the Azores is cooperating with this force, but does not at present form a part of it.

6. Task groups will be formed from time to time and duties assigned to them to meet the demands of the situation. All such dispositions of the force will be communicated to the force in campaign order.

7. For purposes of possible combined operations of the whole Atlantic Fleet, or of divers units thereof, the vessels of this force are assigned by Navy Department order of July 14, 1917 (Op.-17/20392-656) to the several forces of the Atlantic Fleet, but such assignments are not to be considered as effective for either administrative or operating purposes under existing conditions.

8. The destroyers based on Irish ports will, at an early date, be provisionally organized into divisions and flotillas as a measure of preparedness for their operation with the battleship forces, but such organization will have no effect on the execution of the duties now assigned to them.

9. The flagship *Melville* is stationed at Queenstown, Ireland. The force commander, in his additional capacity as naval representative of the United States in the allied European countries, has an office at No. 30, Grosvenor Gardens, London. A representative of the Navy Department, who is also a member of the force staff (at present Capt. R. H. Jackson, United States Navy), has an office at the ministry of marine, Paris.

10. All mail communications from vessels of the force for the force commander shall be addressed to him, and shall be forwarded as follows:

(a) From vessels based on Irish ports, via U. S. S. *Melville*.

(b) From vessels based on French ports, via the senior United States naval officer Brest, France.

(c) From vessels based on Gibraltar, via the senior United States naval officer, Gibraltar.

11. Naval attachés and others having occasion to address the force commander by mail should address to the London office. In France such communications should be forwarded via the staff representative at the ministry of Marine, Paris.

Queenstown. Senior officer at Brest, "Ampat," Brest. Senior officer at Bordeaux "Ambase," Bordeaux. Senior officer at St. Nazaire, "Amport," St. Nazaire.

For written communications utilize official routes and methods of transmission the allied forces with which our forces are operating.

WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral Commanding

Copies to: *Melville*, 40; senior officer, Brest, 30; senior officer, Gibraltar, 15; representative, Paris; Naval attachés, London, Paris, Madrid, Rome; commander in chief, 6; Navy Department, Operations.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
September 22, 1917

Force instructions No. 2.

Subject: General instructions.

General mission: Cooperation with allied forces in destruction of enemy forces.

Immediate mission: (1) Conservation of allied and neutral shipping; (2) saving of life.

FLEET AND NAVY REGULATIONS.

The forces in European waters, being integral parts of the United States Navy and of the Atlantic Fleet, shall be governed by Navy and fleet regulations and instructions in so far as these may apply to the conditions under which the forces are operating.

The employment of the forces of this command shall be governed by such campaign orders and force instructions as may be issued from time to time.

FORCE INSTRUCTIONS.

Force instructions are not to be considered as military orders, nor are they to interfere in any way with the demands of situations which may not have been contemplated, nor with such military orders as may be issued by allied commanders under whose immediate control any vessels of the command may be operating.

The force instructions are designed to serve the following ends:

- (1) To impart the policies of the force commander to the forces under his command.
- (2) To facilitate administration in accordance with the actual war conditions under which the forces are operating; these conditions will, in many cases, necessitate departures from the methods of administration established for peace conditions.
- (3) To disseminate information regarding practices shown by experience to be successful.

POLICIES.

The following general policies of the force commander are announced, and they will be extended from time to time as necessity arises:

- (1) All other considerations should be subordinated to the one of most efficiency: cooperating with the allied forces. Operations should be carried out in accordance with the general plans of the senior allied commanders in the several areas in which the forces are operating.
- (2) The mobility of the United States forces should be such that they may be continuously ready to change their areas of operations as may be made necessary by the operations of the enemy or by orders of the Navy Department. To this end they must remain, to the extreme practicable degree, independent of shore bases and facilities.
- (3) The maximum degree of individual initiative should be encouraged. All forces, or divisions or units thereof, should be governed primarily at all times by the requirements of the particular situation confronting them. Commanders should act in accordance with their best judgment under such general policies of their seniors as have been previously made known to them. In making decisions the policies and wishes of the superiors upon whom responsibility will ultimately rest must be duly considered.
- (4) The force commander and subordinate commanders should be kept fully informed at all times of any facts known to any member of the forces which might affect the decisions and plans of such commanders.
- (5) Every officer and man should be encouraged to realize his personal share of responsibility in accomplishing the mission of the forces.
- (6) All subordinate commanders, commanding officers, other officers, and men should avoid falling into a way of thinking that duty is satisfactorily performed by

merely accomplishing the specific task assigned; they must always bear in mind the general and immediate missions of the force.

(7) The necessity for keeping the Navy Department informed of all matters which may in any way affect its responsibilities as regards these forces, and the service as a whole, must be constantly borne in mind by all.

DOCTRINE.

It is of paramount importance that each group of forces develop a doctrine covering basic tactical methods of procedure suitable for such group. Such a doctrine once developed and revised from time to time should govern all operations of the group, be thoroughly understood by all units, and provide a field within which individual initiative may be exercised with safety and with full confidence of mutual comprehension and cooperation. A doctrine to be of the maximum value must—

(a) Be brief.

(b) Be confined to fundamental essentials, having in view coordination of effort with minimum communication.

(c) Contemplate actual war conditions.

(d) Allow for the circumstances of sea, wind, weather, and navigation as practically encountered.

A doctrine must not be allowed to evolve into a mass of details which manifestly can not be standard or applicable to all situations that may arise.

Not only should all forces be prepared at all times for engagement with enemy submarines, but they should be prepared for the emergency of engagement with enemy ships of other types, either individually or in connection with fleet motions. It is essential, therefore, that such emergency be constantly borne in mind and that every preparation possible be made, based upon such information as is available or can be conjectured.

Pending the development of a doctrine for yachts and other types, the Destroyer Force Doctrine will be issued as a general guide.

Whenever any officer has any suggestions to make concerning the doctrine of the force to which he is attached, he should at once record it and make it known to his superiors. Group and division commanders should consult as frequently as possible for the purpose of making such revisions of the doctrine as may be suggested by experience.

ROUTINES—ROUTINE REPORTS.

All peace routine administration and practices should be subordinated to the requirements of war service as they develop.

It is manifestly important, both for efficient prosecution of the present war and for future professional and material improvement, that records, reports, and administrative practices be not too radically reduced. It is also important that as far as possible reports and records kept should be uniform for all vessels of a type. It is therefore desired that divisional and group commanders confer from time to time and come to an agreement as to suggested changes in established routines or practices or elimination of paper work and returns.

The senior commander of any unit or in any area should forward such recommendations to the force commander for his approval.

GROUP COMMANDER'S REPORTS.

Group commanders should periodically (weekly when practicable) submit to the force commander general reports covering military operations performed by the forces under their command. Such reports should be general in nature and as far as possible should give summaries and tabulations of important duty or data which will be of value or interest to the force commander or to the department. They should be designed primarily to assist the force commander in maintaining a general survey of operations performed without the necessity of going through war diaries and other correspondence in detail. They should also serve as a guide for the formulation of plans for the future.

WAR DIARIES.

War diaries should be kept by all commanding officers and group commanders in accordance with Atlantic Fleet Order No. 18.

A careful reading of this order shows that the war diary is not intended to be a copy of the ship's log. An inspection of some of the war diaries submitted shows that there has been some misunderstanding on this point, as many of them contain matter which is of no importance in such a diary. In the preparation of war diaries

care must be exercised to exclude nonessential items, such as concern the weather, exact time of getting under way and anchoring, movements of other vessels, etc., unless these have an important bearing upon the military operations in hand and are of importance as a matter of record in connection therewith.

Entries are frequently made in war diaries early knowledge of which by other members of the force would be advantageous. When an entry is made which is thought to be in this category the officer preparing the diary should, by any convenient means, bring the fact to the attention of the superior to whom the diary is forwarded; the superior should take immediate steps to disseminate the information if, in his judgment, such action is advisable or should take such steps as may be necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the force commander.

The information contained in war diaries should, so far as practicable, be so grouped under headings that their use by the force commander and the department may be facilitated. Such headings should be descriptive of the information they cover.

PARENT AND SUPPLY SHIPS.

Parent and supply ships should subordinate all other considerations to the efficient repair and supply of the vessels they may be serving and should simplify their methods of administration to this end.

READINESS FOR DUTY.

Regardless of the time that may be set aside in schedules for rest, boiler cleaning or overhaul, it is important that from the moment of arrival at an anchorage vessels undertake immediately all repairs or other work necessary to prepare them for sea and prosecute such work without interruption until completion. For example, if five days should be set aside for rest, boiler cleaning, or other purposes, and the work can be completed in two or three days, it should be so accomplished and the remainder of the time used for rest of the personnel. Such a course is a military necessity in order that the maximum number of vessels may be available at all times to meet any unexpected enemy operations.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY.

Until further notice it is desired that leave and liberty be so regulated that vessels can put to sea, in case of emergency, on a few hours' notice. It is realized that this policy may work some hardship, but the force commander is confident that every member of the force will appreciate the importance of our forces putting forth every effort for the accomplishment of our general and immediate mission. The far-reaching effect not only upon the allied cause but also upon the record and distinction of our service can not be foreseen at present. It therefore behooves this force to leave no stone unturned in putting forth every effort within the power of its personnel and material.

Wm. S. Sims,
Vice Admiral United States Navy.
Commanding.

Copies to: U. S. S. *Melville*; senior officer, Brest; senior officer, Gibraltar; staff representative, Paris; naval attachés, London, Paris, Madrid, Rome; commander in chief, Navy Department (Operations).

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
October 6, 1917.

Force instructions No. 3.

Subject: Duty-free stores and gifts for United States naval forces operating in European waters.

The customs authorities of the United Kingdom have agreed to extend to the vessels of the United States Navy operating in European waters the same relaxation of customs formalities as is now granted to vessels of the British Navy. This courtesy having been extended upon the assumption that officers and enlisted men will regard themselves as in honor bound to avoid any abuse of the relaxations granted, and with the understanding that the United States naval authorities will accept the same responsibility as is accepted by the British naval authorities for the due observance of

regulations and the treatment of revenue offenses as a breach of naval discipline, is incumbent upon all concerned to observe most carefully the requirements of the war agreement:

IMPORTATION OF GOVERNMENT STORES.

Where dutiable Government stores are transhipped from the importing vessel direct into the naval vessel for which intended, if the importing vessel is a United States naval vessel no custom formalities are required. If, however, the importing vessel is a merchant ship, whether chartered as a Government transport or not, the stores may be transhipped without further formalities, and a commissioned officer of the naval vessel receiving the shipment will furnish the master of the importing vessel with a receipt giving sufficient details of the consignment to enable him to complete his accounts with the customs. In cases where the stores are not taken directly on board but are delivered to local agents for transportation from one ship to another, whether in the same port or elsewhere, the agent will take over the goods and carry them under bond in the proper manner, and a commissioned officer of the naval vessel will sign the form of receipt in the ordinary shipping bill which will be required. H. M. customs and excise Form No. 38, sale.

STORES ORDERED FROM MERCHANTS ASHORE.

The appropriate officer of the United States naval vessel making the purchase will fill out a special form of application for dutiable stores as in use for the British Navy, making the necessary alterations as required by the circumstances, and will send it to the merchant for delivery to the local customs and excise officer. They will similarly fill out and return the special shipping bill when received from the merchant. H. M. customs and excise Forms Nos. 61, special, and 101-102, sale).

PRIVATE GIFTS TO PERSONNEL OF UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS.

Where an imported parcel containing dutiable gifts is sent otherwise than by parcel post, the forwarding agent will deliver it to the ship, and in cases where the value would exceed 5 shillings, will present a shipping bill to be signed by the addressee and countersigned by a commissioned officer. In cases where the duty would not exceed 5 shillings or where the parcel is sent by parcel post, the countersignature of a commissioned officer is not required. On production of a declaration by the private donor, gifts of tobacco in quantities not exceeding 2 pounds per man per month or 2 pounds in any one parcel may be sent by parcel post duty free from bonded warehouses or from tobacco manufacturers' premises in the United Kingdom.

DUTIABLE GOODS LANDED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS.

Dutiable goods landed on United States Government service and accompanied by a permit signed by a commissioned officer, will be passed duty free subject to examination for inspection of customs authorities if challenged at the place of landing. Goods landed by naval personnel for individual private use will also be passed duty free without formalities if openly produced on challenge and reasonable in amount, on the general understanding that such goods will not be surreptitiously transported ashore, and that the amount of tobacco landed by any person going on board will not appreciably exceed the amount in force for the British Navy, viz: 8 ounces per seven nights or more. The following articles used on shipboard which are liable to duty in the United Kingdom are: tobacco, including cigars and cigarettes, tea, coffee, cocoa, dried fruits, sugar, and confectionery containing sugar, such as jam, and matches. Dutiable goods must not be landed except under the above rules, and should cases of deliberate smuggling be detected the customs authorities will communicate with the naval authorities so that appropriate disciplinary action may be taken.

Wm. S. Sims,

Vice Admiral, United States Navy,

Commanding.

Copies to: U. S. S. *McCall*, 40; senior officer, Brest, 10; senior officer, Gibraltar, 10; naval attaches, London, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Capt. R. H. Jackson, United States Navy, 3; aviation headquarters, Paris, France, 15; commander in chief, 6; War Department (Operations), 1.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE" FLAGSHIP.
November 10, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 2.

Forces:

- (a) Destroyer flotillas based on Queenstown—Vice Admiral Sims.
- (b) Patrol squadrons based on French coast—Rear Admiral Wilson.
 - (1) Based on Brest—Rear Admiral Wilson.
 - (2) Based on Bordeaux—Commander to be designated.
- (c) Patrol squadron based on Gibraltar—Rear Admiral Niblack.
- (d) Azores detachment—Senior officer present.
- (e) Naval aviation forces, foreign service—Commander Cone.

1. Enemy submarines operating against allied lines of communication.

2. These forces operate under direct military control of senior allied commander present, in accordance with general policies of force commander as set forth in instructions No. 2 of September 22, 1917.

3. (a), (b), (c) and (d): The senior United States naval officer afloat in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

(d) (Additional): Deny the Azores Islands to enemy submarines and operate offensively against such vessels when reported in the vicinity as far as the capabilities and radius of action of the available vessels permit. Do not operate in the vicinity of the Canary Islands east of longitude 20, and south of latitude 30, without first communicating with French naval forces in that area.

(e) Such seaplane and balloon stations as have been or may be established in France and in the British Isles shall be operated under the direction of the senior allied commander in the district in which they are located; the commander of naval aviation forces, foreign service, shall exercise general administrative and disciplinary control over all such stations.

(x) The force commander shall be kept informed of military operations performed or contemplated and state of military readiness for any possible duty of which the forces in question are capable.

4. Keep the force commander informed regarding supplies needed from the United States. Forces in France shall make requests through Paymaster J. F. Hatch, United States Navy, assistant in France to the aid for material, supplies, and repairs; all other forces shall make application for stores direct to the force commander.

When supplies can not be obtained from the United States within the necessary time, make direct requests on allied base facilities.

Local purchases may be made when it is necessary to obtain immediate delivery of supplies so procurable.

5. The force commander's mail address is 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W. Cable and telegraphic address, "Simsadus," London. Use codes and ciphers as may be directed from time to time; utilize allied official mail routes whenever possible.

This order becomes effective on receipt.

Wm. S. Sims,
Vice Admiral, Commanding

Copies to: Secretary of the Navy, Operations (1); commander in chief (5); U. S. S. *Melville* (5); Rear Admiral Wilson, for floating forces and bases (5); Rear Admiral Niblack (5); Commander Cone (5); senior officer, Ponta Delgada (5); Capt. R. H. Jackson (5); Paymaster Hatch (1); naval attachés, London (1), Paris (1), Rome (1), Madrid (1); British Admiralty (1); Admiral Bayly (1); files (5).

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP.
April 2, 1918.

Campaign Order No. 3.

Forces:

- (a) Destroyer flotillas based on Queenstown—Vice Admiral Sims.
 - (1) Submarine detachment—Capt. Hart.
- (b) Naval forces in France—Rear Admiral Wilson.
- (c) Patrol squadron based on Gibraltar—Rear Admiral Niblack.

- d*) Azores detachment—Rear Admiral Dunn.
- e*) Mining detachment—Rear Admiral Strauss.
- f*) Sixth battle squadron, Grand Fleet—Rear Admiral Rodman.
- g*) Naval Aviation Forces, foreign service—Capt. Cone.

1. Enemy submarines operating against allied lines of communication. Enemy high sea fleet contained in enemy home waters.
2. These forces operate under direct military control of senior allied commanders present, in accordance with general policies of force commander as set forth in force instructions No. 2, of September 22, 1917.
3. *(a)*, *(b)*, *(c)*, *(d)*, *(e)*, and *(f)*: The senior United States naval officer in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for his operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.
- (g)* (Additional): Deny the Azores Islands to enemy submarines and operate extensively against such vessels when reported in the vicinity as far as the capabilities and radius of action of the available vessels permit. Do not operate in the vicinity of the Canary Islands east of longitude 20, and south of latitude 30, without first communicating with French naval forces in that area.
- (h)* Such air stations as have been or may be established in France, and in the British Isles shall be operated under the direction of the senior allied commander in that district in which they are located; the commander of naval aviation forces, foreign service, shall exercise general administrative and disciplinary control over such stations.
- (i)* The force commander shall be kept informed of military operations performed and contemplated and state of military readiness for any possible duty of which the forces in question are capable.
4. Keep the force commander informed regarding supplies needed from the United States. Forces in France shall make requests through Paymaster J. F. Hatch, United States Navy, assistant in France to the aid for material and supplies; all other forces shall make application for stores direct to the force commander. When supplies can not be obtained from the United States within the necessary time, make direct requests on allied base facilities. Local purchases may be made when it is necessary to obtain immediate delivery of supplies so procurable.
5. The force commander's mail address is 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W. Cable and telegraphic address, "Simeadus," London. Use codes and ciphers as may be directed from time to time; utilize allied official mail routes whenever possible. This order becomes effective on receipt.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral, Commanding.

Copies to Secretary of the Navy, Operations (1); commander in chief Atlantic Fleet (5); U. S. S. *Melville* (5); Rear Admiral Wilson, for floating forces and bases (10); Rear Admiral Niblack (5); Capt. Cone (5); Rear Admiral Dunn (5); Rear Admiral Rodman (5); Capt. Hart (3); Capt. R. H. Jackson (5); Paymaster Hatch (1); naval attachés, London (1), Paris (1), Rome (1), Madrid (1); British Admiralty (1); Admiral Bayly (1); files (5).

Senator PITTMAN. Those are all the instructions received by you from Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. I suppose I got about 15 cablegrams a day of various kinds.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the substance of those?

Admiral NIBLACK. Sailings of ships, orders transferring officers, notification of sending me supplies and reserve officers and men, dispatch of materials, and all kinds of information that came through operations. He had a very large force in London that kept us informed. And then we got daily bulletins from Admiral Sims of all the happenings in our command and in the war zone, which were very nice to have and very illuminating, and we had a free interchange of information, so that we would all know what the other fellow was doing, as far as we could. The thing was beautifully managed; very efficient.

Senator PITTMAN. He gave you all of the information that he had at his command?

Admiral NIBLACK. And we, in return, gave all of ours. The situation of the submarines momentarily was given to us by radio and telegrams, and we had a great operating board in the office of the commandant, where every convoy was kept in position from hour to hour, relatively, on the chart, and there were dozens of convoys at sea all the time, and as soon as a submarine would be signaled at a certain spot, it would be placed on the board; and then if necessary a radio signal would be sent to the meeting convoy ship to change course a certain number of degrees, or to a certain definite course, to avoid this submarine.

Senator PITTMAN. Then, when you received this information it was up to you to operate your forces?

Admiral NIBLACK. To operate my forces at need. We never closed. Everybody was on watch, and the operating table was kept up to the minute of time.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know whether or not the report of the General Board was before Congress in 1916 when, in the general naval appropriation bill, the personnel of the Navy was increased?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know. I was not in Washington for 14 years prior to the war—that is, on duty.

Senator PITTMAN. By whom is the policy of the Navy fixed?

Admiral NIBLACK. By the President of the United States.

Senator PITTMAN. Does the President of the United States decide the size of the Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; but he decides upon the policy of the Government.

Senator PITTMAN. You mean as to neutrality or war?

Admiral NIBLACK. He can not declare war, but he can announce policies.

Senator PITTMAN. That was what I was trying to get at, what you meant by a policy, because of course as a matter of fact the length of time that we shall remain neutral is entirely dependent upon Congress, as I understand the law.

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely. The power to declare war rests with Congress.

Senator PITTMAN. The question as to whether we should arm merchantmen was a question of policy of Congress, was it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was a question of procedure. It was then the recognized procedure, and it had been determined that we should arm our ships to prevent these aggressions.

Senator PITTMAN. By whom was that determined?

Admiral NIBLACK. That was determined by the Government.

Senator PITTMAN. I understand, but "the Government" is a very broad expression. What department of the Government determined whether we should arm our merchantmen?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know who recommended it, but the executive authority of the United States vested by the Constitution rests broadly upon the President, because the Constitution does not mention the Cabinet. The Cabinet is a creation entirely of Congress, and of course the Constitution is entirely silent with respect to the authority of the Cabinet, but the executive authority rests in the President.

Senator PITTMAN. Then the arming of the merchant marine came through the President?

Admiral NIBLACK. That came through the executive authority, whatever that is. I do not know who gave the order. But it was really a matter of policy; because we began to arm ships before war was declared, because we resented this unrestricted sinking.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, that is what I was getting at.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. I mean as a matter of fact we did not wait until we declared war?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; we began to do that before war was declared, and it was in resentment of this outrageous attitude that Germany took.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, months before we declared war we commenced to prepare to defend ourselves?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, we took certain steps to prepare ourselves; but how thoroughly I am not informed. As a matter of fact, you can not do much without money. Congress holds the purse strings.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. As a matter of fact, Congress has rather restricted the enlargement of the Navy in accordance with the views of the General Board at all times, has it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I would like to have that question read.

(The last question above was read aloud by the stenographer.)

Admiral NIBLACK. No; it has rather increased it in accordance with the views of the General Board, at all times.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; I put it in an inverted way.

Admiral NIBLACK. Congress has not enlarged it in accordance with the recommendations of the General Board, but often the recommendations of the General Board have not been followed by the department, and there is no compulsion on the part of the department to publish or follow the recommendations of the General Board. The General Board is advisory merely. It is not infallible. It is a valuable board, but it makes mistakes, probably; but they are generally on the good side.

Senator PITTMAN. The question whether or not we shall have a large Navy or a small Navy is purely a question of governmental policy that is determined by Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. A governmental policy, and often a political policy.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, all Governments are political.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, all Governments are political.

Senator PITTMAN. You can not have a large Navy unless you have the money to build a large Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. You can not.

Senator PITTMAN. And you are restricted in personnel?

Admiral NIBLACK. At the present moment, do you mean?

Senator PITTMAN. No, not now; in preparation and everything else you are limited by the money that is furnished by Congress to perform those acts?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely.

Senator PITTMAN. The reason I asked you that question, Admiral, is to whether the report of the General Board was before the committees of Congress is that at the time that Congress was considering the increase of personnel in 1916, and also when it was considering

the three-year naval program, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee had before it the report of the General Board, and ever since I have been a member of the Naval Affairs Committee we have had before us the report of the General Board.

Admiral NIBLACK. No; I think that that was a very exceptional case; that the General Board historically—its opinions have never been very definitely given to the committees, and this was rather exceptional.

Senator PITTMAN. In this way we have always, so far as I know, asked the Secretary, or whoever represents him there, the question as to what the opinion of the General Board was in regard to every recommendation.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, I think so. That is a question of history.

Senator PITTMAN. Sometimes we have been in accord with them and sometimes we have not; but I mean to say that the committee has had the benefit of that report, and the question is, dealing with the recommendation that you make, that it should be required by law that the report of the General Board should be submitted to Congress.

Admiral NIBLACK. No, that the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations, who is to have certain power to execute these questions should be submitted. That is quite a different thing. That is quite a different proposition. The law now gives the General Board certain authority, which also is given to the Chief of Naval Operations. I think it is very important that this committee should have before it, as I have given, the law relating to the General Board, the law as now existing relating to the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations. If I may, I will read it. It is not very long. It has to do with exactly who is responsible and how far responsible he is.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. I have no objection to that.

Admiral NIBLACK. This is the law [reading]:

DUTIES OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

[Naval Regulations, chap. 2, art. 126.]

(1) The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and revision of plans for its use in war. (Act Mar. 3, 1915.)

(2) This shall include the direction of the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances, the operation of the communication service, the operations of the aeronautic service, mines and mining, of the naval districts, Naval Militia, and of the Coast Guard when operating with Navy; the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and of the training of the fleet for war; and the preparation and revision and enforcement of all drills books, signals codes, and cipher codes.

(3) The Chief of Naval Operations shall be charged with the preparation, revision, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, naval instructions, and general orders.

(4) He shall advise the Secretary concerning the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy and prepare all orders issued by the Secretary in regard thereto and shall keep the records of service of all fleets, squadrons, and ships.

(5) He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features of all new ships and as to any proposed extensive alterations of a ship which will affect her military value, and all features which affect the military value of dry docks, including their location; also as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunition, fuel stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

(6) He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to foreign relations, and all correspondence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the department's action through his offices.

7) In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war, shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the department, including the Marine Corps headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance.

And, by the way, these war plans are always signed by the Secretary. [Continuing reading:]

After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans.

8. The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer.

Admiral Coontz is going down next week. [Continuing reading:]

9) He shall have two principal senior assistants, officers not below the grade of captain, one as assistant for operations and the other as assistant for material.

10) He shall ex officio be a member of the General Board.

There is a further provision of the law, as follows [reading]:

SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COUNCIL.

[Naval Regulations, chapter 2, article 105.]

The Secretary's advisory council will be composed of the following members:

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The Chief of Naval Operations.

The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

The Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.

The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair.

The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

The Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

The Secretary's advisory council will meet every Thursday at noon in the Secretary's office, unless otherwise directed, and at such other times as the Secretary may direct.

The Naval Regulations is composed of two parts, the blue book and the white part of it. Admiral McKean has called my attention to the fact that it is only where it is stated there that it is in the law, where the reference is given, "Act of March 3, 1915," and the other the regulations signed by the President. And what I have just said, it is stated where it is in the law. The regulations are signed by the President. They have executive force. They have all the effect of law, unsigned by the President.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you think that our Navy, from your knowledge of the situation, did its full part in the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think it did its full share in every way.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, is there not quite a difference in the acts that are essential for general preparation for war and the acts that are essential for a naval battle?

Admiral NIBLACK. There is a great difference. Naval battles are fought on what you might call general written, and on specific orders, which are given either in writing prior to the battle or by signal during the battle, or in the progress of the battle, and those are what you call dispositions and assignments of what you might call task groups and specific forces, as detailed for specific purposes. No plan can outline, ahead of time, what the battle is going to bring. Many orders, for instance, are given which change the disposition of forces and change previous orders.

Senator PITTMAN. Just one other question here, so that the record may not convey a wrong impression from the question asked by Senator from Florida. As I understand, you testified that war plans were in preparation when you were a boy.

Admiral NIBLACK. I mean by that, since 1888, when the War College was created. But I was more than a boy at that time.

Senator PITTMAN. The Senator from Florida asked you if war plans were not in preparation from time immemorial. I did not want to have any misunderstanding from leaving it that way.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think we have always had a plan. We had a war plan in the Civil War. We have had lots of war plans. But I meant to say, there was nothing new about a war plan.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know of any proposal by the General Board during the war, from the commencement of it, that was not carried out by Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. I can not answer that question, because it is rather historical than otherwise. It is a historical question that should be very readily taken up by the Historical Section of the Navy Department and definitely answered.

Senator PITTMAN. But, I say you know of none yourself, from the information you now have?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, I mentioned aviation as a proposition of the General Board that has not materialized.

Senator PITTMAN. There was a considerable amount of money, however, appropriated for that. Congress did its duty in that particular, I believe, during the war.

Admiral NIBLACK. The General Board has to do with the rounding out of programs, and often they get only a part of the program. And of course it is not always a complete one, for that reason; but the Navy has gone on the theory that if we got battleships, it would be like having the necessities of life, and we could dispense with some of the luxuries.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know what department of our Government had charge of the building of airplanes during the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know. They were very slow in getting them out. I do not know who it was.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not under the War Department?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. I am not intending to criticise the War Department in that way, one way or another.

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know what branch of the War Department is involved.

Senator PITTMAN. If there were any mistake in the matter, it is to be blamed upon the Navy, then?

Admiral NIBLACK. No, sir; I do not know about the War Department's organization during the war.

Senator PITTMAN. This report of 1913 you referred to was a report dealing solely with Navy planes, was it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. Solely; and my object in bringing that up was to show the fact that the General Board has been alive to the situation for a great many years, and we are still alive to it, and the building program submitted by the General Board is one that apparently is too large to swallow. It would be difficult to make it, in my opinion, small enough to have it swallowed.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you stated that the Navy did its full share in the war. Everybody knows what splendid work the Navy did during the war; but do you not think that it would have been possible after 1914, and certainly after the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915, to put our Navy in a state of preparedness where we would have been able to do much more in the war than we did do?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, politically it was not possible to do it. It was very desirable, but it was not politically desirable.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not allude to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. Just the situation; what you call the situation of our country. The views of our voters and the newspapers, and all that goes to make up the influential elements in any problem.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as Congress is concerned, I think the Senator from Florida is trying to bring out the idea that Congress is responsible in certain cases. As far as Congress is concerned, have you any doubt in your mind that if the Secretary of the Navy had put up with the Congress of the United States the fact that we needed certain vital changes, certain increases in ships and in personnel, and other changes—have you any doubt that Congress would have enacted legislation to carry out those changes?

Admiral NIBLACK. Very serious doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. After the sinking of the *Lusitania*?

Admiral NIBLACK. Very serious doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Other witnesses have testified very differently from you.

Admiral NIBLACK. I am only giving you the idea that I do not think we can ever get what the Navy really requires to make it what our policy is at the present moment, equal to that of any other navy in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a peace question; but after the sinking of the *Lusitania* it was evident to a great many people, I think to most people in this country, that eventually we were likely to get into war with Germany, and I think the feeling was very strong in this country that we should do everything possible to prepare for that war. Do you not agree with that?

Admiral NIBLACK. That was my impression from reading the newspapers. My own opinion was that the Navy is preparing for war all the time. It is preparing for war now. It is its business to prepare for war, and it should be prepared for war; and I am getting ready for the next war right now, and I am very loath to go into a post-mortem of the last war, because my interest is in the next one.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; but we can get a good many lessons from the past war, can we not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I hope so.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, the sinking of the *Lusitania* was in May, 1916. In December, 1915, and in 1916, we had a naval appropriation bill. Did the House Committee on Naval Affairs report as much as the Navy Department asked for?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a historical question. I could very readily answer that by recourse to the records, and I hope that the history of the war will bring that out. The object of this \$20,000 I have is to accumulate information for writing the history and the classification of this information, but Congress refused to give us more than \$1,800 for the salary of any one person. I cannot get

Admiral NIBLACK. I think history will probably do full justice whoever was responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No, Mr. Chairman; but this discussion as whether Congress was responsible for the action of 1915 or not is very interesting to me, and as we are recording historical facts, I would like to have the record show that I was not a Member of Congress in 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor was I. I think the records will show that Senator Pittman was the only member of this subcommittee who was in Congress at that time.

Senator TRAMMELL. I was not a Member at that time, but all of us remember about that time; and I know that the present committee has not approved of all the recommendations made even by the Secretary of the Navy very recently, so that it is possible that the Secretary made some recommendations to Congress and could not get them through.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not at war now.

Senator TRAMMELL. We were not at war then. The Navy Department and the Secretary have made recommendations considerably larger than the committee has approved of at the present time. Hindsight is better than foresight, so that three years from now, if we should get into war again, they will come and say, "I told you so," again.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m. the subcommittee adjourned on Wednesday, April 14, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

whether we would need anything three or four years afterwards. There was no question in my mind, but there may have been in some peoples' minds.

As far as the armed guard question is concerned, that can not be taken as a definite step toward the increase of the Navy; but do you not recall that the General Board, I think it was in 1916, made a report to the Secretary asking for a certain number of men—for an increase in the personnel—and that at the Secretary's request the board withdrew the suggested increase of 20,000, before the matter was put up to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a matter of official historical record, I hope, and I hope it will be available for historical purposes; and any information of that kind is very valuable. And, moreover, Admiral Badger is available as a member of the General Board. I know nothing about that proposition myself.

Senator PITTMAN. From the records of the General Board, to which you have access, is it not a fact that immediately after the sinking of the *Lusitania* the Secretary of the Navy asked the General Board to prepare a comprehensive building program, and that this was prepared and submitted to the Secretary of the Navy and that it was submitted by him to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. I shall look that matter up. I think that is very important.

Senator PITTMAN. And that it resulted in what is known as the naval program of 1915-16, or the three-year program, and the enlargement of personnel of the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. And is it not a fact that that does not cover the immediate steps that I am speaking about, and which have been in use in the present war? Was not the naval program prepared held up in every possible way during the war with Germany?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, I hope not; but I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the figures will show how much of it has been completed now, nearly four years after it has been prepared.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think that is very important as a historical fact.

Senator PITTMAN. The question that the chairman asks has been answered here several times; but I do not think it is fair to allow it to go into the record as an indication that the Navy Department laid down on its building program during the war. The testimony discloses the fact that the building of superdreadnaughts was postponed because it takes about three years to build a dreadnaught, and every navy yard in the country was necessary for the building of antisubmarine craft and vessels essential to transportation of food and soldiers to the Allies. Every dollar that was appropriated and every navy yard that was available was used, and the only slacking on building that is shown by the prior testimony was on our battle-ships, which could not be made available until after the war.

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a very interesting historical fact.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is bearing out exactly what I say, and that is that that three-year program was not an immediate step going into the war; that is, it was something in the future, and had nothing to do with the immediate steps, such as putting into effect the personnel increase for manning such ships as we had on hand.

Senator PITTMAN. But the personnel report was carried out.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think history will probably do full justice whoever was responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No, Mr. Chairman; but this discussion as whether Congress was responsible for the action of 1915 or not is very interesting to me, and as we are recording historical facts, I would like to have the record show that I was not a Member of Congress in 1915.

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The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m. the subcommittee adjourned on Wednesday, April 14, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Strauss, will you please take the stand and be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH STRAUSS, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The witness was sworn by the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you a statement to make about matters connected with this investigation?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir. When war was first declared in Europe I was on duty in the department as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, to which position I had been appointed in October of the preceding year. At that time the department was organized on the aid system. The chiefs of the material bureaus met almost daily in the office of the aid for material for conference where their work was coordinated by that aid.

Upon taking over the work of the bureau I was apprised of the policy of the department with respect to supply and reserve of ammunition, auxiliaries and their armament, reserve guns, supply and reserve of torpedoes, mines, etc. This policy had been recommended by the General Board and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and the bureau was actually engaged in purchasing and manufacturing this material to the full extent of funds available. This was the part of preparedness for war that was assigned to the bureau of which I was the head, and I hope I will be pardoned for the personal reference, when I state that with the aid of an able staff of officers the work was pursued vigorously, so that at the end of 1915 in answer to an inquiry by the chairman of the House Naval Committee I was able to write him the following letter:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., December 10, 1915.

Hon. L. P. PADGETT, M. C.,
*Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.*

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Referring to our conversation of yesterday with regard to ordnance material on hand, I will give you the following summary of conditions:

POWDER.

The powder situation is excellent. On June 30 of this year the total shortage of powder for all ships including the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona* amounted to only 2,510,000 pounds. That is to say, this amount is not on hand or ordered. I told you yesterday that our average product at Indianhead for the year would be 5,000,000 pounds. Examining the latest returns from the factory I am afraid this is an overstatement. We are hoping to get everything working with the increased plant in February. It may not succeed. If we do succeed the rate, as I told you, from that time on will be 6,000,000 pounds per annum, which would make the average for the year 5,000,000 pounds. I am not counting on it, for the reason that it is not an accomplished fact.

I gave it out in my annual report that 5,000,000 pounds would be the product for the fiscal year 1916. We have had so many delays in obtaining material that I regret I made so optimistic a prediction.

However, to return to the question of powder supply; The 2,510,000-pound shortage could be made up, as I told you yesterday, by the time the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona* went into commission and required their powder. We will not work it quite that way for reasons of expediency, but instead of supplying a full reserve for all the shortages embraced in the 2,510,000-pound shortage, we deem it advisable to begin the manufacture of powder for the *California* class, and will rest on this small shortage in that respect in order to be ahead on new construction.

This general statement can be made: That we have on hand or ordered all the powder and reserve for all capital ships of the Navy that are in commission or are about to be commissioned; that we have all the allowance of powder for all other guns in the service and nearly all of the reserves. The business in hand now in the powder department is to provide the supply and reserve for the five ships of the *California* class. The predicted capacity at Indianhead will be 6,000,000 pounds per year, which will take care of all this call, but will not take care of the new extended building program of the Navy per annum.

So I can repeat, that the powder situation leaves nothing to be desired.

PROJECTILES.

The supply of projectiles is not so satisfactory as that of powder. We have on hand and in process of manufacture in the 14-inch caliber, enough for the supply and reserve for all ships including the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* about to be commissioned and the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*, which will be commissioned probably later in the summer.

The reason I say it is not so satisfactory is because we must now procure the projectiles for, and be diligent in having manufactured, projectiles for the *California* class, even the two 1916 ships which the Secretary yesterday decided would be built at the navy yards.

Of the 13-inch caliber we have all that will be required. Of the 12-inch caliber we have even a slight surplus. Of the 10-inch caliber we have enough; the same with the 8-inch and 7-inch calibers. In the 6-inch caliber we have a shortage; the number on hand and in process of manufacture constitutes 80 per cent of the total requirements as laid down. In other words, the shortage is 20 per cent. In the 5-inch caliber we are very short. The shortage amounts to about 50 per cent of the total requirements, but this shortage is tempered by the fact that we consider the reserve to apply to all the projectiles needed for ships under construction. Taking the three battleships of the *California* class and the two 1916 ships, five ships in all mounting 110 guns, from our shortage, we find that we have on hand and ordered about 61 per cent of 5-inch projectiles for all ships up to and including the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*. If we exclude all ships not ready to fight, which would exclude the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*, the shortage would be only 34 per cent in this caliber.

In the 4-inch caliber our total shortage amounts to nearly 49 per cent. Again excluding destroyers in process of construction, this shortage would be reduced to 41 per cent.

The shortage in the 3-inch caliber is 53 per cent. I do not consider this very seriously, but yet feel that it must be made up. If we could utilize the productive capacity of the country in producing these shells, the entire outfit could be supplied in a few weeks. It is presumable, therefore, that if the money is granted by the Congress this item can be excluded from the question of preparedness.

GUNS.

The guns on hand and in process of manufacture meet all requirements of the department as to armament and reserve guns, with two or three minor exceptions.

which are negligible. All of the 14-inch batteries and the reserve guns for these batteries are built or building. We are fully supplied with 13-inch guns, both mounted and reserve. There is a small shortage in 6-inch 50-caliber reserve guns. For certain reasons connected with this caliber, I do not deem it necessary to provide them. There is a small shortage in 5-inch 51-caliber guns which will require no special appropriation to make up. Current funds under "Ordnance and Ordnance stores" will, I believe, provide sufficient money to meet this small deficiency. Of course, this small shortage in reserve guns is more than made up by the fact that there is a shortage on the total number of 5-inch guns mounted and to be mounted. Some of them will not be mounted and in use for three or four years.

TORPEDOES.

The torpedo situation is well in hand. We have now actually on hand or in process of manufacture torpedoes sufficient for the full allowance and reserve for every ship that we possess or that has been authorized. The torpedoes being manufactured will be ready for the ships as soon as they are put in commission. In this year's estimates I did ask for a large sum of money to provide replacement torpedoes for the three battleships of the *Ohio* class, for the six armored cruisers, and for destroyers. The above-mentioned vessels now have 4,000-yard torpedoes, and it was my idea to replace them with torpedoes that would range seven or eight thousand yards. The 4,000-yard torpedoes would not be wasted, as they would be kept in stock for present and future submarines, a class of vessels upon which such torpedoes would be entirely efficient. The department cut this item out from the estimates. However, the estimates include \$800,000 which will be utilized for the manufacture of replacement torpedoes, principally to carry out a general scheme which we have had in hand now for two or three years, by which the pre-dreadnaught ships are to have their torpedoes changed from 4,000-yard range to about 8,000 yards. This money will complete that scheme and I hope will provide sufficient funds to give new torpedoes to the nine small submarines in the Philippines.

MINES.

We have actually ready for use at the present time two-thirds of the mines that prior to the European war were considered necessary for our needs. The remaining one-third are promised for delivery in the spring, and I believe this promise will be kept if the great dearth of material does not interfere. However, the tremendous use of mines abroad during this war has furnished an object lesson to us and to other nations as to the more extended use of the mines that is possible, and at the suggestion of this bureau, the department, upon the advice of the General Board, has placed a new figure on our needs, and has increased the previous number by 6,000 mines. If the money is made available, these 6,000 mines will be manufactured during the next fiscal year at the Norfolk Navy Yard, where the other mines are being built.

Respectfully,

J. STRAUSS, *Chief of Bureau.*

The word "shortage," used frequently in the above letter, should be explained: We counted ourselves "short" of ordnance material for a ship as soon as the ship was authorized, although the ship was not to be ready for the ammunition, for instance, for three or four years.

As the war in Europe progressed, many new things were learned, and as fast as possible these lessons were taken to heart and our plans expanded accordingly. For instance, it had long been assumed that reserves of small caliber shell (being of simple manufacture) could be produced very readily during the war as they were needed. As a result of our experience in the United States in the production of small shell for the Allies, we learned that the process would be much slower than we thought, so that I changed the policy and asked for and obtained sufficient funds to procure all the refills of ammunition that were stipulated in the General Board plans. When I left the bureau in December, 1916, these shell were being manufactured. While on this subject, I will refer to the manufacture of 12 and 14 inch armor-piercing shell. The difficulties surrounding the production of such

projectiles were great, and the margin of profit as compared with more easily manufactured steel products was probably small, so the steel makers were not very anxious to undertake the business. It became so apparent to me in 1915 that I recommended to the Secretary that we start a shell plant of our own. He approved this and obtained an appropriation for the purpose, so that now we have a plant in Charleston, W. Va., that is manufacturing forged-steel armor-piercing shell. The failure of one firm to fulfill its contracts for the 14-inch caliber, with penalties accruing through many months provided a shortage of reserve shell if they continued to fail in meeting the specifications. However, there were three large steel plants manufacturing them when I went to sea in 1916.

We had been alive to the importance of mines in modern warfare for a long time. In 1913 we adopted a type of mine after proper tests and as soon as possible a contract was entered into with Vickers to manufacture these mines, and at the same time we started to procure equipment to manufacture an equal number at the navy yard at Norfolk. With the completion of these mines we would have had the quantity that fulfilled the requirements recommended by the General Board. As time went on it was seen that very many more mines would be used should we be involved in the war, so that the number to be procured was trebled. When the North Sea barrage was projected, it involved the manufacture of something like a hundred thousand. A new type was invented and developed by the Bureau of Ordnance to that end in the spring of 1917. In the meantime I had left the bureau.

In 1913 we had only 900 mines. The task of getting mines was pushed as much as our limited funds would permit. We had asked for money for mines in 1912, again in 1913, and in 1914 the department asked for \$300,000 for this purpose, but no money was appropriated. So we had to get along as best we could, eking out the supply set by the war plans from money taken from other funds that could legally be so used. As an example of comparative preparedness I have been informed that at that time the British had no mines.

We had at the end of 1916 batteries of four guns each for 180 auxiliary ships. These batteries were housed at navy yards, and the full supply of powder, shell, primers, etc., were all prepared and ready for these ships at the nearest ammunition depots, so that in the event of war the guns could be secured on the ships and the magazines and shell rooms supplied at once.

In December, 1916, I took over the command of the battleship *Nevada* and early in January, 1917, proceeded with the fleet to Cuba for the winter exercises and maneuvers. We came north in March. The general feeling in the fleet was one of confidence inspired by the high morale and excellent condition of the ships and their personnel.

I remained on the *Nevada* until February, 1918, when I was promoted to rear admiral. I was detached in that month and ordered to command the mine force, with temporary duty in Washington, where I was apprised of the plans for constructing a barrier of mines across the North Sea to hem in the submarines. After spending a couple of weeks in studying the plans, inspecting the mine layers, then being prepared, I sailed for England, arriving at London on March 21. I reported to Admiral Sims and spent the next 10 days in discussing the problem with his staff, making the acquaintance of the Admiralty

Officials and getting their views on the task ahead of us. From London I proceeded to the two bases in Scotland. There was one at Inverness and another at Invergordon, 30 miles farther north. These bases consisted of immense assembly plants, then almost completed. After inspecting these bases I proceeded to Scapa Flow to make arrangements with Admiral Beatty by which the mine planters were to be provided with a destroyer screen and escort of capital ships when engaged in the operation of planting the mines.

The next six weeks were spent in organizing for the work so that when the mine layers arrived, in the latter part of May, they were loaded with mines, and on June 8 they planted 3,385 mines on the first trip.

The operation of planting the mines of the northern barrage involved 13 trips of the mine ships from the bases at Inverness and Invergordon. It had been arranged between myself and Admiral Beatty that four days before being ready the latter was to be notified by telegram that the planters would probably be ready on that date. Two days after that another telegram would be sent to Admiral Beatty by me giving the hour of readiness. Then Admiral Beatty would reply and set an exact hour when the ships were to rendezvous off the coast with the screen of British destroyers. Some hours before the time set the destroyer commander with his destroyers would arrive at the base. Admiral Beatty would furnish a routing order, principally as a guide to the swept channels on the coast. The operating order would be given by me after a consultation between the mine squadron commander, the destroyer commander, and the commander of the mine force.

When the expedition returned to harbor the navigation notes would be handed in from each ship at once and the location of the mines as handed in would be reconciled from the various data and a dispatch sent immediately to Admiral Beatty, Admiral Sims, and the Admiralty at London giving the location and number of mines planted on that expedition.

Any change affecting the plan of the barrage proceeded from the London office after consultation with the Admiralty, except on one occasion when an order was received direct from Admiral Beatty which seriously limited the barrage. Upon my making this known to Admiral Sims he had the limiting order rescinded at the Admiralty, although this took over three weeks to accomplish.

In general the British mine layers would proceed to the field from their base in the Firth of Forth, so that we would arrive there at the same time, and thus one escort would serve to protect both fleets. On October 26 the last planting of my force was accomplished and further work was suspended by the impending armistice. In all, the United States planted 56,611 mines and the British 13,652, making a total of over 70,000 mines.

I think it is due to the United States Navy under the existing circumstances to invite attention to the magnitude of this project and to the success achieved in accomplishing it. The barrier began to take toll of the enemy's submarines as early as July 9, when one was disabled on the barrier and compelled to return to Germany. From time to time after that, even in its uncompleted state, it succeeded in sinking one.

It is not known by us how many submarines were sunk or disabled in this mine field. It has been placed as high as 23. My own estimate, based on known sinkings, is 10, although I am inclined to think that that is a modest one.

The entire project consists of various phases which may be summarized as follows:

First, the inception of the scheme which originated in the United States Navy Department as early as April, 1917. This was rejected by the Admiralty and Admiral Sims.

Second, the design of a new mine by the Bureau of Ordnance. This mine was of an entirely new type, the principal advantage of which lay in the fact that only one-third as many would be required to form a deep barrier as would be the case with the then existing types. On July 18, 1917, the design had progressed to such a point as to cause its proposal on that date for use in barring the exit of German submarines to the Atlantic. On July 30 the Bureau of Ordnance addressed a second letter to the Chief of Naval Operations submitting a proposal for a joint American-British mine barrier across the North Sea. This project was further submitted in person by Admiral Mayo at an allied naval conference in London on September 4. This was met by a demurrer on the part of the British, the objection being that it would hamper the movements of the Grand Fleet, and it was agreed that nothing should be done until an adequate supply of mines of satisfactory type could be assured.

On October 20, on the recommendation of the General Board, the department cabled to Admiral Sims directing him to ascertain from the Admiralty whether they thought, in the light of their experience, that a barrier could be maintained from abreast Aberdeen across the North Sea to the Norwegian coast abreast Egersund, and whether the Straits of Dover could be similarly mined.

On October 23 the Admiralty expressed their approval of the scheme.

On October 29 the Secretary of the Navy approved the General Board's report and the project, as finally adjusted between ourselves and the British, was favorably acted upon by the President at a Cabinet meeting on the 30th.

Third, the purchase and reconstruction of eight mine layers of large capacity and the production of mines of the new type amounting to 100,000 or more, preparation of bases, etc.

Fourth, the actual planting of the mines in the North Sea as outlined above.

You will see from these facts that the scheme was purely one originating in the United States Navy Department, urged by the department, and although it was to be a joint effort of the American and British Navies, our Navy constructed four-fifths of it.

It took 64 shiploads of mines to furnish our part of the barrage. These all had to be transported across the Atlantic in United States carriers, taken across Scotland, assembled at the bases, and finally exactly planted in the North Sea.

The production of so vast a quantity of material, all shipped to a distance of 3,400 miles in good time, is a fine example of energy and organization, and when our task was completed on the other side I wrote the following letter to the Navy Department:

MINE FORCE, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET.

MARCH 29, 1919.

From: Commander mine force.

Navy Department.

Subject: North Sea barrage.

I beg to furnish for the files of the Navy Department an expression of appreciation of the part played by the Bureau of Ordnance in the construction of the mine barrage in the North Sea.

The mine itself, though entirely novel, was highly successful in its functioning. This, I understand, was devised in the bureau in a comparatively short time. The plan for mines for the North Sea barrage, that in the Aegean Sea, and across the Adriatic would have amounted in the end to probably 130,000. We actually received at the North Sea bases some 80,000 mines and used 57,000. We would have used more there had not the war been brought to a close when it was. The task placed on the Bureau of Ordnance was a very great one, and the highest credit is due the bureau for its achievement.

J. STRAUSS,

Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

Copy to: Bureau of Ordnance.

On the other side some 7,000 officers and men were employed—all belonging to the Navy; 3,000 men were busily engaged at the two assembly plants in assembling mines and anchors, testing each mine, and loading them in lighters, transporting them, and loading them on the mine layers at anchor in the harbor. This was strenuous labor, and rapidly as the layers worked, the force on shore could always keep ahead of them; 4,000 officers and men belonged to the crews of the layers. The process of laying a field of 5,500 mines only took a little over four hours after the ships arrived at the field.

As soon as the armistice was signed, the mine layers were sent home and plans were begun for sweeping up the mines. This work required considerable preparation, but on May 8, 1919, the work of sweeping was seriously begun and pursued with all the energy possible until September 30, when the last mine was removed. In the work of sweeping some 80 vessels were engaged, manned by 4,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you quote a letter written by you on December 10, 1915. Can you tell the committee what were the conditions in regard to powder, guns, and torpedoes and mines at the time of the declaration of war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Our declaration of war?

The CHAIRMAN. Our declaration of war.

Admiral STRAUSS. No, I can not. I have stated there that when I left the bureau in December, 1916, the full supply of shell, as stipulated by the General Board and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, was being manufactured.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they already manufactured and ready?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; but if you will look at my statement you will see that all ships then in existence had their supply of shell. What were being manufactured at that time were reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. But we had no reserves on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me anything about the number of reserves we had on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, I can not. I think you can very readily get a statement from the Bureau of Ordnance to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. This was when you left the bureau in December, 1916?

Admiral STRAUSS. When I left was in December, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a large reserve on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A large reserve of what, projectiles?

Admiral STRAUSS. Projectiles, powder—everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know about the mine situation—many mines we had on hand at that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. When I left?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. I have stated that here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated it already?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These mines you had on hand, were they latest, up-to-date mines at that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were at that time considered the very latest thing in mines in the world. But since that time we do not think much of them.

The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to that particular time.

Admiral STRAUSS. At that particular time they were supposed to be the very latest thing in mines, and were being manufactured in large numbers by Vickers for the British Government, were being manufactured, I believe, for the Italian Government, and we had placed in an order. Vickers were manufacturing 1,100 for us, and they were commandeered for the British Government.

The CHAIRMAN. On what page of your statement do the facts about the mines appear?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not my statement paged, but I will read the paragraph again, if you please.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to refer to it as you go along.

Admiral STRAUSS. It is page 4, the last paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Page 4 refers to your letter of December 10, 1916, does it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about December, 1916, when you left the bureau.

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, yes. I can not recall the actual number of mines on hand in December, 1916. That can be gotten from the Bureau of Ordnance, quite readily.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not give me the figures now?

Admiral STRAUSS. I can not give you the figures; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get a statement from the Bureau of Ordnance and furnish it to the committee so that we may put it in the record?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; that will be done.

The CHAIRMAN. I would also like a statement as to the number of torpedoes we had on hand at that time, and a statement of the powder, projectiles, and guns. You could get a statement covering all of these?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I would like to have that put in the record showing all the different sizes of the projectiles, and the different sizes of the guns, and whatever other matters would be of interest.

(NOTE.—The following communication, together with tables, subsequently received from Rear Admiral Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and is here inserted in the record.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE.
Washington, D. C., May 7, 1920.

SENATOR: The bureau is in receipt of a letter from Rear Admiral Joseph United States Navy, referring to his hearing before your subcommittee and that you be furnished with information in reply to questions in the cross-examination which referred to the bureau.

Testimony, page 1156 of the record. Admiral Strauss referred to the department policy and the method by which it was arrived at, as regards the supply of materials. All material supplied by the bureau is prepared in accordance with department policy and where, in the appendages, materials required are mentioned it will mean, of course, required in conformity with this policy.

As of the testimony shows that statement of material as of two approximate dates, December, 1916, and when war was declared in April, 1917, are desired. These are adhered to as closely as possible.

are appended hereto, appendages Nos. 1 to 8, statements giving the information.

As furnished the committee by Capt. W. V. Pratt the complete history of the Sea mine barrage compiled by my bureau.

Very respectfully,

RALPH EARLE.

Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Bureau.

FREDERICK HALE.

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX No. 1.

Statement of guns required on hand and on order as of Dec. 1, 1916, and Apr. 6, 1917.

| Caliber | Dec. 1, 1916. | | | Apr. 6, 1917. | | |
|---------------|---------------|----------|-----------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| | Required. | On hand. | On order. | Required. | On hand. | On order. |
| | 40 | 1 | 40 | 45 | 1 | 11 |
| | 125 | 21 | 104 | 40 | 31 | 40 |
| | 80 | 81 | | 80 | 81 | 94 |
| | 40 | 36 | | 40 | 36 | (*) |
| | 36 | 37 | | 36 | 37 | |
| | 100 | 103 | | 100 | 103 | |
| | 50 | 48 | | 50 | 48 | (*) |
| | 8 | 13 | | 8 | 13 | |
| | 16 | 21 | | 16 | 21 | |
| | 14 | 22 | | 14 | 22 | |
| | 145 | 154 | | 145 | 154 | |
| | 60 | 68 | | 60 | 68 | |
| | 90 | 95 | | 90 | 95 | |
| | 40 | | 40 | 70 | | 70 |
| | 352 | 350 | | 352 | 350 | (*) |
| | | 10 | | | 10 | (*) |
| | 14 | 12 | | 14 | 12 | (*) |
| | 82 | 74 | | 82 | 74 | (*) |
| | 696 | 375 | 312 | 696 | 396 | 301 |
| | 150 | 151 | | 150 | 151 | |
| | 189 | 177 | | 189 | 177 | (*) |
| IX | 397 | 152 | 239 | 397 | 160 | 231 |
| VII and VIII. | 104 | 103 | | 104 | 103 | (*) |
| | 259 | 232 | | 259 | 232 | (*) |
| | 1,046 | 876 | 148 | 1,046 | 880 | 144 |
| | 279 | 41 | 226 | 279 | 41 | 226 |
| | 80 | 14 | 65 | 80 | 14 | 65 |
| | 75 | 75 | | 131 | 75 | 56 |
| | 155 | 155 | | 155 | 155 | |
| | 908 | 802 | 79 | 908 | 809 | 72 |
| | 489 | 608 | | 489 | 608 | |
| | 1,400 | 1,437 | | 1,400 | 1,437 | |

..... by passage of appropriation act of Mar. 4, 1917.

..... by passage of appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. Delivery of these guns at all times to meet ship requirements.

..... 40, 41, and 42 mm. necessary by passage of appropriation act of June 30, 1914, and 43 and 44 mm. necessary by passage of appropriation act of Mar. 3, 1915. The delivery of these guns at all times to meet anticipated ship requirements.

..... necessary to make up spares of old guns.

..... by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917. Delivery of these guns at all times to meet anticipated ship requirements.

..... of Guam.

..... by passage of appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. Delivery of these guns at all times to meet ship requirements.

..... by passage of appropriation acts of June 30, 1914, and Mar. 3, 1915, for submarines.

APPENDIX No. 2.

Statement of projectiles required on hand and on order as of Dec. 31, 1916, and Mar. 31, 1917.

| Caliber. | Dec. 31, 1916. | | | Mar. 31, 1917 | | |
|-------------------|----------------|----------|----------|---------------|---------|----------|
| | Required. | On hand. | On order | Required. | On hand | On order |
| 16-inch..... | 7,200 | | | 17,100 | | 0 |
| 14-inch..... | 36,900 | 7,988 | 10,327 | 36,900 | 8,907 | 0 |
| 13-inch..... | 4,320 | 4,800 | | 4,320 | 4,800 | |
| 12-inch..... | 33,750 | 43,656 | | 33,750 | 43,949 | |
| 10-inch..... | 4,950 | 7,000 | | 4,950 | 7,000 | |
| 8-inch..... | 36,900 | 52,435 | | 36,900 | 52,435 | |
| 7-inch..... | 16,200 | 22,560 | | 16,200 | 22,560 | |
| 6-inch..... | 182,700 | 121,000 | 86,100 | 190,350 | 123,500 | 0 |
| 5-inch..... | 478,240 | 181,960 | 380,920 | 478,240 | 187,460 | 0 |
| 4-inch..... | 372,400 | 119,601 | 163,529 | 372,400 | 132,301 | 0 |
| 3-inch..... | 506,700 | 270,134 | 338,788 | 608,850 | 315,134 | 0 |
| 6-pounder..... | 544,800 | | | 544,800 | | 0 |
| 3-pounder..... | 293,400 | | | 293,400 | | 0 |
| 1-pounder..... | 861,900 | 220,000 | 80,000 | 861,900 | 221,000 | 0 |
| 1-pounder AA..... | 270,000 | 60,000 | 222,500 | 270,000 | 60,000 | 0 |

¹ Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917.

² Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of June 30, 1914, and Mar. 3, 1915. Delivery of 100,000 projectiles, less reserve, at all times anticipated gun requirements.

³ Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917. Delivery of 100,000 projectiles at all times anticipated gun requirements.

⁴ Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. Delivery of these projectiles at all times anticipated gun requirements.

⁵ No record of projectiles on hand or on order for these calibers now available.

⁶ Projectiles for 1,000 guns made necessary by the appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. In addition to 100,000 on hand and on order 75,000 had been advertised for.

APPENDIX No. 3.

Statement of powder required, on hand, and on order as of Dec. 1, 1916, and Apr. 6, 1917.

Statement of explosives on hand and on order.

| Kind. | Dec. 31, 1916. | | | Mar. 31, 1917. | | |
|---------------------------|----------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|
| | On hand. | Required. | On order. | On hand. | Required. | On order. |
| Explosive D..... | 1,259,358 | 2,392,300 | 796,000 | 1,455,358 | 2,917,900 | 1,450,000 |
| N. T. "A"..... | 804,000 | 2,205,705 | 140,000 | 865,000 | 2,205,705 | 819,000 |
| N. T. "B" and guncotton.. | 958,000 | 3,141,244 | 2,075,000 | 1,308,000 | 4,425,844 | 4,125,000 |
| Black shell powder..... | 1,847,000 | 2,693,485 | 25,000 | 1,852,000 | 2,693,485 | 200,000 |

NOTE.—Amount of black powder on hand does not include burster charges in loaded and fused shells at ports. Record of this is not in the bureau.

APPENDIX No. 5.

Statement of torpedoes required on hand and on order as of Nov. 1, 1916, and Apr. 1, 1917.

| Type. | Nov. 1, 1916. | | | | Apr. 1, 1917. | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------|-----------|
| | Number required ¹ for— | | On hand. | On order. | Number required ¹ for— | | On hand. | On order. |
| | Ships built. | Ships built and authorized. | | | Ships built. | Ships built and authorized. | | |
| 18-inch long..... | 500 | 1,832 | 256 | 624 | 500 | 2,432 | 2407 | 473 |
| 18-inch medium..... | 752 | 1,256 | 615 | 546 | 752 | 2,168 | 2818 | 1,255 |
| 18-inch..... | 1,386 | 1,834 | 1,144 | 734 | 1,386 | 1,834 | 1,159 | 719 |

¹ Reference is made to the total required, 50 per cent of which total are actually required to be on the ships and 50 per cent in reserve ashore. These figures are as indicated by records at present available.
² Only approximately correct.

APPENDIX No. 6.

Statement of mines required, on hand, and on order as of Dec. 31, 1916, and Mar. 31, 1917.

| Kind. | Dec. 31, 1916. | | | Mar. 31, 1917. | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------|-----------|---------------------|----------|-----------|
| | Required. | On hand. | On order. | Required. | On hand. | On order. |
| Mark I anchored mine..... | ¹ 9,000 | 550 | | ¹ 15,000 | 550 | |
| Mark II anchored mine..... | | 312 | | | 312 | |
| Mark III anchored mine..... | | 1,090 | | | 1,090 | |
| Mark IV anchored mine..... | | 1,280 | 6,000 | | 1,280 | 12,000 |
| Mark I drifting mine..... | 3,600 | 600 | 3,000 | 4,000 | 600 | 3,400 |

¹ Shows total anchored mines of all kinds required.

APPENDIX No. 7.

Statement of depth charges required, on hand, and on order as of December 31, 1916: Required 0, on hand 0, on order 0; as of March 31, 1917: Required 10,000, on hand 0, on order 0.¹

¹ Requisition had been submitted for 10,000, but no contract had been signed.

APPENDIX No. 8.

Statement of gun mounts required, on hand, and on order, as of Dec. 1, 1916, and Apr. 6, 1917.

| Caliber. | Dec. 1, 1916. | | | Apr. 6, 1917 | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|----------|-----------|--------------|----------|
| | Re-quired. | On hand. | On order. | Re-quired. | On hand. |
| 7-inch, 45..... | 90 | 93 | | 90 | 93 |
| 6-inch, 53 ¹ | 40 | | | 40 | |
| 6-inch, 50 ² | 310 | 293 | | 310 | 293 |
| 6-inch, 45 ² | 14 | 12 | | 14 | 12 |
| 6-inch, 40 ² | 82 | 71 | | 82 | 71 |
| 5-inch, 51 ² | 696 | 311 | 185 | 696 | 311 |
| 5-inch, 50..... | 150 | 150 | | 150 | 150 |
| 5-inch, 40 ² | 189 | 192 | | 189 | 192 |
| 4-inch, 50 ² | 501 | 234 | 91 | 501 | 234 |
| 4-inch, 40 ² | 259 | 254 | | 259 | 254 |
| 3-inch, 50 ² | 1,046 | 730 | | 1,046 | 730 |
| 3-inch, 50, A. A. ³ | 279 | 44 | 98 | 279 | 44 |
| 3-inch, 23, sub..... | 80 | 14 | 66 | 80 | 14 |
| 3-inch, 23, boat..... | | | | | |
| 6-pounder..... | 908 | 919 | | 908 | 919 |
| 3-pounder..... | 489 | 580 | | 489 | 580 |
| 1-pounder..... | 1,400 | 643 | 50 | 1,400 | 643 |

¹ Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917. Delivery of gun mounts has at all times anticipated ship requirements.

² Not considered necessary to make up spares for old type guns.

³ Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of August 29, 1916. Orders for manufacture to meet increased requirements due to arming of merchantmen and auxiliaries were placed as rapidly as caps could be obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that at the outbreak of the war we were thoroughly prepared so far as ammunition and guns were concerned?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thoroughly prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Thoroughly prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. To take an active part in the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And we had large stores of reserve ammunition and guns on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. Ammunition and guns and powder.

The CHAIRMAN. All that could possibly be needed toward our taking an active part in the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; all that would be needed—that is, my statement is as of a period one year and four months prior to the war. We had the money, and we were very active in procuring the material and in its being manufactured, and while I was not in the department when war was declared, I have not any idea in the world that the comparatively unimportant shortages of December, 1915, were not made up.

The CHAIRMAN. You say they were made up by December, 1916, after you left the bureau?

Admiral STRAUSS. I did not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you, were they made up by that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not know. I say I do not doubt but that by April we had plenty of ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and I asked you to state whether in your opinion we were in a thorough state of preparedness, so far as ammunition and guns were concerned, on April 6, 1917.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; thoroughly prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. But you can not state that in December, when you left, we were thoroughly prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, we were prepared in December to go to war; but if you mean were we 100 per cent prepared, I say no. And I would like to say right now about preparedness that no first-class navy, no live navy, ever considers itself thoroughly prepared. In other words, its ideals must outstrip its material accomplishments, or they are no good.

The CHAIRMAN. Had we come up, in December, 1916, to the plans that you had outlined?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were not completed; no.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not? But you do not know whether they were completed between December, 1916, and April, 1917?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your estimate that we were thoroughly prepared and that the plans were completed then is simply a guess?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all. I told you before that we were thoroughly prepared for war, so far as ammunition and guns were concerned, in December, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have just stated, Admiral, that your plans were not thoroughly carried out at that time.

Admiral STRAUSS. It does not matter.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no accurate knowledge as to whether they were carried out between that time and April 6, 1917, have you?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; but I do not consider the absolute completion of my plans necessary to be prepared for war. As I say, there is an ideal state beyond what we ever accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. For purposes of comparison, I would like to have you give me a statement of the condition of the Navy in regard to guns and projectiles, etc., those that I have already named, at the time when you left the department, and also give one at the time when war was declared, in April, 1917.

Admiral STRAUSS. I will have that prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Both statements, so that they can be compared.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In December, 1916, you left the Bureau of Ordnance and took command of the battleship *Nevada*?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With what force was she?

Admiral STRAUSS. She was with the battleship force—Force 2.

The CHAIRMAN. And she was with the battleship fleet when war broke out?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was she in every respect thoroughly prepared for war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was her personnel in every respect up to par?

Admiral STRAUSS. Quite so.

The CHAIRMAN. When war was declared?

Admiral STRAUSS. When war was declared. I am reminded that we had supplied some armed guards for several merchant ships.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your personnel had been by that time to a certain extent depleted?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other respects, as to material, she was in good condition?

Admiral STRAUSS. She was perfect?

The CHAIRMAN. And the same is true about the fleet in general?

Admiral STRAUSS. In my opinion the condition of the fleet was excellent when we came north from Cuba in April, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the ships that were in the fleet were in excellent condition?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony has shown that with the exception of this personnel question, where they had been detached on armed guard duties.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, would you say that that was a thoroughly equipped and prepared battle fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It needed no other vessels of any other kind?

Admiral STRAUSS. A battle fleet; yes. The main strength of a battle fleet, of course, is in the battleships. Now, there are required a certain number of destroyers and scouts and light cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. And did the fleet have that certain number that would be required?

Admiral STRAUSS. We only had three scouts that had been built for scouts, at that time in commission, the *Birmingham*, the *Salem*, and the *Chester*. They had been built for scouts. They were not very good scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were not with the fleet; but it did not matter. We had destroyers that could have served as scouts very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a surplus of destroyers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we had, in my opinion, plenty of destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. More destroyers than you really needed for a number of battleships?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not think we had more. We had destroyers about that time. It is a matter of opinion how many destroyers you need per battleship. I think, though, the consensus of opinion would be that two per battleship would do. We had battleships, and 32 destroyers would have afforded us a proper screen. We had 50 destroyers altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. With the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; not with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you have with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think we had about 20.

The CHAIRMAN. About 20?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would not give even two to a battleship?

Admiral STRAUSS. We do not have to have them with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know, Admiral, whether the battle fleet as it existed then was a thoroughly prepared battle fleet and ready to go out and fight——

Admiral STRAUSS. It was.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The German or any other navy?

Admiral STRAUSS. I want to be emphatic about that, that it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, we should discard all scout vessels as not necessary?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; we had in existence enough destroyers to screen the fleet and provide scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did we have them?

Admiral STRAUSS. Had them in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of them in the Pacific Ocean?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not the most adequate screening vessels that we had in the Pacific Ocean scouting and screening vessels?

Admiral STRAUSS. What do you refer to?

The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to the cruisers that were laid up in the Pacific.

Admiral STRAUSS. At the outbreak of the war we had eight armored cruisers, so listed. We had two other ships that had always been listed as armored cruisers; that is, the *Rochester* and the *Brooklyn*. That made 10. Then we had two of the *St. Louis* class which would have served that purpose, light cruisers or armored cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were on the west coast, all except one, the *Montana*, which was on the east coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Was she in condition?

Admiral STRAUSS. She was in condition and actually did go out.

The CHAIRMAN. But she was not with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, it is a very interesting matter for this committee, as a part of the Naval Affairs Committee, to get the opinion of naval officers about what is necessary to constitute a battle fleet, and if it is not necessary to provide these screening vessels, we want to know about it.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; it is necessary to provide them.

The CHAIRMAN. It can not be very immediately necessary if you say that the fleet was all ready to go out for battle that did not have them.

Admiral STRAUSS. I want to differentiate between perfection and what will do.

The CHAIRMAN. How would it do against a fleet that had them?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think that our destroyers would have formed sufficient scouts as against the German fleet's vessels—not in all weathers.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in all weathers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not in all weathers.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in fog?

Admiral STRAUSS. In fog; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In darkness?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in storm?

Admiral STRAUSS. The weather might be so bad that they could not stand it very well, although it is a fact that our destroyers stayed out in all weathers on the other side. The destroyers are not ideal scouts, but if you have not other scouts, you have got to use them, and you can use them successfully.

The CHAIRMAN. You would use them if you had them with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; scouting for the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but would you say that a fleet of 10 battleships and 20 destroyers could go out and fight a fleet of 10 battleships and 20 destroyers and a number of scouting vessels at the same time?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And beat it?

Admiral STRAUSS. I would hope to beat it.

The CHAIRMAN. If they were equal in efficiency?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; not if they were equal in efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, if the battleships and destroyers were equal in efficiency in each case?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, I would not; unless the personnel was superior.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it would be simply a question of the personnel?

Admiral STRAUSS. Personnel, drill, and morale.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is safe enough for us to depend upon the superiority of the personnel and discard some of these ships?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I think we ought to build scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that a thoroughly equipped battle fleet, when it went out to fight, ought to have scouts?

Admiral STRAUSS. It ought to have scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that our fleet in 1917, when the war commenced, if we had been called on to go out immediately—do you think we would have had scouts?

Admiral STRAUSS. Do you mean that we could have gone without scouts?

The CHAIRMAN. No; that we could have had an adequate supply of scouts when we went out.

Admiral STRAUSS. I think we would have used our destroyers successfully as scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. You think we could?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir. I would rather have scouts; but if we did not have them we would take destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a great deal of difference between the cost of a scout cruiser and that of a destroyer, is there not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it is economy to build destroyers instead of scout cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all. You have to pay more for the better implement.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think, Admiral, that our fleet as constituted in April, 1917, could have gone out in mid-ocean and engaged the German Fleet if it had come out, successfully, do you?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if the fleet had come out without engaging the British—if they had slipped by the British?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On what do you base that?

Admiral STRAUSS. Our ships themselves were superior. The guns were superior. I believe the morale to have been superior.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think there would have been any danger of their being attacked by submarines—or torpedo—in any way?

Admiral STRAUSS. No danger at all from submarines in mid-ocean, according to my notion.

The CHAIRMAN. And no danger from destroyers?

Admiral STRAUSS. No more danger than the Germans would have met in from our destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Germans at that time have a larger number of destroyers with their fleet than we had?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know how many destroyers the Germans had. I fancy they had more than we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they not have more battle cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. They had some battle cruisers; but I would not put a battle cruiser in the line of battle.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about an actual line of battle, where battleship meets battleship?

Admiral STRAUSS. I am; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the Battle of Jutland the battle cruisers had something to do with it?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; England had three of them—the *Indefatigable*, the *Queen Mary*, and the *Invincible*—go down in a few minutes; sunk there within a few minutes. My idea is that the battle cruisers have not any business in the line of battle. The purpose of a battle cruiser, the use of a battle cruiser, is an entirely different one.

The CHAIRMAN. But you regard the battle cruiser as a useful adjunct to a battle fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; you must have battle cruisers as anti-aircrafters, to meet the battle cruisers of other nations. An example, and a very good one, of their usefulness is in the destruction of Von Spee's squadron down in the Falkland Islands by Sturdee, in which Sturdee employed battle cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the German destroyers make an attack on the British battleships in the Battle of Jutland and turn them back?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not made up my mind about the Battle of Jutland yet. I have read pretty nearly everything about it that I can get hold of, but I do not feel that I am able to express a good opinion about that battle to-day. In fact, it may take a long time before we get sufficient perspective to judge what really did take place at the Battle of Jutland.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the limit of the size of the guns on our destroyers; do you know?

Admiral STRAUSS. Four-inch.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the limit of the size of the guns on scout cruisers—ordinary scout cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Our design scout cruisers contemplate having four-inch guns as the largest guns.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the scout cruiser, if it came into direct contact anywhere with destroyers, when the battleships were not around, would sink the destroyers at any time?

Admiral STRAUSS. It could; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that not give them a certain advantage?

Admiral STRAUSS. That would undoubtedly give the scout cruiser an advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. But in spite of all these advantages you feel confident that our fleet was ready to start with its battleships and destroyers—and what else?

Admiral STRAUSS. Battleships and destroyers; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What else was it ready to start with?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing. Well, we had the cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but they were not ready, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know; but I mean to say with the battleships and destroyers we could have gone out into the Atlantic Ocean and, in my opinion, whipped the German Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. And in your opinion whipped the German Fleet it was then?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the inception of the barrage originated in the United States Navy Department as early as April 1917, and that it was originated by the Admiralty and Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When do you mean it was originated by them?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not got exactly the date when they originated it. It was practically at once.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, during the first few weeks of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, well, very soon after it was proposed. Now I would like to say that all these things took place in my absence. I have gone to the records.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not go over until March, 1918, was it?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; March, 1918. But you will undoubtedly have witnesses before the committee who can give you the exact information about when it was originated.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to find out was, Admiral, whether Admiral Sims—you stated that Admiral Sims turned down the whole proposition, or turned it down during the earlier stages of the war, and for what reasons he turned it down during the earlier stages of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think you had better get all that information from some other witness. They probably have all the documents, and I have not. I only state the bare fact that it was turned down.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you assigned to the mine-laying squadrons—assigned to the laying of the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I was detached from the *Nevada* in February 1918, spent the next two weeks at the Navy Department, and on about the 10th of March left the United States by passenger steamer and reported to Admiral Sims in London on the 21st of March, 1918. All these data in connection with the command of the mine force.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you arrive in Europe?

Admiral STRAUSS. The 21st of March, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did you have in drawing up the original plans for the operation?

Admiral STRAUSS. I had no part.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did you have in developing and perfecting the material and mines used in the operation?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing at all. I would like to amend that that as the mines arrived from Scotland, certain faults were developed which we had to correct out there. You might say that that was developed.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did you have in the equipping of the mine layers?

Admiral STRAUSS. You mean in the construction of the mine layers?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The equipping them for their work?

Admiral STRAUSS. I did not equip them.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the training of the personnel?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible for the preparation of the mine force?

Admiral STRAUSS. The Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Over here?

Admiral STRAUSS. Over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Entirely?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What arrangements had been made in Europe for the laying of the barrage before your arrival?

Admiral STRAUSS. Agreements had been made between the Admiralty and the London office, approved by the department, and I think Admiral Mayo had something to do with that, as to the location of the barrage.

The CHAIRMAN. Made by the department with the Admiralty?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the mine bases completed and ready for the laying of the mines before your arrival in Europe?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir; not quite.

The CHAIRMAN. Who carried out this preliminary work?

Admiral STRAUSS. All my own bases were built by the British Government, with the original idea that they were to be assemblage plants for their own mines. We were to supply mines, or rather have our mines with their anchors. The first change was made when they asked us to supply the men to man these plants. The second change was made when they asked us to supply anchors, too. So that finally we took over everything there.

The CHAIRMAN. And who did you say had done the preliminary work?

Admiral STRAUSS. The British.

The CHAIRMAN. The British. Was not this work done under Admiral Sims's direct orders—the preliminary work?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know. There was a British commission went up there and selected the bases. The work itself was done by British labor under British direction. That is, in the preparation of the bases. I do not know how much was referred to Admiral Sims in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the admiral give his full support to the equipment and preparation of the mine bases?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think he did, but I was not there then.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your position abroad when you arrived there?

Admiral STRAUSS. I was commander of the mine force.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander of the mine forces?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your relations with the other allied commanders?

Admiral STRAUSS. How do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under any other orders?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes. By direction from Admiral Sims received orders from Admiral Beatty.

The CHAIRMAN. You received your orders direct from Admiral Beatty?

Admiral STRAUSS. I received routing orders, as I have explained it in my letter, from Admiral Beatty; orders when to start mine-laying and——

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under the force commander on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under the command of the force commander on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under his orders?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command of all the operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. Mining operations?

The CHAIRMAN. All operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. The only operations in my part of the North Sea were the mining operations, and I was in command myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in command yourself of the mining operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command in general in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. They did not have a general North Sea commander that I know of. Admiral Beatty was the senior allied naval commander over there.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the actual planning of the various mining operations after you got over there done by you?

Admiral STRAUSS. Do you mean did I go out every time the mines were planted?

The CHAIRMAN. I say, did you plan them?

Admiral STRAUSS. The operations?

The CHAIRMAN. Plan them, yes; not plant? Did you make the plans yourself for laying down the mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. I made them in conjunction with my staff; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this done in connection with the Allies?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; the only—do you mean, did they plan the actual laying of the mines?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had entire charge of that?

Admiral STRAUSS. We did. On one occasion I went out in command of both fleets, the English and the American mine-laying fleets; and on another occasion a British admiral went out and commanded both of our fleets.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, the plans for each mine-laying expedition were not made by Admiral Sims or by the British at the Admiralty?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were not. They were made by me.

The CHAIRMAN. Entirely?

Admiral STRAUSS. Entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. Without reporting to them?

Admiral STRAUSS. I reported when I finished.

The CHAIRMAN. But not before?

Admiral STRAUSS. I would report when I was ready to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom did you receive operation orders for mine-laying expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. I issued my own operating orders. As I have explained in my statement, the routing orders were received from Admiral Beatty.

The CHAIRMAN. Had the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet any control over your force except while engaged in actual mine-laying operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your relations with the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. What do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Were your relations friendly with him?

Admiral STRAUSS. Quite so.

The CHAIRMAN. In every way?

Admiral STRAUSS. In every way.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same with the British vice admiral at Inverness in charge of mining operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. They did not have a British vice admiral at Inverness.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not say British vice admiral, but British admiral, at Inverness, in charge of mining operations.

Admiral STRAUSS. They did not have one there.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no British admiral there?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulties with the members of your own staff?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any trouble with any of your own staff?

Admiral STRAUSS. No. Do you mean with any forces under my command—any of the officers of my command?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. I had the usual occurrences which were met by disciplinary action, but no trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing out of the ordinary run?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any other problem to consider than that of the actual laying of mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. In the North Sea?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I was a member of an allied conference at Malta, in which we considered and fixed upon mining in the Mediterranean. We arranged to place a barrier of mines across the Asiatic, and one in the Aegean Sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were the only other problems, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. Those were the only other projects.

The CHAIRMAN. And they had to do with the laying of mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. We had already started to building up at Biserta, with the object in view of laying those two barriers.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible for coordinating the mine-laying operations with all other allied operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. You mean so far as our service goes?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not a part of Admiral Sim's task in London to exercise general control to coordinate the operations of your forces with the operations of other allied forces?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the actual carrying out of your operation depend on the general situation in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. Do you mean the naval situation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any definite evidence that Admiral Sims did not support the laying of the mine barrage as soon as it was undertaken?

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any disagreement of any kind with the British authorities?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not recall a single one. You mean a quarrel I suppose?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; any difference of opinion?

Admiral STRAUSS. A row?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Any great difference of opinion?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims support you in all essential matters?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, he did.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the opposition of the commander in chief to the laying of mines in the western area of the barrage, what recommendations did you make to Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. I recommended that he press the matter very strongly with the British Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The British objected, did they not, to extending the barrage over because they thought it would interfere with their fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations did you make to Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. I recommended that he make strenuous efforts to get them to lay mines in area B.

The CHAIRMAN. And what did Admiral Sims do?

Admiral STRAUSS. He did. He succeeded in——

The CHAIRMAN. He backed up your recommendations?

Admiral STRAUSS. He backed up my recommendations very well. I attended a meeting at the Admiralty with Admiral Sims and the sea lords, and Admiral Sims was very emphatic about insisting that the mines be laid in area B.

The CHAIRMAN. And did not the Admiralty yield to his representations with respect to laying the mines in area B?

Admiral STRAUSS. They did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any question arise concerning the laying of mine mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. The original plan contemplated the laying of equal number of mines at each of the three depths. This was changed afterwards to an increased number of surface mines at the expense of the number of deep mines.

The CHAIRMAN. And you made recommendations?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; that was done in London by the Admiralty; no change was made there.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your attitude on this?

Admiral STRAUSS. My attitude was that while it might be a good thing to remove the confusion in manufacture might make it inadvisable to change the plans at so late a date. We did make changes at the time. Of course, it meant an immense amount of trouble and an immense confusion over here in the United States in getting out the material, so that I acceded to the change with a good deal of reluctance.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims back up your attitude?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he insist upon the completion of the mining operations in 1918?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not believe I understand your question.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1918 he insisted on having the barrage completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was all done in 1918; yes. Everything was done in 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. And he insisted on that? He agreed with you on that?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken with regard to the closing of the Norwegian territorial waters at the eastern end of the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Somewhat late in the operation the Norwegians mined about the Island of Utsar. We had stopped our barrier within a marine league of that island, and that left a passageway which finally the authorities of Norway agreed to close.

The CHAIRMAN. And you took the ground that it should be done?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; from the very start.

The CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Sims agreed with you on that and backed you up?

Admiral STRAUSS. He agreed with me.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on this matter?

Admiral STRAUSS. The Norwegians mined about the island of Utsar to the 3-mile limit.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any difficulty with the commander in chief of the grand fleet concerning orders issued from him contrary to instructions issued by Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I mentioned that in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; you have got that.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state in your answer here briefly about it? Refer to the page of your statement.

Admiral STRAUSS. When an order was received direct from Admiral Sims which seriously limited the barrage—and that order was not

to place any mines west of the meridian of Greenwich and we have left a gap in the barrier of about 70 miles; that is, from Orkneys east 70 miles—upon my making this known to Admiral Sims he had the order rescinded at the Admiralty, although it took over three weeks to accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Sims had the order rescinded?

Admiral STRAUSS. He had it rescinded.

The CHAIRMAN. Instructions were issued by the Admiralty itself to the commander in chief to countermand these orders, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. I had a telegram from Admiral Beatty rescinding the order.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether he was ordered by the Admiralty to countermand his order?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know, but I presume he was.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate, it was as the result of Admiral Sims's intervention?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I think so. He could tell you more about that than I could. I only know that I informed him that this order had been issued to me, and about three weeks afterwards the order was rescinded. I presume he was instrumental in having it rescinded.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with Admiral Sims's testimony about the magnitude of operations involved in the laying of the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, do you agree with it?

Admiral STRAUSS. That it was a great operation?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you agree with what he says about the magnitude of the operation?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with his statement that the preparation of material for the barrage, and the actual operation, reflect the highest credit upon those engaged?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of any previous project requiring as large an amount of material as the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Requiring as large an amount of material?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been possible to lay such a barrage without antenna mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. It would have been possible, but very much more difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. Very much more difficult?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; it would have taken about three times as many mines; or, you could have laid a barrage not so destructive to the enemy, with the same number of mines.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you said in your statement the advantage of the antenna mines was that you required a less number of them than of the other mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the only advantage?

Admiral STRAUSS. That is the only advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the antenna mine fully, finally perfected?



Admiral STRAUSS. About June, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. About June, 1917?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; it had gone far enough in June, 1917, to assure the Bureau of Ordnance that it was a feasible scheme.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulty with it in actual operation abroad?

Admiral STRAUSS. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulties with the antenna mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we had some difficulties; but we succeeded in correcting them at the bases.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any delays caused by premature explosions due to imperfections in the mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. There was always a certain number of premature explosions when the mines were planted. That generally ran about 4 per cent; and we could afford to neglect it. They made an alteration in the mine on this side which in August increased that loss to as much as 15 per cent, and we stopped work until we could correct that difficulty and prevent so great a waste of mines by premature explosions. However, the delay was not considerable.

The CHAIRMAN. What length of time was required after the perfection of the mine before arrangements were completed, for laying the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. About seven or eight months.

The CHAIRMAN. Seven or eight months?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; that is between the time the mine was perfected—the mine was perfected, we will say, in July, 1917. The rest of the mines was laid June 8, 1918. That delay, of course, involved the procuring of ships, rearranging their interior and mechanism for the purpose, as well as the construction of the mines.

The CHAIRMAN. And it required a large number of ships to take these mines over?

Admiral STRAUSS. It required 64 cargoes—64 shiploads.

The CHAIRMAN. Sixty-four shiploads, for how many mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. About 80,000 mines.

The CHAIRMAN. Of which you said you used about 56,000?

Admiral STRAUSS. Fifty-six thousand six hundred—about 57,000, iv.

The CHAIRMAN. Fifty-seven thousand mines. Do you know of any delays that occurred in preparing this material?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the laying of the Northern barrage begun?

Admiral STRAUSS. On June 8, 1918, the first mine was dropped. On that date we dropped 3,385 mines.

The CHAIRMAN. And when was the barrage completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. We never actually completed the barrage as originally designed, but on October 26 the last mine laying took place, and further work was suspended then by the impending armistice.

The CHAIRMAN. But the barrage was not quite completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was not quite completed; but still it was a very effective barrage?

The CHAIRMAN. In what respect was it not completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, we expected to lay another line up to northward. But, as it was, it was very effective.

The CHAIRMAN. But the barrage extended from the Norwegian coast to the Scotch coast?

Admiral STRAUSS. Within 10 miles of the Orkney Islands. It did not extend all the way over.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the merchant tonnage losses from enemy submarines, in June, 1918, as compared with April, 1917?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not that at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. In April, 1917, the losses were 800,000 tons.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in June, 1918, I think, the testimony has shown that they were between 100,000 and 200,000 tons.

Admiral STRAUSS. They were about 250,000 tons, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the German submarine menace pretty well checked before the barrage was completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; although, as I have stated in my statement, we did get a submarine on July 9, 1918, with the barrage.

The CHAIRMAN. At what time was the barrage sufficiently completed to be considered as a serious difficulty to enemy submarines?

Admiral STRAUSS. About the 7th of September, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. The 7th of September?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the tonnage loss during that month?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not the table here.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not somewhere around 100,000 tons?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; very much more than that. In September, 1918?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. It was probably 200,000 tons; but, without putting that down, let us look it up and get it exact. It was about 250,000 tons in September.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it was about 250,000 tons?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you put in the record exactly?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I will put the exact figures in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that in your opinion substantially all submarines were sunk in the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get definite proof of the sinking of a submarine in the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, of course, the most absolute proof is to get hold of the submarine on the bottom, and as a matter of fact in sweeping the barrage we did have positive evidence of at least three. But you can not always get that. We got those in places where the sweeps brushed along the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the submarines themselves?

Admiral STRAUSS. Where the sweeps brushed along the bottom. But I had a statement from the Admiralty upon which I based my figures as to the number lost. They did not state that 10 had been lost. I think they gave me 8, and I put it at 10. There had been a submarine damaged on July 9. That was the first we heard of the effects of the barrage. The British fleet at Rosyth heard the wireless calls and Admiral Beatty sent out two battle cruisers.

catch her, but she had a pretty good start and went home on the surface. That loss, in effect, would have been reported if we had controlled the barrage, and we wanted to patrol the barrage. I made a recommendation that we at least have sentries out on the barrage, so that in case a submarine was injured and had to come to the surface she could be attacked, or that in case the enemy swept the barrage—mutilated the barrage—they could bring forces here to fight them. That was never done. We never guarded the barrage.

The CHAIRMAN. Then on what do you base your evidence of the submarines that were sunk?

Admiral STRAUSS. On the statement that I received from the admiralty.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that the submarine campaign had been practically defeated in June, 1918, and that these losses had been much reduced and that the merchant tonnage construction was generally increased, do you consider that the northern barrage was the chief cause of the checking of the enemy submarines?

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider it one of the major operations of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do consider it one of the major operations of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It was undoubtedly a tremendous piece of work; there can be no question about that, and it was mostly American work, was it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Eighty per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in actual command at sea of the various mine-laying expeditions carried out by our force?

Admiral STRAUSS. I was in command of three of them at sea. My duties as commander of the force comprised the management of the whole scheme afloat and ashore. It also demanded my attendance at this allied conference at Malta, and I spent about a month here, and during my absence the Chief of Staff, Capt. Belknap, was in command.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if you do not consider that the northern barrage was the chief cause of the defeat of the enemy submarines, on what ground do you base your contention that it was one of the major naval operations of the war, in view of the fact that the armistice came soon after its completion?

Admiral STRAUSS. It does not matter, really, whether it was the greatest contributing cause to the ending of the war or not, so far as being a big operation is concerned. One of the biggest things we did in this war was to get 4,000,000 men enlisted. Only 2,000,000 of them got over, but that does not rob the fact of our getting 4,000,000 men together of its importance.

The CHAIRMAN. And as being a very great stunt to do?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; and having a very great effect. If the war had been continued and the barrage had been completed to the Orkneys and the barrier across the Straits of Dover had been properly completed, it would have ended the submarine menace so far as submarines going from the North to the broad Atlantic was

concerned. Also the barrier that we were to build across the Adriatic and across the Aegean Sea, when completed, would have actually ended the submarine operations.

Now, the tonnage losses were comparatively small in the last month of the war; that is, they averaged about 250,000 tons. If they still were 250,000 tons a month, and this would have put an end to that still tremendous loss. The very last month of the war—that is, October—we lost 112,000 tons. The submarine warfare ended on the 11th of October, by agreement, so that that 112,000 tons is for 11 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Not one-half the month?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not one-half the month. As I repeat, you had a very serious thing to manage, and that was the loss of 250,000 tons a month. The barrier would have stopped that.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendation did you make to Admiral Sims with regard to the command of the joint mine-laying expedition?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not remember that I made any.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember that you made any?

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had command yourself?

Admiral STRAUSS. The English and the United States squadrons acted, generally, separately; but on occasion, when they acted together, either Admiral Clinton Baker or myself commanded the joint expedition afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any request when the first mine-laying expedition was ready, to Admiral Sims, that you yourself were not required to take actual command at sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir. Where did you get that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply asking the question. There was nothing of the kind?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing of the kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, how many of the joint expeditions at sea did you command?

Admiral STRAUSS. Three expeditions I commanded.

The CHAIRMAN. What forces were under your command on these joint expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. My own force once, and the combined forces two other times.

The CHAIRMAN. The combined forces two other times?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But under you?

Admiral STRAUSS. One other time I was in command and another time Rear Admiral Clinton Baker was in command.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the assignment of the British force and the United States mine-laying force during these operations required by the principle of unity of command?

Admiral STRAUSS. Will you repeat that?

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the assignment of the British force and the United States mine-laying force during these operations required by the principle of unity of command?

Admiral STRAUSS. It did not seem to require it. We got along very well without it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without it?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But the policy was to assign them in mine-laying expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not think that I have understood your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have said that on two of the mine-laying expeditions the British forces went along with you on the mine-laying expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we laid close to and parallel to each other.

The CHAIRMAN. And the general policy of having them go along together, handled under your command, was sound, was it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. For that occasion it was; but their activities sometimes were a couple of hundred miles away from ours-- 150 miles. Of course you could not have a joint command then.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, do you think it was sound military policy to require one allied command of all operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, in general do you consider that it was sound military policy to require a unified command of all operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not consider it necessary, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it was necessary?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think you could have had a cooperation of mining operations with their operations in the North Sea, without such unity of command?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think it would have been better to have kept the American mining force as a completely separate force under a separate command?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think it would have been better. I would have preferred to have operated with my own force of destroyers, as a screen, and the battleship squadron that we had out there as a protection, because we lost half of our time in waiting for the other people to get ready, and in waiting for orders from Admiral Beatty. We expended just one-half of the time we were in the North Sea, waiting for this unity of command.

The CHAIRMAN. What would have been the effect so far as protection of the mine force by the Grand Fleet was concerned?

Admiral STRAUSS. It would have been all right if we had had a fleet of destroyers, what we called the six-battleship squadron—Admiral Rodman's battle squadron—to protect us in our operations. We would have done the work in half the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what forces were you dependent for the protection and screening of the mine force in mine laying operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. The British.

The CHAIRMAN. How could you have had this protection unless your operations had been coordinated with others under the general command of the commander of the allied fleet in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. The North Sea was not a special command. Admiral Beatty was the senior British naval officer afloat. His area of operations was anywhere that the Navy was in the North Sea or

in the broad Atlantic. I think you have an idea that this North was a special, separate command. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. But I assume that the forces that were there were coordinating, and that the subordinate officers were under the high officers, in some cases in other places, were they not?

Admiral STRAUSS. In an allied operation or in an operation of our country, the senior naval officer is in command by virtue of his rank and position.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes a certain unity of command, does not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that you approve of?

Admiral STRAUSS. I approve of that for a battle; but if you are trying to get at whether I think we would not have done better in laying this barrage without the English, I will have to say no. I think we would have done it better and quicker if we had acted singly. We did not even need the routing orders of Admiral Beatty if we had had mine sweepers to precede our layers; and as I stated before, we would have gained a lot of time.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have required the protection of our American destroyers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Destroyers and battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would have taken them from some other service, would it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. It would have either taken them from Scapa Flow, or down from Rosyth, near Edinburgh.

Senator KEYES. Admiral, in your letter of December 10, 1916, you say the powder situation left nothing to be desired?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator KEYES. You speak of the torpedo situation being well in hand, and you speak of various supplies, of theirs being a sufficient supply and sufficient reserves. When you say there is a sufficient supply, was that based on the peace program of November, 1915?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir; we work altogether on a war program. That is, the Navy is supposed to be prepared for war at all times, and when a ship is prepared, a declaration of war makes no difference in her supplies or internal economy, whatever.

Senator KEYES. I understood, you, in answer to a question of the chairman, to say that the Navy was fully prepared for war.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator KEYES. I think he asked you on more than one occasion!

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then would you say that the Navy was fully prepared for war when you wrote this letter?

Admiral STRAUSS. What I mean to say, that the Navy is fully prepared for war, I want to go back to this, that if our fleet had been called upon to meet the German Fleet in midocean in battle, I believe we would have defeated it. Now, if you ask, were we ideally prepared, no. If you wish to remove every chance against, you will be ideally prepared; but that is a thing that we can only hope for. Our ideals, as I stated before, must exceed what we have accomplished materially, or we will be at a standstill.

Senator KEYES. Then, in other words, if I understand you correctly, the Navy is always prepared for war, and always has been!

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not think that follows. Very often has not been.

Senator KEYES. Do you think it was prepared for war in 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think in 1914 we could have gone forth all at: yes.

Senator KEYES. That is, we could have sent our ships to sea? I just want to know if you want to make the statement——

Admiral STRAUSS. I want to stick to that statement, that in 1917, when we declared war, we could have gone out into the Atlantic and whipped the German Fleet. That is my belief.

Senator KEYES. Yes; I understand you to make that statement, and it is very clear; and I am not sure but what you are right about

I think you would have done it. But what I am trying to find out is whether the Navy was prepared in April, 1917.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I think so. All of the ships that we had—— and we had a fine fleet of 16 capital ships, and I am not counting the dreadnaughts, or anything like that——could have gone forth with their ammunition and everything aboard of them, and crews trained and everything, and whipped an enemy of the size of Germany.

Senator KEYES. Can you tell us at what time, in your opinion, the Navy became fully prepared for war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think we could have done that in 1915.

Senator KEYES. That does not answer my question. Will you just answer my question? I am not asking you whether you think that the ships could have gone out and put up a good fight, etc. My question was, at what time do you think the Navy became fully prepared for war?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I can not answer.

Senator KEYES. You made a statement that at a certain time it was fully prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator KEYES. I would like to know when that time arrived.

Admiral STRAUSS. I can not tell you.

Senator KEYES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it fully prepared in 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it fully prepared in 1915?

Admiral STRAUSS. The end of 1915, at the time that I took stock of things, yes; so far as my own knowledge goes, that is in my own department.

The CHAIRMAN. And thereafter, until the date of the declaration of war, you would say that it was fully prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, so far as my own department goes, at that time; that is the supply of ordnance material. Now, there are other departments of which I was not informed, that is about the personnel and food supplies, and all that sort of thing.

Now, pass on to 1917, when I was with the fleet, and I can answer your question. I think at that time that we were fully prepared. That is when I was in the fleet and had first-hand knowledge of conditions. Before that time, that is up to the three years preceding December, 1916, I only had a part of it under my supervision, that is the supply of ammunition, torpedoes, mines, and so forth.

Now, your question about when we were fully prepared had better be asked of somebody in the Division of Operations, where they have all of these things under their charge.

Senator KEYES. We shall ask.

The CHAIRMAN. But you state that in your opinion, when war was declared, the Navy was fully prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it as fully prepared as it should have been in view of the fact that the world had been at war since 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think so. Now, war was declared by England on August 4, I think, 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the fleet was prepared, you do not mean only in regard to matters with which you were connected, but in regard to everything else, too?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I do. Of course there is not such a thing as 100 per cent preparedness. I have repeatedly stated that. The question I wish to answer is, Were we ready to go forth and whip the Germans at sea on the 6th of April, 1917, and I answer yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the British whip the Germans completely at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral STRAUSS. I will have to give you my previous answer to that question, that I have not made up my mind about the battle of Jutland yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the British fleet at the battle of Jutland more powerful than our fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very much more?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you can not say whether they actually defeated the Germans at the battle of Jutland or not?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I can not answer that question yet, whether they did; but there were certain well-known defects in the British fleet, defects of equipment that we did not have, and according to Jellicoe's own book——

The CHAIRMAN. They were not defects in screening, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; they were defects of ammunition. Now, we did not have those defects.

The Germans did not have them. Admiral Jellicoe speaks of an inferior shell; and I have heard from other authorities that that was a source of great failure in their shooting.

Senator KEYES. I understand that we had a large and sufficient ample supply of powder at the time we declared war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; perfectly ample, even a year before we declared war.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were connected with the War Department in 1915, Admiral, according to your testimony?

Admiral STRAUSS. In 1913; ending October, 1913.

Senator TRAMMELL. 1913. During 1913 you were bending your energies towards building up the supply of ordnance, were you?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You left the department in December, 1916?

Admiral STRAUSS. I left the department in December, 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time you left, in December, 1916, you state in a general way that the supplies were all up to the standard, as far as war requirements?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, that they were going along in very good shape.



Senator TRAMMELL. Now, in regard to the question of screening vessels, the question of whether or not we would have had to had them if we had met the German fleet, that, of course, is not involved directly, because we did not meet the German fleet, and some seem to think that there was no particular probability of our meeting the German fleet in midocean. But did you have sufficient vessels to carry out the mission and the purpose that was assigned to you?

Admiral STRAUSS. You mean——

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you have sufficient screening vessels, and on?

Admiral STRAUSS. In the North Sea?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. The screening was done altogether by the British. I had no screen at all. The British did that for us. The vessels that would have screened my force were down there operating from Queenstown under a British commander. Admiral Bayley was commanding them.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was more or less a question of strategic location, was it not? If our vessels had been up there assisting you, these other vessels might have had to be down in the location where our vessels were? As a matter of fact, you were utilizing the whole force in a cooperative way—the British and American forces there? You did have ample protection? You had ample protection, did you not, in the way of screening vessels?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You spoke of our having a good many more destroyers than had been mobilized with your fleet. Did not that question of mobilizing rest upon the conditions and the work you would have to perform and the duties that you were undertaking? In other words, if your object and purpose and expectation was a battle with the German fleet, would you not have assembled more of your screening vessels with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. So that the fact that you did not have them there would not mean that you could not have had them there if your main objective had been engaging in battle with the German fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Exactly.

Senator TRAMMELL. And when you were going over there, your primary mission being that of laying mines, you did not necessarily have to have the screening vessels and protection from our own Navy that you would if your main object had been to go and engage in battle with the German fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. I wanted a screen—had to have a screen and a covering force in this operation. Now, we were allied with the British, and it was a matter of whether we got it from the British or from ourselves. It took these destroyers and battleships to do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not care where you got them; you had the protection and the screening force?

Admiral STRAUSS. I did not care where I got them; yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. And they were an assistance to you just the same as you would have been an assistance to them?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, they were, except that they used them for a double purpose. They used them for screening the British opera-

tions as well as ours. Therefore we lost half of our time waiting for the British to come along; so that it would have been better if we had had our own screening force and protecting fleet.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know about how long it takes to construct these scout cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. I fancy it would take two and one-half to three years to construct the latest design. You can get that better from the chief constructor.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not this country would have had more or less of them in course of construction at the time the war came on, in 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we had some under construction.

Senator TRAMMELL. Some in course of construction?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. From your knowledge of the condition in the Navy in 1915 and 1916, was there more or less of a concert of action to better equip and build up the Navy and get it in better condition for war purposes during that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. During the time I was in the Bureau of Ordnance?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; there was decided activity, everywhere.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you had not been making special efforts would it have been necessary to make so much preparation in connection with the mining project? Do you not think that the fact that war was going on, and the desire of the Navy Department to make special preparation, actuated the department to quite an extent in enlarging and extending your line of preparations?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think so. War broke out about six or seven months after I entered the bureau. I started to tell you a little while ago that three days after the declaration of war I asked the department to send abroad two officers as special observers of the effects of shell fire and torpedo fire, and to find out everything they could about what was going on abroad. One of them was Lieut. McCrary and the other was Lieut. Babcock. Lieut. Babcock stayed there only 10 days, and he wrote a letter saying that he would like to come back as it was too expensive; so that he came back on the *Tennessee*. Lieut. McCrary stayed there some time longer, and I think other bureaus of the Navy Department also had observers out, although I did not have much luck with mine.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was prior to the time we entered the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Prior to the time, but immediately after the outbreak of the World War.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then, as a matter of fact, you know that so far as the branch of the service you were connected with was concerned, you were trying to get as much first-hand information as you could, and you sent over officers for the purpose of observing and reporting?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; within three days after war broke out had those orders issued for Babcock and McCrary; and if Babcock had stayed over there, I have no doubt that he would have gotten a lot of information.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, I believe you stated in your direct testimony that some time in April, the month in which we entered war, the Navy Department here took up this matter of recommending the barrage.

Admiral STRAUSS. In April.

Senator TRAMMELL. In April?

Admiral STRAUSS. In April, 1917, I think, a very few days after we declared war. I fancy the matter had been considered some time before that, but very soon after our declaration of war, I am informed that the department proposed this barrier across the North Sea in conjunction with the barrier across the Straits of Dover.

Senator TRAMMELL. That recommendation was not approved of at that time, and I believe you stated that it was not until September, 17, when Admiral Mayo went abroad, that they finally agreed to the idea of the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was quite late in the year. But, if you will permit me to suggest, I think it would be better to ask Admiral Benson (Capt. Pratt, if they are to appear before the committee, as they are here in the department and knew all about these movements.

Senator TRAMMELL. We will make inquiry of them as to the more correct information. But if there was a six months' delay in going ahead with the mine-laying and the barrage, it could not be attributed to the United States Navy?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I think it was attributable to the reluctance that the British had to going into the whole question of the mine barrier across the North Sea.

Senator TRAMMELL. Eliminating the question of the value of the barrage itself, if its benefits were deferred for six months, and it did not act in its effectiveness in helping to shake the submarine menace six months sooner, that was not chargeable to the Navy of the United States?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; you can not charge the United States Navy with any delay in agreeing to that barrage.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated that while you considered that our Navy was fully prepared in April, 1917, you, of course, did not mean an ideal condition, and that no navy was ever 100 per cent prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. No. If any navy or department of the navy say that they are thoroughly and absolutely prepared, I believe they are in a bad way. They not only can not say that they are absolutely prepared before a war, but the developments during a war always make us a step behind. I will give you an example of that, the invention of the paravane during the war, which was a very clever scheme for defeating the surface mine, an attachment that they affixed to a battleship, and as the battleship steamed along it cut these mines adrift automatically. It took some time for us to put paravanes on our ships, and we were behind in that respect, because this was an invention that proceeded out of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think you are thoroughly correct in your views upon that subject, and your opinion that the necessities and the developments, of course, make new things necessary, and the changes are lightninglike during the war, not only in the Navy operations, but the Army, too.

Admiral STRAUSS. Admiral McKean has just reminded me of the depth charge. That was entirely a development of this war, and a

very important one. And that not only runs along in peace time that way, but it runs along in war; so that if you wanted to be captious, you might charge that we did not have depth charges and paravanes.

Senator TRAMMELL. From your general knowledge of the preparation that has been made by the Navy and the effectiveness of the Navy in connection with this war, do you think that our Navy delayed the final victory to any great extent?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral Sims has stated that on account of our not entering wholeheartedly into the war in the first four to six months, and on account of the lack of preparedness, the United States Navy had caused the death of approximately 500,000 more people than would have been killed, the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping and the expenditure by all the allied powers of \$15,000,000,000 more than would have been necessary if we had entered into the matter wholeheartedly in the first four to six months and had not had a lack of preparedness. That is the substance of his statement. Do you agree with that, from your knowledge of the entire situation?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have prepared a statement on that subject.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would be very glad to have it.

Admiral STRAUSS. I have studied Admiral Sims's statement with respect to tonnage losses in connection with this question, and compared it with the information bulletin he sent out from London in September, 1918. The losses given in the bulletin from May to July 1917, inclusive, total 1,825,670 tons. In the remaining five months of 1917 the losses total 2,004,725 tons. Grand total from the time we might have become active on May 1, 1917, until the end of that year 3,830,393. Of this loss Admiral Sims states in his hearings a million and one-half tons would have been saved by our earlier cooperation. That is 39.2 per cent of all that was sunk.

Now take the next year. Admiral Sims cites the losses in October as being 100,000 tons. As a matter of fact it was 112,427, but he should have excluded October altogether from monthly comparisons since according to agreement the Germans called off all submarine warfare against merchant tonnage on the 11th of that month.

However, the total 1918 loss, according to the bulletin, amounts to 2,625,848, and Admiral Sims gives it as his opinion that we could have saved 1,000,000 of that if we had cooperated sooner. That is 38 per cent of the total for 1918. Now note that after fully entering into the business of protecting shipping, instead of a rise in percentage we are credited with a drop. With all due pride in our very efficient work in the war I would give a lower estimate as our share, since the British, operating in their home waters, actually had 3,000 vessels devoted to this duty as against our 232. Furthermore, Admiral Sims himself gives as our share less than 5 per cent of the total number of all patrol craft operating against enemy submarines in British and eastern Atlantic waters. (See Admiral Sims's memorandum to House Naval Committee, August, 1918.)

I feel that the data I have presented should be substituted for the complex calculation submitted by Admiral Sims, as showing that no action of ours, between our declaration of war and the cessation of hostilities, could have saved anything like two and one-half million tons. As the war progressed many things contributed to the sup-

pression of the submarine—the wholesale use of depth bombs in the spring of 1918, improved listening devices, the northern barrage, experience in fighting them, etc. All of these, as well as our share of the patrol and convoy, were factors.

(On December 2, 1917, Gen. Pershing cabled the War Department as follows:

* * * the minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June (1918) is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service in the rear, * * *

And, further:

A study of American tonnage shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in tonnage allotted to other than Army needs.

He had previously defined shipping for Army needs as including that for transport of steel, coal, and food.

The above excerpts from Admiral Sims's quotations from Gen. Pershing's report are significant. It states, in effect, that we must further disturb the economic condition of the country by diverting tonnage from trade to the pressing military needs, but leaves us to infer that if the troops and equipment are there they can be transported. I have seen no statement anywhere that leads me to doubt that when the troops were ready to go transportation was there to take them. Twenty-four divisions of 20,000 each equals 480,000 men. By the end of June, the date set, we had over a million men in France. This number must have exceeded the highest hopes of the allied military leaders.

In my opinion, as a result of the above figures, the answer is no.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that our Navy had considerable to do with putting down the submarine menace, do you not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Much more than 5 per cent?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I think the true figures lie somewhere between the 5 per cent that Admiral Sims told the House committee about and the 38 or 39 per cent that he accuses us of negligently losing.

The CHAIRMAN. And the sooner we got them over there, the better for checking the submarine menace?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there was any delay in getting them over here, it tended to prolong the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why not.

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not think so, at all. The war was decided really and finally by the victory over the Central Powers on the western front. That is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Now, the submarine was a menace, but it did not contribute anything in the world to change the result of that victory. The greatest successes of the Germans never helped them to be fed better or to get more munitions. It did not do them a bit of good in that respect. The submarines might have defeated us, but they certainly never helped the Germans to win.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not help the Germans to win?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Because the Germans did not win?

Admiral STRAUSS. I know; they took no part in assisting the win. They did not win, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think that the German use of the marine in destroying shipping was not a very important feature of war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I say it might have been very important. If it had finally succeeded I think Admiral Sims said it would have defeated us. But—it is sort of paradoxical there—it did not help them to win.

The CHAIRMAN. Because they did not win. But if it had succeeded, and they had been able to cut off the supply of food of the Allies——

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, it did not succeed.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Would it not have had a material effect in causing the Allies to lose?

Admiral STRAUSS. Let me interrupt you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. When I say it did not help them to win, I say they did not win. Now, I can say the same thing about your hypothetical question about our losing. We did not lose.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not lose; precisely. But was there not a very critical condition over there on account of the submarine?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, I think so; but not so bad as is generally made out. Take the question of food for England. England normally raises about 20 per cent of her food, as I understand it. An extraordinary effort, in this war when the war closed she was raising 80 per cent of her food, and that meant that they could get along on short rations, even without our food, if it meant anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you consider that the German submarine could have effectively blockaded England, and that England could have kept on?

Admiral STRAUSS. How is that?

The CHAIRMAN. You consider that the German submarines could have effectively blockaded England and prevented their getting supplies of food, and that they still could have kept on in the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I will not say that. What I did say was that so far as the food supply of England was concerned, the condition was not as serious as they made out. I believe this, though, that if the submarine had been unchecked, and had sunk all the ocean tonnage, it would have caused the Central Powers to win. But that did not, and the Central Powers did not win.

The CHAIRMAN. Because the submarine was checked?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was checked.

The CHAIRMAN. If it had not been checked, do you think it would have been possible for us to send our armies over?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; we had to check the submarine. We had to check the submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the checking of the submarine was perhaps the principal cause of our getting troops over there and helping to win?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; the Germans had 160 or 170 submarines in existence when our troops were going over there. I think it was 100. Our troops were going over there all the time, and these submarines were flying around.

The CHAIRMAN. But the submarines were checked by the allied and American forces which were used to check them, were they not?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were sinking 250,000 or 260,000 tons per month while our troops were going over.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, compared with 800,000 tons per month before we went in.

Admiral STRAUSS. If they had been sly enough to divert the sinkings from other ships to troop ships, it would have been a very serious blow; but they could not do it. You must reduce the whole thing down to, Did they ever stop our troops from going abroad? They never did. We never lost a man.

The CHAIRMAN. Because they were stopped by the Allies, with our assistance.

Admiral STRAUSS. We had not obliterated the submarines when we started to take troops across. They were there, and in tremendous numbers, sinking ships every day. But they did not sink our troopships.

The CHAIRMAN. By the effective use of convoys and of depth charges and of destroyers and other patrol boats, we prevented them from sinking our troop ships, did we not?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were sinking 250,000 or 260,000 tons per month, anyhow; but they never sunk our troopships.

The CHAIRMAN. That was very much of a reduction, of course, from what they had done before.

Admiral STRAUSS. It does not matter. Two hundred and fifty thousand tons of troopships a month would have been a very serious business for us; but they did not sink them.

The CHAIRMAN. No; we prevented them from sinking our troopships by our effective measures, did we not?

Admiral STRAUSS. But it was not prevented by a delay of a few weeks in getting our patrols started there, was it?

The CHAIRMAN. But if our assistance was of any value, it was of value as soon as we could get it over there.

Admiral STRAUSS. We sent over our first ships June 24. They were in pretty full blast at that date.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly we were not as effective as we were later on?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; that was two months after the war began.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you say that you sent two officers, Lieut. McCrary and Lieut. Babcock, over to study the situation in regard to gunnery on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say that Lieut. Babcock returned to this country because he found that it was too expensive on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. That it was too expensive; that was his principal reason, and he said that he could not get much information anyhow.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was allowed to come home?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; he was allowed. He came home on the *Tennessee*.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that look as though the department was making any very strenuous efforts to find out the situation as to gunnery on the other side, if an officer was allowed to come home simply because it was too expensive for him on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. That was not his only reason. That was principal reason he seemed to dwell on. The other was that he could not get any information.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should be said.

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know what the department did otherwise, and what their other agents were. I presume they had that. I am just giving you an instance of our effort to get this information. What becomes of it afterwards I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any information from Lieut. McCarty?

Admiral STRAUSS. Very little; very little.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the department had a plan of a barrage during the first few weeks of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that it was not approved by the British Admiralty. Would it have been feasible without the consent of the British Admiralty, to lay any barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I hardly think it would have been the proper thing to do. It was a sort of front yard of the British islands, and the operation was near their coast, I think, and it was the waters in which they would operate their fleet. We should have had their consent.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been feasible to lay any barrage without the antenna mines which were later discovered?

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, yes; perfectly feasible. The British ships were in this barrage, and they had no antenna mines, at all. Their mines are not antenna mines.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been feasible for us to have substituted over a sufficient number of the other, the old-fashioned mines, which, as you have already stated required at least three to one of the antenna mines, to have constructed this barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. For a barrage equal to the one we laid, it would have taken about 180,000 mines.

The CHAIRMAN. About 180,000 mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. And we actually sent 80,000.

The CHAIRMAN. And a considerable number of ships, to take them over, would it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, we kept a certain number busy going back and forth. We got 64 cargoes in all, but most of them were repeats—the same ship. We ran a sort of a line of mines from the United States to the coast of Scotland.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think it would have been feasible to have gone ahead with the other barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the department accept the view of the admiralty that with the old mines it was not feasible to go ahead with the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know. I was not here in the department. That is another question that I would suggest that you ask some witness about, who was on duty in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. And after the new mines were recommended, did not Admiral Sims do everything in his power to go ahead with the barrage, as far as you know?

Admiral STRAUSS. As far as my personal contact with Admiral Sims goes, with respect to this barrage, he did everything that

did to further it. I got over there, as I say, on the 21st of March, and Admiral Sims did everything he could to see that the work was

The CHAIRMAN. These two observers that you speak of that were never ordered home, were they not? They came home under orders of the department?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Regardless of the accomplishment of these observers that were sent abroad for the purpose of gaining information, so far as the Navy Department was concerned and your particular branch of the service, you were vigilant in trying to get the information were you not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir. The department readily acceded to request to have these men sent over there.

Senator TRAMMELL. If there was any dereliction or if there was failure, then, it was not of the Ordnance Department, because the Ordnance Department did all it could to try to get the information by sending these men?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not say that anybody made any failure, but it seems that they were not able to get the information.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was due, of course, to the fact that the British Admiralty were not opening up very much, and were not revealing very much of their plans to officers from some neutral country.

Admiral STRAUSS. That was a fact, and I think that, coupled with other condition, was what induced Mr. Babcock to give up.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have been asked a good many hypothetical questions about failure. As a matter of fact, did the United States and the allied powers fail in this last war, so far as ultimate result were concerned? Of course I know that is a silly question, but it is no more silly than it is to keep on talking about——

Admiral STRAUSS. I will answer the question. I do not think it is so much to say that the record of the United States Navy in this war, as it was in the Spanish War, was one of brilliant success.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not hear of any nations or any armies starving to death over there for the want of food, did you?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I guess they were pretty well supplied.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not hear of any thousands or hundreds of thousands of our troops that were ready to be transported but could not get transportation, did you?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have no knowledge of any lack of transportation, but I must say that I am not well informed on the subject. I have read Gen. Hines's book to find out, but it does not tell, really, whether there was lack of transportation or not. It does not make it clear.

Senator TRAMMELL. The facts are, so far as you know, that we cooperated and performed such service as to have the allied powers supplied with the necessary food, both civilians and armies. We also cooperated and carried on our activities to such an extent as to get our own troops there in time for them to win a victory.

Admiral STRAUSS. We certainly did.

Senator TRAMMELL. The submarine menace, severe as it was as annoying as it was, proved a failure so far as giving Germany success, did it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, the United States and allied powers coped with the situation successfully; that is the fact?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. They coped with the submarine menace successfully. That is all I have to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 15, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock, a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale, presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Badger, have you a statement to make in connection with the matters involved in this investigation?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES J. BADGER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

Admiral BADGER. I have a general statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad if you will give it to us.

Admiral BADGER. I presume I am called before this committee to make such statements bearing upon the Navy's participation in the Great War, its preparation and conduct, as my service for the past five and one-half years as a member of the General Board of the Navy and chairman of its executive committee may have qualified me to give.

2. It may be well to say here that the General Board was created in 1900 by the then Secretary of the Navy and has been continued in existence by all succeeding Secretaries to date. The Admiral of the Navy, George Dewey, was president of the board from its creation until his death in January, 1917. The board is composed of officers of rank and experience, all of its ex-officio members, of which there are four, holding high executive positions in the naval organization.

3. The General Board is purely advisory in its functions and has no executive powers whatever. In the performance of its duties it is directly under the Secretary of the Navy and is independent of any other office or any bureau of the Navy Department.

4. Three of the principal duties of the General Board as laid down in the Navy Regulations, read as follows:

1. The General Board shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy as to the distribution of the fleet and of the reinforcements of ships, officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps.

2. It shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign, including cooperation with the Army and the employment of all the elements of naval defense, such as the Naval Militia, Coast Survey, Lighthouse Service, Coast Guard, and merchant vessels, and shall constantly revise these plans in accordance with the latest information received.

- December 31, 1915: Commander cruiser squadron. Recommendations for new force, United States war fleet. (G. B., No. 420.)
- January 12, 1916: Commander cruiser squadron informed General Board's recommendation approved. Signed, Josephus Daniels.
- January 28, 1916: Black war plan. (G. B., No. 425.)
- Withdrawn by General Board.
- March 1, 1916: Necessity for dirigibles. (G. B., No. 449.)
- March 30, 1916: Paper filed. Unsigned.
- April 24, 1916: Duty to be performed by patrol motor boats; machinery characteristics. (G. B., No. 420-14.)
- April 24, 1916: Approved and papers forwarded to steam engineers for action. Signed, Josephus Daniels.
- May 17, 1916: Men necessary to man "C" fleet and its auxiliaries; supply of clothing to be kept on supply ships. (G. B., No. 425.)
- May 18, 1916: Approved and Bureau of Supplies and Account directed to take proper action. Signed, Josephus Daniels.
- May 17, 1916: Mobilization—war in the Atlantic. Proposed plan of anchorage. (G. B., No. 425.)
- May 18, 1916: Approved. C. in C. directed to make such use of plan as expedient. Signed, Josephus Daniels.
- May 24, 1916: Antiaircraft guns. (G. B., No. 430.)
- May 25, 1916: Approved. Referred to Bureau of Ordnance, unsigned.
- June 24, 1916: Development of aeronautics. Military functions and characteristics of aircraft. (G. B., No. 449.)
- No record of action by department.
- September 8, 1916: Principle plans necessary for preparation of fleet for war. (G. B., No. 425.)
- September 28, 1916: Letter sent to Lieut. Allen. No signature.
- October 19, 1916: Asphyxiating shell. (G. B., No. 430.)
- December 11, 1916: Letter included in annual report of Secretary. Signed, V. O. Chase, captain, United States Navy.
- October 27, 1916: Illuminating projectiles. (G. B., No. 420-16.)
- October 30, 1916: Approved and returned to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed, V. O. Chase.
- November 3, 1916: Need for net-planting vessel, mine force. (G. B., No. 420-5.)
- February 14, 1917: Approved. C. in C. Atlantic Fleet and Bureau of Ordnance informed. Signed, V. O. Chase.
- January 26, 1917: Nonrigid dirigibles. (G. B., No. 449.)
- No record of action by department.
- February 1, 1917: Apportionment of merchant vessels to War and Navy Departments for war service. (G. B., No. 442.)
- February 5, 1917: Approved and referred to joint Army and Navy board of survey for merchant vessels for information. Signed, Josephus Daniels.
- February 4, 1917: Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers. (G. B., No. 425.)
- No record of action by department.
- February 10, 1917: Mine force. (G. B., No. 431.)
- February 13, 1917: C. in C. Atlantic Fleet and Bureau of Ordnance informed. Signed V. O. Chase.
- February 14, 1917: Supply of floating mines. (G. B., No. 431.)
- February 16, 1917: Approved and forwarded to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed V. O. Chase.
- February 21, 1917: Additional supply of naval defense mines. (G. B., No. 431.)
- February 23, 1917: Approved and returned to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed V. O. Chase.
- February 24, 1917: Vessels for Coast Artillery Corps in time of war. (G. B., No. 442.)
- February 27, 1917: Referred to joint Army and Navy board. Signed, V. O. Chase.
- March 6, 1917: Discussed movement of fleet in view of international situation. Recommended fleet be recalled by March 15 and assembled in Chesapeake Bay. Verbal discussion by General Board. Record in minutes.
- March 17, 1917: System of patrol and sweeping for protection of shipping off New York. Estimate of situation. (G. B., No. 425.)
- April 16, 1917: Referred to commandant third naval district for information and return. Signed, V. O. Chase.
- March 20, 1917: Protection of American shipping. (G. B., No. 425.)
- No record of action by department.
- March 20, 1917: Safety of lives and property of United States citizens on American ships on the high seas. (G. B., No. 425.)

Secretary and Assistant Secretary present for discussion of two preceding subjects.)
No record of action by department.

March 26, 1917: Construction of submarine chasers. (G. B., No. 420-14.)

March 27, 1917: Approved Signed, V. O. Chase.

Assistant Secretary of Navy present at meeting for discussion of above subject.)

March 29, 1917: Admiral Mayo, commander in chief Atlantic Fleet appeared before

rd.
In minutes of meeting.

March 30, 1917: Batteries for naval auxiliaries. (G. B., No. 420-23.)

No record of action by department.

April 5, 1917: Assistance United States can give Allies upon declaration of war.
(G. B., No. 425.)

June 8, 1917. All recommendations acted upon favorably and measures taken in
ordance therewith so far as practicable. Signed, F. H. Schofield.

April 5, 1917: Proposal to send naval officers to England and France to observe
methods of warfare and secure general information. (G. B., No. 425.)

June 9, 1917: Officers and making investigation. Signed, F. H. Schofield.

April 9, 1917: Bases in the Carribbean for use in war with black. (G. B., No. 408.)

June 28, 1917: Approved. Signed, F. D. Roosevelt, Acting Secretary.

April 18, 1917: Development of mining and obstruction materials. (G. B., No. 431.)

April 25, 1917: Approved. Paper referred to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.
Signed, V. O. Chase.

April 20, 1917: Types of vessels to be built for present and future condition. (G. B.,
No. 420.)

No record of action by department.

April 26, 1917: Methods of detecting presence of enemy submarines. (G. B., No.
420-15.)

April 28, 1917: Letter written to Mr. Lake. Signed V. O. Chase.

April 27, 1917: Proposed type of motor boat for destroying submarines. (G. B.,
No. 420-14.)

April 27, 1917: Referred to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Approved.
Signed, V. O. Chase.

April 28, 1917: Value of City Island, N. Y., for naval purposes. (G. B., No. 414-3.)

No record of action by department.

May 2, 1917: Rear Admiral de Chair, R. N., accompanied by Commodore Gaunt,
R. N., appeared before the board to give views and answer questions relating to patrol
and regulation of shipping around the British Islands and French coasts.

Record in minutes of meeting.

May 3, 1917: Further recommendations as to employment of patrol craft to meet
submarines. (G. B., No. 425.)

No record of action by department.

May 3, 1917: Vice Admiral Chocheprat, French Navy, and the French naval attaché
appeared to discuss matters of cooperation between our Navy and those of the Allies.

Record in minutes of meeting.

May 5, 1917: Patrol vessels for duty in European waters. (G. B., No. 425.)

No record of action by department.

May 12, 1917: Increase and training of mine force. (G. B., No. 431.)

June 21, 1917: Approved. Forwarded to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.
Signed, V. O. Chase.

May 12, 1917: Training of sweeping vessels. (G. B., No. 431.)

June 21, 1917: Approved. Forwarded to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.
Signed V. O. Chase.

May 19, 1917: Naval bases outside continental limits. (G. B., No. 425.)

Discussed in meeting of General Board.

May 19, 1917: Japanese cooperation with the Allies. (G. B., No. 425.)

July 2, 1917: Approved and forwarded to State Department. Signed, F. H.
Schofield.

May 25, 1917: Naval base sites in the Antilles. (G. B., No. 404.)

No record of action by department.

May 26, 1917: Purchase of six additional colliers and one tanker. (G. B., No.
420-5.)

No record of action by department.

May 28, 1917: Methods of combating submarine menace. (G. B., No. 442.)

June 11, 1917: Approved. Referred to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed V. O. Chase.

May 31, 1917: Suggestions for routing supplies for European powers cooperating
with United States. (G. B., No. 425.)

June 4, 1917: Approved. Referred to War College for information, Capt. Maxwell.
Signed V. O. Chase.

- June 6, 1917: Submarine trap nets. (G. B., No. 403.)
- June 26, 1917: Approved. Referred to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Signed, W. V. Pratt.
- June 12, 1917: Location and necessity for training station, Marine Corps base, and base of operations for the fleet in the vicinity of Hampton Roads.
- Discussion in minutes of meeting.
- June 26, 1917: Concentration of marines. Disposition April 30, 1919. (G. B., No. 432.)
- June 28, 1917: Approved. Referred to major general commandant. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
- July 13, 1917: Comment on report, Submarine warfare. Number and military characteristics of a new type of destroyer. (G. B. No. 420-429.)
- July 20, 1920: Letter placed before the Secretary. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
- July 26, 1917: Use of homing pigeons by Navy. (G. B. No. 420-16.)
- No record of action by department.
- August 16, 1917: Increase of personnel. (G. B. No. 421.)
- August 29, 1917: Referred to Bureau Navigation. No action pending decision: manning of merchant marine. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
- August 29, 1917: Naval policy—Building program. (G. B. No. 420-422.)
- Original misplaced in Office of Naval Operations. Copy placed in hands of Secretary by Rear Admiral C. J. Badger. No record of action by department.
- September 17, 1917: Distribution of drifting mines. (G. B. No. 431.)
- September 21, 1917: Approved and forwarded to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
- September 22, 1917: Increase of enlisted personnel. (G. B. 421.)
- No record of action by department.
- October 12, 1917: Submarines in active offensive against submarines. (G. B., No. 420-15.)
- October 13, 1917: Referred to bureaus for compliance. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
- October 20, 1917: Inquiry re mine barrier in North Sea. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
- October 24, 1917: Cable sent. Signed, W. V. Pratt.
- October 22, 1917: Plans for opposing enemy submarine activity in Atlantic trade routes by mine barrage at entrance to North Sea. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
- No record of action by department.
- October 24, 1917: Proposed measures to prevent German submarines from operating against allied commerce in the Atlantic. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
- No record of action by department.
- October 27, 1917: Suggestions for the conduct of the war. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
- November 1, 1917: Approved as recommended. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
- (This includes the consideration by the board of 229 suggestions by various officers bearing upon improving methods and material for prosecuting the war.)
- November 16, 1917: Enemy aliens as menace to utilization of resources. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
- No record of action by department.
- November 27, 1917: Lieut. Commander F. R. E. Davis, Royal Navy Air Service, appeared to give information concerning aeroplanes and aviation in the British Navy. Record in minutes of meeting.
- November 30, 1917: Army and Navy technical members of Aeronautical Commission to Europe submit recommendations re general aeronautical policy of the United States. (G. B., No. 449.)
- January 16, 1918: Approved. Signed, N. E. Irwin.
- December 13, 1917: Treaty concerning prizes captured during present war. In minutes of meeting.
- December 15, 1917: Reply to German Government re reciprocal repatriation of sanitary personnel, etc. (G. B., 438.)
- January 11, 1918: Referred to State Department. Signed, L. McNamee.
- December 15, 1917: Guns for long-range bombardments. (G. B. 430.)
- No record of action by department.
- December 15, 1917: Shore mounting for heavy guns. (G. B., 430.)
- No record of action by department.
- December 19, 1917: Lieut. C. H. Varley, Royal Navy, appeared to discuss characteristics of special type of submarine for use in hunting enemy submarines and the practical operation and methods employed in submarine hunting.
- Record in minutes of meeting.
- December 21, 1917: Naval Constructor S. V. Goodall, Royal Navy, appeared to discuss proposed type of submarine for hunting enemy submarines.
- Record in minutes of meeting.

ber 29, 1917: Senior Member Special Board on Submarine Devices re detection of submarines. (G. B., No. 420-15.)
 rd of action by department.

May 5, 1918: Plan for blockading enemy coast by submarines. Capt. J. K. (G. B., No. 425-5.)

May 19, 1918: Referred to Commander Submarine Force for information. L. McNamee.

May 31, 1918: Naval Constructor S. V. Goodall, Royal Navy, appeared to discuss merits of tripod mast vs. cage mast, from British Admiralty viewpoint. in minutes of meeting.

May 7, 1918: Unity of control in the distribution and transportation of war (G. B., No. 451.)
 rd of action by department.

May 14, 1918: Proposed tactical method for operating against submarines. (G. B., No. 418.)
 rd of action by department.

May 14, 1918: Plan of attack on German bases. Lieut. H. F. D. Davis. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
 rd of action by department.

May 19, 1918: Tentative solution of problem of overseas transportation during war. Admiral H. P. Huse. (G. B., No. 451.)

May 19, 1918: Referred to Council of National Defense. Signed, L. McNamee.

May 21, 1918: Type of vessel most suitable for submarine hunting. (G. B., No. 420-14.)

May 23, 1918: Approved. W. V. Pratt.

May 26, 1918: Control of the air in Dunquerque-Calais region to prevent Dover Strait by enemy submarines. (G. B., No. 425-5.)

May 26, 1918: Approved. Signed, L. McNamee.

May 30, 1918: Present and future building program for submarines. Commander Submarine Force. (G. B., No. 420-15.)

May 30, 1918: Paper filed. No action having been taken. Signed, L. McNamee.

May 31, 1918: One-man semi-submersible boat to fire torpedoes. W. Shearer. (G. B., No. 420-14.)
 rd of action by department.

May 31, 1918: Strategic use of Shearer one-man torpedo boat. (G. B., No. 420-14.)
 rd of action by department.

May 31, 1918: The Dunkirk-Calais aircraft offensive. (G. B., No. 425-5.)

May 31, 1918: Reviewed. Approved in part. Signed, L. McNamee.

May 31, 1918: Small subsurface or submarine boats for offensive warfare in North Atlantic. (G. B., No. 420-15.)
 rd of action by department.

May 31, 1918: The Dunkirk-Calais air offensive against submarines. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
 rd of action by department.

May 31, 1918: Submarine building policy. (G. B., No. 420-15.)
 rd of action by department.

May 31, 1918: Radio control of torpedoes. John Hays Hammond, jr. (G. B., No. 420-14.)

May 31, 1918: Referred to Secretary by Lieut Commander Landoz, 2.30 p. m., May 3, 1918. No rd of action.

May 31, 1918: Mr. Cheradame, author on International politics and strategy, discussed normally political and strategical conditions in the Balkan States and in Hungary and Russia. in minutes of meeting.

May 31, 1918: Capt. C. Gilbert More, Royal Air Service, on staff of Vice Admiral temporarily on duty in the office of aviation, appeared to discuss status of aviation abroad. in minutes of meeting.

May 31, 1918: Lieut. Col. J. C. Port, Royal Air Force, discussed practice of storing aeroplanes on ships of the British Navy. in minutes of meeting.

May 31, 1918: Plan for patrol and protection of Atlantic and Gulf coasts and Caribbean Sea. (G. B., No. 425-5.)
 rd of action by department.

May 31, 1918: Two hundred and fifty feet patrol boat. (G. B., No. 420-14.)

May 31, 1918: Construction of 250-foot boats will not be undertaken. Signed, L. McNamee.

- July 23, 1918: Cork protection, U. S. S. *Chester*. (G. B. 420-11.)
- July 30, 1918: Approved. Action will be taken as recommended. Signed J. T. Tompkins.
- August 1, 1918: Capt. Gilbert More, R. A. F., temporarily attached to aviation section, informally discussed conditions at various seaplane stations noted on his recent tour of inspection.
- In minutes of meeting.
- August 5, 1918: Use of homing pigeons in combatting submarines. (G. B. No. 417.)
- August 9, 1918: Approved. Signed W. Evans.
- August 15, 1918: Lieut. Col. F. Lucas, R. A. F., discussed development of airships abroad.
- Record in minutes of meeting.
- August 17, 1918: Lieut. L. Townsend, jr., U. S. N., accompanied informally by Capt. David Albala, of the Serbian Army, and Capt. Henry M. Sguippa, of the Jugo-Slav Army, discussed Jugo-Slavic political and military situation in the Balkans.
- In minutes of meeting.
- August 21, 1918: Rigid airships. Recommendations of Joint Army and Navy Airship Board. (G. B. No. 449.)
- September 4, 1918: Approved. Bureaus concerned notified. Signed W. V. Pratt.
- August 22, 1918: Plan for patrol and protection of Pacific coast and Pacific Islands of United States. (G. B., 425-5.)
- Secret document. No record of action taken by department.
- September 10, 1918: Building program, 1920. (G. B. No. 420-2.)
- In annual report.
- October 14, 1918: Secretary of Navy present for consultation to hear General Board's explanation of the proposed building program for 1920.
- Record in minutes of meeting.
- November 14, 1918: H. M. S. *Argus*, airplane carrier, development of use of aircraft in connection with United States Atlantic Fleet. (G. B. No. 449.)
- No record of action by department.
- December 2, 1918: Terms and conditions that should be insisted upon by the United States in armistice and peace conferences following present war. (G. B., 435.)
- Secret document. No record of action taken by department.
- December 5, 1918: Capt. J. W. W. Ashworth, R. A. F., discussed latest development of aircraft material and personnel.
- Record in minutes of meeting.

The foregoing list does not include the numerous hearings before the board which were held on all important subjects requiring consultation with experienced officers and other qualified specialists.

These hearings covered every range of naval activity and gave the board and the department the benefit of the experience and advice of officers returning from active duty in the theater of operations, including foreign officers (listed above) and foremost military and civilian experts and scientific men.

6. The gist of the criticism of the operations of the Navy Department and the Navy now under investigation is contained in the charges of unpreparedness to enter the war; absence of war plans or policies at the commencement of the war; vacillating and hand-to-mouth policies and plans after war was declared resulting in extending the duration of the war and thereby enormously increasing the allied war losses in lives, ocean tonnage, and money.

7. To each and all of these I enter emphatic denial. I do not mean to say that we had attained to perfection in the Navy—we never shall; that no errors of judgment or mistakes were made—they will always occur, but I assert that the Navy when it entered the war was, as a whole, well prepared and administered.

8. Despite the adverse criticisms that have recently been widely circulated it may confidently be maintained that the Navy met and efficiently stood the stress of a great war; it aided greatly the allied nations, and if success is any test of a military or any other organization, then the alleged shortcomings of the Navy and its directing

ads can properly and justly be dismissed from serious consideration.

9. The preparation of a Navy for war is not a matter of weeks or months but of years, even of generations. The creation of our modern Navy may be said to have commenced in 1890 with the authorization of the *Oregon* class of battleships and since that time has steadily progressed in power, efficiency, and numbers of ships and personnel until at the commencement of the war in Europe in 1914 there were only two navies superior in power to our own. Then, after our entry into the war, our battleships, destroyers, and other types of ships were called into cooperation with allied ships of similar types they measured up fully to the standards of the best. I do not know that any better example of preparation can be brought forward.

10. After the commencement of war abroad in August, 1914, and until the United States entered it, April 6, 1917, a period of nearly three years, the policy of this country was one of strict neutrality. The people, the Congress, and the administration hoped until the last moment to be able to keep out of the war with honor and every effort was made by the Government to avoid showing bias as between the belligerents as well as any expectation on our part of becoming embroiled. Although there were many, particularly of the Navy, who believed our eventual participation in the war to be inevitable, the Navy Department was handicapped in making preparations which would indicate to belligerent agents, in close watch upon our doings, that we were preparing for war. Only the normal increase in our naval power was, under these conditions, permitted us.

11. Nevertheless, the Navy Department in view of the probability of our finally being drawn into war did make such preparations as could be made without violation of our national policy of strict neutrality. Doubtless in the course of this investigation the committee will be informed of the measures adopted along these lines and of the important, efficient, and far-reaching part they played as the war progressed. It should be particularly noted in this connection that the prewar organization of the Navy Department adjusted itself efficiently to war demands. Without material change it stood the strain of enormous expansion and subsequently of speedy and orderly contraction to normal or nearly normal conditions with the minimum of friction or confusion.

12. It has been testified to before this committee by the officers best qualified to do so that on April 6, 1917, the battle fleet of the United States had never been in such efficient condition for war. In some types, principally of small craft, we were deficient and that mainly because of the rapid development of the submarine after war began and the uses to which it was put had given a new and unexpected turn to warfare on the sea—as unexpected by the nations abroad as by ourselves. The difference between us when we entered the war and the Allies was that they had had three years in which to follow the submarine method of warfare and so far as possible in the time build the necessary craft with which to combat it. This, as I have said before, was denied us by our neutral attitude and effort to avoid giving ground for the belief that we were preparing to take part in the war. I would like to accentuate this for it explains many things.

13. Always bearing in mind the difference in size and power between the British and German Fleets and our own in 1914. I do not hesitate to say that we were as well prepared as to our Navy when we entered the war as were the other belligerents in 1914. For the reasons given above we had to catch up with the development of the previous three years and the strides we made in the year and a half before the armistice in producing the types of craft needed were unsurpassed anywhere.

14. As to policies and plans: The policy of the United States before we entered the war was that of strict neutrality, to keep out of the war if we could with honor. After the war, it was to cooperate with the Allies and to the utmost of our power to aid in the winning of the war. This policy of course obtained for the Navy as well as all other departments of the Government. One of the principal criticisms now before this committee for investigation is that the Navy Department had no plans. This is both unjust and incorrect. We had plans—well-considered ones. The trouble is that the plans and the execution of them did not meet with the approval of the critics. It is a difference of opinion. For many years the General Board, in pursuance of the duties required of it, has had in progress plans of campaign by able and competent officers. It is a process that never ends, for constant revision is needed to keep up with modern developments.

15. Among these plans of campaign is one for war in the Atlantic Ocean. To-day this plan is comprised in 170 typewritten pages. All the fundamental information, strategy, probable fighting areas, logistics, organization of the fleet, bases, administration, etc. possible to obtain is incorporated in this plan and has been for years. It contains a fund of useful and essential information of the greatest value for the study and prosecution of war activities in the Atlantic to which we may be a party.

16. To meet special conditions or variations or after contact with the enemy, plans can not be made beforehand upon which dependence can be placed. War is waged in the field and that is why we have commanders in chief and able staffs to assist them. It is unfortunate but true that the enemy may not play the game as we want him to do. The elements alone may upset the best-laid plans and necessitate sudden change and perhaps complete revision. The stories of practicable plans which cover all the varying vicissitudes of a campaign and lead inevitably to success are fairy tales. Operating plans change from day to day, and while every effort can be and is made to foresee what is likely to happen, a wise commander will always be prepared to make radical changes when occasion demands. He knows what is essential to be done—how and when he does it depends upon circumstances.

17. The Navy Department always had in view the things necessary to be done in case we entered the war. I will read, with your permission, a letter, marked "B" from the general board, dated March 13, 1915, approved and put into effect immediately. It proved of great value in expediting and coordinating the department's preparations for war. As the reports came in, the general board examined them, noted progress made or the reverse, and returned them with comments to the department. I will ask you to let Commander Baum read that letter for me.

The letter in question, which was here read aloud by Commander [redacted], is here printed in full as follows:

G. B. No. 425 (confidential).

MARCH 13, 1915.

Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Preparation necessary to be made by the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department to insure a state of preparedness for war.

Closures: As enumerated in paragraph 2.

The strategic study of war in the Atlantic Ocean, in which the United States is a diligent, shows that the full naval force of the United States, together with the necessary merchant auxiliaries, must be manned, fitted out and mobilized within two weeks after the Government decides that war is imminent and a mobilization of the naval force is necessary. In order to accomplish this it is necessary that all preparations possible be systematically made during time of peace and this state of preparedness be constantly maintained.

2. The administrative section of the plan for war in the Atlantic gives generally the work to be inaugurated now and diligently prosecuted by the bureaus of the Navy Department to insure a state of preparedness, and there are forwarded herewith copies of that part of the plan that concerns the activities of the following offices and bureaus: Office of Solicitor, Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Steam Engineering, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Navigation, and headquarters of Marine Corps.

3. The General Board recommends that each office and bureau be furnished with the part of the plan that pertains to its own duties and directed to comply with the requirements of the plan so far as may be practicable, and especially to be directed to report to the department as soon as practicable, not later than one month from the approval of this letter, and thereafter at the end of each calendar quarter, the progress made in the work of preparation and to comment upon any defects in the plan which makes its execution impracticable or that seem cumbersome.

4. It is recommended that copies of these reports be forwarded by the department to the General Board for the purpose of keeping the war plans up to date.

GEORGE DEWEY.

Admiral BADGER. The effort of the department to obtain a well-balanced fleet has been continuous and consistent, but the great cost of new construction made it difficult to procure the various types of ships in the numbers needed. Compromise had to be made. When battleships, the real backbone of the fighting fleet were added, their cost prevented any considerable expenditure for cruisers or destroyers of other types, but in the annual estimates submitted the principle of an ultimately well-balanced fleet was never lost sight of.

In 1911 battle cruisers and a new type of scout cruiser commenced to be recommended, but it was not until 1915 (for the fiscal year 1917) that any were authorized. In that year, influenced by the war then in progress abroad and in order that a more comprehensive program might be inaugurated in preparation for our possible participation in it, the Secretary of the Navy, on October 7, 1915, addressed a letter to the General Board directing the submission to him of a building program to continue through five years, with an expenditure of about \$100,000,000 a year for new construction during that period. This, so far as I know, was the first suggestion for a continuing program for the increase of our naval power. I here offer this letter, marked "C." [Reading:]

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 7, 1915.

To: General Board.

Subject: Building program for the Navy.

1. The department desires that the General Board submit at the earliest practicable date a building program for the Navy that will continue over a period of five years,

with an expenditure of about \$100,000,000 each year for five years, on new construction only. It is desired that this program be so arranged as to provide the fleet with the necessary fighting units and auxiliaries as will make it as powerful and well balanced as possible at the end of this period.

JOSEPH DANFORTH

On October 12, 1915, the General Board submitted such a program which provided for 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, and a number of fleet auxiliaries, the whole, including an appropriation for aviation and reserve ammunition, totaling \$499,876,000. I offer herewith a letter, marked "D." [Reading:]

G. B. No. 420-2.
Confidential.

OCTOBER 12, 1915

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Building program to be authorized within a period of five years in accordance with:
Reference: Secretary's letter No. Op-9 of October 7, 1915.

In accordance with the directions contained in the above-referenced letter, the General Board has drawn up a program which "will continue over a period of five years, with an expenditure of about \$100,000,000 each year for five years, on construction only"; the program to "be so arranged as to provide the fleet with the necessary fighting units and auxiliaries as will make it as powerful and well balanced as possible at the end of this period."

2. Omitting certain ships now nearing the end of their usefulness, the General Board estimates that at the end of the fiscal year 1921 the effective strength of the present Navy, including all ships now authorized, will be as follows:

TABLE 1.—Ships of the present fleet remaining serviceable in 1922.

| | |
|------------------------------------------------|--|
| Dreadnoughts, first line..... | |
| Predreadnoughts, second line..... | |
| Superannuated predreadnoughts, third line..... | |
| Battle cruisers..... | |
| Scouts..... | |
| Destroyers..... | |
| Fleet submarines..... | |
| Coast submarines..... | |
| Fuel ships, coal..... | |
| Fuel ships, oil..... | |
| Repair ships..... | |
| Supply ships..... | |
| Transports..... | |
| Hospital ship..... | |
| Mine ships..... | |
| Destroyer tenders..... | |
| Fleet submarine tender..... | |
| Ammunition ships..... | |
| Harbor-defense monitors..... | |
| Harbor-defense battleships..... | |
| Gunboats..... | |
| River gunboats..... | |

3. The names of the ships of the Navy classified in accordance with the above are hereto appended, marked "A."

4. The General Board is of the opinion that the \$500,000,000 mentioned in the above reference should be so expended that at the end of the quinquennial period a well-balanced fleet will have been authorized in which the ships of the several types will exist in the proportions suited to the geographic and strategic situation of the United States.

5. To accomplish this end the General Board recommends the authorization within the next five fiscal years, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921 of ships as given in the following table. To this table of ships has been added the sum of \$7,000,000 for aircraft and \$11,000,000 for a reserve of ammunition. The last item is to establish a sufficient reserve for ships now in service or authorized. The necessity for it exists now without any reference to future shipbuilding.

TABLE 2.—Classification of new construction, with estimated cost.

| | |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| dreadnaughts, at \$18,800,000..... | \$188, 000, 000 |
| battle cruisers, at \$17,500,000..... | 105, 000, 000 |
| scouts, at \$5,000,000..... | 50, 000, 000 |
| destroyers, at \$1,360,000..... | 68, 000, 000 |
| fleet submarines, at \$1,500,000..... | 13, 500, 000 |
| coast submarines, \$650,000..... | 37, 700, 000 |
| fuel ships, oil, at \$1,355,000..... | 4, 065, 000 |
| repair ship, at \$2,051,000..... | 2, 051, 000 |
| transport, at \$2,000,000..... | 2, 000, 000 |
| hospital ship, at \$2,450,000..... | 2, 450, 000 |
| destroyer tenders, at \$2,000,000..... | 4, 000, 000 |
| fleet submarine tender, at \$1,510,000..... | 1, 510, 000 |
| ammunition ships, at \$1,500,000..... | 3, 000, 000 |
| river gunboats, at \$300,000..... | 600, 000 |
| Total..... | 481, 876, 000 |
| aircraft service..... | 7, 000, 000 |
| reserve ammunition..... | 11, 000, 000 |
| Grand total..... | 499, 876, 000 |

6. In order to admit of the expenditure of the sum of \$500,000,000 upon the most favorable terms the General Board suggests that the appropriation for "new construction only" should be for \$100,000,000 each year as a continuing appropriation. The General Board further recommends that the appropriation acts should authorize new construction each year during the quinquennial period about in accordance with the following table, but for the first year, 1917, it definitely recommends the items as given.

TABLE 3.—Building program, 1917 to 1922.

| | First year, 1917. | Second year, 1918. | Third year, 1919. | Fourth year, 1920. | Fifth year, 1921. |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| dreadnoughts..... | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| battle cruisers..... | 3 | | 1 | 2 | |
| scouts..... | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | |
| destroyers..... | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 6 |
| fleet submarines..... | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| coast submarines..... | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 |
| fuel ships, oil..... | 1 | | | 2 | |
| repair ship..... | | | | 1 | |
| transports..... | | | | 1 | |
| hospital ship..... | 1 | | | | |
| destroyer tenders..... | 1 | | | 1 | |
| fleet submarine tender..... | | | | 1 | |
| ammunition ships..... | 1 | | | 1 | |
| river gunboats..... | 2 | | | | |
| Aircraft Service..... | \$3, 000, 000 | \$1, 000, 000 | \$1, 000, 000 | \$1, 000, 000 | \$1, 000, 000 |
| reserve ammunition, first year.. | 11, 000 | | | | |

7. The general board believes that this schedule provides the most needed ships at the earliest dates. Under such an arrangement the annual expenditures for new construction only would run in detail approximately as shown in appendix B.

8. The expenditures in appendix B and the unit prices set forth in table 2 are in accordance with estimates made by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy Department, based upon current prices of labor and material. They are subject to change before the expiration of the quinquennial period. The board believes that prices of material are not unlikely to diminish in the future, particularly upon the conclusion of the present European war.

9. With a view of obtaining as large an addition to the Navy as possible from the total appropriation, the above building program should be revised, and if necessary, modified from year to year not only to take advantage of further developments of the present war and its professional lessons, but also to profit by the probable fall in prices.

GEORGE DEWEY.

The development of submarine warfare and the necessity for antisubmarine craft for our Navy after we entered the war as well

as the adoption of a great merchant shipbuilding program to meet the submarine menace, prevented the commencement of the capital ships and many large auxiliaries authorized for the five-year program as planned, but after the war it was again taken up and is now progressing satisfactorily. The whole history of this matter is interesting and shows no lack of effort to prepare the fleet for any eventuality as soon as our change from a neutral to a war policy became possible.

18. On February 4, 1917, the general board forwarded a communication to the department, a plan of procedure to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European powers. I will ask your forbearance while I read it in order to show that the department was neither neglectful nor ignorant of the critical situation, as has been charged. The communication referred to is marked "E" and is as follows [reading]:

G. B. No. 425. Confidential. Serial No. 666.

FEBRUARY 4, 1917

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European powers.

On account of existing conditions, the general board recommends that the following steps be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers:

1. Complete complements and allowances of all kinds, first of the A and B fleet, then of the C fleet, and naval districts.
2. Mobilize the A fleet in the Lower Chesapeake, and increase it immediately to the B fleet. (See Black Plan.)
3. Dock and repair all ships in reserve and ordinary that will be used.
4. Arrange for the supply of fuel to the fleet and stock all fuel depots to capacity.
5. Establish additional recruiting stations and increase personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps to the total number required to supply complements for all the ships built, building, and authorized, and to maintain shore establishments and naval defense districts, including aviation service, with 10 per cent additional for casualties as follows: Enlisted force—Navy, 150,000; Marines, 30,000; officers in the proportion prescribed by law.
6. Mobilize the naval districts, including the coast-guard and lighthouse service, and put patrol vessels, mine sweepers, etc., of the Atlantic coast districts, on their stations; no commercial vessels to be mobilized in the Pacific Coast districts at present.
7. Prepare to the utmost detail for the employment of mines along our coast as may be necessary.
8. Prepare nets and other obstruction for submarines, ready for immediate use at the Chesapeake Capes, Delaware Capes, Entrance to New York Bay, eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, Narragansett Bay, Panama Canal, and Guantanamo. Other places as their need becomes apparent. The General Board considers it of the utmost importance that net protection shall be immediately provided for the fleet during its mobilization in Chesapeake Bay.
9. Establish immediately the guards at all navy yards, magazines, radio stations, powder factories, munitions plants, bases, shipbuilding yards, and naval shore utilities in accordance with the mobilization plans.
10. Reduce the force of marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo to the smallest number that can maintain order there, transferring these men to the United States to perform necessary guard duty at navy yards, magazines, radio stations, shipbuilding plants, and to form cadres for the organization of new regiments as recruits are obtained. Organize the advanced base force and complete its equipment.
11. Leave in the Caribbean a sufficient number of light cruisers to keep a lookout for submarines in those waters and for the protection of our interests there. Protect the canal and Guantanamo as far as possible by the use of mines and where possible by monitors, submarines, and nets.
12. For the present use the greater part of the destroyer flotillas as patrol for submarines in the vicinity of the principal ports of entrances leading to them.
13. Base the submarines at canal, Guantanamo, and points along the coast in accordance with the Black Plan.

14. Rush to completion all naval vessels building or authorized; also build up the Aviation Service as rapidly as possible.
15. Guard all bays and harbors on the coast of Maine to prevent their use as bases of supply. Patrol waters of Haiti, Santo Domingo, Porto Rico, and Danish West Indies, Cuban Coast Guard Service to assist in patrolling all bays and gulfs of the east of Cuba.
16. Prepare to close entrances to all ports at night and discontinue or change such aids to navigation as may be necessary.
17. Organize a comprehensive system of intelligence service covering the whole theater of war in accordance with the plans of the office of Naval Intelligence.
18. Take possession of all interned vessels of war of central powers; also take control of all commercial vessels of central powers now in United States waters.
19. Place under surveillance all citizens of the central powers in the Navy or in government employ in naval establishments and remove them from positions in which they may do possible harm.
20. Arm our merchant ships for purposes of defense.
21. In accordance with Black Plan, carry out the following:
 - (a) Issue proclamation prescribing defensive sea areas and put rules in regard to them in force.
 - (b) Issue proclamation prescribing press regulations and establishing censorship of cable and radio, including naval control of all commercial and private radio stations.
 - (c) Issue President's order in regard to visit and search, capture, etc.
22. And as most important, arrange, as soon as possible, plans of cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies for the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce and for offensive naval operations against the common enemy.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

On March 20, 1917, war being imminent, but we being still neutral, precautionary measures for the protection of American shipping were recommended. It is not long and I think should be read. It is as follows:

G. B. No. 425-A. (Serial No. 689.) Confidential.

MARCH 20, 1917.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Protection of American shipping.

Reference: Secretary of the Navy's confidential letter, March 20, 1917.

Of the measures advocated by the General Board in its letter of February 4, 1917, G. B. No. 425, Serial No. 666, especial attention is invited to the following which bear directly upon the protection of our commerce in transit between the United States and Europe:

- (a) Escort vessels to deep water from our ports and similarly from deep water to our ports.
- (b) Arrange with British and French Governments for the convoy of our merchant ships through the barred zones.
- (c) Merchant ships to proceed on high seas from points of leaving and receiving escorts, depending upon their guns for protection, and upon changes of course to follow alternate routes.
- (d) Arrange with British and French Governments a code of signals to be used in directing merchant ships as to routes to be followed and points of meeting escorts.
- (e) Establish a patrol of the Atlantic coast.
- (f) Recruit up to the limit allowed by law for emergencies in order to provide crews for patrols and auxiliaries, and fill battleship complements which have been depleted to supply gun crews to merchant ships.

2. In order to obtain what the General Board regards as the greatest measure of protection to American lives and American shipping on the high seas the General Board invites attention to its letter March 20, 1917, B. G. No. 425, Serial No. 688, and of its previous letters of—

February 6, 1917, G. B. No. 425-1, Serial No. 553-b;

February 17, 1917, B. G. No. 425-1, Serial No. 672;

March 17, 1917, G. B. No. 425, Serial No. 683, on the same subject.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

On April 5, 1917, the country being then committed to war on the side of the Allies, though the declaration had not yet been made, a

paper on the subject of "Assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war," appended marked "G," was submitted. The recommendations are in effect those of February 4 already read to the committee. I will quote from the letter of April 5, as follows:

The General Board believes that the mission of our Navy when war is declared against Germany will best be determined by arrangement with the allied powers now engaged in war with that country. We should immediately obtain from the allied powers their views as to how we can best be of assistance to them and as far as possible conform our preparations and acts to their present needs, always bearing in mind that should peace be made by the powers now at war, we must also be prepared to meet our enemies single handed. We should not depend upon the defensive but prepare for and conduct a vigorous offensive.

* * * * *

"There is no doubt that, if desired by the Allies, sending immediately a number of destroyers to cooperate with the allied powers in the barred zone would greatly add to the moral effect, at home and abroad, of the participation of the United States in the war. The number of this type which may eventually be sent abroad will depend upon the development of a German offensive on this side of the Atlantic, our immediate needs, and the increase of this type in our Navy."

This letter "G" is in effect the reiteration of the law of February 4, "Preparations for War," from which I have quoted. I wish to say that this letter came back to the General Board with this indorsement on it:

"The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 dated April 5, 1917, have been received and action has been taken, as follows: All recommendations acted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith as far as possible.

"By direction of the Secretary:

"F. H. SCHOFIELD."

That is signed by Capt. Schofield, who was attached to Operations and later in London.

The letter referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:

G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 699). Confidential.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war.

References: (a) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 666), February 4, 1917; steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers; (b) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425-1 (serial No. 553-b), February 6, 1917; Black plan, tactical problem I; (c) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425-1 (serial No. 672), February 17, 1917; solution of problem, Black; (d) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 683), March 17, 1917; estimate of the situation as to system of patrol and sweeping best adapted for protection of shipping off port of New York; (e) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 689), March 20, 1917; protection of American shipping.

The General Board believes that the mission of our Navy when war is declared against Germany will best be determined by arrangement with the Allied Powers now engaged in war with that country. We should immediately obtain from the Allied Powers their views as to how we can best be of assistance to them and as far as possible conform our preparations and acts to their present needs, always bearing in mind that should peace be made by the powers now at war we must also be prepared to meet our enemies single handed. We should not depend upon the defensive but prepare for and conduct a vigorous offensive.

2. This recommendation has already been made by the General Board, reference (a) and (e), and is as follows:

"And as most important, arrange, as soon as possible, plans of cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies for the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce and for offensive naval operations against the common enemy."

The General Board wishes to emphasize strongly the necessity of such preliminary arrangement, in order that economy of effort and concentration of purpose may become effective as early as possible.

3. The General Board suggests that consideration be given to the following measures in anticipation of cooperation with the Allies:

(a) Protect shipping proceeding to and from our ports from submarine or other attack.

(b) Prevent the use of unfrequented bays or harbors on our own coasts in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean from use by submarines as bases.

(c) Take over as far as may be desired and practicable the patrol of trade routes in the western, north, and south Atlantic and eastern Pacific, and prevent the exit of enemy merchant ships now finding asylum in the South American ports.

(d) There is no doubt that, if desired by the Allies, sending immediately a number of destroyers to cooperate with the allied powers in the barred zones would greatly add to the moral effect, at home and abroad, of the participation of the United States in the war. The numbers of this type which may eventually be sent abroad will depend upon the development of a German offensive on this side of the Atlantic, our immediate needs, and the increase of this type in our Navy.

(e) Should United States troops be sent to Europe it will be necessary to escort the transports from shore to shore. At present we are short of transports and convoying vessels, and cooperation in this duty with the Allies would be necessary.

(f) The transportation of supplies for the Entente Allies is of the first importance. Requisition all enemy merchant ships detained in our ports, and seize enemy converted ships interned, repair them and place them in service as transports or supply ships.

(g) Mobilize the shipbuilding industries, both commercial and governmental so that the energies of the Nation be extended in the directions needed to provide vessels to combat submarines, to escort merchant shipping, to replace shipping destroyed, and for other necessary additions to the fleet.

(h) Keep constantly in view the possibility of the United States being in the not distant future compelled to conduct a war single handed against some of the present belligerents and steadily increase the strength of the fighting line, large as well as small vessels, doing this with as little interference with the rapid building of destroyers and other small craft for the Navy and cargo ships for the merchant marine as possible.

(i) Manufacture the number of medium-caliber guns which will be needed for merchant shipping and patrol craft.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 8, 1917.

Subject: 699 assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war.
Memorandum for the General Board.

The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425, dated April 5, 1917, have been received and action has been taken as follows: All recommendations acted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith so far as possible.

By direction of the Secretary.

F. H. SCHOFIELD.

Admiral BADGER. On the same date, April 5, 1917, the General Board, not being aware that Admiral Sims was then en route to London, recommended sending to England and France commissions of United States naval officers to collect information at first hand as to the true situation and further suggested that the British and French Governments be requested to send experienced officers to the United States to give information. The officers recommended as heads of the American commissions were Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers to France, and Rear Admiral W. S. Sims to Great Britain. I offer here the letter marked "H," which is as follows. [Reading:]

G. B. No. 425-A. (Serial No. 700.) Confidential.

APRIL 5, 1917.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Detail of a commission of officers to Great Britain and France.

In view of the existing state of war and the value to us of definite technical information as to methods of naval operations developed by the allied powers in the

present war, the General Board believes that steps should be immediately taken to get all the practical information possible for our guidance in our own operations and in order that we may heartily and efficiently cooperate with the Allies.

2. The General Board therefore recommends that negotiations be immediately entered into with Great Britain and France to send experienced naval officers to the United States to give information, and also obtain permission for two commissions of our own naval officers to visit England and France, respectively, so that they may as rapidly as possible acquire the desired information at first hand.

3. The main points on which information is desired are as follows:

- (a) Methods of placing nets, mines, and obstructions, and their character;
- (b) Methods of mine sweeping and countermining;
- (c) Methods of submarine detection, chasing, capture, and destruction;
- (d) Types of antisubmarine vessels and of aircraft for all naval purposes;
- (e) Methods of patrol, escort, and convoy for the protection of both merchant shipping and naval forces against submarine and mine menace;
- (f) Methods of communication actually employed in antisubmarine warfare;
- (g) Methods and codes to be employed by our forces in cooperating with those of the Allies;
- (h) Best methods and manner of cooperation and nature of service to be rendered by our forces, particularly in escorting merchant shipping.

4. The General Board recommends that the commission be constituted of officers on the active list, as follows:

GREAT BRITAIN.

One rear admiral; five lieutenant commanders or lieutenants; one captain; one naval constructor; two commanders.

FRANCE.

One rear admiral; two lieutenant commanders or lieutenants; one captain; one naval constructor; one commander.

The General Board recommends this number of officers so that the work can be divided up and expedited and believes that if this number of officers is detailed the information desired can be obtained in about two months.

CHAS. J. BADGER

APRIL 5, 1917.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations.

Names suggested for commissions (to be sent abroad to obtain information as to methods of prosecuting naval war abroad. See G. B. Serial No. 700):

FRANCE.

Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers, Capt. H. H. Hough, Commander David F. Sellers, Lieut. H. H. Crosby, Lieut. Wadleigh Capehart, and Naval Constructor H. G. Gilmer

ENGLAND.

Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, Capt. W. V. Pratt, Commander Yates Stirling, Commander F. H. Clark, Lieut. F. A. Daubin, Lieut. G. L. Caskey, Lieut. S. C. Hooper, and Naval Constructor E. S. Land.

(Sent in accordance with your request.)

CHAS. J. BADGER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 9, 1917.

Subject: 700 detail of commission of officers to Great Britain and France.

Memorandum for the general board:

The recommendations contained in the general board's letter, G. B. No. 425-A, dated April 5, 1917, have been ——— this date and action has been taken, as follows: Officers are making investigations.

By direction of the Secretary:

F. H. SCHOFIELD.

At his time (April 5) much information, most of it of an alarming character, as to the chances of success of the allied forces both afloat and ashore, was coming in. On April 11 Vice Admirals Browning

nd Grasset, respectively, commanding the British and French cruiser and patrol squadron in the western Atlantic, with members of their staffs, met in the general board room in conference with the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary, and a considerable number of our leading naval officers, to discuss the war situation and to set forth the ways which in their opinion the United States could best render assistance to the Allies. While a discussion of the general subject was had the British and French admirals were particularly concerned as to the patrol of the east coast of North and South America for which their forces were considered inadequate. My recollection of this conference is that everything asked for was heartily accorded and steps were immediately taken to carry the agreement arrived at into effect.

23. On May 2 Rear Admiral de Chair, Royal Navy, and Com-mo-dore Gaunt, Royal Navy, naval attaché at Washington, appeared before the board to give information and their opinions as to the best methods of cooperation between the Allies and ourselves. Rear Admiral de Chair had been sent specially by the British Admiralty to fully acquaint the Navy Department with the naval situation abroad from the British point of view.

24. On May 3 Vice Admiral Chocheprat, French Navy, and the French naval attaché, appeared to discuss matters of cooperation between our Navy and those of the Allies, principally the French.

25. The naval attachés from all the Allied nations were, after the declaration of war, extremely active and were ready at all times to give information from their respective Governments or to immediately try to obtain any that was desired by our department.

26. Later Vice Admiral Grant, Royal Navy, commander in chief of the British North Atlantic cruiser squadron, brought his flagship to Washington and remained for several months as a liaison officer between the British Admiralty and our Navy Department.

27. From start to finish of the war the Navy Department suffered from no lack of accurate information as to the progress of the war from sources outside of our own information gatherers. (See the general board's summary of the situation May 3, 1917, appended, marked "I.")

The summary above referred to is here printed in the record as follows:

G. B. No. 425. (Serial No. 724.) Confidential.

MAY 3, 1917.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Further recommendations as to the employment of patrol draft to meet sub-marines.

References: general board letter, G. B. No. 425, of April 28, 1917 (serial No. 721).

Subject: Immediate steps to be taken for efficient cooperation against submarines.

Since forwarding the above reference, the general board has obtained from the senior naval members of the British and French commissions now in this country, additional specific information in regard to the submarine situation; the measures which the British and French are now taking; and suggestions as to the measures which the United States may best take to supplement British and French endeavor, which is now a probable maximum.

2. The General Board has also interviewed the officer in charge of naval districts, in order that concrete and specific information might be the basis of the recommendations which the General Board feels called upon to make in the present great emergency, and as supplementary to its discussion of the urgency of the present situation, in reference (a), copy appended.

3. The statements of the senior naval members of the British and French commissions before this board May 2 and 3 may be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) The number of patrol vessels, both British and French, now available or in prospect, is not sufficient to meet the submarine campaign waged by Germany.

(b) The present rate of destruction of food carriers to England and France, unless it can be reduced in the next two months, will result in starving both England and France.

(c) England will be starved out before France.

(d) The need for patrol craft is immediate; the critical period is now; and in the next two months the fate of England may be decided.

(e) Unless armed patrol craft, destroyers, and any surface craft able to keep the sea are dispatched in the next few weeks, they will be too late to prevent disaster to England first, and to France, second.

(f) Fifty armed surface craft dispatched now would be "a real help." Two hundred sent now would do much to prevent the disaster which threatens England especially.

(g) The vessels most desired are destroyers; then sea-keeping craft armed with 5-inch, 4-inch, or 3-inch guns, capable of a sustained cruising speed of 13 knots; then any armed sea-keeping craft to relieve British patrol craft of greater speed. Ocean-going tugs are also most valuable for patrol work and for towing into port damaged vessels.

(h) In regard to other assistance, Great Britain needs now two mine layers capable of 12 knots speed and a large number of Navy defense automatic mines.

(i) The belief was expressed that Germany was building submarines faster than they were being destroyed.

4. The officer in charge of naval districts, who appeared before the General Board, stated that approximately the following numbers of listed vessels could be armed and used for patrol in British and French waters if the Government had and exercised the authority to take them over for naval purposes:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Seagoing tugs, armed with 3 to 5 inch guns..... | |
| Yachts, armed with 3 to 5 inch guns..... | |
| Steam fishing vessels, armed with 3 to 5 inch guns..... | |
| Steam trawlers, armed with 3-inch guns..... | |

Total.....

Approximate number of Government vessels available for patrol in British waters:

Destroyers.....

Naval converted yachts and gunboats.....

Revenue cutters.....

Total.....

Grand total.....

5. The Bureau of Ordnance states that there are in service the following naval guns, thus indicating that there are sufficient guns to arm any patrol vessels that it is practicable to fit out:

| | |
|-------------|-------|
| 3-inch..... | |
| 4-inch..... | |
| 5-inch..... | |
| 6-inch..... | |

Total..... 2,400

6. The General Board is convinced that the emergency exists now; that the element is of overwhelming importance; that every effort should be made, first, to meet or prevent submarine attack, and, second, as of less importance, to supply additional food and munition carriers, and that sending 200 or more patrol craft to England in the next two months will go far toward preventing the collapse of Great Britain.

7. The General Board, in view of the above considerations, and those more fully stated in reference (a), makes the following recommendations and urges with emphasis at its command that action to carry them out be immediate, and that the action be prosecuted uninterruptedly, to the exclusion of other war preparations necessary, having constantly in view the statement of the naval members of British and French commissions that Great Britain's fate may be decided in the next two months by the submarine campaign alone.

- (a) Concentrate department effort upon the passage at once of legislation, if needed, enable the President to take over and utilize the yachts, tugs, and other craft necessary for the above patrol duty.
 - (b) Take over, arm, and fit out such patrol craft, in the least possible time, utilizing the full resources of navy yards and private plants to expedite the work, postponing other work which in any way interferes therewith.
 - (c) Dispatch at once at least 36 destroyers for patrol work in British and French waters, accompanied by repair ships, and provide for the necessary fuel and supply ships at stated intervals.
 - (d) Establish a base at a point on the Irish coast for destroyers, from which they may operate to patrol shipping routes. The senior naval member of the British commission suggests Berehaven, on Bantry Bay, Ireland, as the most suitable location and possessing all the facilities necessary for a base. Also as the patrol craft become available establish a base at Brest.
 - (e) Send in advance 100 enlisted men and necessary officers to Great Britain and the same number to France for instruction in mine sweeping.
 - (f) Manufacture naval mines of the anchored automatic type for use in British waters in the number to be agreed upon with the British naval authorities.
 - (g) Fit out and dispatch two mines layers, 18 knots speed.
8. The General Board wishes to reiterate with the utmost earnestness that it believes disaster to Great Britain can only be prevented by immediate action as recommended above.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

Admiral BADGER. In fact, the department fully understood the situation at all times. The action that it took is now a matter under discussion. Before and after the war commenced the direction of the operations of the fleet was in the hands of some of the ablest officers in the service, who were in a position to obtain and did obtain a broader view and more complete information as to the whole situation (for the Navy Department was not the only one to be considered in the operations of the war) than was possible at any other place than the seat of government. Since that direction and operation resulted in complete success, it seems to me to be a waste of time to discuss at this late date the differences of opinion as to what should or should not have been done in the early days of the war, particularly as from it I can see no possible good to the Navy or to the country.

29. Finally, as to the statement that the failure of the United States to immediately send its full force of destroyers and antisubmarine craft to the war zone prolonged the war four months and occasioned the loss to the Allies of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, 500,000 lives, and \$5,000,000,000. This is a very grave charge, but one that I believe to be utterly unfounded. It is in my opinion based upon an entire misapprehension of the influence of the enemy submarines upon the duration of the war.

30. Looking broadly at the progress and conduct of the Great War, the blockade stands out as one of the most salient and decisive features.

31. From almost the day war was declared by Great Britain an effective sea blockade was instituted and maintained against the Central Powers to the very end. At no time did the development of submarine warfare loosen the grip of this blockade, which worked silently, slowly, and unceasingly to exhaust the material war resources of the enemy.

32. Enemy submarines, it is true, destroyed an enormous amount of ocean tonnage, supplies of all kinds, a considerable number of lives, and placed the Allied cause in great peril, but with all their efforts they failed to break that strangling blockade or do sufficient damage

to extort a favorable peace proposition and so, in the end, failed of their purpose.

33. The submarine operations added nothing to the Central Power material strength. The submarines did not open their ports to food or raw materials or other necessities for the prosecution of successful warfare. Actually the Central Powers were no better off, internally, with submarine operations in full blast than without them. Unless the submarines could so exhaust the Allied resources that men and supplies could not be furnished in sufficient volume to the fighting fronts, they had no decisive effect upon the progress or duration of the war.

34. Laboring under the handicap of our strict neutrality, creation of our new armies was not commenced until after war was declared though doubtless plans had been previously made for hastening a general mobilization when the time should come. Under the best of conditions, it took time to recruit, equip, organize, and give some preliminary training to the men destined for foreign service. It was not until a good many months after the declaration of war that we began to send our troops abroad in great numbers, though Admiral Gleaves escorted the first convoy of regular troops across the ocean in the latter part of June, 1917. By good management—it was not luck—we got a little more than 2,000,000 abroad in the course of a year and a half without loss and despite the submarines.

35. It is important to realize that the number of men we sent abroad in the time was phenomenal, and was not limited by lack of over-seas transportation. In the emergency, transport was found and utilized, and so far as the submarines are concerned, they can not be said to have even checked the ocean transit of our troops. It was the arrival on the continent of fresh troops from America in increasing and seemingly unlimited numbers, that finally broke the morale of the enemy, already near the breaking point from four years of strenuous fighting and the material exhaustion due to the blockade.

36. His submarine campaign failed to relieve the blockade, failed either to check the flow of troops from the United States as soon as made ready to cross the ocean or to stop delivery of the necessary supplies for the use of the armies at the front. It did not, in fact, delay the progress of the war, which, as was already predicted, had to be fought out on the Western front, though it came measurably near doing so.

37. The enemy fought until he was exhausted, materially as well as morally. Nothing that the submarine did contributed toward relieving the exhaustion of materials. They weakened the resources of the Allies, but fortunately not to the point where they could not support their civil populations and provide liberally for their armies in all their needs. The doors were closed to the enemy and nothing could enter. The submarine failed to open those doors even a little way and collapse ensued. I am of the opinion that the absence from the submarine danger zone, for a few weeks or even months, of a comparatively small number of United States destroyers or other anti-submarine craft in the early days of the war had no effect whatever upon its duration.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recall in any of the testimony that has been given before the committee so far, any reflection upon the activities or the efficiency of the General Board. The question is whether

the plans that you did give out—did give to the department—were allowed out. Now, you have given us a number of plans that were made by the board and were submitted to the department prior to the outbreak of hostilities. What action was taken on those plans?

Admiral BADGER. I have reason to believe that in the majority of cases favorable and immediate action was taken. I have read here, for instance, in one of these papers, the indorsement of the department, coming from operations, saying that all of the recommendations that were possible had been carried out. I believe that on the whole the plans were carried out by the executive officers in accordance, as far as possible, with the recommendations of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the General Board is advisory.

Admiral BADGER. Absolutely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And until its recommendations are accepted by the Navy Department, they do not have any effect?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Admiral BADGER. No; there is no executive power in the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. And who accepts them?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. In your appendix marked "A" I think you refer to certain detailed recommendations that were made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I gave in that a list of the advisory papers either sent originally or in answer to requests, or in accordance with its routine duty, to the Secretary, with regard to the preparations for and the conduct of the war. I introduced that paper more for the purpose of showing that there was no lack of effort to keep the department informed, and that the department was informed. What action the department took afterwards depended upon the opinions of the executive authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the custom of the department to notify the General Board when its recommendations were accepted?

Admiral BADGER. Of late years; yes. But during the very busy times that came to the department, of the war, that custom was honored more often in the breach than in the observance. However, we were informed as to how things were going, because the ex officio members of the General Board included the Chief of Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the president of the War College. Admiral Sims was the president of the War College immediately preceding the war, but after the war was declared he was, as you know, abroad, and they appointed no one in his place. From these ex officio members, from direct communication from the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary or the chiefs of bureaus, we knew in a general way, and sometimes particularly, how our recommendations were going, and as a rule they were executed where it was possible to do so, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no knowledge that they were actually accepted by the department, except in cases where you have informed us that a letter came accepting them?

Admiral BADGER. No; I have no official written statements to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. And until they were accepted officially by department, they were not orders of the department. They were simply advisory matters that can be used or not as the department should see fit?

Admiral BADGER. That is true; and these papers have been introduced to show that plans and preparations were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; that the General Board did everything that it could?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say that you have no knowledge of the matters in Appendix A were really accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, I do not say that for all those numerous papers. I say that in a number of cases the——

The CHAIRMAN. But, Admiral, it is very easy to find out whether they were or were not officially accepted.

Admiral BADGER. I think it would be easy to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get the record in each case—any official acceptance that was made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I can make a note of that and do that.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case.

Admiral BADGER. In each case on Appendix A?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and state in each case who signed the acceptance.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. But I want to make it plain that the fact of not having received that official notification of the fact that it had been approved, or what action had been taken at that time, will show that it was not accepted and was not carried out, because we have said everybody was very busy, we were sending officers away from the department, and papers of that kind came in and were acted upon, and they did not go to the trouble of sending back and say, "We approve of that paper," but they took it and acted upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. They may not have sent back the approval, but they would have to approve them in order to make them official, would they not? Otherwise, they were mere advice.

Admiral BADGER. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. Remember I was not in the executive department. I think you could find that out from others, from Capt. Pratt, when he comes up, for instance. I think that the probable method that was adopted was when one of these papers came in, ordinarily they went through the Division of Operations, but if they got to the Secretary I think what he did was to say to the Chief of Operations or to one of the staff, "Take that paper and carry it out"; and that was the way that it was done. We did not hear of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no means of knowing that that was done?

Admiral BADGER. I can not swear that that was done, but that is the way I believe it was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the same way with Appendix B, a letter of the General Board dated March 13, 1915, approved and put into effect immediately. You say that was approved and put into effect immediately. It was approved by the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral BADGER. It was approved probably from the Secretary's office; from Operations, I take it. Capt. Schofield was one of

in the Secretary's office, and I think was principally employed in the planning section, and later was sent over and became one of the officers of the planning section of Admiral Sims's in London.

CHAIRMAN. And with authority to sign the paper?

MR. BADGER. With authority to sign by direction of the

CHAIRMAN. And that was sufficient?

MR. BADGER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. So that everything that was done that way, any-
it was approved officially, made the recommendation one of
s of the department; is that right?

MR. BADGER. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. So that Appendix B, this letter from the General
dated March 13, 1915, was approved?

MR. BADGER. Oh, that was approved and carried into effect.
that, because the results of it came to the General Board
thereafter in the reports.

CHAIRMAN. I see that this letter provides that various bureaus
make monthly reports.

MR. BADGER. No; quarterly reports.

CHAIRMAN. Quarterly reports?

MR. BADGER. But one month after that letter was approved,
one month after.

CHAIRMAN. To the department; and "that copies of these
be forwarded by the department to the General Board for
use of keeping the war plans up to date."

MR. BADGER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. That was done?

MR. BADGER. That was done; and further, as I have stated,
General Board commented upon those reports and pointed out
the progress had not been made, or the reverse, where distinct
had been shown, and sent them back to the Secretary's
that he had a paper that had been critically scanned by the
Board, showing how that particular bureau or office was
lagging.

CHAIRMAN. The general recommendations of this letter were
out?

MR. BADGER. Yes, sir; absolutely.

CHAIRMAN. You know that?

MR. BADGER. I know that.

CHAIRMAN. Appendix E referred to a plan to "meet a pos-
sibility of war with the Central European Powers." This
submitted on February 4, 1917. What was done with that
recommendation of the General Board?

MR. BADGER. As I have said, so far as I know, no official
adoption of that was returned to the General Board; but
discussion, and with the knowledge of what was going on, I
think the majority of these things were carried out.

CHAIRMAN. This had to do with the so-called three-year war
—building program—did it not? It is referred to on the
basis of your testimony.

MR. BADGER. Appendix C was the letter of the Secretary of
War to the General Board suggesting a five-year building
program to cost \$500,000,000. \$100,000,000 annually, for new con-

The CHAIRMAN. And until they were accepted officially by the department, they were not orders of the department. They were simply advisory matters that can be used or not as the department should see fit?

Admiral BADGER. That is true; and these papers have been introduced to show that plans and preparations were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; that the General Board did everything that it could?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say that you have no knowledge that the matters in Appendix A were really accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, I do not say that for all those numerous papers. I say that in a number of cases the——

The CHAIRMAN. But, Admiral, it is very easy to find out whether they were or were not officially accepted.

Admiral BADGER. I think it would be easy to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get the record in each case—any official acceptance that was made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I can make a note of that and do that.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case.

Admiral BADGER. In each case on Appendix A?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and state in each case who signed the acceptance.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. But I want to make it plain that the fact of not having received that official notification of the fact that it had been approved, or what action had been taken at that time, will not show that it was not accepted and was not carried out, because as I have said everybody was very busy, we were sending officers away from the department, and papers of that kind came in and were acted upon, and they did not go to the trouble of sending back to say, "We approve of that paper," but they took it and acted upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. They may not have sent back the approval, but they would have to approve them in order to make them official. Would they not? Otherwise, they were mere advice.

Admiral BADGER. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. Remember I was not in the executive department. I think you could find that out from others, from Capt. Pratt, when he comes up, for instance. I think that the probable method that was adopted was, when one of these papers came in, ordinarily they went through the Division of Operations, but if they got to the Secretary I think what he did was to say to the Chief of Operations or to one of the aids "Take that paper and carry it out"; and that was the way that was done. We did not hear of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no means of knowing that that was done?

Admiral BADGER. I can not swear that that was done, but that is the way I believe it was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the same way with Appendix B, a letter of the General Board dated March 13, 1915, approved and put into effect immediately. You say that was approved and put into effect immediately. It was approved by the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral BADGER. It was approved probably from the Secretary's office; from Operations, I take it. Capt. Schofield was one of the

cers in the Secretary's office, and I think was principally employed in the planning section, and later was sent over and became one of the principal officers of the planning section of Admiral Sims's in London.

The CHAIRMAN. And with authority to sign the paper?

Admiral BADGER. With authority to sign by direction of the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was sufficient?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that everything that was done that way, anything that was approved officially, made the recommendation one of the orders of the department; is that right?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that Appendix B, this letter from the General Board dated March 13, 1915, was approved?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, that was approved and carried into effect. We know that, because the results of it came to the General Board quarterly thereafter in the reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I see that this letter provides that various bureaus shall make monthly reports.

Admiral BADGER. No; quarterly reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Quarterly reports?

Admiral BADGER. But one month after that letter was approved, to start; one month after.

The CHAIRMAN. To the department; and "that copies of these reports be forwarded by the department to the General Board for the purpose of keeping the war plans up to date."

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was done?

Admiral BADGER. That was done; and further, as I have stated, the General Board commented upon those reports and pointed out where the progress had not been made, or the reverse, where distinct progress had been shown, and sent them back to the Secretary's office; so that he had a paper that had been critically scanned by the General Board, showing how that particular bureau or office was progressing.

The CHAIRMAN. The general recommendations of this letter were followed out?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. You know that?

Admiral BADGER. I know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Appendix E referred to a plan to "meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers." This was submitted on February 4, 1917. What was done with that recommendation of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. As I have said, so far as I know, no official acknowledgment of that was returned to the General Board; but from conversation, and with the knowledge of what was going on, I believe that the majority of these things were carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. This had to do with the so-called three-year war program—building program—did it not? It is referred to on the last page of your testimony.

Admiral BADGER. Appendix C was the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the General Board suggesting a five-year building program, to cost \$500,000,000, \$100,000,000 annually, for new con-

doubt that they can give you a perfectly satisfactory answer definite answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the next is a paper on the subject of "acceptance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war." That is "G."

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. That paper bears on it the memorandum which I have already read, from Capt. Schofield, stating that all the recommendations contained in this paper have been accepted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith as far as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You consider that an acceptance?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "As far as possible." How far does that qualify?

Admiral BADGER. For that I must refer you to Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, it might or might not mean that the recommendations were followed?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I suppose that if you take it in that point of view; but I happen to know that in most of these statements it was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it done immediately?

Admiral BADGER. As soon as practicable, I believe; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no knowledge of just when it was done?

Admiral BADGER. No; it would not come to me.

The CHAIRMAN. On May 3 you made a summary of the situation which is in Appendix I.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that officially accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. I never heard from it officially.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the provisions of the act were adopted at once?

Admiral BADGER. No, I do not. But I do know that on all general lines we began dispatching—

The CHAIRMAN. In many respects that report coincides with Admiral Sims's recommendations, does it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, it does. In fact all of these reports.

The CHAIRMAN. That bears out Admiral Sims's contention as to the grave danger of the submarine menace, and the importance of sending our vessels abroad as soon as possible to meet it.

Admiral BADGER. The information was the same from the foreign people on this side as it was from Admiral Sims, in effect. Admiral Sims's opinion was perhaps more voluminous, but the situation was in the possession of the Navy Department with regard, or practically without regard, to what came from abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given any information about Admiral Sims's recommendations, from abroad?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; many if not all of his recommendations, telegrams, and cablegrams, came to the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in making this report Admiral Sims's recommendations were consulted?

Admiral BADGER. That was a part of the information of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that the most authoritative information you had on hand at that time?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly not, but it says here that it was brought to the attention of the department, and you say that it was followed quickly as it was available after we entered the war.

Admiral BADGER. Exactly. Now, with regard to the convoy system, the submarine was a new weapon. It possessed the quality of invisibility. It was believed for more than three years of the war, very nearly three years of the war, that to gather merchant ships into groups would give an opportunity for the submarine to attack them, much greater or more fatal to the shipping than to disperse the ships throughout the zone; and you will find in Admiral Sims testimony as late, I think, as June of 1917, a statement to this effect, that up to the present time the dispersion of merchant shipping throughout the danger zone is considered here the best policy," and it was not until later, until a month or two months after our entry into the war, that a trial convoy was established by the British, and I think it was a South African convoy which they brought up through the Channel, and having succeeded with that, then they proceeded to put a convoy system into effect. What the General Board did was simply to recommend the convoy system three months before the British adopted it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. What date was that?

Admiral BADGER. That was about March 20.

The CHAIRMAN. Three months before it was finally put into operation?

Admiral BADGER. Before it was put into operation abroad. It took the French and the British—the Allies—three years to determine that the convoy system would be a good thing to adopt.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know whether the adoption was made on account of this recommendation of the board?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I have not the slightest idea that it was. They never knew anything about this recommendation. That convoy system was adopted because the other system failed, and they were willing to try anything they could.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know whether the various things commended in this report were adopted on account of the making of this report or whether they were adopted in the ordinary routine process of the war?

Admiral BADGER. No; that information will have to be obtained through the Division of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And you received no official acceptance?

Admiral BADGER. Not in the majority of these cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in regard to the next appendix, the paper on the subject of property of United States citizens on board of American ships on the high seas?

Admiral BADGER. This Appendix F is merely renewing a part of the recommendations of the general letter of February 4, and it recommends for the protection of our commerce in transit between the United States and Europe that arrangements be made to escort vessels to deep water from our ports, outgoing, and similarly from deep water to our ports, incoming.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on this report, if any?

Admiral BADGER. I have only the general knowledge that we did escort our vessels, as soon as it was practicable, to deep water. Again, that is for the executive department to state, and I have no

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in general, you would state that the British officers who were over here and who gave us information about the submarine situation gave practically the same information that Admiral Sims gave?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I should say that.

The CHAIRMAN. And bore out his recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Much if it was prior to Admiral Sims's statement. That is to say, he elaborated very much upon that later.

The CHAIRMAN. So that even prior to Admiral Sims's statement the department was aware of the critical condition on the other side and the General Board, as well?

Admiral BADGER. The department was aware at all times of the real situation. What they did to meet that situation was carried out after a study of the situation and the belief of the people charged with that duty that the steps they were taking were the proper steps to meet that condition abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. What steps did the General Board take after the outbreak of the European war in 1914, and prior to these reports that you have given us, in recommending more preparedness to the United States Navy?

Admiral BADGER. Our recommendations were largely, in those cases, with regard to the building program. You gentlemen know the difficulties of pushing through a considerable building program. The question of money and other questions come in that do not affect the General Board. The recommendations are made rather from the military needs, and that point of view, than from the other points that have to be taken into consideration; the financial needs of the country and other necessities that do not affect us for our recommendations.

Now, up to 1914 we had no knowledge that war was likely to take place in the immediate future. It came as a surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to August, 1914?

Admiral BADGER. Up to August, 1914. It came as a surprise. Of course it was known that conditions were very much strained abroad, but still we hoped that there would not be any war, and it was a surprise when in 1914 war was suddenly precipitated. Suppose I give you a summary here of the recommendations for preparation, going back to 1906.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral BADGER. The General Board recommended two battleships, two scout cruisers, four destroyers, four torpedo boats, and a number of smaller craft that it is not necessary to enumerate—auxiliaries mostly. The department recommended two battleships, two scout cruisers, and four destroyers, and four torpedo boats, practically the same that the General Board had recommended. But Congress authorized one battleship and two destroyers. That is all we got out of that recommendation.

In 1907, for 1909, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 4 submarines. The department substantially repeated that recommendation, 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers, 4 submarines.

Congress gave us 2 battleships, 10 destroyers, and 8 submarines. They cut us a good deal, there—more than half.

1908. for 1910, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 4 submarines.

1909. gave us 2 battleships, 5 destroyers, and 7 submarines.

1910. for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers. Battleships were with an armament of 14-inch guns. Those are the first ships with the 14-inch guns. I am only giving you the main ships here.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. The Navy Department cut us down that year to 2 battleships.

1911. gave us two battleships, six destroyers, and four subma-

For the fiscal year ending 1912, the recommendations being made in 1910, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 16 destroyers. We were going up then and looking forward to the light craft of the fleet—4 scouts, tenders, etc.

1912. got out of that two battleships, eight destroyers, and four submarines, with two gunboats.

For 1913, when things began to look rather serious abroad, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 1 or more cruisers; that is as many as we could get we wanted, of battle cruisers; 16 destroyers, 4 scouts, 5 submarines.

We got one battleship, no battle cruisers, six destroyers, and eight submarines. That was for 1913. That is to say, the recommendation was made in 1911. In all these recommendations they do not commence until two years later. It really is about a year and a half.

THE CHAIRMAN. The recommendation was made in 1911?

Admiral BADGER. The recommendation was made in 1911. The session of Congress is for the fiscal year ending June 30 of the next year.

THE CHAIRMAN. You said it began to look more like war?

Admiral BADGER. It began to look a little bit more like war. In 1911 we had some incidents abroad that came very near precipitating war. It came very close to it.

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Excuse me, Admiral, I just want to get matters straight in the record. Did Congress act on that recommendation in 1911?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As I understand, they acted in 1911?

Admiral BADGER. No; the recommendations were made in 1911 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913. If the board makes a recommendation in September of 1920, now, it is not acted upon until 1921, Congress—say, the spring of 1921.

THE CHAIRMAN. It is acted upon by Congress in 1920 and takes effect in 1921?

Admiral BADGER. It is acted upon probably not until January or February of 1921. The Navy bill does not come up until then.

THE CHAIRMAN. That is, the board's recommendations are not acted upon for a year?

Admiral BADGER. The board's recommendations for this fall—suppose in September or October we make those recommendations, in November. Then Congress takes it up in the year 1921, and the appropria-

tion does not become available until after July 1 of 1921, which is the fiscal year of 1922.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Congress takes it up within a few months after the board makes the recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. And makes the appropriation a year from the following July?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it is nearly a year before Congress can authorize the thing. So that is what this means here, for 1912. Now for 1912 the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 16 destroyers, and 1 destroyer tender, 2 transports, 1 ammunition ship, 6 submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 supply ship, 4 gunboats, 2 seagoing tugs, 1 dry dock, 1 submarine testing dock.

Then the Navy Department approved substantially that recommendation, except that they cut 1 battleship, making the recommendation of the department for 3 battleships.

Congress gave us 1 battleship, 6 destroyers, 4 submarines, 1 supply ship, and 1 transport; so that we did not get any too much that time.

In 1913, for 1915, the board recommended 4 battleships, 16 destroyers, 8 submarines, and a lot of other things; but owing to our lack of success with the battle cruisers, and some difference of opinion as to the advisability of battle cruisers that existed at that time we did not ask for any. We got 3 battleships, 6 destroyers, and 4 submarines.

In 1914, for 1916, the board recommended 4 battleships, 12 destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 16 coast submarines, 4 scouts, 4 gunboats, and some tenders.

We got from Congress 2 battleships, 6 destroyers, 16 submarines, 2 fleet submarines, and 1 fuel-oil ship.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the recommendation made in 1914?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Now, in 1915, the recommendation of the General Board was 4 battle cruisers, 4 dreadnaughts, 6 scouts, 30 coast submarines, 7 fleet submarines, 28 destroyers, 6 gunboats, with a number of auxiliaries. It was in that year that the five-year building program was introduced and started, covering a total expenditure for new construction of \$500,000,000, and the Congress did authorize in 1916 that very large program, which is here: Ten battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, 1 submarine with Neff system of propulsion, 3 fuel ships, 1 repair ship, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 fleet submarine tender, 2 ammunition ships, and 4 gunboats. That was the \$500,000,000 program, and that program was recommended in view of the preparation for war on the sea by the United States; and had we been able to go on and complete it, it should have been completed, under the hastening process of the war, in three years. If the war had continued, we should have had many of the essential ships about a year after it ended; but we could not foresee that it was going to end so soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are recommendations as to the building of boats?

Admiral BADGER. As to the building. And those that I have read you, I have read you the authorization by Congress, those things actually have been or are being done now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Did you make any other recommendations from those for a building program to the department.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. My question was whether you made any recommendations for more preparedness for the United States Navy?

Admiral BADGER. I think that those recommendations are covered in the various papers that were sent in, that of February 4, that of March 20, and that of April 5 being typical of the papers that were sent to the department.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to know was whether you made any recommendations before those to which you have referred; from August, 1914, at the outbreak of the war, to February 4, when I think your first recommendation that I think you have referred to was made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if so, will you please state what recommendations were made by the board toward further preparedness?

Admiral BADGER. I will read the titles of some of these papers, if you care to have me do so. I did not take them all, but these are typical papers. From the 1st of August, 1914, the withdrawal of battleships to the home yards was recommended as a preparatory measure, and on the 9th of September, 1914, the withdrawal of battleships from Mexican and West Indian waters was recommended. On the 23d of September attention was called to the lack of gunboats and small cruisers in the Navy.

On the 15th of October—this is all in 1914—the recommendation was for arming merchant ships.

On the 7th of November, 1914, proposed gun and projectile to be used against aircraft.

November 14, 1914, immediate need of trained personnel.

January 6, 1915, suggested method of attacking submarines.

March 13, 1915, information desired in connection with revision of war plans. Periodical reports on preparedness of bureaus.

April 14, 1915, plan of employment of vessels of cruiser squadron.

April 17, 1915, utilization of Coast Guard by Navy Department.

April 24, 1915, commander cruiser squadron recommends organizing armored cruisers in Atlantic.

And so it goes. I do not know that you can gain much from this. These were constant and continuous recommendations.

On the 1st of March, 1916, there was a paper on the necessity for frigates in case we go to war.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a full list of those. You need not give them now. We will put them in the record.

Admiral BADGER. They are all here in this list, Appendix A.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether those recommendations were in all cases accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. They certainly were accepted; but whether they were carried out, I am not in a position to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they officially accepted?

Admiral BADGER. They were never returned.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but I say were they officially accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I have already covered that point, sir. It was always the custom to acknowledge. It depended somewhat

upon who was in charge of the desk that looked over these things. Sometimes we got a receipt for them, concerning the action taken, and sometimes we did not. I will have that looked up in the General Board, and see if I can find that out, and will send it to you.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will do that, Admiral, and send a list to us, we would like that.

Admiral BADGER. I will send a list. I will send another copy of this with what we can find.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no means of knowing whether recommendations that were not officially accepted, were adopted or not?

Admiral BADGER. I have not, except where it came to my attention in the general course of duties that they were being done. In many cases we did know, and had they been disapproved, the chances were greatly in favor of our knowing it, because we were always on the lookout to see that they received proper consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. In November, 1914, did the General Board make a specific recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy as to numerical increases in the enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. What is the date, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you said just now that in November, 1914 you made a recommendation as to the enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. This whole paper gives the history of the personnel and the recommendations of the board, as to personnel in the same way that the one I have been discussing gave it as to material.

The CHAIRMAN. From what date?

Admiral BADGER. This commences in 1900, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902, and it follows it all the way down to last year. Now, in some years we made no recommendation, but you can see the recommendations here. There has been a steady increase in personnel as the material has increased.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well, as long as you have put in the building program from 1906, to put in also the personnel recommendations from 1906 down to the present time.

Admiral BADGER. In the same way?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; in the record. Put them in the record.

Admiral BADGER. I can put in this paper here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; so that we will begin in 1906 instead of 1900.

Admiral BADGER. I can put both of these papers right in as they stand, if you desire.

The CHAIRMAN. And have both papers begin in 1906.

Admiral BADGER. Then I will have to take them back and furnish them later in that shape.

(The papers referred to are here printed in the record as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL BOARD.
April 2, 1920.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Building programs; recommendations by General Board and Navy Department, and action by Congress.

In compliance with your verbal request of March 27, 1920, the following information, compiled from the files of the General Board, is submitted:

The following table shows the progress of construction resulting from the program for every year between 1906 and 1919:

| Year. | Battleships. | | Armored cruisers. | | Protected cruisers. | | Scout cruisers. | | Destroyers. | | Colliers. | |
|-------|--------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| | Completed. | Authorized. | Completed. | Authorized. | Completed. | Authorized. | Completed. | Authorized. | Completed. | Authorized. | Completed. | Authorized. |
| 1906 | 19 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 22 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| 1907 | 24 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 25 | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| 1908 | 26 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 12 | 3 | 12 | 4 | 28 | 3 | 7 | 2 |
| 1909 | 28 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 15 | 3 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 3 | 10 | 2 |
| 1910 | 30 | 2 | 13 | 1 | 18 | 3 | 20 | 3 | 34 | 3 | 12 | 2 |
| 1911 | 32 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 21 | 3 | 24 | 3 | 37 | 3 | 14 | 2 |
| 1912 | 34 | 2 | 15 | 1 | 24 | 3 | 27 | 3 | 40 | 3 | 16 | 2 |
| 1913 | 36 | 2 | 16 | 1 | 27 | 3 | 30 | 3 | 43 | 3 | 18 | 2 |
| 1914 | 38 | 2 | 17 | 2 | 30 | 4 | 33 | 3 | 46 | 3 | 20 | 2 |
| 1915 | 40 | 2 | 18 | 2 | 33 | 4 | 36 | 3 | 49 | 3 | 22 | 2 |
| 1916 | 42 | | 19 | | 36 | 4 | 39 | 3 | 52 | 3 | 24 | 2 |
| 1917 | 44 | | 20 | | 40 | | 42 | 3 | 55 | 3 | 26 | 2 |
| 1918 | 46 | | 22 | | 44 | | 45 | | 58 | 3 | 28 | |
| 1919 | 48 | | 24 | | 48 | | 48 | | 61 | | 30 | |

1906: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1908.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| battleships. | 2 small gunboats. |
| scout cruisers. | 2 shallow-draft river gunboats. |
| destroyers. | 2 squadron colliers. |
| battleships, motor torpedo boats. | 1 ammunition ship. |
| river gunboat (<i>Helena</i> size). | |

"No submarines are recommended this year pending a determination by the department, under the terms of the last appropriation bill, of the best type for our purposes."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| battleships. | 4 destroyers. |
| scout cruisers. | 4 torpedo boats. |
| gunboat. | 1 ammunition ship. |
| gunboats, light draft. | 2 colliers. |

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|-------------|---------------|
| battleship. | 2 destroyers. |
|-------------|---------------|

1907: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1909.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| battleships. | 1 repair ship. |
| scout cruisers. | 2 fleet colliers. |
| destroyers. | 2 mine-laying ships (conversion and equipment for that purpose of 2 cruisers now on the Navy list). |
| submarines. | |
| battleships, motor torpedo boats. | |
| ammunition ship. | |

That the Navy should be of such strength that there may be one fleet concentrated in the Atlantic and one fleet concentrated in the Pacific, each sufficient to cope with any emergency that may require immediate action in its own sphere.
All obsolete armored vessels should be replaced by new battleships as rapidly as possible.

The ratio of destroyers to battleships as set forth in letter of February 9, 1903, to be changed from one torpedo boat destroyer for each battleship, to four destroyers for each battleship.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| battleships. | 1 ammunition ship. |
| scout cruisers. | 2 mine layers (conversion and equipment for that purpose of two cruisers now on the Navy list). |
| 0 destroyers. | 4 colliers. |
| submarines. | |
| repair ship. | |

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 2 battleships. | 8 submarines. |
| 10 destroyers | 5 colliers. |

1908: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1910.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 4 battleships. | 1 repair ship. |
| 4 scout cruisers. | 1 ammunition ship. |
| 10 destroyers. | 2 mine laying ships (conversion and equipment for that purpose of two cruisers now on the Navy list). |
| 4 submarines. | |
| 3 colliers. | |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 4 battleships. | 3 colliers. |
| 4 scout cruisers. | 4 submarines. |
| 10 destroyers. | 1 repair ship. |
| 2 mine-laying ships (conversion and equipment for that purpose of two cruisers now on the Navy list). | 1 ammunition ship. |

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 2 battleships. | 7 submarines. |
| 5 destroyers. | 1 collier. |

1909: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1911.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 4 battleships (armament 14-inch guns). | 1 repair ship. |
| 4 scout cruisers. | 1 ammunition ship. |
| 10 destroyers. | 1 oil-tank ship. |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|----------------|----------------|
| 2 battleships. | 1 repair ship. |
|----------------|----------------|

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 2 battleships. | 4 submarines. |
| 6 destroyers. | 2 colliers. |

1910: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1912.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 4 battleships. | 4 colliers. |
| 16 destroyers. | 3 gunboats. 1 for service in China |
| 1 repair ship. | 2 tugs. |
| 4 scouts. | 1 mine-laying vessel. |
| 2 tenders for destroyers. | 2 transports. |
| 3 tenders for submarines. | 1 hospital ship. |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|----------------|---------------------|
| 2 battleships. | 1 submarine tender. |
| 2 gunboats. | 2 tugs. |
| 2 submarines. | 1 collier. |

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|----------------|---------------------|
| 2 battleships. | 1 submarine tender. |
| 2 gunboats. | 2 tugs. |
| 8 destroyers. | 2 colliers. |
| 4 submarines. | |

1911: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1913.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 4 battleships. | 2 tenders for submarines. |
| 1 or more battle cruisers. | 4 fuel ships. |
| 16 destroyers. | 1 ammunition ship. |
| 1 repair ship. | 1 mine-laying vessel. |
| 4 scouts. | 2 transports. |
| 2 tenders for destroyers. | 5 submarines. |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|--------------|-------------------|
| battleships. | 2 fuel-oil ships. |
|--------------|-------------------|

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| battleship. | 1 submarine tender. |
| destroyers. | 2 fuel-oil ships. |
| submarines. | 1 river gunboat (appropriated for in 1898 |
| destroyer tender. | to replace the <i>Michigan</i>). |

1912: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|-------------------|---------------------------|
| battleships. | 1 submarine tender. |
| battle cruisers. | 1 supply ship. |
| destroyers. | 2 gunboats. |
| destroyer tender. | 2 sea-going tugs. |
| transports. | 1 dry dock. |
| ammunition ship. | 1 submarine testing dock. |
| submarines. | |

"The General Board recommends the conversion of the *Prometheus* into a repair ship, and if this is approved, one fuel ship should be provided for in the building program to replace the *Prometheus*. The *San Francisco* having demonstrated its efficiency as a mine transport, the General Board recommends that the *Baltimore* be likewise converted into a mine transport."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|-------------------|---------------------------|
| battleships. | 1 submarine testing dock. |
| battle cruisers. | 1 supply ship. |
| gunboats. | 1 repair ship. |
| destroyers. | 2 tugs. |
| submarines. | 2 transports. |
| destroyer tender. | 1 dry dock. |
| submarine tender. | |

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|-------------|----------------|
| battleship. | 1 supply ship. |
| destroyers. | 1 transport. |
| submarines. | |

1913: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1915.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|--------------|---------------------|
| battleships. | 1 supply ship. |
| destroyers. | 1 hospital ship. |
| submarines. | 1 destroyer tender. |
| oilers. | 1 submarine tender. |
| gunboats. | 2 dry docks. |
| transport. | |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 2 battleships. | 3 submarines. |
| 3 destroyers. | |

Authorized by Congress:

| | |
|----------------|---------------|
| 3 battleships. | 8 submarines. |
| 6 destroyers. | |

1914: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1916.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|---------------------|--------------------------|
| battleships. | 1 destroyer tender. |
| 2 destroyers. | 1 submarine tender. |
| fleet submarines. | 1 Navy transport. |
| 6 coast submarines. | 1 hospital ship. |
| scouts. | 1 supply ship. |
| gunboats. | Air Service—\$5,000,000. |
| oil fuel ships. | |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|----------------|--------------------|
| 2 battleships. | 7 submarines. |
| 1 gunboat. | 1 fleet submarine. |
| 3 destroyers. | 1 fuel oil ship. |

Authorized by Congress:

- 2 battleship.
6 destroyers.
16 submarines.
- 2 fleet submarines.
1 fuel oil ship.

1915: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1917.

Recommendation by General Board:

- 4 battle cruisers.
4 dreadnaughts.
6 scouts.
30 coast submarines.
7 fleet submarines.
28 destroyers.
6 gunboats.
1 destroyer tender.
- 2 fleet submarine tenders.
4 fuel oil ships.
1 supply ship.
1 transport.
1 hospital ship.
1 ammunition ship.
1 repair ship.
Air Service—\$5,000,000.

The following five-year building program, 1917 to 1922, was recommended O 12, 1915, to comply with Secretary of Navy letter of October 7, 1915:

| | First year, 1917. | Second year, 1918. | Third year, 1919. | Fourth year, 1920. | 1 year |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| Dreadnoughts..... | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| Battle cruisers..... | 3 | | 1 | 2 | |
| Scouts..... | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | |
| Destroyers..... | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | |
| Fleet submarines..... | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| Coast submarines..... | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | |
| Fuel ships, oil..... | 1 | | | 2 | |
| Repair ship..... | | | | 1 | |
| Transport..... | | | | 1 | |
| Hospital ship..... | 1 | | | | |
| Destroyer tender..... | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Fleet submarine tender..... | | | | 1 | |
| Ammunition ship..... | 1 | | | 1 | |
| River gunboats..... | 2 | | | | |
| Aircraft Service..... | \$3,000,000 | \$1,000,000 | \$1,000,000 | \$1,000,000 | \$1 |
| Reserve ammunition..... | 11,000,000 | | | | |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

- 2 battleships.
2 battle cruisers.
3 scout cruisers.
2 gunboats
- 15 destroyers.
25 submarines.
5 fleet submarines.
1 hospital ship.

Authorized by Congress:

- 10 battleships.
6 battle cruisers.
10 scout cruisers.
50 destroyers.
9 fleet submarines.
58 coast submarines.
1 submarine with Neff system of propul-
sion.
- 3 fuel ships.
1 repair ship.
1 transport.
1 hospital ship.
2 destroyer tenders.
1 fleet submarine tender.
2 ammunition ships.
2 gunboats.

Appropriations for some of the above construction were not made until a late

1916: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1918.

Recommendation by General Board:

“The General Board recommends that the following vessels, whose construct been authorized by act of Congress, be included in the department’s estima new construction in the building program, 1918”:

- 4 battleships.
2 battle cruisers.
4 scouts.
20 destroyers.
9 fleet submarines.
18 coast submarines.
- 1 fuel ship.
1 transport.
1 destroyer tender.
1 fleet submarine tender.
1 gunboat.

The following vessels are also recommended for inclusion in the building program:"

| | |
|----------------|------------------------------------|
| mine sweepers. | Air Service, \$6,000,000. |
| supply ship. | Advanced base material, \$460,000. |
| goings tugs. | Net defenses, \$2,000,000. |

Recommendation by Navy Department:

| | |
|----------------|---------------------------|
| attleships. | 14 submarines. |
| attle cruiser. | 4 fleet submarines. |
| out cruisers. | 1 destroyer tender. |
| estroyers. | 1 fleet submarine tender. |

Authorized by Congress:

act of March 4, 1917, funds were appropriated for the construction of the following
els previously authorized:

| | |
|----------------|---------------------------------|
| attleships. | 1 destroyer tender. |
| attle cruiser. | 1 submarine tender. |
| out cruisers. | 18 coast submarines (800 tons). |
| estroyers. | |

nder naval emergency fund:

wenty coast submarines (800 tons).

ew construction authorized:

| | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| estroyers. | 74 tugs. |
| ubmarines. | 392 submarine chasers. |
| leet mine sweepers. | 112 patrol vessels. |

1917: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1919.

Recommendation by General Board, August 29, 1917;

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| royers, as many as the resources of | 30 fleet submarines. |
| ie country will permit. | 2 dreadnoughts. |
| costs. | Air service, \$45,000,000. |
| attle cruisers. | |

Under the special conditions created by the war, the General Board, for the
lding program of 1919, does not recommend additional fleet auxiliaries, mine
epers, seagoing and patrol craft. Such needs as have not already been provided
under emergency appropriation must be met by taking over from the merchant
ine, as the need arises, vessels of the types required and equipping them for
al uses."

Revised recommendation by General Board June 15, 1918:

The General Board believes its analysis of present and future needs to be sound.
ee needs, expressed in numbers of fighting ships of several types, should form
basis of a continuing naval program to be started as soon as practicable. With-
violating the confidential argument of the General Board's report, these numbers
y be summarized for the purpose of this paper. Comparison of the estimated
ngth of certain navies and attainment of a desirable equality by December 31,
0, require the addition to the United States Navy, over and above the three-
r program authorized by Congress August 29, 1916, of the following vessels:

| | | |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| attleships..... | 10- | 12 |
| attle cruisers..... | 15- | 16 |
| outs and cruisers..... | 30- | 63 |
| stroyers..... | 158- | ¹ 200 |
| omarines..... | ² 91- | 127 |

The General Board fully realized that the shipbiulding facilities of the United
tes taxed to capacity, could not undertake the task set by these numbers; but
ieved that present facilities could be increased so as to provide for immediate
struction of the following, as the building program for 1919:

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| stroyers: As many as the resources of the country will permit. ¹ | |
| outs..... | 15 |
| attle cruisers..... | 5 |
| et submarines..... | ² 30 |
| attleships..... | 2 |

Destroyers: The department has meanwhile assured immediate construction of 150 of the 200 even-
lly needed.
Submarines: The General Board has submitted a supplementary building program largely increased
in these figures by reason of war developments.

"Since no part of this program has been included in the pending naval appropriation bill, the General Board believes that the time has arrived to obtain authority for full numbers of essential battle units, viz: Battleships, battle cruisers, and destroyers, which nearly 10 months ago were reported by the General Board as needed and therefore recommended that Senator Francis' bill receive the approval of the department in principle; that construction of 12 battleships, 16 battle cruisers, and 30 destroyers be authorized now, and be started as soon as practicable, and that the funds determined to be necessary for the first year of construction be appropriated."

Recommendation by Navy Department:
No increase over vessels authorized.

Authorized by Congress:
Available until expended—
Destroyers, \$125,000,000.
Coast submarines, \$32,397,000.

1918: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1920.

Recommendation by General Board:

"The General Board recommends as based on the naval policy, that the department request Congress to authorize the following new construction with the provision that the program shall be completed not later than June 30, 1925, viz:"

| | |
|------------------------------|------------------------|
| 12 battleships. | 12 destroyer tenders. |
| 16 battle cruisers. | 6 submarine tenders. |
| 30 scouts. | 6 airplane carriers. |
| 108 destroyers. | 376 patrol vessels. |
| 21 fleet submarines. | 1,704 large seaplanes. |
| 146 S-type submarines. | 156 dirigibles. |
| 24 antisubmarine submarines. | 544 kite balloons. |
| 42 mine-laying submarines. | 24 rigid airships. |
| 284 mine sweepers. | |

Recommended by Navy Department:
Building program recommended by General Board.

Authorized by Congress:
Continue construction of vessels already authorized.

1919: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1921.

Recommendation by General Board:

| | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2 battleships. | 2 airplane carriers. |
| 1 battle cruiser. | 1 destroyer tender. |
| 10 scout cruisers. | 1 submarine tender. |
| 5 flotilla leaders. | Aircraft construction, including experimental development, \$27,000,000. |
| 6 submarines. | |

CHAS. J. BADGER

G. B. No. 421 (confidential).

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL BOARD,
April 5, 1920

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Increase in personnel; recommendations by general board and Navy Department, and action by Congress.

In compliance with your verbal request of March 27, 1920, the following information compiled from the files of the general board, covering recommendations made by the general board and the Navy Department and the action taken by Congress on increase in personnel of the Navy, is submitted.

1906: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1908.

Recommendation by general board: No recommendation.
Recommendation by Navy Department: Increase of 3,000 men.
Action by Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 38,500 men.

1907: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1909.

Recommendation by general board: No recommendation.
 Recommendation by Navy Department: Increase of 6,000 men. Submits report
 personnel board which recommends that number of officers be based on percentage
 number of men. The numbers in grades to be distributed in certain ratios.
 Action by Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 44,500 men.
 Established Female Nurse Corps. Increased Marine Corps, as follows: 1 major general
 commandant in lieu of brigadier general commandant; 1 colonel; 1 lieutenant colonel;
 majors; 18 captains; 7 first lieutenants; 14 second lieutenants; 1 assistant adjutant
 inspector, rank of lieutenant colonel; 1 assistant quartermaster, rank of lieutenant
 colonel; 1 assistant quartermaster, rank of major; 3 assistant quartermasters, rank of
 captain; 1 assistant paymaster, rank of major; 1 assistant paymaster, rank of captain;
 sergeant majors; 15 quartermaster sergeants; 20 first sergeants; 50 sergeants; 125
 corporals; 10 drummers; 10 trumpeters; 518 privates.

1908: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1910.

Recommendation by General Board: No recommendation.
 Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of recommendation.
 Action by Congress: No increase.

1909: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1911.

Recommendation by General Board: No recommendation.
 Recommendation by Navy Department: Increase of 3,000 men.
 Action by Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 47,500 men.

1910: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1912.

Recommendation by General Board: Recommended increase consistent with in-
 crease in vessels.
 Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of recommendation for increase.
 Action by Congress: No increase.

1911: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1913.

Recommendation by General Board: "The General Board invites the attention
 of the department to the continued needs of the fleet in personnel and in dry docks."
 Recommendation by Navy Department: Recommended personnel bill which was
 introduced in the House of Representatives February 13, 1912, as H. R. 20045. Pro-
 vides for basing the personnel of the Navy in officers and men on tonnage of the Navy;
 10 men for every 1,000 tons and fractions in proportion of the battleships and cruisers
 of the Navy fixed on July 1 of each year. Three line officers for every 1,000 tons
 and fractions in proportion of the battleships and cruisers. The total authorized
 number of commissioned line officers not to be increased more than 10 per cent nor
 decreased more than 5 per cent in any fiscal year. Distribution in grades to be in
 the proportion of 1 flag officer, 4 captains, 5 commanders, 13 lieutenant commanders,
 30 lieutenants, 12 lieutenants (junior grade), 35 ensigns. The bill makes further
 provisions as to the ultimate distribution and of percentages allowed for Staff Corps,
 etc.
 Action of Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 51,500 men.

1912: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914.

Recommendation by General Board: No recommendation.
 Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of recommendations made.
 Action by Congress: No increase.

1913: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1915.

Recommendation by General Board: "In the opinion of the General Board, a naval
 policy in relation to personnel is of even greater importance, as all history teaches us
 that the greatest element of success in all enterprises, and more especially in the enter-
 prises of war, lies in the personnel conducting the enterprise and its morale.
 "The General Board has from its incipency given careful consideration to this
 question, and made recommendations to the department from time to time. These
 recommendations have varied in details at times to meet conditions existing at the

time, but have all been founded on the same fundamental ideas, which are expressed in the citation made in paragraph 11 of this letter from general board letter No. 434 of October 17, 1903. The same idea is expressed in paragraph 4 of General Board letter No. 58 of February 9, 1903, which reads:

"4. The General Board further strongly recommends, as an essential part of an intelligent continued naval policy, that whenever an appropriation is made for an increase in the material of the fleet, the corresponding indispensable increase in personnel of officers and men be simultaneously provided for."

"In the opinion of the General Board, the question of personnel is more urgent now than at any time in the history of the Navy; and the board believes that the adoption and continued advocacy from year to year of a regular policy by the department for expansion and regulation of the personnel, coequal with the expansion of the fleet, will result in eventual success."

"The General Board recommends as a basis for such a policy:

"(a) That the personnel of the Navy, officers and enlisted men, including the active list and an established and trained naval reserve, shall at all times be sufficient to fully man the entire fleet for war."

"(b) That the officers and enlisted men of the Navy on the active list shall bear a definite fixed ratio to the total displacement of the fighting units of the fleet."

"(c) That the officers of the active list of the Navy shall be distributed in the various grades in a ratio that will insure the best efficiency of the fleet, by having in all grades the proper proportion of numbers for the duties of the grade, and so regulated as to bring each officer to the grade with sufficient experience and at the age when best equipped to perform the duties of the grade."

Recommendation by Navy Department: Recommend reestablishment of grade of vice admiral. Recommended increase in number of chaplains by 24. No recommendation for any further recommendation for a definite increase.

Action by Congress: No increase.

1914: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1916.

Recommendation by General Board: That personnel of Marine Corps should be 10 per cent of that of the Navy. Extract from General Board letter to Secretary of Navy, August 7, 1914:

"In view of its study and the conclusions arrived at, the General Board specifically recommends that the department exert all its efforts to obtain legislation embodying the following features:

"(1) The obtaining of sufficient officers on the active list to man the fleet adequately on a peace basis; and this the General Board fixes at a minimum of three line officers per thousand tons, and the corresponding number of staff officers."

"(2) The obtaining of sufficient enlisted men to man the fleet adequately on a peace basis; and this the General Board fixes at a minimum of 70 men per thousand tons, exclusive of apprentices for training and prisoners."

"(3) The reorganization of the commissioned personnel of the Navy, both line and staff, and a redistribution in grades that the numbers in grades may correspond to the duties of the grade, and that officers may remain in the various grades during the period of life when they are best mentally and physically equipped for those duties. This requires legislation providing a total to be fixed in accordance with recommendation (1), and the distribution of this total in a fixed proportion between grades, with a service qualification for eligibility for promotion and a fair method of elimination for preserving the best for the active service as the grades go up and the number of places decrease. The General Board recommends as the right proportion between grades: 1 flag officer to 4 captains, to 6 commanders, to 15 lieutenant commanders, to 67 junior officers in the grades of lieutenant, lieutenant (junior grade), and ensign."

"(4) The establishment of an active reserve list of the Regular Navy for certain specified duties in peace and war, to be composed of officers not promoted to the higher grades on the active list for lack of places in those grades, and who have hence been honorably transferred from the active list in accordance with recommendation (3)."

"(5) The establishment of the grades of admiral and vice admiral in the Navy, and the distribution of the flag officers in the flag grades in the proportion of 1 admiral to 2 vice admirals to 8 rear admirals."

"(6) The further development and increase of the Naval Militia."

"(7) The establishment of a national naval reserve, to be composed of ex-officers who have resigned or been honorably discharged, merchant and yacht captains and officers, ex-enlisted men who have been honorably discharged, and all men in other Government seafaring services and all merchant seamen and yachtmen of good character, who can be induced to join and receive training, to the end of obtaining a reserve

fully manning the fleet on the outbreak of war, and supplying losses caused by casualties in war."

The following is an extract from General Board letter to the Secretary of the Navy, G. B. No. 420-2 of November 17, 1914:

"39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list, and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war.

"40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious importance than that of construction; for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. And the training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel, whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

"41. The strength of fleets is measured too often in the public mind by the number and tonnage of its material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its personnel—with their skill and training—and its material; and of these two elements the more important—the personnel—is too often forgotten and neglected in making provision for our fleet. The General Board can not impress this point too strongly upon the department or recommend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct this, and that legislation be urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a trained reserve, sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call comes.

"42. No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus, every nation with which conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy by order with officers and men trained for the service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such reserves, and an active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of our ships by untrained men recruited after war is imminent or declared. To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary) with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained reserve.

"43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends:

"(a) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

"(b) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (a).

"(c) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve in connection with the naval militia has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

"(d) That the naval militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to reinforce the regular service at need."

Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of any recommendation for increase.

Action by Congress: Established naval reserve act of March 3, 1915. Provided for appointment of pay clerks, increased number of naval constructors, and increased Marine Corps by 20 gunnery sergeants, 20 sergeants, 70 corporals, and decreased the number of privates by 110.

1915: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1917.

Recommendation by General Board: Extract from letter G. B. No. 420-2, July 30, 1915:

"Personnel: 11,000 men. This number will provide for the needs of the preships of the Navy, including those nearing completion, but it must be borne in mind that the personnel, commissioned, warrant and enlisted, will have to be further increased as the new construction progresses. * * *

Extract from G. B. No. 420-2, November 9, 1915, to Secretary of the Navy:

"23. The General Board recommends that legislation be sought for the fiscal year 1917 which will authorize an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of—

"(a) Keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years from date of authorization, half of the cruisers, all gunboats, and all necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet.

"(b) Providing partial complements for all other ships in the Navy that would be placed in active use in time of war.

"(c) Providing the necessary personnel for training and for shore stations.

"ENLISTED MEN.

"Navy:

"24. The partial crews mentioned under (b) should be 50 per cent of the full complement for battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. They should be permanent in order that they may be kept thoroughly trained and the ships maintained as efficient units of the fleet, ready for immediate service in case of emergency, simply filling the complements. For other ships the partial crews should be adequate for their upkeep.

"25. This does not provide sufficient personnel for war. With full war complements for all ships of the Navy ready for service in 1917 and a minimum number required at shore stations 74,700 men will be needed. In addition, upon the outbreak of war the personnel of the Navy must be greatly expanded to provide for aviation, coast defense districts, patrol craft, and other auxiliary duties of every kind as well as for a reserve of men under training to replace casualties. The coast guard, naval militia and naval reserve will be far from sufficient to meet these demands. The Navy is the first line of defense of the country. For peace requirements in the fiscal year 1917 the general board regards as inadequate any smaller force than 67,000 men in the regular Navy.

"Marine Corps:

"26. The Marine Corps should also be increased. There are now new demands from many points to provide guards at magazines, powder factories and other important property. To meet them it has been necessary to interfere seriously with the maintenance of detachments of proper strength on board ship and with the continuance of the training of the advance base force. These new demands would be accentuated if the United States were itself at war. The Navy Department has approved the recommendation of the general board that the strength of the Marine Corps should be 20 per cent of that of the Navy. The general board recommends that the authorized strength of the enlisted men of the Marine Corps for the fiscal year 1917 be 13,400 men.

"Officers:

"27. At the present time, the expansion of the Navy calls for an increase in the number of officers and revision of their distribution in the various grades.

"28. In recommending an increase in the number of officers of the Navy the general board has had in view—

"(a) Adequate complements for all ships included under paragraph 23.

"(b) A sufficient number to fill the necessary stations on shore.

"To accomplish this the general board finds that the total number of commissioned line officers, exclusive of flag officers, should number 2,700 for the fiscal year 1917. The general board recommends that Congress be requested to authorize this number to be reached through the Naval Academy as speedily as possible.

"29. In every grade the numbers in the grade should correspond with the number of positions to be filled, whose responsibilities are in accordance with the rank. A very considerable increase is needed in the number of lieutenants and lieutenant commanders; less proportional increase is needed in the higher grades. As the Navy increases the duties appropriate to each grade will increase in about the same ratio as the whole strength of the Navy.

"30. The various ranks of the Navy are established to correspond broadly to various classes of duty whose importance and responsibilities vary. Increased responsibilities are assigned to increased rank. At present the numbers in all the grades, except those of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade), are fixed by law. The present increase in numbers in the body of officers is entirely in those two grades.

31. The general board invites particular attention to the serious congestion in the grade of lieutenant (junior grade), which demands a remedy at the earliest practicable moment. The present condition is a serious detriment to the efficiency of the service and it is rapidly growing worse.

32. The general board limits the part of its report regarding the numbers in grade to an earnest recommendation that those numbers be established by Congress as a percentage of the entire number of officers. At the present time the grades have a length established by fixed numbers, except as noted in the grades of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade), without reference to the total number of officers. This method has no flexibility; in order to keep the numbers in grades properly proportioned to the needs of the service it is necessary to revise them periodically. This adjustment, while it is made from time to time by Congress, has not been done frequently enough to meet the needs of the service. The establishment of fixed percentages in grades would automatically provide for readjustment, while at the same time Congress would keep the whole matter under its control by establishing the total number of officers instead of the numbers in each of the several grades.

33. The officers of the Marine Corps, line and staff, should number 4 per cent of the total number of enlisted men of that corps. They should be recruited from the graduates of the Naval Academy.

34. The numbers of officers of the Medical and Pay Corps should be increased in accordance with the requirements of the service as stated in paragraph 28; those of the other Staff Corps should be increased in accordance with the requirements of their special duties. Entries to the Pay Corps should be from graduates of the Naval Academy.

35. The laws of promotion should be so adjusted as to provide that officers of the rank of ensign in the line, and those of corresponding rank in the Marine Corps, Pay Corps, and Civil Engineer Corps, shall have promotion to the next higher grade after the same length of service in the lower grade, and the general board so recommends.

36. In concluding its remarks upon personnel the general board invites attention to the fact that the repeal of the feature of the law of 1899 providing for the forced retirement of line officers operates to cause a stagnation in promotion. It recommends that the department seek from Congress remedial measures to insure a proper flow of promotion in line, staff, and Marine Corps, as otherwise the service will suffer grave losses of efficiency."

Extract from third indorsement G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 535), May 17, 1916, as follows:

2. The total number of men for which provision is to be made at present, for war on the Atlantic, is 100,000."

Recommendation by Navy Department: That 3½ per cent, or 2,152 men, in Hospital Corps be allowed as additional to authorized strength of personnel; that 2,000 additional marines be authorized; that authorized enlisted strength of Navy be increased 10,000; that 30 civilian engineers be appointed each year to a total of 300; and that civilian radiators be appointed, not to exceed 40 a year.

Action by Congress: Authorized increase to the number of 68,700 enlisted men, 1,000 apprentice seamen, 2,929 Hospital Corps, 350 enlisted men Flying Corps, 84 chaplains, 84 Dental Corps officers, 1,762 midshipmen, 150 Flying Corps officers, and 1,981 marines (enlisted men, including 67 men in Marine Band).

Commissioned officers of line on active list, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, to be 4 per cent of total authorized enlisted strength of the active list, exclusive of Hospital Corps, prisoners undergoing sentences of discharge, enlisted men detailed for duty with Naval Militia and Flying Corps.

Commissioned officers of staff corps on the active list, exclusive of chief warrant officers, to be based on percentages of the total number of commissioned officers of the active list of the line of the Navy as follows: Pay Corps, 12 per cent; Construction Corps, 5 per cent; Civil Engineer Corps, 2 per cent.

Commissioned officers of Medical Corps to be 0.65 per cent of the total authorized number of officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps including midshipmen, Hospital Corps, prisoners undergoing sentence of discharge, enlisted men detailed for duty with Naval Militia and the Flying Corps.

Authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to appoint annually in the line of the Navy for a period of 10 years, 30 acting ensigns for the performance of engineering duties only. Number of surgeons increased by one for duty with the Red Cross. Established Naval Reserve Force on definite basis.

1916: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1918.

Recommendation by general board: Enlisted force Navy to 150,000, marines to 10,000, and officers in the proportions prescribed by law.

Recommendation by Navy Department: Recommended temporary increase 150,000 men.

Action by Congress: Act of May 22, 1917, authorized temporary increase to 150,000 men. Marines increased temporarily to 30,000.

1917: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1919.

Recommendation of general board (G. B. 421, ser. 765, Aug. 16, 1917):

"In accordance with the reference the general board has habitually included recommendations for the personnel in the annual building program. There is now in preparation the program for the fiscal year 1919. In advance of its completion the board has deemed it urgent to represent to the department certain conditions affecting the authorized strength of the personnel—conditions which have developed on account of the war and since the board's last annual program was submitted.

"2. Although in some respects the ultimate needs of the Navy in personnel cannot be foreseen, being dependent upon the duration of the war, immediate needs are apparent. Enlisted men must now be available for: (a) Fighting fleet; (b) maintenance of shore establishments; (c) coast defense ships; (d) new destroyers, yachts, and other submarine chasers; (e) transports, and impressed German ships; (f) fleet aviation service; (g) armed guards already on merchantmen; (h) an addition of 5 per cent for sick; (i) an addition of 10 per cent for casualties.

"3. According to the opinion of the Chief of Bureau of Navigation, as expressed to the general board, the total of present requirements (a) to (i) of paragraph 2 already equals and probably exceeds the total present authorized strength of the Navy regular enlisted men.

"4. The personnel of the fighting fleet must be left intact as far as possible so that the vessels composing it may be ready at all times for any emergency.

"5. Naval Reserves will yield, without additional legislation, the number required for further increase of naval duties. They should be enrolled in numbers as required together with an excess of several thousand for training and contingencies.

"6. The next large increase of naval duties will come about immediately upon recognition of the necessity of manning all merchant vessels by men of the Navy. This is a war measure and follows directly the development of the present war.

"7. Recognition of this necessity is demanded for the following reasons: First, definition of the status, now uncertain, of the crews and armed guards of merchant vessels; assuring them rights of belligerents; second, suppression of strikes, and enforcement of discipline; third, increased safety of ship and cargo, insuring through central authority strict obedience as to routing, zigzagging, speeding in the submarine zone and to other affecting lights and lookouts; fourth, increased speed of loading, of discharge, and of voyages; fifth, decreased cost of wages; sixth, increased intelligence of crews; seventh, American citizenship of enlisted men.

"8. All American merchant vessels now engaged in overseas trade should be manned by naval crews, as soon as practicable. The general board is informed that a large number of Naval Reserves is now available toward this purpose.

"9. All American merchant vessels building, including those under the Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation, should be commissioned as fast as completed with naval crews.

"10. The General Board recommends, therefore, that the Bureau of Navigation be directed to proceed in the enrollment of Naval Reserves to accomplish the objects stated."

In G. B. letter No. 420-2, August 29, 1917, G. B. 421, Serial No. 765, August 16, 1917, is again quoted with the following additional recommendation as to personnel:

"At the present the general board emphasizes its recommendations as stated above to meet the requirements as given above by an immediate increase in the Naval Reserves.

"25. In its annual report for 1916, G. B. No. 420-2, August 16, 1916, the general board recommended 'that the enlisted force of the Marine Corps be maintained at 20 per cent of the total authorized enlisted personnel of the Navy, exclusive of the Hospital Corps.' The act of Congress of May 22, 1917, increasing the strength of the Navy to 150,000, authorized an increase of the Marine Corps to 30,000, thus maintaining the above percentage, as between the regular enlisted forces of the Navy and Marine Corps.

"26. The general board calls attention to the fact that there is now no provision in law to provide automatically or otherwise for an adequate number of senior officers above the grade of lieutenant in the Navy or major in the Marine Corps to properly care for and supervise in war the increased material and enlisted personnel already provided for by legislative enactment.

“27. Since the last annual report of the general board the authorized enlisted force of the Regular Navy has been increased by law to 150,000 men, which, together with seamen apprentices and the Hospital Corps brings the authorized strength of the Regular Navy to about 163,000 enlisted men.

“28. To organize this force so that the greatest efficiency may be obtained there should be created a sufficient body of officers, distributed among the various grades in such manner and in such numbers as will provide responsible officers of commensurate rank and experience to perform all the duties which will devolve upon the Navy during the war.

“29. Excluding the apprentice seamen and Hospital Corps and considering only the 150,000 enlisted men now authorized by law, it is to be noted that the Congress already has enacted, after exhaustive investigation and hearings, a law which provides that the total number of commissioned line officers shall be 4 per cent of the authorized enlisted force and that this total shall be apportioned to the various grades of the Navy in certain specified percentages.

“30. Following the principles recognized in this act, 6,000 line officers should be provided for 150,000 enlisted men.

“31. There are now 2,390 regularly commissioned line officers in the Navy and 325 holding temporary commissions, a total of 2,715, leaving a shortage of 3,285, which must be provided to make the Regular Navy thoroughly efficient—to properly organize it, in fact.

“32. While recognizing the difficulty of obtaining this number of additional officers and after consultation with officers representing the Bureau of Navigation, the General Board believes it can be done if immediate steps are taken to that end. The sources of supply, besides the Naval Academy, are, in order of importance, the warrant officers and enlisted men of the Navy itself, the Coast Guard, the Naval Militia, National Naval Volunteers, the Naval Reserve, and others not belonging to any of these organizations who can demonstrate their fitness for positions in the Navy.

“33. The General Board recommends that the provisions of the act of August 29, 1916, apportioning the officers in the different commissioned grades of the Navy upon the basis of 87,000 men be extended to apply to the 150,000 men authorized in the act of May 22, 1917, and to any further increase of enlisted men which may be authorized.

“34. The General Board further recommends that the upper grades of the line of the Navy be filled at once up to the authorized numbers based upon a strength of 87,000, by the promotion of officers now in the regular service and the issuance of sufficient temporary commissions in the lower grades to make up the total number. When the total numbers of officers for the 87,000 men have been obtained by permanent and temporary commissions as authorized for this enlisted strength, every effort should be made at once to procure the additional number of temporary officers authorized for an enlisted strength of 150,000 men, the corresponding temporary increases in all higher grades being filled by temporary promotions for the period of the war in the proportions specified in the act of August 29, 1916, of line officers now in the regular Navy, the original temporary appointments being made by selection from the sources enumerated in paragraph 32 after such examinations as to fitness as the department may prescribe.

“35. Because the time required to train officers for the more onerous duties and added responsibilities of the higher grades, it is the opinion of the General Board that training in the advanced grades should be started now, not wait until the emergencies of the war have actually to be met with a greatly expanded untrained personnel, when the time for necessary preparation and preliminary training will not be available. Additional senior officers are imperatively demanded to officer not only the battleship forces, but also to organize, supervise, and direct the operations of convoys, supply and transportation trains, and the numerous squadrons and divisions of smaller vessels, cruisers, destroyers, and patrol craft which must be organized and put into service. Reliefs for senior officers must also be provided to fill vacancies caused by sickness and war casualties.

“Staff Corps:

“36. What holds in regard to the expansion of the commissioned officers of the line of the Navy holds similarly for the Staff Corps, and the General Board recommends that steps be taken at once to provide additional permanent and temporary officers for these corps, in accordance with the percentages prescribed in the act of August 29, 1916.

“Marine Corps:

“37. The act of Congress of August 29, 1916, provided for officers for the Marine Corps in proportion to the number of enlisted men, these officers to be apportioned to the different grades in a certain fixed proportion. The act of Congress approved May 22, 1917, authorized a temporary increase of the Marine Corps from 17,400 to 30,000, and

provided for an increase of officers therefor by temporary commissions in the proportions already fixed by law, but limited these temporary commissions to the rank of major and below.

"38. The General Board believes that the number of officers in proportion to the number of enlisted men and the proportions in the different grades as fixed by the law of August 29, 1916, are required to properly officer the Marine Corps as a military organization, and recommends that the officers required for the temporary increase authorized in all grades by temporary commission for the duration of the war according to that proportion.

"Naval Reserves:

"39. The present necessity for the expansion of the Naval Reserves has been discussed in paragraph 24 of this paper. The recruitment and training of officers of the Naval Reserves, in total numbers and percentages in grades, similarly to those provided for the Regular Navy should be immediately taken up."

General Board letter to the Secretary of the Navy (G. B., No. 421; serial No. 77) September 22, 1917:

"Paragraph 2 of the General Board's letter No. 421, of August 16, 1917, states:

" 'Although in some respects the ultimate needs of the Navy in personnel cannot be foreseen, being dependent upon the duration of the war, immediate needs are apparent. Enlisted men must now be available for:

- " '(a) Fighting fleet.
- " '(b) Maintenance of shore establishments.
- " '(c) Coast defense ships.
- " '(d) New destroyers, yachts, and other submarine chasers.
- " '(e) Transports and impressed German ships.
- " '(f) Foreign aviation service.
- " '(g) Armed guards already on merchantmen.
- " '(h) An addition of 3 per cent for sick.
- " '(i) An addition of 10 per cent for casualties.'

"2. In its No. 1159-1094 of August 29, 1917, to the department (copy furnished to the General Board), the Bureau of Navigation made an estimate of the enlisted personnel required for the Regular Navy by March 1, 1919. Over and above 162,490, the present authorized strength, the Bureau of Navigation estimates that an increase of 48,848 is required.

"3. The General Board accepts these figures as a conservative estimate. Anticipating the need of sufficient time for recruiting and training, it is recommended that the department include in its estimates for the coming fiscal year legislative provision for the increase stated by the Bureau of Navigation as required by March 1, 1919."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

To increase the number of midshipmen authorized to 3,128.

To temporarily increase the enlisted strength of the Navy to 180,000 plus 14,000 in trade schools, plus 10,000 for aviation, plus 24,000 for apprentice seamen; total: 228,000.

Recommends an increase of 50,000 men in the permanent strength of the Navy. Recommended temporary increase of Marine Corps to 75,000.

Action by Congress:

Sixty-fifth Congress, second session, act of July 1, 1918:

Permanent enlisted strength, 131,485; apprentice seamen, 6,000; Flying Corps, 35,000; total, 137,835.

Temporary enlisted strength, 181,485; apprentice seamen, 24,000; Flying Corps, 10,000; trade schools, 14,000; total, 229,485.

Marine Corps to temporary strength of 75,500 and to enroll reserves without limit.

1918: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1920.

Recommendation by General Board:

Extract from G. B. No. 421 (serial No. 915), June 7, 1919, as follows:

"The General Board does not at this time recommend a final settlement of the permanent enlisted force, which must depend upon necessities of the Navy after the demobilization of the temporary force now contemplated has been completed.

"The General Board recommends that the permanent force shall remain as at present, 137,485, not including the medical complement provided by law, and that until July 1, 1920, the personnel of the Navy remain as follows:

| | Perma- nent. | Tempo- rary. | Total. |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------|
| Until Oct. 1, 1919..... | 137,485 | 112,515 | 250,000 |
| Oct. 1, 1919, to Jan. 1, 1920..... | 137,485 | 87,515 | 225,000 |
| Jan. 1 to June 30, 1920..... | 137,485 | 62,515 | 200,000 |

"The General Board wishes to add that it considers the present personnel situation of the Navy as most serious and that any reduction below that recommended above could not be made for the present, having in view not only the efficient operation of the Navy as now constituted but also the gravely unsettled international situation."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

To authorize the temporary strength of the Navy at 25,000 men until June 30, 1920.

To authorize the permanent enlisted strength of the Marine Corps to be 26,297 men.

Action by Congress:

Act of July 1, 1918, temporary strength of the Navy to be:

July 1, 1919, to September 30, 1919, 241,000; October 1, 1919, to December 31, 1919, 191,000; January 1, 1920, to June 30, 1920, 170,000.

The above figures include the Hospital Corps, apprentice seamen, Flying Corps, etc. The President is authorized to increase the authorized enlisted strength to 191,000 men.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you specifically about the recommendations in 1914. You do recall a specific recommendation as to numerical increase in the enlisted personnel that was made at that time?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In the report of the board?

Admiral BADGER. I do not find that in that recommendation there was a specific program in 1914 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916. There is quite a lot of material here that I can read, but it hardly bears on the subject of your question. But I can read this. This is an extract from the General Board's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 420-2, of November 17, 1914. [Reading:]

39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war.

40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction; for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. And the training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel, whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

Then further they say:

43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends:

(a) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers, and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

(b) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (a).

(c) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve in connection with the naval militia has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

(d) That the naval militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to reinforce the regular service at need.

Now, the action by Congress on that was that it established a Naval Reserve by the act of March 3, 1915, increased the Marine Corps by a small amount of noncommissioned officers and 110

privates, and increased the number of pay clerks and naval constructors. But the naval reserve act of 1915 was intended to meet the requirements of these recommendations, to give a reserve which would, in connection with the regular men of the Navy, serve in time of emergency to man all of the vessels of the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the General Board at that time?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That report that you have read was the report that was finally submitted to the Secretary of the Navy. Was that the first report that was submitted to the Secretary of the Navy on this matter?

Admiral BADGER. No; it is not. There was a report——

The CHAIRMAN. For numerical increase, was there not?

Admiral BADGER. There was a report prepared in which it was recommended that there be a numerical increase of 19,600 enlisted men, and as I remember it, 1,070 commissioned officers of the line.

The CHAIRMAN. And the report with the numerical increase in it was not published, was it?

Admiral BADGER. It was never sent in. The Secretary of the Navy, for what reasons I do not know, objected to publishing any report giving concrete numbers. He came and attended a meeting of the board, and this report of the personnel, which was then a very live question indeed, was read to him. My recollection is that he said——

The CHAIRMAN. That had the provision for 19,600 enlisted men in it?

Admiral BADGER. In it; yes, sir. Whether that was a special letter or whether it was embodied in the report itself, I am not sure, but I rather think it was a special letter. However, substantially it recommended the 19,600 men and——

The CHAIRMAN. And that was cut out?

Admiral BADGER. It was changed. The principle was maintained but those figures were cut out. I will try to give it to you exactly as I recall it, now.

The Secretary said that he had no objections whatever to the 19,000 appearing in the report, but that he did not feel under the conditions and circumstances he could publish the report of the General Board with that in it. The report of the General Board never had been published in full before the present Secretary of the Navy came in, and Admiral Dewey, who was always most anxious to increase the influence of the General Board and the knowledge of people as to its workings, was anxious that that particular report should be published, and he suggested, and talked over with the General Board, the idea of putting in it the same principle exactly, and leaving out those particular numbers, and that was done. There was no pressure whatever from the Secretary of the Navy beyond the fact that he would not publish the report with those numbers in, and he gave no reasons for his action.

Now, as I remember, the 19,600 men were the number that we believed were required to do what I have already read to you, that legislation be asked for providing for active personnel, officers, and enlisted force capable of keeping in full commission the battleships under 15 years of age, etc. That has been already read.

It was our idea, as I remember it, that the 19,600 men were needed to do that, and by leaving out the 19,600, we still maintained the principle, and the report would be published; and that is all that I remember about it.

The CHAIRMAN. And was Congress informed of the recommendation of the board for the 19,600 additional men?

Admiral BADGER. No; I think not; not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were not provided for?

Admiral BADGER. My recollection—and I think it is correct—is that following this recommendation of the board for the keeping in commission—having men to keep in full commission—various ships enumerated, the Bureau of Navigation, which has charge of the manning of ships and the personnel of the Navy, made a report which was published—I read it—in which it stated that there were men enough in the Navy to do all these things and to have something over; I think something like 500 or 600 men more in the Navy at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. The General Board was familiar with that when made these general recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. The General Board believed that they needed that number of men, 19,600 men.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to what it had?

Admiral BADGER. To meet the requirements. That was the General Board's recommendation.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Secretary had that?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary of the Navy, without either approving or disapproving, except in so far as he stated that he would not publish the report if those figures were left in. They were left out, and it was attempted to provide for it.

The CHAIRMAN. But the action of the Secretary in not putting it up to Congress and not asking that increase, would indicate that he was not in favor of the 19,600 increase, would it not?

Admiral BADGER. Well, of course, the Secretary of the Navy has to do as he thinks best in these matters. I do not know what actuated him. That 19,600 never reached him afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. But it did reach him in the first letter sent him by the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. No, he came over to the General Board, and it was read to him, and there he expressed his disapproval, and it was changed there.

The CHAIRMAN. I will read you Capt. Taussig's statement about that matter.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. [Reading:]

The General Board of the Navy, in its 1914 annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, recognized that the unsatisfactory personnel conditions greatly impaired the efficiency of the fleet, and made recommendation to the department that an additional 19,600 enlisted men be immediately requested. The Secretary of the Navy did not accept the report of the board with this recommendation, but returned the report to the board with the request that all mention of a numerical increase be eliminated. This the board did in order that the other important features of the report be not lost to the public.

Admiral BADGER. The report never left the board containing that 19,600. It never left the board at all, and never was returned.

The CHAIRMAN. But whether it went to him officially or not, went to him?

Admiral BADGER. He knew it, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After the Secretary declined to accept the report of the General Board for the numerical increase of 19,600 men, did the board, before sending the deleted report back to the Secretary, send to the Secretary a letter in regard to the needs of the personnel, giving more details than those contained in the printed report? That report was the letter to which you have referred.

Admiral BADGER. No, that letter was never sent—no letter of that kind was sent to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not this letter read to the Secretary at a meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. It was, yes. That is what I have stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any action taken by the Secretary on the letter, or was it simply filed?

Admiral BADGER. Filed.

The CHAIRMAN. With the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Filed with the General Board, to be produced whenever, in case——

The CHAIRMAN. Does the General Board keep minutes of its proceedings?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the fact that this letter was read to the Secretary in such a meeting of the General Board reported in its minutes?

Admiral BADGER. I can not tell you, but I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it still appear in the minutes of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. It would appear if it is there. Of course, I can not remember the minutes of that occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. You testified that the letter was read to the Secretary at a meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that minutes of the General Board were kept?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, therefore, it must appear in the minutes, in the record of the General Board.

Admiral BADGER. I say therefore it ought to be in the minutes of the General Board. I can not swear that it is absolutely there, but I believe it to be there.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you conceive of any possibility of its not being there?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you verify that fact, Admiral, and notify the committee as to whether it is there and whether it has been there continuously, as far as you can find out?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I have recently seen the paper itself. I have not seen the minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to the minutes, now.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, will you do that as soon as you can, so that we can put it in this record?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I will do it immediately.

CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board in 1914, after the outbreak of the World War, consider that it was possible that the United States would be drawn into the war?

Admiral BADGER. I think we all feared that we should be drawn into the war, yes. It seemed impossible that such a general war as would proceed without a nation like the United States being drawn into it eventually.

CHAIRMAN. And this was considered possible immediately after the outbreak of the World War?

Admiral BADGER. I should say so, so far as I am personally concerned, yes.

CHAIRMAN. And you think that the General Board thought, from that time until the declaration of war, that we would be drawn into the war?

Admiral BADGER. That there was great danger of our being drawn into the war, yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Were there any special reports made to the department after August, 1914, and prior to these reports that you have already alluded to, beginning February 4?

Admiral BADGER. As I have said, all the letters that have been in this appendix A bore upon the possibility of war and the situation therefor. There are I do not know how many here, are 70 or 80 papers, doubtless, or more. And this does not contain by any means all the information that was gathered, because about the continuance of the war, from the early days, when officers of our own service returned from abroad, and when foreign officers came—as many did come, here, the General Board had them before them and conducted hearings, and those reports are in existence now, in bound volumes, and an enormous amount of information in regard to the situation was obtained that would appear — —

CHAIRMAN. And you are going to inform the committee about the acceptance by the department of those various recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. If any of them were not accepted, on whom was the responsibility?

Admiral BADGER. As I say, the mere fact that we did not receive a report showing what the action of the department was does not mean either that it was accepted or rejected. Frequently nothing was done even preceding the commencement of the war, to show what action the department had taken.

CHAIRMAN. But even so, Admiral, if they were not adopted, or if they were formally accepted or not, if they were not adopted, where, and the responsibility for the failure to adopt them, was on whose shoulders?

Admiral BADGER. I am not sure that you can say. They might not have been good recommendations.

CHAIRMAN. Yes; but who has the final say?

Admiral BADGER. The final say is with the Secretary of the Navy.

CHAIRMAN. And you are going to inform the committee about the recommendations made by the board in 1915 for increasing the personnel of the Navy, were approved by the department? Is one of the things that you were to inform the committee

Admiral BADGER. Well, I can——

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you, in each case where you made recommendations, to let us know whether they were accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the word "accepted" or is it "approved?"

Admiral BADGER. "Officially approved," would be the language. But again I will say that the mere fact that we did not receive a return does not prove that it was not accepted and approved, and put into effect by the department.

The CHAIRMAN. But in case of an increase in personnel, it is very simple for you to find out whether, if approved, it was carried into effect?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; we can find out what the recommendations of Congress were in that year.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, will you give me that also? And, in the case of all recommendations for increases of personnel, if they were not approved and not adopted, the responsibility was on the Secretary of the Navy, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. The responsibility is always on the head of the department, whatever it may be.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other plans with regard to naval operations, prepared by the board, before those plans which you have already given us, the first of which I think is dated February 4, 1917?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I have read you one, commencing; a preparatory plan was in 1915. That was establishing reports by the various bureaus as to the status of preparation in each bureau for war.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any others besides that?

Admiral BADGER. Only that all recommendations of the General Board for increase of the Navy, the types of ships, for everything with which it was charged, were in the line of preparation for war, not necessarily for this particular war, but for all wars.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any plan drawn up to meet the case of a war in which the United States naval forces would be used almost exclusively against submarines?

Admiral BADGER. No; because it was believed that we should have to do what the people abroad were doing; to follow their lead. You understand that we entered the war under this handicap that we came in to cooperate after the others had been at war three years. Our neutrality had prevented us from completing the necessary ships to prepare for a new type of warfare, and the recommendations throughout were as soon as we entered the war we should cooperate to the best of our ability with the belligerents on the allied side. We all knew that the submarine had started a new type of warfare. As early as March, even before we entered the war, we had begun to build submarine chasers. The first order for submarine chasers was placed on the 17th of March, 1917, and I think it covered about 40. Every preliminary thing had been done toward increasing our destroyer force, and as soon as war was declared we commenced to sign contracts and commenced just as soon as practicable a vast increase in our destroyers. I think we contracted for in the neighborhood of 350 destroyers, costing somewhere in the neighborhood of \$2,000,000.

piece, in the very few months succeeding the commencement of war, commencing almost immediately. They had very great difficulty in finding facilities for so greatly increasing that kind of craft, but the idea of the Secretary of the Navy and of the General Board and of every other department, so far as I am informed, was that our plan must be dependent upon the plans of the Allies, brought about by familiarity with three years of war under these exceptional conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. But did the General Board have any plan drawn up for a war in which the United States naval forces would be used almost exclusively against submarines; in which the naval warfare would be practically restricted to the submarines?

Admiral BADGER. We could not say that; no, sir. We knew we would have war with these submarines, but I should not say that we thought necessarily it would be confined to submarine warfare. We thought it possible and very probable that our fleet would be called into service.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not formulate a general plan of submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. A general plan?

The CHAIRMAN. You did not draw up any general plan for a submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. I do not think it was possible to draw up any plans for submarine warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. On what did you base your recommendations with respect to submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. With respect to submarine warfare?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. We had the reports of our own officers abroad. We had the reports of the foreign officers who were here, notably the British, and Commodore Gaunt, the naval attaché, who was an unending fount of information on that subject. We had the reports of officers returning, and we had the reports, so far as they went, of losses. All of those combined to acquaint us with the situation and the steps that were taken.

The CHAIRMAN. Had any plans been formulated, prior to our entrance into the war, for sending antisubmarine craft abroad?

Admiral BADGER. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. When were such plans formulated?

Admiral BADGER. I have read you here this morning where the General Board said that undoubtedly it would add much to the moral effect by sending our destroyers abroad and antisubmarine craft, and also that we should, in view of the emergency, send them abroad as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in your recommendation of May 3, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. I think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any general plan governing antisubmarine operations ever drawn up in the Navy Department?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know. I do not believe that any such plan was prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it better, in the opinion of the General Board, to keep the antisubmarine craft on the Atlantic coast or to send them to the war zone?

Admiral BADGER. Now, you are opening a very broad question. Senator, and one that is very controversial.

The CHAIRMAN. Your report of May 3 recommended sending abroad as much as possible.

Admiral BADGER. As much as the condition of our fleet and the number that we had would permit. Now, I do not object to saying this on one view of the situation. It looked in April and May very much as though peace would have to be declared by the British and the French—the Allies. The reports that we were receiving were most pessimistic here, that they could not hold out. In that case, if the German navy had remained untouched, there was no telling how we in this country might become involved with Germany ourselves and therefore it was a very doubtful policy whether we should strip ourselves and run the chance of coming in at the last moment and being defeated on the other side as far as prevention of the collapse of the allied powers was concerned, or whether we should look out for ourselves and our own fleet until we could see about it. Therefore the men who had a responsibility of that kind considered it from that point of view also, that we must look out for our own fleet, in addition to the fleets of the other powers concerned, and not strip our battleships of protection against the submarines that might attack them. We had our fleet here in the Chesapeake. We went to sea for practice purposes, to keep them up, without any real protection, and it was a very dangerous thing, but we had to take the chance, because we had to send all of our other vessels abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the mission of our naval forces in home waters? Was it to protect against operations by an enemy capital fleet or against raiders or submarines?

Admiral BADGER. Both, if necessary; but certainly against raids on our coasts by submarines or by destroyers, or by light craft generally.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore it had three missions; one to protect against the capital fleet, one to protect against raiders, and one to protect against submarines?

Admiral BADGER. Well, say submarines, yes, sir; and all had to be taken into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think there was very much danger of a capital fleet coming against it?

Admiral BADGER. There might have been, if the Allies had sued for peace and the Germans were free to follow their own inclinations, in view of the attitude that we had assumed all through the war. There was a good deal of hatred.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated in your testimony that the fleet was in splendid condition.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, I have stated that, according to all the reports that I have heard, it was in splendid condition.

The CHAIRMAN. That is as a fleet, or in respect to the individual vessels?

Admiral BADGER. As a fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a complete battle fleet?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did it consist of?

Admiral BADGER. It consisted of battleships, destroyers, submarines, and cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. All with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. All forming part of the fleet, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they actually with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. It is not necessary that they should be. The fleet is the ships that compose the Navy—compose the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about a battle fleet, now, that I asked you about.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Well, battleships, destroyers, and submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. And cruisers?

Admiral BADGER. And cruisers also, if we had wanted them with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the cruisers and submarines that you speak of all prepared and ready for war, in every way, as to the personnel and material?

Admiral BADGER. No; they were not fully prepared. We had had misfortunes with the submarines, and who is to blame I do not know. Our cruisers were not up to the modern standard so far as speed is concerned, but they were good cruisers of their class and of their kind. The cruisers with which it is usual to compare them now are the cruisers really that were built after the war commenced, in 1914, and we could not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the details of the battle of Jutland?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, would it be wise to send the battleship force of the United States Navy as it was then, at the time of the war, to meet a fleet like that of Germany as it was constituted at the battle of Jutland, when our battleships were unaccompanied by battle cruisers or scouts or screening vessels, and with only a small force of destroyers?

Admiral BADGER. I think that it would have been a dangerous thing to do. Germany admittedly had a more powerful fleet than ours, and we were striving to get a fleet which would, first, equal that, and then which would equal that of the most powerful nation. When we entered the war in 1917 there was no doubt about the superior power of the German fleet over ours. We had been striving to reach that point where we could equalize the power of those two fleets. Therefore, to say that you can put a less powerful fleet against a more powerful one with a chance of success is not good military tactics. I think, however, that the battle fleet as it stood, that is to say, the battleships, and ship for ship the destroyers were fully equal to the Germans', and I am rather under the impression that our battleships in fleet were as powerful as the Germans'.

The CHAIRMAN. But without the screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. Without the screening vessels, which we were still trying to build as a part of our fleet, and which constituted the main difference in power between the German fleet and our own.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not consider that a Navy or a fleet is in all respects ready for war when it is short of screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. That may be; but that responsibility can not always be placed on the shoulders of the Navy or the Navy Department, because we had been trying to obtain cruisers and other ships for many years where the total cost prevented the growth of that

type of ship as rapidly as we wished. But you can not say that because we did not have them in 1914, the Navy Department was to blame, because the Navy Department had been trying——

The CHAIRMAN. Are you of the opinion that all of the adequate screening vessels we had were prepared and ready at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1917?

Admiral BADGER. No; I do not think they were.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the fact that Congress had not provided those vessels is not the determining factor in the case, because we had vessels that were not ready?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. I am not speaking there of the fact that they were not as good vessels of their class, in some cases, as the more modern cruisers abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. But we did have screening vessels which we could have had ready, and did not have ready?

Admiral BADGER. I am not prepared to say absolutely on that, but I think that we did not put the smaller cruisers into commission until after the war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. At the beginning of the World War were not gun crews taken from our battleship force before it left Cuba to return to the United States, to put armed guards on merchant ships?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know when they began to take them out of the fleet. They did before war commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo, I think, has testified that before the declaration of war the personnel of his fleet was being depleted.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, I think they did before the war started. I do not know exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that a Navy or a fleet is in all respects ready for war when its battleship personnel must be depleted to furnish armed guards for merchant vessels?

Admiral BADGER. I think that was an entirely new and unexpected development, taking the men out of the battleships. It came suddenly and could not have been foreseen.

The CHAIRMAN. But if our Navy had been in all respects complete as to personnel, could we not have taken those men from some less important forces than the actual battle forces which made up our battle fleet?

Admiral BADGER. There we have been struggling ever since we have been in the Navy for a naval reserve. We have been struggling for more men. It is one of the most difficult things in the world to get through Congress—let us put it there for the time being, a provision for men for the Army and the Navy. Now, we had when we entered the war all that had been provided for in the Navy. We found a new duty for those men to perform, and that was to act as armed guards for merchant ships. We supplied that, and it was one of the best things that the Navy has ever done, the way that it met the emergency, supplied that demand, and took in the new drafts who were given, drilled them, and made good the absence of the men who had been sent away, at the earliest possible moment. We have inquired on many occasions from competent officers of the fleet what the result was, and while they have sometimes said that it would reduce their secondary batteries, yet they had been able to hold the main battery crews in good condition, so that I do not think that the actual fighting capacity of the ships was seriously injured by the armed guard crews detachments.

CHAIRMAN. The personnel was materially lowered by it?

Admiral BADGER. We got the men back almost immediately.

CHAIRMAN. But not trained men?

Admiral BADGER. Not as well trained, but we proceeded to man.

CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. But now, Admiral, assuming that Congress was unable for the lack of personnel, I think the testimony already shows that when the General Board recommended an increase of 10,000 men, it was not allowed to put up this report to Congress. The Secretary of the Navy had that cut out.

Admiral BADGER. He had the figures cut out, but my contention is that he did not have the principle cut out.

CHAIRMAN. But he made no attempt to get it?

Admiral BADGER. He made no attempt, so far as I know.

CHAIRMAN. Therefore Congress was not shown the need for 19,600 men.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. And I think the testimony also has shown that in January of 1917, and at several periods thereafter extending well into 1918, the Secretary ordered enlistments in the reserves increased. Now, that can not be very well attributed to Congress, can it?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; no, not in that case.

CHAIRMAN. How many armored cruisers of large size, protected cruisers capable of making 15 knots, did we have in our fleet in April, 1917, do you know?

Admiral BADGER. We had 10 of the armored cruisers to start with. I do not know whether it was 9 or 10 at that time. We had either 9 or 10. We lost one down in Haiti, or somewhere. Yes, there was 9 armored cruisers.

CHAIRMAN. Nine armored cruisers, and how many large protected cruisers capable of making over 15 knots speed?

Admiral BADGER. I should say there were only about 5.

CHAIRMAN. Only 5 protected cruisers capable of a speed of over 15 knots?

Admiral BADGER. Over 15 knots? Let me see. That is, not including the armored cruisers, you understand?

CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Cruisers, first class, the *Rochester*, *Brooklyn*, *Charleston*, and *St. Louis*. Those were cruisers of the type that you speak about, large cruisers ranging along about 9,000 tons.

Of the cruisers, second-class, we had the *Chicago*, *Columbia*, *Minneapolis*, and *Olympia*, ranging anywhere from 7,500 to 4,500 tons. That makes four more.

Of cruisers, third-class, of the *Marblehead* type—they would not come under your question.

There were 10 of 18 or 9 of 17 cruisers, I will say. There were 10 of the *Birmingham* class, which would make about 21, together.

CHAIRMAN. Were these vessels manned and ready for immediate action at the outbreak of war in 1917?

Admiral BADGER. I do not remember. Some of them were and some of them were not. How many were, I do not now remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember whether any of them were immediately available for use with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. I think that some of the armored cruisers were immediately available. They were in the Pacific. We brought them up at a very early date to the Atlantic coast and turned them into the cruiser squadron patrol for the American coast.

The CHAIRMAN. But when the war broke out, on April 6, 1917, if within two weeks thereafter we had had to go into a great naval engagement with the German fleet, do you know whether any of these armored cruisers or protected cruisers would have been available for action with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. I think that the majority of them would have been available; yes. They were in commission on the Pacific coast, and they could have been brought through the Canal. But to get the exact data on that——

The CHAIRMAN. But were they brought through the Canal immediately?

Admiral BADGER. They were not brought through the Canal immediately. They were left on that side.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral BADGER. They were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. And for any urgent action they could not have been brought out. They would have needed several weeks notice, would they not?

Admiral BADGER. Not several weeks. It would probably have taken them two weeks to get to this side.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were all manned and ready?

Admiral BADGER. They were all ready; and a part of the Pacific Cruising Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. All of them?

Admiral BADGER. Some of them; not all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall how many?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As commander in chief of a fleet, would you not have preferred to have had all these cruisers, scouts and screening ships with the battleships?

Admiral BADGER. The more ships I could get, the better I would like it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would not say that these vessels were absolutely necessary?

Admiral BADGER. That type of vessel?

The CHAIRMAN. In order to make up a complete battle fleet?

Admiral BADGER. They are not absolutely necessary, but they would help out a great deal. The information service could have been carried on with destroyers alone, as we have been carrying it on in our Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But would you say that the destroyers could take the places of these larger vessels?

Admiral BADGER. As scouts; as scouting vessels, they would have to. They have done it.

The CHAIRMAN. And as screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. That is one of their duties, as screening vessels—destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, do you think it necessary for us to appropriate large sums of money for these other types of vessels?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Admiral BADGER. Because they help greatly; but I am speaking about the possibility of using the fleet without them. That is quite possible, although of course it would be very much better to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think it would have been dangerous to have engaged in a battle without them?

Admiral BADGER. Not the type of cruiser we had. I think not. They can not approach the battle of the great battleships—the great armored class of ships. They would have to be kept out of range.

The CHAIRMAN. No cruiser can approach a battleship, can it?

Admiral BADGER. No; not with any safety.

The CHAIRMAN. Not with any safety. So that they were not different from other scout cruisers in that respect?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider a well-equipped air service as of importance in connection with naval operations to-day?

Admiral BADGER. Of very great importance.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that such an air service would have been useful with our naval service in the war zone immediately upon our entry into the World War?

Admiral BADGER. Of great use; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could it have been used successfully against German submarine bases?

Admiral BADGER. We hoped they would, but the practice did not show it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board advise the Navy Department of the importance of such a service in 1913?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Navy Department ask Congress for the necessary appropriations promptly to develop that service?

Admiral BADGER. I do not remember now what they asked. We were trying for an aeronautic service, and money was asked at various times, but I am under the impression that we did not—in 1915 we asked for \$5,000,000, which seemed to be a very large sum in those days, and there were appropriations previous to that, and we had a very small number of airships. We were backward all the way in this country in airships when war commenced. We spent quite enough money to have gotten a better exhibit than we did, but the Navy is to be highly commended for the way in which it proceeded at once to provide the necessary bases and all the facilities for utilizing both heavier than air and lighter than air craft abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some more questions to ask you, Admiral, and it is nearly 1 o'clock now, so we will adjourn until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. Will you be here then?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, April 16, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES J. BADGER, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Badger, will you proceed.

Admiral BADGER. Mr. Chairman, yesterday you asked me to supply certain things for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. One of them was the action of the Navy Department in the case of papers under Appendix A.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. I have made notes on this list of all the cases, and I will hand it to the stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. Stating what action was taken?

Admiral BADGER. Stating what action was taken in each case. I will state that where no action appears on the record it does not mean either approval or disapproval by the department. It is simply on account of inaction on the part of the receiving clerk, I take it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated which ones of your recommendations were formally accepted by the department.

Admiral BADGER. All of those for which we have any acknowledgment at all, it is stated what that acknowledgement is. It is in the majority of cases. There are some where no action was forwarded to the board.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not stated what action was taken in regard to following out recommendations, even after they were accepted?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; that comes under the executive part of the department.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are not familiar with that?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; not familiar with that, in most cases.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1917 a number of these approvals were signed by V. O. Chase.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; V. O. Chase. He was at that time senior assistant to the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And he accepted?

Admiral BADGER. He signs by direction for the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. For the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; and you will find some other signatures there; as that of Schofield.

The CHAIRMAN. And in some cases they signed, by direction, for the Secretary?

Admiral BADGER. For the department.

The CHAIRMAN. For the Secretary?

Admiral BADGER. For the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary ever sign any himself?

Admiral BADGER. I am told that some of them are signed by the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, it has the same effect?

Admiral BADGER. It has the same effect.

(Appendix "A," including the additional notations above referred to by Admiral Badger, will be found where originally offered in evidence.

Admiral BADGER. I have also here a statement that you asked for with regard to the personnel, the 19,600 enlisted men, which I took from the hearings of the House committee, Sixty-third Congress, third session, 1915-December 10, 1914. You asked for that yesterday, with regard to the action of the Secretary of the Navy, or of the reading of a paper from the General Board, requesting 19,600 enlisted men.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read your statement?

Admiral BADGER. I have headed it "Action of the Secretary of the Navy as to an increase of personnel for the 1915 program." That was the point on which you were questioning me yesterday. This is taken from the hearings of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives on estimates submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, Sixty-third Congress, third session, 1916. Secretary of the Navy's hearing, December 10, 1914, on personnel, pages 572 to 585. On page 573 the Secretary states:

I have not asked for any increase of enlistments, and I will tell you why.

In this statement of reasons for not asking for more enlisted men in the 1915 Navy bill is introduced a tabular statement of "Distribution of personnel required for the fleet" from Rear Admiral Victor Blue, dated November 28, 1914, showing (from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation's point of view) that there was a surplus of 384 enlisted men in the Navy after providing for its requirements on that date.

That is all that I know with regard to the Secretary's action.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no statement made to the committee?

Admiral BADGER. There was no statement made to the board. That is his action before the House committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I say there was no statement made to the House committee, so far as you know, by the Secretary, telling them of the recommendation of the board?

Admiral BADGER. Not that I know of; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I also asked you about the minutes of the board.

Admiral BADGER. Here is a copy of the minutes. [Reading:]

GENERAL BOARD, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
November 12, 1914.

The executive committee met at 10 a. m. Present: Rear Admirals Badger and Fiske, Capts. Winterhalter, Knapp, Oliver, Hood, and Huges, and the secretary of the board. Rear Admiral Nicholson entered at 10.50 a. m.

Nicholson was at that time Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

The minutes of the executive committee meeting of November 10, and of the General Board meeting of November 11, were read and approved. It was directed that the minutes of the meeting of November 11 be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy before finally becoming a part of the record of the board.

Capt. Hood read to the committee the amended portions of the letter on building program and personnel, 1916, in which reference to the war in Europe is eliminated in accordance with the direction of the board at yesterday's meeting.

Capt. Winterhalter suggested that the figures regarding shortage in enlisted personnel be reconciled with recent information from the Bureau of Navigation.

Admiral Dewey entered at 11 a. m. and the meeting resolved itself into a meeting of the General Board.

The Secretary of the Navy entered at 11.03 a. m.

The letter regarding "The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet a situation which exists at the present time and assure the national defense," G. B. 421, November 13, 1914, was read to the Secretary of the Navy. Minor changes were made in the letter during the reading. Admiral Dewey directed that the letter be filed with the war plans.

The Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Dewey withdrew at 11.30 a. m. The meeting resolved itself into a session of the executive committee and Serial No. 298, building program and personnel, 1916, was again taken up for discussion.

The section about personnel was read and discussed.

Admiral Nicholson withdrew at 12.05 p. m.

A paper from the chief of the Bureau of Navigation to the Navy Department regarding present and suggested distribution of the personnel, was read and discussed. It was directed that the paper, Serial No. 298, as revised, be drawn up in smooth form for consideration tomorrow.

The executive committee adjourned at 12.50 p. m., to meet again at 10 a. m. tomorrow.

Approved by the executive committee, November 17, 1914.

E. H. CAMPBELL,
Commander, United States Navy,
Secretary General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you yesterday, Admiral, the following question: After the Secretary declined to accept the report of the General Board for that numerical increase of 19,600 men, did the board, before sending the deleted report back to the Secretary, submit to the Secretary a letter outlining the needs of the Navy as regards the personnel, giving more definite recommendations than those contained in the printed report?

Admiral BADGER. There was such a letter. It was read to the Secretary of the Navy, and while I do not remember what the Secretary of the Navy said in the matter, the letter was not forwarded officially.

The CHAIRMAN. And took no action on it?

Admiral BADGER. And took no action on it so far as I know; no action on that particular paper, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And in his hearing before the House committee made no allusion to that?

Admiral BADGER. He made no allusion to that paper, which the minutes of the report of the hearing, which I just read, show.

The CHAIRMAN. The minutes?

Admiral BADGER. I mean the report of the hearing before the House committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That shows that that letter was read to the Secretary?

Admiral BADGER. No; that shows that the Secretary made no allusion to that letter there.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have stated that that letter was read to the Secretary at this meeting.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, at the meeting of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. At the meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Now, when the Secretary appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee on the subject of the recommendations for 1915 for personnel—

The CHAIRMAN. I understand; he made no mention of that.

Admiral BADGER. He made no mention of that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. And that information I get from studying the hearings of the House Naval Committee upon that bill.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is whether the minutes of the General Board show that letter was read to the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral BADGER. The following is the paragraph referring to that in the minutes of the board which I read:

The letter regarding "The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time and assure the national defense" G. B. No. 421, November 13, 1914, was read to the Secretary of the Navy. Minor changes were made in the letter during the reading. Admiral Dewey directed that the letter be filed with the war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. What letter was that; your original letter; the amended letter?

Admiral BADGER. No; that was another letter.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the letter referred to in my question?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter outlining the needs of the Navy as regards enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And the minutes do refer to that letter?

Admiral BADGER. The minutes, I believe, refer to that letter; yes, sir. I have not the number of that letter here, but I am satisfied that that reference in these minutes that I have read was to that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get that letter and put it in the record?

Admiral BADGER. I believe so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that for the record.

(The letter referred to is here printed in the record, as follows:)

(Confidential.)

G. B. No. 421.

NOVEMBER 14, 1914.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time, and assure the national defense.

Reference: (a) G. B. letter No. 420-2, of November 14, 1914: Increase of the Navy building program and personnel, 1916.

In its letter of November 14, 1914 (reference a), the General Board summed up the situation of the Navy in regard to personnel, showed clearly the deficiencies which exist for manning all the ships of the Navy for war, and recommended the passage of the two laws which would eventually, when they had come into full operation, provide for these deficiencies, and put the naval branch of the national defense in a state of readiness for war.

2. It was shown that at the present time the Navy is lacking about 1,070 line officers, and a proportionate number of staff officers, and about 19,600 enlisted men allowing the usual number for unavailable prisoners—to fully man all the ships of the Navy with peace complements. It was shown that the only reserves in sight are the partially trained 596 officers and 7,132 enlisted men of the Naval Militia. It was stated that war complements should be 10 per cent above peace complements.

3. We are therefore faced with this condition: If the Navy should be called on suddenly to prepare for an emergency we would be short about 19,600 men to fill the existing vessels of the Navy with peace complements. These places would have to be filled by new enlistments of untrained recruits, though probably some ex-Navy men would return to the service, so that the entire number might not be wholly without some training. In addition, we would have the 7,132 Naval Militiamen, who could just about serve to increase the peace complements to war complements. Even if the 19,600 men were immediately available, this would not provide complements for vessels building nor for the many auxiliaries that would have to be taken into service for war, and would leave no reserves to meet casualties which would occur in war. In other words, should an emergency arise in the near future calling for putting the fleet on a war footing, we should have the available vessels of the Navy as they are to-day manned in large proportion by 19,600 untrained recruits and 7,132 partially trained Naval Militia, and have no provision for manning new ships that would be hurried to completion, or for auxiliaries that would be taken into service, and no reserve provided for casualties.

4. In view of the actual existing situation in the world's affairs to-day, the General Board is of the opinion that this is a dangerous situation, and believes that considerations of national security and defense call for the promptest application of the most effective remedy.

5. If there was no need for considering the present disturbed condition of international affairs, the two laws proposed in the General Board's letter of November —, 1914, would eventually meet the situation and provide and maintain the trained personnel, active and reserve, that is required by the national defense to man the entire fleet for war. When these two laws shall have been passed and shall have become fully operative, the Navy will be in the state of readiness as regards personnel that the country has a right to expect; a state that does not now exist, and that never has existed. With the most expeditious action possible on the part of Congress in passing the two laws recommended, and with the very best efforts of the department in carrying them into effect, there will be a considerable interval of time extending over many months, if not several years, before the trained reserve called for by the proposed laws is fully organized and effective, or before the Navy will be in a complete state of preparedness to meet an emergency.

6. Meantime, during this interval, we are faced by the most complicated and delicate situation in international affairs that has ever arisen; and the General Board is of the opinion that the national defense is not in proper condition to meet any crisis which may arise at any time from this delicate situation. Causes of friction have recently arisen, and are increasing in number as new and hitherto unrecognized interpretations of international law are being made by one or another of the belligerent nations in matters relating to contraband, blockade, closure of open seas, seizure of noncombatant persons from neutral vessels on the high seas, and other questions, all of which affect our national rights and seriously interfere with our legitimate trade and with our national prosperity. As the war develops there may also arise at any time a question even more nearly affecting our national interests in the form of changes in sovereignty in outlying possessions of the belligerent or other nations which lie on or near the American continent, or flank our ocean routes to the Panama Canal or across the two oceans. The general disturbed international situation is further complicated for the United States by the continued unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo; and by the as yet unsettled questions in dispute between this Nation and Japan. Authentic reports show that popular feeling against us in the latter country is growing more unfriendly, and this at a time when Japan's alliance with Great Britain and Russia leaves her free from fear of restraint from those quarters.

7. The General Board hopes that no combination of circumstances will arise that would draw us into this present world conflict; but, from the causes briefly sketched above, foresees grave danger of such a possibility, or of a derogation from our rights as a nation. In the opinion of the General Board this possibility is fostered by our well-known state of military unpreparedness, and is likely to become a probability unless prompt remedy for it is applied at least to that branch of the national defense that forms its first line—the Navy—during this interval covering the time between the present state of unpreparedness and the time when the proposed laws will have operated to supply a continued remedy.

8. To meet this situation the General Board believes that the personnel of the Navy should be increased and trained in the quickest possible manner until it is at least sufficient to fully man the available ships of the existing Navy. The best way—and, in fact, the only possible way to get men quickly and train them—is by enlistment in the regular service, and training in that service. If the General Board's provisions are correct, the element of time is of such importance that even this method of correcting the major deficiency in our naval preparation—lack of trained personnel—is

Admiral BADGER. Yes, at the meeting of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. At the meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Now, when the Secretary appeared before House Naval Affairs Committee on the subject of the recommendations for 1915 for personnel——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand; he made no mention of that.

Admiral BADGER. He made no mention of that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. And that information I get from studying hearings of the House Naval Committee upon that bill.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is whether the minutes of the General Board show that letter was read to the Secretary of Navy.

Admiral BADGER. The following is the paragraph referring to it in the minutes of the board which I read:

The letter regarding "The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time and assure the national defense." G. B. No. 421, November 13, 1914, was read to the Secretary of the Navy. No changes were made in the letter during the reading. Admiral Dewey directed the letter be filed with the war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. What letter was that; your original letter; amended letter?

Admiral BADGER. No; that was another letter.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the letter referred to in my question?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter outlining the needs of the Navy regards enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And the minutes do refer to that letter?

Admiral BADGER. The minutes, I believe, refer to that letter, yes, sir. I have not the number of that letter here, but I am satisfied that that reference in these minutes that I have read was to that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get that letter and put it in the record?

Admiral BADGER. I believe so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that for the record.

(The letter referred to is here printed in the record, as follows:

(Confidential.)

G. B. No. 421.

NOVEMBER 14, 1914

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time, and assure the national defense.

Reference: (a) G. B. letter No. 420-2, of November 14, 1914: Increase of the Navy building program and personnel, 1916.

In its letter of November 14, 1914 (reference a), the General Board summed up the situation of the Navy in regard to personnel, showed clearly the deficiencies which exist for manning all the ships of the Navy for war, and recommended the passage of the two laws which would eventually, when they had come into full operation, provide for these deficiencies, and put the naval branch of the national defense in a state of readiness for war.

2. It was shown that at the present time the Navy is lacking about 1,070 line officers, and a proportionate number of staff officers, and about 19,600 enlisted men, allowing the usual number for unavailable prisoners—to fully man all the ships of the Navy with peace complements. It was shown that the only reserves in the Navy are the partially trained 596 officers and 7,132 enlisted men of the Naval Militia. It was stated that war complements should be 10 per cent above peace complements.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir, always; but not necessarily from the British Admiralty or the French naval office or any other particular place. We based our recommendations upon what we considered the best available information.

The CHAIRMAN. But in general, in such cases, you believed that the experience of the nations who had been operating in the war zone was of great value, did you not?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, as you said, it put them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme was practicable?

Admiral BADGER. That was a particular scheme, Senator, and involved propositions in mine laying. The great distance that had to be covered, the usual depth of water, the weather conditions in the North Sea and up in the Orkney region, and the experience of the British, particularly in laying mines in the open sea, of which we had had very little in our Navy, all led us to refer that matter to the British Admiralty through the proper channels, to find out whether in their opinion it was practicable to lay mines and keep and maintain them there in such deep water under such conditions. We attached a great deal of importance to their opinion on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in general, you would say that the experience of the men who had been through the mill should be followed rather than the experience of men who had not?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Was such information available in Washington?

Admiral BADGER. Not as authoritative. We had line officers who had had experience in the laying of mines, one of them, notably, Capt. Reginald Belknap, and during the consideration of this mine barrier Capt. Belknap was temporarily attached to the general board to give us the result of his experience; so that while we had an experienced officer in the laying of mines, we thought it would be better to get the local experience of men who were familiar with the North Sea conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. And from what sources did you obtain this information?

Admiral BADGER. That was addressed to the representative of the Navy Department in London; I suppose, undoubtedly, to Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was through him that you got that information?

Admiral BADGER. Through him that we got that information; as we got all other information requested from London. All those requests went to the senior officer in London.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if such information was available in Washington, why did the general board in this memorandum consider it necessary to refer the question to London, to the British Admiralty?

Admiral BADGER. Because we thought that they had had more experience than we had had, and would be guided in a measure by the reply that they sent in our findings.

The CHAIRMAN. It is essential, is it not, in warfare, when conditions are changing rapidly, that all operational plans should be based upon full information and well-informed discussion by responsible leader?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

rather palliative than remedial, but it is the best that can be applied at this late and no other would even approach effectiveness.

9. It has been shown that we should have about 19,600 more trained men, together with the 7,132 naval militia we already have, to fully man the available ships of the Navy for war, leaving out of consideration the matter of the needed reserves. The passage of the laws recommended in General Board letter No. 420-2 of November 1914, would provide immediately for about 4,700 men, in the general plan of manning the Navy in the future. This leaves about 15,000 of the 19,600 men believed to be immediately required by present conditions unprovided for, until sufficient time shall have elapsed for the proposed laws to come into full operation and shall have provided the needed reserve. The General Board believes the present exigencies make such delay a national danger. It is, therefore, recommended that, in addition to the two laws already recommended for the general regulation of the naval personnel, an emergency law be passed authorizing the immediate enlistment of 15,000 men additional and that these men be enlisted, trained, and held in service until the operation of the two general laws already recommended shall have provided the needed trained personnel—active and reserve—required to fully man the entire fleet for war.

GEORGE DEWEY

The CHAIRMAN. Then I asked you if the minutes of the board referred to that letter, and the reference to the letter was in the minutes of the General Board and had been in those minutes right along?

Admiral BADGER. As I have already said, I believe that the reference that I have just read, that section from the minutes, refers to that letter, and that letter has been in the files of the General Board since that time. You will observe that Admiral Dewey, who was presiding, directed that the letter be filed with the war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. And the minutes you have read this morning were the minutes prepared at that time?

Admiral BADGER. November 12, 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been on record ever since?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further papers to file?

Admiral BADGER. Here is a paper. You made some reference yesterday to the action of the General Board in 1913 on the subject of naval aviation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. I believe you asked if we had any data on the subject. At all events, the secretary of the General Board, Commander Baum, thought you did, and got a copy of that letter. If you would like to have it read, it can be read now. This is on development of airships, for naval use, August 30, 1913.

The CHAIRMAN. That letter was put in the record by Admiral Niblack during his testimony, and will be found at page 2441 of the typewritten record.

In a memorandum of the General Board, dated November 1914, 425, serial 476, you recommended that the British Admiralty be cabled concerning details of the proposed mine barrier, and stated:

It is believed that the great experience of the British naval forces in North Sea operations and their experience in naval mining during the present war puts them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme is practicable in construction and maintenance, and whether in the opinion of the Admiralty it is the best scheme in sight for limiting the operations of enemy submarines.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; I remember a telegram of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board uniformly base its recommendations and decisions upon the necessity of basing all plans upon the latest and most complete information available concerning naval operations?

quarters of the Navy. If they decided that there should be delay in the sending of those ships over, I accept their decision in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. But, still they would be committing a military error if they were delaying it beyond the necessities of the case?

Admiral BADGER. If they had a good reason for the delay—I do not know what the reason may have been in that particular case.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if they did delay beyond any necessities of the case, it was a military error?

Admiral BADGER. Putting it that way; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims in his testimony has shown that in regard to his recommendations as to the sending of antisubmarines east to the other side, great delays occurred, and that his recommendations were adopted after many months' delay and put into effect; was not that a military mistake?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir: I am not qualified to say that. The vessels were sent by the Navy Department—by the directing head of the Navy Department, of which some of the ablest naval officers were representing the department and directing its movements, and they, knowing the conditions as I have tried to show in my statement, thought at the time that the delay should take place in sending certain types of ships abroad, then I consider that it was their duty to act in the way that they did. It is a question of opinion, as between one man and another, in that case.

The CHAIRMAN. But the fact that they subsequently adopted the recommendations of Admiral Sims indicated that the recommendations were all right, did it not?

Admiral BADGER. I have stated here that operational plans were changed from day to day. What they might refuse to-day, they may accept to-morrow. You can not tell.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims has stated that all of the vessels sent to Europe in the first year of the war were in existence on the 1st of April, 1917. How can a delay in sending forces under these conditions be justified?

Admiral BADGER. That, sir, the officers who were responsible, will have to justify themselves. The men are available, and will, I understand, appear before this committee. I can not say what their action was.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a question of the officers? Is it not a question of the policy of the department about sending them over?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, it is a question of policy of the department. Nobody else could send them except the department.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you, could a delay in sending the forces over under those conditions be justified?

Admiral BADGER. I say you will have to ask the men who are responsible to justify. I can not. I was not an executive officer during the war, and I can not say any more.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is a question of policy, you have already stated that that was a question for the head of the department. The final responsibility rests upon the head of the department?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; as always. The responsibility rests upon the head of the organization finally.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims in his testimony referred to the department's delay or failure of six months in sending over specific requirements of battleships, submarines, and tugs, after conference

of Admiral Sims and the Allies. Were the recommendations of Admiral Sims in your opinion sound?

Admiral BADGER. What is that; sending over what?

The CHAIRMAN. The delay in sending over specific requirements of battleships, submarines, and tugs.

Admiral BADGER. That was Admiral Sims's summing up of the situation, that he needed these things at that time, and I am trying to make it clear that while it was his duty to make such recommendations in accordance with his belief as to the proper thing to do, it was the duty of the directing heads, the responsible heads in Washington, to decide whether they would comply with those recommendations or not. If they did not, then the responsibility lies upon them for their action.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I asked you if the recommendations of Admiral Sims were sound. They were sound, were they not, when the department sent those vessels over later, as they did, in every case?

Admiral BADGER. Generally speaking, recommendations of that kind are sound. But I do not know, and I can not testify, whether they were sound at the moment or not, when the whole situation was taken into account. They might have been sound from that side but they might not have been sound from this side of the conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. At least, they were needed over there, were they not, and the department recognized that by sending them over at a later period?

Admiral BADGER. Undoubtedly they were added and were needed, but the department decided whether that was the proper time, considering everything else, to send them or not. They had the recommendations, and they were the ones who took the action.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, do I understand that you question the fact that they were needed when they were asked for, but admit that they were needed at a later date?

Admiral BADGER. I do not state that. I say that they may have been needed; and yet the action of the department in not complying immediately with the request may have been based on perfectly just and sound reasoning.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least it caused a delay in sending the vessels over?

Admiral BADGER. At least, they did not act immediately on the request of Admiral Sims, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And presumably that had some effect, when they did not send them over when they were asked for, and probably not a beneficial effect?

Admiral BADGER. It may have had an effect upon the plans on this side and may have had an effect on the plans on the other. We can not tell. I can not tell you. It is impossible for me to testify to a thing like that. That must come from the men themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not be willing to state that the delay in sending these ships over held up certain plans on the other side, regardless of the effect it had on this side? You would not be willing to say that it held up the plans on the other side?

Admiral BADGER. No, I do not state that either, Senator. Whatever action was taken either held up or hastened results. Now,

that I have been trying to make clear to you is that they may have been needed on the other side and Admiral Sims's recommendation may have been perfectly just and proper and covered the situation; but on this side there may have been other reasons which were considered serious enough and important enough not to carry out at that time those recommendations. Therefore it can not be said that there was neglect on either side.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they were held up on this side for certain reasons which appeared to be important, perhaps, to the department at that time on this side, and which later turned out not to be important, and then not sending them over held up certain plans on that side which were of great importance, does it not prove that it was a military error not to send them over?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir, I can not agree with you there.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it not prove that it was a mistake in general not to send them over?

Admiral BADGER. No, I will not even say that. I think that in viewing it in the light of future events, you might say, that implication should not go because the conditions at the moment made the authorities at headquarters—the governing, directing, responsible headquarters—take a certain action which later on was found possibly to have been unnecessary, but which they could not, at the time they took that action, know would be unnecessary. I can not see that any charge lies for neglect or dereliction.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you conceive of any possible delay that the department made which would be a dereliction on their part in such a case?

Admiral BADGER. Well, of course you can conceive anything, but I should not ever say that a bad result was obtained by any action of the department unless I knew the reasons which impelled the department to take that action; and those reasons I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. And even if the department was mistaken you are not willing to admit that it was a mistake?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; if I should think it was a mistake. But this is not one of those mistakes that I feel that I can judge upon. I have got to have more information than I have at present.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are not prepared to say that the recommendations of Admiral Sims were sound, about sending these vessels over?

Admiral BADGER. On the contrary, I am willing to say that from his point of view they were sound.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the point of view of the general board?

Admiral BADGER. The point of view of the general board was also sound.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, how about Admiral Sims's recommendations from the point of view of the general board?

Admiral BADGER. I think they were sound. I think the whole thing was sound.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the general board agreed with Admiral Sims's recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. The general board believed that the vessels should be sent at the earliest possible moment; but it qualified that, if you will remember, by saying that depended upon the possibility of submarine action by Germany or the Central Powers, upon our

immediate needs for ourselves, and upon the number of antisubmarine-craft that we had, or might be expected to have. Now, I have not quoted it exactly, but I have given you the gist of it, and it is in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the general board much impressed with the danger of attacks of submarines on this side?

Admiral BADGER. The general board believed that it was possible and believed that everything should be done to meet such an attack should it take place.

The CHAIRMAN. They believed, did they not, that the essential way to fight the submarines was to go for them in the war zone?

Admiral BADGER. In general, yes. But they also believed that the submarines might find their way over here; that they might, by some skillful way in which they had shown themselves to be well versed, find bases on this coast, and that we might find ourselves under serious attack from the German submarines and raiders. They therefore believed that proper precautions should be taken to meet any such attack. If the war abroad had ended suddenly there was reason to believe that some of these vessels, or many of them, might be diverted suddenly to our coast, and that we would find ourselves, as the saying goes, "holding the bag." We wanted to be sure whether we were going to be in that position or not before we denuded our coast of proper protective measures.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if on account of the lack of our assistance on the other side—our immediate assistance—the submarines had been successful and had driven England and France to withdraw from the war, thus leaving us at war with Germany, do you not think that the fact that we could have sent vessels over to help them and did not do so would go down in history as a military mistake?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, I think if it could be shown that that was a good reason for it. But I do not consider that it was a good reason. I do not consider that the presence or absence of the very small number of destroyers that we could have placed there within the first three or four months of the war had any effect on the duration of the war at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There were other vessels besides destroyers that were asked for, were there not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; but the real crux of the situation lay with the destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not think that our destroyers and other vessels going over there had anything to do with putting down the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes. I beg your pardon; yes; a great deal to do with it. I do not know what the percentage is, but the vessels that were sent over; the destroyers, were equal in every way, and if we chose to be a little bit conceited we might say better than the other destroyers in those regions in the danger zone. I think they did their part in reducing the destruction by the submarines. I think that they aided the Allies in many ways. I think that they aided our own Government in carrying out the transportation of troops, particularly through the war zone. But I do not think that they had anything to do with the duration of the war—the length of the war—and I do not believe that their being delayed four months or six months would have had any effect whatever on the length of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that the naval forces and their activities in the war had anything to do with shortening the war?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I do not say that. I say they had everything to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was simply asking from your answer.

Admiral BADGER. I say they had everything to do with it. I place the blockade as the most important naval operation of the war and its results. It was not spectacular, but there it was. It shut Germany up so that it could not get anything from anywhere else. It lived on its own fat. It was exhausted. The whole country was suffering for food and for all the material, the raw material that makes possible to carry on war; and the submarines did not in any way, shape, or manner loosen that blockade or permit stores to come in. The submarines destroyed an enormous amount of supplies and an enormous amount of tonnage, but they had to be absolutely successful in order to change the question of the duration of the war. They did not stop the supplies getting to the allied countries in sufficient quantity to keep the civil population alive and to supply with liberality the armies at the front, and until that could be done they had no effect on the duration of the war.

The Germans were a military race who were determined to fight to the end, and they did fight to the end until they had to collapse, and the mere fact of those submarines working and destroying tonnage and supplies never came to the point where it stopped that.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the blockade was the principal naval operation of the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I said it was one of the most decisive naval operations of the war, and I think the most decisive.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that blockade effected?

Admiral BADGER. The day that Great Britain declared war with Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was effective thereafter until the end of the war?

Admiral BADGER. From that until the end of the war. There was little smuggling and a little aid through the Scandinavian countries, but it was a mere drop in the bucket and could not do anything for Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Our forces had nothing to do with that blockade, and had nothing to do with the establishment of it. That blockade was effective before we came in.

Admiral BADGER. Before we came in. We had nothing to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we came in the blockade was effective?

Admiral BADGER. For three years; yes, sir—nearly three years.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would have been effective without us?

Admiral BADGER. Just the same, whether we were there or not.

The CHAIRMAN. So that that was not one of the services rendered by our Navy in the war?

Admiral BADGER. I say until we came into the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but you say they could have got along just as well without us so far as that was concerned?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, well, we helped. When we came in, we were reinforcements.

The CHAIRMAN. We helped——

Admiral BADGER. I can not state absolutely, but I think you will find that when our destroyers went over to Queenstown and established themselves there, very shortly the British destroyers were withdrawn, and in a little while we found that the United States destroyers were the only ones present. I do not know when this occurred, but I think after we got something like 20 of our destroyers there the British took their own destroyers away.

The CHAIRMAN. And took them back to their fleet?

Admiral BADGER. They used them with their fleet or somewhere else in the channel, at some other point. But that area to the south and west of Ireland was never unpatrolled. What we did was to bring reinforcements to them, and we did it very well; and the aid that we gave in sending these reinforcements was very great. That is the point. That is where we come in.

The CHAIRMAN. So that these vessels of ours were used largely in submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. Almost entirely. We had there only five battleships with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, and later we had three battleships for use in emergency, should the German cruisers go adrift on the Atlantic trade routes. And then we had, from time to time, the convoy vessels that may have touched in one port or the other on the other side; escort vessels for convoys across the ocean. But our fleet as a fleet never got there.

The CHAIRMAN. And our destroyers had a great deal to do with putting down the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; they had a part commensurate with their number and power.

The CHAIRMAN. And much more, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. Well, let us concede it, and say so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A part that was much more than commensurate, would you not say, with the number of vessels we had, in comparison with the number of vessels used by the British? It has been stated that there were 3,000 vessels of the British, and there were a very small number of our vessels.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; but what I was speaking of was a comparison between 36 American destroyers of the latest type and 36 of the British of the latest type. I do not know that we can claim any more than what our national pride causes us to claim, that we were better than anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that Germany depended a great deal upon the success of submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; but it had to be complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that had a great deal to do with Germany continuing the war—the fact that she expected to win through her submarines?

Admiral BADGER. That is entirely a matter of opinion, you understand, Mr. Chairman. I do not know exactly how far you can go under oath as a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I want your opinion.

Admiral BADGER. I have been reading since the war certain books on the subject; for instance, Gen. Ludendorff's book and Admiral von Tirpitz's book, and some others, and there, in those books, are well set forth the hopes of Germany from the submarine war. At one time they were very high, as is shown by the statements in these books.

ter on, particularly the army of Ludendorff, they began to lose hope of any decisive result coming from the submarine. They were yet exhausted. They hoped, and the submarine was doing great work; but they saw—and comment upon that—that it was not doing the work that they expected it to do. They had realized that in any case it was a failure. They were doing a great deal of damage to the lines, but they were not doing the fatal damage, and did not get there. If it had not been for the antisubmarine craft, the destroyers, sloops, and subchasers, trawlers, and all the other things that came, the carriers of mines, and what not, that checked it and held it, they might have succeeded and forced a peace by destroying so much damage and by so having interfered with the supplies, so broken the communications of the allied countries that they would have had to acknowledge defeat; and to prevent that these submarine defensive or offensive vessels, mines, etc., prevented the submarines from making a success of their efforts.

If we had withdrawn antisubmarine craft, the war would have immediately been decided in favor of Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, if America had withdrawn its antisubmarine craft?

Admiral BADGER. No; I say that if all the nations had withdrawn their antisubmarine craft. If America had withdrawn, the damage would have been greater, because the reinforcements we sent would not have been available. Whether or not our reinforcements saved the situation, I do not know. I hope that they did and believe that they did, because we gave them efficient reinforcements at a very critical time. But they did not, by having them there, affect in any way the duration of the war. It would have lasted just as long as it did. What broke the morale of the Germans finally was our troops arriving as they did in such great numbers and such unexpected numbers. A million men in the year was considered something extraordinary, when we began talking about sending men abroad, and we sent 2,200,000 men, I think, taking the actual time that the new armies were going across, in something about a year—a year and a month or two months. It was phenomenal. Nobody believed it was possible. They had had four years of fighting. They had lost enormously. Their material was nearly exhausted, and when they saw these reinforcements that they would have to meet they made no grand final attempts in the spring and summer of 1917, and failing in those, in which our troops, by the way, to the number of I do not know how many, about 600,000 or 800,000 men, were in the front lines, they gave up; and that was the real end of the war; and it was not due to the submarine at all. The submarine hurt the lines, but it did not help them up to the time of their collapse.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the submarines had a great deal to do with the sending of our troops over, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. No; I think not. We had to take all sorts of precautions against the submarine, but the submarine did not, as I have stated in my statement here, even check the transport of our troops from the United States to the Continent of Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. And it had nothing to do, either, with the question of feeding the troops after we got them over?

Admiral BADGER. It gave us great anxiety, but it did not prevent us from feeding them. In that they failed also.

The CHAIRMAN. Because we checked them?

Admiral BADGER. Because we checked them, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, I do not like to feel that it was altogether the Army that won this war. I like to feel that the Navy had some part in it.

Admiral BADGER. You misunderstand me, Senator. Neither side or the other was the determining feature. The Navy and the Army in all wars where navies participate, have to work in cooperation. The thing might be accomplished without the Navy—probably would. This war would have been a failure without the Navy. We could not have sent any troops abroad if it had not been for the Navy—or the navies of the Allies. We did our part in the protection of our transports, but we did not do it all, because our Navy was smaller. The Navy was as essential as the Army. One could not have gotten along without the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but necessarily there was not any chance for our Navy to get into any great naval engagements with the navy of the enemy, and it seems that the principal thing that our Navy did was to take care of this submarine menace, and it seems to me that they did splendid work on it.

Admiral BADGER. They did splendid work.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that the work they did had a great deal to do with cutting it down, and bringing the war to a close.

Admiral BADGER. They had a great deal to do with it. I am trying to make it clear that I speak of the duration of the war, in this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, bringing the war to a close.

Admiral BADGER. No; up to the end it did not shorten the war at all, or lengthen it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy did not help shorten the war?

Admiral BADGER. It did not help shorten the war or lengthen it as it stood; no.

The CHAIRMAN. You would state that the work of the Navy had nothing to do with bringing the war to a close?

Admiral BADGER. No; I do not say that. I say that it did not make it longer by not sending those destroyers to the other side; that it did not lengthen the war.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way did they shorten the war?

Admiral BADGER. They did not shorten the war.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy did not?

Admiral BADGER. No. I do not know whether that is going to show my real ideas or not, but I hope that will read all right when we get it in print.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, well, you can explain in any way you want to.

Admiral BADGER. No; I think it will be understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that the complete readiness of our entire fleet for war, with all its auxiliary forces ready to move at once, and the knowledge by Germany that our fleet was so nearly ready, might have decidedly influenced Germany's action and convinced the German people that they would lose the war, and that brought them to recognize the necessity of suing for peace sooner than they did?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it would have had anything to do with bringing that about?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; the Germans were in for a war on the continent of Europe. They believed that they were going to win it, and they deliberately challenged the United States to enter the war adopting the submarine warfare that they did. They knew we would go to war with them if they did, and they deliberately took the chance of what we should do.

The CHAIRMAN. But they knew just how well we were prepared, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; they knew what we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, they knew as well as we did.

Admiral BADGER. They knew as well as we did what we had, and they knew that it would all be in service against them as soon as they declared war.

The CHAIRMAN. And they knew exactly the state of preparedness we were in, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. They knew we were in a very good state of preparedness, according to my idea, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. And they had full knowledge of our state of preparedness?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In breaking the submarine menace and defeating Germany's submarine campaign, would it not have been wise to make all efforts to closing the channels through which the submarines left their bases before they reached the open sea, before combating them?

Admiral BADGER. If that could have been done, it would have been very much better.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if we could have sent over a fully equipped fleet, could we not have cooperated with the English and closed them in?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know about closing them in. With the whole British fleet, so far as they were called upon to assist, and what we sent over later, as you said, over 3,000 antisubmarine vessels, with tens of thousands of mines, every effort that could be made in three years of warfare was made, but they did not even close the English Channel up to the end of the war. One of the things that the General Board in its report on the feasibility of the northern barrage said was that if they could not close the English Channel it was futile to put that barrage down; and they promised to close it, but they did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we not have helped close the English Channel if we had had our battle fleet there?

Admiral BADGER. We were able to send over there, and did send over, in something like a year and a half—because we were not able to begin until after war was declared—no money was appropriated—the feeling of the people of this country was against war or against showing anybody that we wanted to go to war or thought that we were going to war, and we were behind the others in the development of the means of successfully combating submarine warfare or the submarine menace, nearly three years.

Now, it took us some time to get on a level with those people who had been three years combating this warfare and building with great rapidity. They had, as you stated here a little while ago, 3,000 antisubmarine craft in use when we entered the war. We had com-

paratively little. I do not suppose all of the ships that we would number over 60 or 70, as against over 3,000 that they had and we had to go to work and build. We did build, and we built with astonishing rapidity. We had not commenced when the war ended. The war ended before we had begun to show what we could do, either ashore or afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. That was building ships?

Admiral BADGER. That was building; and we had to do it when the war commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the building of additional ships?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Now, we never did get over there on account of the short time, more than in the neighborhood of 25 ships. It is given here in this table as 220 ships, I think it was on October 1, 1918. It is down here that we had 300 ships there, made up of 68 destroyers, 11 tenders, 28 yachts, 11 tugs, 5 gunboats, 6 cruisers, 6 Coast Guard ships, 11 submarines, 42 subchasers, battleships, 10 mine layers, 11 mine sweepers, and 24 miscellaneous cargo vessels belonging to the Navy, making 375. Later we sent over there, on July 1, 1918, 120 subchasers built especially for that work. Now, in all, then, we were able to have, let us say, somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 actual antisubmarine craft against the 3,000 of Great Britain. We did our share, and we did more than our share; but we did not decide the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the destroyers were the most effective thing, Admiral, in the meeting of the submarine menace, and our proportion of destroyers was very much larger than our proportion of vessels as a whole, over there?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it was. We had on the 4th of May, 1917, 6 destroyers over there. On the 1st of June we had 19. On the 1st of July we had 30. On the 1st of August we had 47. No; I beg your pardon; those are other vessels.

On the 1st of July we had 28, on the 1st of August 37, on the 1st of September 39, on the 1st of December 45, and finally, as the ships were built and gotten ready and sent over, on November 11, 1918, we had 74. Those are destroyers. We only started with about 50.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those destroyers were new vessels that we did not have at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. We had 51 at the beginning of the war, and we had 74 in the war zone at the end of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. We had 51 at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, other things being equal, if those 11 destroyers had been in a state of preparedness, and it had been deemed desirable to have sent them over, we could have sent them over at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. If it had been deemed desirable to send them over, we could have sent them over very much quicker than we did, that is to say, sent them all. Our destroyers were in very good condition before the war began—all the larger destroyers. A good many of them were in reserve, but they had, in the vast majority of cases, considerable reserve crews. During the Mexican troubles in 1914 I was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and I took the reserve destroyers and took them down into the Gulf of Mexico with half crews, and they did everything that the destroyers with

ull crews did. They were ready, and I took them out suddenly, order.

the CHAIRMAN. I would like to get from Admiral McKean later exact condition of preparedness of the destroyers at the beginning of the war, and all the other vessels of the Navy.

Admiral BADGER. All right.

the CHAIRMAN. Now, if all of our naval force except battleship No. 1 and a limited force to guard our own coast, had been over immediately after the declaration of war, would not the effect have been greatly augmented, and could not the German bases have been closed through the joint action of the Allied forces?

Admiral BADGER. That means the Battleship Fleet?

the CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. No; I do not think we could have sent them at that time.

the CHAIRMAN. That is, it means not only the Battleship Fleet with the other vessels that should have been and might have been prepared.

Admiral BADGER. No; while they were able to cruise about in submarine area, and after the early days of the war in fact never one of their capital ships, they did not cruise around without having a base on which they could——

the CHAIRMAN. My question does not refer in any way merely to the Battleship Fleet and destroyers. It refers to the Battleship Fleet and destroyers and all other vessels of the United States Navy except battleship force No. 1 and a limited force to guard our coast.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

the CHAIRMAN. That would have included all of the scouting and screening vessels and other vessels which we had.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

the CHAIRMAN. If they had been in a state of preparedness.

Admiral BADGER. We talked of sending over a large fleet there, but for certain reasons, and I think they came from the Admiralty, necessarily through Admiral Sims, we found that we could not maintain a fleet over there of that kind. They did not want them. There was want of harbors. The question of supplying the fleet with food, and the question of fuel were to be considered. When we sent over, later, the five battleships, the request was not for our best type and best of the oil-burners, but it was for coal-burners because they could not supply them with oil, and they did not want more than five, and my recollection is that in other cases wherever we talked of sending over some ships other than the small type, the heavy antisubmarine craft, and the convoy escort ships, the question of maintenance always came in. The Grand Fleet was in such a state that it did not need reinforcements materially. Our five battleships that went over there were for the purpose of allowing some of their ships to be put out of commission in order to utilize their crews in some other way; and also, we were very glad to do anything possible and to add to our cooperation, to add to our forces abroad. But the British never wanted an American fleet over there under American command. They wanted the American aid to be in the way of reinforcements to their own fleet, and I

sure but they were perfectly correct in that, because to have two separate commands in the same zone would have been very difficult, if not disastrous to carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. You state that the Secretary of the Navy asked Congress for the 19,600 men that the General Board said was necessary to man the fleet in 1915?

Admiral BADGER. For the 1915 program, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For the 1915 program?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the new ships which were received in 1917, and which I think at that time it was evident would be received, was it not plain that the fleet would be undermanned without the increase of personnel in 1917?

Admiral BADGER. To the General Board it was plain that it would be the part of prudence and perhaps necessity to have more personnel for the fleet, yes. There is no doubt of that. Now, prevented that being accepted as a proper view, I do not know. I have told you that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was in charge of the personnel needs of the Navy, in a tabular statement which he presented to the Secretary, and which by the Secretary was presented to the House of Representatives Naval Committee. He stated that we had enough men to look out for all the ships in the Navy without any new ones, for that year. We had gotten an increase the year before of 4,500 enlisted men. But we knew we were short of men and we knew we were very short of officers in case we went to war and we were. We were short of officers then and we are short of officers now for the regular establishment nearly 2,500 line officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I want to ask you a few questions, Admiral, about the battleship fleet.

Admiral BADGER. I am afraid you will have to get someone else for that.

The CHAIRMAN. If our battleship force was screened only by a small force of destroyers, would not the scout cruisers of the enemy fleet seek to destroy these destroyers in the first stage of a battle?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; that is a part of the duty of a scout.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one of the first things they would try to do.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If our weak screen of destroyers had been smashed, would not our battle force have been open to serious danger from submarine and torpedo attack?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it is very dangerous to go out with battleships—

The CHAIRMAN. Would the General Board justify putting the fleet in action in such a condition, simply having a few destroyers as screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; and that is the reason why we did not want to send them abroad as long as we had a fleet that might be in action. We did not want to denude the fleet to the point where we could not send a fleet on the high seas without great danger.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a denuded fleet. But how about the fleet as it then was?

Admiral BADGER. I think, as the fleet then was, we took a risk whenever we sent that battleship fleet out of the Chesapeake Bay for practice, and we did it on many occasions. We took a great

that we might lose some of those ships by enemy submarines had come over there knowing that we were doing that, and taking that risk. There are two sides to the question, in other words, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Certain officers who have appeared before this committee have testified that our battleship fleet, consisting simply of battleships and of destroyers with them, which were few in number, could have met the German fleet and beaten it. Now, would you say that after smashing our weak screen of destroyers, as I asked my question to you——

ADMIRAL BADGER. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (continuing). Would not a night attack upon our battleships by enemy destroyers have endangered our fighting line and weakened it before the main engagement with enemy battleships?

ADMIRAL BADGER. Yes; if I had had my screen entirely smashed I could have gotten out of there as soon as I could.

THE CHAIRMAN. Had the 20 or more armored and other cruisers and our total destroyer force been present ahead of and in the flanks of our battleship force, would not our chances of victory over the enemy battle fleet have been very much greater?

ADMIRAL BADGER. The bigger the fleet and the more complete it is, the better it is.

THE CHAIRMAN. Is a fleet without screening vessels and submarines and scouting vessels of all kinds a homogeneous fleet?

ADMIRAL BADGER. It is not a well balanced fleet. "Homogeneous" is a term referring usually to one particular type. It is not a well balanced fleet. It has not the proper auxiliary vessels to accompany it and to do the auxiliary duty.

THE CHAIRMAN. And as commander in chief of a battle fleet, would you not say that the presence of screening vessels was of great necessity?

ADMIRAL BADGER. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. Would not 10,000 or 15,000 additional men have manned all of these vessels that we had in 1917?

ADMIRAL BADGER. Oh, yes; I think so.

THE CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible for their not being so manned?

ADMIRAL BADGER. I do not know that it took very long to man them. I am not competent to say how long it took to man those reserve ships, particularly the destroyers. When I was familiar with the reserve destroyers, they had a nucleus crew on board, a nucleus which, as I told you, was found to be large enough to handle them under rather strenuous conditions. But they could not have kept it up very long; the work would have been too hard. But they had a nucleus crew.

Now, aboard of all ships there are certain highly trained men that are absolutely essential to the efficient manipulation of that ship, and as we go on that number of highly trained men is increasing on board each ship and type of ship. On board of some ships, like submarines, they all have to be trained to the work. But there are also all except the submarines other men who are, so to speak, hewers of wood and drawers of water. In the old Navy they used to call them "beef." Now you can incorporate, if you have a destroyer

Senator KEYES. In other words, it was the purpose of the Government, to use the common expression, "To sit tight and wait for developments"?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; you can put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. But had it not been for our new policy, an arms race about the world would have started. I am extremely sure that we did have a policy. I did have a policy, then you would have been possible, would it not, to undertake for war preparations; and, if such preparations were failure, if any, to make such preparations would be done of our Government?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That being so, how do you explain the decision of the General Board of October 12, 1915, about the breaking out of the war and approximately a year before we entered the war, which provided for the growth of development in the history of our Navy, involving the construction of 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, and auxiliaries, and the whole including an appropriation of \$499,876,000? Your Secretary objected to the Secretary's suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy was handicapped and permitted to make only a small increase in our naval power?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you if you consider the decision of the General Board referred to as providing for a normal increase?

Admiral BADGER. In the first place, the General Board was always guided in its recommendations by what might be the political policy of the country. We were guided in our recommendations most frequently, and are still and always will be, by what we consider military conditions; and we do sometimes recommend things that we know we are not going to get. Nevertheless, in order to show a consistent policy, also that we believe those things are necessary for the progress or naval progress of this nation, we recommend them.

Now, with regard to that particular program that we had there, we had been trying for years to get, from one year to another, some sort of a building policy. Sometimes we got two, sometimes we got three. One year we got five. And we were modifying vessels. About that date the yearly appropriations for the Navy would run from \$40,000,000 to \$50,000,000. We were not going to get next year, what we were going to get. So when the program came, through the suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy, we did it, done, to bring about a continuing program of around \$50,000,000 a year so as to bring our Navy up to where it ought to be. We seized that with great avidity and put in that program. I did it in a way, the normal increase under very favorable conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that would attract the attention of any of the belligerent nations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And would that make them think that the Navy was preparing for war?

Admiral BADGER. It did. It does not now.

The CHAIRMAN. But I understand you to say that the Government was not to do that?

Admiral BADGER. The responsibility lay with the administration, the Navy Department, because they were the heads, and they were the directing force.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were told that only one of the 11 armored cruisers on the Pacific coast, and few, if any, of the remaining vessels of this class in the Navy were fully manned and officered in 1917, would you consider the fleet ready for battle?

Admiral BADGER. If I was told they were not manned?

The CHAIRMAN. If you were told that only one of the 11 armored fast cruisers on the Pacific coast, and few, if any, of the remaining vessels of this class in the Navy were fully manned and officered in 1917, would you consider that the fleet and the Navy were ready for battle?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. How long do you think it will take to prepare a ship for battle against a ship of the same class that has been in full commission for two years?

Admiral BADGER. That is merely a matter of opinion, sir. It depends on the kind of men. I should say from three to six months for large ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, or the General Board, consider it wise to permit our Navy to such a condition?

Admiral BADGER. If we could keep every ship in the Navy manned and ready for battle, as we keep a moderate number of them, we would be glad, and that is what we, from a military point of view, consider the proper course; but no nation can stand for the expense that would be entailed by such a policy. Even Great Britain had only a small number of her fleet fully manned and ready. Great Britain, however, and Germany also, so far as that goes, had the advantage of a large and more or less trained naval reserve, which they could bring in, as they did bring in, when the war commenced. If you can take it that the General Board or the Navy Department or any other set of officers, if they could get the men, if they could get the money to supply the men to keep a war complement aboard every ship, would recommend it every time. Of course we want it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary tried to stop enlistments in the Naval Reserve both before and after the war commenced.

Senator TRAMMELL. In view of the fact that the Admiral does not know what the testimony was, unless he has read it, I want to say that the Secretary was endeavoring to do all that he could to build up the strength of the Regular Navy, and that it was not up to its full strength by a good deal, and he was bending all his efforts on that. That is a fair statement in regard to his activities as to personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. It is also a perfectly fair statement that he could not fill up the Regular Navy, that he found that he could not get men to go into the regular service, but he could get men for the naval reserve. You can take that up later on, when you examine the Admiral.

Senator TRAMMELL. I want him to know all the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. What plan was adopted in regard to antisubmarine operations on our coast?

Admiral BADGER. I have only a general knowledge of that, sir, and I can not testify. That would come, in all its details from the operations, and I have no doubt that Operations can give

INVESTIGATION.

Senator KEYES. In other words, it was the purpose of the Government, to use the common expression, "To sit tight about that."?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; you can put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. But had it not been for our need, it would have been possible, would it not, to undertake for war preparations; and, if such preparations were a failure, if any, to make such preparations would be a failure of our Government?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That being so, how do you explain the action of the General Board of October 12, 1915, about the breaking out of the war and approximately a year before we entered the war, which provided for the development in the history of our Navy, involving the construction of 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, auxiliaries, and the whole including an appropriation of \$499,876,000? Yes, the Navy was handicapped and permitted to make only a normal increase?

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Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And would that make them think that the Navy was preparing for war?

Admiral BADGER. It did. It does not now.

The CHAIRMAN. But I understand you to say that the Government was not to do that?

CHIEF. The policy of the Government was not to take But that is a 5-year policy, and they could afford to be nervous about that.

CHIEF. I know, but you have stated what the general policy of the Government was. I am extremely interested in trying to find out our Government did have a policy in those four years, 1914 and 1917.

CHIEF. It did.

CHIEF. Then, if you did have a policy and if the policy was stated it was, then your recommendation was consistent with that policy.

CHIEF. We regarded it as we had done many times

CHIEF. And the action of Congress was entirely inconsistent with that policy, then.

CHIEF. The action of Congress was perhaps inconsistent.

CHIEF. Did the Secretary object to it?

CHIEF. The Secretary suggested it.

CHIEF. Therefore the Secretary's suggestion was entirely

CHIEF. That may be. I think they deserve great credit.

CHIEF. Admiral, I do not want you to be put in any false position by anything you may say here before this committee, and to qualify the statement that you made about the Navy's part in shortening the war, I should be glad if you do so and put it in along with your statement.

CHIEF. Oh, no; I do not want to make any qualification of the statement I read. I consider that absolute my opinion. The only thing was that in this long statement I hope that I have not said anything that in any way is inconsistent with my written statement. My real opinion is in my statement. I stand on that.

CHIEF. Yes; but of course the testimony is a part of the

CHIEF. Yes. We went through so much; and I could not have said something that in some way modified my views, as expressed in the statement. I do not modify them at all. They stand.

CHIEF. You have nothing to add?

CHIEF. No, sir.

CHIEF. Admiral, as I understand, the chairman was particularly alluding to your statement this morning—some statement in regard to your stating that the Navy had no part in shortening the war. I did not understand you to say that the Navy

CHIEF. I did not understand you to say that the Navy had no part in shortening the war or bringing it to a close. I did not mean to claim that the Navy was not a part in shortening the war. That is the point, that the chairman had in mind as to whether you really meant to say that the Navy had no part in bringing the war to a close. I did not mean to say that.

CHIEF. Oh, no; I made no such statement as that,

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Senator KEYES. In other words, it was the purpose of the Government, to use the common expression, "To sit tight and await developments"?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; you can put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. But had it not been for our neutral position would have been possible, would it not, to undertake various plans for war preparations; and, if such preparations were not made, failure, if any, to make such preparations would be due to the policy of our Government?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That being so, how do you explain the recommendation of the General Board of October 12, 1915, about one year after the breaking out of the war and approximately a year and a half before we entered the war, which provided for the greatest program of development in the history of our Navy, involving, as you state, the construction of 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scouts, 10 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, and a number of auxiliaries, and the whole including an appropriation for aviation and reserve ammunition totaling \$499,876,000? You state that our Navy was handicapped and permitted to make only a normal increase in our naval power?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you if you consider the recommendation of the General Board referred to as providing simply a normal increase?

Admiral BADGER. In the first place, the General Board was always guided in its recommendations by what might be called the political policy of the country. We were guided in our recommendations most frequently, and are still and always will be as long as we exist, by what we consider military conditions; but we have to follow the political policy and we do sometimes recommend things that we know we are not going to get. Nevertheless, in order to show a consistent policy, and also that we believe those things are necessary for the proper military progress or naval progress of this nation, we recommend them.

Now, with regard to that particular program that you speak of there, we had been trying for years to get, from one year to another, some sort of a building policy. Sometimes we got two battleships, sometimes we got three. One year we got five. And we got other vessels. About that date the yearly appropriations for new construction would run from \$40,000,000 to \$50,000,000. We never knew the next year, what we were going to get. So when that opportunity came, through the suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy as that had been done, to bring about a continuing program of around \$100,000,000 a year so as to bring our Navy up to where it ought to be in our opinion, we seized that with great avidity and put in that program. It was in a way, the normal increase under very favorable circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that would attract the attention of any of the belligerent nations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And would make them think that we might be preparing for war?

Admiral BADGER. It did. It does not now.

The CHAIRMAN. But I understand you to say that the policy of the Government was not to do that?

Admiral BADGER. The policy of the Government was not to take that course. But that is a 5-year policy, and they could afford to wait a little before they got nervous about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but you have stated what the general policy of the Government was. I am extremely interested in trying to find out whether our Government did have a policy in those four years between 1914 and 1917.

Admiral BADGER. It did.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if you did have a policy and if the policy was what you have stated it was, then your recommendation was entirely inconsistent with that policy.

Admiral BADGER. We regarded it as we had done many times before.

The CHAIRMAN. And the action of Congress was entirely inconsistent with that policy, then.

Admiral BADGER. The action of Congress was perhaps inconsistent; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary object to it?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary suggested it.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore the Secretary's suggestion was entirely consistent?

Admiral BADGER. That may be. I think they deserve great credit.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I do not want you to be put in any false position about anything you may say here before this committee, and if you would like to qualify the statement that you made about the Navy not having anything to do with shortening the war, I should be very glad to have you do so and put it in along with your statement.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I do not want to make any qualification of the statement I made in the statement I read. I consider that absolutely correct, in my opinion. The only thing was that in this long series of questions I hope that I have not said anything that in any way contradicts what is in my written statement. My real opinion is in writing—in that statement. I stand on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but of course the testimony is a part of the record.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. We went through so much; and I could not tell whether I might not have said something that in some way might be considered as modifying my views, as expressed in the written statement. I do not modify them at all. They stand.

The CHAIRMAN. You have nothing to add?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, as I understand, the chairman was referring more particularly to your statement this morning—some 30 minutes ago, probably—in regard to your stating that the Navy did not shorten the war. I did not understand you to say that the Navy did not have some part in shortening the war or bringing it to a termination, but that you did not mean to claim that the Navy was entirely responsible for the shortening of the war. That is the point, I think, that the chairman had in mind as to whether you really meant to say that the Navy had no part in bringing the war to a conclusion at the time it was ended.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I made no such statement as that, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not mean in your written statement. I can explain to you. The chairman started out by questioning you a good deal on the matter of whether or not the war was prolonged on account of inactivity and lack of wholeheartedness, and so on, on the part of the American Navy. That was the substance of it. You said emphatically that it was not prolonged on account of that; and later you said that the Navy did not shorten the war.

Admiral BADGER. No; then let me see how I can make that statement. I had no intention of stating anything that would in any way invalidate that written statement of mine, and I think we might let it go at that, sir. I do not know; I would have to examine the testimony to see whether there was any variation in that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I will ask you some questions, then. Do you not think that the activities of our Navy were of sufficient importance to have had some effect upon the war probably being terminated sooner than it would have been if we had not been active?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes. Yes, sir, undoubtedly.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is the point.

Admiral BADGER. The Navy did many things. It assisted in getting the Army across. The movement of the troops shortened the war. In my opinion, it shortened the war greatly.

Senator TRAMMELL. And without our Navy that would have been impossible.

Admiral BADGER. Without our Navy the troops could not have gone across.

Senator TRAMMELL. They could not have moved them. So that the Navy performed a very important function there?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it performed a very important part also in checking the destruction of supplies and material. It did all the things that the other navies did. It was essential to the conduct of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, the Navy filled its mission?

Admiral BADGER. The Navy filled its mission.

Senator TRAMMELL. In bringing to an end the war?

Admiral BADGER. The only thing was that the enemy submarines were unable to do such damage to the Allies that the Allies had to sue for peace.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, the submarine menace was severe, and a source of great anxiety and annoyance, and did a good deal of damage, but their damage was not effective—it was not fatal?

Admiral BADGER. It had to be complete to be fatal. That is the point. It did not reach the complete state.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, on the question of policy, while we all know that this country was assuming neutrality, was not the Navy Department during the years, say, 1914, 1915, and 1916, engaged in trying to better the service and enlarge and increase the Navy?

Admiral BADGER. I think so, sir; and that I have stated in my statement—that it did make preparations.

Senator TRAMMELL. But you, of course, had hanging over you the question of not committing an act of war, or doing something that would precipitate war?

Admiral BADGER. That was it.

Senator TRAMMELL. If the Navy Department had committed an act that could have been considered one of hostility toward a partic-

ur nation, and probably precipitated war, if it had precipitated war 6 years sooner than it did, were we in better fix then or were we better fix at the time we did get into it?

Admiral BADGER. Well, we had increased the Navy its normal increase in those two years. The Navy was more powerful in 1916 than it was in 1914. It was more powerful in 1917 than it was in 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, we could have better afforded to have gotten into the war when we did than to have committed the rash act that would have been considered an act of war two years sooner? Were we not in better condition when we did get to it?

Admiral BADGER. So far as the Navy was concerned, we were far more powerful. The Navy became better each year in its normal development than it was in the year just past. It should be better this year than last year. That is true on that ground.

As to when we should have gotten into the war, that is a thing that I am not prepared even to reach an opinion on.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, as to the question of sending over of our antisubmarine craft: Of course, we know the policy that was allowed out by the department, and I will be frank in stating that we have been unable to find any testimony yet that showed that that resulted in a failure. None whatever. But if we had sent all of our fleet—submarines and everything else—over there, and left the coast entirely undefended and had taken no precautions whatever on this side, is there not at least some possibility or probability that they might have transferred some of their activities to our coast, and would not that have been regarded as a colossal blunder if we had done that?

Admiral BADGER. If they had sent ships over here and found our coasts undefended, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That would have been considered a colossal blunder and mistake on the part of our people. Now, as a matter of fact the policy that we did follow resulted successfully. Is there anything to make it appear that it was a failure, except purely a matter of conjecture?

Admiral BADGER. That is what I state in my written statement.

Senator TRAMMELL. Results count, and not a matter of conjecture?

Admiral BADGER. We succeeded, and it is a matter of difference of opinion as to whether the procedure we adopted was right or wrong.

Senator TRAMMELL. The procedure we followed did result successfully?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. There is no question about that. It resulted successfully. And, in your opinion, from your general knowledge of the situation, the fact that we took a general, broad view of the entire situation, did not restrict ourselves merely to the zone over there, did not, in your opinion, prolong the thing from four to six months, did it?

Admiral BADGER. It did not prolong it at all, according to my ideas.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were asked some questions in regard to the personnel. In the first of 1917, with the Regular Navy not filled up to its full strength, would you regard it as more important to try and recruit the Regular Navy to full strength at that time, rather

than to try to build up a reserve, when we needed men in Navy?

Admiral BADGER. If we had any vacancies, the first fill those vacancies in the Regular Navy. As to the reserve until the war was declared we had no reserve to speak

Senator TRAMMELL. Does not a man get much more much more intensive training in the Regular Navy than serves?

Admiral BADGER. Under normal conditions; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. This is hypothetical: If you were build up your Regular Navy strength to its full authorized you found that you were having a great deal of difficulty that, and you probably attributed it more or less to the fact that you were going into the Reserve instead of into the Regular Navy would you then continue, if you felt that you had to discontinue or the other until you built the other up; would you discontinue the Reserve temporarily or discontinue the regular naval service?

Admiral BADGER. If you found the conditions as you

Senator TRAMMELL. I said that.

Admiral BADGER. I would, of course, prefer to fill up the Regular Navy first.

Senator TRAMMELL. I will state that the testimony here at the time the Secretary discontinued the enlistments in the Regular Navy the testimony of the same witness also is to the effect that the Secretary was bending his energies and doing everything that he could to build up the authorized strength of the Regular Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Which time?

Senator TRAMMELL. At the very same time he was doing so, Admiral Palmer so stated. He was doing everything that he could publishing notices in the newspapers and doing all that he could.

I will ask you another hypothetical question, Admiral: If that quite a good many men were being enrolled and committed in the Reserve as officers, scattered around over the country, if you had no particular use for them, some of them just on little boats, would you think it time to put a check on enlistments in the Reserve until you investigated that?

Admiral BADGER. I can only answer that in the general case if I thought improper enlistments were being made anywhere in the administration of the Navy, I would investigate it, and if I found that it was wrong I would stop it.

Senator TRAMMELL. A question was asked you in regard to if we had had 15,000 more men at the time we went into the war would we not have been able to have manned all the ships to our full quota, and so on? As a matter of fact, did we not have the necessary personnel and the necessary officers to meet the requirements and meet it successfully?

Admiral BADGER. We did, yes. But of course it took longer to do it in that way.

Senator TRAMMELL. The 15,000 men would have been a small percentage of the additional 450,000 that you raised, would it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. This arming of merchantmen, I have stated that that was an entirely new and undreamed-of proposition that came on?

BADGER. No, sir; I did not make that statement. It
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RAMMELL. Unexpected; that is what I mean.

BADGER. Not unknown or not undreamed of.

RAMMELL. I mean as far as necessity was concerned.
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BADGER. Yes.

RAMMELL. That was one of the necessities that arose
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Admiral BADGER. If we had any vacancies, the first thing was to fill those vacancies in the Regular Navy. As to the reserve, of course until the war was declared we had no reserve to speak of.

Senator TRAMMELL. Does not a man get much more rapid and much more intensive training in the Regular Navy than in the Reserves?

Admiral BADGER. Under normal conditions; yes, sir.

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Senator TRAMMELL. That was one of the necessities that arose from the progress made by the submarine menace, was it not?

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That is the only time I remember having used the word "unexpected." But it was unexpected that we would have to arm merchant ships until only a reasonably short time before the war commenced. We commenced arming our ships before we entered the war. The first ship that we armed was armed before the war commenced, I think in March, 1917. That was one of the steps for self-protection that we took.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course I elaborated a little too much when I said that you said it was undreamed of.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. But you said that nobody could have expected or anticipated the necessity of having to put so many men on the merchantmen?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. We did not expect it to the extent to which it went; no.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was successfully carried out so far as you know, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. The reports were very good. It did not do as well as we had hoped. That is to say, it did not stop the depredations of the submarine upon the slower ships--the cargo ships. In many cases, however, it drove off the submarines and undoubtedly saved a great deal of property.

Senator TRAMMELL. It was at least one of the deterring operations against submarine progress?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I have been recently going through, on the Board of Awards, the history of the armed guard that we used during the war, and I find a considerable percentage of cases where the submarine was driven off, and a few cases where the submarine was hit and damaged by the defensive guns on board the merchant ship.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have been asked more or less questions in regard to whether or not the board and the department agreed with Admiral Sims about this and so. As a matter of fact, was not a good deal of the activity, even abroad, thought of, conceived, suggested, even before you heard from Admiral Sims in regard to it, did he initiate all the activities?

plans for the prosecution of the war. The directing heads had be guided also by the situation of the War Department, and particularly of the State Department. I do not know that they ever clashed at all, but in the direction of a war of that kind, particularly in the early stages, those two departments had to be consulted in order to get concerted action of all the power of the country.

Senator TRAMMELL. In regard to your recommendations in 1914, to increased personnel, I believe you stated that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, under whose department personnel was direct, compiled a statement in which he showed that you had a surplus of a few hundred men.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I judge from this that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who was a naval officer dealing directly with the question of personnel, did not agree with your recommendation that you should have the 19,600 men increase at that particular time.

Admiral BADGER. He did not, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. So that if the Secretary of the Navy did not recommend it, he did rely upon information and upon the position which was assumed by the officer directly in charge of personnel. That is, it is to be presumed that he relied upon it?

Admiral BADGER. That would be a reasonable conclusion upon the face of it, yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is all that I have to ask.

Senator KEYES. Admiral, in answering some of the questions asked by Senator Trammell, I understood you to say that you knew of no act on the part of the United States Government that precipitated or tended to precipitate war prior to 1917. He was speaking of the general policy of this country.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I may or may not have said it, but I will answer it now. I do not know of any act that precipitated war.

Senator KEYES. On the contrary, the Government was doing all it could to keep us out of war, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. To keep us out of war, yes.

Senator KEYES. You may remember that there was a great number of papers written about that time not only to Germany but to Great Britain, and Senator Trammell also asked you, I think, if we were not better prepared for war in 1917 than we were or would have been in 1915 or 1916 to have entered the war.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator KEYES. I would like to ask you if you do not think we would have been better prepared in 1921 if we had waited until then?

Admiral BADGER. That was the impression I intended to convey by my answer to the Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not consider naval preparedness an act of war, do you, Admiral?

Admiral BADGER. No; but abnormal preparedness is sometimes considered an act of war, and the foreign nations will make inquiries—immediate inquiries—if they see any abnormal preparations made. The diplomatic blue books or white books teem with letters and with protests made, particularly by Great Britain when Germany was building her fleet; and agreements were made. There was not a movement that explanations were not demanded as to why they were doing this, and so on.

he CHAIRMAN. That is to say, if we had gone ahead with naval preparations, Great Britain would have asked why?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; would have asked why.

he CHAIRMAN. After 1914 do you think Great Britain would have been disturbed about it?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know who would have been disturbed.

he CHAIRMAN. Do you think Great Britain would have questioned us if we had done it after the outbreak of the World War in 1914?

Admiral BADGER. It would be only a thought. Yes, I think Great Britain would not have liked it.

he CHAIRMAN. You think Great Britain would not have liked it? Do you think France would have liked it?

Admiral BADGER. I think France would have cared less.

he CHAIRMAN. But would have cared?

Admiral BADGER. I do not think they would have cared at all.

he CHAIRMAN. How about Italy?

Admiral BADGER. Would not have cared.

he CHAIRMAN. Or any of the Allies?

Admiral BADGER. Would not have cared.

he CHAIRMAN. But you think Great Britain would have cared?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; that is my own opinion, you understand.

he CHAIRMAN. So that we did not prepare ourselves to go into war because we thought Great Britain would question it?

Admiral BADGER. That would be the reasoning. Again, it is my opinion we did not do it because the feeling of the people of this country was to keep out of that war if we could, and that if we made any of these preparations it might influence the other countries. It is just my individual opinion that it would not have influenced anybody except Great Britain.

he CHAIRMAN. How about Germany?

Admiral BADGER. Well, Germany would not have been—it would have influenced Germany in a way, because they would have known that we were increasing our power. I think it would have influenced Germany. But it did not make much difference at that time.

he CHAIRMAN. That is, it would have influenced Germany because we were increasing our power presumably to fight against her?

Admiral BADGER. Well, to fight against her; yes.

he CHAIRMAN. Do you think Great Britain would have minded our increasing our power to fight against Germany?

Admiral BADGER. No; if she could have been dead sure.

he CHAIRMAN. Do you think she would have objected to it?

Admiral BADGER. I do not think she could have liked it.

he CHAIRMAN. Even if it was for the purpose of fighting with Germany against Germany?

Admiral BADGER. Look here, Mr. Senator, we are getting into pretty deep water.

he CHAIRMAN. Do you think Germany would have objected to our building up our naval personnel and material, with the ships and the Navy that we then had.

Admiral BADGER. No, I do not think so; and I do not think it could have made any difference if she had. We had a perfect right to go ahead and do anything that was not abnormal and showing intention to join in the war. I would like to scratch out one or two of those questions, there.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is an extraordinary conception, Admiral, that any of the Allies should have objected, after the outbreak of the World War, to our making ourselves as efficient as possible to go into a war when anyone must have known at that time that if we did go into the war it would be against the central powers. I do not think there ever was any question of our going in on the side of the central powers, after the outbreak of the war.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; there never was any question of that at all.

Senator KEYES. Was there any great disturbance in England over our building program in 1913?

Admiral BADGER. No, but if you will take the service literature you will doubtless find criticisms and articles on the increase of the Navy, and I have seen one such article by a Mr. Hurd (?) who was on the General Board's policy of having a Navy equal to that of the most powerful was stated here about a year or two ago there was a very grave discussion of the reasons for our having any such policy and the necessity for it was exploited, in one of the principal English reviews. The British take more interest, in general, in the Navy in their own navy, and in the naval policy of the world, than we do. They long have regarded their navy as their safeguard. They know more about it, and they have more expert civilian writers and investigators than we have. Anything that occurs that is of interest to naval officers or naval domination or anything of that kind is exploited in that country much more completely and thoroughly than in any other country I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, at least if we were paying attention to the objections of Great Britain, we took the most objectionable course we could possibly take in preparing for a future expansion, did we not, when we finally did act?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I think, perhaps, you misunderstand Mr. Senator. What I said was that we did not want anybody to believe that we were getting ready for war, and that we only were permitted the normal increase.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand why we should not want the Allies to know that we were getting ready for war.

Admiral BADGER. We were permitted only the normal increase of the Navy, and that applied to our own country as well as any other country. It was a part of the policy of neutrality. Now, what particular nation I do not think is of any importance. They all might object, or they all might say, "Go ahead."

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that putting down the submarine menace did not enable us to get the troops abroad, did it not?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; no, sir. I said that we got the troops abroad without the flow being checked by the submarines. If we had had nothing to combat the submarines, we would have got the troops over.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore it did have a great deal to do with getting the troops abroad?

Admiral BADGER. It had everything to do. We got them abroad though, in phenomenal time, and unchecked by the submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. Because by the action of our force and the Allied forces we protected them?

Admiral BADGER. The Allied forces protected them. Without them we could not have gotten them there.

CHAIRMAN. And therefore, by checking the submarine menace, we could enable us to get our troops abroad?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. And getting our troops abroad helped to shorten the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, but it would not have ended it a day sooner than it did, according to my idea.

CHAIRMAN. But are you an expert on the question of the transfer of troops? Do you know anything about the troops of the Allies?

Admiral BADGER. I am not an expert, but I do know that to move the 2,100,000 men across 3,000 miles of ocean, to recruit them, to equip them and give them some little training—and they did all get that, they were simply herded aboard ship almost as soon as they got their clothes—was an extraordinary performance.

CHAIRMAN. It was an extraordinary performance. There is no question about that. But can you testify from naval knowledge as to whether they could have been gotten over sooner had we been able to check the submarine menace, and had we been able to send cargo ships over?

Admiral BADGER. My opinion, as I stated, is that they could not. That is what I have been saying.

CHAIRMAN. That is merely an opinion?

Admiral BADGER. That is merely an opinion.

CHAIRMAN. You have not made a study of that matter?

Admiral BADGER. It is merely an opinion.

CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell has spoken, in questioning you, of the colossal blunder that it would have been to have sent our antisubmarine forces over at the early stage of the war and to have left our coast undefended.

Senator TRAMMELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have you state my entire question.

CHAIRMAN. I am simply stating it from memory.

Senator TRAMMELL. I stated if we had sent them over there and when they had come over here with their vessels and attacked our coast, with our coast unprotected, and without any defense here, would not that have been regarded as a colossal blunder—a colossal failure?

CHAIRMAN. That is what I intended to convey.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. If we had had battleship force No. 1 over here and the boats or vessels which we had over here on our coast after we had sent our antisubmarine forces abroad, could they not have given our coast some protection?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; they would have given some protection to the coast. It depends on how many ships they had retained. The battleships in force No. 1 could hardly have been sent to look for submarines, though. It would have been very dangerous.

CHAIRMAN. I spoke of the other vessels.

Admiral BADGER. Yes; the other vessels. And we had very few. When the submarines did come over, we had very few antisubmarine craft on this coast, to my thinking. I do not remember how

many, but you can find out from the Operations officers how many there were. But we had stripped ourselves by that time to below what would ordinarily have been called a safe limit, and nothing but the emergency abroad, I think, could have influenced the officers to so strip themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. But we had a large force over in the summer of 1917—a large antisubmarine force—did we not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; we had a large force over there.

The CHAIRMAN. And in doing so, we must have stripped ourselves on this side to a certain extent?

Admiral BADGER. We did strip ourselves very close.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did the first German submarine come over?

Admiral BADGER. I have forgotten the date. I am told that it was May, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in spite of the fact that we had stripped our force over here, no submarines came over?

Admiral BADGER. Submarines had been here before we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Not for 9 or 10 months?

Admiral BADGER. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. No submarine came over for 9 or 10 months?

Admiral BADGER. Exactly, but that did not mean that they could not send them if they wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell says that we must judge by results. We won the war, and therefore we did what was right. How about applying that to this question? No submarine did come over, and therefore there was no great danger to our coast over here, as proved by what happened.

Admiral BADGER. We could not see the point then, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. But is it not true, Admiral, that the large bulk of the expert naval opinion of the Allies was to the effect that the submarine menace was principally over on the other side?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; it was, undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the value of the submarine to Germany was for what it could do over on the other side near her base?

Admiral BADGER. It undoubtedly was; but we had had two object lessons before the war, apparently. We had had a submarine come over, go into harbor——

The CHAIRMAN. Before we entered the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; go into the harbor of Newport with all the privileges of a visiting man of war, leave Newport, go out over the shoals past Nantucket lightship, and sink some five or six ships then and there, and then go back home again.

The CHAIRMAN. And that fear of what might happen and what did not happen would justify us in withholding our assistance from the other side?

Admiral BADGER. For a reasonable time.

The CHAIRMAN. And for just as long as we withheld that assistance, by just so long we delayed putting down the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. We delayed to that extent; but I am not saying——

The CHAIRMAN. To the extent that we withheld it, we delayed!

Admiral BADGER. I do not want to get this mixed. I am not saying that the submarines did not go on destroying property. What I am standing for is that because we did not send over sooner than we did we did not prolong the war and cause those enormous losses stated in the hearing of Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell asked you if it was a question between getting men for the naval reserve or men for the regular navy, whether you would not give up the naval reserve in order to get men for the regular Navy.

Admiral BADGER. The question was, as I understood the question, could it be preferable? Supposing you were building up a naval reserve, but had vacancies in the regular Navy, which would you fill first? And I say that I would fill the vacancies in the regular navy first.

The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly; but if you found that you could not get men into the regular Navy, would you not in every way try to get them for the reserve?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; but we want men first in the Navy, and second in the reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Testimony, I think, has shown that in many cases it was not possible to get them for the regular Navy, whereas you could get them into the reserve.

Admiral BADGER. I do not know as to that.

The CHAIRMAN. In such cases you would do everything you could to get them into the reserve at least, as the second best thing you could do, would you not?

Admiral BADGER. If within the law, I would get men for the reserve if I could not get them for the regular Navy; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And after the war had commenced it made very little difference whether the men were in the reserve or in the regular Navy; they were all used, were they not?

Admiral BADGER. They were all used; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were all given training?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; they were all used. They were all given training, of course. They had their values. There were some classes of the reserve; there were certain limitations upon their employment, etc. But, speaking generally, the reserve was absolutely necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. And the reserve, of course, did a great deal of value during the war?

Admiral BADGER. A very great deal. We could not have gotten along without them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that we were adequately prepared as to personnel at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral BADGER. I think not. I think that in accordance with the General Board's views we should have had more men at the commencement of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not at one time in your testimony refer to armed guard preparation as early as 1917?

Admiral BADGER. I have said that the first ship with an armed guard was in March, 1917, I think, a month before the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but did you not refer in your testimony to the question of putting armed guards on ships as early as 1914 or 1915?

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

Subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Pittman, and Trammell.

CHAIRMAN. Have you a statement to make, Capt. Pratt, about matters connected with this investigation?

PRATT. Yes; I have prepared a statement.

CHAIRMAN. First, will you state what were your duties in the room from the time of the commencement of the World War in 1914, up to the present time?

STATEMENT OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

PRATT. Yes, sir. Just previous to the World War Admiral Sims and I went to the torpedo flotilla together, he as commander of the flotilla and I as Chief of Staff. We were serving in this capacity when the World War broke out. I was Chief of Staff and in command of the submarine chaser *Birmingham*. I served on that vessel with Admiral Sims until November, 1915, on which date I was ordered by Operations to proceed to the Panama Canal in connection with the defense of the canal, working in cooperation with Gen. Edwards, who was in command of troops.

I remained on that duty until September, 1916, when I was ordered to the War College, where I was serving until April 6, 1917, when I went into the World War.

From that date, about February 1, I was doing additional duty in the planning section of the Office of Operations. I continued on that duty until the outbreak of the World War in April, 1917, when I did duty entirely in the Office of Operations, in the plans section. I continued on planning duty with no executive functions until July 7, 1917, when, on the death of Capt. V. O. Chase, I was appointed aide for operations to Admiral Benson, and some time later I was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by the Navy Department, which duty I held until January 5, 1919.

CHAIRMAN. And you are now——

PRATT. I am now in command of the U. S. S. *New York*, to which I have been detailed to that duty in January of 1919.

CHAIRMAN. So that you are no longer in the Bureau of Operations?

PRATT. I am no longer in the Office of Operations.

Members of the committee, with your permission I would like to state the subjects under discussion; that is, the points brought up

Admiral BADGER. Yes, if he so desires. There is no law covering the subject. The General Board exists only by the Secretary's order.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation—

Admiral BADGER. Exists by law.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation is the appointee of the Secretary and would be apt to reflect the Secretary's views rather more than the General Board, would he not?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I would not like to say that. I think of every man——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean that the General Board does not feel bound by the views of anybody?

Admiral BADGER. No. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. While the bureau chiefs undoubtedly would!

Admiral BADGER. Bureau chiefs have to be, within proper limits, loyal to their chief, or get out, one of the two.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any such thing as a war and navy board?

Admiral BADGER. There is a joint board; yes, sir. There are several of those boards, but you are doubtless referring to what is called the joint board?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Composed of naval officers and Army officers of high rank. Formerly the joint board, until within, indeed, the last year, had two members of the General Board of the Navy on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on the joint board during the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that board meet?

Admiral BADGER. We met, but we did not meet very often or very satisfactorily.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you instructed to draw up any plans?

Admiral BADGER. No; the trouble with the joint board was that there were many ranking officers on it, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the commander of the Coast Artillery, and the president of the War College—there was not any War College during the war, so that there was the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, and the commander of the Coast Artillery—and it was almost impossible to get those men, because they were busy with war duties, and had no time for coming to any board. On the Navy side we had the Chief of Operations, an admiral who was on the Council of National Defense, myself, and the president of the War College, I think; and we never could get anybody but myself. I was usually the only man who would attend the board meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any other board that could act jointly with the Army?

Admiral BADGER. I think there was no regular board. There were several minor boards composed of Army and Navy officers.

The CHAIRMAN. But not for any general thing?

Admiral BADGER. Not for any general thing.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no actual cooperation as between the members of that board?

Admiral BADGER. As a general thing we did have meetings, and the officers laid down very important things, to me, when there was any necessity for it; but it was very difficult to get meetings; that is what I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the recommendations of that joint board allowed in any case?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know. I think so. So far as I can remember, they always came back approved. There were no very important, far-reaching questions discussed during the time of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. You never took up the question of handling the recruits who were to go abroad?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the matter of the coast defenses?

Admiral BADGER. Those questions came up, and recommendations were made with regard to the coast defenses in various ways, particularly with regard to the mining of the entrances to harbors.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any orders to meet as a board?

Admiral BADGER. No; we met when papers accumulated.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any orders not to meet?

Admiral BADGER. No, not during my membership.

The CHAIRMAN. Simply, you never did much of anything? It never was regarded as an active board?

Admiral BADGER. It was regarded as an active board, but in the press of the war operations it was not frequently called upon in important matters.

I want to say that that board has been rehabilitated now. They have changed the membership, and they have regular meetings and from all that I hear, without being absolutely involved—I am no longer a member, myself—I understand that they are taking up very important questions and settling them now. It has become a very important board.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in February, 1917, receive a request from the Secretary of the Navy to draw up a war plan—did the General Board receive such a request?

Admiral BADGER. I remember that case. There was a paper sent, involving a problem of war—connected with this particular war.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the problem?

Admiral BADGER. It was quite a paper. It involved advice as to the operations necessary to conduct the war, taking up the question of submarine warfare, among the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it a general war plan?

Admiral BADGER. No, it was a problem with regard to the conduct of this particular war.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to all problems of this particular war or some specific problem of this particular war?

Admiral BADGER. As I remember it, it was rather restricted.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get a copy of that letter for the committee so that we can put it in the record?

Admiral BADGER. I can not give you a copy of that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not give a copy of that letter?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir. I have searched for that letter, and it has disappeared from the records. I have had a search in the records of the General Board, and I can not find it in the general records of the Navy Department or in the records of the Division of Operations. In fact, I can not find a copy of it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no way of getting it?

Admiral BADGER. No way of getting it. The answer was prepared under Admiral Fletcher, who was then the head of the planning

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

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Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a statement to make, Capt. Pratt, about matters connected with this investigation?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I have prepared a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. First, will you state what were your duties in the navy from the time of the commencement of the World War in August, 1914, up to the present time?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. Just previous to the World War Admiral Sims and I went to the torpedo flotilla together, he as commander of the flotilla and I as Chief of Staff. We were serving in this capacity in 1914 when the World War broke out. I was Chief of Staff and in command of the submarine chaser *Birmingham*. I served on that ship and with Admiral Sims until November, 1915, on which date I was ordered by Operations to proceed to the Panama Canal in connection with the defense of the canal, working in cooperation with General Lawrence Edwards, who was in command of troops.

I served on that duty until September, 1916, when I was ordered to the Army War College, where I was serving until April 6, 1917, when we went into the World War.

Prior to that date, about February 1, I was doing additional duty in the plans section of the Office of Operations. I continued on that additional duty until the outbreak of the World War in April, 1917, when I did duty entirely in the Office of Operations, in the plans section. I continued on planning duty with no executive functions until July, 1917, when, on the death of Capt. V. O. Chase, I was appointed aide for operations to Admiral Benson, and some time after that was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by the Secretary, which duty I held until January 5, 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are now——

Capt. PRATT. I am now in command of the U. S. S. *New York*, having been detailed to that duty in January of 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you are no longer in the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I am no longer in the Office of Operations.

Gentlemen of the committee, with your permission I would like to handle the subjects under discussion; that is, the points brought up

were in reserve and unmanned or only partly manned when
ered war?

ral BADGER. No, sir, I can not tell you that.

'HAIRMAN. Did the obligation of neutrality forbid this country
eguarding itself against a German attack by making our fleet,
pects, ready for battle after the sinking of the *Lusitania*,
1915 and 1916?

ral BADGER. No. It depended on how far they wanted to go.

'HAIRMAN. You think that was enough of a warning so that
at liberty to prepare ourselves in every way?

ral BADGER. Yes, sir.

reupon, at 1.40 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned
onday, April 19, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

the

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

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Washington, D. C.

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V. PRATT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

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Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 16, 1920.

y.
chairman subcommittee Senate Naval
official documents and certain statements

Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee
the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 13,

ary of the Navy to Hon. Frederick Hale, chair-
Affairs Committee, dated April 5, 1920.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
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The CHAIRMAN. And you are now——

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The CHAIRMAN. So that you are no longer in the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I am no longer in the Office of Operations.

Gentlemen of the committee, with your permission I would like to handle the subjects under discussion; that is, the points brought up

by Admiral Sims's letter and the additional evidence introduced in the following manner:

- (a) Review of first 77 paragraphs of Admiral Sims's letter.
- (b) Discuss some of the points brought up in the additional testimony.
- (c) Sum up the charges set forth in paragraph 78 of the letter and in the additional testimony.

The above gives a viewpoint of the subject at the present date April, 1920.

It is then considered desirable to present additional testimony in the shape of—

- (d) Letter written in November, 1918, after the armistice, outlining in general terms the naval activities during the war.
- (e) Certain documents on file in the department bearing on the critical six months mentioned in Admiral Sims's testimony.
- (f) Final statement.

As authority for the statements I may make, I desire to inform the committee that from the date of our entry into the war in April until June 25, 1917, I was attached to the office of operations in a subordinate capacity as a member of the plans section and acted in a somewhat advisory capacity with no actual administrative functions. On June 25, 1917, upon the death of my predecessor, Capt. V. O. Chase, United States Navy, I was appointed first aid to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson, and some time after was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by the Secretary which office I held until January 5, 1919.

I was in general charge of plans, policy, and operations and acted as a sort of general manager under my chief, Admiral Benson. To the best of my knowledge I was in his full confidence and believe that I enjoyed the confidence of the Secretary of the Navy in all matters pertaining to my sphere of activities.

From the date of my appointment to the above offices I assume full responsibility for all advice given pertaining to my office, and for any acts which I may have committed either while Acting Chief of Naval Operations during Admiral Benson's visits abroad or while Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, or aid for operations.

Before commencing upon the routine I would like to speak of the letter, Mr. Chairman, which you sent to the Secretary, dated April 13, 1920, which I received only the other day, April 17, relating to certain correspondence which you wished filed before your committee, and state the action that I have taken. I have here your letter together with the Secretary's reply to it, which I have presented to the Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and asked him to give me everything pertaining thereto. If you find there is something you need more, I can then send it all over to you. This is the first opportunity that I have really had to collect possibly some of the data which you might want.

(The letters referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE.
April 13, 1920.

HON. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On January 9 Senator Page wrote you a letter asking for detailed information concerning all ships of the Navy prior to and on the declaration of war with Germany. In your reply to him of February 4 you stated that you would

this information collected and that you hoped to have it ready by the time the committee should take up its investigation. On March 24 I wrote you a letter asking for this information, and it has not been furnished either to Senator Page or myself. Will you please see that I have the information at once, as I shall need it for use in the investigation which is now going on? I have received no reply to my letter of March 24, which also asked for official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony before the subcommittee, and a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable. This information also I would like at once for use in the investigation.

Sincerely, yours,

FREDERICK HALE.

Chairman Subcommittee Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

Y DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of the 13th in which you refer to letters and cables, requesting official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony, and a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable.

I note that in Admiral Sims's testimony, on page 27, that Admiral Sims states in answer to a question from the chairman:

To give you an idea of the magnitude of the job, I may say that I do not know how many dispatches there were, but they are in the hundreds of thousands. I asked a statistician some time ago how many there were and he said that if they were all laid up in boards and set on a shelf, that shelf would have to be 140 feet long in order to contain them. Of course, the committee does not want them all.

Senator TRAMMELL. And your reference will refer to the particular numbers, and what they can be found?

Admiral SIMS. Out of those miles of dispatches I am only selecting representative ones, and out of those representative ones I am selecting those that illustrate the point in question; and of all those dispatches, of which there are probably 100,000, I am only selecting a certain number, and those can be included; and if, after my testimony is concluded, you decide that it would be advisable, you can put them in in full; but in the meantime there are only extracts from these dispatches." All the clerical force of the Navy Department is now only sufficient to care for its regular work, and to comply with your request regarding making official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony will take some time.

However, if you insist, I shall be pleased to have these copies prepared.

As to making a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable, I am unable at this late date to make proper reply. The officers most capable of answering these questions are Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral Kean and Capt. Pratt. These officers will undoubtedly be called before your committee and will be in a position to answer any questions regarding them you may submit.

I shall forward a copy of this correspondence to Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral Kean, and Capt. Pratt.

Very respectfully,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Hon. FREDERICK HALE,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 16, 1920.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.

Subject: Request of Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, for certain copies of official documents and certain statements in regard to same.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of letter from Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 13, 1920.

(B) Copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, dated April 5, 1920.

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- (e) Certain documents on file in the department bearing on the critical six months mentioned in Admiral Sims's testimony.
- (f) Final statement.

As authority for the statements I may make, I desire to inform the committee that from the date of our entry into the war in April until June 25, 1917, I was attached to the office of operations in a subordinate capacity as a member of the plans section and acted in a somewhat advisory capacity with no actual administrative functions. On June 25, 1917, upon the death of my predecessor, Capt. V. O. Chase, United States Navy, I was appointed first aid to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson, and some time after was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by the Secretary, which office I held until January 5, 1919.

I was in general charge of plans, policy, and operations and acted as a sort of general manager under my chief, Admiral Benson. To the best of my knowledge I was in his full confidence and believe that I enjoyed the confidence of the Secretary of the Navy in all matters pertaining to my sphere of activities.

From the date of my appointment to the above offices I assume full responsibility for all advice given pertaining to my office, and for any acts which I may have committed either while Acting Chief of Naval Operations during Admiral Benson's visits abroad or while Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, or aid for operations.

Before commencing upon the routine I would like to speak of the letter, Mr. Chairman, which you sent to the Secretary, dated April 13, 1920, which I received only the other day, April 17, relating to certain correspondence which you wished filed before your committee, and state the action that I have taken. I have here your letter together with the Secretary's reply to it, which I have presented to the Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and asked him to give me everything pertaining thereto. If you find there is something you need more, I can then send it all over to you. This is the first opportunity that I have really had to collect possibly some of the data which you might want.

(The letters referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE.

April 13, 1920.

HON. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On January 9 Senator Page wrote you a letter asking for detailed information concerning all ships of the Navy prior to and on the declaration of war with Germany. In your reply to him of February 4 you stated that you would

this information collected and that you hoped to have it ready by the time the committee should take up its investigation. On March 24 I wrote you a letter asking for this information, and it has not been furnished either to Senator Page or to myself. Will you please see that I have the information at once, as I shall need it for use in the investigation which is now going on? I have received no reply to my letter of March 24, which also asked for official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony before the subcommittee, and a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable. This information also I would like at once for use in the investigation.

Sincerely, yours,

FREDERICK HALE.

Chairman Subcommittee Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of the 13th in which you refer to letters and cables, requesting official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony, and a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable.

I note that in Admiral Sims's testimony, on page 27, that Admiral Sims states in answer to a question from the chairman:

To give you an idea of the magnitude of the job, I may say that I do not know how many dispatches there were, but they are in the hundreds of thousands. I asked my statistician some time ago how many there were and he said that if they were bound up in boards and set on a shelf, that shelf would have to be 140 feet long in order to contain them. Of course, the committee does not want them all.

Senator TRAMMELL. And your reference will refer to the particular numbers, that they can be found?

Admiral SIMS. Out of those miles of dispatches I am only selecting representative ones, and out of those representative ones I am selecting those that illustrate the point in question; and of all those dispatches, of which there are probably 100,000, I am only selecting a certain number, and those can be included; and if, after my testimony is concluded, you decide that it would be advisable, you can put them in in full; but in the meantime there are only extracts from these dispatches."

All the clerical force of the Navy Department is now only sufficient to care for its regular work, and to comply with your request regarding making official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony will take some time.

However, if you insist, I shall be pleased to have these copies prepared.

As to making a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable, I am unable at this late date to make proper reply. The officers most capable of answering these questions are Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral Kean and Capt. Pratt. These officers will undoubtedly be called before your committee and will be in a position to answer any questions regarding them you may submit.

I shall forward a copy of this correspondence to Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral Kean, and Capt. Pratt.

Very respectfully,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Hon. FREDERICK HALE,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 16, 1920.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.

Subject: Request of Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, for certain copies of official documents and certain statements in regard to same.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of letter from Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 13, 1920.

(B) Copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, dated April 5, 1920.

1. There are forwarded for your information copies of the above-mentioned correspondence.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Capt. PRATT. I shall read each paragraph of the letter of Admiral Sims upon which I wish to comment and then read the comment that I have to make upon that section. Where I make no comment I note that no comment is necessary. On the first paragraph of Admiral Sims's letter no comment is necessary.

The second paragraph of his letter reads as follows:

2. This is especially true of a naval war of such a peculiar character that the experience of former wars was of little assistance in determining the proper policy and in developing the unusual tactics that were rendered necessary by the number, geographical position, and resources of the countries involved, and by the enemy's method of submarine attack upon merchant shipping in disregard of the tenets of international law and the laws of humanity.

Paragraph 2. This is somewhat misleading. No new principles of broad general policy and strategy are introduced. A novel weapon, the submarine, has been introduced. The introduction of this weapon has rendered necessary certain tactical innovations to combat it. But the broad principles which must govern the general conduct of war remain the same.

Paragraph 3. No comment.

Paragraph 4. No comment.

Paragraph 5 of Admiral Sims's letter read as follows:

5. This is not presented solely from the viewpoint of the commander of our relatively small naval forces in Europe, but specifically as a result of the experience necessarily gained in the unusual and very responsible position of the Navy Department's representative in the naval council of the Allies, where only all allied plans and policies could be continuously discussed, and where only all essential information, both current and general, was at all times available.

The answer to that paragraph, 5, is that our forces in Europe were relatively small in comparison with the forces of the Allies, but toward the close of hostilities they were not small compared with our own forces at home. In this paragraph the major mission has been correctly stated which was that of "Navy Department's representative in Europe." More specifically he was the commander of our forces in European waters, also the direct representative in the war zone of the Chief of Naval Operations. His duties, in order of relative importance, comprise the following:

(a) The direct representative of the Chief of Naval Operations in Europe (with office in London).

(b) Our naval representative in the Allied Naval Council.

(c) Our chief naval executive in Europe who received, referred, transmitted, and carried out such parts of the plans of the Allied Naval Council, as involved our naval forces abroad; which plans and policies has received the approval of our own Government.

(d) The executive abroad in all other matters of United States naval policy and strategy, when that policy and strategy had received the sanction of the home government.

(e) The chief naval executive in all matters pertaining to the broad questions of naval tactics in the war zone, exercising his authority either directly or through his subordinates who were in command of our various naval forces operating in different localities in the war zone.

information is coming to my attention through persons (not connected with either the New York Shipbuilding Co. or the Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.) to effect that officers of both of these corporations have stated that they would be in position to turn out a large number of the larger cargo vessels for this corporation which the Navy program to which they are committed could be deferred.

In order not to interfere with the Navy program I have been careful to make no mention of any of the large shipbuilding companies, including the foregoing, who are at all committed to naval vessels. Based on this later information and as an answer to the suggestion contained in my letter of May 28, above referred to, I now ask that you consider the possibility of permitting this corporation to avail itself of the facilities for building large cargo vessels that are only available at large shipbuilding plants by permitting two of the larger plants as selected by you to place their facilities at the disposal of this corporation as soon as practicable, so far as naval interests are concerned.

Yours, very truly,

GEO. W. GOETHALS, *General Manager.*

Capt. PRATT (continuing). This minority report I have mentioned and read portions of, because it indicates what we did right in line with building up the destroyer force of the Navy to combat the marine menace, and I know that it was carried out. [Reading:]

DECISION 3-E—IMMEDIATE MISSION.

TITLE OF THE POLICY FOR COOPERATING WITH THE EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY GEN. GOETHALS.

JUNE 7, 1917.

2. Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.

Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: Cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in the matter of propositions submitted by Gen. G. W. Goethals, general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

Reference: A Letter of May 28, 1917, from United States Shipping Board to the Secretary of the Navy.

The importance and seriousness of this subject, together with the necessity of being first of all at a correct naval policy which shall coordinate its efforts with efforts of those engaged in supplying the tremendous wastage in cargo tonnage met by the submarine campaign, leads me to submit this letter. Were all views exactly in accord there could be no discussion. There is, however, a decided diversity of opinion in the matter of the naval policy to be pursued. This letter is in accord with the general view of the office; but it is submitted as one view of what the policy should be.

Coming to the present emergency, the Navy Department recognizes the building of cargo vessels is a measure of importance commensurate with the building of warships. Since in the department's opinion the building of a wooden fleet is far adequate or a permanent way of meeting the situation, which must be met by steel construction, the Navy Department is glad to cooperate with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in every way possible in enabling it to put its building program into operation.

A statement of the department's policy as regards the order of importance of ships to be laid down is as follows: (1) Submarine chasers, (2) Destroyers,

(3) Scout cruisers, (4) Submarines, large and small, (5) Battleships, (6) Fuel ships, (7) Destroyer tenders, (8) Submarine tenders, (9) Hospital ships, (10) Ammunition ships, (11) Repair ships, (12) Transports, (13) Gunboats, (14) Battle ships.

The first five types, with the exception of (3), scout cruisers of which only a limited number to serve as destroyer flotilla leaders should be laid down, are types of ships which are needed at present, and the naval needs are such that all vessels of these types authorized should be begun at once.

Of equal importance to the above ships come the heavy merchant cargo carriers contemplated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

Naval ships coming under heads (6) to (12), inclusive, could if necessity arise be supplied out of the very types of ships to be built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

Admiral Grant, Royal Navy, acted as the liaison officer between the Admiralty in London, and the Office of Operations, Washington, and as his office was established here, he was in daily consultation with our office.

Paragraph 6. On this I make no comment.

Paragraph 7 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

7. Brief orders were delivered to me verbally in Washington. No formal instructions or statement of the Navy Department's plans or policy were received at that time, though I received the following explicit admonition: "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."

In reply to that, I would say: I have no first-hand knowledge as to what person made this remark. I have this comment to make. In April, 1917, Admiral Sims, an officer with friendly sentiments toward the British, was sent to England. On June 25, 1917, Capt. Pratt, who had formerly been Chief of Staff for Admiral Sims for over two years, and himself holding friendly sentiments toward the British and French, was made Admiral Benson's aide for operations. Shortly after he was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. On February 2, 1918, Admiral Mayo's estimate that he should proceed to European waters and take command there was not approved by the department. On April 12, 1918, a similar decision of Admiral Mayo was not approved by the department. On August 10, 1918, another estimate and similar decision of Admiral Mayo was again not approved by the department. These estimates of Admiral Mayo's were sound from the viewpoint of our fleet, but Admiral Benson's entire desire was to cooperate along the lines of and in accordance with plans laid down by the Allies and not to disrupt the present arrangement which might have taken place, as Admiral Mayo was senior to Admiral Sims. This seems to indicate a desire to cooperate with our allies even at the expense of our own naval pride, and to support Admiral Sims.

Paragraph 8. No comment, except that his assumed mission was in harmony with the department's intention.

The ninth paragraph of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

9. I arrived in Liverpool on April 9, and in London on April 10, 1917, and went immediately to the admiralty, where the naval situation was fully explained by the responsible officials. This explanation showed that the Navy Department did not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation; that its information was very incomplete and inaccurate. This was due to the insufficient scope of its intelligence service, very few naval officers having been sent to Europe for information before we entered the war.

In regard to paragraph 9, quite correct. This information was later partially given by the various allied missions sent to Washington. For the greater part, however, this information was given to us by the splendid service built up in Europe largely through the efforts of Admiral Sims, with the cooperation of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, which is a division of the Office of Operations. In my opinion our intelligence service in Europe should have been expanded earlier, whether we contemplated entering the war or not.

Paragraph 10 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

10. A review of the cables sent to the department in April, 1917, shows that the situation was very serious, and that the enemy was rapidly winning the war by the destruction of merchant shipping. Throughout the following year numerous cables and letters of the most urgent possible character were sent with the object of impressing

It must have been noted that upon our entry into this war a certain tension between this country and Japan was immediately relaxed. They immediately, in certain press articles, suggested a close cooperation with the United States. Close cooperation now with Japan is, to my mind, the key to the solution of what we have been a future problem.

Therefore if we concentrate our present naval building efforts to—

1. A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs.

2. Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.

3. Battleships laid down and now on the ways.

4. Certain types of small craft, such as tugs and sweepers.

5. Coöperate with the Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers, we will have put the Navy's best efforts not for the Navy alone, but for the country, and especially the Allies, whose war is now our own.

6. For the above reasons I am obliged to differ with the consensus of opinion issued in the Office of Operations and implied in the General Board's recommendation, and do concur in the opinion and propositions expressed in Gen. Goethals's report of May 28, 1917, with the modification set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.

W. V. PRATT.

The CHAIRMAN. That was signed by you?

Capt. PRATT. I signed it. At the time, in view of the letter writing I was appointed as head of the board by the Secretary of the Navy. We did not submit our plans finally until July 6. It took me time to mature it and get it out; that is, how we would best seek to operate against the submarine. This was called the Board of Devices and Plans. That is, it was a board of devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. The members were appointed by the President?

Capt. PRATT. It was a board appointed some time in May or June to confer with the British and French scientists that came over here, and in doing so we went beyond our instructions a bit, and took into consideration everything which could be done in every way, not only in connection with sound devices, which was the principal motive of this mission, but we went further, having already introduced that matter, and put forth a plan which the Secretary signed immediately, adopting a very extensive plan, of the switching of the entire battle-ship program to a destroyer program.

That report is as follows:

REPORT OF BOARD ON DEVICES AND PLANS CONNECTED WITH SUBMARINE WARFARE
TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, July 6, 1917.

1. Board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

2. Secretary of the Navy.

Subject. Summary of conclusions of the board, with recommendations.

1. The board designated by your orders to consider devices and plans connected with submarine warfare has carefully considered many suggestions for dealing with the submarine situation, and submits a preliminary report of its conclusions, with recommendations.

2. The board has given careful study to the discussions of the English and French scientific commissions to this country; has considered the progress made in the United States on the study of the submarine situation; has considered various reports from commanding officers of armed guards; reports from Vice Admiral Sims, and Naval Intelligence reports.

3. The board now considers it a duty to bring to your attention the urgent need of immediately securing an adequate supply of material required for an aggressive submarine campaign, and the formulation of plans to impress into service at the earliest possible moment all available United States vessels that will be of use in offensive operations against enemy submarines.

7. It, therefore, becomes evident that any cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation must be along lines represented by classes (3) and (14).

8. It is therefore believed that the first proposition submitted by Gen. Goethals is sound and that the Navy Department should cooperate to this extent. No new ships for the Navy of classes (6) to (12), inclusive, will be laid down on ways outside of navy yard ways without an adjustment first with the Emergency Fleet Corporation, so long as the present emergency exists. If, however, due to this policy the shortages in such types of naval auxiliaries severely handicap the Navy, it is agreed that the Emergency Fleet Corporation will meet this need out of its own vessels building.

9. It is also believed that the second proposition is sound and that the Navy Department should cooperate to the extent of relieving any or all of the four building ways (not in a navy yard on the Atlantic coast) now under construction for the battle cruisers, in order that said ways may be used by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This arrangement to hold good during the present emergency, or unless a new military necessity demands a new arrangement.

10. It is not the department's policy to allow cargo carrying merchant ships to be laid down on any ways in the existing navy yards. Such construction cramps the yard facilities and handicaps the purpose for which these yards were originally established, viz, the repairs of naval vessels already in service. But in view of the present emergency it is believed that any battle cruisers' ways laid down in a navy yard on the Pacific coast could be temporarily loaned to the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

11. The above views are held because it is believed:

(a) A successful termination of this war will preclude the chance of another for some term of years.

(b) For the allied purposes, merchant ships are as essential to the successful termination of this war as battleships, and that their construction is even more important at present.

(c) The counter for the United States, in case of an unsuccessful termination of this war, lies in: (1) In our naval submarine. (2) In conscription.

(d) Of new future possible opponents other than the present opponents—(1) The chances are remote, owing to present alliances. (2) We are already stronger than any other probable opponents. (3) It would be better to buy our battle cruisers or battleships from our present allies (in case they were needed) than to lay them down now in the present emergency, an emergency which must be met now.

(e) In case this war terminates successfully, the merchant ships laid down by us will be the most useful types in existence in furthering the ultimate good of the country.

12. Finally, we did not enter this war alone. We have allies, and their efforts against the now common enemy have stood between us and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. Their needs are immediate and imperative. Their cause is our cause now. The decision to the estimate of the situation as made in this office was as follows:

"IMMEDIATE MISSION.

"To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers."

And a second important but future mission was:

"Develop the full military and naval strength of the United States as far as possible."

In a paper of April 5, 1917, the General Board, writing on the subject "Assistance that United States can give allies upon declaration of war," makes several pertinent suggestions, of which one is as follows: "Keep constantly in view the possibility of the United States being in the not distant future compelled to conduct a war single-handed against some of the present belligerents and steadily increase the strength of the fighting line," etc. That remark is pertinent and sound, but it does not mean that one fraction of the strength of the effort we should put into the successful accomplishment of the immediate mission should be sacrificed to any possible future contingency. Moreover, the day that the conscription law passed and universal training was assured to the peoples of our country its future security was guaranteed in a manner past every future building program the Navy might attempt.

13. A hasty review of the international situation leads me to the conclusions that England's fleet will never be allowed to pass into German hands, nor can it be quiescent while Germany works her will on any of the present allies. It is the death of England to allow it. If at the end of this war strained relations should arise with England (a proposition which seems to me untenable), no amount of feverish building of dreadnoughts or battle cruisers could hope to put us in a position to cope with her on the high seas. In such a contingency our efforts should now be directed toward building our submarine fleet in both the offensive and information types.

14. It must have been noted that upon our entry into this war a certain tension existing between this country and Japan was immediately relaxed. They immediately, in certain press articles, suggested a close cooperation with the United States. This close cooperation now with Japan is, to my mind, the key to the solution of what might have been a future problem.

15. Therefore if we concentrate our present naval building efforts to—

(1) A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs.

(2) Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.

(3) Battleships laid down and now on the ways.

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(5) Cooperate with the Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers, we will have put forth the Navy's best efforts not for the Navy alone, but for the country, and especially for the Allies, whose war is now our own.

16. For the above reasons I am obliged to differ with the consensus of opinion expressed in the Office of Operations and implied in the General Board's recommendations, and do concur in the opinion and propositions expressed in Gen. Goethals's letter of May 28, 1917, with the modification set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.

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TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

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To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Summary of conclusions of the board, with recommendations.

1. The board designated by your orders to consider devices and plans connected with submarine warfare has carefully considered many suggestions for dealing with the submarine situation, and submits a preliminary report of its conclusions, with recommendations.

2. The board has given careful study to the discussions of the English and French scientific commissions to this country; has considered the progress made in the United States on the study of the submarine situation; has considered various reports from commanding officers of armed guards; reports from Vice Admiral Sims, and Naval Intelligence reports.

3. The board now considers it a duty to bring to your attention the urgent need of immediately securing an adequate supply of material required for an aggressive submarine campaign, and the formulation of plans to impress into service at the earliest possible moment all available United States vessels that will be of use in offensive operations against enemy submarines.

MERCHANT SHIP PROTECTION.

4. Torpedo nets and similar protecting devices of many forms have been considered, and rejected, as being impracticable. They all have the serious fault of greatly reducing the ships' speed; are very cumbersome and difficult to handle; and above all are of very doubtful usefulness in preventing damage to the ship carrying them.

5. Plans for reducing visibility have been considered; including methods of ship's painting; smoke elimination by use of oil engines; and smoke elimination by use of special fuels. The board is of the opinion that every practicable means of reducing visibility should be employed.

6. High speed and zigzag steering are considered to be very simple and effective means of preventing successful submarine attack. In clear weather all vessels in the danger zone should be required to steam at highest speed and on zigzag courses.

7. The armament of merchant ships has been considered. There are two considerations to be met. First, engagement at long range, for which guns of 3-inch caliber and above are required. Second, engagement at very close range, for which small caliber guns capable of large angle of depression are required. One-pounder guns mounted on the ends of bridges are considered by the board to be satisfactory for this latter purpose. Howitzers of the most efficient type should be supplied as soon as possible. Their use at ranges below 2,000 yards is of the utmost necessity.

8. Armed guards and lookouts must be made as efficient and effective as possible. This board is of the opinion that the present methods of supplying armed guards, their training, etc., are in general satisfactory. In connection with the training of the armed guards it is strongly urged that merchant ship captains and other officers be required to attend a naval school of instruction and be taught all methods of avoiding submarine attack. The board is also of the opinion that lookouts must be very carefully selected and trained.

9. Depth charges for merchant vessels present a debatable question. If launched over the side they would be a source of danger to own vessel, unless launched from a point near the stern when the vessel was making at least 10 knots. The board is of the opinion that even a remote chance of using a depth charge successfully in this manner warrants the issue of a small number of those charges to those merchant vessels whose armed guard is under the command of a commissioned officer. The projection of depth charges by means of a howitzer or bomb-throwing device is considered by the board to be a very important matter. Some simple equipment of this kind should be supplied merchant vessels without delay.

10. Smoke boxes of two types have been considered, both of which have sufficient merit to warrant their use. The first type is for use on board own vessel; the second type for use by throwing overboard. A smoke-producing torpedo has been proposed. The board is of the opinion that this plan is impracticable. A smoke-producing bomb, to be thrown by the depth-charge howitzer or the bomb-throwing device, has also been considered. The board is of the opinion that this idea should be developed and the plan put into operation.

11. Several special methods of ship construction and loading of cargoes to render vessels unsinkable have been considered. The board is of the opinion that while this general subject is of great interest and that the plans should be encouraged, they are not preventive methods with which this board is principally concerned.

12. If a simple and efficient sound detection device can be perfected which can be used at speeds up to 12 knots, the board is of the opinion that all merchant ships should be required to carry these devices as a means of evading submarines.

FIXED BARRIERS.

13. Fixed barriers, consisting of several types of nets, anchored mines, and the combination of nets and mines, have all been considered. The board is of the opinion that these devices should be used to completely protect the important harbors of our own coast; and that there may be use for such obstructions abroad. The board is of the opinion that the United States Navy should immediately collect ready for use, a very large quantity of this material, especially offensive mines.

FLOATING BARRIERS OR TRAPS.

14. Floating obstructions consisting of nets, mines, or a combination of nets and mines have been considered, and the board is of the opinion that while there are many objections to the use of these devices when uncontrolled, there is a real use for mine-

and mine-loaded sweeps, either by a single vessel or by a pair of vessels. There are objections to this last plan, but it has some merit, and a limited supply of such material should be made available, at least enough to insure a thorough trial.

UNDERWATER SOUND DETECTORS AND DIRECTION INDICATORS.

Several devices and plans for underwater sound detection and direction finding have been considered; not in detail, but their general characteristics considered with reference to their practical use, and the board is of the opinion that two general classes of devices are required for immediate use: 1st, a simple microphone or magnetophone adapted so as to be a direction indicator, suitable for use on all small patrol vessels, and a more elaborate detector of audible or subaudible sound waves which can be used on destroyers, yachts, merchant vessels, etc., and be used effectively when a vessel is under way at high speed. The board is informed that encouraging progress is being made to develop both classes of devices, and is of the opinion that plans should now be made for their supply and issue, and that immediate steps should be taken to instruct and train the personnel required to operate these devices.

MAGNETIC DETECTORS.

Magnetic detectors have been considered. The board is of the opinion that there is little hope for success in developing a magnetic detecting device that can be used successfully on board a rolling and pitching vessel. At best such a device would be of very limited use. Experimental work along these lines should be conducted so as not to interfere with more important experiments and tests. The principal reason for carrying on experimental work along this line is the hope that it may lead to the development of some useful device.

SOUND ECHO METHODS.

Sound echo methods are being investigated by the engineers of the General Electric Co. and the Western Electric Co. It is hoped that this method can be developed for use in detecting mine cases and submarines when resting on the bottom or so resting that sound devices can not be employed. It is believed that this method requires considerable time for its development and that when developed, the apparatus used will not be simple in construction and operation.

UNDER-WATER VISION.

No means of securing under-water vision have been proposed, although the idea has been suggested. The board can make no comment on this subject; except that although a successful means is found, its useful application must necessarily be so restricted as to make it of very little value.

AIRCRAFT.

Many suggestions have been made for the employment of aircraft alone and, in conjunction with patrol vessels, for the detection and destruction of submarines. The board is of the opinion that with the development of our coastal air stations there should be undertaken as quickly as possible tests and experiments to fully determine the fitness of all types of aircraft for this purpose.

Aircraft are used abroad in large numbers in antisubmarine warfare. The board is of the opinion that this branch of the United States Naval Service should be very promptly expanded to be prepared for such operations. As aircraft will undoubtedly be of very great value, especially as the war progresses, the board is of the opinion that large numbers of the most suitable types be contracted for immediately, so that they will be available when a definite plan has been worked out for their employment. Otherwise delay in securing the aircraft will prevent the prompt execution of the plan.

VESSELS FOR CHASE AND DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES.

The board has considered the question of the best type of vessels to be used in tracking down and destroying submarines, and is of the opinion that the one best type is the destroyer, fitted with sound detecting devices capable of use while the destroyer is under way and of determining direction. The reasons for this opinion

are that only this type has the necessary characteristics of speed, seaworthiness, habitability, reliability, and endurance. The submarines must be hunted, trailed, and destroyed. For this task the destroyer is the best type of vessel known. The board is of the opinion that every effort should be made to put into service as many destroyers as possible, and that a large number of new antisubmarine destroyers of a practical type should be built in the least possible time.

22. The board deems it advisable to submit its recommendations in such form that if approved they may be readily issued as instructions to those responsible for carrying them into effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

Bureaus of Ordnance, Steam Engineering, and Construction and Repair.—(a) Board recommends that the bureaus put in operation every possible means of expediting the completion of destroyers now building; authorize approval of plans by bureaus' local inspectors; authorize any satisfactory changes under the contract that will expedite work; encourage contractors to utilize the services of subcontractors in getting out material; and regardless of additional expense, secure the completion of destroyers now building at the earliest possible moment, submitting to the Secretary for approval any plan or plans to accomplish this end.

(b) Board recommends that the bureaus confer in getting out plans for a new type antisubmarine destroyer which will meet the military requirements specified by the department; and which may be constructed quickly on one standard design which will enable all auxiliary machinery and equipment to be procured in lots of identical units and thus secure the benefits of quantity production. The board further recommends that the plans provide for the immediate construction of 200 destroyers of the new type, and that the bureaus submit data necessary for the department to prepare draft of legislation required to secure these new destroyers as quickly as possible.

Naval Operations.—(a) Board recommends that plans be immediately prepared to fit out and equip all available vessels that can be spared for service abroad to be used in the antisubmarine campaign.

(b) Board recommends that plans be immediately prepared to secure a large number of the most suitable types of aircraft; to train the naval aviators in antisubmarine operations; and to perfect the plans for the use of all types of aircraft in the detection and destruction of submarines.

Bureau of Steam Engineering.—(a) Board recommends that the bureau procure 500 simple underwater microphone or magnetophone sound and direction indicators for issue to patrol vessels; these to be put in service as soon as possible in order to train personnel. The board further recommends that when a satisfactory device is available all patrol vessels in service be supplied with the listening devices.

(b) Board recommends that the bureau immediately arrange for the manufacture of a large number of underwater sound-detecting and direction-finding devices of the Fessenden type in order that United States' and allies' destroyers and other vessels engaged in hunting submarines may be equipped as quickly as possible; also that merchant vessels may be so equipped in order to avoid enemy submarines.

Bureau of Ordnance.—(a) Board recommends that the bureau be authorized to immediately arrange for the manufacture of a large supply of mines, nets, aeroplane torpedoes, aeroplane guns, aeroplane bombs, howitzers, depth charges, smoke boxes, smoke bombs, blunt-nose explosive shell, and other ordnance material which is now required and which will be required in the near future, to enable the allied navies to prosecute a successful aggressive campaign against the enemy submarines. Board recommends that the bureau immediately submit estimates of funds required to carry out the above recommendations.

W. V. PRATT,
Captain, United States Navy.

F. L. PINNEY,
Commander, United States Navy.

E. S. LAND,
Naval Constructor, United States Navy.

W. R. VAN AUKEN,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy.

S. C. HOOPER,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy.

G. K. CALHOUN,
Professor of Mathematics, United States Navy.

J. H. TOWERS,
Lieutenant, United States Navy.

On July 6 that was submitted, and on July 6 the Secretary signed the following letter, which I will submit. That letter went in with the plan. The letter is as follows [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 6, 1917.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Chief of Naval Operations, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Construction and Repair.

Subject: Report on submarine warfare.

Inclosure: (a) Report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

1. The department forwards herewith copy of report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

2. The department has approved this report and recommendations.

3. Please take immediate steps to carry out the board's recommendations.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

NOTE.—This report was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Bureaus of Navigation, Medicine and Surgery, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks on July 9, 1917, directing them to take such action as necessary to carry out board's recommendation.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., July 14, 1917.

From: The board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Its recommendations of efforts which should be made in the endeavor to put an end to the submarine menace. Particular reference to the recommendation for the construction of 200 antisubmarine destroyers.

PRELIMINARY.

1. This letter is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations in response to his verbal instructions of July 14, directing them to make a statement expounding their reasons for the recommendation of 200 anti-submarine destroyers.

2. *Quotation from board's report, page 9:* "Vessels for chase and destruction of submarines."

21. The board has considered the question of the best type of vessels to be used in hunting down and destroying submarines, and is of the opinion that the one best type of vessel is the destroyer, fitted with sound detecting devices capable of use while the destroyer is underway and of determining direction. The reasons for this opinion are that only this type has the necessary characteristics of speed, seaworthiness, habitability, reliability, and endurance. The submarines must be hunted, trailed, and destroyed. For this task the destroyer is the best type of vessel known. The board is of the opinion that every effort should be made to put into service as many destroyers as possible, and that a large number of new antisubmarine destroyers of a practical type should be built in the least possible time.

22. The board deems it advisable to submit its recommendations in such form that if approved they may be readily issued as instructions to those responsible for carrying them into effect.

3. *Quotation from board's recommendation re the destroyers now building and the type suggested for new construction:* "Recommendations—Bureaus of Ordnance, Steam Engineering, and Construction and Repair."

(a) Board recommends that the bureaus put in operation every possible means of expediting the completion of destroyers now building: authorize approval of plans by bureaus' local inspectors; authorize any satisfactory changes under the contract that will expedite work; encourage contractors to utilize the service of subcontractors in getting out material; and regardless of additional expense, secure the completion of destroyers now building at the earliest possible moment; submitting to the Secretary for approval any plan or plans to accomplish this end.

(b) Board recommends that the bureaus confer in getting out plans for a new type antisubmarine destroyer which will meet the military requirements specified by the department and which may be constructed quickly on one standard design which will enable all auxiliary machinery and equipment to be procured in lots of identical units and thus secure the benefits of quantity production. The board further recom-

mends that the plans provide for the immediate construction of 200 destroyers of the new type and that the bureaus submit data necessary for the department to prepare draft of legislation required to secure these new destroyers as quickly as possible.

4. *Reasons for recommendations:*

In making the above recommendations the board was actuated by the following reasons:

(a) *The seriousness of the present situation.*—Every report from abroad indicates that the present submarine situation is extremely serious. This is a matter of fact.

(b) The statements from abroad that vessels of the destroyer type or those approximating the destroyer type are the best antisubmarine craft afloat.

(c) The reiterated statements both from our own officers operating abroad and from foreign officers that one of the most important factors is time, necessitating speed in building and speed in placing those ships which can successfully operate against the submarines in the war zone.

(d) The information received from abroad that while the 110-foot chasers will be used against the submarine, as will also any type of craft which can keep the sea and is not too valuable, still it is not an unqualified success. It is more of a makeshift than it is a desirable sea-keeping antisubmarine craft.

(e) The belief that a standardized type could be developed which while not displacing present destroyers building efforts would in the near future outspeed the present destroyer policy.

(f) That what was needed now was speed in construction and standardization, not improvement (with an eye to the future), and that to get what is now needed certain concessions in the present evolved type of destroyer principally in the direction of speed would have to be made to secure a more rugged type of craft.

(g) The knowledge that England has been forced to develop a type especially for antisubmarine work.

(h) The belief that drastic and perhaps novel methods would have to replace conservative estimate if we were to grasp the present situation in time.

(i) The conviction that the antisubmarine destroyers asked for differed practically so little from the development of the best of the 750-ton type that it would be extremely useful not only now but in the future.

(j) The conviction that the present established naval building policy would have to be modified; that a new policy would have to be decided upon and established, and that no policy could succeed unless the will to drive it through at all cost were there.

5. *The board's conception of the naval building program which should be adopted:*

Before arriving at a decision 200 of the antisubmarine destroyers, the board had to formulate its conception of what an adequate building policy should be now, in order to do its best to meet present conditions while still attempting to safeguard the future.

(a) As a basis of original estimate, the Department's policy in regard to the order of importance of warships to be laid down was taken under consideration. The order of importance as laid down is as follows:

- (1) Submarine chasers.
- (2) Destroyers.
- (3) Scout cruisers.
- (4) Submarines, large and small.
- (5) Battleships.
- (6) Fuel ships.
- (7) Destroyer tenders.
- (8) Submarine tenders.
- (9) Hospital ships.
- (10) Ammunition ships.
- (11) Repair ships.
- (12) Transports.
- (13) Gunboats.
- (14) Battle cruisers.

(b) Owing to the present emergency, the board recognized the building of cargo vessels as a measure of importance commensurate with the building of warships itself.

(c) In order to meet both naval needs and merchant ship needs, it was necessary to effect the closest cooperation between the two representative interests. A definite naval building policy must be established that there might be no conflict between the two paramount interests.

(d) It was believed that certain concessions in the present naval building program would have to be made to the merchant ship building interests, as represented by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. That these concessions would be most useful and

cal in view of the present submarine situation) if made along the lines of the naval ships. And that such concessions, in so far as they are matters of practical building, should be made. That so far as the present big naval tonnage is concerned it was more a question of clearing the ways and releasing the men and materials, rather than a question of how many of the big types we should lay down.

The views stated in (d) were held because it was believed that—

- Successful termination of this war will preclude the chance of another for some terms of years.
- For the allied purposes, merchant ships are as essential to the successful termination of this war as battleships, and that their construction is even more important at present.
- The counter for the United States, in case of an unsuccessful termination of this war lies: (1) in our naval submarine; (2) in conscription.
- Of new future possible opponents other than the present opponents: (1) The chances are remote, owing to present alliances; (2) we are already stronger than any other probable opponents; (3) it would be better to buy our battle cruisers or battleships from our present allies (in case they are needed) than to lay them down now in the present emergency, an emergency which must be met now.
- In case this war terminates successfully, the merchant ships laid down by us will be the most useful types in existence in furthering the ultimate good of the country.
- Finally, we did not enter this war alone. We have allies, and their efforts against the now common enemy have stood between us and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. Their needs are immediate and imperative. Their cause is our cause now.

Therefore, the board believed that we should concentrate our fresh building on

- A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs.
- Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.
- Battleships laid down and now on the ways.
- Certain types of small craft, such as tugs and sweepers.
- Cooperate with Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers.

Thus to be done, we will have put forth the Navy's best efforts, not for the Navy but for the country, and especially for the Allies, whose war is now our own.

Following the above line of reasoning, the board made as its first recommendation the construction of 200 submarine destroyers. The general specifications which had been laid down for the type were practically a modernized type of the old 750-ton destroyer made more seaworthy and more enduring, but with less speed. The final word went in after cabled advice from abroad, Vice Admiral Sims, seemed to favor this same general type.

No recommendations could be made as to submarines, for this type has never been standardized to the extent that the destroyer type has. Moreover, general policy as to their future use is still not entirely settled, though the German experts in this particular type, have clearly indicated their policy. The prime requisite to put through such a policy as indicated above:

The first step to be taken to put any such policy through would be for the naval representatives, the merchant ship representatives, and the builders to get together and definitely decide upon the ways and means to do it.

The above may not be the true solution of our building problem. It is, however, a definite statement of a policy and the reasons that influenced that choice.

W. V. PRATT,

Captain, United States Navy.

F. L. PINNEY,

Commander, United States Navy.

F. S. LAND,

Naval Constructor, United States Navy.

W. R. VAN AUKEN,

Lieut. Commander, United States Navy.

S. C. HOOPER,

Lieut. Commander, United States Navy.

G. K. CALHOUN,

Professor of Mathematics, United States Navy.

J. H. TOWERS,

Lieutenant, United States Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

Memorandum for the Chief of Operations.

Subject: (a) General Board's recommendations in re destroyers building program.

(b) Submarine Device Board's recommendation for 200 submarine destroyers.

1. Referring to General Board's conclusions that certain shipyards now engaged in building destroyers, battleships, merchant ships, etc., could furnish the Government better returns by becoming utilized to the limit of their capacity in the building of the present type of destroyer which may be called a "fleet" destroyer 35 knots speed, etc., in so far as the shipyards mentioned and concerned under the present conditions in those yards, I agree with the General Board's recommendation and recommend that these yards be assigned 50 or 60 "fleet" destroyers according to the present approved plans to which they are building and that every facility and encouragement be given to these yards to complete a minimum of 50 or 60 of these destroyers prior to January 1, 1919.

2. Referring to recommendation contained in (b) of 200 submarine destroyers. I also entirely agree with the program. These last vessels are to be of the type standardized by the board and to be built by other yards than those building under program in paragraph 1. They should be built under the "assembly" plan along the line used by Gen. Goethals in building the ship commission's vessels—that is, a distribution of the various parts to yards and works adapted to the building of each part and then the complete destroyer be assembled at a certain yard assigned as assembly yard, these 200 to be absolutely standardized in every respect and particular, to have only one type of engine, to have only one type of boilers, to have only one type of auxiliaries, to be built absolutely according to one set of standardized plans, so that any parts will assemble at any yard into a completed vessel. This will undoubtedly require the expansion of a number of works, such as pump builders, boiler builders, etc., and it will also require that pump builders, boiler builders, etc., now engaged in the building of their own special type, be converted into factories for the building of the standardized type. In short, it will require the Government to direct the builders, so that we will obtain what we want instead of the previous method of taking what each separate designer or builder thought we needed or knew that he could best produce. This may also require the advance of certain per cent of prices where expansion is necessary. That can be arranged and I believe that the present laws will permit any other control of these factories or workshops that may be necessary to attain our purpose.

3. As a result of the above programs (outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2), I believe it possible for the fleet to be increased by 50 standardized destroyers and 150 to 200 submarine destroyers, all to be in commission by or before January 1, 1919, and the deliveries of which should commence in large number by February 1, 1918.

J. S. McKEAN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 19, 1917.

Memorandum for Capt. Pratt.

As stated in my previous memorandum on general board's recommendation, I am in full agreement with the joint letter, paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, in so far as relates to the following plants and to them only: Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., New York Shipbuilding Co., Wm. Cramp & Sons, Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, Union Iron Works. I believe that these firms can furnish in addition to those already under contract, 50 more destroyers of the fleet type, with certain simplifications such as elimination of reduction gear, etc.

As to the other part of the program, the standardized submarine destroyer, this should be undertaken with works other than those referred to in paragraph 1, and it should be done and could only be done satisfactorily along the line suggested in paragraph 5. I believe that this assembly plan (subletting contracts for different parts to different firms and assembling at certain other yards) would produce from 150 to 200 submarine destroyers by January 1, 1919.

The above programs would call for the construction of both 1 and 2 being given precedence over battleships and to a certain extent over merchant ships building by the Shipping Board. Materials, workmen, and machines should be furnished for this job first. This is logical in view of the fact that the Shipping Board program is in its ultimate results a process of feeding submarines to death. This program contemplates poisoning them.

McKEAN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, July 19, 1917.

Memorandum.

1 The General Board, Vice Admiral Sims, and all officers agree that we should make our maximum effort in building destroyers for antisubmarine warfare.

2. Sixty-six destroyers are now under construction. The contractors for these destroyers can take in hand 50 additional destroyers for delivery previous to January, 1919. The General Board and I are in agreement that contracts for these destroyers should be placed immediately.

3. Operations has recommended that additional standardized destroyers to the number of 200 be authorized. It does not desire a new type of vessel, but a vessel of proven character similar to the 750-ton destroyer of the Beale, Jouett, Jenkins type. The idea being to produce these destroyers on the assembly plan. The technical bureaus report that it is mechanically possible to produce a total of 200 additional destroyers by the exclusive employment of the five largest yards in the country by January, 1919. They state that this would require the merging of those yards under a single management.

4. Operations recommends for special construction destroyers of less speed and greater reliability and simplicity than those now building—a vessel of less than a thousand tons. It recommends an armament of 4-inch-fifty guns because these guns are more quickly obtainable and are an adequate reply to any guns known to be carried by enemy submarines. The General Board recommends substantially the same character of vessel, but armed with 5-inch guns. Larger guns require greater tonnage. These differences are not essential except as they influence speed of construction.

5. I recommend (a) Contracts be let for 50 additional fleet destroyers. (b) Contracts be let for 150 additional standardized destroyers. (c) That every effort be made to have this program carried out, not only by utilizing the five ship yards now building destroyers but using any other yards that might be utilized. The building of capital ships should continue.

The country and Congress do not understand the full significance of events now passing on the sea. They can not believe that control of the sea and with it the permanent isolation of each of the Allies is gradually but surely passing into the hands of our enemies. They are fed on visions of victory through inventions yet to be made or through spectacular detached aerial effort but vaguely comprehended. The vast untraveled expanses of a barren ocean separating allies who would fight strongly together, but instead fall singly before a united enemy has not yet been pictured in their consciousness.

We of the Navy understand these things. We know that the great decision must finally be had on the land. We know that there can be no uniting of our forces there against our common enemy except by way of the sea. We know that of all enemy weapons the submarine alone may be able to prevent that union of strength. We know that of all our weapons the submarine fears the destroyer most. We know that the true answer to the submarine is to drive him from the seas with the sole vessel capable of doing it—the destroyer. We know that when this is done that war on the sea will come back to the surface. Decency and chivalry will then once more hold up their heads while Democracy comes into her own.

With an earnestness beyond expression backed by a conviction that has endured from the first, I ask that we meet this great world crisis by contributing our maximum national effort in building, manning, and fighting destroyers to drive enemy submarines from the sea.

The question of types may rest for the moment while we make the great decision to do our utmost. Let it not be said by posterity that we, seeing our duty, hesitated until it was too late, or that we failed to distinguish essential from incidental effort.

Two hundred destroyers would mean victory for us. They may be had within a year and a half.

The power to accomplish will follow the decision to accomplish.

Let us decide.

SCHOFIELD.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD.
Washington, July 13, 1917.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Number and military characteristics of a new type of destroyer.

Reference: (a) Navy Department letter 28754-26:23, of July 6, 1917.—Report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare. (b) General Board's third indorsement, G. B. No. 420-14, of May 29, 1917.

In accordance with the verbal request of the Chief of Operations for the opinion of the General Board as to the number and military characteristics of a new type of destroyer recommended by a "board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare," the General Board states as follows:

2. As no comments or recommendations of the technical bureaus of the Navy Department, having cognizance of the subject matter under consideration, accompanied this report, the General Board, in order to be fully informed, requested the attendance of the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance, and these officers discussed from the standpoints of their respective bureaus the practicability at this time of building standardized destroyers in the number and of the type proposed.

3. From the statements made by the chiefs of the technical bureaus consulted the General Board's careful consideration of the subject and its previous recommendations in reference (b) advocating additional destroyer construction, the board arrives at these conclusions:

(a) The object sought to be attained by the construction of a standardized destroyer of the type proposed in reference (a) is to save time in order to get into service to meet the emergencies of the war a great number of destroyers with the least possible delay. With this object the General Board is thoroughly in sympathy; but the statements of the Chiefs of Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering lead to the conclusion that only after 30 months can the number of destroyers of the new type, reference (a), by the method proposed, be had in greater numbers than the type now under construction, and that for 18 months, which may be considered to be the critical period of the war, the type now under construction can certainly be had in greater numbers than the type proposed.

(b) To proceed with the immediate construction of 200 destroyers of the type and along the lines recommended would necessitate the taking over and operating them as a unit by the Government of the following shipbuilding companies: Newport News, New York, Cramp's, Fore River, and the Union Iron Works. All other naval construction now in hand at these yards would have to be dropped, and in addition no further work at these yards upon naval vessels, nor upon upon merchant ships, could be undertaken until the completion of the destroyer program.

(c) The labor situation at this time is a most embarrassing obstacle to enlarging the activities at these plants sufficiently to complete such a destroyer program as contemplated in reference (a). The force required would be approximately 60,000 men. The total number now employed at these plants is approximately 30,000. There is now no additional skilled shipbuilding labor immediately available from which to draw the increased force required.

(d) To suspend for two and a half years naval construction now in hand and to that extent delay the construction of other essential fleet units already authorized, or which may be authorized, will not sufficiently strengthen the existing fleet to meet a possible new alignment of powers at the end of the present war or the German Fleet if it succeeds in taking the offensive.

(e) The Chiefs of the Bureaus Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering state that the standardization and construction of destroyers of the type proposed in reference (a) at this time by the five shipbuilding firms above mentioned would encounter many difficulties and complications. These yards are now crowded to the limits of their building capacity by the work in hand and in prospect by that already contracted for. The firms controlling them would have to be persuaded or coerced to suspend work in hand, cancel contracts, remodel and enlarge their plants to do standardized and specialized work, change their methods, double their working forces, and train the new personnel.

(f) Time, a most important element in the present war emergency, would be consumed in making the necessary changes and adjustments before actual construction work could be started.

(g) Complications and delays are to be feared from insufficient supplies of the standard fittings and equipment adopted for the standardized destroyer, and from the necessity to use other equally good fittings and equipment to be readily supplied or

based in open market. For example, if in engineering it were decided to stand-
as to space and weight to accommodate a certain type of pump, that pump and no
other would have to be supplied for all destroyers, although other equally good pumps
might be available in the market.

From the statements of the Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair, it
appears that 66 destroyers are now contracted for of the type recommended by the
general board for the building program of 1918; that six of these will be delivered by
January, 1918; 60 more by September, 1918; that probably 50 in addition, if contracted
or now, can be delivered by January, 1919; and that boats in excess of this number
may be turned out subsequent to January, 1919, at the rate of one or two a month.

From the statements of the Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering, it appears
practicable, so far as propulsive machinery and the equipment under cognizance of
that bureau are concerned, to complete the above program—that is, to complete the
boats now contracted for by September, 1918; 50 additional by January, 1919, and
to provide for additional boats after that date.

From the statements of the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance it appears practicable
to supply the 50 additional destroyers with 5-inch guns by January, 1919. If 200
5-inch guns are contracted for now deliveries will probably commence by January,
1919, and if sufficient numbers of new guns are not ready by the time the destroyers
are ready, their batteries could be completed by taking guns from other naval vessels
and merchant ships temporarily supplying their places with 4-inch guns of which
2,000 are now under contract. In this connection the general board is of the opinion
that, in order to cope with the heavy armament now being installed in the larger type
of German submarines, 5.9-inch caliber—and to prevail decisively against the larger
destroyers now building abroad, it will be necessary to increase the caliber of guns
carried by future destroyers to 5-inch.

4. In view of the above considerations, and especially in view of the opinions of the
chiefs of the technical bureaus consulted that no time can be saved in getting boats
of the type proposed in reference (a) into service in the present congested condition
of the country's shipbuilding industries; and further, that more boats may be expected
in 18 months of the type building under the present method than by that proposed,
the general board makes the following recommendations:

(a) Proceed with the construction of boats of the type recommended by the general
board for the building program of 1918; but, as an emergency measure, the contract
speed of 35 knots may be reduced, but not below 30 knots for acceptance.

(b) Contract now for the construction of 50 additional destroyers of the present
type, to be completed by January, 1919. The general board does not recommend a
larger number at this time because of the impracticability of getting more into service
in the next 18 months.

(c) Install batteries of four 5-inch guns and one antiaircraft gun.

(d) Contract now for two hundred 5-inch guns.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 14, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Destroyers—Special 1918 program.

Reference: (a) Report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine war-
fare (undated). (b) Department's letter No. 28754-26:23 (undated). (c) Special
1918 destroyer characteristics. (d) Department's letter No. 8557-238 of 7 July.

1. Reference (a), page 10, paragraph (b), recommends that 200 destroyers of a new
type to meet certain military characteristics of the department be immediately
constructed.

Reference (b) approves reference (a).

Reference (c) contains the military characteristics which briefly specify: Speed,
28 knots; guns, four 4-inch; tubes, 4 triple.

Reference (c) also specifies that all destroyers of this program be built from identical
plans and be standardized in every particular of hull, machinery, boiler, auxiliaries,
fittings, and equipment.

Reference (d) approves reference (c) and directs that plans and data be prepared
with the utmost expedition.

2. The following report indicates the shipbuilding facilities that are necessary in
order to carry out this program, assuming that these 200 destroyers, in addition to those
now building, shall be ready for delivery in January, 1919, 18 months hence:

In order to build destroyers with expedition, it is necessary that the work be in the
hands of people who have had experience in this line. While it would be possible, in
time, to obtain destroyers from firms that have not hitherto built them, our past

experience indicates conclusively that this can not be done with expedition. At the five large shipbuilding plants—Newport News, New York Shipbuilding Co., Wm. Cramp & Sons, Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, and Union Iron Works—there are now building 49 destroyers, the deliveries of which are due subsequent to January 1, 1918.

3. The first contract date of delivery of any of these vessels was originally September 30, 1918, but the department has already taken steps to speed up the construction of these vessels with a view to having as many as possible completed by the beginning of next year. Assuming that delivery of the 49 vessels above will begin on January 1, 1918, launchings should begin not later than November 1, 1917. To launch these vessels, and an additional 200 before January 1, 1919, would mean about 18 destroyers per month, or about one a week by each of the five companies referred to, if the work were assigned to them. This would require at each yard not less than 12 and probably 15 ways assigned as building berths for destroyers. It is mechanically possible to provide these if the yards are devoted exclusively to destroyers.

4. To build the hull and machinery for the total number of destroyers above referred to would require on the average the labor of 60,000 men. This is nearly double the total number of men now employed on all work by the five big shipyards above referred to. In order, then, to carry out the proposed program it would be necessary not only to employ the entire capacity of the five largest shipbuilding plants in the country on destroyers, to the exclusion of all merchant and other naval work, but to practically double their capacity either at the yards proper or through subordinate companies.

5. In order to carry out the program in the manner desired; that is, to insure complete standardization, it would be necessary practically to merge these five plants into one organization, under one management. This would necessitate the delegation by the President, to one man, of very large powers. To accomplish such an unprecedented program, however, would, in our opinion, require that complete authority, as well as responsibility, should be vested in one man, who would be charged with this work to the exclusion of all other duties, and with preference as regards material and labor over all merchant shipbuilding and any other conflicting military preparations.

6. In the opinion of the bureaus, time would be saved by complete standardization only if it is the intention of the department to continue to construct destroyers at the maximum capacity of the country for at least 2 years and possibly 30 months. If it is the department's desire to obtain the greatest number of destroyers practicable during the next 18 months, we believe it would not be wise to undertake the construction of a new standardized type, but that the maximum results be obtained by duplicating the vessels now under construction, with omissions rather than changes. Owing to the gearing situation, it might be necessary to use direct drive instead of the geared drive in some cases, but one builder is already undertaking the construction of destroyers with direct drive, and this machinery can be duplicated with a minimum delay by other builders should they be unable to obtain the gearing.

7. The additional number of destroyers which could be completed by January, 1919, along the above lines, without materially interfering with the construction of submarines, and without entirely stopping the construction of merchant ships at the large yards, but slowing up all large naval vessels as necessary to avoid interfering with destroyers, can be determined only by detail investigation and consultation with the shipbuilders. We estimate, however, that they would be between 40 and 50. This might involve special measures to increase the facilities at the shipyards, and undoubtedly would require that special consideration be given destroyer material.

8. It is recommended that the bureaus be authorized to take up at once with the shipbuilders the possibilities in the way of construction of destroyers by January, 1919, along the lines indicated above. Orders should be placed at an early date so as to relieve as much as possible the material situation by allowing it to be ordered well in advance.

GRIFFIN.
TAYLOR.

Paragraph 14 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

14. The headquarters in Europe was not infrequently left in ignorance of the department's policies, plans for operation of United States forces, and its intended action upon my many dispatches. Not until July 10, 1917, did the Navy Department outline a policy as regards naval cooperation with the Allies—in a cable quoting a letter to the State Department.

Paragraph 14. The policy letter of July 10 was drawn up and signed on July 3, 1917, by the secretary. It remained a standard theme throughout the war. After June 25 I personally handled

every dispatch of Admiral Sims, as well as all other dispatches, and prepared answers at the time of their receipt for the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations and the secretary on matters pertaining to policy, plan, and operation. As many of Admiral Sims' dispatches were repetitions it was not necessary to answer all of them. The policy laid down in the letter of July 3, while it may have seemed new to the admiral, was in fact the department's guiding standard since we entered the war.

I will not read that letter. It has been read a great many times.

At the same time that I submit that letter I will submit two other documents, which I have marked C-2 and C-3, which are Admiral Mayo's reports on his visit to the British Admiralty, and his statements, which we are already familiar with, as to the conditions of policy with the British Admiralty when their policy went into effect, which was at a date later than ours, even though they had been at war since 1914; so that our policy arrived in London practically coincident with the policy of the British Admiralty, but at a trifle earlier date. I submit these extracts from Admiral Mayo's report, which has already been put in in full.

The letter and the two extracts referred to above are as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 3, 1917.

Confidential.

SIR: Referring to the cablegram from Ambassador Page in London, dated June 23, 1917 (copy attached). After careful consideration of the present naval situation, taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy in so far as it related to the Allies—

(1) The heartiest cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation, in European or other waters, compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters.

(2) The heartiest cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war.

(3) A realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleets.

(4) The conception that the present main military rôle of the United States naval forces lies in its safeguarding the lines of communication of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will, generally speaking, be two classes of vessels engaged—minor craft and major craft—and two rôles of action: first offensive, second defensive.

(5) In pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph (4), the Navy Department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion, the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But, as the primary rôle in all offensive operations must perforce belong to allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that, in general, it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies, deemed necessary to meet immediate needs.

(6) Pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following:

(a) Its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, comprised of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries, in any numbers not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint allied admiralties, which would not involve a violation of our present State policy.

(b) Its unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but cooperating unit when, after joint consultation of all admiralties concerned, the emergency is deemed to warrant it, and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase in the number of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it.

(c) Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

TAKEN FROM ADMIRAL MAYO'S REPORT AFTER VISIT TO EUROPEAN WATERS.--
GENERAL IMPRESSIONS REGARDING CONDITIONS IN BRITISH ADMIRALTY.

OCTOBER 11, 1917

Paragraph 5. (a) There is little doubt that the British Admiralty is at a loss when asked for the history of the war to date. Reports of operations are so isolated and scattered and without system that there is not available any comprehensive record of original plans, the governing reasons therefor, and the degree of success or failure in each case. The inevitable inference is that the war has been carried on from day to day and not according to any comprehensive policy to serve as a guide to plans looking to the effective coordination and cooperation of effort against the enemy.

(b) It is apparent that despite the so-called war-staff arrangements put into effect in the Admiralty during the past three years, until very recently there has been no planning section, nor was there any definite body of men charged with the function of looking ahead, or even of looking back to see wherein lay the causes of success or failure, nor any means of furnishing the heads of the Admiralty with analyses and summaries of past operations in order that decisions as to continuing old operations or undertaking new ones might be reached with a due sense of "perspective," both as to past operations and as to the coordination of new operations in a general plan.

(c) The statement of present Admiralty policy, originally dated July, 1917, now revised to September 17, 1917 (reference (b) and inclosure B is not really a statement of policy, but rather a summary of current activities). That these activities are based on an underlying idea of the defensive may readily be inferred from the leading words in the subparagraphs of paragraph 1 of the paper referred to, namely, "protection," "prevention," "protection," "resistance." See also references (h), (i), (j) and inclosures H, I, J.

(d) The statement of proposed future Admiralty policy dated September 17, 1917 (reference (c) and inclosure C), indicates growing appreciation of the necessity for more energetic offensive measures against the submarine in the way of preventing his egress from the North Sea.

(e) While the development of the submarine menace has been gradual and measures undertaken to meet it have had to be evolved and applied to new developments as they appeared, the present dispersion of allied naval effort against the submarine menace has reached large dimensions and the actual offensive against the submarine has suffered through the accumulation of large numbers of vessels to carry out protective measures. The number of vessels engaged in protective (defensive) effort includes practically the entire British Navy in northern waters except the Grand Fleet, many of whose destroyers and other small craft are also engaged in protective work.

(f) Referring again to the proposed plan of future antisubmarine operations in the North Sea (reference (c) and inclosure C), it appears that it may be necessary to withdraw some vessels engaged in protective work in order to make the offensive effective. However, the effectiveness of the offensive should be cumulative, thus enabling perhaps nearly all the available vessels gradually to be diverted from the protective (defensive) to the offensive.

[Taken from Admiral Mayo's report after visit to European waters, Oct. 11, 1917.]

NOTES ON THE GENERAL NAVAL SITUATION.

Paragraph 13. (a) Apparently the naval plans of the Allies have been in most general terms. Great Britain to control the North Sea and Channel; France her west coast and the French Mediterranean Coast; Italy, assisted as necessary by France, to control the Adriatic, British forces based on Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, assisting in the Mediterranean. Recently the Japanese have given assistance in the Mediterranean, having there 1 cruiser and 12 destroyers. United States forces are operating from Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar.

(b) (1) It is apparent from conversations with officers attached to the Operations Divisions that up to the present there have been no definite naval plans. So far as can be learned there has been no statement of British naval policy previous to that issued by the Admiralty in July, 1917, which is in reality a defense of what was being done and not a real statement of policy.

(2) The defensive nature of this so-called policy is plainly indicated by the paragraph stating the objects to be attained by naval power: the leading words of the four subparagraphs which state these objects are: (1) Protection; (2) prevention; (3) protection; (4) resistance.

(3) All of these objects and many more would be obtained by the destruction of an naval power.

1. In the first month of the war the offensive policy was much more pronounced than at present. The British fleet was, in fact, undergoing a test mobilization when the probability of war became evident. The forces were maintained in a mobilized condition, and therefore began the war in a most advantageous state.

The disposition of the fleet was made with a view to opposing the movements of enemy forces out of the North Sea. The main battle fleet was based in the North Sea, but kept the sea almost continuously. A second battle force was based to the south of England to prevent the passage of any force of less strength than the main Sea Fleet through the Channel. The armored and light cruisers were continually on scouting duty in the North Sea. The British submarines were stationed in the Helgoland Bight with a view to attacking the German fleet if it came out. Mines were laid in Helgoland Bight by the British during this phase.

The frequent attacks on British cruisers by German submarines, especially the catastrophe in which the Hogue, Cressy, and Aboukir were lost, caused a change in plan as follows:

The main fleet was withdrawn from continuous service underway and placed in a base adequately protected from submarines. The heavier cruisers were withdrawn from scouting work and their place taken by light cruisers and destroyers. The mining of Helgoland Bight was begun. The development of the auxiliary services of mine sweeping and patrol was made more rapid.

The present operations are merely developments of this plan. The fleet is ready and anxious to fight a major action, but it is only sent to sea as a fleet when the German fleet is out or thought to be coming out, or occasionally for exercises. The various divisions of the fleet are often under way for target practice, etc.

See references (h), (i), (j) and inclosures H, I, J.

Paragraph 15 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

15. As usual in such cases, the policy thus set forth was academically sound, but that it was not carried out, or was not understood by the department, is shown by the fact that for 10 months after its receipt I was still urgently recommending an increase of forces—still trying to convince the department that the war was in the eastern Atlantic; that the United States naval front was off the European coast and not off the United States coast; that it was there only that the naval enemy was operating; that it was there only that United States shipping, let alone allied shipping, could be protected with the maximum efficiency.

Paragraph 15. This policy was perfectly understood by everybody in the department, and was accepted as standard doctrine.

Paragraph 16 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

16. A review of the dispatches makes it apparent that the department did not accept the reports and recommendations with the seriousness that the critical situation demanded. There are many instances that illustrate this. One that may be cited is the case of our battleships that were requested as reinforcement of the Grand Fleet.

I beg you to take particular notice of that expression "reinforcement of the Grand Fleet," as expressed in his letter of January 7, 1920.

As to paragraph 16, I remember the cable, and upon its receipt a cable was drafted in reply. The reason why these ships were not sent at that time can, of course, best be explained by the Chief of Naval Operations. I am, however, under the impression that the cable sent by Admiral Sims did not sufficiently impress the Chief of Naval Operations with the gravity of the situation, and that he did not wish to break up the organization of our battleships unless it were absolutely necessary to do so, feeling that we might be called upon to use these units as a whole, and as a reserve. Personally, I was not in accord with this policy as I favored making concessions and sending the ships at once, but Admiral Benson's views turned out to be correct in the end, as nothing happened to justify the fears expressed. In fact, in this case the gravity of the situation as regards the Grand Fleet, if such existed, was not stated in such definite terms as to leave no doubt in our minds. The reason assigned, viz, that the Admiralty contemplated placing five of the King Edward class

out of commission to get the personnel for other craft, did not carry such weight with it as a simple statement to the effect that "the Grand Fleet required reinforcement" would have carried. To have obtained quicker results it would have been better had Admiral Sims presented his views in the manner outlined.

In this connection with regard to many of Admiral Sims's despatches, had he confined himself to simpler statements and repeated himself less he would have presented his views better and would have eliminated the chance of being judged to have overstated his case. From long experience with Admiral Sims in the past, I seldom misunderstood him, but to others less familiar with his methods, his real attitude of mind was not so apparent. This is merely given as my judgment, but I believe it to be correct.

Paragraph 17 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

17. Following a conference with Admiral Jellicoe, then first sea lord, or "chief of naval operations," of the British Admiralty, and Admiral Beatty, the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, it was strongly recommended on July 21, 1917, that four of our coal-burning battleships be sent at once. There was great delay before there was even an acknowledgement of this request. This naturally subjected me to much embarrassment. The request, though repeated, was finally refused.

Paragraph 17. This matter was handled immediately by me and a favorable reply drafted. The answer was not sent immediately and then it was not a favorable one. The question was being weighed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary, I think.

Paragraph 18 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

18. In the following November the Chief of Naval Operations arrived in England with the Col. House mission. After discussing this question of the necessity of sending our battleships with the same officials with whom I had discussed it, he cabled at once recommending that they be sent. The result was that it was over four months after the original request (November 28) that the four ships sailed from the United States.

Paragraph 18. Correct. Cable to that effect was received from Admiral Benson, who was then in London. The matter was taken up immediately by me with the Secretary, and his approval to the plan secured at once. Admiral Mayo was called up in conference at the office. The ships to go were selected, the admiral to command was picked out, and the ships were dispatched as soon as they could be made ready. The ships were docked at this time to give them the last finishing touch before sending them out to fight. This is common naval practice where it is possible to carry it out, and it is sound. From the date of receipt of order to proceed until the date of arrival at Scapa Flow was one month less one day, I believe. The ships had a very severe winter passage over.

Paragraph 19 of the letter is as follows:

19. This is but one of a number of examples of a similar kind, and strikingly illustrates the nature of the delays caused by the department's insistence upon trying to understand the intricate details of rapidly changing conditions 3,000 miles away. As it was of course a physical impossibility to keep the department fully and accurately informed, and as the department insisted upon making decisions concerning both the disposition and the actual operations of the European forces, the inevitable result was unsound decisions, and in some cases long delays before the department was induced to accept the original recommendations that were based upon exhaustive discussions of the actual conditions with the heads of the allied navies.

Paragraph 19. This statement, in my opinion, should not be accepted at its face value. All information relating to plans and poli-

ries, unless the urgency of the situation demanded instant action, should be sent to the department to decide upon. We were, in the summer of 1917 when the office of communications had been established in the office of operations, in complete control of the radio and cable situation, handling easily some 2,000 dispatches daily. In addition to naval dispatches we were handling some of the cable work for the Army and some of the similar work for the State Department, principally because our cipher codes were better. We were daily in receipt of cables from Admiral Sims, going into minute detail as to his material, personnel, and supply needs. These cables used hundreds of words and were in cipher. It was a much simpler matter to give a general explanation of a plan or policy and most necessary to do so. It would be an unsafe act of the department to inaugurate the principle of cutting itself adrift from the broader phases of plan and policy in the war zone, and to leave these decisions entirely in the hands of its naval officer in command there. The department at home must keep its hands on such matters, or else it might become involved in affairs which had not received the approval of the home government and which might commit our country to actions not approved here. The commander of our forces in European waters had full authority within his own realm of discretion and his judgment and advice were always given paramount weight. On the other hand, for the department to interfere with him in matters of detail pertaining strictly to his own forces and not involving other forces, was an error. Without doubt the department committed some such errors, though I do not recall specific instances. Though they might be embarrassing at times, there were none made which affected the favorable outcome of the war.

Paragraph 20 of the letter is as follows:

20. Judging from the actions that were finally taken, after extensive cabled and written communications, and consequently long delays, it is apparent that if I could have appeared daily in Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and the discussions before the conferences upon which they were based, they would undoubtedly have been carried out from two to six months earlier. The point is that if the department considered that there was anyone in Washington more competent to form just conclusions, he should have been sent to Europe for that purpose; but, failing this, the recommendations of the Navy Department's representative, based upon conferences with the allied commanders, should have been accepted and immediately acted upon. The action of the department in this respect was a violation of a fundamental principle of warfare—see Mahan or any authority—and it was continuous throughout the war. It added greatly to the burden of my work.

Paragraph 20. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, in so far as I know, had the fullest confidence in Admiral Sims. His reports were excellent and there is no officer in the service who could have done the work he was doing better, or even so well. He understood our need for information and the desirability of spreading it effectively. He kept the department well informed. During the war it was thought that the closest cooperation existed between his office in London and our office in Washington.

The Chief of Naval Operations has often said, if I recollect correctly, that he could not find another officer to take Sims's place. There is a marked difference between having the fullest confidence in an officer, being guided by his opinions and judgment, and giving over to that officer the complete power to make ultimate decisions beyond the scope of those he ought legitimately to make. It is no violation of

the principles of Mahan, nor of the dictates of common sense, in a war of this magnitude, where so many of the influencing factors lay outside of the war zone, and in our own country, for the department to keep a general hand of the situation. Whatever criticisms is made should not be directed at the principle, but at the practical working of that principle, if just criticism there be. When all is said, in broad matters, it was not Admiral Sims's final decisions that were needed, but the final policy and decision of the home Government back of him, based on his preliminary views and directed by his judgment at the front. Request after request was made by Admiral Sims, and were acted upon immediately by the department, but he in turn does not seem to realize the difficulties confronting those whose duty it was to supply the demands made.

Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the letter of Admiral Sims are as follows:

21. There was great delay and reluctance in accepting the indisputable fact, which should have been apparent to anyone, that the critical sea area was in the eastern Atlantic in the so-called submarine war zone; that the submarine campaign could be critical and could affect the ultimate decision of the war only in that area

22. This attitude in Washington greatly slowed the sending of the necessary assistance, and necessarily resulted in prolonging the war.

Paragraphs 21 and 22 can not be concurred in. The officers at home in the Office of Operations were men trained in the same school of thought as Admiral Sims and were loyally giving him their full support. There is no office in the department to which he is more indebted. From the Secretary down there was not, from the time I entered the office, the slightest doubt as to where the war was being waged. We knew it even before he told us. Every plan—and there were many—every effort, was directed toward throwing our effective forces there. The results were by no means as satisfactory as any of us desired, but the reinforcements demanded can not be created in a day and moved like pawns on a chess board. The difficulties confronting us could not have been fully appreciated, or so sweeping a statement would not have been made.

Paragraph 23 of the letter is as follows:

23. It would seem to be self-evident that the department could not possibly have been kept completely informed in detail, by cable code messages, of the actual situation in the war zone, and particularly of the rapidly changing conditions during the critical period of the war in the summer of 1917.

Paragraph 23. The department was kept wonderfully well informed by Admiral Sims. We had a fund of information accumulated in the office through cables from the admiral, through his letters and reports, and through the literature furnished us by the Admiralty through Admiral Sims. The work he did in this respect was deserving of every praise.

Paragraph 24 of the letter is as follows:

24. As a matter of fact, this was a physical impossibility during all of that most critical period. The work of collecting the necessary information, or even the purely mechanical work of transcribing it, would have been away beyond the physical capacity of one man assisted by the one aid I was allowed during that time. The best that could possibly be done was to keep the department informed by cable in a general way of the conclusions reached by the various discussions with the allied commanders at the "front" and of the decisions based thereon.

Paragraph 24. Admiral Sims has a just complaint in this case. He should have been allowed more assistants, and earlier. It was

impossible to meet all his demands, but greater effort should have been made in the beginning, I think.

Paragraph 25 of the letter is as follows:

25. In cases where the department declined to approve such decisions the only course was to try to explain by letter as fully as time and insufficient assistance would permit. The result was, of course, long, embarrassing, and dangerous delays.

Paragraph 25. The gist of this paragraph seems to be that Admiral Sims has a cause for complaint because the department did not accept all his recommendations and act on them favorably, without reserving the right of ultimate decision for itself. In all cases of an unfavorable decision the department accepted the responsibility for it. It was not placed on Sims's shoulders. Had the ultimate outcome of these decisions been disastrous, Admiral Sims's claim would have had more force, but it was not so. On the whole, the Navy did play a successful rôle, as successful a rôle as a Navy which was not prepared specially a long time ahead to enter this particular kind of a war could have been expected to play.

Paragraph 26 of the letter is as follows:

26. If the department had promptly accepted the recommendations made, beginning four days after my arrival abroad, and continuing for some months, and had sent at once all the destroyers and other craft which were finally sent in the next four or five months, it follows that the United States naval intervention would have been much more efficient.

Paragraph 26. The department did accept this information as indicating the true state of affairs, and it gave heed to the recommendations of Admiral Sims. From the date I entered the office I know that the accepted doctrine was "the war is over there." The forces did not go over as fast as any of us desired, but the reasons for it do not lie in the failure to accept the recommendations made. The failure to get into the war immediately, in full force, upon the declaration is not the fault of Operations or the failure to recognize the character of the war, and where it was being waged, but were, for the most part, due to natural causes and to causes which antedated our entry into the war. It was not possible to press a button and move ships, men, and supplies with the rapidity desired either by Sims or by the department. All of the destroyers were not ready to move instantly; navy yards and mercantile shipyards were not ready to undertake the vast amount of work thrown at them. Submarine chasers had to be built. Tugs had to be bought, refitted, and built. Yachts had to be bought, stripped and made ready for war service. The transports, which were the seized German ships, had to be repaired, manned, and put into service. Other transports and supply ships had to be built. Arrangement had to be made with the Army for the transport of its great military force to Europe.

The reorganization and expansion of the Office of Operations and of the bureaus had to be undertaken. The coordination of the bureaus with this office had to be developed; the methods of administration had to be divested of their prewar conservatism, the red tape abolished, and more authority given to subordinates in the matter of detail; habits of quick and accurate thinking and quick decision under the stress of war, had to be developed. The personnel had to be expanded and trained; the task of creating sufficient reserves of war supplies had to be undertaken. The organization of the various

bodies which acted as the cooperating agents between the Navy Department and all other departments and with the allied representatives on this side of the water had to be undertaken. Certain essential problems of home defense had to be undertaken. Though we knew that the immediate and pressing problem was the suppression of the submarine menace and acted in accordance with this knowledge, we also knew that this problem had to be considered in connection with all the other problems I have outlined. Our country could not afford to make any disjointed effort nor to move forward along any one line of action, without due consideration of all lines. We had to profit, if we could, by any previous mistakes of our allies, and we had to prepare for the contingency of a long war. The situation demanded of us that we should make a united, powerful effort, and in this effort the naval establishment had to play its appointed rôle, in harmony with every other effort our country was putting forth. Every master of military warfare and naval warfare knows that the great general's first concern is with the reserves. The weight of the first blow is ultimately controlled by the strength and coordination of the reserves. To build up our reserves was one of our naval problems and had to be considered at the same instant we were called upon to strike at the front.

All of these conditions were difficulties to surmount. They retarded the flow of ships and supplies to Admiral Sims, but the spirit was willing, and the principles he laid down were, in the main, accepted. He always had back of him the loyal support of the office of operations and of the bureaus.

Paragraph 27 of the letter is as follows:

27. I realize that it is difficult at the present time to believe that any policy involving such delays could have been persisted in, particularly when combined with a failure to comply with my requests for additional staff officers to assist my one aid; but a review of the dispatches and letters exchanged with the department during this period (the first four months of the war) will show that the department insisted upon the impossible; that is, upon full and detailed substantiation of every proposition advanced, even many of those concerning the disposition and handling of the naval forces in actual contact with the enemy.

Paragraph 27. I wish to emphasize the fact that this policy of delay, so styled, was not persisted in so far as my particular work is concerned. In this matter I can vouch for the attitude of every person in the department with whom I came in contact, from the secretary down. In my opinion Admiral Sims was not given an adequate staff early enough and I think this should have been done at the expense of every other activity, if necessary. It was a difficult task to accomplish satisfactorily, when all the other necessary activities in which we were engaged are taken into account. However, it should have been done. If the admiral was handicapped by interference with the movements of his force in contact with the enemy, this was wrong in principle. He has cited instances and I have yet to note one which materially affected the outcome of the war.

Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the letter are as follows:

28. For example, in the above-mentioned statement of policy, from the Navy to the State Department, a copy of which was sent me, it is clearly set forth that readiness completely to cooperate by sending our light forces abroad was dependent upon the condition that the Allies should keep the department fully informed through me of their plans and intentions.

other words, while the department's first statement of policy (which was by 1917, or three months after we entered the war) was what I had recommended since the beginning, it nevertheless withheld putting it into effect, apparently of a conviction that the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of

statement in paragraph 29 shows that he had already accepted policy of the Navy Department that went out to him on July 2 of the policy that should be adopted, and there is nowhere in that letter or any other cable that was sent—and I know, because I had that letter—any statement that we were holding back because he had failed to give us information.

reason therein given by Admiral Sims as the department's for our failure to reinforce him as rapidly as he desired, was that the Allies had failed to give the department full and complete information and that therefore the requested aid was withheld. This implies definite knowledge of the department's motives in this or else it is an assumption based on his own opinion. From the middle of June until the signing of the armistice, I can state that to the best of my knowledge no such motive as he claims existed, and I do not recollect any such information having been sent abroad to the department. We entered the war in the middle of April, and of necessity our organization had to go through the transition from a peace basis to a war basis. Before we entered the war, our naval establishments were on a peace basis and our forces were enjoined to preserve neutrality. It would be far more just to ascribe the failure to achieve the desired results immediately, to the difficulties attending the transition from peace to war than to an ungenerous attitude which was not true. I doubt whether we shall ever be prepared to wage effective war at the instant of its declaration. As a man, I do not believe that our democratic form of government accustoms itself to the same instant readiness to strike other nations as an autocratic form of government does. Yet in the end, we are to be thankful. We may be slow to start but later we gain an impetus and momentum which no militaristic form of government can equal, due to the united force of a free people joined together for a common purpose. These were our two conditions at the beginning and at the end of this war. We ran true to form.

The loss in efficiency at the beginning was more than counterbalanced in the end. In this particular war we were fortunate in having even a period for preparation, due largely to the fact that the control of the sea was held by the British fleet, and that barring the line, the German fleet was contained. Had the situation been reversed and had the German fleet controlled the sea, our preparations in preparation would have been greatly increased, if not made impossible. Gentlemen, the statement made in Admiral Sims's paragraphs 28 and 29 is not correct, whatever the inferences which he draws from cables, etc.

Paragraph 30 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

The truth of the matter was that nothing was being withheld, and that all plans which were in writing, which were actually of an official nature, in any way affected United States naval cooperation, had been transmitted to the department as completely as long distance communication—coded—permitted.

Paragraph 30 is entirely correct. We were in receipt of the full information at all times. The cooperation which existed be-

tween ourselves and the governments with which we in this war seemed excellent in naval matters.

Paragraph 31 of the letter is as follows:

31. Certain suggestions were made by the British Admiralty in the campaign. For example, in April, 1917, there was an suggestion that we should attempt a raid in the Channel with a heavy force and get it to be intercepted by a force from the Grand Fleet, the nearest base of which was near Edinburgh. Accordingly, the Admiralty suggested that a squadron of ships be based on Brest or in the Channel. No reply was made. Also, the value of submarines in the campaign was first explained. None were sent until October, 1917, when five arrived in Ireland. More in January and February, 1918.

Paragraph 31. I do not recall now the suggestion of a squadron of battleships to Brest or channel ports. It was in the office in an executive capacity. No direct order was ever made for such forces at any time I was in the office. In the case of the ships to reinforce the Grand Fleet, discuss where.

I will read you a summary of the situation concerning our submarines to the war zone, compiled from data of the office of operations:

[Extract from letter from Admiral Sims dated Apr. 19, 1917.]

SUBMARINE VERSUS SUBMARINES.

There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines on the grounds that the possibilities of their accomplishments were not sufficiently great to justify the risk involved of mistaken identity and damage to friends.

The director of antisubmarine warfare believes, however, that such promises will, and the experiment is now being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet.

Some enemy submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually by surprise. One valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty is removed the enemy is forced to keep down more and to take much greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small amount.

In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels under the actual conditions in the areas in which they operate. Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected effort.

MEMORANDUM RE S/MS, STATIONS AND DUTIES.

1. In a general report, by letter dated April 19, 1917 (date of receipt in department not known), Admiral Sims set forth the probable usefulness of allied S/Ms against enemy S/Ms. No definite recommendation, the letter being in nature of a report setting forth the situation.

2. On June 30, 1917, Admiral Sims in replying to certain proposals in a department paper dated April 17, 1917, cabled that "All S/Ms we can send to Irish coast will be invaluable there." etc.

3. On July 2, 1917, department directed C. in C. by letter to designate 12 S/Ms for European service and set August 15 as tentative sailing date. On July 11, C. in C. designated 12 S/Ms and made certain recommendations concerning them out; all but one of them had been at navy yards since early in May undergoing extensive repairs and alterations. Department issued final orders by letter dated August 15, 1917, directing preparations for S/Ms going on distant service.

4. Admiral Mayo cabled August 29, 1917, "After consultation with Admiral Jellicoe, Beatty, and Sims, recommend sending one division of S/Ms to Azores. There had been messages between department and Admiral Sims concerning the question of waters of Azores prior to this."

governments with... in naval matters... is as follows... by the British... April, 1917, the... with a heavy for... Fleet, the nea... rally suggest... nel. No repl... campaign wa... five arrived... call now... channel... capacity... ne I was... le Grand... situation... piled from... dated Apr... MARINES... times... acc... stated...

ready, four K class S/Ms sailed for Ponta Delgada with Bushnell as own tender not being ready. Sailing date, from New London, was arrived October 27, and Bushnell returned immediately.

and L class S/Ms. with Bushnell and three tugs left navy yards November 4, 1917, for Azores December 4, 1917. Expedition was broken up by very stormy weather; four S/Ms and Bushnell arrived Ponta Delgada December 24 and were held there by Admiral Sims's order until January 1918.

summer of 1918 there were several despatches between department, and Admiral Dunn (Azores), concerning unsuitability of K class S/Ms for relief by better S/Ms was recommended and decided upon. Relieving force arrived just before signing armistice.

spring and early summer of 1918, Admiral Sims did not recommend our S/Ms in Irish waters and in connection with information concerning visits of German S/Ms to Atlantic Coast pointed out that our S/Ms were the best measure to use.

department's cable of September 9, 1918, stated that there was great concern over enemy S/Ms activities along our troop lanes west of Brest, suggested operating S/Ms in that locality and asked if the O class S/Ms were wanted abroad.

Admiral Sims's cable of September 13 stated that S/Ms were proving of little use in hunting there, gave statistics of enemy S/Ms destroyed by allied S/Ms for months and ended, "It would, however, be desirable to send the O boats to intensify our search efforts in other equally important areas."

Admiral Sims's cable of October 3, 1918, then stated "Owing to lack of success in operations against S/Ms west of Brest, admiralty proposes adopting department's plan and sending S/Ms to operate in this area" and stated that sending O boats would improve chances of success.

Savannah's division of 8 O boats which had been engaged on antisubmarine duty on Atlantic coast was immediately sent to navy yard to dock, sailed from New York November 2 and arrived at Azores after the armistice.

THOS. C. HART.

was in charge of the submarine division of operations. He was also in command of the L-boats that went abroad, to Queenstown. I would like to submit this table in connection with that report, owing to the testimony that has been submitted by Admiral Sims as to the unsuitability of our submarines. I think every naval officer knows that they were not what they should be, and we wanted better, but it might be interesting to note that these tests, which we supposed to be very poor, performed as well as—will not say better than—any of the submarines that were over on the other side, as this table submitted will show. It will possibly be interesting for me to read a few lines of it.

Capt. Pratt here read the table referred to, which is here printed the record as follows:

Submarine Division 5 performances from Dec. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918.

| | AL-1 | AL-2 | AL-3 | AL-4 | AL-9 | AL-10 | AL-11 |
|-------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Number of days at sea..... | 115.9 | 125.4 | 134.0 | 90.2 | 108.0 | 136.6 | 106.2 |
| Number days on patrol..... | 76.5 | 83.0 | 89.0 | 60.0 | 62.0 | 95.0 | 78.0 |
| Miles on surface..... | 12,072.3 | 17,562.3 | 12,093.8 | 10,871.6 | 12,251.8 | 15,617.3 | 13,066.3 |
| Miles submerged..... | 2,353.0 | 1,879.0 | 3,120.0 | 2,126.0 | 2,058.6 | 2,891.8 | 1,906.8 |
| Hours submerged..... | 1,245.4 | 1,163.1 | 1,669.2 | 1,285.1 | 954.8 | 1,794.5 | 1,597.0 |
| Hours charging batteries (starboard)..... | 265.6 | 343.6 | 368.0 | 207.1 | 214.7 | 287.7 | 227.6 |
| Hours charging batteries (port)..... | 312.2 | 306.1 | 332.0 | 237.4 | 181.3 | 275.9 | 227.5 |
| Fuel used, gallons..... | 50,413.0 | 66,076.0 | 55,373.0 | 42,216.0 | 52,008.0 | 58,749.0 | 57,545.0 |
| Lubricating oil used, gallons..... | 12,956.0 | 15,379.0 | 12,767.0 | 10,944.0 | 16,084.0 | 19,765.0 | 13,272.0 |
| Exercise torpedo runs..... | 12.0 | 10.0 | 11.0 | 14.0 | 8.0 | 15.0 | 12.0 |
| Torpedoes lost..... | 1.0 | 1.0 | | | | 2.0 | |
| Torpedoes wrecked..... | | 1.0 | | | 1.0 | | |
| Number times enemy sighted.... | 3.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| Times enemy attacked with torpedoes..... | 1.0 | | | 2.0 | | | 1.0 |
| Number torpedoes expended.... | 4.0 | | | 5.0 | | | 2.0 |

The CHAIRMAN. Does that "times enemy attacked with" mean that the enemy attacked us?

Capt. PRATT. No, that we attacked the enemy.

Paragraph 32 of the letter of Admiral Sims reads as follows.

32 In spite of the numerous messages sent in April, the only information up to April 27, 1917, was that six destroyers only would be sent. The situation then so very critical that I appealed to the American ambassador in London and sent a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 1917, the necessary information was received of the department's intention to send more than six destroyers—that ultimately 36 and two repair ships would be sent.

Paragraph 32. I am not thoroughly familiar with the situation in April, not being in the office in an administrative capacity at that time.

I will here read a statement showing the number of destroyers sent to the first of each month, in Europe, under repair at home and available but being used in home waters. This list does not include 5 old destroyers on the Pacific coast of 450 tons, which were later moved to the Atlantic. These destroyers were old, small and very useful. They were later used to swell our coast defense, relieving better boats to meet the requests from Halifax, and later having been repaired, got as far as the Azores. The destroyers left at home as you will note, did not exceed 9 or 10. They were used to screen the fleet in sea maneuvers, protect transport ships at this end of the voyage until they met the European destroyers. They were used to convoy valuable ships, principally British, to their own ports. Despite the acute situation in British waters, no valuable ship of theirs requested a destroyer escort on approaching our ports. The requests came to us from their Admiralty through their naval representative here.

I desire to submit at this point the following papers:

(E) List of destroyers, showing their duty, availability and location from Jan. 1, 1917, to Dec. 1, 1918.

(E1) Order to destroyer commander.

(F) List of U. S. vessels in commission on the 1st of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive, operating in European waters.

(G) List of U. S. naval vessels in commission on the 1st of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive.

(H) Location and availability of submarine chasers.

(H1) List of results in European waters April 6, 1918.

First, there is the following memorandum in regard to destroyers.

First destroyers sailing for Europe (Apr. 24, 1917): *Conyningham*, *Davis*, *McDonough*, *Porter*, *Wadsworth*, and *Wainwright*.

Destroyers sailing from the Philippines (Aug. 1, 1917): *Bainbridge*, *Barry*, *Chawick*, *Dale*, and *Decatur*.

New destroyers were commissioned from May 1, 1917, to January 1, 1918, and sailed as follows: *Manley*, October 15, 1917; *Stockton*, November 26, 1917; *Caldwell*, December 1, 1917; *Isabel* (fast yacht, classed as destroyer), December 28, 1917.

The five destroyers in home waters which were not at navy yards on June 1, 1917, were: *Allen*, *Ammen*, *Henley*, *Shaw*, and *Terry*.

Status of oil-burning destroyers from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919.

| Date. | In home waters. | | En route to Europe. | In European waters. | | | Total. |
|---------|-----------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------|-------------|--------|
| | At yards. | Not at yards. | | Brest. | Queens-town. | Gibral-tar. | |
| 1917. | | | | | | | |
| Jan. 1 | | 46 | | | | | 46 |
| Feb. 1 | | 46 | | | | | 46 |
| Mar. 1 | 2 | 44 | | | | | 46 |
| Apr. 1 | 20 | 26 | | | | | 46 |
| May 1 | 27 | 14 | 6 | | | | 47 |
| June 1 | 14 | 5 | 4 | | 24 | | 47 |
| July 1 | 7 | 5 | 7 | | 28 | | 47 |
| Aug. 1 | 5 | 7 | | | 35 | | 47 |
| Sept. 1 | 7 | 5 | | | 35 | | 47 |
| Oct. 1 | 6 | 6 | | | 35 | | 47 |
| Nov. 1 | 4 | 6 | 3 | | 35 | | 48 |
| Dec. 1 | 6 | 5 | 3 | | 36 | | 50 |
| 1918. | | | | | | | |
| Jan. 1 | 7 | 4 | (1) | 2 | 36 | | 49 |
| Feb. 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 36 | | 50 |
| Mar. 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 38 | | 50 |
| Apr. 1 | | 6 | | 6 | 38 | | 50 |
| May 1 | 4 | 5 | | 6 | 38 | | 53 |
| June 1 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 38 | | 57 |
| July 1 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 22 | 26 | | 60 |
| Aug. 1 | 1 | 15 | | 23 | 25 | 2 | 66 |
| Sept. 1 | 2 | 19 | | 23 | 25 | 2 | 71 |
| Oct. 1 | 5 | 21 | 3 | 25 | 25 | 2 | 81 |
| Nov. 1 | 9 | 20 | 1 | 28 | 25 | 4 | 87 |
| Dec. 1 | 11 | 21 | | 25 | 27 | 8 | 92 |

1 sunk Dec. 6.

have made a distinction between the oil-burning and the coal-burning, because both in fleet operations and in operations requiring quick movement a distinction must be made between the tactical uses of these two. The coal burner makes a good deal of smoke and is easy for a submarine to find on the surface. The oil burner can run smokeless, and is therefore by far the most protective of all destroyers, owing to their sea-keeping qualities; anything less than a 750-ton boat, unless she is perfectly brand-new, is not to be classed with her as a sea-keeping ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Can an oil-burning destroyer make an equally effective smoke screen as a coal-burning destroyer?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; more effective. She has the power to run smokeless, or she can make a screen so dense, as I saw it once when I was with Admiral Sims, from Boston Harbor all the way down to Cape Ann everything was so completely clouded and the smoke was so thick that you could not see the forecastle because of the moisture in the atmosphere with the oil smoke.

Now, here is the status of the coal-burning destroyers:

Status of coal burning destroyers from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919.

| Date. | In home waters. | En route to Europe. | In European waters. |
|--------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1917. | | | |
| Jan. 1 | 21 | | |
| Feb. 1 | 21 | | |
| Mar. 1 | 21 | | |
| Apr. 1 | 21 | | |
| May 1 | 21 | | |
| June 1 | 21 | | |
| July 1 | 21 | | |

Status of coal burning destroyers from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919—Continued.

| Date. | In home waters. | En route to Europe. | In European waters. |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1917. | | | |
| Aug. 1..... | 11 | 6 | |
| Sept. 1..... | 9 | 7 | |
| Oct. 1..... | 9 | 5 | |
| Nov. 1..... | 9 | | 1 |
| Dec. 1..... | 9 | | 1 |
| 1918. | | | |
| Jan. 1..... | 9 | | 1 |
| Feb. 1..... | 6 | 3 | 1 |
| Mar. 1..... | 6 | | 1 |
| Apr. 1..... | 6 | | 1 |
| May 1..... | 6 | | 1 |
| June 1..... | 6 | | 1 |
| July 1..... | 6 | | 1 |
| Aug. 1..... | 7 | | 1 |
| Sept. 1..... | 8 | | 1 |
| Oct. 1..... | 8 | | 1 |
| Nov. 1..... | 8 | | 1 |
| Dec. 1..... | 8 | | 1 |

11 sunk Nov. 19.

NOTE.—“Home waters” includes Atlantic coast and Pacific coast and the Philippines. Of these 21 destroyers 5 were 750 tons—*Reid, Smith, Flusser, Lamson, Preston*. The remainder were smaller vessels classed as coast torpedo boats of approximately 400 tons.

We had in home waters on January 1, 1917, 21 destroyers. That includes five of the 750-ton boats, and the other 16 are not classed as destroyers exactly, but I will show you in this book, which I will submit afterwards [indicating], in which I have marked the page, how they come in. They were old 400-type boats. They were scattered all over the world—a few of them were. But of those 21, the five really effective ones were the five 750-ton coal burners.

There has also been given in Capt. Taussig’s report, I think, a statement which may have left some impression as to his failure to have received orders to cooperate fully with the forces on the other side after his arrival. I will submit a copy of his orders, and will read such pertinent extracts as relate to the operations. [Reading]:

ORDERS ISSUED TO COMMANDER, EIGHTH DIVISION, DESTROYER FORCE, APRIL 14, 1917.

(Secret and confidential.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, U. S. S. *Wadsworth*, Flagship.

Subject: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

1. The British Admiralty have requested the cooperation of a division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britian and France.

2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in every way possible.

3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior British naval officer present, and thereafter cooperate fully with the British navy. Should it be decided that your force act in cooperation with French naval forces your mission and method of operation under French Admiralty authority remain unchanged.

Route to Queenstown.—Boston to latitude 50 north, longitude 20 west, to arrive at break then to latitude 50 north, longitude 12 west, thence to Queenstown. When in radio communication of the British Naval forces off Ireland, call G CK and

the vice admiral at Queenstown in British general code of your position, and speed. You will be met outside of Queenstown. Facilities will be provided by the British Admiralty. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear Admiral Sims at London and led by such instructions as he may give you. Make no reports of arrival to Department direct.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Will now submit a list of United States naval vessels in commission the first of each month from April 1, 1917, to November 1, inclusive, operating in European waters. This list is as follows [ing]:

United States naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive, operating in European waters.

Senator PITTMAN. I wish you would read again the figures for April and May.

apt. PRATT. There were none on the 1st of April. There were none in European waters in April, 1917. We had not gone to war. Destroyers did not sail until the 24th of April and did not arrive there until the 4th of May.

Senator PITTMAN. I understood you to say there were none in European waters in May.

apt. PRATT. No, sir; on the 1st of May; and on the 1st of June shows what had come over in May. On the 1st of June there were 18 destroyers and 1 auxiliary, making a total of 19.

the CHAIRMAN. When did the 24 arrive on the other side? That one arrived on May 4 and the other 18 arrived when?

apt. PRATT. I have not got that date.

the CHAIRMAN. The latter part of the month?

apt. PRATT. Yes; I have that also. I have it later on in my statement. I have another paper which shows what we had on April 6, 1917, and that is given, and the ships are named with the date of sailing and date of arrival of each. That statement will include those

I would like to submit a list of naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from April 1, 1917, to November 1, 1918, inclusive. This is a list of all naval vessels including those abroad and on this side. Of battleships there were 29.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the battleships there by name?

Capt. PRATT. No; this is just the classes. Admiral McKean has the full list showing the comparative readiness. Admiral McKean is more qualified to give the preparation than I am, as I was merely an operator, taking what was handed to me and then operating. His information is more accurate than mine.

This list is as follows:

List of United States naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from April 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive.

November 1, 1918, there were 1,498 ships being operated by the Navy.

I will submit also a list of our submarine chasers. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 18, 1919.

Memorandum for Capt. Pratt:

There were no submarine chasers in European waters in 1917.

Submarine chaser convoys sailing for Europe:

| | Number. | | Number |
|--------------------|---------|---------------------|--------|
| Feb. 22, 1918..... | 11 | June 28, 1918..... | |
| Mar. 18, 1918..... | 1 | Sept. 26, 1918..... | |
| Mar. 25, 1918..... | 13 | Oct. 18, 1918..... | |
| Mar. 31, 1918..... | 12 | Oct. 24, 1918..... | |
| Apr. 25, 1918..... | 18 | | |
| May 18, 1918..... | 24 | Total..... | 1 |
| June 10, 1918..... | 6 | | |

Location and availability of submarine chasers.

| In commission. | In United States. | In Europe or en route. | In commission. | In United States. | In Europe or en route |
|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Mar. 1, 1917..... | | | Apr. 1, 1918..... | 169 | 37 |
| Apr. 1, 1917..... | 1 | | May 1, 1918..... | 213 | 55 |
| May 1, 1917..... | 1 | | June 1, 1918..... | 222 | 79 |
| Jun. 1, 1917..... | 21 | | July 1, 1918..... | 199 | 103 |
| Jul. 1, 1917..... | 42 | | Aug. 1, 1918..... | 199 | 103 |
| Aug. 1, 1917..... | 73 | | Sept. 1, 1918..... | 197 | 103 |
| Sep. 1, 1917..... | 97 | | Oct. 1, 1918..... | 179 | 121 |
| Oct. 1, 1917..... | 121 | 11 | Nov. 1, 1918..... | 164 | 135 |

1 14 en route.

Between March and April, 1917, contracts for over 300 110-foot submarine chasers were let. The dates in this table are the dates when they sailed for Europe; and also the number en route or already in Europe.

There were no submarine chasers in European waters in 1917. They were not built; nor did we have any tugs and escort vessels in time to get them over in that year. They had to be built and put into shape.

Senator PITTMAN. The question as to where these were built, etc., probably will be answered by Admiral McKean.

Capt. PRATT. That comes under Admiral McKean, and he knows about when the contracts were let and the way they were built.

I can, of course, give some idea of the efforts we were making to put them in shape, and will state that there was an office under Capt. Tompkins, organized in the office of operations as soon as the submarine chasers began to be available, and they were sent to New London for the crews to train, and to fit them with the sound-detecting devices, which was then done in New London, and for some experimental work in actually operating with our submarines submerged, and to have the personnel in training, in order to fit them as rapidly as possible to project to Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. None of them, however, reached Europe?

Capt. PRATT. None of them reached Europe until 1918. The first one was only completed in September, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated there were 135 in Europe on the first of November?

Capt. PRATT. 1918.

Senator TRAMMELL. 1918?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, 1918; and not 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That was at the end of the war.

Capt. PRATT. I have here also a book of data, which is the last book published, the issue of which went out of date with the beginning of the war because the information therein contained was supposed to be confidential and secret, and we did not wish to keep it up to date after we went into the war. But it gives you, type for type, the vessels that we had in our Navy. It is called "Ships' Data of United States Naval Vessels," published by the bureau of construction and repair. It shows you the name of every ship we had in the Navy on November 1, 1916. Of course, that is what we had when we went into the war. I built anything more, practically

we had not anything more that was new and that might be useful in case anyone wanted to read it, so that I have submitted it here.

I have here also a list of the vessels in European waters April 1918, which gives their date of sailing and date of arrival in Europe. This gives you complete information as to the ships and the dates of sailing and dates of arrival. This list is as follows. [Reading:]

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918.

DESTROYERS.

| Name. | Date of sailing. | Date of arrival in Europe. |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| Bainbridge..... | Aug. 1, 1917..... | Oct. 20, 1917. |
| Barry..... | do..... | Do. |
| Dale..... | do..... | Do. |
| Decatur..... | do..... | Do. |
| Macdonough..... | Jan. 16, 1918..... | Feb. 20, 1918. |
| Isabel..... | Jan. 17, 1918..... | Do. |
| Stewart..... | Jan. 16, 1918..... | Feb. 9, 1918. |
| Truxton..... | Aug. 31, 1917..... | Sept. 17, 1917 (Azores) |
| Whipple..... | do..... | Sept. 17, 1917. |
| Worden..... | Jan. 16, 1918..... | Feb. 9, 1918. |
| Smith..... | July 16, 1917..... | July 28, 1917 (Azores). |
| Lamson..... | do..... | Do. |
| Preston..... | July 22, 1917..... | July 31, 1917 (Azores). |
| Flusser..... | July 30, 1917..... | Aug. 12, 1917 (Azores). |
| Reid..... | July 21, 1917..... | July 31, 1917 (Azores). |
| Paulding..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Drayton..... | do..... | Do. |
| Roe..... | Nov. 9, 1917..... | Dec. 13, 1917. |
| Terry..... | Jan. 9, 1918..... | Feb. 6, 1918. |
| Sterrett..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 9, 1917. |
| McCall..... | Jan. 17, 1918..... | Feb. 22, 1918. |
| Burrows..... | June 14, 1917..... | July 5, 1917. |
| Warrington..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Monaghan..... | Nov. 9, 1917..... | Dec. 13, 1917. |
| Trippe..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Ammen..... | June 17, 1917..... | July 5, 1917. |
| Patterson..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Fanning..... | June 14, 1917..... | July 6, 1917. |
| Jarvis..... | May 25, 1917..... | June 13, 1917. |
| Beale..... | Jan. 9, 1918..... | Feb. 6, 1918. |
| Jenkins..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Cassin..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| Cummings..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Downes..... | Oct. 18, 1917..... | Nov. 8, 1917. |
| Duncan..... | Oct. 31, 1917..... | Nov. 15, 1917. |
| Aylwin..... | Jan. 4, 1918..... | Jan. 16, 1918. |
| Parker..... | June 16, 1917..... | July 6, 1917. |
| Benham..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Balch..... | Oct. 25, 1917..... | Nov. 8, 1917. |
| O'Brien..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Nicholson..... | do..... | Do. |
| Winslow..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| McDougal..... | Apr. 24, 1917..... | May 4, 1917. |
| Cushing..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Ericsson..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| Tucker..... | do..... | Do. |
| Conyngham..... | Apr. 24, 1917..... | May 4, 1917. |
| Porter..... | do..... | Do. |
| Wadsworth..... | do..... | Do. |
| Wainwright..... | do..... | Do. |
| Samson..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Rowan..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| Davis..... | Apr. 24, 1917..... | May 4, 1917. |
| Allen..... | June 14, 1917..... | July 5, 1917. |
| Wilkes..... | do..... | Do. |
| Shaw..... | June 17, 1917..... | July 6, 1917. |
| Caldwell..... | Feb. 14, 1918..... | Mar. 5, 1918. |
| Stockton..... | Jan. 30, 1918..... | Feb. 12, 1918. |
| Manley..... | Nov. 24, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917. |

MINE LAYER.

| | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Baltimore ¹ | Mar. 4, 1918..... | Mar. 18, 1918. |
|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918—Continued.

YACHTS.

| Name. | Date of sailing. | Date of arrival in Europe. |
|-------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| | June 14, 1917..... | June 27, 1917. |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 20, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 5, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | June 14, 1917..... | June 27, 1917. |
| | Nov. 3, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 14, 1917..... | Jan. 22, 1918 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Oct. 20, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Do. |
| | do..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 17, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Feb. ^{a)} |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June |
| | Dec. 21, 1917..... | Jan. |
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. |
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept |

TUGS.

| | | |
|------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 8, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 4, 1917..... | Jan. 12, 1918 (Azores). |
| Queen..... | Dec. 20, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Jan. 8, 1918..... | Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 17, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | Jan. 8, 1918..... | Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores). |

^a These vessels were in the United States Navy prior to declaration of war.^b Commissioned in European waters Aug. 27, 1917^c Interned at Constantinople, Turkey

TRAWLERS.

| | | |
|-------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | Sept. 29, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | do..... | Do. |

MINE SWEEPERS.

| | | |
|-------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 15, 1917..... | Jan. 21, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |

COAST GUARD CUTTERS.

| | | |
|-------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 9, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 15, 1917..... | Aug. 25, 1917 (left Azores). |
| | Aug. 19, 1917..... | Sept. 4, 1917 |
| | Sept. 20, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 11, 1917 (Azores). |

we had not anything more that was new and that might be usef case anyone wanted to read it, so that I have submitted it here.

I have here also a list of the vessels in European waters Apr 1918, which gives their date of sailing and date of arrival in Eur This gives you complete information as to the ships and the dat sailing and dates of arrival. This list is as follows. [Reading:]

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918.

DESTROYERS.

| Name. | Date of sailing. | Date of arrival in Eu |
|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Bainbridge..... | Aug. 1, 1917..... | Oct. 20, 1917. |
| Barry..... | do..... | Do. |
| Dale..... | do..... | Do. |
| Decatur..... | do..... | Do. |
| Macdonough..... | Jan. 16, 1918..... | Feb. 20, 1918. |
| Isabel..... | Jan. 17, 1918..... | Do. |
| Stewart..... | Jan. 16, 1918..... | Feb. 9, 1918. |
| Truxton..... | Aug. 31, 1917..... | Sept. 17, 1917 (Azores) |
| Whipple..... | do..... | Sept. 17, 1917. |
| Worden..... | Jan. 16, 1918..... | Feb. 9, 1918. |
| Smith..... | July 16, 1917..... | July 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| Lamson..... | do..... | Do. |
| Preston..... | July 22, 1917..... | July 31, 1917 (Azores). |
| Flusser..... | July 30, 1917..... | Aug. 12, 1917 (Azores). |
| Reid..... | July 21, 1917..... | July 31, 1917 (Azores). |
| Paulding..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Drayton..... | do..... | Do. |
| Roe..... | Nov. 9, 1917..... | Dec. 13, 1917. |
| Terry..... | Jan. 9, 1918..... | Feb. 6, 1918. |
| Sterrett..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 9, 1917. |
| McCall..... | Jan. 17, 1918..... | Feb. 22, 1918. |
| Burrows..... | June 14, 1917..... | July 5, 1917. |
| Warrington..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Monaghan..... | Nov. 9, 1917..... | Dec. 13, 1917. |
| Trippe..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Ammen..... | June 17, 1917..... | July 5, 1917. |
| Patterson..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Fanning..... | June 14, 1917..... | July 6, 1917. |
| Jarvis..... | May 25, 1917..... | June 13, 1917. |
| Beale..... | Jan. 9, 1918..... | Feb. 6, 1918. |
| Jenkins..... | May 21, 1917..... | June 1, 1917. |
| Cassin..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| Cummings..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Downes..... | Oct. 18, 1917..... | Nov. 8, 1917. |
| Duncan..... | Oct. 31, 1917..... | Nov. 15, 1917. |
| Aylwin..... | Jan. 4, 1918..... | Jan. 16, 1918. |
| Parker..... | June 16, 1917..... | July 6, 1917. |
| Benham..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Balch..... | Oct. 25, 1917..... | Nov. 8, 1917. |
| O'Brien..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Nicholson..... | do..... | Do. |
| Winslow..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| McDougal..... | Apr. 24, 1917..... | May 4, 1917. |
| Cushing..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Ericsson..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| Tucker..... | do..... | Do. |
| Conyngham..... | Apr. 24, 1917..... | May 4, 1917. |
| Porter..... | do..... | Do. |
| Wadsworth..... | do..... | Do. |
| Wainwright..... | do..... | Do. |
| Samson..... | May 15, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Rowan..... | May 7, 1917..... | May 21, 1917. |
| Davis..... | Apr. 24, 1917..... | May 4, 1917. |
| Allen..... | June 14, 1917..... | July 5, 1917. |
| Wilkes..... | do..... | Do. |
| Shaw..... | June 17, 1917..... | July 6, 1917. |
| Caldwell..... | Feb. 14, 1918..... | Mar. 5, 1918. |
| Stockton..... | Jan. 30, 1918..... | Feb. 12, 1918. |
| Manley..... | Nov. 24, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917. |

MINE LAYER.

| | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Baltimore ¹ | Mar. 4, 1918..... | Mar. 18, 1918. |
|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918—Continued.

YACHTS.

| Name. | Date of sailing. | Date of arrival in Europe. |
|-------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| | June 14, 1917..... | June 27, 1917. |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 20, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 5, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | June 14, 1917..... | June 27, 1917. |
| | Nov. 3, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 15, 1917..... | Jan. 22, 1918 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Oct. 30, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Do. |
| | do..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 17, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Feb. 9, 1918 (left Azores). |
| | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 21, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 2, 1917 (Azores). |

TUGS.

| | | |
|--|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 4, 1917..... | Jan. 12, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 20, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Jan. 8, 1918..... | Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 17, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | Jan. 8, 1918..... | Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores). |

- ¹ These vessels were in the United States Navy prior to declaration of war.
² Commissioned in European waters Aug. 27, 1917.
³ Interned at Constantinople, Turkey.

TRAWLERS.

| | | |
|--|---------------------|-------------------------|
| | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | do..... | Do. |
| | Sept. 29, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | do..... | Do. |

MINE SWEEPERS.

| | | |
|--|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Dec. 15, 1917..... | Jan. 21, 1918 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |

COAST GUARD CUTTERS.

| | | |
|--|---------------------|------------------------------|
| | Aug. 29, 1917..... | Sept. 9, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 15, 1917..... | Aug. 23, 1917 (left Azores). |
| | Aug. 19, 1917..... | Sept. 4, 1917. |
| | Sept. 29, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores). |
| | Aug. 30, 1917..... | Sept. 11, 1917 (Azores). |

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918—Continued.

TENDERS.

| Name. | Date of sailing. | Date of arrival in Eu |
|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Melville..... | May 11, 1917..... | May 24, 1917. |
| Dixie..... | May 31, 1917..... | June 13, 1917. |
| Panther..... | July 30, 1917..... | Aug. 12, 1917. |
| Bushnell..... | Oct. 12, 1917..... | Oct. 27, 1917. |
| Prometheus..... | Dec. 5, 1917..... | Feb. 11, 1918. |
| Tonopah..... | Jan. 7, 1918..... | Do. |

GUNBOATS.

| | | |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| Sacramento..... | July 22, 1917..... | Aug. 1, 1917. |
| Mechias..... | July 30, 1917..... | Aug. 16, 1917. |
| Castine..... | Aug. 1, 1917..... | Do. |
| Nashville..... | Aug. 2, 1917..... | Aug. 12, 1917. |
| Wheeling..... | Aug. 31, 1917..... | Sept. 17, 1917. |
| Marietta..... | Sept. 13, 1917..... | Sept. 24, 1917. |
| Paducah..... | Sept. 29, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917. |

CRUISERS.

| | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Birmingham..... | Aug. 8, 1917..... | Aug. 17, 1917. |
| Chester..... | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 2, 1917. |

SUBMARINES.

| | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| K-1, 2, 5, 6..... | Oct. 12, 1917..... | Oct. 27, 1917. |
| L-1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11..... | Dec. 4, 1917..... | Jan. 27, 1918. |
| E-1..... | do..... | Jan. 12, 1918. |
| L-9..... | Jan. 17, 1918..... | Feb. 22, 1918. |

BATTLESHIPS.

| | | |
|---------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Delaware..... | Nov. 25, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917. |
| Florida..... | do..... | Do. |
| New York..... | do..... | Do. |
| Wyoming..... | do..... | Do. |
| Texas..... | Jan. 30, 1918..... | Feb. 11, 1918. |

I submit also the following list:

French submarine chasers.

| Departed United States during— | Numbers. | T |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| December, 1917..... | 28, 29, 67, 170, 171, 172, 180, 314..... | |
| January, 1918..... | 173..... | |
| March, 1918..... | 174, 175, 176, 350..... | |
| April, 1918..... | | |
| May, 1918..... | | |
| September, 1918..... | 53, 384, 385, 386, 387, 371, 372, 379, 381, 382, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397. | |
| October, 1918..... | 87, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 398, 404, 405, 406. | |
| No record..... | 14, 15, 16, 75, 76, 65, 66, 243, 347, 348. | |
| Sunk Dec. 10, 1917, in United States..... | | |
| Grand total..... | | |

se books I have submitted for the reference of the committee marked the places that refer to our smaller submarine and merely submit these in case any questions are to be asked about the subject.

I had difficulty, because in a way the files that I operated during the war have been more or less disrupted since I left, to get historical data. I have not always been able to lay my hands on everything I would like, as I could while we were at sea, in order that the state of personnel preparedness may be determined by the gentlemen of the Senate Naval Committee. I have here the list and directory of January 1, 1917, February 1, 1917, March 1, 1917, April 1, 1917, and May 1, 1917, in which I have pasted little slips which indicate the number of ships on full commission and vessels operating in the reserve due to personnel shortages; so that that gives you the complete story when you get McKean's material report. I leave these books here for your reference.

CHAIRMAN. They are not to go in the record?

PRATT. No, sir. I have prepared a list of destroyers showing complements on board in January, 1917, and also the complement on March 31, 1917. I did that because it would help the committee a great deal in being able to read the summary rather than to go through those five blue books that I submitted and report for themselves, and I therefore, with your permission, propose to submit this paper to go in the record at this point. It will tell you the whole story as far as I know it.

CHAIRMAN. This is as to condition and personnel?

PRATT. No; as to personnel and condition, Admiral McKean should show the full account of personnel. I do not like to go outside my own bailiwick. I could do it from the lists, but I would not should do it.

CHAIRMAN. Very well.

What is referred to is as follows:)

APRIL 19, 1920.

Destroyers, 1917.

| Vessel. | Complement. | On board January, 1917. | On board Mar. 31, 1917. |
|----------------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | 94 | A-33 | 96 |
| | 88 | R-53 | 96 |
| | 96 | A-86 | 91 |
| o boat) | 26 | O-13 | 13 |
| o boat) | 26 | R-18 | 41 |
| | 76 | A-56 | 84 |
| | 96 | A-87 | 98 |
| | 75 | A-60 | 76 |
| | 88 | R-44 | 60 |
| | 96 | A-87 | 92 |
| | 88 | R-49 | 74 |
| | 96 | A-81 | 94 |
| | 82 | A-79 | 74 |
| | 96 | A-80 | 94 |
| | 96 | A-78 | 88 |
| | 96 | A-80 | 98 |
| | 74 | A-87 | 74 |
| | 94 | A-94 | 115 |
| | 74 | A-73 | 78 |
| | 88 | A-75 | 79 |
| | 96 | A-85 | 88 |

—Active duty.

R—Reserve.

O—Ordinary.

Destroyers, 1917—Continued.

| Vessel. | Comple- ment. | On board January, 1917. | On Ma H |
|------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| Ericsson..... | 96 | A-72 | |
| Fanning..... | 88 | A-73 | |
| Flusser..... | 84 | R-52 | |
| Henley..... | 88 | R-49 | |
| Jacob Jones..... | 96 | A-83 | |
| Jarvis..... | 88 | R-76 | |
| Jenkins..... | 88 | A-63 | |
| Jouett..... | 88 | R-44 | |
| Lamson..... | 84 | R-57 | |
| McCall..... | 88 | R-69 | |
| McDougal..... | 96 | A-84 | |
| Monaghan..... | 88 | R-54 | |
| Nicholson..... | 96 | A-84 | |
| O'Brien..... | 96 | A-85 | |
| Parker..... | 96 | A-88 | |
| Patterson..... | 88 | R-56 | |
| Paulding..... | 88 | A-73 | |
| Porter..... | 96 | A-77 | |
| Preston..... | 84 | R-39 | |
| Reid..... | 84 | R-54 | |
| Roe..... | 88 | R-52 | |
| Rowan..... | 98 | A-97 | |
| Sampson..... | 98 | A-83 | |
| Smith..... | 84 | R-74 | |
| Sterrett..... | 88 | R-47 | |
| Stewart..... | 72 | R-42 | |
| Terry..... | 88 | R-42 | |
| Trippe..... | 88 | R-45 | |
| Truxton..... | 72 | R-41 | |
| Tucker..... | 96 | A-81 | |
| Wadsworth..... | 96 | A-79 | |
| Wainbright..... | 96 | A-83 | |
| Walke..... | 88 | R-44 | |
| Warrington..... | 88 | R-48 | |
| Whipple..... | 72 | R-38 | |
| Wilkes..... | 96 | A-92 | |
| Winslow..... | 96 | A-83 | |

A—Active duty. R—Reserve.

Gentlemen, these lists speak for themselves. Of all the submarine types, which are the destroyers, the subchasers, vac gunboats, coast-guard vessels, the destroyer of 750 tons and all is the only real efficient fighter. Of these craft you will note except 9 or 10 were immediately sent over, or docked and put in condition and sent over. The older destroyers of 400 tons, the coast-guard ships with a few exceptions, and the yachts in the Navy (as I want to say about the yachts that there were only three yachts that were ready to go, the *Mayflower*, the *Yankton*, and the *Scorpion* interned in Constantinople; they were the only three yachts that could really cross the ocean); and the yachts that were in the Navy at the beginning of the war, at that time, were of the Spanish vintage, and practically incapable of crossing the Atlantic, a 3,000 mile voyage. The gunboats, except the *Sacramento* and about 10 coast-guard ships, were of the same age or older. They, however, were sent, and the patrol of the coast, as soon as the agreement was made with the British and French admirals on this coast (acting as representatives of their two admiralities) was terminated. All of the subchasers which were sent had to be built. Yachts sent had to be the latest and best types with sufficient radius to cross the Atlantic, they had to be commandeered and fitted after war was declared. Gentlemen, every one of these antisubmarine types except a few of the latest destroyers are not built for cross Atlantic work.

of our destroyers, even, had a short 2,000-mile working radius, stating fuel-oil bases at St. John's Newfoundland, and the to help them across. When you consider the difficulties mounted to get these antisubmarine craft across the Atlantic of them in midwinter, praise and not criticism should be given. No nation in the world has ever done this before, and it speaks of determined efforts made on this side of the water and of the well manning these boats that they ever got there at all. I so in this connection to read a short pertinent extract from the defense plan and to submit it. It will be noted that this was signed by Commander Babcock, the officer who stood closest to Admiral Sims and was perhaps best able to express the opinions of the Admiral at that time.

The plan was worked up in the office of operations when it was first necessary that we might be called upon to avoid a submarine menace on this side.

CHAIRMAN. When was that?

PRATT. The plan is dated February 6, 1918. There was a board to formulate a plan of defense in home waters, composed of the Chief of Naval Operations, and others. I submit this as a whole. It is dated March 19, 1918.

I only read pertinent extracts, and submit the report as a record for the record. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 6, 1918.

Special Board to Formulate a Plan of Defense in Home Waters,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Defense against submarine attack in home waters.

Pursuant to instructions, reference (a), the board convened at 10 a. m., Monday, March 4, 1918.

GENERAL POLICY.

The general policy of the United States is to send the maximum possible force to the theater of war. This policy the board has constantly in mind to the end that there might be no weakening of it. As regards any force still retained or in the future to be held in American waters, which might be suitable abroad, the board has been governed by the consideration of trans-Atlantic transit, the security of which is the chief task of the naval force on America, depends for its success upon a sufficient guard in American waters. The force retained in American waters can not, with military prudence, be reduced below the minimum required for meeting the emergency here being considered. It has devolved upon this board to determine what minimum is; and such determination should be held to against the repeated temptation to send all force abroad, of individuals who have not fully considered the matter as a whole. In the course of our discussions this principle has repeatedly been asserted to and reaffirmed. Emphasis is laid upon it as the basis of any plan for defense against hostile operations near our coast.

POLICY IN THE FACE OF SUBMARINES.

In the event of actual submarine hostilities on this coast, first disclosed perhaps by the sinking of a steamer by a mine, what shall be the policy as to shipping? Shall we continue with the least possible interruptions, or shall it be held in port until the submarines shall have been located and destroyed? The latter course would render at once to the enemy a large measure of success in his purpose.

9. It is recognized that to keep on sending out shipping may involve the loss of some vessels soon after departure from our ports. We are, notwithstanding, convinced that this course should be pursued. To hold vessels in port until all is over will encourage the enemy both near and abroad; it will help prolong his period of activity on our coast and will demoralize and confuse our arrangements on shore more than would the loss of one or two vessels. Abroad, the suspension of armaments for several weeks would have an effect serious beyond calculation. On the other hand, to continue with our sailings boldly, unshaken in our general offensive policy, would hearten our own people while giving no ground to the enemy submarine. The escort with our convoys would force the submarines to take a chance for every sinking they might attempt. From the first disclosure of their presence their accomplishing anything in our waters should become increasingly difficult, and this can only come about by our taking the strong line of action.

10. On this point it is therefore the decision of the board that we should keep sending shipping out with the least possible delay, at the same time taking all possible offensive measures to remove the danger.

* * * * *

37. The kind of force that should accompany convoys has already been stated. In addition, it is the board's conclusion (bb) that, in addition to harbor and inshore vessels, there should be a force of destroyers and of submarines ready to act on information of hostile submarines near our coast. (cc) That the strength of these should be, in the first naval district, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine; third naval district, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines; fifth naval district, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines.

* * * * *

42. The board concluded, therefore, (dd) that new destroyers should remain on our coast for one month shakedown after commissioning, to be available for service in the event of the appearance here of hostile submarines; but that not more than nine at one time need be so detained, if prepared earlier to sail for distant service.

That is signed by the members of the board, among whom Commander J. V. Babcock, who was at that time acting as liaison officer between ourselves and Admiral Sims.

That was approved by Admiral Benson.

(The document above referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 6, 1918

From: A special board to formulate a plan of defense in home waters.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Defense against submarine attack in home waters

Reference: (a) Opnav letter No. — of February 1, 1918, convening board.

1. Pursuant to instructions, reference (a), the board convened at 10 a. m. Monday, February 4, 1918, all members present except Lieut. Commander Foy, who was absent beginning with the afternoon session. As a result of its deliberations, the board submits the following report:

BASIS OF DISCUSSION.

2. The Germans have completed a number of cruising submarines of large range and large capacity, and these may be used on our coast, with a view to divert some of our military activity away from European waters. The constant increase of submarine forces abroad may compel an enemy effort to cause such a diversion, and the comparative openness of American waters offers a good field for submarine activities. Information is indefinite as to the number of enemy submarines possibly intended for American waters, but an approximation is sufficient for discussion. The salient features of the situation are therefore taken to be as follows:

GENERAL SITUATION.

3. A division of 4 submarine cruisers, each armed with 6-inch guns, 36 mines, 16 torpedoes, and capable of at least one month's activity on our coast, may appear in American waters without warning.

4. Their aim will be to destroy shipping; interrupt the transport of troops and supplies to Europe; interfere with our coastwise shipping; by these means causing

to send some of our naval force for defense of home waters. Bombardment of towns may also be done, with a view to heighten popular demand for action and thereby embarrass the naval administration. We will employ mines, guns, torpedoes, and bombs. Their principal activities are expected to be directed against the main shipping centers; Halifax, New Hampton Roads, and Florida Straits. At the same time, by activity of some several localities so separated as to suggest the presence of a large force, they seek to produce a maximum popular disturbance early in their campaign.

GENERAL POLICY.

The general policy of the United States is to send the maximum possible force for offensive operations in the active theater of war. This policy the board keeps constantly in mind, to the end that there might be no weakening of it. With regard to any force still retained or in the future to be held in American waters which might be suitable abroad, the board has been governed by the consideration of trans-Atlantic transit, the security of which is the chief task of the naval force on America, depends for its success upon a sufficient guard in American as in European waters. The force retained in American waters can not with military prudence be reduced below the minimum required for meeting any emergency here being considered. It has devolved upon this board to determine what minimum is; and such determination should be held to against the repeated suggestion to send all force abroad of individuals who have not fully considered the matter as a whole. In the course of our discussions this principle had repeatedly been asserted to and reaffirmed. Emphasis is laid upon it as the basis of any plan for defense against hostile operations near our coast.

POLICY IN THE FACE OF SUBMARINES.

In the event of actual submarine hostilities on this coast first disclosed perhaps by the sinking of a steamer by a mine, what shall be the policy as to shipping? Shall we proceed with the least possible interruptions, or shall it be held in port until the submarine shall have been located and destroyed? The latter course would surrender at once to the enemy a large measure of success in his purpose. It is recognized that to keep on sending out shipping may involve the loss of some vessels after departure from our ports we are, notwithstanding, convinced that this should be pursued. To hold vessels in port until all is clear will encourage the enemy both near and abroad; it will help prolong his period of activity on our coast; it will demoralize and confuse our arrangements on shore far more than would the loss of two vessels. Abroad, the suspension of arrivals for several weeks would have a serious effect beyond calculation. On the other hand, to continue with our ordinary policy, unshaken in our general offensive policy, would hearten our own people giving no ground to the enemy submarine. The escort with our convoys will give the submarines to take a chance for every sinking they might attempt. From the first disclosure of their presence, their accomplishing anything in our waters becomes increasingly difficult, and this can only come about by our taking the initiative of action. At this point it is therefore the decision of the board that we should keep on shipping out with the least possible delay; at the same time taking all possible measures to remove the danger. The measures necessary to put into effect the foregoing policy divide under two heads, control of shipping and military offensive.

CONTROL OF SHIPPING.

After discussing the several questions involved successively, the board came to the following conclusions:
 That where mines have appeared, outbound shipping should be routed clear of them, through a swept channel.
 That shipping should use swept channels as soon after the sweeping as circumstances permit.
 That coastwise shipping should proceed at night and independently. (See change.)
 That ocean shipping should proceed in convoys.
 That the convoys should be as large as the available escort permit.
 That convoys should be preceded to the 50-fathom curve by four submarine equipped with listening attachment. (See change.)

(g) That air scouts should patrol the convoy's intended course out to the curve from the convoy's departure until it clears 50 fathoms or darker (See change.)

(h) That convoys should be accompanied by an ocean escort, by an escort to the 50-fathom curve, and by one or more escorting submarines (See change.)

(i) That the ocean escort should be a cruiser, or a converted merchant naval commission, armed with guns of 5-inch or larger caliber.

(j) That the antisubmarine escort should consist of submarine chasers, depth bombs and guns up to 3-inch caliber. (See change.)

(k) That the antisubmarine escort for a convoy should be the number approved instructions in force at the time.

(l) That the escorting submarines with a convoy should precede it, and to keep lookout for enemy submarines and warn and divert the convoy if an enemy submarine can sight it. (Omit, see changes.)

13. Considering a suggestion that interference with shipping would be difficult by sending convoys out of more ports than are so used at present, concluded that available escort vessels were too few, that land transports were disarranged, and that harbor facilities would be taxed too much beyond capacity to offer any success for such a measure. Accordingly,

(m) The dispatch of convoys should be limited to New York and Hampton Roads as at present.

14. The foregoing applies mainly to the area between Nantucket Shoals and Hatteras. Shipping out of the Gulf, including the important fuel oil tankers as yet been convoyed and escort force is not available to establish a service.

15. A division of submarines and an aviation station are located at Key West. Dependence must be placed upon these and upon local and passing transatlantic coastwise lookout service for information of hostile submarines in the vicinity. In such event shipping out of the Gulf of Mexico should be routed south of the Gulf. (See change.)

16. In the event of submarines operating against shipping coming from the Gulf, shipping may be routed via Cape Horn; but action as to this would be left to the particulars of the situation at the time for any more definite decision on this board. (Omit, see changes.)

17. *Incoming shipping.*—In order to route incoming shipping clear of dangers, it is the consensus of the board that the best means would be to route incoming shipping clear of dangers. This would insure the correct receipt of and compliance with routing instructions. Not enough cruisers being available to convoy return shipping, however, it is the choice but that—

(n) Return shipping to the United States must be independent of convoys (See change.)

18. Considering the great extent of coastal waters inside the 50-fathom curve, it is at best possible only to keep one avenue of approach to New York and Hampton Roads sufficiently swept for a practical degree of safety from enemy submarines. The sweeping task is lessened by the fact that only a small number of mines can be covered by submarines. Judging by the latest experience abroad, these mines are laid in small groups in several widely separated locations. There being only a few sweepers available, they can be employed to the best advantage by sweeping the route clear of mines rather than by attempting to keep several fixed routes clear. In searching formation sweepers can cover more ground than in a sweeping line. The board concludes, therefore—

(o) That incoming shipping should be routed into port through approaches that have been found by searching or sweeping to be safe.

19. *Secrecy in routing.*—To the end that vessels may be warned daily of the presence of submarines and mines and receive directions for their movements—

(p) Return shipping to the United States should be controlled by radio from the United States.

20. To provide for the necessary secrecy of such radio control.

(q) Each belligerent vessel should carry a commissioned communication officer of her own or of United States nationality. Such officer would be in charge of the vessel's communication and would decipher code messages and transmit them to the master of the vessel. He would have no authority over nor responsibility for the vessel. He must have seagoing experience, but must be trustworthy and of sufficient education to supply these communication officers, our trained personnel need not be trained for this duty.

21. The foregoing provision must be undertaken immediately to be of use when wanted; but wholly apart from its value in emergency, the board

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918—Continued.

YACHTS.

| Name. | Date of sailing. | Date of arrival in Europe. |
|----------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Albionite..... | June 14, 1917..... | June 27, 1917. |
| Albion..... | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 20, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 5, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | June 14, 1917..... | June 27, 1917. |
| Albatross..... | Nov. 3, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 15, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Oct. 30, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 17, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Feb. 9, 1918 (left Azores). |
| Albatross..... | June 9, 1917..... | June 26, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 21, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Nov. 4, 1917..... | Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 20, 1917..... | Sept. 2, 1917 (Azores). |

TUGS.

| | | |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Albatross..... | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 4, 1917..... | Jan. 12, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 20, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Jan. 8, 1918..... | Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 17, 1917..... | Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | Jan. 8, 1918..... | Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores). |

¹ These vessels were in the United States Navy prior to declaration of war.
² Commissioned in European waters Aug. 27, 1917.
³ Interned at Constantinople, Turkey.

TRAWLERS.

| | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Albatross..... | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | Sept. 29, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |

MINE SWEEPERS.

| | | |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| Albatross..... | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 4, 1917..... | Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Dec. 15, 1917..... | Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 26, 1917..... | Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores). |

COAST GUARD CUTTERS.

| | | |
|----------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| Albatross..... | Aug. 29, 1917..... | Sept. 9, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 15, 1917..... | Aug. 25, 1917 (left Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 19, 1917..... | Sept. 4, 1917. |
| Albatross..... | Sept. 29, 1917..... | Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores). |
| Albatross..... | Aug. 30, 1917..... | Sept. 11, 1917 (Azores). |

deep-mine fields contributing materially to the destruction of enemy submarines, remote, on account also of the small number of submarines that may be expected to operate. The board therefore concludes that—

(t) Unless hostile activities on our coast be prolonged beyond control by other measures, no deep-mine fields should be planted; but

(u) That naval districts be prepared to plant mines and that steps be taken to make mines available for planting a deep barrier across the approaches to New York Harbor and Hampton Roads; and further (see change),

(v) That districts should be prepared to announce fictitious mine fields in the event of the emergency contemplated actually arising, and to route shipping accordingly.

30. As a whole, the passive defenses of the first, second, third, and fifth districts are deemed sufficient for the defense of the principal harbors in those districts.

ACTIVE OFFENSIVE.

31. The purpose of measures of active offense is to locate and destroy the submarines.

32. The principal operations of these submarines must be conducted in the offing of New York, off the capes of the Chesapeake, and in the Florida Straits and Yucatan Channel. In order to continue their operations beyond their self-contained capacity, the enemy submarines must replenish from some near-by base or by some means of supply from our coast or some neutral source.

33. *Information service.*—To locate the submarines, we have an organized lookout service in operation along the coasts in the several naval districts, and also a secret service of sufficiently wide extent and connections. These should be warned to be on the lookout for evidences of any use of our coasts and of any support to enemy submarines from on or near our coast.

34. The same applies to the possibility of the enemy's use of a base in the Bahamas. Connection of our intelligence service with that of the British in the Bahama Islands should be sufficient provision to secure timely information. In this connection it is stated by the commander of squadron 2, Cruiser Force, that a reconnoissance of the Bahama Islands shows little suitability of that region for use as a submarine base.

35. *Air patrol.*—The naval air service, in addition to assisting the escort of convoys, may contribute materially to the locating of submarines by air scouting off our coast, including the use of kites and dirigibles, especially between Nantucket Shoals and Cape Hatteras. It is assumed that this may and will be done, should the contemplated emergency arise.

36. *Active forces.*—The situation has not yet sufficiently developed to enable the board to do more than outline the offensive action that may be taken. The conclusion was reached

(aa) That provision should now be made for forces to be available where likely to be needed, to detect and locate enemy submarines, to act upon information of their whereabouts, and to be capable of attacking a submarine if encountered.

37. The kind of force that should accompany convoys has already been stated. In addition, it is the board's conclusion

(bb) That, in addition to harbor and inshore vessels, there should be a force of destroyers and of submarines ready to act upon information of hostile submarines near our coast.

(cc) That the strength of these should be, in the first naval district, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine; third naval district, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines; fifth naval district 4 destroyers, 5 submarines.

38. The possibility of there being more submarines capable of service, at the New London and other bases, and of more destroyers being under shake down, after the building program shall have begun to yield more frequent deliveries, was taken into account; as also the submarines at Key West and Panama and the vessels already in the several districts. The forces named in paragraph (cc) above are the minimum increase needed.

CONTROL OF ACTIVE FORCES.

39. The lookout service and reports of coastwise and other passing traffic first come under the cognizance of the naval districts, and these districts will have at disposal the forces intended to act according to the situation that may arise. The success of measures against submarines in the majority of cases will probably depend on the celerity with which the forces act on information received. This indicates that their action and control should be in the hands of the respective naval district commands, and the board so recommends.

40. *Providing the necessary forces.*—Adverting to the policy laid down in paragraph 7 of the board, examining the sources that could be drawn upon for the force specified in paragraph (cc), concluded that the best practical plan was to utilize new destroyers and new submarines during the shake-down period, before departure for European waters.

41. Considering first the destroyers, this would involve a delay at first, but this is unavoidable if adequate provision is to be made for the contingency under consideration. Besides the delay is not so long as at first apparent. Not less than two weeks is the probable minimum required by the average new destroyer for preliminary shake-down. To this some few days more may be needed for new fittings constantly being added, which would be installed on board on this side instead of abroad. During the time so spent the destroyer would be available for emergency if here, but if abroad it would not be operating, so no operating time is lost on this account. Further, by a somewhat longer shake-down time on our coast, together with a quick run across, instead of a slow passage for shake-down en route, the ultimate date of beginning service in the war zone would be little affected. The same applies to the submarines.

42. The board concluded, therefore—

ii. That new destroyers should remain on our coast for one month shake-down after commissioning, to be available for service in the event of the appearance here of hostile submarines, but that not more than nine at one time need be so detained, if prepared earlier to sail for distant service.

iii. That the nine destroyers so detained shall be stationed, one in the first, and two each in the third and fifth naval districts, the commandants of which shall be instructed to use them as necessary in the event of hostile submarines appearing on this coast; otherwise not to employ them, but instead to allow them all possible freedom in their training for active service.

iv. That to provide the necessary submarines for the emergency service contemplated, new submarines should have a shake-down period of two months; their training course not to be interrupted, but to continue in its normal course from its usual base; but, upon the appearance of hostile submarines, one division to be escorted to New York and one division to Hampton Roads; further, while based on these places, to continue their training to such extent as the situation may permit; the respective naval district commandants to observe the same attitude as towards destroyers, stated in paragraph (ee).

43. Still other forces are required, which with available sources may be stated briefly:

gg. Participation by any force from the Atlantic Fleet, other than the cruiser force now employed in convoy duty, is not counted upon.

hh. A force of 30 submarine chasers each, based on New York and on Hampton Roads, will be needed for convoy escort and listening service. To provide these, the earliest deliveries intended for other districts should be diverted to the third and fifth districts until the necessary total numbers are present in these districts.

ii. One destroyer and one submarine permanently employed in experimentation are counted upon, with one new destroyer under paragraphs (dd) and (ee), to make up the force for the first naval district.

In order to accomplish the sweeping task without delaying shipping, in or out-bound, there must be based at New York and Hampton Roads, sweepers enough to keep in service two sweeping groups of three pairs each. For this there must be 18 or more mine sweepers at each place named. As neither the third district nor the fifth has this number, the board recommends that sweepers from the first and second districts be added to those of the third district when the occasion arises, and similarly those from the fourth district to go to the fifth district.

kk. For the air service to be performed, it is estimated that a force of 40 airplanes will be needed at Rockaway Inlet and at Hampton Roads in order to insure 16 planes being serviceable for escort duty; and this number should be made available. (See change.)

44. *Weakness of district vessels.*—The armament of such vessels of the naval districts as are seaworthy is too light for engaging a single submarine with success, except by surprise. It is therefore recommended—

ll. That in view of the possible appearance of submarines armed with 5-inch or 6-inch guns, the armament of district vessels be replaced by larger calibers as soon as practicable, but not to the deprivation of suitable armament for vessels navigating the war zone.

45. *Aids to navigation.*—In order to increase the navigating difficulties of submarines, especially in fog and darkness, and also to prevent the converging of shipping at a point favorable for submarines to operate, the board recommends—

(mm) That immediate steps be taken to install on board all outside lightships on the Atlantic coast radio and listening equipment.

(nn) And that, upon the appearance of a hostile submarine in American waters, all submarine signal bells be stopped, the bells and whistles on outside buoys silenced and Nantucket Shoal lightship be withdrawn. (See change; see additions (oo) and (pp).)

46. The board has included in this report only such detail as has seemed necessary to make its recommendations clear, to show the extent to which existing dispositions have been taken into account, to make a decision where there has been or may be doubt or wide difference of opinion, and especially to strengthen the statement as to the minimum of increase in force necessary to retain on this side. In view of existing machinery for executing plans, it seems inadvisable to go further into details.

M. Johnston, rear admiral, United States Navy; Philip Andrews, captain, United States Navy; S. S. Robison, captain, United States Navy; L. R. de Steiguer, captain, United States Navy; R. R. Belknap, captain, United States Navy; I. McNamee, captain, United States Navy; J. R. Y. Blakely, captain, United States Navy; J. V. Fullenwider, commander, United States Navy; J. V. Babcock, commander, United States Navy; E. J. Foy, lieutenant commander, United States Navy.

Approved as changed by modifications, etc., appended.

W. S. BENSON.

[Confidential.]

MARCH 19, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commandants, first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and fifteenth naval districts.

Subject: Defense in home waters

References: (a) Report of Special Board February 6, 1918. (b) Approval with modification by Chief of Naval Operations March 6, 1918. (c) Memorandum for all divisions of Office Chief of Naval Operations March 13.

1. Your attention is invited particularly to the analysis of the distribution of the responsibility among the several divisions of the Offices of Operations in working out the plans of defense set up in the report and approval subject to above references (a) and (b).

2. The commandants of the several districts will perfect provision for the defense of the several districts in conformity with these plans. Concentration of all mine sweeping and of more or less of the mine laying groups from other districts particularly the first, second, and fourth districts, in the third and fifth districts is indicated and in laying out the district defenses the withdrawal from district forces of such units must be compensated for. The policy indicated in the report is to mine sweep the approaches to the harbors of New York and Norfolk only and in view of this, the difficulty of making such compensation will not be great inasmuch as the service of mine sweeping will not be required elsewhere.

This should not result, however, in the curtailment of plans for training district forces in these activities.

3. Attention is further invited to the requirements indicated in respect to torpedo boats and submarine chaser boats for use in defensive and convoy work.

4. The responsibility for working out these defensive plans and maintaining at all times the requisite force and material rests as to each district with the district commandant. Commandants will report promptly and in sufficient detail when perfected and dispositions established for maintaining these defense plans, and will take necessary steps to secure any equipment lacking to this end and report fully in respect thereto.

5. This letter and the references cited above and the subject matter is highly confidential in character and must be so regarded by all having knowledge of it.

H. OSTERHAUS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 13, 1918.

Memorandum for all divisions of Office of Naval Operations.

Subject: Execution of a plan for defense against submarine attack in home waters.

1. In accordance with the attached plan and approved modifications, the following parts thereof are assigned to the divisions of this office for information and action. Where a part has been assigned to more than one division the officers in charge will cooperate in its execution in accordance with the duties of their respective divisions.

2. Provisions of the plan that require the action of any bureau will be prepared by the head of the division concerned and transmitted to the bureau after signature by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Communications Division.—Assistant for operations: Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, and 45. Over-sea transportation: Paragraphs 12 (c), (d), (e); 13 (m), 17 (n); 19 (p); and 22. Ship movements: Paragraphs 12 (i); 19 (p); 36 (aa); 37 (bb), (cc); 39; 42 (dd), (ff); 43 (gg), (hh), (jj).

Submarine detection. Paragraphs 12 (j); 36 (aa); 37 (bb), (cc); 42 (dd), (ee), (ff); 43 (ii), (jj); and 45 (mm), (nn), (pp).

Material Division.—Paragraphs 12 (i), (j); 26 (r); 27 (s); 29 (t), (u); 36 (aa); 43 (ii), (jj); 44 (ll); 45 (mm), (pp).

Intelligence Division.—Paragraphs 32, 33, and 34.

Communications Division.—Paragraph 19 (p); 20 (q); and 21.

Naval Districts Division.—Paragraphs 12 (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (h), (j), (k); 15; 18 (o), (p); 26 (r); 27 (s); 29 (t), (u), (v), 32; 33; 34; 35; 37 (bb), (cc); 39; 42 (dd), (ee), (ff); 43 (ii), (jj), (kk), 44 (ll); 45 (mm), (nn), (oo), (pp).

Air Division.—Paragraphs 12 (g); 15; 35; 36 (aa); and 43 (kk).

W. S. BENSON.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 6, 1918.

The foregoing plan, "Defense against submarine attack in home waters," with the following alterations, modifications, or changes is approved. Steps will be taken immediately to put it into effect.

MODIFICATION AND CHANGES OR ALTERATIONS—OUTBOUND SHIPPING.

Paragraph 12 (c).—That the best practice is to have the coastwise shipping proceed by day, hugging the shore and keeping within the 5-fathom curve or as near it as practicable. Also, since it is the policy of the shipping committees charged with such work, to allocate the smallest and least valuable ships to the coasting trade, it, as a matter of expediency, should be the policy to protect said shipping by the means within the capacity of the naval districts through which the coastwise shipping passes, rather than to attempt to divert guns from ships in the trans-Atlantic trade, or to allocate cruisers for the protection of our coastwise trade, except in such cases where the districts could not afford protection, or the guns were readily available.

That if it were found expedient to route coastwise ships at night, that they should sail independently, being routed with due regard to the warnings received of the location of enemy submarines.

Paragraph 12 (f).—Change to read: "That convoys should be preceded to the 50-fathom curve or as far beyond as necessary by four submarine chasers equipped with listening attachments."

Paragraph 12 (g).—Change to read: "That air scouts should patrol the convoys intended course out at least to the 50-fathom curve and as far beyond as circumstances permit, or until darkness comes on."

Paragraph 12 (h).—Omit the words "and by one or more escorting submarines for lookout." It is the policy to use our submarines offensively against hostile submarines, and their movements are influenced by the movements of hostile submarines, or by the movements of our convoys.

Paragraph 12 (j).—Add at the end of paragraph: "and also of destroyers if advisable."

Paragraph 12 (l).—Omit entirely.

Paragraph 15.—Last two lines. Change to read: "Shipping out of the Gulf of Mexico should be routed north or south of Cuba as circumstances existing at the time render most expedient."

Paragraph 16. Held to be not sound as the delay thus caused to shipping practically reduces its efficiency to a lower limit than the actual submarine sinkings could impose.

Paragraph 17 (n). Add the words "until such time as convoys can be established."

Paragraph 27 (s). That in view of the slight advantages to be derived as compared to the inordinate risk to shipping, the subsurface mine will not be used offensively against hostile submarines. That it is legitimate to use it defensively, but that such use should be confined to the purpose of barring entrance and exit to our principal shipping ports and confined to the lowest limits compatible with a fair degree of safety. That even when a defensive mine field is laid, a clear and ample passage must be left for the transit of shipping, and this passage must under no circumstances be mined but be patrolled and protected by other means. That all mines upon being detached from their moorings must become innocuous. That the three places to be considered now as coming within the scope of defensive mining are New York, capes of the Chesapeake, and east entrance to Long Island Sound.

Paragraph 29 (u). After the words Hampton Roads add: "But that owing to the great demand for mines abroad this step be not considered now."

Paragraph 43 (*kk*). Read that a force consisting of at least one squadron of 20 air planes will be needed at each station, Rockaway Inlet and Hampton Roads, and that this number should be made available as soon as practicable, not to interfere with the European program.

Paragraph 45 (*nn*). Omit the words "and Nantucket Shoal Lightship be withdrawn."

Paragraph 45. Add new paragraph: "(oo) Be prepared upon special order of the Navy Department to withdraw all light vessels on the Atlantic Coast, but this will be done only when the necessity is strongly apparent."

Paragraph 45. Add new paragraph "(pp) Establish listening stations at the entrances to Chesapeake Bay, New York, and the east end of Long Island Sound. If these stations prove effective and are needed, to extend the system to other important localities."

W. S. BENSON.

During the time from April to July the organization for handling of communications to and fro between Admiral Sims and ourselves was cumbersome and, in my opinion, not efficient.

Just as a side light, I will say about that cablegram for Admiral Sims that went to Petrograd, I think the trouble was we had to send our cables from Operations to the Office of Intelligence, and it was afterwards sent by them to the British Embassy for coding, and from the British embassy it was sent abroad, and it was there that the mistake of sending it to Petrograd took place, I think.

In April, and until the communication system was reorganized directly under the office of operations, in the early summer of 1917, most of our cables came through the Office of Naval Intelligence. The system after reorganization became very efficient. It was used by the State Department during the peace conference.

Paragraphs 33 and 34 of Admiral Sims's letter are as follows:

33. Most earnest requests were made for tugs because of the urgent need for them in the submarine zone. These requests fully explained how many torpedoed ships could have been beached and salvaged if these tugs had been available. Experience has shown that such vessels could be repaired and put in service again in a short time—a very short time compared to that required to build new ships—thus resulting in a great saving of tonnage.

34. A year after we entered the war but four tugs had been sent, and two of these were specifically allocated to Italy by the department. Nine more were eventually sent at various times, but none before April 23, 1918.

Paragraphs 33 and 34. This is true. The department was having its own difficulties in getting tugs. There was a tremendous demand for tugs on our own coast to assist our transports, handle coal, and for the many purposes connected with our own logistic situation at home. The principal duty of our naval establishment as a whole may be summed up in Army terms, "the preservation of the line of supply," and by that is meant the line of supply both for material and for troops. The center of all these efforts originated at home. It was therefore more important for us to use those facilities which helped build up and sustain our vast system of reserves affecting the Army, Navy, and allied civil industries in this way than it was to send them abroad.

To further increase economy of effort the tug facilities in each of our two great ports of embarkation were pooled. Apart from the above needs and the strictly naval needs of mine sweeping, and of bringing in disabled shipping on our own coast, the policy was to fit out tugs for the service abroad. I wish distinctly to point out the difference between tugs and other naval antisubmarine craft. The destroyers, chasers, yachts, and gun boats were fighters, and their

place was abroad, where the fighting was. The rôle of the tug is, however, first commercial, and its location is properly at the center of commercial activity, that is here at home. Its second rôle was that of the fighter. When our war reserve needs could be met, and long before that time even, the preparation of tugs which could not be spared here was begun. The above conceptions naturally influenced the flow of tugs abroad. So great was the demand for this type that both the Navy and the Shipping Board had to start building these craft immediately. Had the transport service stopped, and the coal situation become more acute than it was, then the whole service of supply in the rear would have been paralyzed. The Army can appreciate what this means. The Army itself was in the market for tugs. Those we obtained were, for the most part, harbor tugs which could not cross the ocean. All that we did get had to be overhauled and repaired. This took time. The Salvage Division was formed to assist in effecting the work the admiral mentioned, but this took time. The first two tugs ready were sent to Italy, where they were badly needed. Italy at that time had received less than any of the other Allies, and the pressure brought to bear to send them there was great. It is a matter of judgment whether it was wiser to send these two tugs to England or to Italy, where there were very limited war transportation facilities. The department decided in favor of Italy.

There is herewith submitted a list of the seagoing tugs available for crossing the Atlantic.

When you come to examine the great numbers of tugs on our coast you will find them essentially harbor tugs. They can not cross the Atlantic. We lost several tugs at sea in the war.

The list of tugs referred to is as follows:)

| Number of seagoing tugs in Euro- pean waters: | | | | Number of seagoing tugs in home waters: | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------|-------|--|--|--------------------------------------------|----|--|--|
| June 1, 1917..... | None. | | | June 1, 1917..... | 27 | | |
| July 1, 1917..... | None. | | | July 1, 1917..... | 30 | | |
| Aug. 1, 1917..... | None. | | | Aug. 1, 1917..... | 32 | | |
| Sept. 1, 1917..... | None. | | | Sept. 1, 1917..... | 42 | | |
| Oct. 1, 1917..... | 7 | | | Oct. 1, 1917..... | 35 | | |
| Nov. 1, 1917..... | 8 | | | Nov. 1, 1917..... | 35 | | |
| Dec. 1, 1917..... | 8 | | | Dec. 1, 1917..... | 40 | | |
| Jan. 1, 1918..... | 8 | | | Jan. 1, 1918..... | 43 | | |

| Name. | Material of hull. | Breadth. | Mean draft. | Dis- place- ment. | Gross ton- nage. | Speed, knots. | Length over all. | Length. | Fuel ca- pacity, coal, oil. | Cruis- ing radius. |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Tons.</i> | | | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Tons.</i> | |
| Anderson..... | Wood.. | 23 8 | 10 3 | | 290 | 12.0 | 139 7 | | 220 | 1,683 |
| Banning..... | Steel.. | 26 7½ | 11 6 | 575 | | 11.0 | 123 6½ | | | 3,000 |
| Boyd..... | | 26 0 | 11 6 | | | 12.5 | | 140 0 | 175 | 4,530 |
| Comber..... | | 22 6 | | | | 11.0 | | 143 0 | | 3,000 |
| Costa..... | | 29 0 | 16 0 | | | 13.0 | | 170 0 | 286 | 4,300 |
| Edell..... | | 24 6 | 12 0 | | 299 | 12.0* | 150 0 | | | 1,120 |
| City of Lewes ¹ | | 24 0 | 9 0 | 748 | | 12.0 | 150 0 | | 80 | 1,940 |
| Garney ¹ | | 23 4 | 8 6 | | 276 | 10.4 | 155 0 | | 56 | 1,000 |
| Graves..... | | 22 0 | 8 6 | | | 10.4 | 150 0 | | | |
| East Hampton..... | Wood.. | 26 6 | | | | 12.5 | | 162 9 | 210 | 2,880 |
| Edwards, W. A..... | do..... | 23 10 | 10 0 | 660 | | 9.5 | 160 0 | | | 1,000 |
| Edwards ¹ | | 24 0 | 8 9 | | 300 | 10.4 | 158 0 | | | 1,000 |
| Arizona..... | Steel.. | 30 0 | 15 6 | 732 | | 12.0 | 125 6 | | 50,610 | 3,456 |
| Benese..... | | 29 0 | 16 0 | | | 15.0 | 170 0 | | 286 | 4,300 |
| Princess Queen..... | Iron.. | 27 0 | 14 0 | | | 14.0 | | 135 0 | 151 | 3,600 |
| Hinton ¹ | Wood.. | 23 9 | 10 3 | | 184 | 11.5 | 160 0 | | 100 | 1,200 |
| Hubbard ² | do..... | 22 0 | 8 6 | | 276 | 13.0 | 155 0 | | 100 | 1,500 |
| Frederick..... | Steel.. | 26 0 | 13 6 | 702 | | 13.2 | 152 0 | | 41,752 | 3,920 |
| James, W. T. ³ | | 22 0 | 8 5 | | 267 | 13.0 | 150 0 | | 100 | 1,000 |

¹ These tugs were operating in European waters on Oct. 1, 1917.
² Gallons of oil.
³ This tug was operating in F
7. 1, 1917.

| Name. | Material of hull. | Breadth. | Mean draft. | Displacement. | Gross tonnage. | Speed, knots. | Length over all. | Length. | Fuel capacity, coal, oil. | Cruising radius. |
|-----------------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------------|
| | | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Tons.</i> | | | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Ft. in.</i> | <i>Tons.</i> | |
| Long Island..... | Wood.. | 24 1 | 6 9 | | | 1.5 | 164 4 | | 180 | 3,200 |
| Lykens..... | | 29 0 | 15 0 | | | | 170 0 | | | 4,300 |
| Mohave..... | Steel... | 24 0 | 12 10 | 575 | | 11.11 | 122 6 | | 149 | |
| Macomber..... | Wood.. | 22 8 | 9 0 | | | 10.0 | | 138 7 | 425 | |
| McKeever Bros..... | | 24 0 | 12 0 | | | 10.0 | | 136 0 | | 1,000 |
| McKeever, E. J..... | | 24 0 | 12 0 | | | 10.0 | | 136 0 | | 1,000 |
| McKeever, S. W..... | | 24 0 | 12 0 | | | 10.0 | | 136 0 | | 1,000 |
| McNeal, G. H..... | | 21 0 | 9 6 | | 244 | 10.0 | 140 0 | | 100 | 1,000 |
| McNeal, K. L..... | | 24 0 | 9 6 | | | 10.0 | 160 0 | | 120 | 1,000 |
| Nahant..... | | 26 0 | 14 7 | | 405 | 13.0 | | 134 7 | 230 | 4,140 |
| Ontario..... | Steel... | 35 6 | 12 6 | 1,120 | | 13.2 | 185 2 | | 445 | 6,600 |
| Osceola..... | Steel... | 26 3 | 14 0 | 571 | | 14.0 | 138 0 | | 154 | 2,500 |
| Passaic..... | Wood.. | 27 0 | 9 6 | 401 | | 10.5 | | 124 4 | 45 | |
| Patapasco..... | Steel... | 29 1 | 12 3 | 755 | | 13.0 | | 148 0 | 324 | |
| Patuxent..... | Steel... | 29 1 | 12 3 | 755 | | 13.0 | | 148 0 | 324 | 5,400 |
| Peoria..... | Steel... | 25 0 | 10 6 | 487 | | 9.0 | | 131 0 | 70 | |
| Potomac..... | Steel... | 28 6 | 12 0 | 785 | | 16.0 | | 138 9 | 200 | 2,700 |
| Palmer, J. A..... | Wood.. | 22 0 | 9 6 | | | 12.0 | 155 0 | | | 1,000 |
| Penobscot..... | | 24 6 | 13 6 | | 269 | 11.0 | 121 0 | | 1,245 | 5,000 |
| Pocomoke..... | Wood.. | 18 5 | 8 6 | | | | | 115 0 | | 1,120 |
| Price, E. F..... | Wood.. | 18 9 | 8 8 | | | 12.0 | | 125 5 | | 1,300 |
| Sagamore..... | Steel... | 30 0 | | 1,000 | | | | 149 3½ | | |
| Sonoma..... | Steel... | 34 0 | 12 6 | 1,120 | | 13.08 | 185 2 | | 435 | 6,200 |
| Sappho..... | Wood.. | 28 9 | 8 9 | | | 15.0 | 180 0 | | 25 | 300 |
| Struven, Peter C..... | Wood.. | 22 0 | 9 1 | | | 11.5 | 152 0 | | | |
| Tavernilla..... | Steel... | 29 10 | 13 3 | 732 | | 11 2 | 125 6 | | 140 | 5,700 |
| Tillamook..... | Steel... | 24 0 | 12 10 | 575 | | 10.55 | 122 6 | | 149 | |
| Unadilla..... | Steel... | 25 0 | 9 11 | 355 | | 12.0 | | 110 0 | 263 | |
| Uncas..... | Steel... | 25 0 | 12 0 | 441 | | 12.0 | | 119 3 | 120 | 2,500 |
| Victorine..... | | 27 9 | 15 6 | | | 12.0 | 168 9 | | 143 | |
| Wando..... | Steel... | 26 7½ | 11 6 | 575 | | | 123 6½ | | 150 | |
| White Cap..... | | 22 8 | 13 6 | | 303 | 11.0 | | | | 3,000 |

¹ Barrels of oil.

Paragraph 35 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

35. The department caused serious embarrassment and delays in putting into effect the convoy system, which was the most important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine war against allied shipping.

Paragraph 35. I was not Assistant Chief of Naval Operations at the time when Admiral Sims first brought this subject up, but I remember that the plan was at first looked at with disfavor. There was much to say on both sides, and some British officers on this side had doubts as to its success. It was by no means a proved project at this time, though it later proved to be a success. Our first troop convoy went out June 14, guarded by destroyers, escorting our first 14,000 troops to France. It was always within the province of the British to establish their own convoy system and to prove its worth. On date July 5, 1917, we accepted the convoy system in toto, and after that used every available ship we had for this purpose excepting the battleships which were not so used until September 9, 1918, and ships were allotted to our own and to British convoy impartially, always excepting the primary duty of guarding our own troop convoys, which was one of the, if not the major, sea operations engaged in by our naval forces during the war.

While we are being criticized for not agreeing to convoy immediately, there was a similar dissension of opinion among some of the British authorities in Queenstown. Our destroyer forces there were working on the British patrol system when they first went over, this being the plan in vogue at that time, and they continued under that system for some time. This system was later admitted to be inefficient.

This subject of convoy will be discussed more at length later when it comes to a discussion of operating plans; that is, plans which have been commented upon in the statement of Admiral Sims.

I likewise submit the cable in which we accepted the convoy in toto. [Reading:]

To O. N. I.:

Please send the following message to Vice Admiral Sims through British Admiralty—
Secret:

"Sims. Replying your 72. Department agrees to scheme or convoy outlined by Admiralty. Has designated eight ships for work, *Denver* class; steaming radius, average conditions, 4,500 miles. Three can be available New York July 8, four more available about July 10. At 10 knots can steam to longitude 20 and return to base without refueling."

Paragraphs 36 and 37 of Admiral Sims's letter are as follows:

36. The department was repeatedly assured that the Allies at all times had remarkably accurate information as to the movement of submarines and that it was practically certain that they could not reach our coast, or even leave European waters, without advance information being supplied. Subsequent events proved this assurance to be correct.

37. No submarine visited our coast until May 1918, and the department was in all cases informed when they started across, and often as to their exact destination, where they were to lay mines, etc.

I wish to invite your attention to the fact that in sections 36 and 37 the impression is conveyed that we were informed at all times as to the movement of submarines and that they could not come over without our being informed, in 1917, as well as 1918, when the submarine did come across. This is correct, but requires further explanation. In 1918 the situation was exactly as Admiral Sims states. When the first German submarine arrived about the 1st of June, 1918, it arrived on schedule, and we had been expecting it. In 1917, however, the situation was somewhat different, especially in the first few months of the war.

In all of the letters about that time from the Admiral his main anxiety was lest we become over anxious for the safety of our coast and thus hold back the craft which ought to go abroad. He explained at length how profitable it would be if the entire submarine campaign could be transferred to our coast. This had been accepted by us before he even broached the subject, as sound military doctrine. And we also knew that large numbers could not cross, even if the Germans wanted to send them. Therefore we had, of our own accord, fortified by his assurances, planned our efforts so that nothing should interfere with our major mission of getting all available antisubmarine craft across the Atlantic, except the barest minimum compatible with common sense, even though in 1917 he could not and did not give us the assurances he did in 1918. It is a fairly conclusive proof of our steadfastness in adhering to the doctrine above stated, that when the submarines did strike our coast, no panic was created and the plans for getting troops across went on just as quietly as though nothing had happened. Neither did we hold back our destroyers in any appreciable numbers, except that it was necessary to double our guards sailing with the troop convoys, particularly as we were sailing many ships from both New York and Hampton Roads, frequently forming junctions at sea, and it was considered good judgment to give them an offing beyond the range of submarine activities. No absolute guaranty could be given that the submarine got clear of European waters and ceased firing.

less, nevertheless that did not worry us; we are probably judges of our own frame of mind.

In this connection it might be well to explain that by agreement entered into with the Admiralty, we were responsible for the seas west of longitude 30, and the British forces and forces under Admiral Sims were responsible east of longitude 30. This did not prevent us from making any pertinent suggestions concerning waters outside our own particular jurisdiction; neither did it preclude the Admiralty nor Admiral Sims from making any suggestions they chose concerning our waters. We had no objection to receiving any or all suggestions that might be offered, and the Admiralty, while they may have been apparently felt no resentment. Admiral Sims seems to be the one of the trio who had any feeling in the matter, and this is difficult to understand, as he through his close association with the Admiralty and the department was always in close touch, and his judgments and opinions were given paramount weight. This feeling of dissatisfaction appears to me to be of somewhat recent origin. I did not note it during the progress of the war, though I was in close touch with Admiral Sims. So thoroughly did we have the matter in hand after we had reorganized the service in the summer of 1917, that the matter of long messages to and from was a question of very few hours indeed.

Paragraph 38 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

38. My dispatches show that with all possible emphasis I tried to induce the department to view the campaign as a whole; to consider our naval force as a relatively small item of an allied naval team; that our mission was the protection of all allied lines of communication, and not the United States lines of communication alone; that, particularly in the early part of our campaign, the strictly United States lines of communication, as compared to allied lines, were inconsiderable and it was quite possible to give our relatively small commerce quite superior protection at the expense of losing the war by denying essential protection to the vast allied commerce upon which the success of our common cause chiefly depended.

Paragraph 38. This statement is correct. It is also true that this point of view was accepted by the department or, speaking more specifically, by the Office of Operations, which is that office of the department dealing in policy, plans, strategy, and the movement of ships. We had no commercial convoys of our own to protect in 1918, when for the service of our Army in France, a convoy system was established to French bay ports. We did, however, from the beginning, assume that our primary duty in convoy matters was to protect our own troop transports. After that primary duty was performed, our second task was to protect our own supply lines to France when they were organized. Subject only to these restrictions, our men-of-war were available to guard any convoy and commercial ships sailed in any convoy. Admiral Sims was conversant with this policy. The plan of commercial convoy we accepted from the Admiralty, July 5, 1917. In 1918, a British officer from the Admiralty was sent to Washington to assist and cooperate in our convoy plans. The plans and routings for our troop convoys were handled entirely by our own forces. The troop convoy plans prepared by Admiral Sims, were accepted, but where one end of the route rested in Europe under Admiral Sims, and one in the United States under Admiral Gleaves, the Office of Operations acted as the coordinating agent between the two individual commands. In the first troop convoy of June 14, the plan for which (

States, none yet having been sent us by Admiral Sims, or at it having been received yet, was not an unqualified success, it was a waste of effort, for the protecting force of destroyers. ops were sent over safely, but the measures which had to be o guard them were not economical. This was the subject of n by Admiral Sims. His suggestions were immediately d, and his plan, which we received after the first troop convoy was adopted for other troop convoys.

graph 39. No comment.

graph 40. No comment.

graph 41 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

the possession of adequate shipping was an imperative requirement in this follows that the essential policy was to pool all antisubmarine forces and use the best possible advantage for the protection of all shipping, regardless of it happened to be under. As the winning of the war was the paramount and as our antisubmarine forces and those of the Allies were always inadequate as it was consequently impossible to prevent a certain amount of loss, it ent that the game was to reduce the combined loss of allied shipping below a which would defeat the objective of the enemy and thus insure victory of the cause as a whole.

graph 41. This is correct. This policy relating to shipping accepted by the department. We concurred in the policy of g antisubmarine forces, as evinced by the disposition of our yers based on the Irish coast, under a British admiral, and in position of our forces in the Mediterranean and at Gibraltar. served the right merely of protecting our troops and the sup- o those troops as a right of paramount importance.

graph 42 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

it was repeatedly explained that if we could actually entice the enemy into his submarines to our coast it would be greatly to the advantage of the cause, even granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely; e chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to the United States without our having advance knowledge, while remote, was a fully justifiable and therefore that such considerations should not deter us in any way from ng every possible bit of naval strength into the fight on the actual "front;" , in the "war zone" in European waters. Moreover, that the risk was slight, els could be sent back, if necessary, before submarines could reach our coast ld do much damage. In making long passages submarines necessarily steam speed—from 5 to 6 knots.

graph 42. This is correct. This was accepted by the depart- as being true, and the department's policy was to send all submarine craft to Europe which could be efficiently used there. e was much pressure brought to bear upon the department various sources to make it keep back some of our antisubmarine s on this side. From private sources; from the British commander in chief in Atlantic waters; from Admiral Gleaves, the commander of our transport forces; from Admiral Mayo, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, pressure was brought to bear to give to r forces submarine protection, but the chief of naval operations r deviated from his general policy of sending our antisubmarine t to Europe. Practically the sole exception to this policy was in y pl few destroyers kept on our own coast for the convoy of our own end pships, and the tugs essential for our own uses. The numbers of he Ue destroyers were few. The War Department insisted upon it, ud a public opinion would not stand for our troops going across certain amount of protection being given to the ships ginning of the voyage to the end.

less, nevertheless that did not worry us; we are probably the best judges of our own frame of mind.

In this connection it might be well to explain that by agreement entered into with the Admiralty, we were responsible for the safety of the seas west of longitude 30, and the British forces and our forces under Admiral Sims were responsible east of longitude 30. This did not prevent us from making any pertinent suggestions we chose concerning waters outside our own particular jurisdiction; neither did it preclude the Admiralty nor Admiral Sims from making any suggestions they chose concerning our waters. We certainly had no objection to receiving any or all suggestions that might be offered, and the Admiralty, while they may have been amused, apparently felt no resentment. Admiral Sims seems to be the only one of the trio who had any feeling in the matter, and this is difficult to understand, as he through his close association with both the Admiralty and the department was always in close touch, and his judgments and opinions were given paramount weight. This sense of dissatisfaction appears to me to be of somewhat recent origin, for I did not note it during the progress of the war, though I was in close touch with Admiral Sims. So thoroughly did we have the radio and cable situation in hand after we had reorganized the service in the summer of 1917, that the matter of long messages to and fro was only a question of very few hours indeed.

Paragraph 38 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

38. My dispatches show that with all possible emphasis I tried to induce the department to view the campaign as a whole; to consider our naval force as but one relatively small item of an allied naval team; that our mission was the protection of all allied lines of communication, and not the United States lines of communication alone; that, particularly in the early part of our campaign, the strictly United States lines of communication, as compared to allied lines, were inconsiderable; and that it was quite possible to give our relatively small commerce quite superior protection at the expense of losing the war by denying essential protection to the vastly greater allied commerce upon which the success of our common cause chiefly depended.

Paragraph 38. This statement is correct. It is also true that this point of view was accepted by the department or, speaking more specifically, by the Office of Operations, which is that office of the department dealing in policy, plans, strategy, and the movement of ships. We had no commercial convoys of our own to protect, except in 1918, when for the service of our Army in France, a convoy route was established to French bay ports. We did, however, from the beginning, assume that our primary duty in convoy matters was to protect our own troop transports. After that primary duty was performed, our second task was to protect our own supply lines to France when they were organized. Subject only to these restrictions, our men-of-war were available to guard any convoy and our commercial ships sailed in any convoy. Admiral Sims was conversant with this policy. The plan of commercial convoy we accepted from the Admiralty, July 5, 1917. In 1918, a British officer from the Admiralty was sent to Washington to assist and cooperate in joint convoy plans. The plans and routings for our troop convoys were handled entirely by our own forces. The troop convoy plans, as prepared by Admiral Sims, were accepted, but where one end of the route rested in Europe under Admiral Sims, and one in the United States under Admiral Gleaves, the Office of Operations acted as the coordinating agent between the two individual commanders. The first troop convoy of June 14, the plan for which originated in the

United States, none yet having been sent us by Admiral Sims, or at least not having been received yet, was not an unqualified success, that it was a waste of effort, for the protecting force of destroyers. The troops were sent over safely, but the measures which had to be taken to guard them were not economical. This was the subject of criticism by Admiral Sims. His suggestions were immediately accepted, and his plan, which we received after the first troop convoy sailed, was adopted for other troop convoys.

Paragraph 39. No comment.

Paragraph 40. No comment.

Paragraph 41 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

41. As the possession of adequate shipping was an imperative requirement in this war, it follows that the essential policy was to pool all antisubmarine forces and use them to the best possible advantage for the protection of all shipping, regardless of the flag it happened to be under. As the winning of the war was the paramount object, and as our antisubmarine forces and those of the Allies were always inadequate, and as it was consequently impossible to prevent a certain amount of loss, it was apparent that the game was to reduce the combined loss of allied shipping below a point which would defeat the objective of the enemy and thus insure victory of the common cause as a whole.

Paragraph 41. This is correct. This policy relating to shipping was accepted by the department. We concurred in the policy of pooling antisubmarine forces, as evinced by the disposition of our destroyers based on the Irish coast, under a British admiral, and in the disposition of our forces in the Mediterranean and at Gibraltar. We reserved the right merely of protecting our troops and the supplies to those troops as a right of paramount importance.

Paragraph 42 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

42. It was repeatedly explained that if we could actually entice the enemy into shifting his submarines to our coast it would be greatly to the advantage of the common cause, even granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely; that the chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to the United States coast without our having advance knowledge, while remote, was a fully justifiable risk, and therefore that such considerations should not deter us in any way from throwing every possible bit of naval strength into the fight on the actual "front," that is, in the "war zone" in European waters. Moreover, that the risk was slight, as vessels could be sent back, if necessary, before submarines could reach our coast or could do much damage. In making long passages submarines necessarily steam at slow speed—from 5 to 6 knots.

Paragraph 42. This is correct. This was accepted by the department as being true, and the department's policy was to send all antisubmarine craft to Europe which could be efficiently used there. There was much pressure brought to bear upon the department from various sources to make it keep back some of our antisubmarine forces on this side. From private sources; from the British commander in chief in Atlantic waters; from Admiral Gleaves, the commander of our transport forces; from Admiral Mayo, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, pressure was brought to bear to give to their forces submarine protection, but the chief of naval operations never deviated from his general policy of sending our antisubmarine craft to Europe. Practically the sole exception to this policy was in the few destroyers kept on our own coast for the convoy of our own troopships, and the tugs essential for our own uses. The numbers of these destroyers were few. The War Department insisted upon it, and the public opinion would not stand for our troops going across without a certain amount of protection being given to the ships from the beginning of the war to the end.

I remember a conference held in the chief of naval operations office, I think in the spring of 1918, between the chief of naval operations, Admiral Benson (the commander in chief), Admiral Mayo and the commander of the transport forces, Admiral Gleaves, at which I was present, when the policy of sending all of our destroyers abroad was discussed. Both Admiral Mayo and Admiral Gleaves thought that it would be wise to keep more destroyers on this side both for the fleet and for the transport service, in view of the fact that we never could be quite sure of where and when the German submarine would strike. In this matter I remember Admiral Benson stood firm and did not change his policy of endeavoring to send all of the effective antisubmarine craft abroad. However slow the actual desired results may have been; however delayed the destroyers were in getting across, and the delays were many and disappointing to us, as well as to Admiral Sims, there was no question as to the department's attitude of mind, nor of the efforts taken by operations to hasten them along.

Paragraph 43 of the letter of Admiral Sims is as follows:

43. Submarines attacked almost exclusively merchant vessels, thus cutting off supplies essential to the armies. This was their correct mission, and they wisely avoided conflict with allied naval vessels. It was, therefore, our mission to adopt such tactics as to force the submarines into contact with the Allies' military vessels, while protecting the merchant shipping. This meant antisubmarine craft in such numbers that the submarines could not reach their prey without encountering them. It was for this reason that it was continuously urged that everything be sent, not only destroyers, which are preeminently the best antisubmarine craft, but also yachts, gunboats, tugs, etc.; in fact, any craft that could steam across the ocean or be towed across.

Paragraph 43. Submarines did attack merchant vessels oftener than troopships, but not from the military reason that it was better to sink supplies than troops. Our troops were carried in merchant ships, but our troop convoys were much better protected than the merchant convoys; they were more dangerous to attack, and the ships themselves more difficult to sink. However, one troopship when sunk was usually worth much more than one supply ship. Many merchant ships could be sunk without eliciting one iota of the general anxiety in our country which the sinking of one troop transport would cause. The public opinion is a very important factor for any military organization to reckon with in war. The public and the War Department demanded adequate protection for their troop transports and it was given. Even though there were times and places where the Navy did feel that a little reduction in the protecting forces could be made, we could afford to take no chances with the troops, and this was sound military judgment, I think, for our military forces were the units intended to deal the final blow to the Germans, the blow which was delivered when a sufficient force had been landed and trained in France. So important was it considered to get our troops over, that beginning with the spring of 1918 and through to July and August the French and British military missions in our country were directing every effort to that end, especially in the matter of Infantry divisions and machine-gun battalions, even at a sacrifice in the matter of supplies, and some ships that had been carrying supplies were converted into troop transports.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12.30 o'clock, Captain, and I think we will have to stop now. We will continue to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow
April 20, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Will you continue, Capt. Pratt?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

Capt. PRATT. Continuing my testimony from where I left off yesterday, paragraph 44 of the letter of Admiral Sims reads as follows:

44. It is quite true that there were many naval activities outside of the Eastern Atlantic, such as in Caribbean, South Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters. But, considering the rapidity with which at the time in question we were losing the war in the submarine zone, these forces were of little importance—practically none as regards ultimate success. A great deal of unnecessary effort was expended in these areas. It was repeatedly pointed out that we could afford to lose some antisubmarine craft, but could not afford to continue the loss of merchantmen at the rate then being sustained.

My comment on that is, the office of operations realized full well that the areas mentioned were not vital areas with one exception. It was strictly necessary to preserve the flow of oil from Mexico and the Gulf to Europe. This oil was vital to the British fleet and to our own, and the oil reserve was low. We began in the early summer of 1917 with few exceptions the task of withdrawing our few remaining forces of every description from all other stations in the world and of focusing them in the war area. The destroyers in the Philippines were sent through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, only a few old submarines and small gunboats taken during the Spanish War, together with one old monitor, were left in Asiatic waters. All submarine chasers built and building, except about five, and all submarines except five for training purposes, all destroyers, together with all valuable cargo and supply ships, were drawn around to the Atlantic from the Pacific. A division of four cruisers, which was later reduced, was maintained in South American waters under Admiral Caperton, to cooperate with South American countries, principally Brazil, which had entered the war. The Caribbean station and patrol was arranged, in April, after joint conference with the British commander in chief and French admirals in our waters, acting as naval representatives of their respective countries. Our

forces in home waters were, according to accepted policy, being reduced to the minimum, and this minimum consisted for the most part of some submarine chasers and those yachts, destroyers, and tugs which were not fit and did not have the steaming radius to cross the Atlantic.

All other craft except the battleships, some submarines, and a few cruisers and destroyers for convoy duty were started, if they had not already gone, on their way to Europe, as they became materially available. When our submarines were asked for, they were sent as soon as they could be made ready; but if I recollect correctly, at the time of asking Admiral Sims did not want them all sent, and at various times he advised their use by us in home waters in case of attacks by German submarines. The new destroyers building were, with very few exceptions, upon completion slated to go across for operations in European waters.

Paragraph 45 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

45. It was realized, of course, that if a considerable number of antisubmarine vessels was not kept on our coast there would be risk of public criticism which, in time of war, must not be based upon inadequate information, because to inform the public would be to inform the enemy. But I strongly advise that this risk be accepted; that we should not be influenced in our war measures by the possibility of such adverse criticism; that the situation made it imperative that every possible means be used to defeat the enemy as speedily as possible, regardless of other considerations, and thus save many valuable lives.

This was realized at home in the department as well as in Europe, and it was not permitted to handicap our efforts. The craft on this side made a brave showing, but apart from our submarines they were practically useless as submarine fighters and were almost exclusively craft that could not get across the Atlantic.

Paragraph 46 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

46. Perhaps the most remarkable situation disclosed by the correspondence with the department is that during the most critical period—the first four months after we entered the war—I had but one aid, and that for more than the first year I had a wholly inadequate staff.

This is true, and it was an error in judgment, I think. The office of operations was just as badly off. We gave them in London the best men that we had in our office here to help them out when we could not spare them. At the beginning of this war the Navy was very short in trained officers and men to cope with operations of the magnitude which we were called upon to undertake. This shortage retarded the flow of trained men and ships to Europe. The fleet and all home craft, including the cruisers used in convoy, had to be used for training purposes. The Navy had to be expanded from some sixty thousand and odd men to over five hundred thousand, and while training had to operate at the same time.

Paragraph 47 of the letter is as follows:

47. With all the insistence possible it was explained, in numerous cables and letters, for four weary and anxious months, the absolute necessity of further assistance in order to handle the situation effectively, but only to receive always the same answer, namely, that officers were "not available."

Paragraph 47. This is correct. We were in the same fix and far worse at home. The fleet claimed it was being ruined by lack of trained officers. There were only so many, and they had to be spread out in a very thin layer.

Paragraph 48 of the letter is as follows:

Finally, in July, 1917, my only aid was unable longer to support the continuous strain of the past four months' work, including the very anxious task of planning for and handling the troop convoys then arriving. And it was only after this fact had been cabled that three officers were sent out, though the department still declined to provide the adequate staff that had been requested, with full explanations of the types of officers required and the necessity for each. I urged the department to send me at least the staff that the commander of one flotilla of destroyers would have at time of peace. But all in vain.

Paragraph 48 of the letter, no comment.

Paragraph 49 of the letter is as follows:

As it gradually became apparent that support in this matter need not be expected. I began slowly building up a staff by detaching officers from some of the ships. This was, of course, regrettable, as many of the ships were at that time short of officers, but it was necessary, on pain of the whole force becoming ineffective through the rapidly growing and essential administrative work getting beyond the capacity of the headquarters force. Ultimately this force consisted of about 60 regular and 40 reserve officers and 1,000 enlisted men and clerical force for the administration, supply, and operation of widely dispersed forces of about 370 ships of all classes, 100 officers, and 75,000 men. Its necessity was finally, I believe, tacitly recognized by the department, but not until near the end of the war, when a few officers were sent for staff duty. If it had been recognized from the beginning, as well as the necessity of sending all possible antisubmarine forces, there can be no doubt that the end of the war would have been hastened and hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and many lives would have been saved.

This policy had already been started on this side of the water. Admiral Sims's forces were the only ones that were anywhere near manned to full complement, either in officers or men. In proportion to the forces he had under him, he had more trained men and officers than the rest of the Navy. This was a perfectly correct policy to pursue, in view of the fact that these were the men who would be most actively engaged with the enemy. Everybody wanted to go with Sims, where the fighting and glory were to be, and none wanted to stay at home with the drudgery. I must reiterate again that the necessity for sending antisubmarine forces abroad was fully recognized. The results were not what either Admiral Sims nor we desired; but the principle was recognized, and an earnest effort was being made to get them fit and overseas as fast as possible.

Paragraph 50. Correct. No comment.

Paragraph 51. Granted.

Paragraph 52. No comment.

Paragraph 53 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

If the department realized these conditions, it is made clear by the records that it was not influenced by them. The correspondence shows that I was trying to get the department to understand that I was confronted with an impossible task—that it was actually physically impossible for me and one aid to carry on efficiently the necessary operations of the forces, let alone comply with the department's demands for the details of information concerning all the various plans of the Allies, the details of all methods and appliances used, etc. All this, not to mention the details required concerning new construction, new types of vessels, new methods of gunfire, etc.

Paragraph 53. Granted. It was a stupendous task with which he was confronted. An adequate staff was required from the beginning. When Admiral Benson went abroad, this office was stripped of some of its best men when they could not be spared. In spite of the difficulties, the fund of operating information, plans, policies, data from all of the allied nations except Russia, etc., collected in our office through the effort of Admiral Sims, was enormous.

Paragraph 54 of the letter is as follows:

54. In a word, it would hardly be possible to conceive of a more complete misunderstanding by the department of the actual situation that confronted me on the other side, particularly during the critical period of the war.

This seems hardly the correct way to express the situation. It was natural that the complete understanding and cooperation which we hoped for and which grew as the war progressed, should not exist at first in the same degree that it did later. It is not possible to jump from peace to war, and in a few days have every man alive to the situation, and to the danger and responsibilities confronting him, to the same extent that he is later. We all developed as the war progressed. It was not a misunderstanding, but rather a natural period of transition, during which the viewpoints became adjusted.

Paragraph 55 of the letter is as follows:

55. On a number of occasions I invited the department's attention to the fact that it was impossible intelligently to direct the operation of our forces from Washington that if we were to cooperate with the allied navies, which was the only efficient way of participating in the war, it was essential that we keep in close personal touch with the heads of the allied navies in the war area.

This principle seems sound so long as the operations were confined to tactical operations, and conformed with the general plans and policies approved by the Admiralty and in Washington. The Department at home should not interfere with the detailed movements of our naval forces at the front, and did not in any marked degree do it, but should set its mark of approval upon every change of plan of magnitude or any new important plan, before the operations involved in these changes are carried on at the front, without reference to the Department. If this paragraph is intended to carry the suggestion that the Navy Department should be moved to London, the suggestion is not sound.

Paragraph 56. No comment.

Paragraph 57. No comment.

Paragraph 58. This is correct. No comment.

Paragraph 59 of the letter is as follows:

59. The policy indicated by the dispatches in question may be summed up by the statement that ships as well as troops in the field, no matter what their individual skill, would be very heavily handicapped if their combined efforts were not coordinated and directed from the most central source of all available information.

This is correct. With reference, however, to our total naval effort, this position is not necessarily at the front. Our total naval effort in this war consisted less in the operation of forces at the front than in a logistic effort in the rear, in which the greatest problems we had to contend with, originated and had to be solved, here at home. It must be noted that in this war the main united naval effort was one of logistics.

Paragraph 60 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

60. The department frequently omitted to keep its naval representative abroad informed of its plans, intentions, and sometimes even the movements of forces in the European area, and there was at times embarrassment caused by lack of general information concerning the Navy's activities in other areas, such as the South Atlantic Pacific, etc. As foreign forces and shipping were also operating in those areas, it was embarrassing not to be able to answer in conference with the Allies all questions concerning our actual naval activities as well as prospective plans, the carrying out of which would necessarily influence allied plans.

It was always the department's intention to keep Admiral Sims fully informed in all such matters. If we failed in this respect it was, of course, an error and an omission. Errors happened, naturally, but in the vital essentials he was informed. There was, moreover, a double check in this matter. We were at all times in the closest touch here with the various naval representatives of the Allies, particularly with the British Commander in Chief and with the French Commander in Chief, and the various liaison officers. We had no secrets from them and they had none which they kept from us. Matters of importance which we might have forgotten to inform Admiral Sims about would be almost sure to reach the naval department of one of the allied powers with which we were closely associated. Admiral Sims's representatives in Europe were closely in touch with each allied office. He was almost sure to be in touch with all information as he had been, at his own request created attaché in London, and we had directed all other attachés to forward their important information through him first, before sending it to us, that he might be in position, if necessary, to act immediately without reference to the department at home if the urgency of the situation demanded.

Paragraph 61. No comment.

Paragraph 62 of the letter is as follows:

62. Apart from the resulting lack of coordination, it was very difficult—I fear sometimes impossible—to avoid the impression conveyed thereby to the heads of the allied navies that I was not being supported or was not in the confidence of the department.

Paragraph 62. This seems difficult to understand in view of the backing the Office of Operations was giving the admiral.

Paragraph 63 of the letter is as follows:

63. Delays and confusion were caused by the department's dealing directly from Washington with European naval officials in Europe without using its own representatives there to investigate conditions at the "front," discuss all details with the allied navies, and thus coordinate effort.

Paragraph 63. Not understood. It had a perfect right to do so. It should however keep Admiral Sims informed.

Paragraph 64 of the letter is as follows:

64. For example, on May 8, without previous explanation, the department announced its intention to establish naval bases at Bordeaux and Brest, although on May 5, it had been informed of the results of a conference with the French naval authorities and their agreement that our forces should remain concentrated at that time in the area of greatest enemy activity.

May 8, 1917, was before the time I came into very active connection with the Office of Operations. The Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant for Material are more qualified to speak on this particular point than I.

Paragraph 65 of the letter is as follows:

65. Delays and confusion were also caused by dealing with representatives of foreign countries stationed in America, who made independent and strenuous demands for ships, coal, and other supplies, etc., without reference to the demands or necessities of others. The department thus ignored its own representative who was manifestly abroad for the paramount purpose of investigating the details of all such requests, and determining, after conferences with the allied navies, their relative merits and, particularly, their relation to the necessities of the antisubmarine campaign.

Paragraph 65. This is a matter of opinion. We were the source of all supplies and the center of all supply efforts. This is one of

in which the forces may be engaged. To do anything else is to commit an error, because it commits your commander in the field, whoever may be the commander detailed to handle local operations, to a movement to which he can not adjust himself well. Therefore a distinction must be drawn, as I said before, between the base plan which it is the province of the board to draw, and the more detailed plans of operations, which must continually adjust themselves to local conditions as they occur. I wish also at this time to make comment upon Admiral Fiske's interpretation of what a general plan must be. If we were to accept in toto all that Admiral Fiske has stated about a general plan, and the ability to put your hand in a drawer and pull out a plan which at once throws us into war, that is at once to accept the proposition that we are a military nation, and having a man like Von Moltke, he can put his hand in a drawer and commit himself to a movement at once, because that means that the aggressive nation can always take the initiative.

A nation on the defense has got to adjust itself to the initial movement that enemy plans against it, and that is why there must be a distinction made between the general plan, as Admiral Fiske has outlined it, and a general plan which a nation like the United States must make in order to prepare itself for war. There is a vast difference in the conception of the two ideas and in the execution.

I submit herewith a list of plans of preparation. [Reading:]

DISCUSSION.—I. PLANS PREPARATION.

1. General plan (discuss), General Board plan.
2. Armed neutrality.
- 2a. Armed guard plan.
3. Naval district.
4. To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers.
5. Make a general estimate of the character of service which will be required of our naval forces in order to serve best our own interests and to cooperate with our allies.
6. Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.
7. Organize the destroyers and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district force in combating the present submarine warfare.
8. Patrol force.
9. Make an estimate of the numbers and types of small craft necessary to obtain now in addition to the naval craft already assigned in order to put the coast defense districts in a position to cope with the immediate situation—antisubmarine war.
10. Outline the general scheme whereby we may furnish assistance to the allies in the shape of small craft without interfering too greatly with our own similar needs and without disrupting our own organizations.
11. Direct the policy of our naval bases as to their repair, reserve operating and supply facilities to meet the following conditions: 1. The needs of the immediate situation. 2. The future needs.
12. Plan for the expenditure of the naval emergency fund, so as to best supplement current appropriation for a period of six months.
13. Establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.
14. To indicate the steps tending to make life, ships, property, of vessels carrying armed guards, self protecting.
- 14a. To make an estimate of the number of merchant ships fit for such service it might be necessary to commission as naval auxiliaries to cooperate with the allies in protecting shipping from German raiders.
15. To outline the general plan whereby naval vessels may be requisitioned for guns to place on merchant shipping.
16. Mobilization, April 6, 1917. (Ship's data and readiness for service).
17. Plan for cooperating with Allies.

18. Establish the policy to be adopted toward the German vessels now lying in ports.
19. Fuel oil for naval purposes.
20. Outline general scheme for the efficient cooperation of information—plans—operations.
21. To outline the best general plan to get troops to the western front in a manner which will—
- (a) least interfere with any active offensive the Navy may be called to participate in; (b) not interfere with the mission of logistics; (c) best safeguard the certainty of the arrival of the Army forces at the destination; (d) least endanger our country's vital interests.
22. Taking over transports.
23. The naval position and needs in the matter of Panama Republic with special reference to the defense of canal.
24. Outline of the policy for cooperating with the Emergency Fleet Corporation along the lines suggested by Gen. Goethals.
25. Inaugurate a naval building program which will best meet our immediate needs and which will not be inharmonious with any future policy we may be called upon to adopt.
26. Report of submarine board already submitted, marked B.
27. Policy for priorities of personnel.
28. Mobilization plan, November 3, 1917.
29. District defense—Already submitted, marked I.
30. Revised plan for coast defense by submarines.

Now, the first general plan of which I have any knowledge—because I did not come into the office until after February, or during the first part of February—which in any way affected the detailed movement, which were necessary for us to commit ourselves to in order to have proper plans for this work, is the one spoken of by the general board, its plan of February 10, 1917. The general board plan that Admiral Badger speaks about (I have not seen it) I think is a plan which puts us in readiness to cope with our enemy alone. That was not the situation which faced us.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that plan?

Capt. PRATT. Number 4, I think, was the one I speak of; but this one, the first one we took up, is one dated February 10, and that is the plan, by the way, which the general board submitted in one copy, and which has been lost. I can find no trace of it anywhere. The only reasonable assumption that I can make is that my predecessor, Capt. Chase, who drew it up, or who drew the assumptions up, had the plan submitted to him, and it was mislaid at his desk. There was but one copy. I do not know where that is, and nobody else knows; but I can read the assumptions upon which that plan was based; and, incidentally, I wish to say that did not have a great deal of bearing on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the plan of February 10, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; the plan of February 10; and I can state that with a certain degree of assurance, because, being in the plans section in conjunction with Capt. Scofield and Capt. Scott, I personally myself wrote all of these on the typewriter, so that I know something about what we were thinking of at the time.

On February 10 Capt. Chase submitted to the general board the following letter, which I will read. It is the first time I have seen any note made of this particular subject. [Reading:]

FEBRUARY 10, 1917.

To: The general board.

Subject: Solution of problem.

1. The department desires the general board to consider the following problem and submit its solution as soon as practicable:

PROBLEM.

General situation.—Conditions as at present except that war with Germany declared.

Special situation.—The allies do not desire our battleship force at present.

Required.—Naval estimate of the situation: First, as to the grand strategy demanded by the situation; second, as to disposition of battleship force; third, as to method of assisting in maintaining communications with Europe including scheme for cooperation with allies; fourth, as to methods of driving submarine from the sea.

Assume.—Mobilization of all naval vessels and possibility of mobilizing merchant vessels as required.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS

The CHAIRMAN. What date was that?

Capt. PRATT. February 10, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the one the answer to which was lost?

Capt. PRATT. That is the one the answer to which was lost.

On February 17 the General Board submitted to the Secretary of the Navy the following [reading]:

GENERAL BOARD, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 17, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Solution of problem, Black. Reference (a) Navy Department confidential letter of February 10, 1917.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the general board submits herewith problem and solution based upon the general and special situations described in the Navy Department's instructions.

CHARLES J. BADGER.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not a reply to that letter?

Capt. PRATT. No, no; not a reply, but it simply authenticates the fact that a reply was sent.

Now, to come to the plans. The work on these passed from the General Board to the plans section in operations. On March 8, 1917, there was worked out by Capt. Schofield in the plans section, a complete plan of armed neutrality. That was the plan from which the armed guard system flowed. It was drawn up purposely as the last resort that this country might possibly take unto itself to keep from being involved in war. The whole plan is here, and I offer it. The important factor in it is the policy upon which the details of the plan were based.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an operational plan and not a general detailed plan?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; it actually carries the operations; prescribes all the rules and regulations which the merchant captains must adopt. It prescribes when they may open fire and when they may not. It was my plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I say it was an operational plan. You make a distinction between the two, do you not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; an operational plan, and put up by the plans section of operations. It was put out by Capt. Schofield. [Reading:]

POLICY.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany and of her allies. Their armament can not be used for any other purpose.

It is lawful for the submarines of Germany and her allies to exercise all the rights of belligerent vessels of war and it is unlawful for any American merchant vessel to resist the exercise of any of those rights.

It is unlawful for the submarines of Germany or of her allies (1) to attack a merchant vessel by gunfire or by torpedo fire except that the vessel attempt to escape or resists or does not heed a summons to stop; (2) to approach a merchant vessel submerged as if for attack; (3) to sink or attempt to sink a merchant vessel before the crew and passengers have been placed in safety, except that the vessel is at the time sinking or attempting to escape; and (4) to require the passengers and crew of a merchant vessel to take to the ship's boats when such act places the lives of the passengers and crew in serious jeopardy.

The rest is detail, rules for the masters to adopt, and so on. The whole plan I will submit.

The plan is as follows:

ARMED NEUTRALITY—RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS.

POLICY.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany and her allies. Their armament can not be used lawfully for any other purpose.

The belligerent right of visit and search can not be lawfully resisted by a neutral merchant vessel. The announced policy of Germany to sink all vessels that enter certain areas of the high seas has led the Government of the United States to authorize its merchant vessels to resist any and all attempts of the submarines of Germany and her allies to approach, visit, or search American merchant vessels on the high seas.

American merchant vessels are forbidden to pursue or to search out the submarines of Germany or of her allies, or to engage in any other offensive warfare against them.

The following regulations amplify and define more precisely the policy above outlined:

REGULATIONS.

1. The belligerent right of visit and search is hereby denied to the submarines of Germany and her allies.

2. It shall be lawful for any American merchant vessel to fire upon any submarine of Germany that attempts to approach or that lies within 4,000 yards of the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine.

3. No American merchant vessel shall attack a submarine of Germany or her allies that is retiring or is attempting to retire.

4. No American merchant vessel shall ever assist in hunting for submarines of Germany or of her allies.

5. No American merchant vessel shall fire at any submarine of Germany or of her allies that lies more than 4,000 yards from the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine except that the submarine shall have fired first.

6. Every effort compatible with the safety of the merchant vessel shall be made to save the lives of the crew of any submarine that may be sunk or that submits.

7. Every effort shall be made to avoid the submarines of Germany or of her allies.

8. American colors shall be displayed conspicuously at sea during daylight.

POLICY NO. 2.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany and her allies. Their armament can not be used lawfully for any other purpose.

The belligerent right of visit and search can not be lawfully resisted by a neutral merchant vessel. The announced policy of Germany to sink all vessels that enter certain areas of the high seas has lead the Government of the United States to authorize its merchant vessels to resist any and all attempts of the submarines of Germany and of her allies to approach, visit, or search American merchant vessels within the zones proscribed by Germany. American merchant vessels outside the zones proscribed by Germany shall not resist the exercise of the belligerent right of visit and search by the submarines of Germany and of her allies.

American merchant vessels are forbidden to pursue or search out the submarines of Germany or of her allies, or to engage in any other offensive warfare against them.

The following regulations amplify and define more precisely the above outlined:

REGULATIONS.

1. The belligerent right of visit and search is hereby denied to the submarines of Germany and her allies within the zones proscribed by Germany.
2. The belligerent right of visit and search is permitted to the submarines of Germany and of her allies on the high seas outside of the zones proscribed by Germany.
3. It shall be lawful for any American merchant vessel to fire upon any submarine of Germany or of her allies that attempts to approach or that lies within 4,000 yards of the commercial route of the vessel sighting a submarine, if the submarine is sighted within the zones proscribed by Germany.
4. It shall not be lawful for any American merchant vessel to take any offensive action against any submarine of Germany or of her allies on the high seas outside of zones proscribed by Germany, unless the vessel is fired at either by guns or torpedoes or unless the submarine is submerged.
5. No American merchant vessel shall attack a submarine of Germany or of her allies that is retiring or attempting to retire.
6. No American merchant vessel shall ever assist in hunting for submarines of Germany or of her allies.
7. No American merchant vessel shall fire at any submarine of Germany or of her allies that lies more than 4,000 yards from the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine except that the submarine shall have fired first. Further, if the submarine that fires first is sighted outside of the zones proscribed by Germany, the presumption shall be that the shot is a warning shot and not an attack until the contrary fact is established.
8. Every effort compatible with the safety of the merchant vessel shall be made to save the lives of the crew of any submarine that may be sunk, or that submitted, or is in distress.
9. Every effort shall be made to avoid the submarines of Germany and of her allies.
10. American colors shall be displayed continuously at sea during daylight.

POLICY NO. 3.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany and of her allies. Their armament can not be used for any other purpose.

It is lawful for the submarines of Germany and of her allies to exercise all the rights of belligerent vessels of war and it is unlawful for any American merchant vessel to resist the exercise of any of those rights.

It is unlawful for the submarines of Germany or of her allies—

1. To attack a merchant vessel by gunfire or by torpedo fire, except that the vessel attempt to escape, or resists, or does not heed a summons to stop.
2. To approach a merchant vessel submerged as if for attack.
3. To sink or attempt to sink a merchant vessel before the crew and passengers have been placed in safety, except that the vessel is at the time resisting or attempting to escape.
4. To require the passengers and crew of a merchant vessel to take to the ship's boats when such act places the lives of the passengers and crew in serious jeopardy.

PRECAUTIONARY.

Communicate with the commandant of the naval district before leaving a United States port to make sure you have the latest information and instructions.

Your safety requires that you obey all instructions from vessels of war of the United States or of friendly powers.

Keep your intended route secret, but file it with your agent before sailing. Patrol vessels may prescribe your route to avoid new dangers or to insure that vessels shall scatter on the high seas.

Sail near dusk or at hour designated by local authorities.

Make land falls at night.

Make port at dawn or at hour designated by local authorities.

Proceed through neutral waters—that is, waters within 3 miles of a neutral shore, whenever practicable.

Advantage should be taken of the protection afforded by patrol vessels wherever such protection is afforded.

Always proceed at highest possible speed when within 150 miles from land. Speed is an excellent protection against submarines.

Make no entries in log concerning sighting of vessels of the United States or of friendly powers or concerning any communication received from such a vessel.
 Do not show navigational lights at night except to avoid collision. Keep ships properly darkened at night.
 Keep boats rigged out ready for lowering.
 Never go to the assistance of a vessel that is being attacked or that has just been attacked.
 Always carry steam ready for a spurt of speed.
 Maneuvering in narrow waters or whenever the presence of submarines is suspected is an excellent safeguard against submarine attack.
 Look out for explosives in taking on board fuel or cargo.
 Have sharp lookouts kept for submarines and mines at all times, particularly from ahead to abaft either beam.

ON SIGHTING A SUBMARINE.

On sighting a ship at sea, change course so as to insure that you will not close her unless she gives chase, in which case bring her astern and keep her there until chase abandoned or vessel is recognized.
 If the submarine is sighted on the surface beyond torpedo range, bring submarine to the beam and keep her there. If submarine attempts to close, bring her astern and proceed at highest possible speed.
 If submarine is sighted close aboard forward of the beam, the greatest safety lies in making course directly toward the submarine.
 If submarine is sighted close aboard abaft the beam, the greatest safety lies in turning away from the submarine and proceed at highest speed.

ON OPENING FIRE.

1. Hoist national colors before first shot is fired.
2. Once it has been decided to open fire, do not submit to the gun fire of a submarine so long as ship's battery can be used.
3. Do not fire on a vessel at night unless attacked by that vessel.
4. Send all persons except bridge force and the guns' crews below decks while ship is under fire.
5. Watch out for torpedoes and maneuver to avoid them. If unable to avoid them, maneuver so that they will strike a glancing blow.
6. If capture is imminent, destroy all documents, log books, papers, etc., by burning.

MISCELLANEOUS.

If you see a suspicious object in the water, do not watch it so hard that you will not see a possible mate near by.
 Sink all floating torpedoes found. Look out for the nose of a torpedo, as a moderate blow there will explode the torpedo. Never ram a torpedo, but sink it by gun fire or sending a small boat alongside to attach a heavy load to the tail.
 Sink all mines sighted at sea, using rifle fire. High velocity, small bore, rifles, with ball bullets are best for this purpose.
 Never assume that a mine or torpedo is safe. It is not.
 Report to the Navy Department, or nearest naval authorities all mines, torpedoes, submarines and suspicious objects that are encountered at sea. The report should contain the following information:

- a. Exact position in which sighted.
- b. Date and hour.
- c. Distance at which seen and examined.
- d. Shape and general appearance.
- e. Whether floating or moored.
- f. What was done with object.
- g. What did ship do.
- h. Additional details and remarks.

Passenger and noncombatant members of the crew can not lawfully engage in offensive operations except under the orders of the master or the officer in charge of the gun.

INFORMATION.

Submarines have been known to disguise themselves as fishing steamers showing smoke coming from their funnels, and as sailing vessels.

Submarines lay mines that may show a dummy periscope. The periscope may be recognized by the fact that it does not bob about and wobble, the fact that it is usually in motion, leaving a frothy wake.

Submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, as they carry only a limited number. When these are exhausted, they must lose time by returning for a new supply. They prefer to attack by gunfire.

Submarines that attack at night are usually not submerged. A machine-gun fire is very effective in beating off the night attack of a submarine.

Shallow water by day is fairly safe from submarines, but mines are more often encountered in shallow water than in deep water.

NAVAL DETACHMENT.

The master of a merchant vessel commands the vessel, her passengers and crew. The naval detachment is subject to the orders of the master of the vessel, except as to the employment of the ship's battery.

The ship's battery, being a part of the military force of the United States, is used in accordance with the instructions of the Navy Department. The commanding officer on board the merchant vessel shall be responsible for the execution of the instructions of the Navy Department relating to the employment of the battery.

Fire shall never be opened except by joint consent of the master and the senior naval officer on board. The joint consent of the master and the senior naval officer may be given in advance of the emergency, but the responsibility of the master for the proper employment of the battery shall not thereby be lessened.

Fire shall cease when the senior naval officer on board so directs. The movements of the ship shall not be controlled, even during an emergency, by the senior naval officer on board, but he shall advise with the master as to directing the movement of the ship for defensive purposes.

The naval officer commanding the naval detachment shall rank as a captain on the ship next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for such command of the ship.

The discipline of the naval detachment shall be administered by the commanding officer of the detachment.

The members of the naval detachment shall perform no ship duties not connected with the serving of the gun, military lookout duty, and the maintenance of their quarters.

The enlisted personnel of the naval detachment shall be quartered together in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the detachment.

The senior naval officer on board shall be responsible for—

- (a) The condition of the battery and its appurtenances.
- (b) The training of the guns' crews and spotters, including members of the crew detailed by the master to assist in the service of the guns.
- (c) The readiness of the ship's battery day and night.
- (d) The readiness of the naval detachment to man the guns at day and night.
- (e) A continuous lookout near each gun.
- (f) The making of all reports required by the Navy Department.

MEMORANDUM.

ARMED NEUTRALITY.

The term "armed neutrality" has its origin in the League of Russia, Prussia, and Denmark, of 1780.

Previous to that date, the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents were not settled and defined clearly by the conventional law of Europe, to which the powers had given sanction. The principles governing these rights were:

- (a) That free ships gave freedom to the merchandise except contraband.
- (b) That neutrals might sail freely to and between enemy's ports and were blockaded.

When the war between France and Spain on the one hand and Great Britain on the other broke out, Great Britain betrayed a disposition to deviate from the principles. Great Britain's nonadherence to the principles above mentioned caused the Netherlands to join with France in the war, and caused the

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celebrated declaration containing the principles to which the commanders
moments were told to adhere.

principles were:

1. All vessels may freely sail from port to port and on the coast of the nations
at war.

2. Goods belonging to the subjects of the said nations at war are, with the
contraband articles, free on board neutral vessels.

3. In respect to the definition of contraband articles the Empress adheres to
of the Tenth and Eleventh articles of her treaty of commerce with
and extends the obligations therein contained to all the nations at war.
4. To determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this denomination is con-
sidered the entrance into which is manifestly rendered dangerous in consequence
of operations made by the attacking power with ships stationed and sufficiently

by which Russia made with the other members of the league, the fol-
lowing binding principles:

1. The cargo of a neutral ship, though the property of an enemy, should
remain on board unless the vessel be found laden with a larger quantity of articles con-
traband than is necessary for the use of the voyage.

2. That no merchandise should be deemed contraband of war but such as
is used in war.

3. That nothing should be carried into the port, or city of one belligerent
blockaded, or shut so closely by the ships of war or batteries of the
other that a merchant vessel could not attempt to enter without danger.

4. That the principles were communicated formally to the powers at war, together with
the declaration that the league had determined to maintain these principles by arms if

needed. The armed neutrality of 1780 was revived and several additional powers
were added to the principles of the league. The methods taken to enforce the armed
neutrality were: 1. The employment of convoys and squadrons cruising in the vicinity of the commerce
of the neutral nations to protect it.

2. In 1797, John Adams, then President of the United States, addressed
Congress regarding the protection of American commerce at sea. The orders of
Congress were: 1. That all vessels carrying goods of British manufac-
ture should be seized, whether these goods were then owned by neutrals and in neutral

President Adams stated in his speech that he entertained no doubt
of the propriety of the policy permitting vessels to employ means of defense while
engaged in lawful foreign commerce. He said further: "It remains for Congress
to make such regulations as will enable our seafaring citizens to defend them-
selves against violations of the laws of nations, and at the same time restrain them
from committing acts of hostility against the powers at war."

At the same time the President asked for increase in naval forces to give additional
protection to American commerce at sea. As a result of the President's request, Con-
gress passed a law authorizing employment of force for the protection of commerce.
The law found expression in the instructions of the Secretary of the
Navy to the fleet. These instructions were as follows:

of the United States:

1. To the commanders of armed vessels belonging to the United States,
Philadelphia the 10th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and ninety-eight, and in the twenty-third year of our independence.

2. In accordance with the acts of Congress, passed the 28th day of May, the 28th day of
June, and the 9th day of July:

3. That you be authorized, instructed, and directed to subdue, seize, and take any
vessel, or vessels, sailing under authority or pretense of authority from
any republic, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the
United States, or elsewhere on the high seas; and such captured vessel with her apparel,
furniture, and the goods and effects which shall be found on board
together with all French persons and others, who shall be found acting on
the coast within some port of the United States; and also to retake any vessels,
which have been captured by any French vessel—in order that proceedings
may be taken against the citizens of the United States, or persons resident therein,
concerning such capture or recapture in due form of law, and as to right
of property.

and, etc.,

(Signed) BEN STODDART.

to officers of ships of war, volume 1, 1798.

INFORMATION.

Submarines have been known to disguise themselves as fishing vessels, steamers showing smoke coming from their funnels, and as sailing vessels.

Submarines lay mines that may show a dummy periscope. The genuine may be recognized by the fact that it does not bob about and wobble as the fact that it is usually in motion, leaving a frothy wake.

Submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, as they carry only a limited supply. When these are exhausted, they must lose time by returning for a new supply. They prefer to attack by gunfire.

Submarines that attack at night are usually not submerged. A heavy machine-gun fire is very effective in beating off the night attack of a submarine.

Shallow water by day is fairly safe from submarines, but mines are more frequently encountered in shallow water than in deep water.

NAVAL DETACHMENT.

The master of a merchant vessel commands the vessel, her passengers, and crew. The naval detachment is subject to the orders of the master of the vessel in all matters except as to the employment of the ship's battery.

The ship's battery, being a part of the military force of the United States, is used in accordance with the instructions of the Navy Department. The senior naval officer on board the merchant vessel shall be responsible for the execution of the instructions of the Navy Department relating to the employment of the ship's battery.

Fire shall never be opened except by joint consent of the master and the senior naval officer on board. The joint consent of the master and the senior naval officer on board may be given in advance of the emergency, but the responsibility of the naval officer for the proper employment of the battery shall not thereby be lessened.

Fire shall cease when the senior naval officer on board so directs.

The movements of the ship shall not be controlled, even during action, by the senior naval officer on board, but he shall advise with the master as to methods of directing the movement of the ship for defensive purposes.

The naval officer commanding the naval detachment shall rank as an officer of the ship next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for succession to the command of the ship.

The discipline of the naval detachment shall be administered by the naval officer commanding the detachment.

The members of the naval detachment shall perform no ship duties except those connected with the serving of the gun, military lookout duty, and the cleanliness of their quarters.

The enlisted personnel of the naval detachment shall be quartered and mess together in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the detachment.

The senior naval officer on board shall be responsible for—

- (a) The condition of the battery and its appurtenances.
- (b) The training of the guns' crews and spotters, including members of the ship's crew detailed by the master to assist in the service of the guns.
- (c) The readiness of the ship's battery day and night.
- (d) The readiness of the naval detachment to man the guns at any time, day or night.
- (e) A continuous lookout near each gun.
- (f) The making of all reports required by the Navy Department.

MEMORANDUM.

ARMED NEUTRALITY.

The term "armed neutrality" has its origin in the League of Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, of 1780.

Previous to that date, the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents had been settled and defined clearly by the conventional law of Europe, to which all maritime powers had given sanction. The principles governing these rights were:

- (a) That free ships gave freedom to the merchandise except contraband goods.
- (b) That neutrals might sail freely to and between enemy's ports except such ports were blockaded.

When the war between France and Spain on the one hand and Great Britain on the other broke out, Great Britain betrayed a disposition to deviate from the above principles. Great Britain's nonadherence to the principles above mentioned caused Holland to join with France in the war, and caused the Empress Catherine of Russia to join with Great Britain.

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celebrated declaration containing the principles to which the commanders of armaments were told to adhere. The principles were:

1. Neutral vessels may freely sail from port to port and on the coast of the nations at war.

The goods belonging to the subjects of the said nations at war are, with the exception of contraband articles, free on board neutral vessels.

With respect to the definition of contraband articles the Empress adheres to the provisions of the Tenth and Eleventh articles of her treaty of commerce with Britain, and extends the obligations therein contained to all the nations at war.

To determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this denomination is confined to those the entrance into which is manifestly rendered dangerous in consequence of dispositions made by the attacking power with ships stationed and sufficiently

by a treaty which Russia made with the other members of the league, the following were the binding principles:

That the cargo of a neutral ship, though the property of an enemy, should not be seized unless the vessel be found laden with a larger quantity of articles contraband of war than is necessary for the use of the voyage.

2. That no merchandise should be deemed contraband of war but such as is actually used in war.

3. That nothing should be carried into the port, or city of one belligerent while blockaded, or shut so closely by the ships of war or batteries of the nation, that a merchant vessel could not attempt to enter without danger.

These principles were communicated formally to the powers at war, together with a statement that the league had determined to maintain these principles by arms if necessary.

In 1800 the armed neutrality of 1780 was revived and several additional powers were added to the principles of the league. The methods taken to enforce the armed neutrality were convoy and squadrons cruising in the vicinity of the commerce as it was their duty to protect.

On May 16, 1797, John Adams, then President of the United States, addressed a message regarding the protection of American commerce at sea. The orders of office to her cruisers were to seize all vessels carrying goods of British manufacture, no matter whether these goods were then owned by neutrals and in neutral hands or not. President Adams stated in his speech that he entertained no doubt of the propriety of the policy permitting vessels to employ means of defense while engaged in lawful foreign commerce. He said further: "It remains for Congress to prescribe such regulations as will enable our seafaring citizens to defend themselves against violations of the laws of nations, and at the same time restrain them from committing acts of hostility against the powers at war."

At the same time the President asked for increase in naval forces to give additional security to American commerce at sea. As a result of the President's request, Congress passed a law authorizing employment of force for the protection of commerce. The provisions of the law found expression in the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy to armed vessels. These instructions were as follows:

JOHN ADAMS,

President of the United States:

Instructions to the commanders of armed vessels belonging to the United States, given at Philadelphia the 10th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, and in the twenty-third year of our independence.

In pursuance of the acts of Congress, passed the 28th day of May, the 28th day of June, and the 9th day of July:

You are hereby authorized, instructed, and directed to subdue, seize, and take any armed French vessel, or vessels, sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the French Republic, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere on the high seas; and such captured vessel with her apparel, guns, and appurtenances and the goods and effects which shall be found on board the same, together with all French persons and others, who shall be found acting on board, to bring within some port of the United States; and also to retake any vessels, which may have been captured by any French vessel—in order that proceedings may be had concerning such capture or recapture in due form of law, and as to right shall appertain.

By command, etc.,

(Signed)

BEN STODDART.

From letters to officers of ships of war, volume 1, 1798.

Instructions to the commanders of armed vessels, belonging to the United States, given at Philadelphia, this 28th day of May in the year of our Lord, 1798, and in the 22d year of the independence of the said States.

Whereas it is declared by an act of Congress, passed the 28th day of May, 1798, that armed vessels, sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the French Republic, have committed depredations on the commerce of the United States, and have recently captured the vessels and property of citizens thereof, on and near the coasts, in violation of the law of nations and treaties between the United States and the French Nation;

Therefore, and in pursuance of the said act, you are instructed and directed to seize, take, and bring into any port of the United States, to be proceeded against according to the laws of nations, any armed vessel sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the Republic of France, which shall have committed or which shall be found hovering on the coasts of the United States, for the purpose of committing depredations on the vessels belonging to citizens thereof; and also to retake any ship or vessel of any citizen or citizens of the United States which may have been captured by any such armed vessel.

By command,

From letters to officers of ships of war, volume 1, 1798.

ARMING MERCHANT VESSELS.

The right of merchant vessels to arm is a survival of the ancient practice of arming all merchant vessels as a protection against the piratical acts of other vessels or of irresponsible communities.

The arming of merchant vessels, not holding letters of marque, has been generally a private act. The convoy of merchant vessels is a public act. Armed neutrality is a public act in which the neutral engages to maintain by force if necessary his rights against any or all belligerents. Armed neutrality has the sanction of international law in so far as it seeks to support the principles of international law, but it is a measure founded on the decision to use force rather than diplomacy.

As one of the methods of using force is convoy, the following rule of convoy is pertinent:

"Neutral vessels under convoy of vessels of war of their own nationality are exempt from search. The commander of the convoy gives orally or in writing at the request of a commander of a belligerent ship of war, all information as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes which could be obtained by visit and search."

From the foregoing it will be seen that arming merchant vessels and armed neutrality are not the same unless the armed forces of the Government participate in the arming of merchant vessels. The duty of the Government, in the latter case, is obviously to announce the principles that shall govern its armed neutrality, and to announce further that these principles are applicable alike to all belligerents.

Armed neutrality does not do away with the belligerent right of visit and search. Resistance to this right by the armed forces of the Government, no matter where those forces may be, is an act of war.

Following that, and previous to the declaration of war, seeing that it was impossible to have our neutrality respected, the problem of placing armed guards on ships was done. It might be a violation of neutrality, but it was at that time a necessity, and as war did flow shortly afterwards, I suppose no question could be raised. The complete plan for that, in many pages, I will submit.

When it became necessary later to make use of more guns than we had in reserve, it became necessary to evolve another plan, which is likewise done, and I will read it, whereby we could strip ourselves a little more than we had done, and take those guns which we considered would not be needed, from our heavy naval ships, our second line of battleships, and place them on the merchant ships for the simple reason that there would be no probability of our second line battleships being called upon to engage with the enemy and there was every probability of the merchant ships which needed to supply our troops, having to pass through the war zone and come in contact with the enemy's submarines, and possibly with the enemy's raiders. This plan is as follows:-----

ARMED GUARD PLAN—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

ARMING MERCHANT VESSELS WITH NAVAL GUNS FOR DEFENSE.

(Commander W. Pitt Scott, U. S. N., Mar. 1, 1917.)

The international situation has been growing steadily worse and has resulted in a breaking off of the diplomatic relations of this country with Germany, with the prospect of an actual state of war rapidly increasing.

It has been decided to arm merchant vessels with naval guns for defense. Our decision is made. The problem that now confronts us is as to how we are to accomplish this in other words, to prepare a plan.

It may then be stated as our:

Mission.—To prepare a plan for arming our merchant vessels with naval guns for defense, including rules for conduct of ships and personnel.

In considering this problem the procedure will be considerably facilitated if the arrangements are discussed in their logical sequence, viz: (a) What vessels are to be armed; (b) How to arm them; (c) How to man the guns; (d) Rules for conduct of merchant ships; (e) Rules for officers and men of naval service if assigned to duty on merchant vessels; (f) Rules for masters of merchant vessels to which naval gun crews have been assigned.

Enemy forces.—Their strength, disposition, and probable intentions.

Strength.—The enemy forces that are a menace to our merchant vessels are limited to German and Austrian submarines, with the possibility of a detached surface raider; and under the present conditions, the menace of this latter may be considered as of less moment.

The number of German and Austrian submarines is unknown. The number that this country had at the beginning of the war is useless in forming an estimate of their present number, as reports from German sources as to the immense number built since the war began, and from British sources as to the immense number sunk or captured, are too vague to warrant close estimation. From the best information obtainable, it is probable that Germany and Austria combined have no less than 250 submarines. As Germany's policy is understood to be to relieve her submarines on every two weeks for rest and overhaul, it is probable that the actual number available at any one time is considerably less than one-half this number. Were the scene of operations shifted to the American coast, the number that would be available would be enormously reduced, even though it is possible mobile submarine bases could be established.

The German U-boats have a radius of at least 6,000 to 7,000 miles, have a surface speed up to 18 knots, and a submerged speed of 10 to 12 knots.

While the earlier boats are armed with lighter guns, their latest boats are armed with guns up to 4-inch.

Disposition.—At the present time it is probable that the submarine strength of Germany is concentrated in and about the "forbidden zone," the area decreed by Germany as surrounding England and France, and in the Mediterranean.

Probable intentions.—Germany has officially announced her intentions of stopping with every available weapon and without further notice all sea traffic in certain designated blockade zones around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean. While the sailing of regular American passenger vessels may be continued, they are permitted—by Germany's decree—to do so only under such obnoxious and limiting stipulations that no attention can be paid to them.

It is therefore Germany's probable intention to sink all vessels that enter this forbidden area.

Owing to the expense of each torpedo and the submarine's limited carrying capacity of this weapon, it is probable the enemy will endeavor to accomplish, as far as possible, her task by gunfire.

OUR OWN FORCES—STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

Strength.—The guns that may be used for our purpose may be considered under two classes: (a) Those guns of 6-inch caliber and below that are now available, i. e., unmounted and in reserve; (b) those of similar caliber that are now mounted on board ship but which, owing to improved methods of fire control, are of little military value and might be spared for our purpose.

In considering the number of guns that are available for our purpose it must be borne in mind that the problem before us is not an independent one, and that the two classes of guns above enumerated are already assigned to other necessary purposes in a certain contingency, in case we enter into a state of war. In this contingency

the guns of class (a) have already been assigned under a mobilization plan, and guns of class (b) would be urgently needed in providing batteries for patrol and auxiliary vessels.

It can not therefore be assumed that the above reserve guns can be utilized entirely for our purpose, but our present problem must be coordinated with the necessities of the future, and it becomes a question of policy as to how far we may proceed in completing our stock of reserve guns to accomplish our immediate purpose.

The guns of class (a) are reserved for batteries of merchant vessels that would be taken over as auxiliaries in case of war. These are assigned as per the attached summary of which is as follows: 30 6-inch, 83 3-inch, 85 5-inch, 124 6-pdr., 159 4-inch, 160 3-pdr., or which may be summarized according to their present location, as follows:

| | 6-inch. | 5-inch. | 4-inch. | 3-inch. | 6-pounder. | position. |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------------|-----------|
| New York..... | 22 | 36 | 81 | 57 | 16 | |
| Norfolk..... | 8 | 16 | 44 | 16 | | |
| Boston..... | | 4 | 4 | | 4 | |
| Philadelphia..... | | 16 | 8 | 1 | 4 | |
| Washington, D. C..... | | 5 | | | 48 | |
| Charleston..... | | | 4 | | 28 | |
| Portsmouth, N. H..... | | | 4 | | 8 | |
| Newport..... | | | | 2 | | |
| Mare Island..... | | 8 | 14 | 8 | 1 | |
| Puget Sound..... | | | | | 8 | |
| Olongapo..... | | | | | 8 | |
| Total..... | 30 | 85 | 159 | 83 | 124 | |

Of the above, 4 6-inch, 9 5-inch, 23 4-inch, 50 6-pounder, and 53 3-pounder are at present unassigned.

The guns of class (b) are not immediately available and after it was decided that no guns could be spared from the present ships' batteries it would probably be some time before they could be utilized.

Disposition.—The disposition of our available guns is given in the preceding table.

Courses of action.—If it appears to be impracticable to arm all American vessels then the questions of what vessels to arm, and how to arm them, must be a question of policy, giving precedence to those vessels that more urgently need this defense and to those that will best serve the interests of this country by having this defense. Primarily these vessels are to be armed for defense against German, and possibly Austrian, submarines as a result of Germany's decree of establishing a forbidden zone around England and France. This then may be considered the area of greatest menace if not the only area in which for the moment American ships will need defense. Ships then sailing for points in the forbidden zone or traveling through that area should be given precedence, omitting for the present and until more guns are available all others, though should the present broken relations with Germany develop into a state of war those vessels engaged in the coast trade and those sailing to West Indian and Gulf ports, would demand and would require equal consideration with those sailing for the forbidden zone.

A further factor that should govern in determining what vessels should be given precedence in arming for defense is a consideration of those vessels for which batteries have already been assigned in case of mobilization. If so now armed for defense with their assigned batteries for mobilization, or with a part of those batteries, less additional arming would entail when the further necessity arose.

It must further be considered as a question of policy as to what vessels would be immediately taken over in case of war. Many of the vessels now listed would, of course, not be taken over at once. The larger and faster vessels listed as suitable for scouts and to which the heavier batteries have been assigned, would, by their nature and by the necessity of maintaining supplies to the Entente Powers, probably be maintained in their merchant capacity for as long a time as possible.

From an inspection of the mobilization sheets and the assignment of batteries in case of war it appears that the only regular trans-Atlantic carriers that are listed for assignment of batteries are the five large vessels of the International Mercantile Marine. Other vessels listed for batteries are those engaged in the coast trade or trade to the Pacific Ocean and Gulf ports. A great many not listed for batteries are engaged in cargo trade to such ports as will best serve their interests. It is to this class that our attention must be given, and our furnishing batteries to them—considering our present limitations.

apply—must depend on their number, as they have no regular routes, decision must be based on their application.

It would appear then that our estimate as to:

a. What vessels to arm, is:

1. Regular transatlantic carriers, those listed as suitable to be taken over in time of war, and to which batteries have already been assigned.

2. Cargo carriers that apply for this defense, stating they intent to travel through the forbidden zone.

To be a real defense these vessels must be armed with a weapon of sufficient power and range to cope with a vessel by which they are likely to be attacked. We know that the latest German U-boats have guns of 4-inch caliber. A vessel equipped with a battery only of lesser caliber and of sufficient speed would be powerless against a U-boat carrying this weapon, which could stand off out of our range and sink at will. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is only their latest boats that carry this heavier gun, and that which would not be a defense against their latest boats would be a defense against many that might be encountered. Further, it is known that these boats approach, as a rule, to close range to avoid wasting any torpedo, and while their 4-inch gun may outrange a 3-inch or a 6-pounder, or a 3-pounder, the submarine is far more vulnerable to a lighter gun at short range than is the larger vessel to a heavier gun at the same range.

With our limited supply it will be advantageous therefore to utilize all the guns we have available, though it is not believed that guns of less than 3-pounder are desirable. The possibility of any efficiency of a lesser weapon is more than offset by the need of personnel that would be necessary to man it.

It is probable that the latest German U-boats are assigned almost exclusively to the area around Great Britain and France, leaving to the Austrian boats the attacks in the Mediterranean, and on the presumption that the Austrian boats are less efficient and of a lesser development, precedence in assigning the heavier batteries available should be given to those sailing through northern zones.

While certain batteries have been assigned to vessels in case of mobilization, and it is desirable to retain these batteries for this purpose, yet these batteries are in the case of the larger vessels assigned for offensive rather than defensive purposes and for this latter purpose do not need the full battery assigned for the former. While a more effective defense would be to mount four guns on each vessel, one in the bow, one astern, and one on each beam, owing to the limited supply it is believed a fairly efficient defense could be maintained by mounting two guns provided these can be mounted so as to cover an arc from ahead or astern to abaft, or ahead of the beam, especially so in the case of any but the larger vessels.

Our estimate, then, as to (b) "How to arm them," is:

1. Assign two guns to each vessel, except in the case of the larger vessels, where four should be mounted, if the supply permits. (2) Assign, as far as practicable, these guns to the same vessels to which they are already assigned under mobilization plans. (3) Give precedence in assigning the heavier calibers to those vessels whose travel takes them through the northern zones in preference to those taking the Mediterranean routes.

The estimate as "How to man the guns" resolves itself into two questions:

a. Who are to man the guns? (b) What number should or can be assigned to each gun?

The first of these, "Who is to man the guns?" brings forth a question of policy as to whether they should be manned by trained men of the Navy or whether by men secured by the steamship companies themselves, both of which considerations are influenced by the lack of trained men.

Should it be decided to man these guns by regularly enlisted men of the Navy, opportunity may be given to Germany to claim that these vessels are offensively armed vessels and in the Government service, but this should have no weight in our decision, for such a claim should insure them only greater immunity from attack as long as there is no actual state of war, and in that case it is immaterial what their status is as far as Germany's probable action would be. The present state of our international relations has reached such a point that it is incumbent upon us to formulate our own policy without fear of giving affront on a purely technical point which, from our own point of view upheld by international law, is thoroughly justified.

The question of policy as regards taking trained men from the fleet is, however, worthy of more consideration from the viewpoint of the shortage of these men that now exists. The Navy is already seriously handicapped by the lack of personnel, and the greatly increased demands that will be necessary in case of war presents a serious problem if this shortage is to be further depleted to furnish guns' crews for merchant vessels.

On the other hand to make this defense effective requires trained men, and it has been demonstrated that the steamship companies have so far either been unable or unwilling to obtain them. It is undoubtedly their right to demand protection from their Government.

It has been said that in time of war there would be no difficulty in recruiting men for the Navy. This is probably so, but in coming to this conclusion, while no doubt these men would be largely influenced by patriotism, were the psychology considered it would undoubtedly be found that this desire for excitement plays its part. Many men hesitate to enlist for a four-year enlistment with the prospect of four years' routine but would willingly do so if they had the certain prospect of something doing. Were patriotism the only influence, these men would be enlisting in large numbers now when their services are urgently needed for the benefit of their country.

As this question of arming merchant ships now looms large before the public, and this duty offers the possibilities of excitement and "fame" it is believed that many men could be immediately enlisted on short-term enlistment for this particular service. Many trained ex Navy men who are now awaiting developments will no doubt be immediately attracted.

As however trained men are immediately necessary, there is no other solution than to provide these men from the present enlisted force of the Navy. As it is however of the utmost importance to return these men to their present duties at the earliest moment, steps should be taken to immediately secure men to replace them. The first step in this direction would be to obtain legislation authorizing a short term (one year) enlistment for this particular service. As rapidly as men were recruited they would be given naval training in gun pointing and the service of the piece. Their entire time devoted solely to this particular training should qualify these men in a comparatively short time and as rapidly as they qualified they would be ordered to this duty; it will be noted as previously referred to, that it will be impracticable to arm all vessels immediately, and many will have to wait depending on the urgency of their needs, and until guns and personnel are available, so that this method has an additional advantage in that it will furnish a progressive system of supplying this personnel without the necessity of constantly calling away trained men of the fleet.

Should it be found less desirable to actually enlist these men in the Navy than to recruit them for the steamship companies, arrangements might be made with the companies to recruit their men for them, give them the proper training, and then turn them over to the companies. While this would be cheaper for the Government and would perhaps simplify the control of the master over these men, it is believed not to be as desirable as actually enlisting them.

The questions of furnishing officers to command detachments on these vessels is subject to the same remarks as above as regards the present shortage in the Navy with the less apparent necessity of supplying them.

As the repelling of a submarine attack will usually be at a comparatively short range, if not often at nearly point-blank range, if trained personnel man the guns, the service of an officer to direct and control the fire is much less necessary than if longer range firing were anticipated.

If trained personnel are assigned to these guns it is not believed necessary to spare an officer to give them further training, and a realization of the menace to which they are exposed would be their best incentive to keep on the job.

Therefore, from the viewpoint of training, keeping the crews in shape or from directing and controlling the fire, it is believed it is not necessary to assign an officer to this duty.

Were sufficient officers available, it would appear desirable to assign an officer as the representative of the Government to avoid committing any unneutral or belligerent act or unwarrantably involving the country in international complications; but were an officer assigned for this purpose it must needs be an officer of some experience and well versed in international law, and considering the present great shortage of officers, it is not believed the situation warrants the taking away of officers from other urgent duty for this purpose.

Our estimate then as to who are to man the guns, is—

1. Immediately: Trained enlisted men of the Navy. 2. Specially enlisted short-term men, and when these are qualified, these men to replace the regularly enlisted men. 3. No officers to be assigned.

As the total number of ships that will be immediately armed can not for the moment be gauged, it will of course be impossible to estimate the total number of men required, but six is the minimum number that can effectively serve a gun of 6-inch, 5-inch, 4-inch, or 3-inch (these would include, pointer, trainer, sight setter, plugman, shellman, and powder man or extra shellman), and four is the minimum that can likewise serve a 6-pounder, or 3-inch.

On this basis, and considering solely the guns now available in reserve and unassigned, 668 men will be immediately necessary. Assuming that one petty officer will be assigned to each gun 149 of the above will be petty officers.

Our estimate, then, as to the number of men is—

(a) One petty officer and five men to be assigned to each gun of 6-inch, 5-inch, 4-inch, and 3-inch caliber; (b) one petty officer and three men to be assigned to each 6-pounder, and each 3-pounder; (c) immediate requirement 149 petty officers and 519 men; (d) additional men to be trained solely for this duty as rapidly as practicable.

PART II—RULES FOR CONDUCT OF MERCHANT SHIPS.

FOREWORD.

(Commander W. Pitt Scott, Mar. 3, 1917.)

The arming of merchant vessels with naval guns for defense being solely for the protection of those vessels while engaged in their legitimate commerce, this purpose must never be lost sight of and must be rigidly adhered to. For this reason all measures of an offensive nature must be refrained from unless actually attacked. But considering the circumstances under which this defense has become necessary it may be well to consider what may be construed as an actual attack.

Germany has developed her warfare to the point where she has practically abandoned the principle of visit and search and has inaugurated a policy of sinking all ships of her antagonists, often without even a warning, and has similarly sunk many neutral nations.

Within the past month she has extended this policy by officially announcing her intentions of "stopping with every available weapon and without further notice all sea traffic" in certain designated zones, which extend for several hundred miles seaward of England and France. This then may be taken as sufficient notice of her intention to sink all vessels in that area.

It is to be expected that practically all ships that we are intending to arm for defense are engaged in carrying contraband. This, though within their legitimate rights, subjects them to condemnation if overhauled and subjected to a lawful visit and search. Owing to Germany's position and the nature of her warfare, condemnation of a prize means her sinking.

In the eyes of international law armed resistance of a neutral merchant ship to one of the belligerent armed vessels differs from the resistance of an enemy's merchant vessel in that the former is an act of war, while the latter (the two countries being already at war) merely subjects her to the consequences. Therefore, it can make little difference to us in the consequences whether we resist an attack after the submarine has opened fire upon us or whether we make that resistance immediately.

Therefore, when we arm these vessels for defense, knowing that they contemplate carrying contraband, and, therefore, subject to being sunk if apprehended, we take the position that we are arming these vessels for resistance against being sunk.

Owing to Germany's methods and to her announced intention of sinking all vessels in the forbidden zone, in order to make our resistance effective an "attack" must be construed literally. Therefore, a "threat" by a submarine, either by actually firing at our vessel or by its approach and menacing attitude, must be considered an attack.

RULES.

1. Every effort should be made to avoid meeting hostile submarines.
2. If a submarine is sighted course should be changed so as to give it as wide a berth as possible. If sighted ahead, course should be changed 90°.
3. If a submarine approaches, change course to bring the boat astern and proceed at full speed.
4. If the submarine is submerged fast ships can considerably reduce the chance of a successful torpedo attack by zigzagging.
5. Have sharp lookouts kept at all times, particularly from ahead to abaft either beam.
6. Speed being one of the best defenses against submarine maximum speed should be used when passing through the forbidden zone.
7. Provisions will be made for darkening ships and when passing through the forbidden zone, ships will be completely darkened, including all navigational lights.
8. Advantage should be taken of the protection afforded by the Allied patrol fleet as far as information of their protected lanes is communicated.

9. Radio will not be used either to send or to acknowledge a call, except in the presence of a hostile submarine it becomes necessary to summon assistance.

10. Observe all signals of the English and French patrol boats.

11. American colors will be conspicuously displayed during the daylight.

12. Great care and judgment must be exercised in initiating an attack on submarines. Fire on a submarine will not be opened unless the submarine fires first or unless it is evident that she contemplates doing so either with gun or torpedo. In no case will fire be opened at a range exceeding 3,000 yards unless the submarine herself opens fire at a greater range.

13. Secrecy should be maintained as to the route to be taken.

14. All suspicious looking vessels should be given a wide berth. Instances have been noted where German submarines have been disguised as small steamers and converted merchantmen have been fitted with torpedoes.

RULES FOR OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE NAVAL SERVICE IF ASSIGNED TO DUTY ON MERCHANT VESSELS.

Policy.—If a naval officer and enlisted men of the Navy are assigned to a merchant vessel for its defense, it is necessary to so define the authority of both the master of the ship and of the naval officer that there can be no question of a conflict of authority.

By existing law the master of a merchant ship is supreme in his command on the high seas and no part of that authority or responsibility can be withheld from him except by legislative act, nor does it appear desirable to do so. If a naval officer is assigned to one of these vessels either to represent the Government or to maintain the efficiency of the gun battery and personnel, he must either be placed in full command of the vessel or be entirely subordinate to the master. From the viewpoint of the Government and from that of the company, the former is not desirable, though if we enter into a state of war it will doubtless later be found necessary or desirable to place each of these vessels under command of a naval officer or one sufficiently acquainted with naval plans and procedure as to be able to coordinate his movements with naval procedure. The naval officer therefore, if, under present laws, assigned to one of these merchant vessels, must be subordinate in all respects to the master, can have no independent authority, but will be charged with certain responsibilities in regard to the battery and naval personnel.

RULES.

1. The naval officer assigned to duty on merchant vessels armed for defense will be under the orders of the master of that vessel.

2. He will have direct supervision over the ship's battery and all appurtenances thereof, and will be directly responsible for its efficiency.

3. He will have direct supervision over the enlisted personnel of the Navy assigned to that vessel and will be responsible for its training and efficiency.

4. He will issue such orders as will insure the battery and personnel being ready to repel a submarine attack at a moment's notice.

5. The Navy personnel are not required for duties unconnected with the armament except in case of emergency.

6. The naval officer will arrange with the master to detail additional men of the ship's company to assist in completing the gun's crew.

7. He will arrange with the master times when these additional men will be available for instruction and training.

8. He will make such reports as are necessary direct to the Navy Department.

9. He will consult with the master and advise him in all matters regarding the repelling of an attack and the procedure thereof.

RULES FOR MASTERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS TO WHICH NAVAL GUN CREWS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED.

1. The master is in sole command of his vessel.

2. He will not interfere with the duties assigned to the personnel of the Navy assigned to his vessel for manning the defense guns.

3. He will be responsible for opening and ceasing fire upon a submarine, but he will consult with and be advised by the naval officer upon these actions.

4. After fire has been opened upon a submarine and until he gives the order to cease fire, he will in no way interfere with the management of the piece nor with the direction or control of the fire.

5. He will keep the naval officer fully informed as to the ship's movements and of his procedure when passing through menaced waters.

6. He will issue all orders to personnel through the naval officer.

(Confidential.)

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS ON WHICH ARMED GUARDS HAVE BEEN PLACED.

1. Armed guards on American merchant vessels are for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany or of any nation following the policy announced by Germany in her note of January 31, 1917. Neither the armed guards nor their arms can be used for any other purpose.

2. The announced policy of Germany, in her note of January 31, 1917, to sink all vessels that enter certain areas of the high seas, has led the Government of the United States to authorize armed guards on merchant vessels to resist any and all attempts of the submarines of Germany or of any nation following the policy announced by Germany in her note of January 31, to put that policy into practice.

3. It shall be lawful for the armed guard on any American merchant vessel to fire upon any submarine of Germany or of any nation following the policy of Germany announced in her note of January 31, 1917, that attempts to approach, or lies within 4,000 yards of the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine, if the submarine is sighted within the zone proscribed by Germany.

4. No armed guard on any American merchant vessel shall fire at any submarine that lies more than 4,000 yards from the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine, except that the submarine shall have fired first.

5. No armed guard on any American merchant vessel shall take any offensive action against any submarine of Germany or of any nation following the policy of Germany announced in her note of January 31, 1917, on the high seas outside of the zones proscribed by Germany, unless the submarine is guilty of an unlawful act that jeopardizes the vessel, her passengers, or crew, or unless the submarine is submerged.

6. No armed guard on an American merchant vessel shall attack a submarine that is retiring or attempting to retire either within or without the zone proscribed by Germany, unless it may be reasonably presumed to be maneuvering for renewal of attack.

7. In all cases not herein specifically excepted the armed guard on American merchant vessels shall be governed by the principles of established international law and the treaties and conventions to which the Government of the United States is a party.

8. American merchant vessels are forbidden to pursue or search out the submarines of any nation or to engage in any aggressive warfare against them.

9. American merchant vessels shall make every effort compatible with the safety of the merchant vessel to save the lives of the crew of any submarine that may be sunk, or that submits, or is in distress.

10. This paragraph stricken out.)

11. This paragraph stricken out.)

12. American merchant vessels should communicate with the commandant of the naval district before leaving a United States port to make sure of the latest information.

13. The safety of American merchant vessels requires that they obey all instructions of vessels of war of the United States.

ON SIGHTING A SUBMARINE IN THE PROSCRIBED ZONES.

14. If a submarine is sighted beyond torpedo range, bring submarine abaft the beam and keep her there. If submarine attempts to close, bring her astern and proceed at highest possible speed.

15. If submarine is sighted close aboard forward of the beam, the greatest safety lies in changing course directly toward the submarine.

16. If submarine is sighted close aboard abaft the beam, the greatest safety lies in turning away from the submarine and proceeding at highest speed.

ON OPENING FIRE IN DEFENSE AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL ACTS OF SUBMARINES.

17. Hoist national colors before first shot is fired.

18. Once it has been decided to open fire, do not submit to the gunfire of a submarine so long as the armed guard can continue to fire.

19. Send all persons except bridge force and the armed guard below decks while vessel is under fire.

20. Watch out for torpedoes and maneuver to avoid them. If unable to avoid them, maneuver so that they will strike a glancing blow.

THE ARMED GUARD.

21. The armed guard is commanded by the Senior Naval Officer on board. He shall have exclusive control over the military functions of the armed guard and shall be responsible for the execution of all the regulations given herein governing the employment of the armed guard.

22. The military discipline of the armed guard shall be administered by the naval officer commanding the armed guard.

23. The armed guard shall be subject to the orders of the master of the merchant vessel as to matters of nonmilitary character, but the members of the armed guard shall not be required to perform any ship duties except their military duty, and these shall be performed invariably under the direction of the officer commanding the armed guard.

24. The decision as to opening fire or ceasing fire upon any submarine shall reside exclusively with the naval officer commanding the armed guard.

25. The enlisted personnel of the armed guard shall be quartered and messes together on board both in port and at sea, at the expense of the owners of the vessel on which the armed guard is serving, in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the armed guard.

26. The naval officer commanding the armed guard shall take precedence next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for succession to the command of the ship. He shall be quartered and messes on board both at sea and in port, at the expense of the owners of the vessel on which he is serving, and in a manner appropriate to his precedence next after the master.

27. The master of the merchant vessel shall, on request of the commander of the armed guard, detail members of the crew to handle ammunition, clear decks, and otherwise supplement the service of the gun.

28. The naval officer commanding the armed guard shall be responsible for—

- (a) The condition of the battery and its appurtenances.
- (b) The training of the guns' crews and spotters, including members of the ship's force detailed by the master to assist in the service of the guns.
- (c) The readiness of the ship's battery at night.
- (d) The readiness of the armed guard to perform its duties at all times.
- (e) The continuous lookout near each gun by a member of the armed guard.
- (f) The making of all reports required by the Navy Department.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

MARCH 13, 1917.

ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

PROBLEM.

General situation.—The present situation.

Special situation.—It has been decided to arm merchant vessels with naval guns for defense.

Required.—Estimate of the situation as to (a) what vessels to arm; (b) how to arm them; (c) how to man the guns; (d) rules for conduct of merchant ships; (e) rules for officers and men of naval service if assigned to duty on merchant vessels; (f) rules for masters of merchant vessels to which naval guns crews have been assigned.

Preliminary.—In considering the question of arming merchant vessels there are three directions which our effort may take: (1) arm merchant ships generally, irrespective of their prospective employment; (2) arm merchant ships that have been listed as naval auxiliaries in accordance with mobilization plans; (3) arm merchant ships that are to traverse the so-called forbidden zones.

The following facts must be considered as a preliminary to the solution of the problem of arming merchant vessels:

(a) The problem assumes that the policy of arming merchant vessels has been determined upon. It is, therefore, not made the subject of comment here.

(b) Merchant vessels can not be armed in any considerable number, or effectively, without Government aid. The Government can aid in one of two ways: (1) by selling guns to shipowners, or (2) by placing Government-owned guns at the disposal of shipowners. The difference in these two methods, so far as the international aspect is concerned, does not appear material to me. The Government, in either case, is an active party to the act, and thereby becomes measurably responsible for the subsequent use to which the

The arming of merchant vessels by naval guns will probably result in the guns being used against submarines, which in turn will probably lead to war.

Although war may not result from the present situation, it appears so probable that all steps of a military nature, involving a distribution of our forces, or of our military resources, must be taken in such a way as to harmonize with the requirements of the kind of war that now seems most probable.

A previous general estimate of the situation deduces that if war is declared our interests demand that our immediate mission shall be "To render the maximum possible naval support now to the enemies of the Central Powers." In the examination of the way to accomplish the above mission the following decisions relating to merchant vessels were arrived at: "To assist in arming merchant vessels and in training gun crews for all merchant vessels engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade with the Entente Powers." "To mobilize shipping by subsidy into the trans-Atlantic trade, where necessary to increase traffic with cooperating powers." "To make the minimum possible demands on cargo vessels of the merchant marine for military service."

The total number of ocean-going merchant vessels (Great Lakes not included) in the United States is about 550.

The total number of sea-going yachts that might be available for arming and which might have to be armed in war against submarines is over 100.

The local patrol of the New York approaches will require a minimum of 100 armed vessels—yachts, tugs, and motor vessels.

The total number of guns now available for mounting on vessels of all classes is: 1-inch, 32; 5-inch, 84; 4-inch, 176; 3-inch, 88; 6-pounder, 136; 3-pounder, 188.

Of the vessels to which batteries are assigned for general mobilization purposes there are but five vessels engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade at present. These vessels are the *St. Louis*, *St. Paul*, *New York*, *Philadelphia*, *Kroonland*, and *Finland*. In other words, of the entire number of guns available for mounting but 28 would be in immediate active use in the defense of trans-Atlantic commerce if merchant vessels were armed in accordance with present mobilization plans.

From an examination of the above facts we are led to the unavoidable conclusion that if merchant vessels are to be armed with a view either to their own safety or with a view to permitting their free use of the so-called forbidden zones, or with the view of supporting the Entente Powers, or with a view of furthering our national aims, we should arm first those merchant vessels which are to traverse the so-called forbidden zones.

So soon as we adopt the arming of merchant ships as a principle we have to realize the special helplessness of unarmed vessels in the presence of submarines that are making war on us. Joining this consideration to the alarming shortage of ships and the necessity of merchant ships for our success in the war, I conclude that American ships should not thereafter be permitted to enter the areas of great danger until they are armed.

If merchant vessels are to be armed for defense the question is what constitutes "armed for defense." The reply must be adjusted to the ruling of the authorities in the ports that the armed merchant vessels are to visit. So far as the Entente Powers are concerned we can be certain that there will be no restriction on the number of guns assigned any vessel, nor on their position on board. As the essential element is the safety of the ship and as the military situation requires that we concentrate our effort on support of the Entente Powers, and as the Central Powers have announced that they will sink armed merchant vessels wherever encountered, the solution of the question as to how arm merchant vessels is made entirely dependent on the method of arming that will give the merchant vessel the greatest possible offensive power against an attacking submarine.

As submarines may appear and may attack on any bearing, all-around-fire is important. The number of guns per ship is dependent upon the supply available.

The above decision as to arming merchant vessels is based upon the principle that the offensive or defensive character of a vessel's battery depends upon the use to which it has been or is intended to be put.

DECISION.

Distribute guns to vessels and mount them so as to give the greatest degree of protection to each vessel, no matter what direction from which it is attacked.

The actual assignment of guns to vessels can not be made until a list of vessels to engage in trade in or near danger zones is obtained, and until the desires of owners are ascertained.

There are two methods of manning guns placed on merchant vessels: (1) By guns crews drawn from the merchant crew of the vessel; (2) by naval guns crews.

When the Government places its own guns on privately owned vessels it accepts a certain responsibility for the use to which the guns are placed. In the period preceding war it is of importance that these guns shall not be used imprudently, or contrary to governmental policy. I believe that there can be no sure control of the use of the guns except naval control. Naval control is open to two objections:

(a) That it tends to alter the status of merchant vessels.

(b) That it makes a demand for personnel that it is very difficult to meet.

These objections must be considered in the light of the following facts:

Four trained men per gun and one or two officers per ship will ensure sufficient service of the guns.

Guns are not effective without trained crews. The chance of the successful defense of the ship would probably be more than doubled by having guns controlled by officers and men of the Navy.

For these reasons and because of the great importance of preserving and defending our shipping I recommend that guns on merchant vessels shall be manned and officered by the Navy.

RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF MERCHANT VESSELS.

POLICY.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense. Their armament can be used lawfully for no other purpose. The fact that a vessel sighted may be hostile or may have hostile intentions does not justify any hostile act on the part of a merchant vessel, but it does justify readiness to act. The merchant vessel may use its armament solely to resist attack, or to resist pursuit in a zone where it is the custom of vessels of the nationality of the pursuing vessel to sink American merchant vessels without warning. A vessel must discontinue the use of its armament as soon as the attacking vessel ceases to attack and to pursue.

INFORMATION.

Submarines have been known to disguise themselves as fishing vessels; disguise themselves as small steamers, showing smoke coming from their funnels; disguise themselves as sailing vessels; lay mines; lay mines that show a dummy periscope. The genuine periscope can be recognized by the fact that it does not bob about and wobble, and by the fact that it is in motion and leaves a frothy wake close aboard.

Submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, as they carry only a limited number. When these are exhausted they must lose time by returning for a new supply. They prefer the attack by gunfire. The arming of all merchant vessels and their unanimous determination to resist the surface attack of submarines will reduce losses by at least 80 per cent.

Submarines that attack at night are not submerged. A heavy rifle and machine-gun fire is very effective in beating off the attack.

Submarines are apt to operate near navigable channels from positions inside outlying shoals. They avoid shallow water.

Torpedoes can be set to float after a run; they then become mines.

Raiders are apt to be armed with torpedoes.

Shallow water by day is fairly safe except as to mines.

REGULATIONS.

1. Always communicate with commandant of naval district before leaving a United States port to make sure that you have the latest information and instructions.

2. Your safety requires that you obey all instructions from vessels of war of the United States or of friendly powers.

3. Keep your intended route secret but file it with your agent before sailing. Patrol vessels may prescribe your route to avoid new dangers, or to insure that too many vessels shall not follow the same route.

4. Sail near dusk or at hour designated by local authorities.

5. Make your landfalls at night.

6. Make port at dawn.

7. Lay your course through neutral water—within 3 miles of a neutral shore—wherever practicable.

8. Always proceed at highest possible speed when within 150 miles of land. Speed is an excellent protection against submarines.

- Make no entries in log concerning the sighting of any vessel of the United States or of friendly powers or concerning any communication received from such vessel.
10. Do not show navigational lights at night except to avoid collision. Keep ship thoroughly darkened.
 11. Fly no colors or house flag at sea except in presence of ships of war of friendly powers unless you are about to use your armament, in which case you must show your proper national colors before firing.
 12. If your vessel is armed, always fly your true colors in approaching and while passing through neutral waters.
 13. You may use false colors at sea subject to the restrictions given in above paragraphs.
 14. If you see a suspicious object in the water, do not watch it so hard that you will not see its possible mates near by.
 15. Paint out names and other distinguishing marks.
 16. Keep boats rigged out and ready for lowering.
 17. Never go to the assistance of a vessel that is being attacked or has just been attacked. Leave this job for small vessels.
 18. Sink all floating torpedoes found. Look out for the nose of a torpedo, as a moderate blow there will explode the torpedo. Never ram a torpedo, but sink it by gun fire or by sending a small boat alongside to attach a heavy load to the tail.
 19. Sink all mines sighted at sea, using rifle fire. High-velocity, small-bore rifles with steel bullets are best for this purpose.
 20. Never assume that a mine is safe. It is not.
 21. Report to the Navy Department, or nearest naval authorities, all mines, torpedoes, submarines, and suspicious objects that are encountered at sea. The report should give the following information:
 - a. Exact position in which sighted.
 - b. Date and hour.
 - c. Distance at which seen and examined.
 - d. Shape and general appearance.
 - e. Whether floating or moored.
 - f. What was done with object.
 - g. What did ship do?
 - h. Additional details and remarks.
 22. Always do your utmost to escape hostile vessels under all conditions. You will be sunk if you do not escape.
 23. Remember that submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, and that they are afraid of gunfire. So do not submit to the gunfire of submarines so long as you can fire your own guns.
 24. Passengers and noncombatant members of the crew can not lawfully engage in defensive operations except under the orders of the master or the officer in charge of the guns.
 25. When you sight a ship at sea, consider it as possibly hostile. Change course so as to insure that you will not close her unless she gives chase. In which case bring her astern and keep her there and send out calls for help.
 26. If a submarine is seen at a distance, or on the surface, or if periscope is seen, alter course to bring the submarine astern and keep it there and proceed at the highest possible speed. Do not stop because of gunfire of the submarine, but reply to it as effectively as possible.
 27. When your vessel is under fire, send all of the bridge force and the guns' crews below decks and be ready to stop leaks from shot holes. Always have in mind definite plans for listing the ship to bring holes near the water line out of the water.
 28. If the submarine does not use gunfire to bring you to, it is probably because she has no gun or else no ammunition.
 29. Always watch for torpedoes and maneuver to avoid them. The torpedo leaves a well-defined wake of bubbles and is slick, if the water is not too rough. If unable to avoid the torpedo, maneuver so that it will strike a glancing blow, as torpedoes sometimes fail when striking a glancing blow.
 30. If submarine attacks submerged from positions forward of the beam and close aboard, the greatest safety probably lies in changing course directly toward the submarine. If the attack is made from positions abaft the beam, the greatest safety lies in presenting the stern to the submarine.
 31. Always carry steam ready for a spurt of speed.
 32. Beware of decoy vessels making signals of distress.
 33. Zig-zagging in narrow waters is excellent protection against unseen submarines, as submarine can not easily get into position for attack.
 34. If capture is imminent destroy all documents, log books, papers, etc., by burning.
 35. Look out for explosives in taking fuel and cargo.

36. Inspect ship carefully before sailing to be sure that no job has been done re-
reptitiously that will make the ship unseaworthy.
37. Watch out for "accidental ramming" in neutral waters of vessels manned
enemy subjects.

FIRE-CONTROL RULES.

1. Hoist national colors before first shot is fired.
2. The master is responsible for opening fire, ceasing fire, and for the conduct of
persons engaged in the defense of the vessel.
3. The master must not fire on a vessel after she has indicated surrender.
4. The master is bound by the treaties and covenants to which the United States
is a party.
5. Keep guns in constant readiness, with ammunition at the guns.
6. Do not fire at a vessel at night unless attacked by that vessel.
7. The point of aim should be the center of the water line.
8. The guns' crews should aim so as to keep one-half of the shots falling short. Shots
that go over do no damage, while shorts, by throwing spray, interfere with the man-
vering of the submarine and its aim.

RADIO RULES.

9. If attacked, report broadcast in plain language, position and type of attack
vessel.
10. Arrange radio apparatus so that master will control absolutely the sending
messages.
11. Make sure of the loyalty of your radio operators.
12. Before leaving port, inquire specially for codes in which to report special
information by radio.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING NAVAL DETACHMENT ON MERCHANT VESSELS.

1. The master of a merchant vessel commands the vessel, her passengers, and crew.
The naval detachment is under the command of the master. They shall obey the
orders of the master and the regulations of the ship.
2. The naval officer commanding the detachment shall rank as an officer of the
ship next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for succession to com-
mand of the ship.
3. The discipline of the naval detachment shall be administered through the naval
officer commanding the detachment.
4. The members of the naval detachment shall perform no duties except those con-
nected with the service of the guns and military lookout duty.
5. The enlisted personnel of the naval detachment shall be quartered and mess
together in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the detachment.

Mobilization, present battery assignments.

| Name of vessel. | Battery. | Terminal ports. |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| St. Louis..... | Four 6-inch, four 3-inch..... | New York-Liverpool. |
| Morro Castle..... | do..... | New York-Habana. |
| St. Paul..... | Four 6-inch..... | New York-Liverpool. |
| New York..... | do..... | Do. |
| Philadelphia..... | do..... | Do. |
| Unassigned..... | do..... | |
| Kroonland..... | do..... | New York-London |
| Northern Pacific..... | Four 5-inch, four 3-inch..... | San Francisco-Astoria. |
| Great Northern..... | do..... | Do. |
| El Occidente..... | do..... | New York-Galveston. |
| Advanced Base..... | Eight 5-inch..... | |
| Pastores..... | Four 5-inch, four 3-inch..... | New York-Panama. |
| Calamares..... | do..... | Do. |
| Medina..... | do..... | New York-Galveston. |
| Momus..... | do..... | New York-New Orleans. |
| El Mundo..... | do..... | New York-Galveston. |
| Creole..... | do..... | New York-New Orleans. |
| Antilles..... | do..... | Do. |
| Neches..... | do..... | New York-Galveston. |
| Tenadores..... | do..... | New York-Panama. |
| Lenape..... | do..... | New York-Jacksonville. |
| El Sol..... | do..... | New York-Galveston. |

Mobilization, present battery assignments—Continued.

| Name of vessel. | Battery. | Terminal ports. |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Assigned..... | Four 5-inch..... | |
| Advanced Base..... | Eight 5-inch..... | |
| Albion..... | Four 5-inch, four 3-inch..... | New York-Galveston. |
| Assigned..... | Four 4-inch..... | |
| Albatross..... | Four 5-inch..... | New York-Liverpool. |
| Albatross..... | Four 4-inch..... | Norfolk-Colon. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Navy. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Assigned..... | do..... | |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Navy. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-West Indies. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Boston-Port Limon. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-West Indies. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Cuba. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Galveston. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Pacific ports. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Boston-Baltimore. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Cuba. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Norfolk. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-West Indies. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Seattle. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-West Indies. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Norfolk. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Savannah. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-New Orleans. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | Do. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Savannah. |
| Albatross..... | do..... | New York-Gulf. |
| Assigned..... | Twenty 4-inch..... | |
| Brazos..... | Four 3-inch..... | New York-San Juan. |
| Apache..... | do..... | New York-Jacksonville. |
| Arapahoe..... | do..... | Do. |
| Torpedo station..... | do..... | |

It was also necessary at this time to take into consideration what we should do at home to prepare ourselves for an adequate defense, and while the idea of defense was not a paramount idea, it had to be considered. The paramount conception of our naval districts was to so use our districts that they would be able to utilize to the full the facilities for repair and to coordinate these efforts with our fleet afloat, and particularly with the merchant ships which had to be taken over, which had to be repaired and supplied in order that the civil activities coming within the naval district could be coordinated with the needs of shipping. Our navy yards were supposed to look out particularly for the naval ships, but the civil industries within a naval district and the acts of taking over merchant ships had to be considered and operated through our naval districts. There is quite a plan here for organizing our naval districts, and attached to it I have the President's proclamation, called the commandeering act, allowing us to take over boats; also I have attached a list of ships in the naval districts, and also a list of ships which were commandeered for the purpose of sending abroad, and which were sent abroad, with the duties of selling and taking over, the price of them when taken, all quite complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were vessels all outside of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. All outside of the Navy.

(These papers are as follows:)

NAVAL DISTRICTS, INCLUDING EXTRACTS FROM COMMANDEERING ACT, JUNE 15, 1917.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 17, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Commandants first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth.

Subject: Circular letter to all districts, amplifying General Order 372 of February 28, 1918.

1. In districts having within their boundaries a navy yard, all the industrial activities of the district will be under the head of the industrial organization of the navy yard. In the first district they will be under the head of the industrial activities of the Charleston yard except as to the industrial activities in the Portsmouth yard, which will not be disturbed.

2. All officers detailed to the district whose duties include industrial activities will be, so far as those activities are concerned, under the industrial control of the head of the industrial activities of the district.

3. The military control of the submarine base at New London is under the commandant of the district. (See Operation's letter of Apr. 15, 1918, 24514-846.8.)

4. Chief of Naval Operations' letter to commandants first, second, third, fourth, fifth districts, and others of January 9, 1918, paragraph 3, provides:

"The Bureau of Navigation will designate an officer to perform the local duties of district supervisor of the 'Naval overseas transportation service' for the first, third, fourth, and fifth naval districts. This office shall, under the direction of the commandant of the district, be charged with the duties of taking over necessary alterations, repairs, upkeep, and supply of all vessels of the 'naval overseas transportation service' coming in that district and the movements of the vessels within that district." (For this purpose the waters of the second district are considered as coming within the jurisdiction of the third district.)

5. The activities at the naval operating base at Hampton Roads, Va., have been placed under the commandant of the fifth naval district and made the subject of separate order, General Order 363 of January 28, 1918.

6. The Washington Navy Yard and the activities located on the Severn and Potomac Rivers including the naval air station, Anacostia, D. C., are affected by orders subsequent to General Order 372 of February 28, 1918, as follows:

C. N. O. Jan. 19, 1918, Op-Air 078-3.

C. N. O. April (28905-560), Op-14 4/8.

7. In the twelfth district conditions are affected by the following orders:

Secretary of the Navy letter to commander patrol force Pacific Fleet, May 25, 1917, directing him to assume general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth districts. This supervision not to be constructed as displacing the organization of naval districts or supplanting the naval district commandants in the performance of duty within their districts. Chief of Naval Operations letter of July, 1917 (278383-127), placing above duties upon the commander division 2, Pacific Fleet.

8. Marine detachments stationed or quartered at the navy yards will be under the immediate military control of the commandants of the yard and through the commandant together with other district activities under the military control of the commandant of the district.

9. Marine detachments stationed and quartered elsewhere within district limits will be under the military control of the commandant of the district.

10. The advanced base force at Philadelphia will be under the military control of the commandant of the district.

11. Attention is invited particularly to the provision of General Order 372 of February 28, 1918, directing that the naval activities in each district shall be organized under four heads.

W. S. BENSON.

(Copies to Bureaus of Steam Engineering, Op. Mat. Construction & repair, Op. Air. Yards & Docks, Naval Intel. Supplies & Accounts, Armed Guard. Navigation. Naval Communications. Ordnance, Capt-Commandant Coast Guard. Medicine & Surgery, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.)

FEBRUARY 20, 1918.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Commandants of all naval districts.

Subject: Powers and duties of naval district forces in regard to protection of private plants, wharves, and water fronts.

The powers and duties of the naval district forces on the water and on shore in regard to guarding wharves, piers, and vessels lying alongside; private plants, State

and municipal property, and munitions and merchandise not on property under direct naval control, has been the subject of perplexity to the various district commandants and others having responsibilities in connection with these matters. The subject is a complicated one and the bearing and relative importance of the various elements involved subject to such sudden changes that it is not felt desirable, even if it were possible, to frame a series of definite rules to cover the various demands for such service. What is undertaken in this is rather to collect definite information as to what has been done, and how matters involving these questions have been handled and to point out a number of important considerations to be taken into account when dealing with such cases. It should always be kept in mind that the question of the power to act is to be considered in connection with the policy of the department as to how far and to what extent it is to be exercised, which is quite a different consideration. This policy is in a general way to become involved as little as possible with activities on land, or even within the harbors and inland waters, but to confine the activities of the district forces to duties which are primarily naval and, consequently, such as no other agencies are as well adapted to undertake—such as the patrol of the waters adjacent to the coast in watch for the activities of the enemy from the sea, searching and sweeping for mines, guarding nets and mine fields, directing the movement of vessels of commerce through mine fields and the defensive sea areas as established, the routing of vessels and assembling of convoys, placing of guards on vessels when necessary in their passage in and out of harbors, as a matter of cooperation with the Treasury Department, collecting intelligence of attempts against the safety of vessels at sea, and, a service to be considered of first importance, the training of the enlisted force in these duties, and so as to fit them for service on transports and vessels carrying war material.

2. The Government has divided the duties in connection with the defensive sea areas, and the coastal waters and harbor entrances, the control of shipping in the harbors and of the crews of merchant ships, their passengers and cargoes while in port, and the protection of the various activities along the shores and harbors from vicious acts on the part of alien enemies or others, between the Navy Department, Treasury Department, and the office of the Attorney General. The control of the anchorages and of merchant vessels and their crews, passengers, and cargoes while in harbor, is placed in charge of the Treasury Department, which will act through captains of the port in certain specified harbors, and elsewhere through the collector of customs; and the enforcement of the enemy alien act and the responsibility for seeing that its provisions are carried out, lies with the Attorney General, who acts primarily through the United States marshals and deputy marshals.

3. The Secretary of the Treasury is given control of vessels and their crews in harbors by the proclamation of December 3, 1917, which

Recites: "An act to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage and better to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes," approved by the President June 15, 1917, and quotes:

Section 1, which provides that whenever the President by Executive order or proclamation declares a national emergency, the Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, inspect her, place guards on her, and, if necessary, in his opinion, to prevent injury to vessels or to harbors or waters of United States, or secure observance of rights and obligations of United States, take full possession and control by and with the consent of the President for such purposes, and remove all on board, including officers and crew.

Recites: Proclamation of April 6, 1917.

Recites: That it is now essential to exercise these powers.

Proclaims: A national emergency accordingly and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to make regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States and to inspect, place guards on, etc., as above.

The Secretary of the Treasury has asked for the cooperation of the naval districts in carrying out these duties to the extent of the use of certain personnel and of patrol boats, which are to be detailed for boarding and transportation work, after conference between the district commandant and the officer in the particular port representing the Secretary of the Treasury in these matters. In agreeing to this cooperation the Navy Department has pointed out to the Treasury Department, and it is a matter of agreement and understanding between the two departments, that this cooperation must be somewhat limited by force of circumstances, due to the scarcity of the supply of tugs and vessels of the type best adapted to this service, and that at any time some emergency may arise that would make superior demands upon and remove the services of the vessel at the disposal of naval districts.

4. The Attorney General is charged with the duty of enforcing the restrictions placed upon enemy aliens by the proclamations of April 6, 1917, and November 16, 1917. This latter

Recited: Section 4067 Revised Statutes: Whenever war is declared and the President makes proclamation, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation within the United States and not naturalized shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized to direct the conduct to be observed by the United States toward them, restraint to which they shall be subjected, provide for removal, and establish any other regulations.

Recites: Sections 4068-4069-4070 Revised Statutes.

Recites: Proclamation of April 6, 1917, which gives rules for guidance of citizens in their intercourse with alien enemies and rules for guidance of alien enemies, and places enforcement as provided in sections 4069-4070, as above.

Proclaims: That an alien shall not be found within 100 yards of canal, of wharf, pier, or dock used directly or by means of lighter for vessel of over 500 tons, etc., or of warehouse at water, railroad, or other terminal, storage or transfer facilities in connection with dock, etc. That Attorney General, in his discretion, may exclude enemy aliens from other depots, warehouses, terminals, etc., not in above described class, etc.

Excludes enemy alien, except on public ferry, from ocean, bay, river, or other waters within three miles of shore line of the United States or its territorial possessions. This includes all inland waters connected with ocean and navigable by ocean-going vessels, including the Great Lakes, all of the District of Columbia, and the Panama Canal Zone. Forbids use of airplanes, balloons, etc. Alien enemies must register as decreed by Attorney General, and must comply with all regulations. Attorney General is authorized in accomplishment of this registration to utilize all agents, agencies, officers, and departments of the United States, and of States, Territories, municipalities, etc., and all such are granted full authority for all acts done in the premises when acting by direction of Attorney General. Alien enemy shall not change his abode or travel except as authorized by Attorney General, etc.

As stated, the duty of enforcing these limitations in respect to alien enemies lies with the Attorney General, and he has, of course, the right to call upon the Federal authorities, including the armed forces of the United States, and State, city, town, or village authorities, to assist.

Regulation 4 of the proclamation of April 6, 1917, has never been strictly and completely enforced, but to the extent and in the manner directed by the Attorney General. A circular was issued by the Attorney General, dated May 22, 1917, giving instructions as to the issue of permits under regulation 4 of the President's proclamation of April 6, 1917. It is understood that this is considered to be no longer active. Another set of instructions to United States attorneys and marshals for the enforcement of the supplemental proclamation of November 16, 1917, was issued by the Attorney General, dated December 17, 1917.

The Attorney General has by letter of November 30, 1917, called this proclamation to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy and asked his views as to the manner and extent of cooperation with a suggestion as to the form it should take, and the Secretary of the Navy has explained the limitations imposed by the necessities of the situation, and agreed to afford the full measure of cooperation possible under existing circumstances in the following letter:

"Answering your letter of November 30, requesting cooperation in establishing and maintaining a system of patrol over areas covered by supplemental proclamation recently promulgated regarding alien enemies, I have the honor to say that the area covered by the President's proclamation includes not only a portion of the entire coast and of all the harbors, but the banks of all navigable rivers and sounds and inland waters navigably connected with the high seas, including the Great Lakes and territorial possessions.

"The Navy Department has undertaken to regulate and otherwise safeguard shipping in portions of these areas, those defined as defensive sea areas in the President's several proclamations in respect to such areas, and to establish systems of defense as to various activities of the enemy which it has been thought could be reasonably anticipated, and which fall within the scope of naval operations to undertake.

"Whenever and to the extent that patrol service established by the Navy in connection with such activities covers any of the areas referred to in the proclamation, cooperation will gladly be furnished as far as practicable.

"The opinion appears to be very generally held that the best and most reliable protection can be afforded by armed guards or secret watchmen on the docks or piers and within the plants. It is understood that steps are being taken—are in fact well advanced—to place at the disposal of the Army an organized force to be used for this purpose.

Within the scope of naval operations, however, to furnish protection to patrol them, except as incidental to such service, and no attempt

can be made to establish any general system of patrol covering all of the areas defined in the proclamation."

* * * * *

5. Following are various rulings, given in brief, and observations on these matters by this department and others when dealing with various concrete cases where action has been required.

The Secretary of the Navy has said:

"Such acts as the destruction of bridges and the obstruction of channels by individuals or small civilian parties, are felonies or offenses against the law, whether occurring in peace or war. The National forces are not permitted of their own volition to assist the local authorities in the police duties which devolve upon these authorities, and in some States are very jealous of interference by the Federal forces in the enforcement of the police power. The law is very specific on this point, and the fact that the country is at war does not alter the rights of the local police in dealing with the civil offenses."

And again, upon a request to guard railway bridges and local piers:

"To guard the countless railway bridges, tunnels, piers, etc., by which the Navy is served, would overtax the strength of the entire Navy. Any naval force which might be assigned to such work would be liable to withdrawal should occasion demand their employment elsewhere. It would appear, therefore, that in the impossibility of furnishing guards from the Navy, each community must supply police protection for the utilities lying within its jurisdiction. Not the least of the advantages of such an arrangement would be the avoidance of these controversies between the civil and the military authorities, which would surely arise if the latter were to attempt to take over some of the duties of the former."

In the case of the Bremerton water works, it was stated that the navy yard at Puget Sound was "entirely and absolutely dependent upon this water system for its supply, and should it be cut off the yard could not run beyond three days." An extreme case, but although the Judge Advocate General allows the authority under such circumstances he qualifies it, as will be noted in the last part of the quotation.

It is certainly clear from the attached papers that the waterworks question, upon which the navy yard, Puget Sound, is "entirely and absolutely dependent" for its sustenance, is therefore to a limited extent an instrumentality of the Federal Government, the duty of protecting which devolves upon such Government in view of the circumstances disclosed by the attached papers. That the President has power to utilize the naval forces where their employment is necessary in order to protect the property and interests of the naval establishment of the United States is undoubted and needs no authorities in support of the proposition; and this would be true even in time of peace. It is accordingly my opinion that the necessary orders to effectually protect the water supply of the navy yard, Puget Sound, may be issued by the Secretary of the Navy acting for the commander in chief. It is needless to say that any action taken under this authority should, if practicable, be with the knowledge and consent of the local authorities where they are unable to cope with the situation. This appears to be the case shown by the attached papers—an implied, if not express, consent for the use of the naval forces—for the purpose mentioned is certainly contained in the letter from the mayor of Bremerton and the governor of Washington.

W. C. WATTS,
Judge Advocate General.

The Navy Department did not approve this request.

Brig. Gen. L. McI. Carter, in charge of Division Militia Affairs of the Army:

"The desire to thrust the protection of private enterprises upon the Army should be checked, else the fighting forces in Europe will be affected. States, individuals, cities, and manufacturers should be impressed with the idea that the relation of the Government to State and individual is not changed by reason of the war in Europe, and States, municipalities, and corporations should then comply with these obligations of protecting life, liberty, and property."

The question of how best to furnish this protection has also been the subject of much thought and discussion, and some comments in this direction are quoted:

By direction of the Secretary of the Navy:

"Probably the best protection against criminal acts against your property is a properly organized secret service, as injuries likely to occur would probably be inflicted by individuals and not by an armed body of the enemy forces. It is the attack by armed forces that should be resisted or watched for by the Navy and not the act of an individual criminally inclined."

From Chief of Naval Operations:

"The guarding of the water supply is a function of the State and local military forces. It is directed that the necessary action be taken to bring the inadequate guard to the attention of the proper authorities."

C. N. C.

"Requests for armed guards at private plants should not be considered by the commandant. Persons or corporations making such requests should be informed that it is the duty of the local authorities to furnish police protection, or of the State authorities to furnish protection by State troops. Where firms are making important material for the Navy Department, the department will forward requests for armed guards to the War Department for such action as may be practicable."

C. N. C.

"The department does not contemplate as a general proposition the establishment of patrols inside of harbors. It is realized, however, that in and near large seaports there are certain private activities which are of great interest to the Government and to allied nations, which can not receive a full measure of protection from forces on shore. It is considered proper for commandants to establish such patrol of rivers and harbors leading to large cities as will insure keeping the channels open and will prevent possible attack from armed boats on shipping at wharves."

C. N. C.

Commandant of the district:

"In addition to the above the commandant should make arrangements to provide for armed guards on all pier ends as patrol boats alone can not furnish the necessary protection, but must have armed guards on shore to protect by means of arms as well as against danger of fire."

From report of chief of staff of naval district as to piers:

"The above is submitted, however, with the opinion that the most constant and careful watch, and the most reliable protection, can be given by armed guards equipped with searchlights on the pier ends and that reliable protection can not be given by patrol boats alone."

5. It should be noted that the authority resting upon the Secretary of the Treasury under the proclamation referred to is the making and enforcing of rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movements of vessels and their inspection, the authority to place guards on board if necessary to prevent injury to the vessels or to the harbors or waters of the United States, and in order to secure observance of rights and obligations of the United States, the authority to take full possession of vessels and to remove all on board, including officers and crew; and it should be noted that the authority of the Attorney General is with respect to alien enemies, and, when requested by the Attorney General in respect to an alien enemy, or by the Secretary of the Treasury, with respect to a merchant vessel or or its passengers or crew, the Naval Reserve Force become authorized to carry out the orders given by these officials or their representatives, and doubtless have all the power that the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury might have under the circumstances. These powers, it should be noted, are to compel search and arrest.

Several inferences can safely be drawn from the foregoing with regard to the policy of the Navy Department as to how far the naval district forces should concern themselves with these activities. The question of cooperation between the Navy and Treasury Departments will be worked out under the direction of the district commandants, as indicated so far as the Navy is concerned; and the question and character of cooperation to be maintained with the Department of Justice will be seen from the letter given above. There is no question, of course, as to property or plants which are upon or form part of an inclosure under the exclusive control of the Navy Department, or of naval vessels. These are to be guarded at all times, and the obligation to do this falls on the naval and naval district forces. As to other wharves piers, vessels, State and municipal property, munitions and merchandise, if in the discharge of the regularly ordered duties of the naval districts patrolling or otherwise, any attempt to injure such property should be observed or suspected, on the part of an alien enemy or any other person, the force observing it should undoubtedly attempt to prevent such injury and to apprehend such offender and to turn him over, if an alien enemy, to the nearest United States marshal or his representative; if any other person, to either the State or the Federal or municipal authorities, whichever is not most advisable or convenient under the circumstances; that is, of course, if immediate action is required, otherwise the occurrence should be immediately reported to someone authorized to deal with it. Beyond this, no patrolling or guarding should be attempted. It is to be observed that the responsibility for guarding against such attempts, and of ascertaining suspects, does not rest with the district forces, but only when such incidents are encountered in the course of their regular work, and when in an emergency their aid is definitely sought by Federal State, or municipal authority. A case in point would be a district vessel undergoing repairs at a private plant. In this case the crew should guard the vessel, and keep continuous sentry on guard to prohibit any unnecessary entry on the vessel, and the crew should, while in the yard, aid in apprehending any person suspected

intended injury to the plant, or other vessels there. But the guarding of private plants from attack, either by an alien enemy or by some other evilly disposed individual, can best be done on shore; is not primarily the duty of the naval districts' forces, and these forces are not the first or even the second, in point of precedence which would be invoked by the Attorney General.

7. It is understood that many, if not most, of the private shipyards and plants, which are doing work for the Government under contract or agreement, have obligated themselves as part of their contract to maintain sufficient guard to protect the work from this very type of injury. This obligation should be insisted upon and made the subject of constant inquiry, and those in charge should be instructed how best to carry it out. The municipal authorities and the State authorities controlling the territory in which such plants are situated, are also bound to protect the property from any person attempting such acts, and such persons are in any event, common criminals, which it is the duty of the State and municipal authorities to apprehend and control. The Army has been authorized also to create a special force for this purpose and, in addition to this force, there is available to a greater or less extent, according to the locality, the State militia and various other organizations of home guards, etc.

8. If called upon directly to institute a water patrol in front of some particular plant by some one of the authorities above enumerated, even if unusual conditions seem to justify the service, care should be taken to see that the plant in question is adequately guarded on the shore side, and that the piers, if any, are patrolled by means of guards on the piers themselves, otherwise the patrol of the water front would not be sufficiently effective to justify the diversion of the district forces to that purpose. It is also hardly worth the diversion of the force to attempt to guard one point where other points in the same locality, equally worthy of protection, are not receiving it.

9. It seems to be generally agreed, and the reasons are obvious, that an armed guard on a pier with a searchlight is a much better protection than a patrol on the water; and such protection can, of course, be furnished without interfering with the patrol organization and duties.

10. It is considered that if good judgment is used in dealing with applications to the district forces for such protection, besides making the attitude of this department clear, and also the reasons and justification for it, the duties of the State and local authorities, and of the owners of the plants, can be pointed out and insisted upon.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Extracts from "An act making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the Military and Naval Establishments, etc.," approved June 15, 1917:

To purchase, requisition, or take over the title to, or the possession of, for use or operation by the United States any ship now constructed or in the process of construction or hereafter constructed, or any part thereof, or charter of such ship.

Compliance with all orders issued hereunder shall be obligatory on any person to whom such order is given, and such order shall take precedence over all other orders.

* * * If any person owning any ship * * * shall refuse or fail to comply therewith or to give to the United States such preference in the execution of such order, or shall refuse to * * * supply * * * the ships * * * so ordered, at such reasonable price as shall be determined by the President, the President may take immediate possession of any ship, * * * and may use the same at such times and in such manner as he may consider necessary or expedient.

Whenever the United States shall cancel, modify, suspend, or requisition * * * any ship * * * in accordance with the provisions hereof, it shall make just compensation therefor, to be determined by the President; and if the amount thereof, so determined by the President, is unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation therefor, in the manner provided for by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

The President may exercise the power and authority hereby vested in him, and expend the money herein and hereafter appropriated through such agency or agencies as he shall determine from time to time: * * * All ships constructed, purchased, or requisitioned under authority herein, or heretofore or hereafter acquired by the United States, shall be managed, operated, and disposed of as the President may direct.

The word "person" as used herein shall include any individual, trustee, firm, association, company, corporation, or contractor.

The word "ship" shall include any boat, vessel, or submarine and the parts thereof.

Vessels taken over and purchased by naval districts Dec. 13, 1918.

[Agreement A, Government owned. Agreement B, free lease, \$1 per month plus cost of restoration and restoration only. Agreement C, chartered.]

WITH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC FLEETS.

| S. P. No. | Name. | Agreement. | Type. | Length. | Gross tons. | Date taken over. | Purchase price. |
|-----------|-----------------------|------------|-----------|---------|-------------|------------------|-----------------|
| | | | | Ft. in. | | | |
| 1158 | Arctic..... | C | Tug..... | 111 5 | 197 | Oct. 10, 1917 | |
| 418 | Aramis..... | A | Yt..... | 157 6 | 230 | July 3, 1917 | \$240,000. (n) |
| 651 | Atlantic II..... | A | Yt..... | 177 6 | 303 | June 10, 1917 | 75,000. (n) |
| 2640 | Bay Ocean..... | A | M. B..... | 130 | 148 | June —, 1918 | 52,500. (n) |
| 2302 | Beaver..... | A | S. S..... | 357 5 | 4,507 | July 1, 1918 | 1,300,000. (n) |
| 823 | Broadbill..... | A | Yt..... | 66 | | June 27, 1918 | 21,000. (n) |
| 1015 | Challenge..... | A | Tug..... | 122 | 255 | June 24, 1918 | 150,000. (n) |
| 68 | Despatch..... | A | Yt..... | 167 9 | 287 | Aug. 6, 1917 | 112,000. (n) |
| 1161 | Hackett, F. B..... | A | Tug..... | 108 | 194 | Dec. 8, 1917 | 150,000. (n) |
| 210 | Helenita..... | B | Yt..... | 187 | 304 | Aug. 11, 1917 | |
| 1121 | Osborne, Chase S..... | A | Tug..... | 128 4 | 492 | Feb. 16, 1918 | 113,727.33 |
| 3740 | Surprise..... | A | Bge..... | | | June 1, 1918 | 22,000. (n) |
| 617 | Yacona..... | A | Yt..... | 211 | 527 | Sept. 29, 1917 | 197,055. (n) |

USED BY INSPECTOR OF NAVAL DISTRICTS, EAST COAST.

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|---|---------|-----|-----|---------------|-------|
| 317 | Aloha..... | B | Yt..... | 216 | 659 | Apr. 28, 1917 | |
|-----|------------|---|---------|-----|-----|---------------|-------|

STATION SHIP, SAN DOMINGO.

| | | | | | | | |
|------|--------------|---|---------|-----|-----|-------------|----------------|
| 1233 | Kwasind..... | A | Yt..... | 180 | 303 | May 9, 1917 | \$140,000. (n) |
|------|--------------|---|---------|-----|-----|-------------|----------------|

USED BY FRENCH COMMANDER IN CHIEF CARIBBEAN PATROL.

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|---|---------|-----|-------|---------------|----------------|
| 136 | Niagara..... | A | Yt..... | 180 | 1,443 | July 10, 1917 | \$175,000. (n) |
|-----|--------------|---|---------|-----|-------|---------------|----------------|

TURNUED OVER TO BRITISH.

| | | | | | | | |
|------|-----------------|---|-----------|-----|-------|---------------|------------------|
| 1254 | Old Colony..... | A | S. S..... | 395 | 4,779 | Nov. 12, 1917 | \$1,150,000. (n) |
|------|-----------------|---|-----------|-----|-------|---------------|------------------|

DESTROYER FORCE.

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|
| 521 | Isabel..... | A | Yt..... | 245 3 | | | \$607,527.36 |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|

FLEET TENDERS.

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------------|---|---------|-----|-----|--------------|----------------|
| 609 | Nokomis..... | A | Yt..... | 243 | 872 | Oct. 4, 1917 | \$501,000. (n) |
| 543 | Sialla..... | A | Yt..... | 207 | 558 | June 5, 1917 | 220,000. (n) |

FOR DISTANT SERVICE, NOT IN COMMISSION.

| | | | | | | | |
|------|---------------------------|---|--------------|-------|-------|---------------|----------------|
| 2432 | Blue Ridge (ex Va.).... | A | S. S..... | 269 | | Apr. 19, 1918 | \$250,000. (n) |
| 2527 | City of South Haven... | A | S. S..... | 247 7 | | Apr. 19, 1918 | 300,000. (n) |
| 2222 | Puritan..... | A | S. S..... | 259 | | Apr. 19, 1918 | 287,000. (n) |
| 1478 | Roosevelt, Theodore.... | A | S. S..... | 287 | | Apr. 22, 1918 | 315,000. (n) |
| 560 | Astrea..... | A | M. B..... | 35 | | June 21, 1917 | 2,500. (n) |
| 135 | Aphrodite..... | B | Yacht..... | 302 | 1,147 | May 3, 1917 | |
| 1286 | Albany Bt. Corp. No. 132. | A | Speed boat.. | 30 | | Nov. 30, 1917 | 4,800. (n) |
| 593 | Arcturus..... | A | Yacht..... | 177 6 | 456 | Aug. 7, 1917 | 181,300. (n) |
| 1256 | Aroostook..... | A | S. S..... | 375 | 4,779 | Nov. 19, 1917 | 1,350,000. (n) |
| 530 | Anderton, R. J..... | A | Tug..... | 139 6 | 290 | June 18, 1917 | 95,000. (n) |
| 1232 | Barnegat..... | A | Tug..... | 138 8 | 439 | Oct. 12, 1917 | 245,455. (n) |
| 2211 | Bella..... | A | S. S..... | 235 3 | 1,272 | Feb. 22, 1918 | 263,775. (n) |
| 53 | Boy Scout..... | A | M. B..... | 45 | | Apr. 28, 1917 | 7,000. (n) |
| 493 | Cahill, Winfield..... | A | M. F..... | 137 | 299 | June 12, 1917 | 110,000. (n) |

Vessels taken over and purchased by naval districts Dec. 13, 1918—Continued.

FOR DISTANT SERVICE, NOT IN COMMISSION—Continued.

| S. P. No. | Name. | Agree- ment. | Type. | Length. | Gross tons. | Date taken over. | Purchase price. |
|--------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | | | | <i>Ft. in.</i> | | | |
| 112 | Carola IV..... | A | Yacht..... | 167 | | June 10, 1917 | \$25,000.00 |
| 119 | Charles..... | A | S. S..... | 407 | 3,731 | May 28, 1918 | 1,420,000.00 |
| 122 | Christobel..... | A | Yacht..... | 164 | 248 | Apr. 30, 1917 | 55,000.00 |
| 123 | City of Lewes..... | A | M. F..... | 150 | 254 | May 18, 1917 | 149,508.68 |
| 127 | Concord..... | A | Tug..... | 140 | 353 | Sept. 22, 1917 | 250,000.00 |
| 128 | Conestoga..... | A | Tug..... | 170 | 617 | Sept. 14, 1917 | 315,000.00 |
| 133 | Corona..... | A | Yacht..... | | | June 10, 1917 | 90,000.00 |
| 136 | Corsair..... | B | Yacht..... | 254 | 1,136 | May 25, 1917 | |
| 137 | Courtney, W. J..... | A | M. F..... | 143 | 276 | May 28, 1917 | 100,000.00 |
| 137 | Cythera..... | B | Yacht..... | 192 | 603 | Oct. 20, 1917 | |
| 137 | Douglas, Otis W..... | A | M. F..... | 158 | 300 | May 28, 1917 | 110,000.00 |
| 137 | Dionra..... | A | M. B..... | 46 | | May 17, 1917 | 8,500.00 |
| 137 | Dreadnaught..... | A | Tug..... | 143 | 450 | May 17, 1917 | 222,500.00 |
| 137 | Druid..... | A | Yacht..... | 217 | 539 | June 2, 1917 | 90,000.00 |
| 137 | Emeline..... | A | Yacht..... | 196 | 407 | June 10, 1917 | 92,500.00 |
| 137 | Favorite..... | A | Tug..... | 196 | | Jan. 23, 1918 | 169,000.00 |
| 137 | Galatea..... | A | Yacht..... | 192 | 367 | July 26, 1918 | 195,000.00 |
| 137 | Genesee..... | A | Tug..... | 170 | 617 | July 26, 1917 | 315,000.00 |
| 137 | Goliath..... | A | Tug..... | 134 | 414 | Dec. 4, 1917 | 273,500.00 |
| 137 | Grosbeak..... | A | M. B..... | 38 | | Apr. 28, 1917 | 4,500.00 |
| 137 | Gypsum Queen..... | A | Tug..... | 135 | 361 | Sept. 17, 1917 | 205,548.92 |
| 137 | Harvard (ex Wacouta)..... | B | Yacht..... | 243 | 804 | Apr. 28, 1917 | |
| 137 | John B. Hinton..... | A | M. F..... | 160 | 309 | June 14, 1917 | 110,000.00 |
| 137 | Katydid..... | A | M. B..... | 40 | | May 11, 1917 | 2,500.00 |
| 137 | Hubbard, B. H. B..... | A | F. B..... | 155 | 276 | May 28, 1917 | 100,000.00 |
| 137 | James, W. T..... | A | M. F..... | 150 | 276 | May 28, 1917 | 100,000.00 |
| 137 | Joanna..... | A | M. B..... | 40 | | Dec. 9, 1917 | 9,000.00 |
| 137 | Lydonia..... | A | Yacht..... | 214 | 497 | Oct. 27, 1917 | 170,000.00 |
| 137 | Lynx..... | A | M. B..... | 45 | | Apr. 21, 1917 | 13,000.00 |
| 137 | McNeal, K. L..... | A | M. F..... | 160 | 331 | Aug. 10, 1917 | 117,500.00 |
| 137 | Manatee..... | A | M. B..... | 35 | | Apr. 21, 1917 | 3,000.00 |
| 137 | Margaret..... | A | Yacht..... | 176 | 245 | Aug. 14, 1917 | 104,500.00 |
| 137 | May..... | A | Yacht..... | 239 | 652 | Aug. 11, 1917 | 180,000.00 |
| 137 | Montauk..... | A | Tug..... | 134 | 434 | Oct. 12, 1917 | 184,091.25 |
| 137 | Black Hawk (ex Santa Catalina)..... | A | S. S..... | 404 | | Dec. 14, 1917 | 1,900,000.00 |
| 137 | Nahant..... | A | Tug..... | 134 | 405 | Oct. 12, 1917 | 272,727.00 |
| 137 | Narragansett..... | A | S. S..... | 320 | 3,539 | June 11, 1918 | 601,500.00 |
| 137 | Nahma..... | B | | | | June 21, 1917 | |
| 137 | Noma..... | B | Yacht..... | 262 | 763 | May 10, 1917 | |
| 137 | Nopatin..... | A | S. S..... | 320 | | Jan. 13, 1918 | 601,500.00 |
| 137 | Penobscot..... | A | Tug..... | 121 | 269 | | 84,091.00 |
| 137 | Piqua (ex Kanawha)..... | B | Yacht..... | 227 | 475 | Apr. 28, 1917 | |
| 137 | Quinnebaug..... | C | S. S..... | 373 | 2,015 | Dec. 2, 1917 | |
| 137 | Rambler..... | A | Yacht..... | 110 | | Nov. 17, 1917 | 99,000.00 |
| 137 | Remlik..... | A | Yacht..... | 200 | 432 | June 10, 1917 | 95,000.00 |
| 137 | Saranac..... | C | S. S..... | 351 | 3,723 | Dec. 6, 1917 | |
| 137 | Scoter..... | A | M. B..... | 53 | | Apr. 21, 1917 | 15,000.00 |
| 137 | Sea Rover..... | A | Tug..... | 121 | 199 | Dec. 11, 1917 | 178,000.00 |
| 137 | Shawmut..... | A | S. S..... | 396 | 4,779 | Nov. 9, 1917 | 1,350,000.00 |
| 137 | Sultana..... | B | Yacht..... | 186 | 390 | Apr. 21, 1917 | |
| 137 | Thompson, Sara..... | A | Oil tanker..... | 321 | | | 700,000.00 |
| 137 | Utowana..... | A | Trawler..... | 169 | 185 | Aug. 16, 1917 | 235,103.10 |
| 137 | Undaunted..... | A | Tug..... | 143 | 450 | Jan. 30, 1918 | 222,500.00 |
| 137 | Vedette..... | B | Yacht..... | 198 | 441 | May 25, 1917 | |
| 137 | Venetia..... | C | Yacht..... | 226 | 589 | Aug. 4, 1917 | 2,000.00 |
| 137 | Wadena..... | A | Yacht..... | 176 | | May 25, 1917 | 20,000.00 |
| 137 | Wanderer..... | A | Yacht..... | 197 | 362 | June 10, 1917 | 80,500.00 |
| 137 | Wenonah..... | A | Yacht..... | 163 | 290 | Aug. 8, 1917 | 145,000.00 |
| 137 | Yale..... | A | S. S..... | 407 | 3,731 | Mar. 13, 1918 | 1,420,000.00 |

NOTE.—All of the above-named vessels with the exception of the Bella and Nahma, which were taken over abroad, were taken over in the United States and sent abroad.

(Signed) W. V. PRATT.

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918.

[Vessels on our own coast: Agreement "A," Government owned; agreement "B," free lease; "C," charter; character "*", vessels shown on lists other than ships movement.]

FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| 765 | Adelante..... | Yt..... | 125 feet..... | A..... | Coast Guard Light house. |
| 967 | Admiral II..... | Yt..... | 138 feet..... | A..... | |
| 541 | Admiral..... | Smk..... | 73 feet..... | A..... | |
| 599 | Akbar..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | A..... | |
| 206 | Alacrity..... | Yt..... | 118 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Androscoggin..... | C. G. C..... | 210 feet..... | | |
| | Azelea..... | L. H. T..... | 145 feet..... | | |
| 590 | Aztec..... | Yt..... | 260 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Arabia..... | F. sch..... | 103 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Bainbridge..... | T. B..... | 245 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Barry..... | T. B..... | 245 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1704 | Billow..... | Traw..... | 117 feet 8 inches..... | C..... | |
| 540 | Bonita..... | M. B..... | 46 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1707 | Breaker..... | Traw..... | 117 feet 8 inches..... | C..... | |
| 542 | Burns, E. M..... | Sch..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2366 | *Boston Fl. Hosp..... | | 160 feet..... | C..... | Loaned from adian Govt |
| 632 | Calypso..... | M. B..... | 54 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. D. *30-58-94..... | Traw..... | 90 feet..... | | |
| | C. D. *31-59-96..... | Traw..... | 90 feet..... | | |
| | C. D. *36-61-97..... | Traw..... | 90 feet..... | | |
| | C. D. *41-65-98..... | Traw..... | 90 feet..... | | Do. |
| | C. D. *46-67-99..... | Traw..... | 90 feet..... | | Do. |
| | C. D. *50-78-100..... | Traw..... | 90 feet..... | | Do. |
| 1104 | Cherokee..... | Yt..... | 115 feet..... | B..... | Coast Guard. |
| | Coast Guard No. 25..... | H. Bt..... | 80 feet..... | | |
| 626 | Cobra..... | M. B..... | 53 feet..... | A..... | |
| 344 | Comber..... | Traw..... | 144 feet..... | C..... | |
| 633 | Constance II..... | M. B..... | 41 feet..... | A..... | |
| 538 | Content..... | M. B..... | 74 feet..... | A..... | |
| 339 | Crest..... | Traw..... | 114 feet..... | C..... | |
| 3223 | *Cullen, Katherine..... | W. brg..... | 144 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B. *2..... | T. B..... | 160 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1285 | Dalquiri..... | M. B..... | 62 feet..... | A..... | |
| 3249 | Derrick Ltr..... | Brg..... | 77 feet..... | A..... | |
| 625 | Doris B. IV..... | M. B..... | 67 feet..... | A..... | |
| 573 | Easthampton..... | Traw..... | 163 feet..... | A..... | |
| 624 | Edithena..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | A..... | |
| 315 | Edwards, W. A..... | Tug..... | 165 feet..... | A..... | |
| 677 | Eleanor..... | M. B..... | 58 feet..... | B..... | Fish Commi: |
| 708 | Elsie III..... | M. B..... | 52 feet..... | A..... | |
| 707 | Endion..... | Yt..... | 100 feet..... | A..... | |
| 537 | Estella..... | M. B..... | 52 feet..... | A..... | |
| 539 | Euphemia..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Green, Wm. F..... | Sch..... | 115 feet 7 inches..... | A..... | |
| 600 | Gurkha..... | M. B..... | 61 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Halcyon (F. Com.)..... | Tug..... | 108 feet..... | | |
| 582 | Halcyon II..... | Yt..... | 140 feet..... | C..... | |
| 3190 | Hercules..... | S. Ltr..... | 111 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Hibiscus..... | L. H. T..... | 174 feet..... | | |
| 654 | Hippocampus..... | M. B..... | 56 feet..... | B..... | |
| 783 | Hobo..... | M. B..... | 72 feet..... | B..... | |
| 650 | Hupa..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Heron..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| 3051 | Ibis..... | M. S..... | 141 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1144 | Katrina..... | Yt..... | 66 feet 5 inches..... | B..... | |
| 1229 | Liberty III..... | Aux. Sch..... | 103 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Lilac..... | L. H. T..... | 145 feet..... | | |
| 572 | Long Island..... | Traw..... | 151 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1230 | Louise..... | Aux. Sch..... | 104 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Lapwing..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1043 | Machigonne II..... | Yt..... | 136 feet 5 inches..... | C..... | |
| 735 | Maylay..... | Yt..... | 150 feet..... | C..... | |
| 522 | Mann, Charles..... | Tug..... | 77 feet..... | A..... | |
| 737 | Marold..... | M. B..... | 100 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Mayflower..... | L. H. T..... | 155 feet..... | | |
| 567 | Mist..... | M. B..... | 59 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Nantucket..... | N. Tr. Shp..... | | | Ordered retu |
| 1251 | Natalia..... | M. B..... | 49 feet..... | B..... | |
| 649 | Needle..... | M. B..... | 71 feet..... | A..... | |
| 610 | Nelansu..... | M. B..... | 51 feet 5 inches..... | B..... | |
| 726 | Orca..... | M. B..... | 85 feet..... | A..... | |
| 533 | Paloma..... | Yt..... | 85 feet..... | A..... | Do. Do. Public Health |
| 658 | Pauline..... | M. B..... | 42 feet..... | B..... | |
| 622 | Politesse..... | M. B..... | 29 feet..... | B..... | |
| 596 | *Pete..... | M. B..... | 29 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Relief (Pub. Health)..... | M. B..... | 53 feet..... | | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| F | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-----|------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| 176 | Rivalen..... | M. B..... | 43 feet..... | B..... | Ordered returned. |
| 177 | Rockport..... | Yt..... | 124 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 178 | Ross, Sadie..... | Tug..... | 60 feet 5 inches..... | A..... | |
| 179 | *Russell, Lillian..... | Barge..... | 36 feet..... | A..... | |
| 180 | Samoset..... | Str..... | 103 feet..... | A..... | |
| 181 | Satilla..... | Yt..... | 128 feet..... | A..... | |
| 182 | Sayonara II..... | M. B..... | 74 feet..... | B..... | |
| 183 | Shad..... | M. B..... | 43 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| 184 | Shada..... | M. B..... | 96 feet..... | B..... | |
| 185 | Shark..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | A..... | |
| 186 | Shrimp..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | B..... | |
| 187 | Shur..... | M. B..... | 78 feet 7 inches..... | A..... | |
| 188 | Skink..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| 189 | Starling..... | F. B..... | 141 feet..... | C..... | |
| 190 | Steamer No. 2235..... | S. L..... | 30 feet..... | A..... | |
| 191 | Stinger..... | M. B..... | 80 feet 5 inches..... | A..... | |
| 192 | Surf..... | Traw..... | 118 feet..... | C..... | |
| 193 | S. P. No. 511..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | B..... | |
| 194 | S. P. No. 507..... | Yt..... | 140 feet..... | A..... | |
| 195 | S. P. No. 524..... | Yt..... | 145 feet..... | A..... | |
| 196 | S. P. No. 548..... | Smk..... | 101 feet..... | A..... | |
| 197 | S. P. No. 699..... | Yt..... | 114 feet..... | A..... | |
| 198 | S. P. No. 701..... | M. B..... | 54 feet..... | B..... | Do. |
| 199 | S. P. No. 711..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | B..... | |
| 200 | S. P. No. 730..... | M. B..... | 58 feet..... | A..... | |
| 201 | S. P. No. 746..... | M. B..... | 61 feet 5 inches..... | B..... | |
| 202 | S. P. No. 1003..... | M. B..... | 39 feet..... | B..... | |
| 203 | S. P. No. 1240..... | Barge..... | 283 feet 7 inches..... | A..... | |
| 204 | S. P. No. 1259..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | B..... | |
| 205 | S. P. No. 1919..... | Brg..... | 135 feet..... | A..... | |
| 206 | Tallapoosa..... | C. G. C..... | 165 feet 10 inches..... | | |
| 207 | Talofa..... | Yt..... | 101 feet..... | B..... | Coast Guard. |
| 208 | Thrasher..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | A..... | |
| 209 | *Tanager..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 210 | Valeda..... | M. B..... | 59 feet 5 inches..... | A..... | |
| 211 | Venture..... | M. B..... | 80 feet..... | B..... | |
| 212 | Verna & Esther..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | C..... | |
| 213 | Wasaka III..... | M. B..... | 53 feet..... | B..... | |
| 214 | Whistler..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| 215 | Wissahickon..... | Yt..... | 120 feet..... | B..... | |
| 216 | Winnisimmet..... | Tug..... | 96 feet 5 inches..... | | |
| 217 | Woolley, James..... | Tug..... | 80 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | Do. |
| 218 | *Wild Goose II..... | M. B..... | 33 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 219 | Zenda..... | M. B..... | 44 feet..... | A..... | (D. S.) |
| 220 | Zirania..... | L. H. T..... | 150 feet..... | | |
| | | | | | Lighthouse. |

SECOND NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|---------------|------------------------|--------|------------------|
| 122 | Acoma..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | C. G. (salvage). |
| 123 | Acushnet..... | C. G. C..... | 152 feet..... | | |
| 124 | Aileen..... | Conv. yt..... | 138 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| 125 | Alcalda..... | M. B..... | 105 feet..... | B..... | |
| 126 | Alpha..... | M. B..... | 56 feet..... | B..... | Lighthouse. |
| 127 | *Anemone..... | Lht..... | 174 feet..... | | |
| 128 | Arcady..... | St. yt..... | 145 feet..... | A..... | |
| 129 | Ardent..... | Fish..... | 106 feet 2 inches..... | A..... | |
| 130 | Arrow..... | | | | Do. |
| 131 | Artmar..... | M. B..... | 63 feet..... | A..... | |
| 132 | Barbara..... | M. B..... | 40 feet 8 inches..... | B..... | |
| 133 | Belle of Boston..... | Sch..... | 53 feet..... | B..... | |
| 134 | Beluga..... | M. B..... | 73 feet..... | B..... | |
| 135 | Celeritas..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| 136 | Chanticleer..... | M. B..... | 37 feet 5 inches..... | B..... | |
| 137 | Charmian II..... | M. B..... | 58 feet..... | B..... | |
| 138 | Christine..... | Barge..... | 103 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 139 | *C. T. B. 3..... | T. B..... | 176 feet..... | A..... | |
| 140 | *C. T. B. 13..... | T. B..... | 176 feet..... | A..... | Do. |
| 141 | *Daisy..... | Lht..... | 74 feet..... | | |
| 142 | Daraga..... | M. B..... | 77 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 143 | Dauntless..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | |
| 144 | Don Juan de Austria..... | G. B..... | 210 feet..... | A..... | |
| 145 | Doris B. III..... | M. B..... | 47 feet..... | B..... | |
| 146 | Eaglet..... | M. B..... | 87 feet 9 inches..... | A..... | |
| 147 | Edamena II..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | A..... | |
| 148 | Enaj..... | Str..... | 89 feet..... | B..... | |
| 149 | Enterprise..... | M. B..... | 66 feet..... | A..... | |
| 150 | Felicia..... | Conv. yt..... | 199 feet..... | A..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

SECOND NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|-----------------------|-----------|------------------------|------------|-------------|
| | Fish Hawk..... | Str. | 156 feet..... | | Bureau of F |
| 742 | Green Dragon..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | B | Ordered ret |
| 1215 | Harvest Queen..... | Barge | 153 feet..... | A | Prob. Ret. |
| 1770 | Hazelton..... | M. B. | 40 feet..... | B | |
| 585 | Hellanthus..... | M. B. | 60 feet 6 inches..... | A | |
| 1218 | *Herreshoff 309..... | Yt. | 87 feet..... | B | |
| 2840 | *Herreshoff 323..... | Str. | 112 feet..... | A | |
| 1221 | Hildegarde..... | Sch. | 150 feet..... | B | |
| | *Isla de Luzon..... | G. B. | 192 feet 8 inches..... | A | Torpedo sta |
| 643 | Joy..... | M. B. | 93 feet..... | B | |
| 1031 | Jolly Roger..... | M. B. | 55 feet 2 inches..... | B | Ordered ret |
| 529 | Kestrel..... | M. B. | 107 feet..... | B | |
| 661 | Lady Betty..... | M. B. | 48 feet..... | B | |
| 212 | Lady Mary..... | M. B. | 96 feet 6 inches..... | B | |
| 636 | Lomado..... | M. B. | 69 feet..... | A | |
| 676 | Lydia III..... | M. B. | 51 feet 5 inches..... | A | |
| 876 | *Lykens..... | Tug. | 157 feet..... | A | |
| 980 | Macomber, B. F..... | Fish. | 138 feet 6 inches..... | A | |
| 143 | Magistrate..... | M. B. | 63 feet..... | B | |
| 563 | Magnet..... | M. B. | 105 feet..... | A | |
| 691 | Mansfield & Sons..... | Oys. bt. | 100 feet..... | A | |
| 28 | Mauna Loa..... | M. B. | 55 feet..... | B | |
| 1966 | Morse, C, W..... | Str. | 411 feet 1 inch..... | C | |
| 428 | Mystery..... | M. B. | 74 feet..... | B | |
| 161 | Narada..... | Conv. yt. | 224 feet..... | B | |
| 396 | Natoya..... | M. B. | 43 feet 5 inches..... | A | |
| 523 | Nightingale..... | M. B. | 45 feet..... | A | |
| 33 | Niji..... | M. B. | 56 feet..... | B | Do. |
| 1163 | *Narragansett..... | Fer. bt. | 117 feet..... | A | |
| 957 | Ojen..... | M. B. | 40 feet..... | B | |
| 659 | Owaissa..... | M. B. | 79 feet 5 inches..... | B | |
| 1227 | Pachogue..... | S. S. | 99 feet 8 inches..... | A | |
| 671 | Parthenia..... | Str. | 131 feet..... | A | |
| 8 | Patrol No. 4..... | M. B. | 40 feet..... | B | |
| 29 | Patrol No. 5..... | M. B. | 49 feet..... | A | |
| 54 | Patrol No. 6..... | M. B. | 63 feet..... | A | |
| 31 | Patrol No. 7..... | M. B. | 40 feet..... | A | |
| 56 | Patrol No. 8..... | M. B. | 72 feet..... | B | |
| 85 | Patrol No. 10..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | A | |
| 1106 | Patrol No. 11..... | M. B. | 55 feet..... | B | |
| | Phalarope..... | Str. | 89 feet..... | | Bureau Fish |
| 690 | Polly..... | M. B. | 62 feet..... | A | |
| 1048 | Pollyana..... | M. B. | 35 feet 10 inches..... | B | |
| 702 | Pomander..... | M. B. | 43 feet..... | B | Ordered ret |
| 839 | Price, E. F..... | Fish. | 121 feet 5 inches..... | A | |
| 171 | Quest..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | B | |
| 508 | Raazoo..... | M. B. | 62 feet..... | B | |
| 506 | Raccoon..... | M. B. | 50 feet..... | B | |
| 588 | Raeo..... | M. B. | 73 feet..... | A | |
| 2057 | Raymond..... | Barge | 102 feet 8 inches..... | A | |
| 1195 | Rhebal..... | M. B. | 50 feet..... | B | |
| 781 | Sea Otter..... | M. B. | 40 feet..... | A | |
| | *Snohomish..... | Tug. | 152 feet..... | | Coast Guard |
| 170 | Sovereign..... | Yt. | 166 feet..... | B | |
| | *S. P. 76..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | B | |
| | *S. P. 265..... | Fish. | 115 feet..... | A | |
| | *S. P. 411..... | M. B. | 76 feet..... | A | |
| | *S. P. 531..... | Sch. yt. | 98 feet..... | A | |
| | *S. P. 598..... | M. B. | 52 feet 9 inches..... | B | |
| | *S. P. 614..... | M. B. | 49 feet 6 inches..... | B | |
| | *S. P. 728..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | B | |
| | *S. P. 838..... | Fish. | 157 feet 8 inches..... | A | |
| 391 | Thetis..... | Yt. | 127 feet..... | A | |
| 743 | Toxaway..... | M. B. | 52 feet..... | B | |
| 646 | Tramp..... | Str. | 79 feet..... | A | Ordered sol |
| 664 | Tuna..... | M. B. | 98 feet..... | B | |
| | Vesuvius..... | T. B. | 252 feet 4 inches..... | A | |
| 3246 | Vincent..... | M. B. | 49 feet..... | B | |
| 238 | Wacondah..... | St. vt. | 177 feet..... | A | |
| 89 | Whippet..... | M. B. | 72 feet..... | B | |
| 340 | Whitecap..... | Traw. | 135 feet..... | C | |
| 879 | Wildcat..... | M. B. | 63 feet 4 inches..... | A | |
| 3297 | Winthrop..... | S. tug. | 80 feet..... | A | |
| 156 | Winchester..... | S. yt. | 225 feet..... | A | |
| | Yank..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | B | |
| 463 | Yo-Ho..... | M. B. | 47 feet..... | A | |
| 907 | *Yard 210..... | M. B. | 60 feet..... | B | Sunk. |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT.

| P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|----|---------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|------------|-------------------|
| 17 | Abalone..... | M. yt..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | Ordered returned. |
| | Adams..... | G. b..... | 189 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Adirondack..... | Str..... | 288 feet 2 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Abdeck..... | M. yt..... | 38 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Akela..... | S. yt..... | 98 feet 7 inches..... | B..... | |
| | Alice..... | M. yt..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Amn. ltr. No. 28..... | Ltr..... | 108 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Amn. ltr. No. 29..... | Ltr..... | 107 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Anado..... | M. b..... | 70 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Aspinet (Ex-Apache)..... | Tug..... | 141 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Atilda..... | C. b..... | 94 feet..... | C..... | Guantanamo. |
| | Aurora..... | Tug..... | 110 feet..... | C..... | |
| 44 | Auton, Helen..... | Cov. brg..... | 100 feet..... | C..... | |
| | *Amphitrite..... | Montr..... | 250 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| | *Avalon..... | M. b..... | 46 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Actus..... | M. b..... | 120 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Barracuda..... | M. b..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Beaumont II..... | M. b..... | 62 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| | Berkshire..... | Str..... | 266 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Bivalve..... | M. b..... | 55 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Bluebird..... | M. b..... | 72 feet..... | B..... | Awaiting sail. |
| | Biesbosch..... | Str..... | 160 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Bresnahan..... | Barge..... | 100 feet 3 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Calumet..... | S. yt..... | 147 feet..... | B..... | |
| | *Cambridge..... | Str..... | 245 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Cardinal..... | M. s..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 11 | Caswell, H. H..... | Str..... | 82 feet 8 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Caswell, Richard..... | Tug..... | 84 feet 9 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Catherine..... | Barge..... | 130 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Cayuga..... | S. tug..... | 99 feet..... | A..... | Do. |
| | Chesapeake..... | Str..... | 210 feet..... | A..... | |
| 8 | Chicota..... | S. yt..... | 81 feet..... | B..... | |
| 24 | Chittenden, J. W..... | Barge..... | 128 feet 2 inches..... | A..... | |
| | City of Yonkers..... | St. ltr..... | 107 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Clarke, Carry..... | Sch. bg..... | 194 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Cigarette..... | Yt..... | 125 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Commander..... | M. yt..... | 61 feet 2 inches..... | B..... | |
| 2 | Commerce..... | Ltr..... | 85 feet 1 inch..... | A..... | |
| | *Concrete brg. No. 1..... | Brg..... | 112 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Comfort..... | Hosp. s..... | | C..... | Lighthouse. |
| 4 | Coney, F. F..... | Tug..... | 102 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Coquette..... | Tug..... | 58 feet..... | C..... | |
| 4 | Coronet..... | M. yt..... | 90 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2 | Crawford, C. P..... | Tug..... | 100 feet 2 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Cullen, Dorothy..... | Tug..... | 81 feet 2 inches..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B. No. 8..... | T. B..... | 205 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B. No. 10..... | T. B..... | 157 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B. No. 15..... | T. B..... | 175 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Dana..... | St. ltr..... | 84 feet 7 inches..... | C..... | |
| 4 | Dodger II..... | M. yt..... | 76 feet 2 inches..... | A..... | Do. |
| 14 | Dolphin..... | Barge..... | 88 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Derby, John..... | Cov. brg..... | 101 feet..... | C..... | |
| | *Daisy..... | L. H. T..... | 74 feet..... | C..... | |
| 9 | Edith M..... | M. yt..... | 59 feet..... | A..... | |
| 14 | Editha..... | M. yt..... | 98 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| 15 | Elithro II..... | M. yt..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| 4 | Ellen..... | M. yt..... | 67 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 55 | Fashion..... | Brg..... | 80 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Finch..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 73 | Florence..... | St. yt..... | 124 feet..... | B..... | Do. |
| 6 | Foam..... | Traw..... | 114 feet 3 inches..... | C..... | |
| 17 | Freehold..... | Tug..... | 101 feet 1 inch..... | C..... | |
| 10 | Freelance..... | S. yt..... | 137 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Gardenia..... | L. H. T..... | 117 feet..... | C..... | |
| 11 | Gasoline Ltr. No. 23..... | Ltr..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | |
| 11 | Gem..... | St. ltr..... | 164 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| 10 | Genevieve..... | Str..... | 82 feet..... | A..... | |
| 4 | General Putnam..... | Str..... | 122 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | |
| 19 | Get There..... | M. yt..... | 58 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| 17 | Gillen Bros..... | Ltr..... | 105 feet 8 inches..... | C..... | Coast Guard. |
| 13 | Glenville..... | Str..... | 120 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | |
| 12 | Gordon..... | St. ltr..... | 105 feet..... | A..... | |
| 4 | Grayce..... | Cov. brg..... | 90 feet..... | C..... | |
| 15 | Griswold..... | Str..... | 92 feet 2 inches..... | C..... | |
| | *Gloucester..... | Yt..... | 204 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Guide..... | M. B..... | 70 feet..... | C..... | |
| 10 | Hauoli..... | S. yt..... | 211 feet..... | A..... | |
| 16 | Hebe..... | M. yt..... | 52 feet..... | B..... | |
| 13 | Hereshoff No. 322..... | M. B..... | 82 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| 2892 | Hiawatha..... | Tug..... | 65 feet 5 inches..... | C..... | Coast Guard. |
| 947 | High Ball..... | M. yt..... | 45 feet..... | A..... | |
| 191 | Hopestill..... | M. yt..... | 89 feet..... | A..... | |
| 142 | Hoqua..... | M. yt..... | 71 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Hudson..... | Tug..... | 96 feet 6 inches..... | | |
| 2584 | Hydraulic..... | St. yt..... | 83 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | |
| 270 | Idalis..... | M. yt..... | 68 feet..... | B..... | |
| 803 | Itasca II..... | M. yt..... | 99 feet 9 inches..... | B..... | |
| 878 | Jimetta..... | M. yt..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| 390 | Johnson, Catherine..... | S. ltr..... | 110 feet..... | A..... | |
| 3295 | Josephine..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| 3065 | Josephus..... | Barge..... | 213 feet..... | C..... | |
| 72 | Joyance..... | St. yt..... | 134 feet..... | A..... | |
| 415 | Kemah..... | M. yt..... | 146 feet..... | A..... | |
| 479 | Knickerbocker..... | Tug..... | 110 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1237 | Knox, General..... | Brg..... | 251 feet 1 inch..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| 1235 | Kuper, Chas. P..... | Tug..... | 62 feet 5 inches..... | C..... | |
| | *Larkspur..... | L. H. T..... | 162 feet..... | | |
| 3250 | cLagoda..... | M. B..... | 85 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Lamberton..... | Destr..... | 310 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1397 | Lee..... | Barge..... | 103 feet..... | C..... | |
| 921 | Little Brothers..... | St. ltr..... | 70 feet..... | C..... | |
| 721 | Linta..... | St. yt..... | 108 feet..... | B..... | |
| 2141 | Logan, James..... | Ltr..... | 90 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| 504 | Lowell..... | Tug..... | 119 feet 4 inches..... | C..... | |
| 1396 | Luna..... | C. brg..... | 108 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | Lighthouse. Coast Guard. |
| | *Lilac..... | L. H. T..... | 145 feet..... | | |
| | *Mackinac..... | C. G. C..... | 110 feet..... | | Sunk. |
| | Mannahatta..... | Str..... | 220 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2119 | Margin..... | M. B..... | 41 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| 100 | Marie..... | M. yt..... | 70 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Marion..... | C. brg..... | 122 feet 1 inch..... | C..... | |
| 397 | Marie Alice..... | St. yt..... | 174 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2313 | Merchant..... | Xtr..... | 131 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Merritt, I. J..... | Str..... | 163 feet..... | A..... | |
| 425 | Minerva..... | M. yt..... | 80 feet..... | B..... | |
| 49 | Momo..... | M. yt..... | 57 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Montgomery..... | Destr..... | 310 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Morris..... | T. B..... | 138 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| 36 | Mustang..... | M. yt..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Mystery..... | S. tr..... | 106 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | |
| 428 |do..... | M. B..... | 71 feet..... | B..... | Lighthouse. Do. |
| | *Mistletoe..... | L. H. T..... | 153 feet..... | B..... | |
| | *Myrtle..... | L. H. T..... | 130 feet..... | | Do. Coast Guard. |
| 666 | Natoma..... | M. Yt..... | 120 feet..... | A..... | |
| 517 | Naushon..... | S. Yt..... | 153 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| 559 | Nautilus II..... | M. Yt..... | 66 feet..... | B..... | |
| 298 | Navajo II..... | M. Yt..... | 67 feet..... | A..... | |
| 343 | Nemesis..... | M. Yt..... | 41 feet 9 inches..... | B..... | |
| 266 | Newark..... | Tug..... | 107 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1222 | New England..... | Ltr..... | 130 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Newport..... | Nautical training ship..... | | | |
| 2147 | North Pole..... | Brg..... | 113 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1208 | Ocoee..... | M. Yt..... | 68 feet..... | B..... | |
| 928 | Osprey II..... | M. Yt..... | 80 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1249 | Ostrich..... | M. Yt..... | 35 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Pansy..... | L. H. T..... | 147 feet..... | | |
| | Patrol..... | M. B..... | 68 feet 9 inches..... | | |
| 675 | Pattina..... | M. Yt..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | Lighthouse. |
| | Pentucket..... | Tug..... | 92 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 86 | Perfecto..... | M. Yt..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Perkins..... | Destr..... | 289 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Portland..... | C. Brg..... | 77 feet 1 inch..... | C..... | |
| 2364 | Postmaster Gnrl..... | Str..... | 175 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Preble..... | T. B..... | 245 feet..... | A..... | |
| 179 | Privateer..... | M. Yt..... | 108 feet..... | A..... | |
| 679 | P. R. R. No. 9..... | Tug..... | 92 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Progressive..... | Tug..... | 75 feet..... | C..... | |
| 9 | Psyche V..... | M. Yt..... | 75 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| | *Rogers, John..... | L. H. T..... | 151 feet..... | | |
| 2009 | Rood Laura..... | Aux..... | 52 feet..... | B..... | |
| 2170 | Relief..... | Tug..... | 184 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1309 | Resolute..... | Tug..... | 36 feet..... | A..... | |
| 107 | Riette..... | M. Yt..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2439 | Ripple..... | Traw..... | 114 feet 3 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Robbins, R. D. U..... | St. Ltr..... | 95 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Robin..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agree- ment. | Remarks. |
|-------|----------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------|
| 24 | Ross, E. K. | Tug. | 104 feet 2 inches | C. | Coast Guard. |
| 25 | Rutoma | M. Yt. | 68 feet | A. | |
| 26 | Sunbeam III. | M. B. | 52 feet | B. | |
| 27 | *Superior | Brg. | 105 feet 5 inches | A. | |
| 28 | *Sands | M. B. | 36 feet 2 inches | A. | |
| 29 | Sabala | M. Yt. | 141 feet | B. | |
| 30 | Sachem | St. Yt. | 166 feet 6 inches | B. | |
| 31 | San Toy II. | M. Yt. | 70 feet | B. | |
| 32 | Sapphire | S. yt. | 98 feet | B. | |
| 33 | Sea Gate | S. S. | 130 feet | C. | |
| 34 | See W See | M. B. | 65 feet | B. | |
| 35 | Seymour, Henry | Brg. | 91 feet | A. | |
| 36 | Shannon | Cov. brg. | 89 feet 8 inches | C. | |
| 37 | Simplicity | M. yt. | 58 feet 9 inches | A. | Sunk. |
| 38 | Siwash | M. yt. | 78 feet | A. | |
| 39 | Spray | Traw. | 126 feet 6 inches | C. | |
| 40 | Sterling | Cov. brg. | 77 feet 1 inch | C. | |
| 41 | Sturdy | M. yt. | 75 feet | A. | |
| 42 | Success | L. tr. | 64 feet | A. | |
| 43 | S. P. No. 117 | Stm. yt. | 144 feet | B. | |
| 44 | S. P. No. 145 | M. yt. | 80 feet | A. | |
| 45 | S. P. No. 182 | M. yt. | 90 feet | A. | |
| 46 | S. P. No. 237 | S. yt. | 145 feet | A. | |
| 47 | S. P. No. 247 | Tug. | 93 feet 3 inches | C. | |
| 48 | S. P. No. 296 | M. yt. | 50 feet | B. | |
| 49 | S. P. No. 427 | S. yt. | 150 feet | A. | |
| 50 | S. P. No. 460 | M. yt. | 96 feet 3 inches | A. | |
| 51 | S. P. No. 498 | M. yt. | 90 feet | A. | |
| 52 | S. P. No. 689 | M. yt. | 60 feet | B. | Ordered returned. Do. |
| 53 | S. P. No. 899 | M. yt. | 52 feet | B. | |
| 54 | S. P. No. 913 | M. yt. | 55 feet 6 inches | B. | |
| 55 | S. P. No. 1755 | S. ltr. | 100 feet 4 inches | C. | |
| 56 | S. P. No. 2221 | Tug. | 135 feet | A. | Sunk. |
| 57 | Sanderling | M. S. | 187 feet 10 inches | A. | |
| 58 | *Tarantula | M. yt. | 128 feet 9 inches | B. | |
| 59 | Takana | Tug. | 69 feet 5 inches | C. | |
| 60 | Tamarak | M. yt. | 80 feet | B. | Coast Guard. |
| 61 | Taniwha | M. yt. | 112 feet | B. | |
| 62 | Tasco | Tug. | 109 feet | C. | |
| 63 | Thistle | M. yt. | 70 feet | B. | |
| 64 | *Tulip | L. H. T. | 174 feet | | Salvage. Ordered returned. Lighthouse. |
| 65 | Vivace | S. yt. | 118 feet | A. | |
| 66 | Vencedor | M. yt. | 90 feet | B. | |
| 67 | Westchester | Tug. | 42 feet 7 inches | C. | |
| 68 | Walker, J. B. | Brg. | 247 feet 1 inch | A. | Coast Guard. |
| 69 | Wandana | S. yt. | 65 feet | A. | |
| 70 | Wemootah | M. yt. | 70 feet | A. | |
| 71 | Widgeon | M. S. | 187 feet 10 inches | A. | |
| 72 | Wissahickon | S. yt. | 100 feet | | |
| 73 | Wiwoka | M. yt. | 62 feet | B. | |
| 74 | Xarifa | S. yt. | 192 feet | B. | |
| 75 | Zara | S. yt. | 156 feet | A. | |
| 76 | Zoraya | S. yt. | 133 feet | B. | |

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|------|-----------------|----------|-------------------|----|--------------|
| 371 | Absegami | M. B. | 75 feet | B. | Coast Guard. |
| 433 | Ameera | M. B. | 71 feet 3 inches | A. | |
| 1 | Arawan II | M. B. | 71 feet 1 inch | B. | |
| | *Arabian | Tug. | 82 feet 7 inches | C. | |
| 2174 | Bernard | Tug. | 77 feet | C. | |
| 681 | Breakwater | Fish. | 105 feet | A. | |
| 160 | Brown, Albert | Str. | 103 feet | A. | |
| 172 | Caliph | M. B. | 60 feet | B. | |
| 1217 | DeGrasse | S. S. | 81 feet 2 inches | A. | |
| 639 | Dianthus | M. B. | 65 feet | B. | |
| 612 | Dohema, jr | M. B. | 57 feet | B. | |
| 372 | Drusilla | M. B. | 83 feet 9 inches | B. | |
| 549 | Edorea | M. yt. | 137 feet 4 inches | B. | |
| 965 | Elfin | M. B. | 50 feet 8 inches | B. | |
| 177 | Emerald | Yt. | 163 feet | B. | |
| 724 | Fearless | Fish. | 103 feet | A. | |
| 506 | Frances II. | M. B. | 45 feet | B. | |
| 682 | Garner, Mary W. | Fish. | 140 feet | A. | |
| 83 | Georgiana III. | M. yt. | 96 feet | B. | |
| | Guthrie | C. G. C. | 88 feet | | |
| 210 | *Helenita | Yt. | 187 feet | B. | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agree- ment. | Remarks. |
|-------|---------------------|--------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 125 | *High Ball..... | M. B..... | 31 feet..... | B..... | Lighthouse. Coast Guard. Ordered return |
| | Idealia..... | M. yt..... | 75 feet 8 inches..... | B..... | |
| | Iris..... | C. G. C..... | 150 feet 3 inches..... | | |
| | Itasca..... | C. G. C..... | 189 feet 6 inches..... | | |
| 1188 | Jane II..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | B..... | |
| 602 | Juniata..... | M. B..... | 139 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| USS | Kingfisher..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 594 | Kuwana II..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| 683 | McKeever Bros..... | Fish..... | 136 feet..... | A..... | |
| 684 | McKeever, E. J..... | Fish..... | 136 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1169 | McKeever, S. W..... | Fish..... | 136 feet..... | A..... | Coast Guard. |
| 870 | Margo..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| 591 | Miramar..... | M. yt..... | 115 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Modock..... | Tug..... | 101 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Morrill..... | C. G. C..... | 145 feet..... | | |
| 204 | Nirvana..... | Cruiser..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| 167 | Owera..... | S. yt..... | 195 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1072 | Peggy..... | M. B..... | 30 feet..... | B..... | |
| 648 | Pierce, G. F..... | S. S..... | 129 feet 8 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Samoset..... | Tug..... | 102 feet 7 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1427 | Sappho..... | S. S..... | 180 feet..... | C..... | |
| 70 | Shrewsbury..... | M. B..... | 98 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2575 | Springfield..... | S. S..... | 127 feet..... | C..... | |
| 685 | Sussex..... | Fish..... | 74 feet 2 inches..... | A..... | |
| 510 | Suzanne..... | Yt..... | 110 feet..... | B..... | |
| 104 | Sybilla III..... | Yt..... | 120 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Starboard Unit..... | M. B..... | 112 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 256..... | M. B..... | 69 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 406..... | M. B..... | 72 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 467..... | Fish..... | 140 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 544..... | M. B..... | 58 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 545..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 705..... | M. B..... | 65 feet 4 inches..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 871..... | M. B..... | 53 feet..... | B..... | |
| 5 | Tacony..... | M. B..... | 82 feet..... | B..... | |
| USS | Teal..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1113 | Tinicum..... | S. S..... | 151 feet..... | C..... | |
| 3312 | Triton..... | Tug..... | 84 feet 8 inches..... | C..... | |
| 686 | Vester..... | Fish..... | 96 feet 4 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1995 | Victor..... | M. B..... | 74 feet..... | B..... | |
| 2266 | Visitor..... | Tug..... | 63 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | Lighthouse. |
| 1192 | Vitesse..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Woodbine..... | L. H. T..... | 95 feet..... | | |
| 61 | Zenith..... | M. B..... | 73 feet 3 inches..... | B..... | |

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|------|--------------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|
| 3057 | Advance..... | Tug..... | 107 feet 5 inches..... | A..... | Lighthouse. C. C. of Balt., |
| 268 | Almax II..... | M. B..... | 56 feet 9 inches..... | A..... | |
| 693 | Amagansett..... | Menhdn..... | 123 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | |
| 1203 | Anderson, M..... | M. B..... | 36 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1206 | Anna Belle..... | M. B..... | 37 feet 9 inches..... | C..... | |
| | Arbutus..... | L. H. T..... | 145 feet..... | | |
| 1283 | Archer, Daisy..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Avocet..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1182 | *Atlantic..... | M. B..... | 49 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| 484 | Babette II..... | M. B..... | 52 feet..... | B..... | Coast and Survey. |
| | Bache..... | S. V..... | 153 feet 2 inches..... | | |
| 963 | Bagheera..... | M. B..... | 66 feet..... | B..... | C. C. of Balt. i |
| 1292 | Baughman..... | Sch..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| 323 | Bellows..... | Men..... | 162 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2817 | Bie & Schiott..... | M. B..... | 64 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Bobby..... | M. B..... | 30 feet..... | | F. C. Bd. of N Washington Yard. |
| 1513 | Bobylu..... | M. B..... | 35 feet 10 inches..... | B..... | |
| 1708 | Boothbay..... | S. S..... | 126 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | Ord. returned C. C. of Balt., |
| | Bouker, No. 2..... | Tug..... | 103 feet..... | A..... | |
| 327 | Bradley, G. H..... | Men..... | 104 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Briggs, Jerry..... | M. B..... | | | |
| | Brant..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Blanche..... | Tug..... | 80 feet..... | C..... | |
| 2274 | Calvert..... | M. B..... | 44 feet..... | B..... | |
| 703 | Caprice..... | M. B..... | 45 feet 10 inches..... | B..... | |
| | Captain Dud..... | Ltr..... | 90 feet..... | A..... | |
| 525 | Chilhowee..... | Yt..... | 125 feet..... | A..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------|-------------------------|
| 42 | Chipper..... | M. B..... | 57 feet 9 inches..... | B..... | Returned Nov. 12, 1918. |
| 48 | Clarke, J. A..... | Tug..... | 90 feet..... | C..... | |
| 44 | Clarke, Jos M..... | Tug..... | 86 feet 2 inches..... | C..... | |
| 179 | Clio..... | Str..... | 120 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Columbine..... | L. H. T..... | 145 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Conwell, F. G..... | Tug..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| 8 | Cosy..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B., No. 11..... | T. B..... | 157 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B., No. 12..... | T. B..... | 157 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. T. B., No. 4..... | T. B..... | 147 feet..... | A..... | |
| 75 | *Credenda..... | Tug..... | 57 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| | Daisy..... | Lch..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| 14 | Davis, M. M..... | Men..... | 150 feet..... | A..... | |
| 231 | Dempsey, L. A..... | Tug..... | 62 feet 5 inches..... | C..... | |
| 21 | Dennis, E. B..... | Menhdn..... | 110 feet..... | C..... | |
| 78 | Desire..... | M. B..... | 90 feet..... | B..... | |
| 130 | Dorchester..... | Sch..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | |
| 139 | Dorothy..... | M. B..... | 41 feet..... | B..... | |
| 46 | Elee..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | German. | |
| 92 | Elizabeth..... | M. B..... | 53 feet 1 inch..... | A..... | C. C. of Balt., O. R. |
| | Emily B..... | Tug..... | 50 feet..... | C..... | |
| 23 | Emma..... | M. B..... | 42 feet..... | C..... | |
| 298 | Erickson, A. H..... | Tug..... | 68 feet..... | C..... | |
| 43 | Euphane, Helen..... | Menhdn..... | 120 feet..... | A..... | |
| 71 | Fantana..... | M. B..... | 72 feet..... | B..... | |
| 130 | Fli Hawk..... | M. B..... | 74 feet 7 inches..... | B..... | |
| 133 | Folly..... | Sch..... | 64 feet..... | B..... | |
| 80 | Froehlich, E. M..... | ven..... | 138 feet..... | A..... | |
| 135 | Frolic..... | Sch..... | 62 feet..... | B..... | |
| 14 | Gladiola..... | M. B..... | 68 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | Do. |
| | Gladiator..... | Tug..... | 90 feet..... | C..... | |
| 271 | Gray, Carl R..... | Tug..... | 88 feet 9 inches..... | A..... | |
| 139 | Grayling..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| 181 | Gretchen..... | M. B..... | 54 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Gresham..... | C. G. C..... | 188 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| 32 | Grey Fox..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Gratitude..... | Tug..... | 140 feet..... | C..... | |
| 210 | *Green, Howard..... | Tug..... | 92 feet..... | A..... | |
| 137 | *Goucher, S. M..... | Tug..... | 65 feet..... | C..... | |
| 188 | Gleam..... | Lch..... | 30 feet..... | A..... | Wash. Navy Yard. |
| | Hampton..... | Tug..... | 90 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1414 | Hayward, Eliza..... | Sloop..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| 137 | Hazel..... | M. B..... | 44 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Hercules..... | Tug..... | 105 feet..... | A..... | |
| 183 | Hiawatha..... | M. yt..... | 89 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Holly..... | Lht..... | 167 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Hopkins..... | Destr..... | 245 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Hull..... | Destr..... | 245 feet..... | A..... | |
| 234 | Hurst, Floyd..... | M. B..... | 48 feet 8 inches..... | A..... | |
| 234 | *Hopkins..... | M. B..... | 62 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | C. E. of Balt., O. R. |
| 136 | *Hurst..... | M. B..... | 62 feet 7 inches..... | A..... | |
| 119 | Idylcase..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Iro (ex Iroquois)..... | Str..... | 200 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1861 | Isle of Surrey..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | C..... | |
| 432 | Itty E..... | M. B..... | 25 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1439 | Jackson, Nellie..... | Sch..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Jessamine..... | L. H. T..... | 146 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1476 | Jones, Bessie..... | Sch..... | 62 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Jones, Paul..... | Destr..... | 249 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Juniper..... | L. H. T..... | 90 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| 429 | *James, W. T..... | Menhdn..... | 150 feet..... | A..... | |
| 182 | *Joe Digger..... | Brg..... | 85 feet 6 inches..... | C..... | |
| 49 | Kajeruna..... | S. yt..... | 153 feet..... | B..... | |
| 439 | Kanised..... | M. yt..... | 100 feet..... | A..... | |
| 200 | Karibou..... | M. B..... | 66 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Laurel..... | L. H. T..... | 110 feet..... | A..... | |
| 399 | Legonia..... | S. yt..... | 140 feet 4 inches..... | A..... | |
| 732 | Letter B..... | M. B..... | 32 feet..... | B..... | |
| 646 | Luce Brothers..... | Menhdn..... | 122 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1325 | McLane..... | Str..... | 120 feet..... | B..... | C. C. of Balt., O. R. |
| 612 | McNeal, H. G..... | Menhdn..... | 140 feet..... | A..... | |
| 3061 | Majestic..... | Str..... | 150 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Malvern..... | Tug..... | 65 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Maple..... | L. H. T..... | 155 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1225 | Mason, Chas. B..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Massasoit..... | Tug..... | 89 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1009 | Maud..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Mayrant..... | Destr..... | 293 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 647 | Menhaden..... | Menhdn..... | 100 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Moore..... | Tug..... | 96 feet..... | C..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------------|------------|----------------------------------|
| 2047 | Moosehead..... | S. S..... | 185 feet 3 inches... | A..... | Washington Yard. |
| | Murray, J. W..... | Tug..... | 60 feet..... | C..... | C. C. of Balt., Do. |
| 1438 | Murray..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1288 | Music..... | M. B..... | 41 feet..... | B..... | |
| 3289 | Myrtle..... | M. B..... | 40 feet 8 inches... | B..... | |
| 1202 | *Maggie..... | Hs. bt..... | 164 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1305 | *Mercy..... | S. S..... | 429 feet 10 inches... | A..... | Do. |
| 3028 | Nerita..... | M. B..... | 60 feet 6 inches... | A..... | |
| 570 | Natick..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1436 | Nettle..... | M. B..... | 41 feet..... | B..... | |
| 370 | Nonpareil..... | Tug..... | 101 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2377 | Olsen, John G..... | Tug..... | 65 feet..... | C..... | Lighthouse. |
| 1224 | Onset..... | M. B..... | 14 feet..... | C..... | |
| 311 | Onward..... | S. yt..... | 140 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Orchid..... | L. H. T..... | 177 feet..... | | |
| | Owl..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches... | A..... | |
| 319 | Palmer..... | Fish..... | 135 feet..... | A..... | Coast Guard. |
| | Pamlico..... | C. G. C..... | 158 feet..... | | |
| 1219 | Pearl..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | |
| 978 | Phillips, D. K..... | Menhdn..... | 135 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1204 | Pilgrim..... | M. B..... | 100 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Pompano..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | C..... | Wrecked. |
| 1004 | Qui Vive..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Rail..... | M. S..... | 187 feet 10 inches... | A..... | |
| 1083 | Regis II..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | |
| 869 | Reynor & Sons..... | M. B..... | 64 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Riverside..... | Str..... | 174 feet..... | C..... | Coast Guard. C. C. of Balt., Do. |
| | Rocket..... | Tug..... | 95 feet..... | A..... | |
| 3070 | Rosedale..... | Str..... | 150 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1211 | Ross Lucille..... | Tug..... | 71 feet 7 inches... | C..... | |
| 712 | Rush..... | M. B..... | 36 feet 6 inches... | A..... | |
| 3209 | *Rescue..... | Tug..... | 160 feet..... | A..... | Do. |
| 1109 | Sayona II..... | M. B..... | 60 feet 6 inches... | B..... | |
| | Scandinavia..... | M. B..... | 61 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1063 | Secret..... | M. B..... | 37 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Seminole..... | C. G. C..... | 188 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1458 | Smith, A. B..... | Sch..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | C. C. of Md. |
| 1291 | Snark..... | M. Yt..... | 62 feet 4 inches... | B..... | |
| 2162 | Somerset..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 62..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 223..... | M. B..... | 83 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 328..... | Menhdn..... | 128 feet..... | A..... | At Annapolis. |
| | S. P. No. 426..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | C..... | |
| | S. P. No. 584..... | M. B..... | 30 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 747..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 789..... | M. B..... | 93 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 810..... | M. Lch..... | 75 feet..... | B..... | Annapolis ferry |
| | S. P. No. 1182..... | M. B..... | 49 feet 6 inches... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1209..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1212..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1260..... | M. B..... | 63 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1287..... | Sch..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | Do. |
| | S. P. No. 1355..... | M. B..... | 35 feet 6 inches... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1764..... | M. B..... | 35 feet 3 inches... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1965..... | M. B..... | 61 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 2440..... | M. B..... | 36 feet 6 inches... | C..... | |
| 3231 | Sparrow II..... | M. B..... | 51 feet..... | A..... | C. C. of Md. |
| 336 | Spartan..... | Tug..... | 109 feet..... | C..... | |
| 267 | S. T. No. 7..... | Tug..... | 98 feet..... | C..... | |
| 1457 | St. Marys..... | M. B..... | 49 feet..... | B..... | |
| 332 | Struven..... | Menhdn..... | 152 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Sylvia..... | S. Yt..... | 124 feet..... | A..... | At Annapolis. |
| | *Severn..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | | |
| 2684 | *Swansboro..... | Brg..... | 120 feet 5 inches... | A..... | |
| 2714 | *Snapper..... | M. B..... | 84 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2079 | *Shady Side..... | S. S..... | 85 feet..... | A..... | |
| 933 | Teaser..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | Annapolis ferry |
| | Tioga..... | Tug..... | 72 feet 7 inches... | A..... | |
| | Toad..... | M. B..... | 18 feet..... | | |
| 734 | Vega..... | Syt..... | 175 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Virginia..... | Tug..... | 107 feet..... | C..... | |
| 3361 | Vaud J..... | M. B..... | 101 feet..... | A..... | At Annapolis. |
| 3314 | Viking..... | M. B..... | 42 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Wahneta..... | Tug..... | 100 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Wasp..... | Conv. yt..... | 180 feet..... | A..... | |
| 562 | Wild Goose I..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2129 | Willoughby..... | Str..... | 115 feet..... | C..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|-------------------|----------|--------------------|------------|--------------|
| 470 | Adams, Walter | Traw | 137 feet | C | Coast Guard. |
| 151 | Alaska | Traw | 141 feet | C | |
| 147 | Apache II | C. G. C. | 175 feet | B | |
| 147 | Arval | M. B. | 75 feet | A | Lighthouse. |
| 138 | *Atlantic | S. S. | 103 feet 3 inches | B | |
| 138 | Betty Jane | M. B. | 36 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Brunswick | L. V. | 112 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Clarinda | M. B. | 98 feet | B | |
| 138 | *C. T. B. No. 1 | T. B. | 160 feet | A | |
| 138 | Courier | Lch. | 57 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Cypress | L. H. T. | 173 feet 7 inches | B | |
| 138 | Dolphin | M. B. | 42 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Dorothea | G. B. | 182 feet 4 inches | B | Do. |
| 138 | Eclipse | M. B. | 183 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Frying Pan | L. V. | 136 feet | C | |
| 138 | Inca | Tug. | 101 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Jeanette | M. B. | 49 feet 10 inches | A | |
| 138 | Katrich II | M. B. | 40 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Kite | Tug. | 78 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Lady Anne | M. B. | 65 feet | A | |
| 138 | Lighter, Wooden | Ltr. | 100 feet | B | |
| 138 | Luola | M. B. | 40 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Mangrove | L. H. T. | 165 feet | A | |
| 138 | Manito II | M. B. | 56 feet | A | |
| 138 | Marija | M. B. | 46 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | M. B. No. 104-C | M. B. | 30 feet 6 inches | A | |
| 138 | M. B. No. 468 | M. B. | 33 feet | A | |
| 138 | M. B. No. 748 | M. B. | 31 feet 3 inches | A | Do. |
| 138 | M. B. No. 749 | M. B. | 40 feet | A | |
| 138 | M. B. No. 963 | M. B. | 30 feet | A | |
| 138 | Me Too | M. B. | 50 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Miss Anne II | M. B. | 43 feet | B | |
| 138 | Miss Betsy | M. B. | 41 feet | C | |
| 138 | McCauley, Wm. F. | Tug. | 104 feet | A | Do. |
| 138 | Pelican | M. S. | 187 feet 10 inches | C | |
| 138 | *Pirate | M. B. | 42 feet 5 inches | A | |
| 138 | *Palmetto | L. H. T. | 90 feet | C | Do. |
| 138 | *Ranger | Traw | 137 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Relief | L. V. | 116 feet | B | |
| 138 | *Reposo II | Yt. | 49 feet 10 inches | A | Do. |
| 138 | Seago | Tug. | 98 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Steamer No. 875 | S. Lch. | 40 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Tocsam | M. B. | 40 feet 5 inches | B | Coast Guard. |
| 138 | Tyheo | C. G. C. | 67 feet | B | |
| 138 | *Wanderlust | M. B. | 85 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Water Lily | L. H. T. | 61 feet | B | Lighthouse. |
| 138 | *Williams, Hy. P. | S. S. | 135 feet | A | |
| 138 | *Wilrose II | M. B. | 75 feet | B | |
| 138 | *Wisoo II | M. B. | 83 feet | A | |

SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|------|----------------|---------|-------------------|---|-------------|
| 2725 | *Brown, Alex | Tug. | 90 feet | A | Lighthouse. |
| 759 | Clark, Jas. H. | Str. | 68 feet 8 inches | A | |
| 110 | Coco | M. bt. | 36 feet | A | |
| 1086 | Dohrn, Anton | M. B. | 70 feet | B | Do. |
| 685 | Cossack | M. B. | 64 feet | A | |
| 81 | Ell | M. B. | 53 feet | B | |
| 735 | Express No. 4 | M. B. | 40 feet | B | Do. |
| 437 | Grey Hound | M. B. | 39 feet 9 inches | A | |
| 1150 | Hetman | M. B. | 60 feet | A | |
| 144 | Howarda | M. B. | 69 feet | A | Lighthouse. |
| | Ivy | Lht. | 173 feet | A | |
| 220 | Katherine K. | M. B. | 55 feet | A | |
| | Lawrence | Dest. | 240 feet 5 inches | B | Do. |
| 60 | Little Al | M. B. | 56 feet | A | |
| 193 | Marguerite | M. B. | 59 feet | B | |
| 787 | Marpessa | M. B. | 50 feet | A | Do. |
| | *McDougall | Tow bt. | 170 feet | A | |
| 75 | Ora | M. B. | 55 feet | A | |
| 101 | Panama | M. B. | 67 feet | A | Do. |
| 45 | Patrol No. 1 | M. B. | 40 feet | B | |
| 409 | Patrol No. 2 | M. B. | 40 feet | A | |
| | Peoria | Tug. | 131 feet | A | Do. |
| | Perry | Dest. | 245 feet | A | |
| 291 | Pope Mary | M. B. | 51 feet 6 inches | A | |
| 1151 | Russ | M. B. | 60 feet | A | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agree- ment. | Remarks |
|-------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| 1012 | Satellite..... | M. B..... | 77 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | Owner refused |
| 2365 | Sea Hawk..... | M. B..... | 62 feet 4 inches..... | A..... | |
| 102 | Shadow III..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| | Snowdrop..... | Lht..... | 69 feet..... | | |
| 407 | Speedway..... | M. B..... | 54 feet..... | B..... | |
| 470 | St. Sebastian..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 24..... | M. B..... | 43 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 90..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 103..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 263..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 471..... | M. B..... | 42 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 635..... | M. B..... | 53 feet 8 inches..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 744..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | Coast Guard. |
| 122 | *Traveler..... | M. B..... | 50 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| 126 | Tanguingul..... | M. B..... | 63 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| | Tuscarora..... | C. G. C..... | 178 feet..... | | |
| 1258 | Velocipede..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1795 | War Bug..... | M. B..... | 62 feet 4 inches..... | A..... | |
| 106 | Zigzag..... | M. B..... | 44 feet..... | A..... | |
| 93 | Zumbrota..... | M. B..... | 70 feet..... | A..... | |

EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|-------|----------------------|----------------|------------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | Alert..... | Sch..... | 60 feet..... | | Coast Guard. |
| 729 | Apache..... | M. B..... | 62 feet 4 inches..... | A..... | |
| USS | Asp..... | M. B..... | 72 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. Coast Guard. |
| 946 | Augusta..... | Yt..... | 98 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1149 | Barnette..... | Tug..... | 111 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Camellia..... | L. H. T..... | 106 feet..... | | |
| | Commanche..... | C. G. C..... | 160 feet..... | | |
| | Cometa..... | M. B..... | 24 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1425 | Commodore..... | M. B..... | 63 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| 938 | Corinthia..... | Yt..... | 80 feet..... | B..... | |
| USS | C. T. B. No. 9..... | T. B..... | 153 feet..... | A..... | |
| 3158 | Dantzler, B. H..... | Tug..... | 97 feet..... | A..... | |
| 109 | Elmasada..... | M. B..... | 67 feet..... | A..... | Do. |
| 292 | Glendoveer..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | |
| 3104 | Hudson, Ashur J..... | Tug..... | 104 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1243 | Josephine..... | M. B..... | 82 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1284 | Kangaroo..... | M. B..... | 62 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Lady Doris..... | M. B..... | 26 feet..... | B..... | |
| | May..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | B..... | |
| 277 | Najelda..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Penrose..... | C. G. sch..... | 62 feet..... | | |
| 281 | Quicksilver..... | M. B..... | 51 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. Sunk. |
| 597 | Rickwood..... | M. B..... | 70 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1047 | Roamer..... | Yt..... | 83 feet..... | A..... | |
| 915 | Shirin..... | Yt..... | 107 feet..... | A..... | |
| 822 | Sister..... | Sch..... | 72 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Sunflower..... | L. H. T..... | 163 feet 6 inches..... | | |
| | S. P. No. 672..... | M. B..... | 76 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 912..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1092..... | M. B..... | 54 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1390 | Underwriter..... | Tug..... | 112 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1114 | Vision..... | M. B..... | 67 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | Coast Guard. |
| 448 | Wendy..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Zillah..... | M. B..... | 54 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Davey..... | Tug..... | 92 feet 6 inches..... | | |

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH DISTRICTS.

| | | | | | |
|-------|------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------|-----------------------------|
| | Active..... | C. G. C..... | 36 feet 3 inches..... | | Coast Guard. |
| | Advance..... | C. G. C..... | 50 feet 2 inches..... | | Do. |
| 218 | Althea..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | Lighthouse. |
| | Amaranth..... | L. H. T..... | 166 feet..... | | |
| 197 | Arroyo..... | M. B..... | 48 feet..... | A-F-3 | Transferred to district. |
| | Aspen..... | L. H. T..... | 126 feet..... | | Lighthouse. |
| 40 | Atlantis..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | A..... | Transferred to district. |
| 382 | Avis..... | M. B..... | 52 feet..... | B..... | Do. |
| 451 | Andwin..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | Do. |
| 1166 | Bab..... | Lch..... | 35 feet..... | A-F-3 | |
| 623 | Betty M III..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH DISTRICTS—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agreement. | Remarks. |
|-------|-------------------------|----------------|-------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| | Clover..... | L. H. T..... | 93 feet..... | | Lighthouse. |
| 232 | Cleo..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| 84 | Coyote..... | M. B..... | 70 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Crocus..... | L. H. T..... | 165 feet..... | | Do. |
| 331 | Dickey..... | M. B..... | 46 feet..... | B..... | |
| 182 | Doloma..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| 88 | Gopher..... | Sch..... | 175 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Ensign..... | M. B..... | 68 feet..... | B..... | Transferred to third district. |
| 88 | Essex..... | G. B..... | 185 feet..... | A..... | |
| 88 | Hawk..... | Yt..... | 147 feet..... | A..... | |
| 216 | Hyac..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Hyacinth..... | L. H. T..... | 150 feet 8 inches..... | | Lighthouse. |
| 1011 | Geraldine..... | M. B..... | 67 feet..... | B..... | |
| 388 | Ionita..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | A..... | |
| 492 | Jaydee III..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | B..... | |
| 245 | Josephine J. II..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| 219 | Killarney..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Marigold..... | L. H. T..... | 160 feet..... | | Do. |
| 1741 | Marjorie M..... | Lch..... | 32 feet..... | B..... | |
| 440 | Mikawe..... | M. B..... | 55 feet..... | A..... | |
| 212 | Minnemac II..... | M. B..... | 78 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1711 | Miss Toledo..... | M. B..... | 60 feet..... | B..... | |
| | *Mona II..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Motor Boat No. 752..... | C. G. Lch..... | 28 feet 8 inches..... | | Coast Guard. |
| 128 | Ono..... | M. B..... | 45 feet..... | A..... | |
| 310 | Raboco..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1744 | Sandoval..... | G. B..... | 110 feet..... | A..... | |
| 305 | Seatag..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Search..... | C. G. C..... | 40 feet 9 inches..... | | Coast Guard. |
| | Sentinel..... | C. G. C..... | 45 feet 7 inches..... | | Do. |
| 1788 | Steamer No. 567..... | M. B..... | 34 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Sumac..... | L. H. T..... | 160 feet..... | | Lighthouse. |
| | S. P. No. 246..... | M. B..... | 80 feet 6 inches..... | B..... | |
| | S. P. No. 269..... | M. B..... | 58 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 274..... | M. B..... | 98 feet..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 438..... | M. B..... | 90 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| | S. P. No. 706..... | M. B..... | 42 feet..... | A..... | Transferred to third district. |
| | S. P. No. 892..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | B..... | |
| 360 | Terrier..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | B..... | |
| 379 | Verdi..... | M. B..... | 75 feet..... | A-F-3..... | Transferred to third district for return to owner. |
| | Vigilant..... | C. G. C..... | 45 feet..... | | Coast Guard. |
| 361 | Voyager..... | M. B..... | 52 feet..... | A..... | |
| 450 | Weepoose..... | M. B..... | 59 feet..... | A..... | Transferred to third district. |
| 1175 | Welcome..... | M. B..... | 40 feet..... | B..... | |
| 221 | Whirlwind..... | M. B..... | 117 feet..... | A..... | Do. |
| 1788 | Wolverine..... | G. B..... | 164 feet 11 inches..... | A..... | |
| 1788 | Yantic..... | G. B..... | 180 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1010 | Yarrow..... | M. B..... | 65 feet..... | B..... | |

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|------|---------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------|--------|----------------------|
| 751 | Albacore..... | M. B..... | 50 feet 8 inches..... | B..... | |
| 752 | Arvilla..... | M. B..... | 46 feet..... | B..... | |
| | Azalea..... | Cruiser..... | 61 feet..... | | Immigration Service. |
| NYD | Admiral Glass..... | S. S..... | 85 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1668 | Barge..... | Brg..... | 40 feet..... | B..... | |
| 3234 | Browning, Ellen..... | M. B..... | 23 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Bear..... | C. G. C..... | 195 feet..... | | Coast Guard. |
| 1105 | Caroline..... | M. B..... | 42 feet 5 inches..... | B..... | |
| NYD | Castro..... | S. S..... | 79 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1015 | *Challenge..... | Tug..... | 122 feet..... | A..... | |
| NYD | Dart..... | Ferry..... | 71 feet 10 inches..... | A..... | |
| 776 | Ellington..... | M. B..... | 61 feet..... | | Bureau Immigration. |
| | Golden Gate..... | S. S..... | 103 feet 8 inches..... | | Coast Guard. |
| | Hartley..... | St. sch..... | 62 feet..... | | Do. |
| 1370 | House-Boat A-1..... | Hse. bt..... | 23 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Intrepid..... | Slg. ves..... | 176 feet 5 inches..... | A..... | |
| NYD | Lively..... | Tug..... | 107 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Lookout & Signal Sta. Breakwater..... | | | | |
| NYD | Leslie..... | Fire bt..... | 75 feet..... | A..... | |

List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

| S. P. | Name. | Type. | Length. | Agree- ment. | Remarks. |
|-------|----------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | Madrono..... | L. H. T..... | 164 feet..... | | Lighthouse. |
| 2225 | Navigator..... | Tug..... | 134 feet 3 inches..... | A..... | |
| 756 | Normannia..... | M. B..... | 42 feet..... | B..... | |
| NYD | Pinafore..... | Ferry..... | 45 feet..... | A..... | |
| 757 | Rosa..... | M. B..... | 48 feet..... | B..... | |
| 180 | Sentinel..... | M. B..... | 64 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Sequoia..... | L. H. T..... | 174 feet..... | | Do. |
| USS | Tillamook..... | Tug..... | 122 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| USS | Unadilla..... | Tug..... | 110 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Unalga..... | C. G. C..... | 190 feet..... | | Coast Guard. |
| 519 | Vergana..... | S. yt..... | 125 feet 7 inches..... | A..... | |
| NYD | Vigilant..... | Tug..... | 115 feet..... | A..... | |
| NYD | Wave..... | Mtr. dry..... | 28 feet..... | ?..... | |

THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|
| | Arcata..... | C. G. C..... | 85 feet..... | | Coast Guard. |
| | C 7 B No. 7..... | T. B..... | 198 feet 5 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Explorer..... | C. & Geo. Ves..... | 138 feet..... | | Coast and Geodetic Survey. |
| | Forward..... | C. & Geo. Ves..... | 163 feet..... | | Do. |
| | Guard..... | C. G. C..... | 67 feet 5 inches..... | | Coast Guard. |
| 181 | Helori..... | M. B..... | 98 feet..... | A..... | |
| 260 | Olympia..... | Conv. yt..... | 65 feet..... | A..... | |
| 1138 | Oneonta..... | Tug..... | 118 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Rose..... | L. H. T..... | 127 feet 5 inches..... | | Lighthouse. |
| | Roosevelt..... | Str..... | 160 feet..... | | Bureau of Fisheries. |
| 1352 | San Juan..... | S. S..... | 128 feet..... | C..... | |
| 301 | San Souci II..... | M. B..... | 50 feet..... | B..... | |
| 1351 | Star No. 1..... | Whaler..... | 116 feet..... | C..... | |
| | Scout..... | C. G. C..... | 62 feet 5 inches..... | | Coast Guard. |
| | S. P. No. 1078..... | Tug..... | 86 feet 5 inches..... | C..... | |
| | S. P. No. 1290..... | M. B..... | 127 feet..... | B..... | |
| | *Falcon..... | M. B..... | 85 feet..... | C..... | |
| | *Fern..... | L. H. T..... | 98 feet 4 inches..... | | Lighthouse. |
| | *Heather..... | L. H. T..... | 165 feet..... | | Do. |
| | *Manzanita..... | L. H. T..... | 174 feet..... | | Do. |

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|--|---------------|--------------|------------------------|--------|-------------|
| | Fortune..... | Tug..... | 137 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Hermes..... | | 97 feet 6 inches..... | | Ex-German. |
| | Kukul..... | L. H. T..... | 190 feet..... | | Lighthouse. |
| | Monterey..... | Montr..... | 256 feet..... | A..... | |
| | Navajo..... | Tug..... | 141 feet 4 inches..... | A..... | |
| | Samoa..... | | | | Ex-German. |

FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

| | | | | | |
|------|-------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|--------|------------------------|
| | Chame..... | Tug..... | 130 feet..... | | Custody Rec. Pan. |
| | Clapet No. 4..... | Conv. scow..... | 130 feet..... | A..... | |
| | C. B. T. No. 5..... | T. B..... | 213 feet 6 inches..... | A..... | |
| | DeLenseps..... | Tug..... | 82 feet..... | | Loaned by Pan. Can. |
| 1841 | Herreshoff No. 306..... | St. yt..... | 114 feet..... | A..... | |
| 2232 | Herreshoff No. 308..... | St. yt..... | 112 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Goodwill..... | Sch..... | 35 feet..... | | Pan. Can. |
| | Mariner..... | Tug..... | 150 feet..... | | Custody Rec. Pan. Can. |
| | Pequeni..... | Sch..... | 68 feet..... | | Pan. Can. |
| | Vedette..... | Sch..... | 32 feet..... | | Do. |
| | *St. Launch 2224..... | Sch..... | 40 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *M. B. 3437..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *Mtr. dory 3004..... | M. B..... | 21 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *M. B. 2007..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | A..... | |
| | *M. B. 1302..... | M. B..... | 35 feet..... | A..... | |

Capt. PRATT. We now come to a series of plans in the regulating of estimates that were made—you must remember we had very little time to work and commit ourselves much to writing. The

real thing which was desired was the decision, and opportunity for the secretary and the chief of naval operations to look at decisions and not be involved in a mass of reasoning about the decisions, so that they could make quick decisions. I wrote these myself, but I am sorry to say that, being very careless, I have not placed dates on them.

I wish especially to invite your attention to that. I do know, however, that they took place between the time I went to the office in the first part of February, and when I became aid for operations in June, and I know very well, too, when most of them took place previous to the war or when we came in. Some of them were before and some of them after.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case will you give the estimate of the date as near as you can get at it?

Capt. PRATT. I will try to do it as near as I can. This plan is as follows [reading]:

PLAN—MISSION TO RENDER THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SUPPORT NOW TO THE ENEMIES OF THE CENTRAL POWERS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

War being declared, the third general mission becomes the "immediate mission."

Third. Immediate mission: To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers.

Reconciling the various decisions arrived at from the different estimates of the situation (general), the following "decisions" to the immediate mission are arrived at. These decisions serve as the "missions" to further estimates and more detailed "plans" for each decision of the "immediate mission."

Decisions to (third) immediate mission: Action taken.

1. Mobilize all naval districts.
2. Mobilize all naval vessels.
3. Organize for antisubmarine warfare.

a. Organize, inaugurate policy and make plans for the operation and administration of the naval districts.

b. Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval force shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

c. Make estimate of the best methods for cooperating the present naval and military forces to meet the immediate needs caused by the antisubmarine war.

d. Adopt the policy that our merchant shipping shall be protected against antisubmarine warfare to the utmost, and its aims directed toward furthering the immediate needs of our cooperating allies, and our own future needs.

e. Inaugurate a naval building policy which will best meet our immediate needs.

f. Inaugurate a financial policy with regard to the moneys already appropriated by Congress, and not yet specifically allotted, together with estimates of further moneys that may be needed.

g. Make a survey of our general diplomatic situation, with special reference to naval and immediate needs.

h. Make a survey of general financial and industrial situation with view to organizing same to meet immediate needs.

i. Outline the general scheme whereby we may best cooperate with our allies.

j. Make a general military survey and estimate of the immediate situation.

k. Formulate a policy whereby the proper necessary news may reach the public, in order that its interest may be kept up, and morale stimulated, without disclosing important military secrets.

l. Direct the policy of our naval bases as to reserve, repair, operating, and supply facilities to meet the following conditions (1) the needs of the immediate situation, 2) our future needs.

m. Thoroughly organize the naval general staff for the purposes of advising, planning, communicating, supplying, repairing, and operating all naval facilities to meet 1) the immediate situation, (2) the future needs.

(n) Take steps to overcome the present shortage in personnel of the Navy, in officers and enlisted men, and prepare plans to establish a reserve to fill casualties which might be caused (1) by the immediate situation, (2) by the most probable future situations.

(o) Inaugurate a system of training for our naval forces, active and reserve, to meet (1) the immediate situation, (2) the most probable future situation.

(p) Establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.

(q) Establish the policy to be adopted toward the German vessels now lying in our ports:

(a) As regards the vessels having a national character.

(b) As regards the interned merchant vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that an operational plan?

Capt. PRATT. No; it is operational to a certain extent, but it is more basic than anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. That was drawn by you in the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I wrote it myself. Here is another plan. [Reading:]

Plan. Mission: Make a general estimate of the character of service which will be required of our naval forces in order to serve best our own interests and to cooperate with our allies.

This, you must realize, was before we went into the war, but while the patrol system was so in vogue with Great Britain, and to establish a patrol, I wish to state now, is one of the best ways to get our various craft coming from all sources; the yachts we would take in from outside sources, and all the rest, thoroughly organized in the quickest way before they were sent abroad; so that just as soon as the idea germinated that we were to drop the patrol and send forces abroad we had forces already organized and trained, ready to go abroad and do the work, which would not have been the case had we not had an organization of this sort established to conduct this particular section of work; and the coast patrol which was adopted on our coast was not a handicap to the vessels that went abroad. On the contrary, it served as very useful training for the vessels and the men, particularly those of the reserves who came in later, and it allowed them to know something of the work that they would be called upon to conduct abroad.

This plan is as follows. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington, D. C.

Mission.—Make a general estimate of the character of service which will be required of our naval forces in order to serve best our own interests and to cooperate with our allies.

Following an estimate of the situation, the below conclusions were reached:

CONCLUSIONS.

1. That there will be required of the Navy the following service tasks: (a) The service of security or defense, (b) the service of information, (c) an active offensive against the enemy, (d) a reserve of force ready to assume the offensive when the opportunity arrives, and (e) the service of logistics.

2. To meet the above service tasks the following forces are assigned or created (a) District coast defense, (1) to protect the coast against all enemy efforts, (2) to protect logistics within the area of its jurisdiction, and (3) conducted by the water craft and land forces assigned for this purpose; (b) patrol and escort, (1) to assist logistics beyond the limits of the coast defense districts; (2) to patrol for information, (3) to operate actively against S. M. and their bases, and (4) conducted by yachts, destroyers,

cruisers, small Government vessels; (c) information forces, (1) to assist all services—offensive, reserve, logistics, defensive, and (2) conducted by communication service, (3) N. I. service, appropriate patrol and escort force, district scouting force, and appropriate district coast defense force; (d) active offensive, (1) to operate against the enemy S. M. and bases and raiders, (2) conducted against S. M. and bases by appropriate district forces, patrol force, submarines, destroyers, and (3) conducted against raiders by cruisers; (e) reserve, (1) to train to be and to hold themselves in readiness to act offensively against the enemy; (2) conducted by battleships, major ships not in active use, any fleet auxiliaries needed to further fleet training, that portion of the train needed in the service of fleet logistics; (3) to be effected at such places as—(a) the fleet may be on the strategic offensive, and (b) the fleet may be mobile; (f) logistics, (1) to carry supplies to the Allies, (2) conducted by armed merchant ships, unarmed merchant ships, and national vessels; (3) to carry supplies to national forces, and (4) conducted by the train.

Here is another plan [reading extracts]:

Mission.—Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

Decision...... (3)..... B..... immediate mission.

Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

(3)..... B..... immediate mission.

Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

Estimates of the general situation bearing on the above mission were submitted by the General Board, Commander Schofield, Capt. Magruder, Commander Sterling, Capt. Pratt, Capt. Plunkett. Estimates of local problems involving the Atlantic coast, the Caribbean area, the New York area were submitted by Commander Lanning and some of the above-mentioned officers. Reconciling the various estimates, the following decisions were reached.

I will tell you here was a case where the decision was countermanded by Admiral Benson directly.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you have given the date of that.

Capt. PRATT. I have not the date, but it was prior to the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the probable date?

Capt. PRATT. It was in February or March. It was a very serious oversight on my part not to date these plans, but not being a stenographer and typewriter I made that omission.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case I wish you would say whether it was prior to the war or not.

Capt. PRATT. This was prior to the war. [Reading:]

DECISIONS.

1. Send battleships and armored cruisers to Pacific in order to—
 - (a) Remove those types that can have no immediate military purpose as far from the submarine menace as possible.
 - (b) Place them where their potential as a fleet in being might be used to the best political advantage.
 - (c) Relieve vessels in the Pacific needed in the Atlantic to cope with the immediate situation.
 - (d) Allow battleships a free drill ground for bringing and keeping ships up to maximum efficiency.
 - (e) Remove the bad morale effect of practically interning our own battleships in the Atlantic seaports.
 - (f) Avoid the congestion at our navy yards consequent to preparing our coast defense districts, our gunboats and small cruisers, our patrol fleet, and destroyers for an active campaign in the Atlantic.
 - (g) Free certain auxiliary types, especially the destroyers and mining vessels, from their duty of guarding the fleet, and thus permitting them to operate actively against the enemy.

2. Send the fleet train, or such portions of it as are necessary to subsist the battleships, to the Pacific.
3. Send the fleet submarines with the battleships to the Pacific.
4. Make the necessary arrangements for the navy yards on the west coast to undertake all the repairs to the battleships and armored cruisers it is possible for them to handle.
5. Retain all the other submarines in their present separate organization, and not under the coast defense districts.
6. Assign to the naval craft in the fitting out and repair work at the yards, necessary to put these craft in a position to cope with the immediate submarine warfare, the following order of precedence of work:
 - (a) Destroyers.
 - (b) Small craft, gunboats, cruisers.
 - (c) Submarines.
 - (d) Battleships.
 - (e) Fleet auxiliaries.
7. Send the fleet mining force to the coast defense districts to form the nucleus of the sweeping forces operating from there.
8. Distribute the Atlantic coast defense battleship division, to act as training ships for the naval personnel, mobilized in that district.
9. Organize the destroyer and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district forces in combatting the present submarine warfare.
10. Draw up a general plan of operations for this patrol force.
11. Issue to the patrol force the manual on submarine warfare prepared for the naval districts.
12. When the reserve battleship forces are put in condition in accordance with (d) or paragraph (6) to have them join the main fleet.
13. Keep the main forces of the marines where they are at present needed, but be prepared to supply the ships of the patrol force operating in the Gulf and Caribbean waters with marine guards.

The idea of not having that fleet sent to the Pacific was not because in a theoretical sense it was sound, but because there might be a lowering of the morale, and therefore, even though it might cause a certain amount of congestion at the navy yards, it was deemed wisest to have the fleet come north, and the decision was made by Admiral Benson, and it was undoubtedly a sound decision; to have done that would have relieved some of the congestion of the navy yard work on this side.

The next plan, which I have marked 7, was also before the war. It is as follows:

PLANS FOR—

Decision (9).—Organize the destroyer and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district forces in combating the present submarine warfare.

Decision (10).—Draw up a general plan of operations for this patrol force.

Missions.—No. (9). Organize the destroyer and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district forces in combating the present submarine warfare. No. (10). Draw up a general plan of operations for this patrol force.

From an estimate of the situation on No. (9), prepared by Commander Schofield, the following decisions are made:

DECISIONS TO (9). (ACTION TAKEN.)

(1) To base the organization of the patrol force upon the character of the work it may be called upon to do and upon an estimate of the probable localities of its operations.

(2) To keep in mind the apparent necessity for some sort of patrol and of escort for the merchant shipping entering and leaving our principal ports, a protection which will extend beyond the limits of efficient operation of the district forces.

(3) To base the assignment of ships to the organization upon the two most probable forms of duty a patrol force would be called upon to do: (a) Off shore or sea patrol, requiring a high degree of endurance, with normal low speeds; (b) escort duty, requiring a high degree of speed and mobility, but a lesser degree of sea endurance; and (c) a certain degree of immunity from submarine attack for each class.

4) That the principal areas of operation for the patrol force will be: (a) The Boston sea area; (b) the New York sea area; (c) the Delaware capes sea area; (d) the Chesapeake capes sea area; (e) the Key West sea area; and (f) the Canal Zone sea area.

5) That the sea areas of minor importance are: (a) The Narragansett Bay sea area; (b) the Savannah and Charleston sea areas; (c) the New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, and Galveston sea areas; (d) the Mexican Gulf coast; (e) the Central American coast; (f) the Caribbean fringe of islands, and (g) the South American coast line to the Caribbean fringe.

6) On the basis of the above requirements to organize the patrol force into six squadrons of three divisions each, with six vessels to a division. Total 111 craft when fully recruited.

7) To assign to each squadron vessels of each type: (a) The low speed, high-endurance class; (b) the high speed, low-endurance class.

8) To keep similar units together in divisions to facilitate their working in harmony and to interrupt to as slight a degree as possible the present fleet organizations, from which some of the units forming the patrol force are drawn.

9) To assign competent leaders to each squadron.

10) To assign a patrol force commander for the entire force.

11) To enter the organization of the patrol force on the mobilization sheet.

From estimates of the situation based on the solution of the New York problem and the Caribbean area problem, the following decisions to (10) are arrived at:

DECISIONS TO (10). (ACTION TAKEN.)

(1) That the first best assignments of the patrol force would be as follows: (a) One squadron to the Boston sea area; (b) two squadrons to the New York sea area; (c) one squadron to Delaware Capes sea area; (d) one squadron to Chesapeake Capes sea area; (e) one squadron to Key West sea area.

(2) That the best normal position for the commander of the patrol force would be the New York sea area.

(3) That the normal line for the inshore patrol under the supervision of the coast defense districts, will extend to the 50-fathom curve.

(4) That where the water deepens to more than 50 fathoms after leaving the harbor entrances, the district patrols need not accompany, escort or patrol to a distance in excess of 45 miles, unless the waters to seaward of this limit are flanked by the mainland or are covered by a fringe of outlying islands.

(5) That the activities of the patrol forces begin where the jurisdiction of the coast defense districts cease.

(6) That the outer limits of escort and patrol, for the patrol force, will not at first extend beyond the longitude of the shoals on Georges Bank.

(7) That in the Caribbean problem, as it affects the Canal Zone, the outer limit of the most probable submarine efforts will not extend to the eastward of a line between Roncador Reef and Cartagena Harbor until the outer fringe of the Caribbean Islands is reached, when a second probable submarine area is liable to be encountered.

(8) That in the protection of shipping coming from and entering the Gulf of Mexico, a probable area of submarine operations lies in the Yucatan Channel, the Straits of Florida, and the waters between the Bahama Islands, the mainland, and Cuba.

(9) That the most probable basing spots for submarines are on the Cuban coast, the islands and reefs of the Caribbean and Gulf, the Central and South American coasts, and in the summer season the coasts of Maine and Nova Scotia.

(10) That the most probable areas of enemy submarine activities will always lie as close to the entrances and exits of the ports of shipping as the district patrol and sweeping operations render practicable.

(11) That the intensity of the submarine activities off any port will depend upon its maritime importance.

(12) That if its operations are discovered and its activities handicapped in any one area the submarine will transfer its activities to the nearest most likely area.

(13) That the probable number of enemy submarines now operating lies between 150 and 300, of which 200 is a fair probable estimate.

(14) That of this number probably not more than 75 will keep the sea at one time. That, of the 75 at sea, probably not more than 35 will ever be on this coast (including the Caribbean) at one time.

(15) For the purposes of training, and to familiarize officers with the probable situations that might arise, to submit problems to the commander of the patrol force and to his staff for solution.

The next plan, which I have marked 8, is a plan for organization of a patrol force. Admiral Wilson, before the war, organized the

patrol force and put it into effect. (That is the organization showing the ships.) It flowed automatically from the preceding estimates we had made, and this put it into effect. I submit that plan.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Capt. PRATT. He joined sometime toward the end of March, and the plan was started sometime before he joined. It was before we entered the war. I do not know the date, but I know it was before the war and at the time he came up to take command.

(That plan is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. PRATT.

[Organization of patrol force, April 1, 1917: *Olympia*, flagship; *Panther*, destroyer tender; *Dixie*, destroyer tender.]

SQUADRON 1.

Division 1:

Chester, flagship.

Des Moines (special duty, Mediterranean).

Division 2:

Smith.

Flusser.

Lamson.

Preston.

Reid.

SQUADRON 2.

Division 4:

Birmingham, flagship.

Sacramento (under repairs).

Division 5:

Walke.

Monaghan.

Perkins.

Roe.

Sterett.

Terry.

SQUADRON 3.

Division 7:

Dolphin (Virgin Islands, temporary).
Chattanooga.

Division 8:

Warrington.

Henley.

Beale.

Patterson.

Mayrant (out of commission).

SQUADRON 4.

Division 10:

Tacoma, flagship; Mexican patrol.

Denver.

Division 11:

Cummings.

Ammen.

Jarvis.

Burrows.

McCall.

Fanning.

SQUADRON 5.

Division 13:

Cleveland, flagship.

Raleigh (under repairs, Mare Island).

Division 14:

Cassin.

Jouett.

Trippe.

Jenkins.

Drayton.

Paulding.

SQUADRON 6.

Division 16:

Albany.

New Orleans (under repairs, Puget Sound).

Division 17:

Balch.

Benham.

Aylwin.

Parker.

Downes.

Duncan.

MARCH 28, 1917.

To: Capt. Henry B. Wilson, United States Navy, commanding U. S. S. *Pennsylvania* (commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet).

Subject: Detached command of *Pennsylvania*; to command Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Upon the arrival of the *Pennsylvania* in American waters you will regard yourself detached from duty in command of that vessel; will proceed to Washington, D. C. and report Navy Department for temporary duty.

2. When so directed you will regard yourself relieved of this temporary duty, will proceed to such port in which the *Olympia* may be and assume command of the Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet, *Olympia* flagship.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

PATROL FORCE UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "OLYMPIA," FLAGSHIP,
Fleet Base Three, April 9, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 1:

Forces:

- (a) Northern Detachment, Capt. Jones, Squadron 1.
- b) Nantucket Detachment, Capt. Twining, Squadrons 2, 3.
- c) Delaware Detachment, Capt. Oman, Squadron 5.
- d) Chesapeake Detachment, Capt. Morgan, Squadron 6.
- e) Gulf Detachment, Capt. Johnson, Squadron 4.

1. No news regarding enemy forces.
2. This force will give maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and to friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces. Vessels shall on every occasion use all means within their power to capture or destroy every enemy submarine sighted.
3. (a) Northern Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 through Cape Sable and Nantucket Shoal Lightship and Barnegat. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.
- b) Nantucket Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Nantucket Shoal Lightship and Barnegat. Base, New York and Newport.
- c) Delaware Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Barnegat and Assateague Light. Base, Hampton Roads.
- d) Chesapeake Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Assateague Light. Base, Hampton Roads.
- e) Gulf Detachment: Guard area Florida Straits and Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.
- f) Proceed when ordered. Use 75 time.
4. Tenders: *Dixie*, base Key West; *Panther*, base Newport.
5. Cipher ROT.
- Flag in *Olympia* bases vicinity of New York.

H. B. WILSON.

Subject: Instructions to vessels of patrol force.

1. Patrol commanders will patrol to the best advantage the areas assigned, with the view to safeguarding trans-Atlantic shipping and destroying enemy submarines sighted.
2. Make every effort to facilitate the passage of vessels through the patrolled area.
3. From sunset to sunrise ships to be darkened and lookouts stationed both aloft and on deck.
4. At all time of the day and night such portion of the battery to be manned and ready for use as is necessary to open fire instantly on a submarine sighted on any bearing.
5. The gun is the primary weapon against the submarine. but this is not to preclude the use of torpedoes when conditions warrant.
6. Visual signals will not be used at night except in cases of emergency, and then to be restricted to the use of blinker tube if possible.
7. Searchlights will not be used for search, but to illuminate a target already definitely located, and they should be turned off immediately when the target has disappeared.
8. Recognition signals as directed.
9. Radio: Every precaution shall be taken to ensure that unnecessary radio messages are not sent, and messages when sent should be as brief as possible. Use land lines and cable for communication rather than radio.
10. In case of reported contact with an enemy vessel, the two adjacent vessels will proceed to assist in hunting down the enemy, keeping lookout for possible mate.
11. The patrol force will cooperate with the commandants of the naval districts in every way.
12. Upon discovering a submarine by night a patrol boat may be able to get very close before being seen. An attempt to approach as close as possible shall be made before turning on a searchlight or firing guns. The submarine shall be stalked at night and surprised; wait until the patrol boat is nearly on top of the submarine before announcing the boat's presence by searchlight and gun. Care must be exercised that the object seen is certainly a submarine before making radio report, for this may tell the submarine that patrol boats are in its vicinity.
13. Consider any submarine hostile unless it is definitely known that our submarines are operating in the locality.
14. When a raider is reported the available vessels of the supports will be sent to sweep to the best advantage in the area under the supervision of the patrol force. If

the raider is reported within a patrol area, the commander of the patrol will assist in the search within his own area, having due regard to his patrolling duties.

15. Vessels will continue the search until otherwise directed. When the officer conducting the search considers that further operations are not justified, he will request instructions for the force commander.

PATROL FORCE UNITED STATE FLEET,
U. S. S. *Olympia*, Flagship, April 17, 1917

Campaign order No. 2.

Forces:

- (a) Northern patrol, Capt. Jones, squadron 1.
- (b) Nantucket patrol, Capt. Twining, squadron 2.
- (c) Chesapeake patrol, Capt. Morgan, squadron 6.
- (d) Southern patrol, Capt. Oman, squadron 5.
- (e) Gulf patrol, Capt. Johnston, squadron 4.
- (f) Caribbean patrol, Capt. Anderson, squadron 3.
- (g) Supports, *Olympia*, *Columbia*, *Charleston*.

1. The area assigned to this force has been extended to include a portion of the Caribbean heretofore supervised by the French.

2. This force will furnish maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces.

3. (a) Northern patrol: Guard area between lines bearing 90 from Cape Sable and 100 from Sankaty Head. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.

(b) Nantucket patrol: Guard area south of northern patrol to line bearing 110 from Absecon light. Base, New York and Newport.

(c) Chesapeake patrol: Guard area south of Nantucket patrol to line bearing 100 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.

(d) Southern patrol: Guard area south of Chesapeake patrol to line bearing 107 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.

(e) Gulf patrol: Guard area of the Bahamas south of Southern patrol north of latitude 23 and west of meridian 75, and the Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.

(f) Caribbean patrol: Guard area south of Gulf and Southern patrols, and the Caribbean west and north of a line from the Panama-Colombian boundary to the west point of Jamaica, thence along north coast of Jamaica, south coast of Haiti, Porto Rico, and Santa Cruz, through Anegada passage, and thence 84°. Base, Guantanamo, Canal Zone and St. Thomas.

(g) Supports: *Columbia* at Hampton Roads; *Charleston* at St. Thomas. Be prepared to operate at high speed on short notice as far as meridian 50. Keep full of fuel.

(h) Use every means to capture or destroy enemy submarines sighted.

Cooperate closely and constantly with the commandants of naval districts in adjustment of areas of operation, in exchange of information, and in routing outgoing and incoming merchant vessels. Tenders are available for repairs within their capacity. Effective noon, April 25. Proceed then. Use 75 time.

4. Tenders: *Dirie* at Key West; *Panther* at Newport.

5. Flag on *Olympia* vicinity New York.

Cipher as indicated.

H. B. WILSON.

Then here is a plan for making an estimate of the number and types of small craft necessary to obtain now, in addition to the naval craft already assigned, in order to put the coast-defense districts in a position to cope with the immediate situation, antisubmarine war. That plan is as follows:

PLAN FOR DECISION TO MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SMALL CRAFT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN NOW, IN ADDITION TO THE NAVAL CRAFT ALREADY ASSIGNED, IN ORDER TO PUT THE COAST DEFENSE DISTRICTS IN A POSITION TO COPE WITH THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION, ANTISUBMARINE WAR.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington, D. C.

Action taken:

Mission.—To make an estimate of the numbers and types of small craft necessary to obtain now, in addition to the naval craft already assigned, in order to put the

ant-defense districts in a position to cope with the immediate situation, antisubmarine war.

Following an estimate for the coast defense districts, from Eastport, Me., to Galveston, Tex., which involves not only (1) the establishing and protecting of lanes of traffic from our principal shipping ports to the European Continent, but (2) takes into consideration some degree of protection for those ports not of the first importance, but all within the range of submarine activities, the following decisions to meet the immediate situation are made:

DECISIONS.

1. The most important duty is to protect the interests and shipping at the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and capes of the Chesapeake.
2. That a second but less important step is to protect the interests and shipping at the ports of, or sea areas in the vicinity of, Portland, Me., Narragansett Bay, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, Port Arthur, and Galveston.
3. That certain harbor police (patrol) will be required for the four principal ports of shipping.
4. That some minor harbor police (patrol) will be required for the lesser important ports.
5. That in addition to the above port protection, and protection to the lanes of maritime travel (indicated as necessary for the four principal ports in decision (1) there will be required certain submarine base hunting operations, coming within the scope of activities of the Coast Defense districts, in the following areas: The coast of Maine; the Gulf of Mexico.
6. That to fulfill the duties outlined in the previous five paragraphs, there will be required in addition to the naval craft already available for use in the Coast Defense districts the following craft for the below-mentioned duties:
 - (a) Harbor entrance patrols (yachts, tugs preferable, or equivalent small craft, of good sea qualities, 50; (b) escort and patrol craft (for the four principal ports of shipping, fast sea keeping motor craft), 250; (c) sweepers and mine craft (for the four ports mentioned above, and for the east entrance of Long Island Sound—sea-going tugs only), 50; (d) harbor police patrol (for the four principal shipping ports, fast small motor craft), 60; (e) submarine base hunting craft (for the Gulf of Maine, 5 coast sections, 12 boats to a section, fast sea keeping motor craft or equivalent), 60; (f) submarine base hunting craft (for the Gulf of Mexico, from the west coast of Florida to Galveston, Tex., fast sea-keeping motor craft, or equivalent), 60; total, 630.

The plan which I have marked "10" was also some time before the war. It is as follows:

PLAN No. 10.

MISSION—TO OUTLINE THE GENERAL SCHEME WHEREBY WE MAY FURNISH ASSISTANCE TO THE ALLIES IN THE SHAPE OF SMALL CRAFT WITHOUT INTERFERING TOO GREATLY WITH OUR OWN SIMILAR NEEDS AND WITHOUT DISRUPTING OUR OWN ORGANIZATIONS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

CONCLUSIONS.

- (1) A law to commandeer shipping should be enacted.
- (2) Vessels are divided into the following general classes:
 - (a) Purely naval.
 - (b) Pleasure craft.
 - (c) Merchant shipping necessary to the overseas traffic.
 - (d) Commercial craft, more or less vital to home needs.
- (3) The craft from which we may choose vessels to send to the Allies, outside of class (a), (purely naval), for patrol purposes, in conformity with the above mission, must come out of classes (b) and (d).
- (4) All of class (b) not absolutely needed at home can be spared.
- (5) Only so many of class (d), which includes tugs and trawlers, as can be spared, should be sent.
- (6) Class (b) includes craft fit for deep-sea work and having good radius of action. It also includes those fit only for near-shore work, with short radius of action.
- (7) To meet the present need:
 - (a) Do not break up existing naval organizations.
 - (b) Inspect all pleasure and merchant vessels and classify.

(7) To meet the present need—Continued.

- (c) Commandeer all pleasure craft (class (b)), that will be needed to fill up the needs of naval districts, patrol force, and distant service.
- (d) Take into naval districts all the pleasure craft (class (b)) that are not sea keeping, and have not a radius of 1,500 miles, that the districts may need; also take into the district forces as many of the tugs and trawlers (class (d)) as trade and fishing can spare.
- (e) Draft into the patrol force all of class (b) having over 1,500 miles radius of endurance, and good sea keeping qualities.
- (f) When necessary to send a patrol force abroad, take from the patrol force on this side, and augment it, with the maximum number of tugs (class (d)) the naval districts can spare.
- (g) If practicable, do not attempt to form new forces, but first increase the present organizations. Utilize their efforts for perfecting the unit organizations now in existence. When needed, detail one or more complete units for special service abroad.
- (h) Speed up the drafting into service of the small craft needed.
- (i) Build tugs and trawlers.

Plan No. 11 was also before the war. Admiral McKean would know more about just when that would come than I would. That plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 11.

MISSION—DIRECT THE POLICY OF OUR NAVAL BASES AS TO THEIR REPAIR, RESERVE OPERATING, AND SUPPLY FACILITIES TO MEET THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS (1) THE NEEDS OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION; (2) THE FUTURE NEEDS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Following general estimates of the situation, made by Capt. McKean, the Commission on Yards and Bases, and other officers, the following tentative decisions are reached:

DECISIONS—IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

- (1) That the repair facilities of all our yards on the Atlantic coast will require expansion.
- (2) To meet present needs, repair and supply, as navy-yard assets, are much more important factors than building.
- (3) That in the conduct of any war the repair facilities of our navy yards will be so taxed as to leave little room for construction.
- (4) That if the fleet is to be sent north and is to stay there, the repair facilities of the New York strategic area and of the Chesapeake Bay strategic area will have to be enlarged to meet the extra demands that will be made on them.
- (5) That the navy yards should be used first for legitimate naval needs, assigned in the order of present importance.
- (6) To meet the needs of the naval districts, recourse should be had to civil repair facilities (as far as practicable) whenever the mobile repair facilities assigned to a district are not adequate.
- (7) That if the major ships on the Atlantic coast which serve no particularly useful war purpose at present were removed to the Pacific, it would greatly facilitate the ability of the Atlantic yards to cope with the repair needs of ships that were useful in waging submarine warfare.
- (8) That if the major ships are transferred to the Pacific immediate steps will have to be taken to put the Puget Sound area and the San Francisco area in a position to adequately care for them.
- (9) That to meet the immediate situation, in addition to enlarging the repair facilities of the present yards, there will be required new bases, or a great expansion of the facilities of the old bases, as follows, in the order of their importance:
 - (a) New York—Long Island Sound area—Main reserve, repair, supply base—An enlargement or extension of present facilities, within area—First-class base.
 - (b) Chesapeake Bay area—Main reserve, repair, and supply base—An enlargement, or extension of present facilities within area—First-class base.

That to meet the immediate situation, etc.—Continued.

c. Key West area—Operation base, with limited repair and supply facilities, for fleet and submarine operations—Second-class base.

d. Aviation bases (at selected spots).

In addition to present facilities, and those mentioned above under Immediate Needs, there will be required at the place mentioned, bases of the character specified:

e. New London—Main submarine base—First-class base.

f. Charleston, S. C.—Main submarine base—First-class base.

g. Culebra, St.—Advance fleet and submarine operating Thomas area. Base—Second-class base.

h. Canal Zone—Main fleet and submarine operating base—First-class base.

i. San Francisco—Main fleet base—First-class base.

j. San Diego, San Pedro area—Main submarine base—First-class base.

k. Guam—Advance fleet and submarine operating base—Second-class base.

l. Aviation bases (at selected spots).

m. Coast-type submarine bases—(For a limited local defense at certain strategic and advanced positions, beyond quick supporting distance of our coast and forces).

Senator PITTMAN. Captain, this was all prior to the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; all prior to the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And so were all the other plans that you have submitted?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they followed logically up. I wrote these myself, and I am quite sure that I am correct.

Next is this plan which I have marked 12:

PLAN No. 12.

REASON—TO PLAN FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF THE NAVAL EMERGENCY FUND SO AS BEST TO SUPPLEMENT CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS.

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Purchase patrol vessels and yachts for inshore and offshore patrol and fit them out..... | \$25,000,000 |
| Build 250 110-foot, 18-knot patrol vessels and fit them out..... | 25,000,000 |
| Provide additional guns and ammunition as circumstances indicate.. | 5,000,000 |
| Purchase 100 pairs of mine sweepers and fit them out..... | 10,000,000 |
| Rush work on present dirigibles and build 24 more..... | 1,500,000 |
| Erect air patrol stations as per report of Joint Army and Navy Board. | 1,500,000 |
| Provide bases, floating or ashore, as circumstances require, for patrol forces..... | 5,000,000 |
| Provide antisubmarine nets and torpedo nets..... | 5,000,000 |
| Provide 1,000 buoys, anchors, and chains to make lanes and patrol areas..... | 500,000 |
| Speed up construction of 3 battleships nearest completion, all authorized destroyers, and all authorized submarines..... | 10,000,000 |
| Additional storehouses and depots..... | 5,000,000 |
| Technical experts, draftsmen, clerks, and other necessary personnel. | 250,000 |
| Lay down immediately as many destroyers as shipyards can handle. | 10,750,000 |
| Balance available..... | 10,500,000 |

The CHAIRMAN. These plans were all yours, were they not, Capt. Pratt?

Capt. PRATT. Not alone mine. I wrote them. They were worked up in conjunction with any officer who had any knowledge on that particular subject. They were worked mostly with Capt. Schofield, Capt. Scott, and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were put in by you?

Capt. PRATT. They were put in by me; and one reason why I bring them up is because I was later called upon to execute the very plans that I had been drawing up, so that I knew something about what we were going to do.

I present plan No. 13, mission to establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.

This also, I think, was a plan which was made before the war, because the preliminary discussions of the plans for the northern barrage began by conversations which took place between the officer who was later responsible for most of the work, Commander Fullenweider, in conference with the planning section in Operations.

This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 13.

MISSION—ESTABLISH A POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO THE USE OF MINES IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

(3)—P. Mission: Establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.

Following an estimate of the situation by Capt. Pratt, the following decisions are reached:

DECISIONS.

(1) That for the purposes of a pure defense, a passive defense can be made more certain than an active offense.

(2) That for the purposes of an efficient offense, a mobile offense is better than an immobile offense.

(3) Keeping the above doctrine in mind, that our objectives in mining are (a) to absolutely protect certain valuable floating and shore facilities lying within vulnerable seacoast areas; (b) not to handicap the ingress and egress of war and merchant vessels, of our own or of our allies, from certain important ports or sea areas; (c) to facilitate every offensive effort that can be made against the enemy submarine, without restricting the activities of any of our vessels participating in this work.

(4) That the best positions in which to employ offensive mining against submarines is directly off their permanent or home bases.

(5) That there are no sea areas on this side of the Atlantic answering the character of permanent or home hostile submarine bases, though there are probably sea areas which could well answer the purposes of temporary bases.

(6) To use only mines that can be controlled or removed at any time, for offensive mining.

(7) To use defensive mines to as limited an extent as possible, and then only when other means such as very heavy nets, gates, and obstructions are impracticable.

(8) That to be an adequate protection to a harbor (since the submarine can cut any wire net), a net must be exceedingly strong and made of other material than wire.

(9) That owing to the impracticability of establishing permanent or movable barriers at all the necessary ports or sea areas, defensive mining will have to be resorted to in certain localities.

(10) Be prepared to adopt the following policy at the below-named ports. In adopting this policy (a) the definite obstruction should be given the first consideration; (b) the mine field should be considered as an adjunct to the definite obstruction, and used only where it is impracticable to do otherwise.

(a) Kennebec River: Movable heavy gate of logs and chains, moved by tugs.

(b) Portland, Me: Same. Stop any entrances except one.

(c) Portsmouth, N. H.: Same.

(d) Boston, Mass.: Block two entrances permanently, use heavy gate across other. Mine flats where necessary.

(e) Narragansett and Buzzards Bay: Mine.

(f) Long Island Sound: Mine heavily, Race Rock to Little Gull. Obstruct all entrances to Fishers Island Sound except one. Gate that. Mine heavily, Little Gull to Gardiners Island, leaving heavy gate entrance off the old fort, on end of Gardiners Island. Use Plum Gut-Gardiners Island passage. Throw heavy gate net across East River near Throgs Neck.

(g) New York entrance south: Block Gedney and Swash Channels. Place heavy log and chain gate across Ambrose Channel. Mine the flats.

Delaware Bay entrance: Heavily mine across the entrance Cape May toward Henlopen. Leave entrance and exit via a movable heavy log and chain gate at Henlopen.

Philadelphia, Wilmington, Chesapeake and Delaware Canal entrance: Mine below canal and establish heavy log and chain movable barrier across narrowest channel adjacent to mine fields.

Chesapeake Bay entrance: Mine heavily across from Cape Charles to Cape Henry. Establish entrance and exit near Cape Henry via a heavy movable log and chain gate. Hampton Roads.

Baltimore: Mine across flats near North Point to channel. Gate the channel.

Washington: Gate the Potomac near Sheridan Point.

Charleston and Savannah: Heavy movable gate obstructions near the breakwaters.

Key West, Mobile, Pensacola, Galveston: Establish heavy mobile gate obstructions to channel near entrances. Mine shoals and flats adjacent as necessary.

New Orleans: Obstruct two entrances. Use heavy mobile gate for third channel.

Port Arthur: Establish heavy mobile gate for channel.

That the above-named ports should receive the first and immediate consideration and arrangements be made locally, for putting the above or similar policy into effect.

12. If it develops that other localities require defensive mining, arrangements should be made through the district commandant for same, but that it should be remembered, defensive mining and obstruction is adopted (a) to protect certain areas which are the logical submarine objectives; (b) that a measure of defensive mining and obstruction relieves the patrol forces, from a passable defensive patrol, and allows them, to a greater measure, to operate offensively and actively against the submarine; (c) that defensive mining in localities where there is no apparent submarine objective, other than temporary basing, is apt to be more harmful to our own forces than to the enemy; (d) that to attempt to adopt defensive mining in localities which might be used as temporary submarine bases, is too elusive an objective.

13. That for the present the use of offensive mining against the submarine, by any except the most mobile and controlled of mines, is too passable an offensive, to give efficient results, in view of the great areas over which the submarine can operate.

14. That the submarine is only a mobile mine, and that the principles involved in the destruction of a mine field (a) locating; (b) sweeping; (c) counter mining, though more difficult of execution, are nevertheless the correct principles to adopt against the submarine.

15. That until more definite data on the subject is received, the antisubmarine efforts of all craft be as actively offensive in character as practicable, and that the efforts of all craft, except those used in safeguarding, shipping and port entrances, and police duties, be directed towards:

a. Scouting for and marking down submarines, their bases and their mines. And to draw a cordon around said craft, by search-curve methods, in order to establish a limit within certain times, beyond which said submarine once marked, can not be.

b. Day air reconnaissance: For locating submarines in conjunction with surface craft.

c. Sweeping for submarines and for their mines with grapnels, anchors, sweeps, mines, or torpedoes, with the object (once the submarine is marked down) of (a) locating, (b) destroying either under water or on the surface.

d. Trapping: By the use of indicator nets.

e. Bombing: By the use of water bombs set for varying depths, and used abundantly in the suspected areas where a submarine is located.

f. Gunning: For surface submarines.

16. That our own submarines, being merely safe mobile mines, should not be used by us (in an active sea offensive) against the enemy submarines until their role can be proven to be more actively mobile and offensive, and less immobile and passive, than it is at present, since such use would serve to handicap the activities of our own craft, which can inaugurate a more active offensive at sea. That if our submarines are to be used offensively against the present enemy, their best use will be as an offensive mobile mine, close up against the enemy probable basing spots, effecting with their torpedoes what the allies are attempting to do with their policy of fixed mines in the neighborhood of and across the entrances to the submarine home and fixed bases.

17. That at his bases, and perhaps on the open sea, the submarine, may be more likely to be caught off his guard, at night, than in the daytime.

Very rough sketch for use of towed mines or water bombs by destroyers or submarine chasers.

That plan goes definitely into details more in relation to what we should do on our own coast. It is very general as to our operation abroad and only later do they come to a definite conclusion in the plan for the northern barrage, which is a separate proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. These are still plans that were submitted before the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; this was one, also. When I come to the other I will tell you; because we started armed guards before we actually went into the war. But this plan, I think, is even preliminary to the details that Capt. Scott worked out, and which I submitted to you as the armed-guard plan.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same applies as to being all before the war, to all you have read heretofore?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; to all that I have read heretofore, as well as to these. This plan, No. 14, is as follows:

PLAN No. 14.

MISSION—TO INDICATE THE STEPS TENDING TO MAKE LIFE, SHIPS, PROPERTY OF VESSELS CARRYING ARMED GUARDS SELF-PROTECTING.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) That in addition to providing guns and efficient armed guards for merchant ships, in order for them to act offensively—defensively against submarines—it is also equally necessary to take purely defensive measures to safeguard (a) life; (b) property (including the ship itself), carried by these merchant vessels.

(2) The first steps taken must concern those vessels now actually engaged in commerce.

(3) Inspection of the reports and accounts of the sinkings of the *Astec*, *Vacuum*, *Rockingham* lead to two conclusions: (a) The armed guard was not efficient (shown in the case of the *Rockingham*, by not immediately attempting to avoid an unknown possible danger); (b) The life-saving apparatus is not efficient (indicated in reports of the *Astec* and in newspaper accounts of the lack of seaworthiness of the *Vacuum* boats).

(4) The first step necessary after providing adequate guns and instructions, is to furnish a personnel capable of handling the guns and of understanding the instructions.

(5) The second step is to give the commander of the armed guard authority to carry the instructions out. This implies naval control of merchant shipping furnished with armed guards.

(6) The third step consists in making the merchant ships provide themselves, or to provide them with (a) efficient lifeboats; (b) excess life rafts in case the weather boats are stove in; (c) efficient life belts; (d) proper equipment for the lifeboats especially in the matter of ration (such as the Navy emergency ration). In the case of lifeboats probably the most efficient type for the service required is the old type lifeboat used in the Life-Saving Service.

(7) The final step concerns (a) the new construction planned for; (b) the construction already built but under repair (such as the seized German ships). These ships must be made as unsinkable as human ingenuity can devise. This is essential.

I do not know whether this was before or after the war. The plan is to make an estimate of the number of merchant ships for such service that it might be necessary to commission as naval auxiliaries to cooperate with the Allies in protecting shipping from German raiders. It has nothing to do with the antisubmarine campaign. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 14.

— TO MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MERCHANT SHIPS FIT FOR SUCH USE IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMMISSION AS NAVAL AUXILIARIES TO COOPERATE WITH THE ALLIES IN PROTECTING SHIPPING FROM GERMAN RAIDERS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

CONCLUSIONS.

In forming an estimate, to divide the ocean into the following areas which it be considered advisable for the United States to guard, in addition to the forces in Asiatic waters.

- a. North Atlantic to the Azores and to O. Lat.
 - b. South Atlantic, O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
 - c. North Pacific to Honolulu—Aleutian Islands to O. Lat.
 - d. South Pacific to Tutuila—O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
 - e. West Coast of Africa to reinforce allies.
- To estimate on the division of three ships as a working unit, and to determine the probable working bases within each area assigned, as follows:
- a. North Atlantic to the Azores and to O. Lat.
 - (1) 1 division to base—Halifax or Bermuda.
 - (2) 1 division to base—St. Thomas or Trinidad.
 - (3) 1 division to base at the Azores.
 - Total, 9 ships.
 - b. South Atlantic—O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
 - (1) 1 division to base at Bahia or Rio, British or French Guiana.
 - (2) 1 division to base at the Falklands or River Platte.
 - Total, 6 ships.
 - c. North Pacific to Honolulu—Aleutians to O. Lat.
 - (1) 1 division to base at San Francisco, Puget Sound, and Mexican coast.
 - (2) 1 division to base at Honolulu.
 - (3) 1 division to base at Panama.
 - Total, 9 ships.
 - d. S. Pacific to Tutuila—O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
 - (1) 1 division to base at Tutuila, Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia.
 - (2) 1 division to base at Panama, Guayaquil, Callao, and other South America ports if possible.
 - Total, 6 ships.
 - e. West Coast Africa to reinforce allies.
 - (1) 1 division base at Cape de Verdes.
 - (2) 1 division to base at Cape Town.
 - Total, 6 ships.
- Grand total, 36 ships.

That this work should be attempted by an offensive force additional to the and escort force, whose work is in the nature of close in protection for our coasts and shipping in its vicinity.

That to meet the above demand there are at present the following classes of vessels available: Mobilization plan, scout force, divisions 1, 2, 3, 4, and the 5th. In addition (if properly fitted with heavier battery) there are the 3 ships transport class (though it might be wiser to hold in reserve 2 of this class, as per tenders, in view of the great increase in destroyer building). Total naval available, 16.

That therefore there would be required 20 merchant ships to be fitted as naval mines in case the above plan in all its details were carried out.

That therefore 20 to 23 merchant ships (preferably interned ships) of high long endurance, capable of carrying a sufficiently powerful battery of 50-caliber, be inspected, put in readiness, and taken over as naval auxiliaries.

That until such time as these ships be actually required for active cruising they be operated by the Navy in the service of logistics.

That such vessels, when so armed and operated by naval forces in the service, are always their own protection against the ordinary raider.

There is a very detailed plan of operations. This is after the war declared.

Senator PITTMAN. About what date, Captain? Could you approximate it?

Capt. PRATT. Some time in April, very early, because the immediate necessity showed itself of being able to place guns on a great many ships, and we therefore had to take secondary batteries from other ships, and that is the reason why, as Admiral Fullam has stated in his testimony, guns were taken from the Pacific ships, and it became necessary, and not only was it necessary but we found that that was a policy which was a good one, and it is being carried on at present for the simple reason that those lower-deck guns were close to the sea, and it was found that in rough weather the lower ports of the ship were apt to be flooded. And not only did that policy meet the war needs, but that is carried on to-day in most ships, and those guns have never been replaced, because it is better to keep them off.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by saying that the ports were flooded?

Capt. PRATT. In rough weather the sea would come in and sweep the lower deck and come down below; that is, if you had to fight. If you could go into action with all your ports closed and all your hatches battened down, you would not be flooded so much, although the guns would be useless from having the seas sweeping over. That was an error; or I will not say an error, because it was the thought of the day when those ships were built, and they were as good as any better than any of the ships like them in foreign navies that were built before we took to heart the lesson of the sinking of these vessels under Admiral Craddock off the coast of South America, and that was one of the principal reasons for their sinking, that they could not fight in a very heavy seaway, and we had to take that into consideration almost immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the lower decks?

Capt. PRATT. What we mean by the lower decks are the main decks; below the turret guns. Our older battleships had that.

We had an estimate of 423 ships that would have to be armed. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 15.

MISSION—TO OUTLINE THE GENERAL PLAN WHEREBY THE NAVAL VESSELS MAY BE REQUISITIONED FOR GUNS TO PLACE ON MERCHANT SHIPPING.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Following an estimate of the situation, based on estimates by Capt. Plunkett, Commander Scott, and Lieut. Pickering, of the Bureau of Ordnance, the following general conclusions were reached.

CONCLUSIONS.

- (1) To establish a general policy for the immediate requisitioning of naval guns.
- (2) To base the requisitioning on the number of merchant ships that may have to be supplied.
- (3) First to remove all the 6 and 3 pounder guns and hold them for the use of the small craft in the naval districts.
- (4) In requisitioning guns from a ship, follow this plan: Call for a ship to supply a certain number of guns, and specify the caliber, but leave the decision of the guns to be selected to the individual ship.
- (5) In taking or leaving guns, the following rules to be observed: (1) Take those guns of the medium calibers, which interfere most with the fire of guns better placed.

2 take those guns which can best be spared, having in mind the probable duty of the ship; (3) leave only the minimum number of the smallest caliber guns, that might be needed for a possible submarine defense.

6 That the order of precedence in removing guns from classes of ships should be generally as follows:

- 1 The guns held in reserve.
- 2 The guns of the T. D. battery assigned to the new dreadnaughts.
- 3 Guns from the ships of the Coast Defense Division, not likely to engage in active operations.
- 4 Guns from the old battleships, A class.
- 5 Guns from the scouts (armored and protected cruisers), certain ships in the destroyer flotilla, patrol forces, and train, when the ships are available, for the purpose of removing guns.

7 Guns from the T. D. battery of the dreadnoughts, AA class.

7 That naval auxiliaries (which is to include all merchant shipping taken into naval service for naval uses) should be armed with no less than four high-powered guns, preferably of a standard type, such as the T. D. battery of the dreadnoughts).

8 That armed merchant ships should carry, if possible, four guns and never less than two guns, adequate for the purpose assigned.

9 A general estimate of the shipping (merchant) that might have to be considered in the arming problem, taken from Commander Scott's paper, is as follows:

- Class (1). Those engaged in present Atlantic trade, 70.
- Class (2). Those in other trades that might be diverted to the Atlantic, 175.
- Class (3). Included in class 2.
- Class (4). Vessels that might be taken over as naval auxiliaries:
 - 1 Merchant ships, 50.
 - 2 Yachts (for the patrol force), 50.
 - 3 Coast Guard, 12.
 - 4 Army transports, 14.

Class (5). Available German ships, 102.

Class (6). Vessels enrolled in naval districts.

Class (7). Vessels in the United States coast trade, 165.

Class (8). Vessels in the Pacific trade, 80.

Class (9). New building program (wooden ships), 1,000.

Total that may have to be provided for in the immediate future, classes (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), 423.

10 Following the principles laid down in conclusion 5, the below guns in each class of ship indicated in conclusion 6 are believed to be available.

Class (a) Guns now in reserve (including *Memphis* and *Milwaukee*), 6-inch, 43; 5-inch, 68; 4-inch, 88; 3-inch, 88.

Class (b). Guns T. D. battery for dreadnoughts AA building.

In reserve, .50-caliber, 5-inch: *California* and *Tennessee*, 44; *New Mexico*, *Idaho*, and *Mississippi*, 66; total, 110.

Class (c). Guns from the Coast Defense Divisions:

| Ship. | Take guns. | Leave guns. |
|--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Massachusetts..... | 8 3-inch..... | 4 2-inch. |
| Alabama..... | 8 3-inch..... | 4 3-inch. |
| Iowa..... | 6 4-inch..... | 4 4-inch. |
| Oregon..... | 8 3-inch..... | 4 3-inch. |
| Chicago..... | 6 4-inch..... | 6 4-inch. |
| Total..... | 24 3-inch; 12 4-inch..... | 12 3-inch; 10 4-inch. |

Class (d). Guns from battleships A class:

DIVISION 1.

| Ship. | Take guns. | Leave guns. |
|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Alabama..... | 6 6-inch..... | 4 3-inch; 8 6-inch. |
| Illinois..... | 6 6-inch..... | 4 3-inch; 8 6-inch. |
| Kentucky..... | 6 5-inch..... | 10 5-inch. |
| Kearsarge..... | 6 5-inch..... | 10 5-inch. |
| Total..... | 12 6-inch, 12 5-inch..... | 8 3-inch. |

DIVISION 2.

| Ship. | Take guns. | Leave guns. |
|----------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Ohio..... | 6 6-inch..... | 6 3-inch, 10 6-inch. |
| Maine..... | 6 6-inch..... | 6 3-inch, 10 6-inch. |
| Missouri..... | 6 6-inch..... | 6 3-inch, 10 6-inch. |
| Wisconsin..... | 6 6-inch..... | 4 3-inch; 8 6-inch. |
| Total..... | 24 6-inch..... | 22 3-inch. |

DIVISION 3.

| | | |
|-------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| New Jersey..... | 4 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 6-inch. |
| Virginia..... | 4 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 6-inch. |
| Rhode Island..... | 4 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 6-inch. |
| Nebraska..... | 4 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 6-inch. |
| Georgia..... | 4 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 6-inch. |
| Total..... | 20 3-inch..... | 24 3-inch. |

DIVISION 4.

| | | |
|--------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Minnesota..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 7-inch. |
| Louisiana..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Kansas..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| New Hampshire..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Total..... | 40 3-inch..... | 24 3-inch. |

DIVISION 5.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Connecticut..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 7-inch. |
| Vermont..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch; 12 7-inch. |
| Michigan..... | 10 3-inch..... | 12 3-inch. |
| South Carolina..... | 10 3-inch..... | 12 3-inch. |
| Total..... | 40 3-inch..... | 36 3-inch. |
| Grand total, class (d)..... | 36 6-inch; 12 5-inch; 100 3-inch..... | 114 3-inch. |

Class (e). Guns from the scouts (armored and protected cruisers), destroyer and patrol force, and train.

SCOUT FORCE, DIVISION 1.

| Ship. | Take guns. | Leave guns. |
|-----------------|----------------|-------------|
| Charleston..... | 12 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| St. Louis..... | 12 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Total..... | 24 3-inch..... | 12 3-inch. |

DIVISION 2.

| | | |
|-------------------|----------------|------------|
| San Diego..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| South Dakota..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Frederick..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Total..... | 30 3-inch..... | 18 3-inch. |

DIVISION 3.

| | | |
|-----------------|----------------|------------|
| Pueblo..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Pittsburgh..... | 10 3-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Huntington..... | 10 2-inch..... | 6 3-inch. |
| Total..... | 30 3-inch..... | 18 3-inch. |

DIVISION 4.

| | | |
|---------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Saratoga..... | 8 3-inch..... | 0 3-inch; 10 5-inch. |
| Montana..... | 10 3-inch..... | 8 3-inch. |
| North Carolina..... | 12 3-inch..... | 8 3-inch. |
| Total..... | 30 3-inch..... | 24 3-inch. |

PATROL FORCE.

| Ship. | Take guns. | Leave guns. |
|------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Trile..... | 2 3-inch..... | 8 3-inch, but at least 2 5-inch guns should be added to battery. |
| Salem..... | 8 3-inch; 2 5-inch..... | 0 3-inch and 5-inch.. |
| Total..... | 8 3-inch; 2 5-inch. | |

DESTROYER FORCE.

| | | |
|--------------|----------------|-----------|
| Seattle..... | 10 3-inch..... | 8 3-inch. |
|--------------|----------------|-----------|

TRAIN.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Prairie..... | 2 3-inch..... | 8 3-inch. |
| Hancock..... | | 6 3-inch. |
| Buffalo..... | | 6 4-inch. |
| | | But at least 2 5-inch guns should be added to battery of all these ships on active duty. |
| Total..... | 2 3-inch..... | |
| Grand total, class (e)..... | 2 5-inch; 126 3-inch..... | 72 3-inch available. |

Class (f) guns from the T. D. Battery of the dreadnaught AA Class:

DIVISION 6.

| Ship. | Take guns. | Leave guns. |
|-------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Pennsylvania..... | 8 5-inch..... | 14 5-inch. |
| New York..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| Texas..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| Delaware..... | 4 5-inch..... | 10 5-inch. |
| Oklahoma..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| Totals..... | 36 5-inch..... | 63 5-inch. |

DIVISION 7.

| | | |
|-------------------|----------------|------------|
| Arkansas..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| North Dakota..... | 4 5-inch..... | 10 5-inch. |
| Florida..... | 6 5-inch..... | 10 5-inch. |
| Utah..... | 6 5-inch..... | 10 5-inch. |
| Total..... | 24 5-inch..... | 43 5-inch. |

DIVISION 8.

| | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|--------------|
| Wyoming..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| Nevada..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| Arizona..... | 8 5-inch..... | 13 5-inch. |
| Total..... | 24 5-inch..... | 39 5-inch. |
| Grand total, class (f)..... | 84 5-inch..... | 145 5-inch.. |

(11) The following is the approximate general total of guns available for use on the basis of the above policy:

| | 6-inch. | 5-inch. | 4-inch. | 3-inch. |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Class (a), reserve..... | 43 | 66 | 88 | 88 |
| Class (b), new dreadnoughts..... | | 110 | | |
| Class (c), Coast Defense..... | | | 12 | 24 |
| Class (d), battleships A..... | 36 | 12 | | 100 |
| Class (e), scouts..... | | 2 | | 126 |
| Class (f), dreadnoughts AA..... | | 84 | | |
| Total..... | 79 | 276 | 100 | 338 |

Or a total of 793 guns of all classes which can be spared for merchant ships or auxiliaries in addition to the low-velocity 3-inch, which are adapted for the naval dis-
craft and are not here considered.

(12) The following is the grand total of 3-inch and 4-inch guns left on the vessels above enumerated (those not enumerated not coming in the classes consid-
eligible for requisitioning for guns), which might at the expense of a portion of
submarine defense be spared if it were deemed advisable to draft all the 3-inch
4-inch guns from the A, B, and C classes (battleships, armored cruisers, scouts,
cruisers), 3-inch, 198; 4-inch, 4.

(13) Experience, limited to the few armed American ships that have crossed
Atlantic, indicates that a smaller caliber gun, like a 3-inch, which can easily
quickly be handled in a seaway on a ship that rolls and pitches in any mod-
seaway, is more useful than a more powerful larger caliber gun, but one more diff-
to handle as an antisubmarine menace.

DECISION—(3)—D—IMMEDIATE MISSION.

Adopt the policy that our merchant marine shall be protected against anti-
marine warfare to the utmost and its aims directed toward furthering the imme-
needs of our cooperating allies and our own future needs.

MEMORANDUM RE PAPER OF MR. F. H. FORD TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY—
PORTANCE OF NOW CONSTRUCTING THEREIN (UNITED STATES) A MODERN UN-
STATES MERCHANT MARINE."

The accompanying paper seems in the main thoroughly sound.

In particular is the premise on page 1, and the remarks on pages 8 and 11
curred in.

On page 6, at the bottom of the page, the proposition to limit naval construc-
to 350,000 tons might be all that is absolutely required for the present needs, but
set figure should not be the basis for new naval construction.

Except for the battleships almost completed, which it is believed should be pu-
to completion, the naval demands on construction should be limited to destroy-
chasers, submarines. The first two are indispensable in meeting the subma-
menace, as they are the only types now known that the submarine has any fe-
or which can conduct offensive operations against the submarine.

As for the submarine itself, this type is necessary for our reserve strength in
the present war ends unfavorably for the Allies. Were it an assured fact that
could (through satisfactory arrangements with our Allies) count on an adeq-
allied lump tonnage in submarines, turned over to the United States for her own
in case the United States were left to push the present war through, we might disp-
with submarine building, but the question is too uncertain, and in this one res-
of naval craft the United States must be in a position, if this war ends unfavor-
for the Allies, to impose upon Germany, with our submarines, the same condi-
she seeks to now impose upon the Allies. Hence, the need of the three naval ty-
destroyers, chasers, submarines, and the limits to tonnage, should be what the si-
tion seems to demand—350,000 may be ample, for example:

| | |
|----------------------------------------|-----|
| 100 destroyers, at 1,200 tons, is..... | 120 |
| 34 submarines, at 850 tons, is..... | 29 |
| Total..... | 149 |

leaving approximately 200,000 tons surplus, which represents over 235 850-ton
marines, or otherwise as needed.

It would seem unwise not to complete the almost completed battleships: of w
there are only three. Besides having a reserve fighting value, these vessels hav
a pinch, carrying capacity either in a supply or transport sense, and it would
unwise to waste the efforts already spent on them.

Apart from the above naval types, and with the exceptions above noted, the ac-
panying paper is thoroughly concurred in.

Not only should all construction effort be directed toward the construction of
chant tonnage, but the present facilities should be increased to the limit.

Last, but not least, every effort should be devoted to producing a merchant
which, not only through inner compartmentation, but by outer torpedo explo-
such as blisters, outer-hung plates, lattice framing, etc., be made as nonsinkab-
possible. The mission should be, speed in construction—nonsinkable construc-

W. V. P.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the probable date on all of these?

This is the mobilization sheet of April 6, 1917. I happen to have it at date. The order went out to mobilize on that date. It gives the assignment and location of each ship, with the name and type.

Capt. PRATT. No; it does not do that, because it is a mobilization sheet. The repair sheet Admiral McKean has, showing the exact condition on that date of each ship. Those five blue books that I gave you yesterday show, at the places where I put slips between the leaves, at each date, February 1, March 1, April 1, just the condition, and whether the ships were in condition, due to matériel and personnel, because it is a Bureau of Navigation pamphlet. That will show you exactly the material condition.

PLAN No. 16.

Mobilization sheet, Apr. 6, 1917.

| Name. | Type. | Assignment. | Location. |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Pennsylvania ¹ . | Battleship..... | Battle force..... | York River. |
| Dakota ² . | do..... | do..... | York River (T. Sd.). |
| Missouri ² . | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Kentucky ² . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Massachusetts ² . | do..... | do..... | Boston. |
| Delaware ² . | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Vermont ² . | do..... | do..... | New York. |
| Maine ² . | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Wisconsin ² . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| New Jersey ² . | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Illinois ² . | do..... | do..... | Boston. |
| Rhode Island ² . | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Alaska. | do..... | do..... | Boston. |
| Idaho ² . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Minnesota ² . | do..... | do..... | Tangier Sound. |
| Indiana ² . | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Kansas ² . | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| New Hampshire ² . | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Connecticut ² . | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Montana ² . | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Michigan. | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| South Carolina ² . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| New York ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Texas ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| California ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Oklahoma ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Arkansas ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| North Dakota ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Florida ¹ . | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Utah ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Wyoming ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Nevada ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Arizona ¹ . | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Charleston. | Cruiser. | Scout force. | Balboa. |
| St. Louis. | do..... | do..... | Honolulu. |
| Minneapolis. | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| San Diego. | do..... | do..... | Mare Island yard. |
| South Dakota. | do..... | do..... | Puget Sound yard. |
| Frederick. | do..... | do..... | En route Puget Sound to San Francisco. |

¹ In readiness for battle.

* Training personnel and back up n. 1.

Mobilization sheet, Apr. 6, 191

1331

Mobilization sheet, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Name. | Type. | Assignment. | Location. |
|-------|--------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| | Submarine. | Submarine force. | Norfolk. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Submarine tender. | do. | New London. |
| | Submarine. | do. | New York. |
| | do. | do. | At sea. |
| | Destroyer. | do. | New London. |
| | Submarine. | do. | At sea. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Destroyer. | do. | Hampton Roads |
| | Submarine. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Battleship. | Atlantic coast divisions. | Philadelphia. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Cruiser. | Philippine division. | Manila. |
| | do. | do. | Shanghai. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Monitor. | do. | Cavite. |
| | Gunboat. | do. | Philippines. |
| | do. | do. | Asiatic station. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Destroyer tender. | do. | Do. |
| | Destroyer (coast). | do. | Do. |
| | Destroyer. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Monitor. | do. | Do. |
| | Submarines. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | Torpedo boat. | First district. | Annapolis. |
| | Gunboat. | do. | Santiago, Cuba. |
| | Torpedo boat. | do. | Boston. |
| | do. | Second district. | Newport. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | Third district. | Norfolk. |
| | do. | do. | |
| | do. | do. | |
| | do. | do. | |
| | do. | do. | |
| | do. | do. | |
| | Cruiser. | Fourth district. | Charleston. |
| | Torpedo boat. | Fifth district. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Philadelphia yard. |
| | do. | do. | Charleston. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | Sixth district. | Do. |
| | Gunboat. | Seventh district. | En route Puerto, Mexico, to Vera Cruz. |
| | do. | do. | Boston yard. |
| | do. | Eighth district. | Tampico, Mexico. |
| | do. | do. | Nipe Bay, Cuba. |
| | Torpedo boat. | do. | |
| | Battleship. | Twelfth district. | San Francisco. |
| | Gunboat. | do. | At sea. |
| | do. | do. | Mare Island. |
| | Torpedo boat. | do. | San Pedro. |
| | Submarines. | do. | Twelfth district. |
| | Monitor. | Thirteenth district. | San Pedro. |
| | Submarines. | do. | Do. |
| | Torpedo boat. | do. | Puget Sound. |
| | Gunboat. | do. | Do. |
| | Cruiser. | do. | Do. |
| | Submarines. | Fourteenth district. | Pearl Harbor. |
| | Gunboat. | Canal Zone. | Vera Cruz. |
| | Submarines. | do. | Canal Zone. |
| | Destroyer (coast). | do. | Do. |
| | Destroyer. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Do. |
| | do. | do. | Mare Island. |

NOTE.—Destroyers marked "coast" were old boats of 400 tons of time of Spanish War and not serviceable for duty abroad except with long fitting out.

Mobilization sheet, Apr. 16, 1917—Continued.

| Name. | Type. | Assignment. | Location. |
|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Perry..... | Destroyer (coast)... | Canal Zone | Puget Sound. |
| Preble..... | Destroyer..... | do..... | Mare Island. |
| Hull..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Hopkins..... | do..... | do..... | San Pedro. |
| Lawrence..... | do..... | do..... | Mare Island. |
| Ozark..... | Monitor..... | Submarine force..... | Norfolk. |
| Tonopah..... | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Tallahassee..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| San Francisco..... | Mine planter..... | Mine force..... | Hampton Roads. |
| Baltimore..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Lebanon..... | Tender..... | do..... | Do. |
| Sonoma..... | Tug..... | do..... | Hampton Roads. |
| Ontario..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Patapsco..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Patuxent..... | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads. |
| Hannibal..... | Tender..... | do..... | Buppan Bluff, Canal |
| Leonidas..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Osceola..... | Tug..... | do..... | Guantanamo. |
| Peoria..... | do..... | do..... | Key West. |
| Vestal..... | Repair..... | Train..... | York River. |
| Prometheus..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Solace..... | Hospital..... | do..... | Do. |
| Celtic..... | Store..... | do..... | St. Thomas. |
| Culgoa..... | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Glacier..... | do..... | do..... | San Diego. |
| Hancock..... | Transport..... | do..... | St. Thomas. |
| Prairie..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Buffalo..... | do..... | do..... | San Jose del Cabo. |
| Jupiter..... | Collier..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Cyclops..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Neptune..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk yard. |
| Proteus..... | do..... | do..... | Guam. |
| Nereus..... | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads. |
| Jason..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Orion..... | do..... | do..... | En route Honolulu to Zone. |
| Mars..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Vulcan..... | do..... | do..... | En route Guantanamo Philadelphia. |
| Nero..... | do..... | do..... | Pichilique. |
| Brutus..... | do..... | do..... | San Diego. |
| Maumee..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Arethusa..... | do..... | do..... | Charleston. |
| Kanawha..... | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads. |
| Caesar..... | do..... | Atlantic coast division | Alexandria, Egypt. |
| Sterling..... | do..... | do..... | New York. |
| Nanshan..... | do..... | Pacific auxiliary | Mare Island yard. |
| Saturn..... | do..... | do..... | En route San Francisco Cordova. |
| Rainbow..... | Tender..... | do..... | Mare Island. |
| Iroquois..... | Tug..... | do..... | San Diego. |
| Abarenda..... | Collier..... | Asiatic auxiliary | En route Cavite to Sulu |
| Ajax..... | do..... | do..... | Nagasaki. |
| Piscataqua..... | Tug..... | do..... | Guam. |
| Wompatuck..... | do..... | do..... | Olongapo. |
| Eagle..... | Gunboat..... | First district..... | Manati. |
| Vesuvius..... | Dynamite..... | Second district..... | Newport. |
| Amphitrite..... | Monitor..... | Third district..... | New Haven. |
| Newport..... | Gunboat..... | do..... | New York. |
| Gloucester..... | do..... | do..... | Brooklyn. |
| Wasp..... | do..... | do..... | Whitestone Landing. |
| Vixen..... | Tug..... | Fourth district..... | Philadelphia yard. |
| Montgomery..... | Gunboat..... | Fifth district..... | Norfolk. |
| Mayflower..... | do..... | do..... | Washington, D. C. |
| Sylvia..... | Yacht..... | do..... | Do. |
| Sylph..... | do..... | do..... | Do. (?) |
| Elfrida..... | do..... | Sixth district..... | Norfolk. |
| Dorothea..... | do..... | Great Lakes..... | Cleveland, Ohio (O. C.) |
| Alert..... | Tender..... | Fourteenth district..... | Pearl Harbor. |
| Navajo..... | Tug..... | do..... | Do. |
| Fortune..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Supply..... | Supply..... | do..... | Guam. |
| Potomac..... | Tug..... | Fifteenth district..... | Guantanamo. |
| Dochra..... | Supply..... | Train..... | Philadelphia. |
| Rappahanock..... | do..... | do..... | Commissioned Dec. (Philadelphia). |
| Kittery..... | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Proteus..... | Collier..... | Collier..... | En route Montevideo de Janeiro. |
| Orion..... | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads. |
| Mars..... | do..... | do..... | Boston. |

Mobilization Sheet, Apr. 16, 1917—Continued.

| Name. | Type. | Assignment. | Location. |
|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Vulcan..... | Collier..... | Collier..... | North River. |
| Maumee..... | Oilers..... | Oiler..... | En route Queenstown to Hampton Roads |
| Cuyama..... | Oiler..... | do..... | Portsmouth, England to Hampton Roads. |
| Arrowie..... | do..... | do..... | Dover, England. |
| Gold Shell..... | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads to Devon- port, England. |
| Los Angeles..... | do..... | do..... | Sheerness, England, to Hampton Roads. |
| Rockefeller..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Standard Arrow..... | do..... | do..... | Portsmouth, England, to Hampton Roads. |
| Tepila..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Pensacola..... | Cargo..... | Cargo..... | Do. |
| Bath..... | do..... | do..... | Brest. |
| Nero..... | do..... | do..... | Cardiff. |
| Houston..... | do..... | do..... | Tompkinsville (?). |
| Newport News..... | do..... | do..... | En route St. Nazaire to Phil- adelphia. |
| Astoria..... | do..... | do..... | Commissioned Nov. 15, 1917 (Charleston). |
| Beaufort..... | do..... | do..... | Thompkinsville. |
| Quincy..... | do..... | do..... | Commissioned Feb. 2, 1918 (New Orleans). |
| Long Beach..... | do..... | do..... | Commissioned Dec. 20, 1917 (Charleston). |
| Gulfport..... | do..... | do..... | San Pedro. |
| Sterling..... | do..... | do..... | Azores. |
| Ticonderoga..... | do..... | do..... | Commissioned Jan. 5, 1918 (Boston). |
| Teresa..... | do..... | do..... | Brest. |
| Sioux..... | do..... | do..... | Commissioned Dec. 1, 1917 (Norfolk). |
| Carib..... | do..... | do..... | New York. |
| Manta..... | do..... | do..... | En route Tampico to Key West. |
| Orama..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Potomac..... | Tug..... | Santo Domingo..... | Port au Prince. |
| Nokomis I..... | Yacht..... | do..... | Commissioned Dec. 5, 1917 (New York). |
| Vixen..... | do..... | St. Thomas..... | St. Thomas. |
| Petrel..... | Gunboat..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo. |
| Osceola..... | Tug..... | do..... | Do. |
| Brutus..... | Collier..... | Pacific Fleet..... | San Francisco. |
| Nanshan..... | do..... | do..... | San Diego. |
| Iroquois..... | Tug..... | do..... | Do. |
| Saturn..... | Radio repair..... | do..... | Cordova, Alaska. |
| Glacier..... | Supply..... | do..... | Rio de Janeiro. |
| Abarenda..... | Collier..... | Asiatic Fleet..... | Cavite. |
| Ajax..... | do..... | do..... | Nagasaki to Manila. |
| Piscataqua..... | Tug..... | do..... | Guam. |
| Wompatuck..... | do..... | do..... | Olongapo. |
| Caesar..... | Collier..... | do..... | Rangoon to Singapore. |

The first plan for cooperation with the Allies, which I have marked 17, was April 13, 1917. I have a copy of the dispatch which was sent from the commander in chief of the British naval forces, via the ambassador in Washington to his Admiralty in London. The date is April 13, 1917. This reads as follows:

PLAN No. 17.

FIRST PLAN FOR COOPERATION WITH ALLIES.

[From C. in C. A. & W. L., via ambassador, Washington.]

APRIL 13, 1917.

Your 246: Following points of agreement have been arrived at with United States Navy Department, French admiral sending telegram to Paris. Begins questions raised by British Admiralty.

First. One squadron immediately ready to proceed from North Atlantic port on receipt of information of escape of raider. Operations of ships of this squadron will be

coordinated with those of allied squadrons. Area of operations, from the parallel of Cape Sable to the longitude 50 west, thence south to the parallel of 20 north.

Second. Second squadron on the east coast of South America will be provided as soon as possible in the near future. Area of operations, from Brazilian coast along parallel 5 south to meridian 30 west, thence south to 15 south, then parallel with coast to the latitude of 35 south, then along that parallel to the coast.

Third. Six destroyers will be sent over in the immediate future; these will be based on British or French port, as may be considered most necessary.

Fourth. United States will look after west coast of North America from Canadian to Colombian boundaries.

Fifth. Relations with Chile, excellent. United States armed Government nitrate vessels will maintain continuous service for the present which will be utilized.

Sixth. United States China squadron will be maintained for the present.

Seventh. United States will supervise Gulf of Mexico and Central America as far as Colombian boundary, thence to west point of Jamaica along North coast of Jamaica to the east point of Virgin Islands, thence north to the southeastern limit of area referred to in first.

Eighth. If and when enemy submarine appear they will attempt to send several submarines to the Canadian coast, but this only possible if a parent ship or accommodations of men on shore provided.

Following points raised by French minister of marine:

First. Provision of small patrol for French coast not yet possible owing to requirements of home (?) (defense); when available, however, they will be supplied, France escorting them over and manning if necessary. Every possible effort will be made immediately to supply these; too much reliance should not be placed, however, in early success.

Second. Provision of armed naval transports for carrying (?) (railway material) to France: One will be furnished immediately, a second and third as soon as possible.

Further message transmitted in another cipher:

I will remain at Washington until I know whether you have any further instructions and to complete conference upon details on which I have been requested to advise Navy Department. H. M. S. *Leviathan* proceeds to Halifax. I shall return there by train.

That is signed by the British commander in our waters.

Senator PITTMAN. Captain, before you leave that plan, will you state in what conference this plan was worked out?

Capt. PRATT. I was not present, but it was between Vice Admiral Browning, Admiral Grasset, the General Board, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations—I do not know whether Admiral Mayo was there or not—all our leading men and the leading men of France and England.

The CHAIRMAN. April 11, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. April 13 is the date I have on this.

Senator PITTMAN. I wanted to tie it in with other evidence. There was evidence of a conference occurring early in April with the British and French admirals and our operating department, and I wanted simply to see if this was the result of it.

Capt. PRATT. This is the result of it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the result of the conference of April 11?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I wanted to say this in connection with that. This is a note of my own:

Admiral Sims's testimony following the agreement of April 13 contains the following passage:

"It will be noted that the agreements except in the third paragraph relate mainly to employment of forces elsewhere than in the war zone, but until I learned of this agreement by accident, I was totally unaware that any conference had been held. I learned from Admiral Jellicoe that he did not regard the agreement as embodying the full answer of cooperation needed from the American Navy, but that the specific arrangements provided for were intended to cover only the situation outside of the critical submarine zone. How it was regarded in Washington, I had no idea."

The CHAIRMAN. From whom is that quoted?

Capt. PRATT. From Admiral Sims in his testimony:

If there were doubts in Admiral Jellicoe's mind on the subject, why didn't he make direct request either through Admiral Sims to us, or via his own representatives here, as to the exact nature of the reinforcements required in European waters, beyond those asked for specifically by the commander in chief of the British forces in North Atlantic waters who had been directed by the Admiralty to confer with the department on this subject.

It was an oversight of operations not to have informed Admiral Sims, but would it not also have been better for the Admiralty to have reinforced Admiral Sims's pleas, in view of the agreement which they knew we had entered into.

I present this plan, which I have marked "18," to establish the policy to be adopted toward the German vessels now lying in our ports. This I think is after the war opened.

Senator PITTMAN. For the benefit of the record: When you say "after the war," you mean after our entry into the war?

Capt. PRATT. After our entry into the war; yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. We all understand it, of course.

Capt. PRATT. That was a very loose expression of mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the probable date of it?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was some time in April or the latter part of May; probably in April, because in May I was very busy executing some of the plans that I had been instrumental in drawing up. We were so short of men to really carry on things that you sometimes had to take up a plan and just walk away with it; in other words, you had to promote the very plan which you had drawn up, which in one case I did. And Capt. Scott picked up his armed-guard plan and walked away with it. He actually executed it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you refer to that later when you come to it?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I will. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 18.

MISSION—ESTABLISH THE POLICY TO BE ADOPTED TOWARD THE GERMAN VESSELS NOW LYING IN OUR PORTS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

a) As regards the vessels having a national character.

b) As regards the interned merchant vessels.

Following estimates of the situation by Commander Schofield and Capt. Pratt, the following decisions were reached:

DECISIONS.

(1) That this country having, in the President's proclamation, set for itself certain standards whereby in the existing laws enemy property rights, the safety and freedom of enemy human life, is to be respected and safeguarded to the limit compatible with the public welfare, it can not with dignity maintain other than this steadfast course of conduct.

(2) That the laws of necessity and of might do not make right, when the actuating motive is aggression and not defense.

(3) That for reasons of public defense, caused by the enemy's aggressive actions, it is correct to invoke the fundamental law of self-protection, and that such law is good law, if special treaties be abrogated by us or be abrogated automatically by the enemy through his actions toward us.

(4) That cause for retaliation, due to the enemy's treatment of our ships and citizens, and due to his own hostile acts within our own ports, does exist, but that it would be more in keeping with our dignity if we acted lawfully, rather than in the spirit of retaliation.

(5) If it becomes necessary for the public good that the German vessels lying in our ports be seized by us, that such an act partake of a lawful act rather than as an act of retaliation.

(6) That such necessity does exist now; that we take over the German ships lying in our ports (a) for our own public safety; (b) for our own use, due to the fact that Germany, in disregard of all law, having sunk so many of our own ships has rendered such a course necessary for the public good.

(7) That the German Government having shown an entire disregard for all law, we are entitled in self-defense to abrogate any special treaties we may have with her and to turn to the fundamental law or self-protection, in our attitude toward her.

(8) That it is a physical impossibility, owing to the acts of the German officers and crews themselves, to invoke the 24-hour precedent (hitherto allowed by the rules of international law) in behalf of the German ships now lying in our ports.

(9) That therefore it would be policy to abrogate any special treaties we may have with Germany, provided she has not already abrogated the same by her own acts; and then to seize all the German ships under an Executive order.

(10) That having seized all the ships, they should be taken over by the Navy, manned, gunned, commissioned, and operated by the Navy to further the ends of the most pressing immediate need, which is (to preserve the line of supplies to our allies) in accordance with the following plan: First. Taken over: By Executive order. Second. Inspected: By naval men for the purpose of repair, fit and commissioning. Third. Distributed: To the various yards and repair shops for repair. Fourth. Repaired: This work to take precedence over all other work except that of building destroyers and submarine chasers. Fifth. Armed: With not less than four naval guns of caliber not less than 5 inches. Sixth. Commissioned: Commissioned and manned by naval crews and officers. Seventh. Operated: As munition and supply ships across the Atlantic, under the direction of the Navy Department, but in co-operation with the shipping authorities. Eighth. Reimburse: To seize and hold the vessels of purely national character; later on, as an act of policy and kindness and consonant with our principles, the private owners of ships having a purely private character should be reimbursed.

APRIL 7, 1916.

Plan as to vessels of German Navy in United States ports:

1. Survey them, with a view to placing them in service.
2. Place the converted merchant vessels in service as naval auxiliaries, officers and manned by the Navy.

Plan as to refugee German ships in United States ports:

1. President to issue an Executive order (not to be published), placing all refugee German merchant vessels in custody of the Navy for service.
2. Continue present guards until Navy is ready to take over.
3. Navy survey, repair, and place in service all vessels as naval auxiliaries.
4. Determine order in which vessels will become available.
5. Navy to officer and man all vessels.
6. Assign to each vessel a minimum battery of four guns.
7. Arrange with existing trans-Atlantic shipping companies to handle the commercial shipments abroad, the Navy to operate the vessels.
8. Inventories and accounts of repairs to be kept, in order that the Government may be in a position to make such adjustments as policy may dictate later.

APRIL 7, 1917.

Memorandum:

I find no authority of treaty or law justifying seizure of vessels except by a general embargo, which, of course, can not be considered. This being the case, the decision must be founded on conditions that exist. These are:

- (1) The vessels can not put to sea.
- (2) Their crews are not on board, and the vessels are in the main disabled.
- (3) It is well known that German crews would destroy these vessels if they had further opportunity.
- (4) Success in the present war is dependent on shipping. Ninety enemy ships are in our power. It is impossible for them to return to their own country.
- (5) Imperative military necessity requires that these vessels render service and that they shall be diverted into the service that, for the present at least, will be most effective—the trans-Atlantic trade. There is no certain way of putting them in this trade except by placing them under complete naval control.
- (6) I consider it undesirable, for many reasons, for the Navy to do anything other than operate these vessels at sea.

Nineteen is a plan for fuel oil for naval purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the probable date of that?

Capt. PRATT. It was some time in April, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. After we had gone to war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. It may have been earlier, but it is not a very material plan. It is as follows:

PLAN No. 19.

MISSION--FUEL OIL FOR NAVAL PURPOSES.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Subject. Fuel oil for naval purposes.

Reference: Paper from Rear Admiral J. R. Edwards, United States Navy, March 6, 1917.

A study of this very valuable and able paper leads, in summarizing the whole subject matter, to certain conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. For fleet tactical purposes alone, the use of oil is superior to the use of coal.
2. For economic reasons the use of coal for fleet purposes is probably now and in the future will be cheaper than the use of oil.
3. The United States is in the position of favored nation, when balancing economic against strategic or tactical reasons, internally. She is in the same position, externally, when balancing her economic condition against that of any other nation in the world.
4. In its control of the oil of the world, the United States is in the position of favored nation. As regards the rest of the world its control of oil is in a greater ratio than its control of coal.
5. The use of oil alone for fleet purposes must be dependent upon several factors:
 - a. Available supply at source (at home or controlled).
 - b. Control of that supply for fleet purposes.
 - c. Ability to receive supplies when operating away from source (at home or controlled).
6. The use of coal for fleet purposes is dependent upon the same factors mentioned in 5.
7. The statement on page 57, "The more thoughtful and conservative recognized authorities upon petroleum are practically in accord in the belief that the limit of production in the United States has substantially been reached," is an excellent expression of competent opinion, but it is not a definite statement of the amount of oil on hand, or in sight, or if the amounts on hand or in sight will be ample for fleet uses for a number of years ahead.
8. The statement on page 100, "The Navy should immediately obtain the permanent services, in an advisory capacity at least, of one eminent civilian petroleum technologist," seems sound.
9. If, after expert investigation, the conclusion is or has been reached that the available oil supply under our control, at source, is sufficient for present fleet needs with a good outlook in the future, for a reasonable term of years, then this should be made the basis for decision, that the fighting fleet units be oil burning.
10. If, after expert investigation, the conclusion is or has been reached that the available oil supply under our control, at source, will not be adequate for fleet needs for a reasonable number of years ahead, then this should be made the basis for a decision that our fleet revert either to (a) coal burning or (b) oil and coal burning.
11. Because the above reason (aside from commercial reasons) is the only real controlling reason in the case, once (a) the tactical superiority of oil is established; (b) an understanding is reached that oil and coal alike must be treated as supplies, and that the matter of supply is a matter of logistics, incident to any operations, whether military or naval, conducted away from well-established base.
12. If the condition outlined in paragraph (10), exists, then it will be necessary, first, to revert to condition (b), coal and oil burning; and, second, to condition (a), coal burning, for fleet fighting units.
13. If it becomes necessary to revert to condition (b), oil and soft coal burning, then the two schemes offering the best solutions seem to be: (a) Boilers separately fitted for

oil and coal, with the purpose of using both oil and coal separately but at the same time when necessary; (b) boilers built to use either coal or oil independently, but so fitted that if oil is being used, a transfer to coal burning can be effected with certain boiler changes, of a minor character, or vice versa.

(14) Of the two schemes outlined above and taken from the reference paper—

(a) No. (1) is more economical than No. (2)—for alteration in construction reasons—for ordinary steaming reasons, unless No. (2) scheme contemplates the constant use of coal.

(b) No. (1) gives practical training in the use of both oil and coal, which No. (2) does not.

(c) No. (1) requires no prewar changes, or only a partial prewar change, per each large fighting unit, to return entirely to oil, while No. (2) scheme requires entire prewar changes, per boiler per ship, unless oil had previously been used entirely, in which case we are back to our original proposition, now under consideration, of the inadvisability of using oil as a fuel for our fighting units entirely.

(15) Whatever we use, whether oil or coal, or both at the same time, the question of adequate advance preparation, in the matter of bases, reserve supplies, facility of transport, is vital and much the same, whatever propelling agent we use.

(16) If, through lack of adequate oil supply, it becomes necessary to revert to schemes similar to those outlined in paragraph 13, then it should be the constant aim (a) to keep certain reserve supplies of oil constantly on hand, on board ship; (b) be equipped with boilers, so fitted, that with the supplies carried on board, and in a minimum space of time the ship could, with her own resources, change from coal to oil burning.

The next is a plan to outline a general scheme for efficient cooperation in information, plans, and operation. This was made, I think, very early in April. Really, it was on the basis of this that the reorganization in the Office of Operations practically took place; partial reorganization, but more correctly and accurately stated, an expansion.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this after the declaration of war?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was very shortly afterwards. I carried it into effect myself after I became aid for Operations, to a very large extent; but it was gradually developing all the time, and there is no one man who is responsible for the increase in that office; the Plans Section, the Material Section, especially under Admiral McKean; such officers as Admiral McKean and Commander Carter, Admiral Benson's aid, and Admiral Belknap, who took up the whole merchant ship proposition and expanded it and created an office within our office; such men as Commander Ingersoll, who took up our communication system and expanded it to meet the needs of the war; Wilson Brown, Todd, Admiral Osterhaus, Capt. Marvell, Capt. Blakely, Capts. Schofield and McNamee, Yarnell, Evans, McCauley, Hart, Bristol, Gormhley, and Crenshaw in the Submarine Section, and particularly Capt. Gilpin, who really took the card index system and made a visible operation section so that we could conduct our operations visibly in the same way that a staff conducts its operations in the field. That is the base plan of it. That must have been very early in April. I made it out myself, and I carried it into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably after war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; the office was running. But of course it was on a peace basis before that time. We had to expand a great deal. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 20.

MISSION—TO OUTLINE A GENERAL SCHEME FOR THE EFFICIENT COOPERATION OF INFORMATION—PLANS—OPERATIONS.

Following an estimate of the situation the following conclusions were reached:

1. That there shall be kept in the operating room a graphic record of operations, as follows: (a) A fleet-movement sheet. (b) The information sheet. (c) The district sheets. (d) A sheet showing the movements of merchant shipping. (e) Working sheets. (f) A card-index system of recording all movements, orders, information, and general instructions.

2. (a) *Fleet-movement sheet.*—The fleet-movement sheet shall show in appropriate manner the general movements of our naval forces, and the enemy movements. When more detailed accuracy is needed, as in the specific direction of naval forces or of merchant shipping, the necessary details will be worked out on the working sheets, and the movements as they occur transferred to the fleet movements and movements of merchant-shipping sheets.

3. (b) *Information sheet.*—The information sheet should give the following information: (1) Information of our own naval forces. (2) Information relating to enemy naval forces. (3) Information relating to naval defense districts and cooperate activities of a general character. (4) General information. (5) Information of a military character. (6) Information relating particularly to merchant shipping, general in character.

4. The scene upon which the (a) fleet movement sheet and (b) the information sheet, should be laid, is an enlarged chart of the world, taking in all areas where movements of ships may occur and where information may be obtained. Upon this chart should be entered, in advance, all information liable to be constantly referred to, and the names of all the places liable to be used by vessels of our and the enemy fleets.

The working sheets, involving more detailed operations, will naturally be limited to that section of the world immediately under consideration.

5. On the fleet-movement sheet it should be possible (under the system devised) to identify individual ships; also entire organizations and parts of organizations. The sight areas upon which the two forces are laid down should be broad enough to give an outline of the enemy's probable policy and strategic objective. The working sheets should be sufficiently detailed to permit of tactical deployment and the development of the enemy's tactical plans.

6. The information sheet should be kept up in a graphic manner by daily additions and changes, so that at a glance the trained observer can immediately place: (1) The various kinds of information available. (2) The order of its importance. (3) The date when it occurs. (4) Where it occurs. (5) A brief outline of its character. (6) Where the information is filed. (7) Whether immediate action is necessary.

7. Information is intimately connected with plan and movement, and can in no wise be separated with efficient results. It is the food which stimulates creative production, and it furnishes the guides to the roads movement should follow. The graphic representation of information and its cooperation with movement and plan: (1) Relieves the mental processes at times when those processes need relief. (2) Helps the mental faculties to concentrate when concentration becomes necessary. (3) Permits the entire picture to come into the vision, so that the broad outlook is not lost. (4) Permits of detailed inspection when detail is required. (5) Allows no detail to escape the memory. (6) And above all it preserves that continuity between the past, present, and future which is so essential to well-balanced, connected plans and to the efficient administration of them.

8. (c) *The district sheets.*—The district sheets should be kept up in such a way that it is possible to obtain from them a fairly succinct synopsis of daily events at a glance. Owing to the variety of operations and the infinite number of movements within each district, due to the great number of small craft and their relative unimportance, it will probably be impossible to keep such a sheet up to date after the manner of a fleet-movement sheet. But if at the end of each day, week, or specified time a miniature chart of the district were submitted by the commandant, indicating—(1) the extent and character of operations; (2) the general plan of action and field of operation for each distinct force; (3) the positions of important events, with time, date, and forces involved; (4) the location of enemy forces; (5) the extent of cooperation with other forces; (6) an accurate account of entrance, exit, and control of merchant shipping; (7) any further pertinent remarks of importance—then a very fair graphic representation of naval activities within each district would be had, and such information would be of great value.

9. (d) *Movements of merchant shipping sheet.*—There is at present kept up an administrative sheet showing the names of the merchant ships that have applied for

armed guards, the guns assigned, etc., but there are no sheets which (a) keep track of the movements of merchant ships, or (b) furnish them with information of a military nature for their guidance, similar to the pilot charts furnished as navigational aids. In view of the fact that the submarine, mine, and raider are now greater menaces than any of the dangers depicted on the pilot charts, the value to the mariner of such a chart as (b) above is evident.

If later on naval control over the movements of merchant ships is introduced, the value of a merchant-ship movement sheet, such as indicated in (a) above is evident, and it will record in graphic form the directions issued to each merchant ship plying within the areas of naval control.

(10) (e) *Working sheets*.—There must be working sheets upon which are depicted in appropriate manner. (1) The fleet strategic plans. (2) The fleet tactical dispositions and events as they happen. (3) Sheets upon which can be worked out such directions as it may be necessary to give to merchant shipping in safeguarding it across the Atlantic.

There must be an intimate connection between the working sheets mentioned in (1) and (2) and the fleet operation orders, and any radio messages sent or received by the fleet or by operations. Appropriate means for temporary file near the working sheets must be provided, in order that no necessary information be lost or neglected, and to afford a check. But these files are merely for the purpose of conveniently handling the immediate work at hand, and do not replace the permanent card-index file. Sheet (3), for the merchant shipping bears an intimate relation to the "district sheets sent out by the district commandants" to operations and to the "Pilot chart of information sent out by the district commandants" for the benefit of merchant shipping.

(11) (f) *Card-index file*.—For a permanent system extending over years, including peace-training maneuvers as well as actual war operations, some form of card-index system for ready reference is necessary.

NOTE.—The details for the fleet movement sheet, and for the information sheet have been worked out.

Then I have a plan, to outline the best general plan to get troops to the western front——

The CHAIRMAN. In each case I wish you would give the probable date.

Capt. PRATT. This was about the 1st of April.

Senator PITTMAN. In each case, when you speak of the 1st of April, you mean 1917?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean before the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I am merely showing you some of these plans to show you that we had some preparations.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know whether it was before the war or after we entered the war, in each case.

Capt. PRATT. Well, I conceived of it before the war. I probably wrote it after the war. This is not particularly important. It did not go into effect during the war, but the gist of it was put in effect after the armistice, because they used these very ships that were indicated to bring our troops home. It was not a real operational plan. It is as follows:

PLAN No. 21.

Mission.—To outline the best general plan to get troops to the western front.

Following an estimate of the situation, the following conclusions were reached:

(1) That the above order of precedence expresses the needs of the immediate situation, because—

- (a) The efficient offensive is an offensive which must be directed solely and whole-heartedly at the immediate threatening enemy menace, which is the submarine menace.
- (b) The submarine menace threatens the life of logistics and the great supply arteries to the warring allies, both in their homes and at the front.
- (c) In the ultimate issue, the deciding factor tending to end the war will be a favorable military decision on the western front.

That the above order of precedence expresses the needs of the immediate situation, because—(Continued).

(d) Like supplies, the arrival of reinforcements must be as certain and as sure as the existing state of affairs will permit.

(e) The actual pressing needs of the immediate situation in offensive effort, supplies, and reinforcements must take precedent over any possible conjectural future contingency.

That in viewing the problem of this war as a whole from the broadest naval and military points of view, with an eye to determining our part in it, the following facts come out:

(a) The main arena of war is and will continue to be the western frontier of Europe, including the bordering oceans.

(b) In that arena there are: (1) Two offensive fighting lines, one furnished by the Army on land, the second composed of those naval units capable of conducting an offensive against the enemy water offensive (his submarine operations). (2) Two containing forces, composed of both naval and military units, the Army being in the nature of a tactical containing force, while the allied fleets form a strategic containing force. (3) A reserve which is composed of nations, armies, naval forces held in positions of readiness from which at the opportune time they may be launched most efficiently against the enemy. That our entry in this war has placed us primarily in the rôle of the reserve, until such time as efficient cooperation with the Allies demands that we assume some rôle in the offensive line. (4) A line of supply for reinforcements of men and supplies of food and munitions. This is the rôle (aside from a somewhat minor offensive), which our naval forces in the reserve can at first play an eminent part by (a) maintaining the food and munition supply line, by building, arming, and manning the merchant shipping available.

(c) Furnishing offensive forces where offensive forces may be useful, such as against enemy submarines and raiders. (d) Safeguarding the transport of the military forces sent to the front.

It is a fact that the submarine campaign has severely taxed and strained logistics and matter of supplies. It is a further fact that the transport of military forces to the front will increase the present tax—

(a) By making the demands for supplies at the front greater.

(b) By making demands for transport service on the merchant shipping already strained by logistic demands.

There then remains but one class of vessel, whose present services are not in demand either for offensive work or for the service of logistics, but which are held in reserve for a future contingency. This call may be—

(a) To conduct a legitimate offensive of their own before this war is ended.

(b) To assist in the service of supply and transport during this war.

(c) Caused by the unsuccessful termination of the present war.

(d) Caused by unforeseen or new complications arising or brought to a focus after this war.

The class of vessels referred to are the naval warships of the major type—battleships and armored cruisers.

That of all the demands outlined in paragraph 4, (a), (b), (c), (d), the paragraph at (b) will make the first demands and probably the most pressing demands. As the nature of the demand will probably be so great that even with regard to major fighting ships, it will have to be removed from the class of future contingencies and placed in the immediate present. This then leaves (a), (c), (d) as contingencies.

That the future contingency does not warrant us in sparing any portion of our fleet from the immediate work at hand, or of withholding any of our major ships from the service in the line of supply, for—

(a) It furnishes most excellent training, and morale to meet the future situation, as reserves to the allied fleets.

(b) Were the present war to end unsuccessfully, our best reply to that condition is the submarine campaign, waged by our naval forces, on similar but humane lines and our Army well trained through universal service.

(c) If through complications arising after this war, with a fresh antagonist, we were forced to engage in a fresh war, the submarine and the universally trained Army are still the Nation's best defensive assets, leaving our country safe even if at first forced to adopt a defensive instead of an offensive rôle.

(d) The reason that our whole-hearted participation in this war, now we are in it, is likely to leave us in a more favorable position, in regard to future wars, than any half-hearted cooperation could possibly do.

(7) That therefore of all our naval forces now held in the reserve; the one which we must guard carefully and maintain for our own defense, as an offensive defense; the one we can least spare, and the one which must be built up trained to the minute and held for our own purposes, is our submarine force.

(8) That therefore if the demands of the supply line become so great that our merchant shipping can not be withdrawn from the service of supply to the service of transport of troops, then will the armed ships of the Navy with its major units have to undertake the service of the transport of troops.

(9) That for the purpose of safeguarding the passage of troops, the heavy armed and fast naval vessels, are the safest carriers, and therefore the surest.

(10) That the same objections exist to transporting troops by the convoy method en masse, as exist in the transport of supplies.

(11) That the fast heavy armed ship is to some extent its own defensive convoy against such enemies as raiders, but to further insure its immunity against submarine attack it would be wise to escort such vessels (if practicable) by the craft that constitute the submarine greatest menace.

(12) Therefore the instant the demand is made to transport our military forces to the front, for offensive action, unless our own naval major ships can themselves be used in offensive action, against their proper foes, that they should be used in offensive action, against their proper foes, that they should be used in the service of the line of supply, to transport troops, in the following order of their naval effectiveness:

- (a) The dreadnoughts.
- (b) The armored cruisers.
- (c) The older battleships.

(13) That in this service of transport, no attempt should be made to congregate at certain home points of embarkation, great numbers of troops and not to wait until this congregation of the military forces was an assured fact, in order to start the journey together, but that the most effective and surest means of getting the military forces across the water, also the quickest, is to observe the following rules:

- (a) Select different points of embarkation.
- (b) Collect only at the points of embarkation, such complete organizations as will make the immediate passage.
- (c) Sail individually.
- (d) Sail secretly.
- (e) Make the passage at speed.
- (f) Arrange for the grand assembly and final adjustment of organizations of troops to take place on the other side, not on this side.
- (g) If destroyers or appropriate craft can be spared from the service of offense, escort the major transporting ships by units not to exceed 3 escorting small craft, for each major ship.

(14) While making passage, strip the naval vessels of such part of its crew:

- (a) Not needed for running.
- (b) Not absolutely needed for training.
- (c) That due to the service of transport, with an eye to contingencies, it was felt might be spared for the particular voyage in question.

(15) Leave in the shore training camps, from each naval vessel, a sufficient personnel of officers, to insure the efficient training of the shore group, during the time of passage of the ship.

(16) Shift the ship and shore groups, whenever it is deemed necessary.

This was a plan which we started working on, I should think, about the first part of May or the last part of April. It took a great deal of time to get it through, to get the required approval from Mr. Denman, who was then on the Shipping Board, and to get the signatures of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It was something which had to receive the cooperation of both the Army and the Shipping Board, as well as ourselves, and the details are not here, but the proclamation was itself signed (I handled this myself) in July 12, 1917, and the names of the ships taken over, the German ships, the troop transports, and that is the transport plan that we began to operate under [reading]:

PLAN No. 22.

[Joint letter.]

WAR DEPARTMENT—NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

From: Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.

To: The President.

Subject: Transports to be commissioned in the Navy.

1. After consultation, the War and Navy Departments jointly recommend that the following-named ex-German vessels be commissioned in the Navy for transporting troops and munitions during the continuance of the present war:

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Leviathan—Vaterland. | Neckar—Antigone. |
| Mount Vernon—Kronprinzessin Cecillie. | Rhein—Susquehanna. |
| Memnon—Kaiser Wilhelm II. | Princess Irene—Pocahontas. |
| George Washington—George Washington. | President Grant—President Grant. |
| Amerika—America. | Cincinnati—Covington. |
| Powhatan—Hamburg. | President Lincoln—President Lincoln. |
| Aeolus—Grosser Kurfurst. | Frederick der Grosse—Huron. |
| Madawaska—Koenig Wilhelm II. | Barbarossa—Mercury. |

2. The War and Navy Departments jointly recommend further that should it be found necessary to take over additional vessels for permanent employment as transports during the present war vessels so taken over shall be commissioned in the Navy.

W. S. BENSON
Chief of Naval Operations.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

TASKER H. BLISS,
Chief of Staff.

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 12, 1917.

Approved:

WOODROW WILSON.

I submit this plan, which I have marked 23. This was the first part of April. It did not have anything to do with the war, as it turned out.

The plan referred to is as follows:

PLAN No. 23.

MISSION—THE NAVAL POSITION AND NEEDS IN THE MATTER ON PANAMA REPUBLIC,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE CANAL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington.

Memorandum prepared for State Department, May 19, 1917.

W. V. P.

OPERATIONS.

Memorandum for the State Department.

The naval position and needs in the matter of Panama, with special reference to the adequate defense of the canal:

(1) The primary position of the Navy with reference to the defense of the canal is largely a matter of strategy, and the first question is the proper location of the fleet, either in the Atlantic or the Pacific. To effect this the integrity of the canal must be assured.

(2) As a base of supply for the fleet, acting in accord with the above mission, the Panama area is of prime importance, and is centrally located, for certain naval activities. However, such a base will be in the Canal Zone itself, and within the present fixed fortifications.

(3) To effect the local defense of the canal there must be—

(a) An adequate local military and naval defense of the entire Panama area.

(b) Efficient cooperation between not only the military and naval forces of the United States stationed in the zone, but also between the United States forces in the zone and the inhabitants of the Republic of Panama, in order that their reserves of supplies and men may be thrown into the balance with the United States and

(7) That therefore of all our naval forces now held in the reserve; the one which must guard carefully and maintain for our own defense, as an offensive defense; the one we can least spare, and the one which must be built up trained to the minute and held for our own purposes, is our submarine force.

(8) That therefore if the demands of the supply line become so great that our merchant shipping can not be withdrawn from the service of supply to the service of transport of troops, then will the armed ships of the Navy with its major units have to undertake the service of the transport of troops.

(9) That for the purpose of safeguarding the passage of troops, the heavy armed and fast naval vessels, are the safest carriers, and therefore the surest.

(10) That the same objections exist to transporting troops by the convoy method en masse, as exist in the transport of supplies.

(11) That the fast heavy armed ship is to some extent its own defensive convoy against such enemies as raiders, but to further insure its immunity against submarine attack it would be wise to escort such vessels (if practicable) by the craft that constitute the submarine greatest menace.

(12) Therefore the instant the demand is made to transport our military forces to the front, for offensive action, unless our own naval major ships can themselves be used in offensive action, against their proper foes, that they should be used in offensive action, against their proper foes, that they should be used in the service of the line of supply, to transport troops, in the following order of their naval effectiveness:

- (a) The dreadnoughts.
- (b) The armored cruisers.
- (c) The older battleships.

(13) That in this service of transport, no attempt should be made to congregate at certain home points of embarkation, great numbers of troops and not to wait until this congregation of the military forces was an assured fact, in order to start the journey together, but that the most effective and surest means of getting the military forces across the water, also the quickest, is to observe the following rules:

- (a) Select different points of embarkation.
- (b) Collect only at the points of embarkation, such complete organizations as will make the immediate passage.
- (c) Sail individually.
- (d) Sail secretly.
- (e) Make the passage at speed.
- (f) Arrange for the grand assembly and final adjustment of organizations of troops to take place on the other side, not on this side.
- (g) If destroyers or appropriate craft can be spared from the service of offense, escort the major transporting ships by units not to exceed 3 escorting small craft, for each major ship.

(14) While making passage, strip the naval vessels of such part of its crew:

- (a) Not needed for running.
- (b) Not absolutely needed for training.
- (c) That due to the service of transport, with an eye to contingencies, it was felt might be spared for the particular voyage in question.

(15) Leave in the shore training camps, from each naval vessel, a sufficient personnel of officers, to insure the efficient training of the shore group, during the time of passage of the ship.

(16) Shift the ship and shore groups, whenever it is deemed necessary.

This was a plan which we started working on, I should think, about the first part of May or the last part of April. It took a great deal of time to get it through, to get the required approval from Mr. Denman, who was then on the Shipping Board, and to get the signatures of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It was something which had to receive the cooperation of both the Army and the Shipping Board, as well as ourselves, and the details are not here, but the proclamation was itself signed (I handled this myself) in July 12, 1917, and the names of the ships taken over, the German ships, the troop transports, and that is the transport plan that we began to operate under [reading]:

NAVAL POSITION

From: Secretary of War and Navy
To: The President.
Subject: Transports to be constructed

1. After consultation, the War and Navy Departments have determined that the following-named ex-German vessels were used to transport troops and munitions during the war:
- Leviathan—Vaterland.
 - Mount Vernon—Kronprinzessin.
 - Agamemnon—Kaiser Wilhelm.
 - George Washington—George Washington.
 - Amerika—America.
 - Powhatan—Hamburg.
 - Aeolus—Grosser Kurfurst.
 - Madawaska—Koenig Wilhelm.

2. The War and Navy Departments have found necessary to take over additional transports during the present war.

W. S. BENSON
Chief of Naval Operations
JOSEPHUS DANIELS
Secretary of the Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 22, 1917
Approved:

I submit this plan, which was submitted in part of April. It did not turn out.

The plan referred to is as follows:

MISSION—THE NAVAL POSITION
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PANAMA CANAL

Memorandum prepared for the President

Memorandum for the President

The naval position and the adequate defense of the Panama Canal.

(1) The primary position is largely a matter of strategy. The fleet, either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, must be assured.

(2) As a base of supply, the Panama area is of prime importance for military activities. However, the present fixed fortifications are inadequate.

- (3) To effect the local defense of the Panama Canal:
- (a) An adequate local force.
 - (b) Efficient cooperation between the United States station and the zone and the installation of supplies and other facilities.

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against any probable enemy until such time, at least, as the United States may be able to send the necessary forces of its own.

(c) The absolute safeguarding of either one of the two routes of passage from the United States to Panama, via the Atlantic, via the Pacific, together with the complete security of the two terminal ports of disembarkation.

(4) The relations of Panama to the United States in a military and naval sense are comprised in paragraph (3).

(5) The first main essential in our relations with Panama, from a military and naval point of view, is hearty and efficient cooperation. To effect this much depends upon—

(a) The character of the heads—diplomatic, military, and naval—we send to this country. These people are extremely susceptible to courtesy, and without it we will not get far. They also have many quite able men conducting their affairs.

(b) The practical aid we give them in the matter of loans, etc.

(c) The extent and character of our efforts to win their support, and to make their efforts coincide with our own.

(6) The second essential from the military and naval point of view is the question of transportation of the troops locally stationed on the zone and their ability to move quickly from any point within the Canal Zone to any threatened point within the Republic whose integrity is vital to the integrity of the canal.

This is immediately a question of roads, and this is also the first purpose toward which any loans we may make should be directed. The two most necessary roads are roads paralleling the Pacific coast line—one toward Chepo, one toward Montijo Bay. A third road might parallel the northeastern Atlantic coast line toward Porto Bello or beyond. The northwestern Atlantic coast line toward Chiriqui is as yet too undeveloped to warrant the first expenditures for roads in this direction.

(7) The next essential is the development of the resources of Panama, to enable it to become a reservoir of supply for our forces stationed in the Canal Zone. Beyond the acquisition by the United States of the lands of Panama now under consideration (with perhaps a few minor exceptions), it is not believed that the policy of expropriation should extend further than it already has. The defense of the canal depends less upon the expropriation of Panama lands by the United States than it does upon a hearty and efficient cooperation with its people and their willingness to enter with us into any defense we consider necessary, extending even to the very borders of the Panama Republic itself. To effect this last purpose, we must have the right when the military necessity arises (a right we possess now under the terms of the treaty) to temporarily occupy with military forces any lands within the entire Republic, or any of its waters, with our naval forces.

To develop the resources of Panama, that they may become ample and available for our forces operating from the Canal Zone as a center, transportation to and from this center is a first requisite.

(8) Another essential to defense is the development of the system of communications within the Republic. This includes radio telegraph, cable, and telephone systems.

(9) The prime essential to a protracted defense of the Canal Zone lies in the ability of the United States to control one ocean and the terminal facilities of the canal bordering on that ocean. A second equally important essential is the ability of the United States to furnish reinforcements of troops, ships, and supplies, delivered at the canal terminals within the time they are urgently needed. These are matters concerning principally the United States, with which Panama is little concerned except as to results.

(10) As far as the Navy itself is concerned, beyond the right to use the waters of Panama as it sees fit, when necessity arises involving any question of the defense of the Canal Zone (a right it now possesses, or, if not clear as to point of law, which it should possess), there is but one position of tactical and strategic value, which it would be specially advantageous for the United States to possess now—this is Saboga anchorage in the Pearl Islands, with those islands surrounding it.

Respectfully submitted.

W. V. PRATT,
Captain, United States Navy.

Approved.

I simply give that as an instance to show that we were not asleep as to what might happen.

I next submit a plan for outline of the policy for cooperating with the Emergency Fleet Corporation along the lines suggested by Gen. George Goethals. This is dated June 7, 1917. It is as follows:

PLAN No. 24.

MISSION—OUTLINE OF THE POLICY FOR COOPERATING WITH THE EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY GEN. G. W. GOETHALS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 7, 1917.

From: Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in the matter of propositions submitted by Gen. G. W. Goethals, general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

Reference: (a) Letter of May 28, 1917, from United States Shipping Board to Secretary of the Navy.

1. The importance and seriousness of this subject, together with the necessity of arriving first of all at a correct naval policy which shall coordinate its efforts with the efforts of those engaged in supplying the tremendous wastage in cargo tonnage caused by the submarine campaign, leads me to submit this letter. Were all views thoroughly in accord there could be no discussion. There is, however, a decided difference of opinions in the matter of the naval policy to be pursued. This letter is not in accord with the general view of the office; but it is submitted as one view of what the policy should be.

2. Owing to the present emergency, the Navy Department recognizes the building of cargo vessels is a measure of importance commensurate with the building of warships itself. Since in the department's opinion the building of a wooden fleet is not an adequate or a permanent way of meeting the situation, which must be met by steel construction, the Navy Department is glad to cooperate with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in every way possible, in enabling it to put its building program into operation.

3. A statement of the department's policy as regards the order of importance of war ships to be laid down is as follows:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| (1) Submarine chasers. | (8) Submarine tenders. |
| (2) Destroyers. | (9) Hospital ships. |
| (3) Scout cruisers. | (10) Ammunition ships. |
| (4) Submarines, large and small. | (11) Repair ships. |
| (5) Battleships. | (12) Transports. |
| (6) Fuel ships. | (13) Gunboats. |
| (7) Destroyer tenders. | (14) Battle cruisers. |

4. The first five types, with the exception of (3) scout cruisers (of which only a limited number to serve as destroyer flotilla leaders should be laid down), are types of ships which are needed at present and the naval needs are such that all vessels of these types authorized should be begun at once.

5. Of equal importance to the above ships come the heavy merchant cargo carriers contemplated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

6. Naval ships coming under heads (6) to (12), inclusive, could, if necessity arose, be supplied out of the very types of ships to be built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

7. It therefore becomes evident that any cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation must be along lines represented by classes (3) and (14).

8. It is therefore believed that the first proposition submitted by Gen. Goethals is sound and that the Navy Department should cooperate to this extent. No new ships for the Navy of classes (6) to (12) inclusive, will be laid down on ways outside of Navy Yard ways without an adjustment first with the Emergency Fleet Corporation, so long as the present emergency exists. If, however, due to this policy the shortages in such types of naval auxiliaries severely handicap the Navy, it is agreed that the Emergency Fleet Corporation will meet this need out of its own vessels building.

9. It is also believed that the second proposition is sound, and that the Navy Department should cooperate to the extent of relieving any or all of the four building ways (not in a navy yard on the Atlantic coast) now under construction for the battle cruisers, in order that said ways may be used by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This arrangement to hold good during the present emergency, or unless a new military necessity demands a new arrangement.

10. It is not the department's policy to allow cargo-carrying merchant ships to be laid down on any ways in the existing navy yards. Such construction cramps the

yard facilities and handicaps the purpose for which these yards were originally established, viz, the repairs of naval ships already in service. But in view of the present emergency, it is believed that any battle cruisers' ways, laid down in a navy yard on the Pacific coast, could be temporarily loaned to the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

11. The above views are held because it is believed:

(a) A successful termination of this war will preclude the chance of another for some term of years.

(b) For the allied purposes, merchant ships are as essential to the successful termination of this war as battleships, and that their construction is even more important at present.

(c) The counter for the United States, in case of an unsuccessful termination of this war lies in: (1) In our naval submarine; (2) in conscription.

(d) Of new future possible opponents other than the present opponents: (1) The chances are remote, owing to present alliances; (2) We are already stronger than any other probable opponents; (3) It would be better to buy our battle cruisers from our present allies (in case they were needed) than to lay them down now in the present emergency, an emergency which must be met now.

(e) In case this war terminates successfully, the merchant ships laid down by us will be the most useful types in existence in furthering the ultimate good of the country.

12. Finally, we did not enter this war alone. We have allies, and their efforts against the now common enemy, have stood between us and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. Their needs are immediate and imperative. Their cause is our cause now. The decision to the estimate of the situation as made in this office was as follows:

IMMEDIATE MISSION.

To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers. And a second important but future mission was:

Develop the full military and naval strength of the United States as far as possible.

In a paper of April 5, 1917, the general board writing on the subject "Assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of War" makes several pertinent suggestions of which one is as follows: "Keep constantly in view the possibility of the United States being in the not distant future compelled to conduct a war single-handed against some of the present belligerents and steadily increase the strength of the fighting line," etc., etc.

That remark is pertinent and sound, but it does not mean that one fraction of the strength of the effort we should put into the successful accomplishment of the immediate mission should be sacrificed to any possible future contingency. Moreover, the day that the conscription law passed, and universal training was assured to the people of our country, its future security was guaranteed in a manner past every future building program the Navy might attempt.

13. A hasty review of the international situation leads me to the conclusions that England's fleet will never be allowed to pass into German hands, nor can it be quiescent while Germany works her will on any of the present Allies. It is the death of England to allow it. If at the end of this war strained relations should arise with England (a proposition which seems to be untenable) no amount of feverish building of dreadnoughts or battle cruisers could hope to put us in a position to cope with her fleet on the high seas. In such a contingency our efforts should now be directed toward augmenting our submarine fleet, in both the offensive and information types.

14. It must have been noted that upon our entry into this war, a certain tension existing between this country and Japan was immediately relaxed. They immediately in certain press articles suggested a close cooperation with the United States. This close cooperation now with Japan is to my mind the key to the solution of what might have been a future problem.

15. Therefore, if we concentrate our present naval building efforts to:

- (1) A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs;
- (2) Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.
- (3) Battleships laid down and now on the ways.
- (4) Certain types of small craft, such as tugs and sweepers.

(5) Cooperate with the Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers, we will have put forth the Navy's best efforts, not for the Navy alone, but for the country, and especially for the Allies, whose war is now our own.

16. For the above reasons I am obliged to differ with the consensus of opinion expressed in the Office of Operations, and implied in the general board's recommendations, and do concur in the opinion and propositions expressed in Gen. Goethals' letter of May 28, 1917, with the modification set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.

W. V. PRATT.

Number 25 is a plan to inaugurate a naval building program which will best meet our immediate needs and which will not be inharmonious with any future policy we may be called upon to adopt. This was probably about the 1st of June. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 25.

MISSION—INAUGURATE A NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM WHICH WILL BEST MEET OUR IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND WHICH WILL NOT BE INHARMONIOUS WITH ANY FUTURE POLICY WE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ADOPT.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Following estimates of the situation submitted by Commander Schofield, Commander Lanning, and other officers, the following decisions are reached:

NOW.

- (1) That the immediate need is to speed up the naval building program.
- (2) In building now, to lay special stress on those particular types which are needed now.
- (3) That the destroyer, with its accompanying flotilla tender, is the type which is needed now.
- (4) To lay down as many of these craft, at once as the various yards can accommodate, with the idea of bringing the grand total of destroyers to a number which shall be in the ratio of 4 to 1 with the battleships and battle cruisers, or a grand total of 232. Number to be laid down now, 124.
- (5) To lay down immediately a flotilla of small fast patrol craft for the use of the Atlantic coast defenses. The basis of the policy in determining the numbers of these craft, to be as follows:
 - (a) They are bought or constructed because of the immediate need only and not for future needs;
 - (b) that for future needs the present type of 110 foot craft may radically change;
 - (c) that sufficient numbers to provide for the defense of the four principal Atlantic seaports and to patrol certain probable submarine basing localities be provided;
 - (d) that to meet the immediate need it is unnecessary to estimate for the Pacific coast;
 - (e) that the minimum of such craft, rather than the maximum, should be the basis of estimate;
 - (f) that 250 such craft represent the minimum and that 500 should be an ample margin.

NOTE TO 4.—At the beginning of the war England had 245 destroyers. This did not begin to be enough, and she is supposed to have laid down many more. Germany was credited with 167. We are credited with 52 built and 108 total authorized.

- (6) Push to completion our major naval craft now on the ways and over 50 per cent completed.

- (7) That the next immediate need is an aircraft building program sufficient to provide for the adequate patrol of the entire Atlantic and Gulf coast defense districts.

NOTE.—Sir Douglas Haig is credited with saying that one trained pilot and machine, on the western front, was worth 2,000 men. The air patrol and bombing work of the heavier-than-air machines, in conjunction with the observation work of the lighter-than-air machines, both working in cooperation with the fast, small patrol craft, should be a good defensive measure against submarines, freeing the strictly naval craft from the many defensive demands that will certainly be made upon them. This would leave the purely naval types free to cooperate in the very best manner the demands of an allied campaign might make.

IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

- (8) That the type which may be most urgently needed immediately following the present situation is the sea-keeping submarine.

- (9) To lay down as many of these sea-keeping submarines as possible with the idea of bringing the total of submarine class to 200, or on a par with our possible transatlantic opponent.

NOTE.—At the beginning of the war Germany was credited with 65. Various estimates put her submarines of different classes between 200 and 300 now.

(10) That the approximate number of sea-keeping submarines we should lay down to provide for the immediate future following this war is approximately 150.

(11) That of the 150, approximate, submarines needed to bring our total to 300 the ratio of one-third for scouting and two-thirds for strictly offensive deep-sea work should be observed.

FUTURE NEEDS.

(12) That the future naval need may be to build major ships of the dreadnought and battle-cruiser type; and to provide suitable fleet accompanying aircraft.

(13) That in planning for our needs in battleships and in battle-cruisers, we should adopt some building policy.

(14) That the policy to adopt is as follows:

To build major ships, in numbers, so that the United States will have, as least—

(a) Naval equality, with a margin of safety, on our Atlantic frontier, to our most probable opponent.

(b) Marked naval superiority on our Pacific frontier—when the high-sea fleet is mobilized in those waters.

NOTE.—At the beginning of the war, Germany had 20 dreadnoughts, 6 battle cruisers, 26 scouts. Our present program calls for 29AA, 6BB, 10S. Unless Germany has increased her tonnage in major ships, during the war, our program would leave us short only in BB, and scouts. If the scouts of the future are the submarine and aircraft we could afford to be short in surface scout types, provided we were ahead in submarines, aircraft, and battle cruisers.

(15) That the minor naval craft, such as aircraft, destroyers, submarines, forming the fleet, should be proportioned so that the fleet will be properly balanced.

(16) That the probable scouting agents of the future may very likely be the submarine and the aircraft.

(17) That the final future needs of the mobile fleet lie in adequate numbers of supply ships, hospital ships, fuel ships, mine layers, tugs, and parent ships to properly balance the fleet.

(18) That the fleet building program should be considered separately from the coast defense building or purchase program in order that undue emphasis should not be laid on the question, defense.

(19) That as far as is practicable, in view of the immediate situation, the fleet building program should be given the right of way over the purely coast defense program.

(20) That no fleet building program is well balanced or adequate which does not at the same time consider the necessity of enlarging the capacity of the necessary repair reserve and supply bases at home, and which does not contemplate the acquisition and proper fitting out of the necessary fleet and coast operation bases.

What I had marked as No. 26 has already been submitted in my plan of policy as the plan of the board on submarine detection. Its date is July 6, 1917.

Twenty-seven is policy for priorities of personnel. Its date is November 1, 1917. That is the plan that Admiral Palmer spoke of, when we switched and gave him a definite plan that he could operate under for his training purposes. It is as follows:

PLAN No. 27.

POLICY FOR PRIORITIES OF PERSONNEL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 1, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Bureau of Navigation and C in C.

Subject: Policy of operations re the readjustment of complements.

Reference: (a) Bureau of Navigation confidential letters Nos. N1, CMB, 1, MH, October 10, 1917; (b) C in C's letter of October 24, 1917.

1. Forwarded.

2. While the ultimate mission of every force which forms an integral part of the fleet is to fit itself to play its part most efficiently in battle, to expeditiously accomplish this ultimate mission for the good of the whole may require the assignment of

immediate missions to parts of the organization, which missions must depend both on the immediate operation of war to be performed and the ultimate goal to be achieved.

3 The ultimate and immediate mission of the vessels of battleship force 2 shall be: maintain themselves in instant readiness for battle.

4 The ultimate mission of battleship force 1 is to fit itself for battle. To that end it shall maintain a permanent nucleus battle organization of both officers and men efficient to keep the material in constant readiness for battle and permit rapid preparation for battle when battle complement is assigned.

The immediate mission of battleship force 1 is to train officers and men for service in other vessels.

5 The immediate mission of vessels of the cruiser force is to guard convoys.

6 The immediate mission of the destroyer force is to operate against the enemy.

7 The immediate mission of the submarine force is twofold, (a) to operate against the enemy, (b) to train personnel for service in new vessels that may operate against the enemy. Ships not engaged in operating against the enemy should be engaged in training personnel.

8 The immediate mission of the train is the service of logistics, (a) for our military and naval forces at the fighting front, (b) for our fleet at home, (c) in any allied service abroad, (d) general service at home.

9 In all forces, when not incompatible with the immediate mission, additional personnel should be carried for training.

W. V. PRATT, Acting.

DEAR ADMIRAL: While I am morally sure this is in accord absolutely with your policy, I want to be sure. So, while it was signed and sent to Navigation, I told them to hold it up pending your O. K. in the matter. Therefore, I am sending this to you, and if you agree cable me to that effect, please. We are in reality working along these lines, and it seems to be a necessity, but as yet while all agreements are verbal, I really want a policy on paper. Will you then cable, please?

PRATT.

Twenty-eight is the mobilization sheet of November 3, 1917, which is the end of the critical six months, or about the end of the critical six months spoken of, showing the position at that time, the duty, the location, and the assignment of our naval forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Of all of our naval forces?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I think so. It is the mobilization sheet, and it should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Including all the ships we had taken over outside of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. All that would be in commission at that time. No, there might be others taken over that might not appear in here.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they were in commission they would be here?

Capt. PRATT. They would be there; and the list taken over is in the 'naval districts' list. This sheet is as follows:

PLAN NO. 28.

Mobilization sheet Nov. 3, 1917.

| Name. | Type. | Assignment. | Location. |
|----------------|------------|------------------|----------------|
| USS Maine | Battleship | Battleship force | York River |
| USS Oregon | do | do | Do |
| USS Nevada | do | do | Do |
| USS Arizona | do | do | Do |
| USS Texas | do | do | Do |
| USS California | do | do | Do |
| USS Maryland | do | do | Norfolk |
| USS Delaware | do | do | York River |
| USS Vermont | do | do | Hampton Roads |
| USS Iowa | do | do | Chesapeake Bay |
| USS Kansas | do | do | Do |

Mobilization sheet Nov. 3, 1917—Continued.

| Name. | Type. | Assignment. | Location. |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Rhode Island..... | Battleship..... | Battleship force..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Nebraska..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Georgia..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Minnesota..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Louisiana..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Kansas..... | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| New Hampshire..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Connecticut..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Vermont..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Michigan..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| South Carolina..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| New York..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Delaware..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Texas..... | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Oklahoma..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Arkansas..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| North Dakota..... | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Florida..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Utah..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Wyoming..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Nevada..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Arizona..... | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Mississippi..... | do..... | do..... | Not in commission. |
| Charleston..... | Cruiser..... | Cruiser force..... | Boston. |
| St. Louis..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| De Kalb..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Von Steuben..... | do..... | do..... | Thompkinsville. |
| Minneapolis..... | do..... | do..... | Canal Zone. |
| Seattle..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| North Carolina..... | do..... | do..... | New York. |
| Montana..... | do..... | do..... | Portsmouth, N. H. |
| Huntington..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| San Diego..... | do..... | do..... | New York. |
| Saratoga (Rochester)..... | do..... | do..... | Mare Island. |
| South Dakota..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| Cleveland..... | do..... | do..... | Charleston. |
| Tacoma..... | do..... | do..... | New York. |
| Chattanooga..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Des Moines..... | do..... | do..... | Portsmouth, N. H. |
| Denver..... | do..... | do..... | Halifax. |
| Albany..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| New Orleans..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Columbia..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Stewart..... | Destroyer..... | Destroyer force..... | Norfolk. |
| Whipple..... | do..... | do..... | Azores. |
| Truxton..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Paul Jones..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Preble..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Hopkins..... | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Hull..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Macdonald..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Worden..... | do..... | do..... | Chesapeake Bay. |
| Barry..... | do..... | do..... | Gibraltar. |
| Decatur..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Dale..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Bainbridge..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Chauncey..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Panther..... | Destroyer tender..... | do..... | Brest. |
| Smith..... | Destroyer..... | do..... | Do. |
| Flusser..... | do..... | do..... | Queenstown. |
| Lamson..... | do..... | do..... | Brest. |
| Preston..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Reid..... | do..... | do..... | Azores. |
| Prairie..... | Destroyer tender..... | do..... | |
| Monaghan..... | Destroyer..... | do..... | Boston. |
| Roe..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Jewett..... | do..... | do..... | Norfolk. |
| Henley..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| McCall..... | do..... | do..... | York River. |
| Terry..... | do..... | do..... | New York yard. |
| Mayrant..... | do..... | do..... | Philadelphia. |
| Beale..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| Balch..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Lylwin..... | do..... | do..... | Charleston. |
| Downes..... | do..... | do..... | At sea. |
| Duncan..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Dixie..... | Destroyer tender..... | do..... | Queenstown. |
| Drayton..... | Destroyer..... | do..... | Do. |
| Perkins..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Sterett..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Warrington..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |
| Walke..... | do..... | do..... | Do. |

ly against them. The department being best in touch with all information concerning enemy movements will for the present designate the areas to be occupied by available submarines.

There will be certain special submarine patrols which will be directly administered from the Office of Naval Operations; naval districts concerned will be given information concerning them which is needed in their own operations. Operation orders for ordinary submarine patrols will as heretofore be issued by the naval districts in which the submarines are based. Since all districts whose offshore waters need submarine patrols are not manned by submarine divisions, and because contiguous patrol areas sometimes lap into two districts, it is essential that neighboring districts be informed of a prospective patrol in order that it may issue instructions to prevent danger to our submarines and joint interference between their operations and those of the district surface and aircraft.

Aircraft, surface hunting units and other surface patrol or scouting craft must not be sent on antisubmarine missions into areas known to be occupied by our own submarines; to do so would unnecessarily endanger our own submarines and the efforts of the air and surface craft might be nullified in hunting them. The naval district which issues the operating order to a submarine going on patrol will inform the commander in chief and commander cruiser force, Atlantic Fleet, the naval districts which include the area and also the districts next them, of the movement, including duration; this information should be sent out as early as possible. These instructions are not to be understood as interfering with dispositions for rescue or escorting air or surface craft—but the craft concerned in such a movement should be informed that our submarines are in the areas likely to be traversed. Hunting units are to be instructed to assume submarine patrol areas occupied unless informed to the contrary.

4. Ordinary submarine patrols will normally be one week, beginning and ending Saturday. On Wednesday of each week, naval districts in which submarines are based will inform Office of Operations—or may direct the submarine organization of the district to do so—of the submarines which on the following Saturday will be available for patrol. If there is no reason for maintaining a patrol at the particular time, none will be directed and the available boats will exercise, but remain ready for patrol. Otherwise, directions will be given to occupy certain areas. It then devolves upon the districts concerned to prepare operation orders, arrange convoy in and out and inform other districts.

PATROL OPERATION ORDERS.

5. Under ordinary circumstances, submarines will not need to be convoyed during darkness and convoy effort may be saved by having them leave for patrol in the afternoon and return early in the morning; this shortens the run of the convoying vessel and reduces the danger of our submarines encountering each other. These advantages offset anything that is gained by having them actually relieve on station. Since, however, late arrivals may happen, it is advisable to lay down outbound and inbound submarine routes for the different ports in which submarines are based, and direct which routes to follow.

Patrol operating orders are to include information concerning the convoy and west-bound routes that pass over the patrol area that will be in effect for the period of the patrol; this is in order that they may protect those routes in good weather and avoid them by night and in thick weather. When known, the probable sailing dates of convoys that concern them will also be given submarines going on patrol.

A submarine is not to enter any submarine area other than those to which it is assigned to patrol, unless said submarine knows such area to be unoccupied by submarines or hunting units. Such information as is necessary for this safeguard is to be supplied in patrol operation orders.

Patrol-operation orders should give schedules and wave lengths upon which information is likely to be broadcasted. When their important operations are not thereby nullified, they should listen on such schedules; since they can not always get a message, those containing important information or direction should be repeated on one or more subsequent schedules.

SURFACE HUNTING GROUPS.

6. The commandants of naval districts will formulate plans for using their submarine-chaser hunting groups and air forces to protect areas near the coast not occupied by submarine patrols.

In working out the details of these plans, it is advisable that submarine-chaser hunting groups be based as near as practicable to the areas in which they are expected to operate.

1352

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

Mobilization sheet, Nov. 5,

bureaus and a representative from the general board. Every Tuesday morning an executive session was held. At the conference the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations presided and all officers of the grade of captain and admiral who might be on temporary duty in the office, for the purpose of getting in touch with the war situation preparatory to assignment to duty at the front, were invited to attend. The situation of the past week was rehearsed. All formulated plans ready were passed upon, signed, and made ready for final approval by the Secretary. All new plans were assigned to certain members of the committee, chosen by the chairman, and these members were instructed to report their finished plans by a certain date. This method worked very satisfactorily, except as noted in the failure to have the basic deliberative body, which at that time was not possible, as there were not the officers available. Every chief of division had to constitute himself the deliberative head for all work coming under his cognizance.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that plan submitted?

Capt. PRATT. This is not a plan. When did we first start this?

The CHAIRMAN. When did you commence doing this?

Capt. PRATT. We commenced as soon after June 25 as I possibly could.

The CHAIRMAN. June 25, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. 1917. That is the way I operated.

Now, I would like to discuss for a moment some of the plans which actually were in use in the war zone, which are not plans of preparation but are distinctly war plans of operation, one of those being the relations of armed guards and convoys. There has been a certain inference, I think, drawn that convoy and armed guard ran counter to each other. On the contrary, they did not run counter at all, and that very detailed plan of armed guard which we had in operation before the war flowed naturally and automatically into convoy operations, and really was conducive to a greater degree of efficiency than any system which the British had evolved up to the time we entered the war, or any time after we entered the war to its close. The points where convoy run counter are not to armed guard but to the system of patrol, which was in vogue in the British Navy when we entered the war, and according to the testimony of one of the destroyer captains whom I have talked to, existed for a period, he would say, of at least 6 weeks after our destroyers got across to the other side; so that not trying to find any fault with Admiral Sims's statements at all, I merely wish to explain the situation a trifle, and to show, as I think, that he had a rather mistaken idea of our convoy in relation to armed guard and convoy, and particularly where he cites that cable in which he states that he was ready to "jump overboard."

There was no statement made in that cable (I drew that part of it up myself); I drew the whole cable up myself, I think, and I know the purpose of my own mind. It was that there should be no misunderstanding of the value of armed guards, both within the convoy and without the convoy, because the convoy system as it was inaugurated, as it went into effect at the beginning of the war, and as it continued throughout the war, to the signing of the armistice, was never a whole and completely and thoroughly rounded project, because it was not possible for them to convoy ships in and out. There were not sufficient vessels to do it. Therefore convoy, while it protected the cargo

100 per cent during its existence, into the ports throughout the barred zone or through the war zone, did not protect the ship on its way out because that ship had to go alone. While it protected the cargo 100 per cent, it protected the tonnage about 50 per cent. But the arming of our ships and placing on board those ships a trained personnel was as far as it was humanly possible, the most adequate protection which we could give that ship. A ship was all the better for going into convoy with an armed guard on board, far better than she was without it. The system of patrol which had been inaugurated on the other side was one of dividing the dangerous area into squares. Our destroyers were assigned duties in the squares. They picked up an incoming ship, carried it through to the next square, and it was carried through to the next and so on until it reached port. That was not an effective system. But there was really quite as much discussion on the other side—more, in fact, I imagine—as there was on our own, as to whether they should give up a system which they themselves had evolved and go to convoy, or whether they should change in the middle of the war and adopt convoy.

It was for those very reasons, and for the fact that it was considered a very doubtful procedure as to whether untrained merchant captains in conditions of fog and bad weather, in winter or summer, could handle their ships with the precision necessary, the same precision with which you have to handle a naval vessel, and whether there would not be more sinkings, due to actual collisions, than there were due to submarines, that caused us on this side to weight the question—not to refuse it, but to weigh it—and it was ultimately decided upon——

The CHAIRMAN. For the information of the committee, will you explain how the convoy would protect the cargo 100 per cent and the tonnage 50 per cent?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; because the loaded ships were assembled, say at our ports. There were various convoy systems, some coming up from South Africa, some along the coast of Spain and France to British ports, and let us say from our own ports, the convoy was assembled off Halifax. It proceeded under the guard of a cruiser, and it was met outside of the dangerous area by destroyers, which escorted it into port. The vessels were discharged and they then proceeded on their own responsibility back to ports of loading.

The CHAIRMAN. With no convoy going back at all?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; they wanted to do it, and toward the end of the war we discussed the problem, and not doubting its advisability at all, we wanted to do it if we could. There was also this further objection to convoy, which made it a matter of discussion, and that was a very important point. It was almost sure to, and it did slow up the transport of foodstuffs into allied countries. The actual amount that it slowed up was over 20 per cent—between 20 and 25 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the time was taken to gather the ships up?

Capt. PRATT. To gather them up; and there was also one other serious feature, too, that caused numerous cablegrams to pass between Admiral Sims and us, and that was particularly the putting of fast ships into the convoy. We were running at that time the only trans-Atlantic line which could carry mails and passengers across, in our ships of the International Mercantile Marine, the New York and

the St. Louis, fast 18-knot ships. They did not have the bunker capacity to go into Halifax and to go across, and in talking the matter over with Mr. Franklin, he said that he would far rather that these ships should run through without any protection at all; so that when the discussion came up as to whether those should go—and that was one of the main points of contest—we thought it was safer to let those vessels go on their own responsibility, rather than to put them into a slow merchant convoy of from 11 to 8 knots. What I wish to state is that it was not a refusal on that point, because as you will note, he states that the first convoy came through about May 31, I think; and even while we were discussing the details, the discussion being then—I will read it to you later—as to whether it would not be wiser to form a convoy this way, to let all the ships sail as fast as they could out of our own ports, and let them collect, say at any point that the Admiralty might desire, outside of the war zone, on certain days, there to herd together, and after having collected in as fast as they could, from that point to be convoyed in; and that was one of the points of discussion which was being held at that time—one of our ideas.

But even while we were discussing that point, Admiral Jellicoe finally said, in his cable of about July 4 or 5, they wanted it done. We stopped immediately and acceded to it, because the British had finally said they wanted it, and whether we did not think it best, it was their plan and their ships were involved more than ours, and we yielded at once. But the point was, the point I wish to make is, that while it took Great Britain a number of years to find out that they really wanted convoy, we with discussion only between May 31 when it became an assured success and July 5 when we had practically accepted it in toto, and that appears to me to be rather a natural thing to do. But I wanted to clear up the point that there is no opposition between armed guard and convoy. The counter arguments between patrol and convoy.

The CHAIRMAN. There would be an opposition between the two ideas if the armed guard were used exclusively to take the place of convoy, would there not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. We would then have to accept our own risks, as we did in the case of the American line ships. If we refuse to accept convoy, we accept the risks. It does not interfere with convoy at all. That was simply because, in this case, of the belief that the risk for the ship is greater in convoy than running alone. She then has to go on her own, and when she gets outside of the port she signals and gets routing instructions in; and that does not interfere with the convoy, because of keeping her out; unless we demand protection for her. Then it would. I have submitted a number of papers which further elaborate and go into comparisons between the two.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they papers that were submitted to the department during the war?

Capt. PRATT. No; it was done after the war. It was done the other day, to clarify the situation. It is more the summary of what has happened.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in regard to the convoy system?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and what I will read will be to show some of the evidence of the figures we got from having such a system worked

In view of the lack of special equipment and special training of some chasers assigned to naval districts, and the necessity of using these vessels in places for escort work, etc., it is not considered practicable at present for districts to efficiently patrol all those areas adjacent to the coast, with the chasers available for that purpose.

The department has therefore organized three special hunting squadrons, each with three chasers. Each squadron is composed of a certain number of submarine hunting groups and a vessel of the cruiser or destroyer type, with sufficient force to back up the operations of the submarine chasers and maintain the contact with the surface.

The operations of these special hunting squadrons will be under the control of the department, and they will be sent to infested areas to cooperate with the district craft. The operations of these squadrons will be restricted to areas assigned by submarine patrols, as follows:

The first squadron to operate on the Atlantic coast to the northward of latitude 30 north; the second squadron to operate on the Atlantic coast between the latitude 30 north and 40 north; the third squadron to operate in waters to the southward of latitude 30 north.

W. S. B

Copy to commander Submarine Division 8, secret file room, Capt. T. U. S. Navy, Capt. Hart, U. S. Navy, Commander Woodson, U. S. Navy.

There was a comment made by Admiral Fiske in which he admitted the plan under which the Office of Operations was to be organized, and he rather inferred that we had no plan up to the time he submitted those papers, which, as a practical war measure, had no real value at all. He does not know anything about it. We are doing the work, and we know what we are talking about.

Now, in order to get a real operating plans section that you have got to have something besides men that sit down and write paper things for somebody else to do. A real operating plans section has not only got to have the ability to draw up original conceptions, but it must have men on that committee who have the power to execute the things that they have drawn up. No other plans section in war will operate and really get things done except a plans section of that sort. So that very early in the morning after I came in as Aid for Operations, seeing that that did not exist, during the summer and fall of 1917, the following method of handling plans was evolved. I want to set at rest any doubt that may have arisen as to whether we had plans, as far as being able to cope with the questions that came up.

The CHAIRMAN. For operations?

Capt. PRATT. For operations; yes, sir. Owing to the shortage of specially trained officers and of the need of all regular officers in the Navy, it was not possible to form a plans section entirely divorced from administrative duties, although its desirability is not questioned. Such a deliberative body is of inestimable value in presenting data and first plans to the executive body. The crying need of the time was for an executive plans section which not only combined the deliberative and executive functions but the more practical features of the administrative system, so that we not only got the plan but the backing of the various bureaus to put it through. With this formulated plan ready for action it was then in shape to get the approval of the Chief of Operations and of the Secretary. Therefore an executive plans section was formed in Operations, consisting of the heads of the various divisions of the office and including representatives from each

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Capt. PRATT. Yes; and what I will read will be to show some of the evidence of the figures we got from having such a system worked

from the date we went into the war. It was of inestimable value to us. It may not have been to the British, because their system was different from ours. They only put two gunners on a ship while we put a full gun's crew. During the period during which we were at war, 384 merchant ships were armed and 1,832 trans-Atlantic trips were made by these ships.

Three hundred and forty-seven attacks by enemy submarines were reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these altogether American ships?

Capt. PRATT. American ships.

Two hundred and twenty-seven attacks by enemy submarines were classified as "actual."

Twenty-nine ships were sunk under classification "torpedoed."

Two ships were sunk by shell fire, one of which, a tanker, caught fire after a running fight of 2 hours' duration. The other was sunk only after all ammunition had been expended in a running fight of over 4 hours' duration.

One hundred and ninety-three attacks were successfully repulsed.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read the names of those two ships?

Capt. PRATT. One was the *Morini*, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the name of the other?

Capt. PRATT. I can get the names of those two ships. I will do so.

Thirty-four attacks resulted in probable damage to the enemy submarine.

Two million seven hundred and thirty-eight thousand and twenty-six tons of United States shipping were armed.

One hundred and sixty-six thousand four hundred and twenty-eight tons of United States armed shipping were sunk by enemy submarines.

As a result of attacks successfully repulsed, approximately 1,400,000 tons of United States shipping was saved.

In arming ships, of course the very first thing that is accomplished is to force the submarine to use the torpedo. Anyone who has seen that picture of the U-23 in which 21 vessels were sunk, and all except one were sunk with torpedoes, must realize what a tremendous saving to shipping these precautionary measures were of arming merchant ships. The point, as I said before that I wish to emphasize is that it assists convoys as soon as they adopt it, and is in nowise a measure against convoy.

This analysis and the accompanying memorandum I submit, as follows:

[Extract from Admiral Sims's article, December, 1919, *World's Work*.]

Our first division of destroyers reached Queenstown on Friday morning, May 4, 1917; the following Monday they put to sea on the business of hunting the submarine and protecting commerce. For the first month or six weeks they spent practically all their time on patrol duty in company with British destroyers, sloops, and other patrol vessels. Though the convoy system was formally adopted in the latter part of May, it was not operating completely and smoothly until August or September. Many troop and merchant convoys were formed in the intervening period and many were conducted through the submarine zone by American destroyers; but our ships spent much time sailing singly, hunting for such enemies as might betray their presence, or escorting individual cargoes. The early experiments had demonstrated the usefulness of the convoy system, yet a certain number of pessimists still refused to accept it as the best solution of the shipping problem; and to reorganize practically all the shipping of the world, scattered everywhere on the seven seas, necessarily took time.

ANALYSIS OF ARMED-GUARD PLAN IN RELATION TO CONVOY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., March 27, 1920.

1. Admiral Sims alleges that the Navy Department entered war unprepared, with no well considered policy or plans, and that the policy pursued was one of vacillation. Quite to the contrary there is presented herewith an estimate of the situation as prepared by the Navy Department on March 1, 1917. Considering the situation at that date, this is a clear-cut and well-defined estimate, which was almost immediately incorporated into a policy and put into effect. That this policy was not a vacillating one is borne out by the fact that it was fundamentally in existence and practice at the signing of the armistice (termination of hostilities). That the Navy Department acted promptly and effectively is shown by the sequence that on March 1 an estimate of the situation had been prepared; on March 13 this had been incorporated into a policy which embodied certain regulations for putting it into effect which policy and regulations were approved on that date by the President; on March 16 the promptness is still further shown by the sailing for the war zone of the first armed merchant ship; on April 19 the effectiveness is clearly shown when a hostile submarine was damaged by the first shot of the participation by the United States into the war—a 6-inch shell fired by the armed guard of the steamship *Mongolia*.

2. In referring to the records of the case at hand we find that the commander, United States naval forces operating in European waters arrived in England April 10, 1917. On April 19, he submits by letter to the Navy Department his estimate of the situation, N. B. It is reasonable to suppose that the Navy Department received this letter 10 days later.

3. Certain quotations are here made from the above letter relative to the subject in hand:

Paragraph 3. "The submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war and stated briefly the Governments have not been able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation present."

Paragraph 7. "The enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in two months through shortage of supplies."

Paragraph 14. "Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection within the war zone."

Paragraph 15. "It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same—the area is too large; the necessary vessels are not available."

Paragraph 17. "After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion."

Paragraph 18. "The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is communication with the shipping itself and full cooperation by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually changed and at all times it can not be counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent."

Paragraph 19. "Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for admiralty instructions."

Paragraph 20. "The admiralty has had frequent conference with merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is 'Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves.' They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling their speed are to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this in view I do not personally agree, but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations."

Paragraph 21. "The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of ships, merchant as well as naval, is speed and zigzagging."

Paragraph 22. "In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly destroyers, and until the enemy submarine morale is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity—increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small:

"More ships! More ships! More ships! is heard on every hand."

Paragraph 32. "All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is speed and zigzagging."

4. It is particularly desirous to bring out at this point that statements and recommendations submitted by Admiral Sims are accepted in their good faith for the welfare of the Navy in accomplishing its mission throughout the war; it is only the fallacies thereof which lead him to his allegation and bring him to his conclusions that are being brought out.

From the above quotations taken from the letter of April 19, 1917, the following military points of this case are presented:

First, the real issue of the war is the submarine campaign against merchant shipping.

Second, the Allied Governments have not been able to and are not now meeting the situation.

Third, the enemy expect to win in two months through cutting off of supplies.

Fourth, there is a demand through criticism for convoy.

Fifth, objections to convoy manifest themselves through: (1) lack of necessary vessels (probably meaning escorting or station vessels); (2) lack of cooperation from the merchant personnel in that lose codes and do not carry out instructions.

Sixth, that the most unanimous demand from merchant masters is "Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves."

Seventh, that the best protection against submarine menace and torpedoes is speed and zigzag.

Eighth, that the admiralty after trying various methods of controlling shipping believes the best policy to be one of dispersion.

5. That the department was not only meeting the situation as outlined by the above points, but was even putting into effect an even more effective policy is brought out by the following:

(a) Great Britain as the greatest maritime nation and with the largest interest at stake in the protection of her mercantile marine against the enemy's submarine policy, and after nearly three years of war experience upon which to base its policy had taken the following measures: (1) Establishes patrols in the close proximity of her coasts as a weapon or protection against the submarine and as a means to transmit routing instructions to merchant ships arriving at their stations; (2) routes the merchant vessels to avoid vicinity of recently known submarine activities. This form of routing often takes the form of closing ports for several days at a time, thus completely holding up all shipping in that vicinity; (3) provides a single gun located aft with a trained personnel of two or three men to man it; (4) provides an apparatus to the merchant ships for the purpose of making smoke screens; (5) issue certain instructions to merchant ships covering speed, zigzag, darkening ship, handling ship in the presence of the enemy, to avoid certain known practices of the enemy in attempts to entice a merchant ship in contact with mines or to a position for torpedoing it, etc.

(b) That neither France nor Italy have put forward any effective policies.

(c) On the other hand we find that the Navy Department has previous to entering the war laid down and put into effect a policy which not only embraced all that was covered by the British policy after three years' experience, but for the following reasons was the more effective: (1) That it provided at least two guns as a protection for each vessel; (2) that it provided a commissioned officer or experienced chief petty officer of the Navy in charge with two leading petty officers as assistants and a complete trained gun crew from the battleship force for each gun; (3) to maintain its efficiency a rigid system of inspection coupled with special training was put into effect. Upon the establishment of convoy, signal and radio personnel of the Navy was added; (4) that it supplied personnel sufficient for a lookout system; (5) that it provided a military force to see that all rules and regulations prescribed or recommended were carried out; (6) that it presented the entering wedge whereby it was possible for the Navy Department later to assume a more direct control of the mercantile shipping.

To bring out this latter point which is most important, the following should be considered: (1) That the Navy Department either in peace or in war has no direct control over the privately owned shipping of the United States; (2) that such control as is exercised by this Government comes under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce; (3) that in Great Britain the admiralty has the right to control her shipping in time of war; (4) that even with this power the admiralty, after three years' experience, was having trouble in exercising its functions; (5) that the Navy Department by its foresight did, in a comparatively short time, considering our system of Government, eliminate these conditions.

6. The ultimate effectiveness of the department's policy will be shown further on in detail.

Admiral Sims, as a result of this letter of April 19, 1917, draws certain conclusions in which he intimates that failure to adopt convoy system was largely responsible for great losses of tonnage and limited the number of troops which could be sent abroad during the first year.

The fallacies in this argument are:

1. Up to that time no specific recommendation for convoy had been made; in fact dispersion had been decided upon by the Admiralty.

2. The type of vessels being sunk were not suitable for transporting troops.

3. At that time all such ships as were suitable for troop transports were being rapidly converted and put into condition.

4. After the declaration of war the loss of tonnage to the United States shipping during April, 1917, was only 8,944 tons of which 2,551 tons represented an armed ship. This armed ship, the *Vacuum*, was torpedoed under conditions most favorable to the submarine in that the sea was rough, with whitecaps, making it difficult to see a periscope. Despite these conditions, however, the fact that the torpedo was sighted before it reached the ship was encouraging as it demonstrated the value of lookouts, and had weather conditions been more favorable, would doubtless have enabled the vessel to maneuver to avoid torpedo as happened in many instances later.

On April 30, 1917, it is to be noted that a cable from Admiral Sims to the department states that "Admiralty is making a study of convoy system for shipping," and "This advance information for department's consideration."

Again, on May 1: "Admiralty has decided to give trial to convoy scheme.

"I urgently recommend favorable action.

"Through British Naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary."

On May 25, he cables: "The principal of convoying merchant ships in accordance with general plans is approved by the Admiralty."

On May 31 a cable states that British convoy from Gibraltar arrived safely on May 20, 1917.

7. It is to be noted that May 1 the department is notified that Admiralty decides to give trial to convoy system and that it will be advised as to its progress. By May 31 it is informed that the first experiment is successful. In other words, no definite plan for operation has been submitted and the department has been requested only to furnish 14 ships for escort duty for New York service. This might readily be interpreted as meaning that the British having taken three years to reach the point of experiment, the Navy Department was expected to meet the situation overnight, and this when no established plan of operation has been submitted. In the meantime we find that the result of the department's policy has resulted from the declaration of war to June 1, 1917, in the loss of 26,765 tons of United States shipping, of which 2,551 tons still represent armed ships and 10,406 tons represent sailing ships, which naturally are to be considered in connection with convoy. At this time, noting the excessive loss to sailing vessels, the department armed a schooner sailing for Italy. The schooner later fought a successful fight with an enemy submarine in the Mediterranean, with probable damage to the submarine. Guns being required for the larger ships made it impracticable to arm sailing vessels as a class.

8. To avoid confusion in the separate subjects of convoys for troop ships and convoys for supply or cargo ships, it is here necessary to enter briefly into the subject of convoy of troop ships in order to bring out the proper sequence of Admiral Sims's correspondence with the department.

On June 6, 1917, the department notifies Admiral Sims of tentative sailing of first troop convoy.

On June 8 Admiral Sims's reply tends to show that there is no definite plan established in the submarine danger zone for the handling of even the troop ship convoys.

On June 10 the department evidently appreciating the lack of definite plan for handling convoys in submarine zone, requests a definite plan be submitted, and it is in reply to this specific request that Admiral Sims submits his letter of June 13 formulating a plan. It is further to be noted that the plan had been submitted principally with troop-ship convoy in mind, though it is used as an argument in presenting the allegation that the Navy Department was holding up cargo-ship convoys. Here it should again be noted that it would require about 10 days for this plan to reach the Navy Department.

On June 14 Admiral Sims cables the department that "there are now sufficient vessels available for escort duty to insure safety of all vital supplies and also prospective movements of our troops and their supplies." Here the department is informed for the first time that the situation, insofar as escort in submarine zone is concerned, is ready to be handled abroad.

On the following day, June 15, the first United States convoy sailed from the United States, or a convoy system for troops was effective.

To return to the problem of establishment of convoys for supply ships, we find—

On June 15 Admiral Sims cables the department, "Strongly urge putting convoy system into effect immediately from Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and North Atlantic ports as previously recommended."

This appears as a rather large field to cover in view of the fact that New York alone had previously been mentioned (and the number of escorting vessels required would be entirely out of the question).

On June 18, the department cabled Admiral Sims as follows:

"Received: June 20, 1917, via Admiralty.

"To: Commander in chief, Queenstown.

"Following for Admiral Sims:

"There will be no additional movements before August of troops. You will be furnished fully with information as to sailing of Army supply ships as far as possible in advance and the actual sailing intended route and probable dates of arrival will be reported. We hope to sail four Army supply ships now fitting out in about 10 days' time. The 32 destroyers which are all that there are available have sailed; 110 fleet chasers which are to be sent to France should begin to deliver in August. Fishing vessels, 12 in number, will sail in August for France. There are no other small craft available at present although work on yachts is being pushed probably ready July 15. In regard to convoy I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently."

On June 20 Admiral Sims replies:

"Sent: June 20, 1917.

"To: Secretary of Navy.

"Through: Admiralty.

"The immediate dispatch to this area of all possible destroyers and antisubmarine craft of any description is mandatory if the submarine issue is to be effectively met. During absence of destroyers for escort duty with troops transports the forces in this area reduced to only 10 destroyers and 10 sloops, only 6 of each in operation at a time. This requires 5 days at sea with 2 days in port, which can not be continued with reliability. Other areas are similarly short of sufficient forces to meet the situation. Yesterday the majority of these forces were engaged in escorting individual inward-bound valuable ships, thereby leaving all shipping following them unprotected. Ships sunk yesterday as far west as 17:30. It will seem suicidal if the convoy system as proposed by the British Admiralty is not put into immediate operation and applied to all shipping, thus forcing submarines to encounter antisubmarine craft in order to attack shipping. It is impossible to carry on partial convoy and partial patrol system. Both can not be done, the former much better than present system which is not succeeding.

"Urgently request information of department's action on this dispatch and upon previous similar dispatches. A decision is necessary before decisive action can be taken on this side.

"Sims."

The records of the Navy Department show that this was received on June 21 through the British Embassy. It is important to note the dates of these cables and their intent.

The department in its cable has drawn lines between troop ships, Army cargo ships, and American vessels, and evidently had in mind Admiral Sims's cable of June 15.

In presenting his allegations, Admiral Sims, while dealing with the subject of "Antisubmarine craft in war zone," first quotes his cable of June 20 and the following remark, "In reply to the increasing urgent series of messages in June I finally received a message from the department on June 20 which I will now read to you." He then quotes the department's cable of June 18.

Considering his remarks which follow, a fallacy of his allegation is disclosed in the fact that he has misconstrued the times of dispatches quoted.

He says: "I would like to invite attention to that last paragraph, 'In regard to convoy I consider that having armed guards are safer when sailing independently,' and that was signed 'Daniels.' Well, I can assure you that I was about ready to jump overboard when I got that last message. After all the information that had been sent as to the nature of the antisubmarine campaign to be informed officially by the Navy Department, 'In regards to convoy I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.' When this message came I realized once more that the department did not appreciate the situation or such a message would have been impossible."

Admiral Sims further remarks, "I would have supposed that anyone who had even casually read the Sunday newspapers would have known that the arming of merchant

ships would have the opposite result as it obliges the submarine to torpedo without warning instead of sinking a ship with its own gunfire."

On June 21 Admiral Sims cables:

"My recommendations concerning the convoy system were not based upon American vessels, but upon all allied shipping, for it is upon the preservation of the remainder of this shipping that our success against the enemy is entirely dependent. It is assumed here that the comparative immunity of American shipping from submarine attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the peace propaganda in America. This is apparently clearly shown by the German press. Actual and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect them from attack, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thus obliging her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise. Armed merchantmen are being sunk daily off this port." (That is Queenstown.) "The success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the system will defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time. The system is merely a plan that obliges the submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchantmen. The present campaign is not succeeding."

On June 22 Admiral Sims cables:

"To: Secretary of the Navy.

"Sent: June 22.

"The British Admiralty have now adopted the convoy system and will put it into full effect as fast as ships can be obtained for high-sea convoy against raiders and destroyers for escort duty in submarine zone. As previously reported, convoys are in successful operation from Mediterranean and Hampton Roads. Plans are in hand for total of eight convoys a week as follows: Two from Gibraltar, two from Hampton Roads, two or three from New York, one from Canada, the latter preferably being combined with the New York convoys. One a week from New York will be put into operation as soon as possible with British cruisers, in absence of our support. I again urgently advise our full support, assisting and cooperating in assembly of convoys, and furnishing one cruiser or reserve battleship a week for high-sea escort. Reserve battleships are admirably suited for this duty, which will not interfere with personnel training, for which I understand they are now being used."

9. On June 24 the department cables the following to Admiral Sims:

"The department is strongly of the opinion—based on recent experiences—that the question of supplying adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships is one which can in no wise be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of inspection, this method is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive submarine measures."

Here Admiral Sims remarks:

"There was the opinion formed in America, necessarily without the information that should have been considered in connection with it, which was holding up a convoy system, and which held up for two or three months, and which cost the loss of a number of hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and some lives. It will be noted that, in this cable, the department reiterates the opinion expressed by the Secretary, four days before, that the arming of merchant ships constituted one of the most effective defensive submarine measures, and implying thereby that it merited more consideration than the convoy system, or, at least, that until it was further developed, it was unnecessary to take the convoy system very seriously. In any case it is difficult to construe these answers from the department, to my specific and urgent recommendations concerning the convoy system, as anything less than what they considered justifiable substitutes for the convoy system. The committee can perhaps imagine my state of mind when confronted with this situation."

On June 28 Admiral Sims cables as follows:

Sent: June 28, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

From: Queenstown.

Referring to department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the most effective defensive antisubmarine measures, I again submit with all possible stress, the following based on extended British war experience. The measures demanded if enemy defeat in time is to be assured, are not defensive but offensive-defensive. The merchantmen's inherent weakness is a lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defense against a torpedo attack against armed ships. In this area alone, during the last six weeks, 30 armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although 3 of these were escorted each by a single destroyer. The result would have been, of course, the same no matter how many guns these ships carried or what their caliber.

Three mystery ships, heavily armed, manned by expert naval crews, with much previous experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging submarine with gunfire at 6,000 yards, but submarine submerged and approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number of American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the enemy hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful gun attacks, from advantageous sun position, against armed ships, without ship being able to see submarine. I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated, it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be of destruction of shipping and avoidance of antisubmarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using, for their final approach, an auxiliary periscope less than 2 inches in diameter. This information just acquired.

All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrated that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, of convoys from 16 to 20 ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our anti-submarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of convoys of merchantmen. Moreover, it permits of concentrated attack by our forces, and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various routes of approach.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping, which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad weather of autumn; that is, in the next three months. Heaviest effort may be anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coast lines and of allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.

SIMS.

10. On June 26 French cabled Washington as follows:

[Translation.]

"From: French Naval General Staff, first section, Paris.

"Date: June 26, 1917.

"To: French naval attaché, Washington.

"Replying to your telegram, at the request of Admiral Benson, we have considered, in concert with the British Admiralty, before the entrance of the United States into the war, the principle of the grouping in convoys of merchant ships across the Atlantic with protection by cruisers. The cruisers are intended to protect the ships against pirates and the new large submarines. They shall conduct the convoys to the approach entries, where destroyers will assure the escort to the port of discharge. Admiral Grasset has received instructions to make arrangements with the British admiral at the Bermudas, and have these cruisers perform escort duty.

"We are quite ready to consider, in concert with the American Admiralty, a new distribution of the allied cruisers for the protection of merchant ships and transports. We will, moreover, communicate to Capt. Jackson all the information we possess on the matter."

11. On July 1 Navy Department proposes shipping intelligence officers for shipping.

On July 3 Admiral Sims submits recommendation for same.

On July 2 Navy Department proposes routing system for convoy.

On July 3 Admiral Sims submits recommendation for same.

On July 11 Admiral Sims receives a letter from Admiral Jellicoe relative to convoy.

On July 12 Admiral Sims cables the department his recommendation relative Admiral Jellicoe's letter.

After presenting communications of July 11 and July 3, Admiral Sims remarks:

"I am going into this thing at some length because it is the most important measure that was taken during the war, and consequently the continuous resistance for a number of months to the introduction of that convoy system by the Navy Depart-

ment is the most serious error that was committed. In spite of these recommendations the fact remains that it was found necessary to keep the British offices going throughout the war, and that the department set up an independent duplicate organization in the principal ports of the United States, thereby wasting both officers and money."

On July 14 Admiral Sims submits further recommendations for convoy, etc., and on later dates further correspondence relating to details and with attending criticisms. But the main point to be brought is that on July 14 a convoy of cargo ships, including United States armed merchant ships, sailed from New York under escort of United States cruiser with signalmen of the United States Navy in each ship to maintain communication. In other words, the convoy system as recommended has been put into effect.

To analyze the previous situation to determine whether the Navy Department was furnishing "continuous resistance for a number of months," we find—

1) On April 19 by letter Admiral Sims states: "The best policy is one of dispersion." (This letter probably received Apr. 29.)

2) On April 30 Admiral Sims cables, "Admiralty making study of convoy system."

3) On May 1 Admiral Sims cables, "Admiralty has decided to give trial to convoy scheme."

4) On May 25 Admiral Sims cables, "The principle of convoying merchant ships is approved by Admiralty."

5) On June 6 Navy Department notifies Admiral Sims of tentative sailing of troop convoy.

6) On June 8 Admiral Sims not ready to handle even troop-ship convoys.

7) On June 10 department requests plan for handling convoys in submarine danger zone.

8) On June 14 Admiral Sims reports ready for troop-ship convoys.

9) On June 15 troop-ship convoy sail.

10) On June 13 (by letter) Admiral Sims forwards plan, principally relating to troop-ship convoys.

11) On June 22 Admiral Sims cables recommending one convoy a week from New York.

12) On July 14 we find a convoy escorted by United States cruisers sailing from New York and thereafter at regular intervals, as shown by following dates:

July 14, July 22, July 28, August 7, August 14, August 22, August 30, September 7, September 15, September 23, etc.

Though further correspondence between Admiral Sims and the department would tend to show that, whereas the convoy system was in actual effect, the definite plans for its proper functioning had not been worked out. Here the convoy subject will be dropped, it having been clearly shown that the department had not resisted the convoy plan for several months, nor had the arming of merchant ships prevented its adoption. In fact, it could readily be said that the department inaugurated convoys before the escorting forces in the submarine danger zone were prepared to handle the situation.

12. As Admiral Sims has included several depreciative remarks which cast reflection upon the efficiency of the policy of arming United States merchant ships and would lead one to believe that such a policy was worthless, an analysis of the phase of the situation will follow:

There was a clearly defined policy, which policy was immediately put into effect, has been shown (see estimate of situation and regulations).

Further, this policy did not interfere with the introduction of the convoy system. In fact, rather than delay the convoy system, it actually did, through the establishment of military personnel in the merchant marine, greatly assist in making the convoy system effective.

That it developed into a major operation is shown through the figures that 384 merchant ships were armed and 30,000 of the Navy personnel were at one time or another engaged in this branch of service.

Before showing the actual effectiveness of this policy answer will be presented to various statements made by Admiral Sims.

After representing that he cabled on June 20, "It will seem suicidal if convoy system proposed by British Admiralty is not put into immediate operation and applied to all shipping," and that the department replied, "In regard to convoy we consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently" (the fallacy of this representation has been previously shown), Admiral Sims remarks, "When I got that last message I was about ready to jump overboard," and "I would have supposed that anyone who had even casually read the Sunday newspapers would have known that the arming of merchant ships would have the opposite result, as it obliges the submarine to torpedo without warning instead of sinking a ship with its own gunfire."

Had these remarks been made at that date they might be overlooked, but they are evidently his views after nearly three years' consideration.

The general conditions at that time are but little changed from those brought forward previously to the date of May 30, 1917, but again special notice should be made of the difference between the arming of United States and British ships.

From May 30 to June 30, 1917, we find the following serious encounters between armed United States merchant ships and enemy submarine:

First. May 30, steamship *Silvershell*.

Second. June 1, steamship *Mongolia*.

Third. June 4, steamship *Norlina*.

Fourth. June 6, steamship *William O'Brien*.

Fifth. June 10, steamship *Virginian*.

Sixth. June 10, steamship *Petrolite*.

Seventh. June 12, steamship *Moreni*.

Eighth. June 14, schooner *Glynn*.

Ninth. June 16, steamship *Archbold*.

Tenth. June 23, steamship *Wico*.

Eleventh. June 25, steamship *St. Paul*.

To be brief, of the above-mentioned cases, three repulsed the submarine attack with probable damage to the submarine. Five successfully drove the attacking submarine away and two were torpedoed before submarine was sighted, but torpedo was sighted before striking ship. One ship was sunk by gunfire after an engagement lasting two hours and only after the ship (which was a tanker) was a mass of flames and all available ammunition expended. The records of these cases will show that the policy of arming ships was more effective than merely "obliging the submarine to torpedo without warning." Should a comparison be made of the effectiveness of the British policy to protect her merchant marine even "after extended British war experience," with the policy of the United States made effective almost over night, the results will most certainly favor the United States.

15. Admiral Sims in his cable of June 21, 1917, states, "The comparative immunity of American shipping from submarine attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the peace propaganda in America." The above record of engagements for June, 1917, hardly bears out this statement.

Admiral Sims, in his cable of June 21, 1917, further states, "Armed ships are being sunk daily off this port (Queenstown)," and in his cable of June 28, 1917, "In this area alone during last six weeks 30 armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen although 3 were escorted each by a destroyer."

To that period, only two United States armed ships were torpedoed. As to the word "vicinity" it is not known just what is to be included, but the two ships mentioned were the steamship *Petrolite*, torpedoed June 10, 1917, 130 miles off Cape Spartel, Morocco, and the steamship *John D. Archbold*, torpedoed June 16, 1917, 85 miles southwest of Penmarch, France.

Though Admiral Sims distinctly states that his efforts were directed not only in the direction of the United States, but rather in the interest of the allied merchant marine, it could hardly be expected that the Navy Department could at such short notice be prepared to take immediate steps beyond the limits of the United States shipping. That it did this, and in an effective manner, has been shown. Had it accomplished only the purpose Admiral Sims lays down (that of forcing the enemy to use its torpedoes), it would have been of considerable value. In fact, Admiral Sims puts the value of a cruiser in the same general class.

So it must appear that Admiral Sims based his recommendations on the failures of other nations rather than on the United States.

16. Another point to be brought here deals with the mission of arming merchant ships.

Admiral Sims says in cable of June 21, "Actual and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect them from attack without warning, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thus obliging her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise."

In cable of June 28, he says, "Guns are no defense against a torpedo attack without warning," and in the same cable, "It would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament in merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes."

Here let us look at the mission for which the Navy Department armed the merchant ships.

- (1) As a defensive measure against attack by enemy submarines.
- (2) To provide a lookout system to prevent sudden attack.
- (3) To provide communication between ships while sailing in convoy.

4 To provide military representatives on civilian-operated ships.

As a defensive measure against attack, it accomplished its mission when—

3 It prevented successful attack made by gunfire.

2 When by its gunfire it kept the submarine submerged and so disconcerted it that it could not take the proper reckonings or make approach for torpedo attack.

The lookout system accomplished its mission when—

1 First sighted the enemy in time to prevent its making a successful attack.

This was accomplished either by sighting the enemy in time to permit the vessel to maneuver to avoid a torpedo or in time to drive off the submarine by gunfire. Communication in convoy was accomplished by putting United States Navy signalmen and radiomen in all United States merchant ships.

Military representatives allowed the Navy Department to obtain first-hand information as to whether merchant ships were carrying out rules and regulations prescribed—this latter was of considerable importance, particularly in enforcing convoy and furnishing valuable information to the Department of Commerce and Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

Whereas many cases could be presented that each and all of its missions were most favorably accomplished, the following general résumé should speak for itself and demonstrate that the effectiveness of the Navy Department's policy far exceeded Admiral Sims's views on the subject.

During the period in which the United States was at war—

384 merchant ships were armed and 1,832 trans-Atlantic trips were made by these ships.

347 attacks by enemy submarines were reported.

227 attacks by enemy submarines were classified as "Actual."

29 ships were sunk under classification "Torpedoed."

2 ships were sunk by shell fire, one of which a tanker caught fire after a running fight of two hours' duration, the other was sunk only after all ammunition had been expended in a running fight of over four hours' duration.

193 attacks were successfully repulsed.

34 attacks resulted in probable damage to the enemy submarines.

2,738,026 tons of United States shipping were armed.

166,428 tons of United States armed shipping were sunk by enemy submarines.

As a result of attacks successfully repulsed, approximately 1,400,000 tons of United States shipping was saved.

The history of the engagements of the armed guards serving on board the ships of the United States merchant marine, furnishes one of the most interesting features of the participation by the United States in the World War and that it was not only interesting but one of the most effective measures undertaken by the Navy and one of which the Navy should be duly proud rather than criticized and condemned, it is believed has been clearly demonstrated.

(Secret.)

MARCH 6, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Chief of Debarkation Service, United States Army; chairman Shipping Board; Bureau of Navigation; Bureau of Ordnance.

Subject: Merchant vessels in trans-Atlantic service to carry armed guard.

1. Latest reliable advices from abroad indicate that the Germans are putting into service from 8 to 12 large cruising submarines of 3,000 tons displacement, 18 knots surface speed, and armed with one or two 6-inch guns. These craft may be in service during March. As the Germans have from time to time extended the range of their submarine activities, it is fair to assume that the addition of these craft to their forces will enable them to still further extend the scope of their operations. These submarines, while not so effective as smaller craft when operating under water, are, from the character of their armament, dangerous to unarmed ships sailing without some form of protection.

2. While the escort system is, up to a certain degree, protection against the surface attack of submarines, if the escort be heavy and numerous enough, still its efficiency is to an extent dependent upon the guns of the convoyed vessels themselves, and were the convoy so numerous as to hamper the movements of the escort, a gun attack from the rear or flanks on the unarmed convoy does not seem an impossibility. On the return voyage, all vessels which are convoyed eastward sail direct and alone for their port of destination, once they are convoyed beyond the supposed danger zone. The possibility of the extension of the zone of submarine operations even to our

coast has rendered it possible what these fast cruising submarines might find it profitable to attack single slow unarmed ships near our coast.

3. While the department has made every effort not to slow shipments, even stating that it felt a reasonable degree of safety was insured to unarmed ships while in convoy, this statement was only intended to apply to the ships while in convoy and operations close to the European shores. For the reasons given above the department deems it wise, before the return of summer and good weather, to state that it believes that time ripe to return to its original policy of insisting that vessels engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade should be armed, and carry either an armed guard or be manned by a trained personnel.

W. S. BENSON.

NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

Secret.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Embarkation Service, United States Army; chairman Shipping Board; Bureau of Navigation; Bureau of Ordnance.

Subject: Arming and manning merchant ships.

Reference: (a) Letter No. 28754-1:25/229, Op-28, Mar. 6, 1918; subject, Merchant vessels in trans-Atlantic service to carry armed guards.

1. In this war the foes of the merchant ship, which it may encounter and which it may partly through its own efforts it may defeat, if properly equipped and handled, are—

- (a) Armed raiders.
- (b) Cruising submarines, armed with heavy guns.
- (c) Smaller submarines, relying on torpedo attack.

The first two classes rely upon gun attack largely. The last depends upon the torpedo and mine for its successes.

2. Broadly speaking, the Navy has two general aims, which are, tersely expressed—

- (A) To win the war.
- (B) To safeguard the future.

And of the two (A) naturally is paramount in importance.

3. Apart from the purely naval features which are not the concern of this letter, the Navy is, in its attitude toward merchant shipping, faced with the problem of adjusting its (A) and (B) of the merchant ship problem with the (a) (b) and (c) of paragraph 1, viz, the character of enemy our merchant ships do and may encounter and the localities where such enemies may operate.

4. To meet this situation stated in paragraph 3, the Navy has adopted the following policy:

(C) In those localities where the enemy operates or is liable to operate the merchant vessels to be efficient and to do its full quota toward helping win this war must in zones of danger be (1) properly handled; (2) properly armed; (3) adequately escorted where escort is needed.

5. Referring to paragraph 4, and confining this letter strictly to the water operations, a strict interpretation of (1), properly handled, must mean organized, administered, and operated. To carry out (2), properly armed, the Navy has attempted to furnish guns. To carry out (3), adequately escorted, the Navy has assigned its cruisers and destroyers.

6. To sum up, the Navy felt that in the zones of danger at sea, as on the firing line on land, military principles and practice should prevail, and to that end believes that three things should be put into effect on merchant ships to make these principles and practice effective.

(1) Merchant ships crossing the danger zones should be commissioned and manned with naval crews.

(2) Or else should be provided with an armed guard.

(3) Arm all ships crossing the danger zones.

The Navy did not concern itself with ships outside the zones of enemy operations. This is a general statement of the theoretical policy which it is believed the Navy ought to adopt toward merchant shipping in order to give it the individual protection apart from escort, to which it is entitled.

7. The practical solution of a theoretical aim is, however, a matter of adjustment and this statement applies with equal force to both the material and personnel factors.

8. As the matter stands to-day, the Navy does—

- (a) Man all ships turned over for Navy use.
- (b) By joint rules, approved by the President, man Army troop transports and cargo ships.

(c) Provide guns for all ships crossing the Atlantic, where the guns are available, and where installing guns does not too greatly interfere with the operations of the ships.

9. While reaffirming the principles stated in paragraph 6 the Navy will, in the matter of manning, as a matter of adjustment between the Army and Ship Control Committee, whenever it is satisfactory to the Army, consider that the term transport means (1) all ships carrying troops; (2) any ships that regularly carry Army stores across the Atlantic, voyage in and voyage out; (3) all such ships shall be gunned.

10. In the policy of arming ships the Navy provides at present (a) four guns or more for all troop ships; (b) two guns for cargo ships; (c) it does not provide guns for ships not entering the present danger zones owing to scarcity of guns.

11. While reaffirming the principle that ships operating in the danger zones should be armed and manned with naval personnel, and while further asserting that the danger of submarine operations on our own coast is an ever increasing one, as a matter of adjustment the Navy will continue to attempt to furnish guns in the following order of importance:

(a) Four to all troop-carrying ships; (b) two to all regular Army cargo ships crossing the Atlantic; (c) two to all other cargo carriers of 5,000 tons or over crossing the Atlantic; (d) two to all other cargo carriers crossing the Atlantic, where the installation of guns would not so seriously interfere with the carrying of cargo as to greatly handicap the service of said craft as a cargo carrier, and where said armament is desired; (e) not to arm merchant ships engaged in coastwise traffic on the Atlantic until the other classes above mentioned are provided for, but to attempt to afford the necessary protection by the aid of escort furnished by the naval districts until such time as guns are available and their need is demonstrated; (f) not to arm ships engaged in the Pacific trade at the present, until the need is demonstrated.

12. To provide for suitable escort ships of the cruiser type, vessels which combine the qualities of troop and cargo carriers with those of escort, the department is of the opinion that immediate steps should be taken to fit out every tenth ship of the new type building for the Emergency Fleet Corporation (type 16 to 18 knot, carrying 1,200 troops adopted as standard by the standard plans committee) with not less than eight 5-inch guns or better, instead of four, in order that the number of self-contained escort ships may be increased.

13. It is recommended, however, in all cases of new construction, or when alteration and repair allows the time, that gun emplacements be fitted for all ships, including those of the Pacific, except in the cases of ships engaged in the coastwise trade which are structurally unfit to carry guns, and which it would be manifestly uneconomical to attempt to arm.

14. Finally, as to the Navy's policy toward the merchant marine in the future. While the Navy standards may be high, it is believed that to make the merchant service attractive for American sailors the former standards must be raised. The question of just compensation to owners, charterer, and crew should be one capable of fair adjustment. The Navy has no desire to control merchant shipping after this war is over. Its most earnest wish is to see developed a merchant marine which will be a pride to our country, and which will fly the American flag in every ocean, as our ships before the Civil War.

OCTOBER 11, 1917.

[Taken from Admiral Mayo's report after visit to European waters.]

GENERAL NOTES ON THE CONVOY SYSTEM AND THE SHIPPING SITUATION.

[Paragraph 15.]

a. (1) The principal antisubmarine effort is to-day being exerted in escorting convoys through the submarine-danger zones in the Atlantic and North Sea and Channel. The convoy system will soon be in operation in the Mediterranean.

(2) The reduction in the per cent of losses of vessels in convoy has given rise to hopes that the adoption of the convoy system by all ocean-going vessels will reduce the submarines' menace below the danger point.

(3) Such an assumption is dangerous without more experience than has been had yet, and as the convoy system has only been in operation during the latter months of the fair weather of summer, the difficulties attendant upon operations in the gales of winter and the fogs of fall and spring must be carefully considered.

(4) The convoy system is strategically defensive though tactically offensive. This defensive is merely a counterattack. Such operations on land are never decisive, and less coupled with strategically-offensive operations, are more than apt to fail on the land. Convoy operations can not win the war. They may, if successful, prevent defeat. Unless the navies of the allied forces are satisfied to let the armies or political conditions settle the war, a more offensive plan is essential.

(b) (1) From present prospects the decision on land is far-distant. The people of the European nations at war are war-weary; the losses on land are enormous. Unless the Navy can unmistakably check the submarine menace, the war is apt to be decided by political or labor conditions.

(2) National morale is to-day the vital point, and the effect on allied morale of a successful check to the submarine would be to raise it beyond any possibility of breaking. Likewise, this would so reduce the enemy's chances of winning the war that the morale of the Central Powers would be likely to break.

(c) The convoy system should be regarded merely as a defensive operation carried on while preparing for an offensive. Such an attitude does not prevent thoroughness in carrying out the operation and in order that it may be successful in its rôle, requires careful study to anticipate the changed conditions of the winter and the possible operations which may be conducted by the Central Powers to break up the system.

(d) (1) The convoy system requires the assembly of from 15 to 20 vessels, most of which are run on a schedule of 1 every 8 days. Assuming that on the average there is a delay of 2 days in and 2 days out in a round trip, and that the average time for a round trip is 50 days, it will be seen at once that this is equivalent to a reduction in shipping of 8 per cent. In addition to this, there is the congestion of ports due to arrival and departure of large groups of ships practically simultaneously, which reduces the rapidity of discharge and loading.

(2) In order to make up for the loss in tonnage due to controlled sailings, it is necessary to attain the highest efficiency of employment of all ocean-going merchant tonnage. In order to accomplish this, it is essential that all merchant shipping be controlled as to route, ports, and cargo by the Government, and that the Government representatives coordinate their efforts with the corresponding representatives of the Allies.

(3) An instance will indicate where the savings can be made: There are about 400 ships a month trading from the southeast coast of South America direct to the United States. Most of these ships are American or neutrals operating on an American time charter. This trade is no doubt profitable, but it is doubtful if it is essential to the conduct of the war.

(4) The United States and the Allies must consider carefully what peace-time trade can be dispensed with to meet the very serious shipping situation now before us.

(5) The efficient employment of such shipping as is available, for the transportation of materials essential to the conduct of the war, offers one of the most promising fields for reducing the actual shortage of shipping.

(e) *Defense of convoys against raiders.*—(1) The means at the disposal of the enemy with which to attack the convoys are:

1. U-boats.
2. *Deutschland* type of submarine cruisers.
3. Raiders (armed merchant ships).
4. Cruisers.
5. Battle cruisers.

(2) It appears that the system of protection for convoys now in operation is efficient so far as the resources available permit. The losses of vessels in convoy to the loss of vessels not in convoy is at present about 1 to 20. Of course the greater safety of the submarine in attacking vessels not under escort leads to a pervulence of this form of attack and undoubtedly when all vessels are in convoy the proportion of ships sunk will not decrease in the above ratio.

(f) (1) The merchant captains state that in the bad weather of winter it will be impossible for ships in ballast to operate in convoys so it seems that the proportion of shipping in convoy can never (for the next few months) exceed 50 per cent.

(2) The dispersion of convoys and the difficulty of maintaining position in convoys during fogs and gales will seriously reduce the efficiency of this system during the winter.

(3) The bad weather and long nights will however seriously reduce the efficiency of the submarine and it is believed that the rate of sinkings from U-boats will remain practically constant.

(g) (1) The introduction of the cruising submarine with its long radius of action will move the submarine menace further from the coast of Europe and thus necessitate more extensive destroyer escort operations. At present the force available does not permit this extension but as the number of submarines of this type is limited (probably six) this disadvantage must be accepted.

(2) This type of submarine is fitted with one or two guns 5.9-inch in caliber and is designed to use this gun as its primary weapon. The system of ocean escort is a partial answer to this form of attack.

(4) (1) The raider and cruiser menace are similar and can be considered together. It is quite possible that the raiders or cruisers so employed would have a battery of 6-inch guns and therefore the ocean escorts should be vessels with batteries not less than 6-inch.

(2) In view of the difficulty that would be experienced by one cruiser in guarding a convoy of 15 or 20 ships against a raider of equal speed, it seems that the enemy will use fast ships and those of merchant ship type with sufficient speed being rare, they probably will be cruisers.

(3) The enemy cruisers, however, have rather short radius of action and consequently could not operate long on the main trade routes unless they could obtain fuel from ships engaged in unneutral service. In view of this fact particular investigation of all ships not sailing in convoy should be made and coal cargoes should be made to destination. Vessels with cargo of fuel should be made to travel in convoy.

(4) The threat from raiders or cruisers could best be met by increasing the number of ocean escorts with each convoy, but due to lack of suitable vessels this is an impossibility unless escort by battleships is adopted.

(5) (1) The most serious threat is that by enemy battle cruisers. If one of these vessels accompanied by a fast supply ship, and preceded by a submarine scouting force, could get to sea the possible damage that could be done would be enormous.

(2) Very serious thought must be given to this possibility and the secret service of the Allies should be directed to ascertain information indicating that any such arrangements are in preparation or even contemplated.

See details in reference (f) and inclosure F.

There were some points brought up the other day in Admiral Strauss's testimony about the northern barrage, and as you gentlemen said you were going to ask some questions and go into the matter a little more fully, I have here submitted the entire history, and I have put markers in at certain important points, one of the important points being the inception of the problem. As I said before, Capt. Fullenwider, who is practically the father of the idea, used to come over and talk with us in the plans section of operations almost every day, long before we went into the war, in February, the beginning.

He carried this idea so far that finally on April 15, 1917, he submitted the following paper, which I offer here:

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM.

APRIL 15, 1917.

Subject: Antisubmarine warfare.

1. To consider adequately and properly the means and methods of overcoming the submarine menace, it is necessary to consider the various elements of the war situation. The questions involved being political, economic, and military as well as naval.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The European deadlock.

2. The military situation in Europe is practically a stalemate. In France the British-French forces appear to have a slight advantage, but at the recent rate of progress it will take years to force the Germans back to their frontier.

3. The Italians are holding their own, but without prospect of decisive victory.

4. In the Balkans the Allies have not sufficient force, apparently, to obtain a decision, and the submarine menace may be expected to interfere greatly with the transportation of reinforcements even if the Allies can spare men from other fronts.

5. The Russians are holding, but the staying power of the new Government is doubtful in view of possible internal dissensions. Russia apparently lacks cohesion and unity and can not be relied upon for increased effectiveness.

6. In Asiatic Turkey the Allies are making progress slowly, but even complete victory there would not materially affect conditions in Europe.

7. It is doubtful if the German forces have reached their maximum; but, assuming that they have, so also have those of Great Britain, while those of France have been in the decline for some time. The one remaining source of man power among the Allies in Europe is Russia, but it is doubtful whether that supply can be utilized

without greatly increased assistance from without in the munitioning of the Russian armies.

8. In short, it does not appear that a decision can be expected except through the influence of sea power.

The naval situation.

9. Through her control of the surface of the seas, Great Britain has made the position of the Central Powers complete, and there can be but little doubt that Germany is in distress through want of certain supplies, but there is no assurance that she will reach her limit of endurance within the next two years. On the other hand, Germany by her submarine warfare on shipping is seriously curtailing Great Britain's imports. Great Britain being far more dependent than Germany upon importation of food will be more quickly starved into submission by an effective blockade. While starvation for Britain is doubtless far off, it is a fact that she is now keenly feeling her tremendous loss of shipping, and apparently she has thus far found no means of effectively combating the submarine peril.

10. The result of the war hangs upon the submarine issue. Germany will win the war if she can continue the rapid diminution of merchant shipping. The only hope of the Allies (including America) lies in finding means to curb the effectiveness of the submarine and replacing lost ships, and any further delay will be fatal.

11. If the submarine menace can be materially diminished, the war can be brought to a successful conclusion probably within a year.

HOW MERCHANT SHIPPING CAN BE PROTECTED.

12. The question as to how merchant ships can be protected divides itself into two parts; first, the destruction of hostile submarines; second, the means of making individual merchant ships comparatively safe from torpedo attack.

ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES.

24. There are three general lines of attack on submarines, viz:

- (a) Destroy them at their home base.
- (b) Prevent their egress from or ingress to their home port.
- (c) Hunt them down and destroy them at sea.

25. Under existing conditions in Europe, attack upon submarines at their home base is practicable only from the air, and the difficulties attending this are formidable. Given a large fleet of bomb-dropping Zeppelins, with an over-riding force of battleplanes to beat off hostile aircraft, it should be possible to build up damage, if not destroy, any German naval base on the North Sea, though it may require the sacrifice of a large number of aircraft.

26. If Dutch and Danish territory could be used as aeronautical bases, the problem would be much easier of solution, since the German naval stations are within easy flight from those territories; but Holland and Denmark will probably remain allied because they lack the power to prevent German invasion.

27. The sealing up of German ports and denial to the submarines of a northern base on the sea is a more promising line of attack but this also presents grave difficulties, notwithstanding the Allies' superiority at sea. The means at hand are:

(a) Mines so placed that a submarine could not pass. This method involves the necessity of control of the surface waters to prevent mine-sweeping, countermining, etc.

(b) Submarine nets: Nets also require protection and are of doubtful value against large submarines which are now fitted with cutters.

(c) Entanglements: So placed as to foul submarine propellers. These are designed as to be fairly safe against the usual methods of dragging and cutting, but are of doubtful value.

(d) Entanglements or nets with bombs: This is the same as above with the addition of small mines or bombs attached.

28. All measures for sealing ports or channels present the difficulty that the Germans have so extensively mined their waters and have such supervision and control as to render such measures almost, if not, impracticable. It is possible to establish mine barriers in zones at a distance from the German coasts, thus sealing up the North Sea. This will require between 500,000 and 1,000,000 mines.

29. The third line of attack, that is, the hunting down and destruction of submarines at sea, is impossible of complete success, but is the only one presently available. The means of attack are:

Surprise attack on the surface of destroyers or other fast light boats armed with 3-inch guns, but 3-inch guns are of doubtful value against most recent U-boats. U-boats will not often be surprised on the surface, since they can submerge in one to three minutes, and have means of detecting the presence of a vessel at a considerable distance.

Trap nets, fixed: These are invaluable in the rare event of a submarine attempting to enter a protected harbor or area. In such an event, a destroyer or patrol boat could drop depth mines or bombs on or near the U-boat.

Towing nets: A light net, say, 1,000 feet in length towed by destroyers, trawlers, or other light craft with the object of trapping or entangling a submarine, which could then be destroyed by depth mines as above.

Indicator nets: Same type of net as the towing net, but buoyed in the open sea elsewhere to foul a submarine, the resultant position of which would be indicated by the action of the buoys. Its position being indicated, it would be destroyed in the same manner by depth bombs.

Entanglements: These may be of various descriptions, depending upon material used, the object being to entangle the submarine or its screw in such a manner as to compel her to rise to the surface and expose herself to gun fire or to indicate her position so that she might be destroyed by depth bombs.

Towing mines, or towing torpedoes: Designed to be towed by fast boats in such a manner that the towline, and eventually the mine, will foul the submarine and destroy it. A properly designed towing mine apparatus would enable a destroyer or patrol boat to sweep a width of probably 500 feet and foul the submarine therein at any depth, 60 feet of the surface, or other predetermined depth.

Aircraft: Planes to locate the submerged submarines and to destroy them by dropping bombs.

Shells: Needed, high-explosive, nonricochet shell for use in 3 to 6 inch guns; delayed-action.

Possible developments are:

1. High-speed torpedo carrying a heavy charge with time or distance fuse to destroy submerged submarines.

2. High-trajectory bomb thrower or howitzer bomb to carry at least 150 pounds of explosive and to have a delayed-action fuse; range, 1,500 yards; mount to give flexibility to permit of installation on merchantmen and other vessels capable of carrying them.

SUMMARY.

Things that must be done to win the war: First, stop the submarines at their source; build unsinkable merchant ships; and further delay will be fatal.

Barriers for the North Sea.

By political arrangement Danish and Norwegian waters can be mined. If by allied forces, it will become necessary to inclose the North Sea by barriers.

Northern barriers would extend from the mideastern coast of Scotland to the western coast, a distance of about 250 miles. In this case also the neutrality of Ireland would be involved, but it is unavoidable. The maximum depth on this line is the average depth about 240 feet.

Southern line would extend from the southeast coast of England to a point on the coast near the Belgian frontier, a distance of about 40 miles. Maximum depth 150 feet; average depth, 60 feet.

In connection to the North Sea barriers, it would be necessary to close the Adriatic by mines.

Providing that a special form of mine is used carrying 50 pounds of T. N. T. and laid out horizontally and vertically, there would be required for the North Sea the following:

| | Mines. |
|------------------------|----------------|
| For the North Sea..... | 750,000 |
| For the Adriatic..... | 24,000 |
| Total..... | 774,000 |

Based on the assumption that the Adriatic and the eastern Mediterranean, and a reserve supply of mines, would bring the total number of mines required to about 1,000,000. Assuming a factory to produce 1,000 per day each, these mines could be produced in 1,000 days.

39. On the basis of 50 pounds of T. N. T. per mine, there would be required 50,000,000 pounds of T. N. T. or equivalent explosive.

40. There would be required at least 40,000,000 feet of steel wire rope for mooring the mines.

41. These figures are given to indicate the magnitude of the work of preparation any such plan is to be adopted, and to show the necessity of immediate definition of policy. If an immediate decision should be made, the proposed barrier scheme could not be put into effect inside of six months.

S. P. FULLINWIDER.

NOTE.—The mines above referred to were a special new type of small and cheap mine under tentative design and consideration. The design was never finished owing to the development of the Mark VI mine which was regarded as more suitable for antisubmarine barrages.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Capt. PRATT. April 15, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That was before we had antennæ mines?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; before we had the antennæ mines.

When the antennæ mine became developed, it then became a feasible project, and was taken up. Commander Belknap was appointed to handle the work in the Office of Operations; the Secretary approved the plan as soon as it was presented to him, and as soon as the organization was drawn up. I know I handled it myself with him one night at 6 o'clock, in company with Capt. Belknap, and the work proceeded from then on. When the operation became one of greater magnitude, involving a flag command, Admiral Strauss was appointed to command the operation, and he took the force abroad and operated it. I submit the history of that northern barrage.

(The document referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.

CHAPTER I.—CONCEPTION AND INCEPTION OF THE NORTHERN BARRAGE¹ PROJECT.

The northern barrage was one of the most important naval projects carried out by the United States during the war. To appreciate the importance of the barrage as a factor in the prosecution and winning of the war, one must consider the general military situation as it existed in April, 1917, when the United States threw her weight into the scales with the Allies. There was every reason at that time for a pessimistic view of the situation. The military situation on the West Front was practically a stalemate. The French and British forces appeared to have a slight advantage over the enemy, having made small gains here and there; but they plainly had little or no prospect of obtaining an early military decision. The Italians were holding their own, but with no prospect of decisive victory.

On the east front, the Russians were holding for the time being; but there were ominous indications that the newly established revolutionary government would be unable to overcome internal dissensions and that the Russian power might crumble at any time.

In the Balkans the Allies had insufficient force, apparently, to prosecute an offensive campaign; and the growing submarine menace in the Mediterranean seriously threatened the lines of communication by which this force was sustained. In fact, there was grave danger, especially in view of the pro-German attitude of the then Greek Government, that the Allied Force based on Saloniki would have to be withdrawn and the entire Balkan peninsula given up to the Central Powers. In Asiatic Turkey the British were making slow progress in Mesopotamia; but it was doubtful whether victory there would have any material effect on conditions in Europe.

In short, at the time of the entrance of the United States into the war, there was no prospect of victory over the Central Powers unless and until heavy American forces could be sent to Europe to turn the scale. America was not ready, and could not be

¹ This barrage was known in the United States as the North Sea barrage; but, since it was termed by the British "Northern barrage," and since there were other shorter and minor mine barrages planted in the North Sea by the British, the title "Northern barrage" will be used in this narrative.

expected to create and equip an adequate army within at least one year, or probably two.

The sending of an American Army to France would necessitate the safeguarding of the lines of communication across the Atlantic; in other words, the result of the war was seen to hang upon whether or not the Allies and the United States could obtain and hold the mastery of the sea.

As in all wars in which maritime nations have been engaged, sea power was to prove the decisive factor. The British fleet and the naval forces of the United States and other associate powers were supreme on the surface of the sea, and had it not been for the submarine there would not have been the slightest occasion for doubt of a quick and satisfactory outcome of the war; but the surface fleets were, as a matter of fact, almost impotent in the face of the submarine menace. The German Government concentrated early in the war on the development of the submarine and built these vessels in large numbers, with the purpose, as it turned out, of waging a ruthless war on shipping and thereby bringing Great Britain and her Allies to terms. Generally speaking, the German high seas fleet was kept safe at home, while the British grand fleet and other allied heavy naval forces, having no enemy to meet on the high seas, were compelled to wait at their well-protected bases until the German fleet should put to sea. Thus there was little naval activity beyond the submarine warfare waged by the Germans against merchant shipping, and the allied antisubmarine campaign.

The Germans embarked on the policy of sinking merchant ships without warning in December, 1916; and in February, 1917, unrestricted submarine warfare on merchant shipping was formally announced. While the sinking of merchant tonnage had been very considerable up to this time, it rapidly increased until it reached a high point in April, 1917, of 800,000 tons a month. The average for the first six months of that year was 600,000 tons a month, or about 7,000,000 tons a year. It was a plain mathematical deduction that if this condition were permitted to continue, it would assure a victory for the Central Powers within a year, since the diminished merchant fleet of Great Britain and the Allies could not possibly stand the tremendous loss and meet the requirements of transportation necessary to the successful prosecution of the war.

Soon after the United States entered the war, it became a settled policy of our Government to send a large force of troops to reinforce the French and British on the west front. The increasing submarine menace gravely complicated the problem of transporting our troops and their supplies, and every known method of hunting out and destroying submarines was given careful consideration by the Navy Department. Aside from the possible heavy loss of life due to the sinking of American transports by enemy submarines, there was the moral effect of such sinking to be considered; it might react most unfavorably on the morale of the entire American nation and correspondingly cheer the German public.

It became the general policy of the Navy Department to employ every promising means of destroying enemy submarines, and not to be content to rely on any one means to the exclusion of others. The means which proved successful and which were developed, in cooperation with our Allies, to the utmost included the following:

- (a) Arming of merchant vessels with guns manned by naval gun crews.
- (b) Sending vessels in convoys through the danger zones protected by destroyers and other suitable naval vessels.
- (c) "Hunting groups" of vessels of various types equipped with "listening apparatus."
- (d) Aerial patrol by seaplanes and "blimps" armed with depth bombs.
- (e) Arming of destroyers and other suitable craft with an unlimited supply of depth charges.
- (f) Mining of waters habitually traversed by enemy submarines.

The first important antisubmarine plan to give encouraging results was the convoy system, adopted in July, 1917. This plan had the one serious defect of slowing down shipping, since in a convoy of, say, 20 or 30 vessels the speed of the convoy was reduced to that of the slowest ship; but following the adoption of this plan the average loss fell to about 450,000 tons a month. The losses were principally from slow convoys composed of relatively slow-speed cargo vessels. The losses from fast convoys made up of transports and other craft having a speed of more than 12 knots were comparatively small; and the effectiveness of the system was finally demonstrated by the fact that no troop ships in American convoys were lost during the war. However, the loss of 450,000 tons of shipping a month, or even a much smaller loss, would have proved fatal to the Allied cause if permitted to continue; and additional measures were imperatively necessary.

The allied powers were in a very difficult position and were not prepared to quickly put into effect adequate measures against the entirely novel and unexpected form of

submarine warfare instituted by the enemy. So far as the United States was concerned, whatever offensive or defensive measures were decided upon, the procurement of the necessary material therefor would take valuable time. In short, the Navy was not prepared for and could not perform its proper functions until after adequate numbers or quantities, of destroyers; chasers, guns, mines, depth charges, etc., could be built or manufactured.

Taking the case of mines alone, there were on hand in April, 1917, approximately 5,000 mines of a type which was comparatively unsuitable for antisubmarine operations. To show the inadequacy of this supply, it may be stated that the British were using about 7,000 a month and were endeavoring to increase their output to 10,000 a month. Also, the British had found from their own experience that the type of mine possessed by the United States (the Vickers-Elia) was not well suited for the peculiar type of mining in hand and had changed to a new type, a horn mine resembling the German and Russian mines.

Not until after the United States entered the war did the British and other allied Governments furnish us with important military information; but, as soon as we were permitted to avail ourselves of their war experience, the Bureau of Ordnance decided that it would be desirable to provide at least 100,000 mines and that these must be of a type more suitable for antisubmarine operations than any then in existence. In other words, it devolved upon that bureau to develop a new design of mine and to arrange for its manufacture at the rate of approximately 1,000 a day or four and two-tenths times the production that Great Britain had succeeded in reaching. The reasoning leading to this decision is given below at some length.

The Bureau of Ordnance, even before the United States entered the war, had made a close study of the general conditions, particularly with reference to possible measures to be taken to counteract the submarine peril. The mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, as a result of many conferences on this all-important subject with the chief and assistant chief of bureau and also section chiefs,¹ suggested the measures that could be taken by the United States in a memorandum under date of April 15, 1917, a partial copy of which is appended. This memorandum dwelt upon two principal propositions: First, the protection of merchant vessels by means of cellular construction and "blisters"; and second, antisubmarine barrages enclosing the North Sea and the Adriatic. Obviously, it was impossible to consider seriously any proposition to close German harbors as long as the enemy had complete control of his own waters. The next best thing to "closing the holes" was, of course, to close the North Sea by means of a barrage restricting the operations of enemy submarines to the North Sea and preventing their getting into the Atlantic and interfering with the lines of communication between the United States and Great Britain and France. The proponents of this plan freely admitted that such a barrage probably could not be made completely effective, but insisted that even if it were only partially effective it would win the war.

The memorandum was written mainly with a view to crystallizing opinion within the bureau and furnishing a basis for discussion by officers of the bureau with others concerned in the design and procurement of material for increased naval activities.

Within the Bureau of Ordnance, practically all officers who would be concerned with such a project quite agreed on the principle that the enemy submarine should be contained by means of such a barrage, though the type of barrage and its location were for a considerable period matters of doubt. The consensus of opinion, however, was that the barrage should extend from the east coast of Scotland to the Norwegian coast. This, together with a short barrage across the Dover Straits, would shut off access to the Atlantic, or at least make the continued operations of enemy submarine exceedingly hazardous and unprofitable.

The proposal to construct a barrage 250 miles long was so novel and unprecedented from every practical viewpoint that it was realized at the time that it would be difficult to obtain a prompt decision without considerable preliminary propaganda within the department. Time was regarded as the supreme factor in the situation, as every day saw the loss of many priceless ships and cargoes.

On April 17, the department cabled to Admiral (then Rear Admiral) W. S. Sims, in command of United States naval forces in European waters, directing him to report on the practicability of blockading the German coast efficiently in order to make the ingress and egress of submarines practically impossible. He, in answer, stated that this, of course, had been the object of repeated attempts by the British Navy with all possible means and found unfeasible. Failure to shut in the submarine by a close

¹ At this time, Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, United States Navy, was chief of bureau, Capt. T. A. Kearney, United States Navy, the assistant chief of bureau, and Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy (retired), the chief of the mines and net section, while Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, was chief of the experimental section.

blockade using mines, nets, and patrols in the "Bight" and along the Flanders coast attracted attention of the department upon plans for the alternative of restricting the enemy to the North Sea by closing to him the exits through the Channel and the northern end between Scotland and Norway, as proposed by the Bureau of Ordnance. These are outlined in a memorandum of the Office of Operations, dated May 9, 1917, which was to be submitted for the advice and comment of the British Admiralty with its valuable antisubmarine experience. It was noted that, in working up any plan, the whole field of operations was to be considered primarily with a view to attacking the submarine under water as well as on the surface. It was stated that the entrances to the North Sea, while very broad and presenting immense difficulties, came within the bounds of possibility of control. Estimating the cost of gaining this control and confining enemy submarines within the North Sea to be \$200,000,000, or perhaps twice that sum, there was no doubt that the United States would devote whatever amount it was worth if the purpose was to be accomplished. This was proposed to be done by establishing a barrage of nets, anchored mines, and floating mines, to operate from 35 feet to 200 feet below the surface, which, while safe for surface craft, would bar a submerged submarine, while patrols could deal with those running on the surface.

Commenting on this, the Admiralty, who had apparently considered the United States proposals to particularly advocate the extensive use of nets, replied on May 13: "From all experience Admiralty considers project of attempting to close exit to North Sea * * * by method suggested to be quite unpracticable. Project has previously been considered and abandoned. The difficulty will be appreciated when total distance, depths, material, and patrols required and distance from base of operations are considered." It was the British experience that nets failed of their purpose on account of the possibility of cutting them; mine nets, when located, were avoided or run over; all were difficult to maintain in place and required too many patrol vessels to watch. Mine barrages were not considered wholly effective unless maintained by patrols at all points. Considering the use of such a barrage from Norway to Scotland, patrols could not be properly protected on such a long line, because the defense would be stretched out in a long and locally weak line and therefore subject to enemy raids in sufficient force to break through the patrol, cut nets, and sweep mines, and so clear a passage for the submarines. If protected with heavy vessels, these would be exposed to the German policy of attrition with torpedo attack. In short, as concluded by Admiral Sims in his report to the department on May 14, 1917: "Bitter and extensive experience has forced the abandonment of any serious attempt at blockading such passages."

It is noteworthy that the attitude of the British Admiralty and of Admiral Sims was not favorable to the further consideration of the North Sea barrage project; but, notwithstanding this, the proponents of the project, i. e., the officers of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, redoubled their efforts to secure its adoption, feeling that the result of the war depended upon it more than upon any other possible measure.

From early in March until the latter part of July, 1917, the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance made an intensive study of many types of barrage, among them the submarine trap and indicator nets which had been used by the British. Most of the plans considered were devised within the bureau; but in addition a very large number of inventions and suggestions from private sources were studied. Unfortunately, practically all inventions or ideas emanating from nonprofessional sources were based on incomplete knowledge of fundamental conditions and requirements. Their shortcomings may be expressed briefly by saying that they were based on mill-pond conditions, whereas the waters in which such a barrage as that under consideration had to be planted and maintained were subject not only to very adverse weather conditions but also to the activities of the enemy naval forces which, up to this time, had displayed great initiative and resourcefulness.

The types of barrage studied were of three principal classes: First, nets and entanglements; second, nets in combination with mines or bombs; and, third, mines alone. The possibility of employing nets or entanglements alone was abandoned early, inasmuch as the war experience of the British indicated that it was exceedingly difficult to plant and maintain nets of sufficient weight and strength to be of any material value, and because the depth of water in which the proposed barrage must be laid was quite prohibitive. The quantity of wire rope required also was prohibitive in the time available.

Nets in combination with mines or bombs were open to the same criticism, with the additional point that such material would be very difficult and dangerous to handle and the planting would be too slow. It was finally decided that mines offered the only practicable solution; and, since no mine then in existence, either in America or abroad, was suitable for the project, mainly owing to the excessive number

required, it became necessary for the bureau to design a mine especially adapted to the purpose. A discussion of the evolution of the mine which was finally adopted will follow. It is only necessary to say here that the novel principle of the firing gear of the new mine was discovered in April, 1917, but was not brought to a state of development warranting its adoption until the latter part of July, 1917.

While from the first the new firing mechanism showed great promise, the officers responsible for its development felt that it would be unwise to place too great reliance on it before it has been thoroughly tested out; and, therefore, studies of other means of forming a barrage were continued without cessation up to the day that the new mine was adopted. As late as July 15, 1917, a memorandum prepared by the mine section was submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance suggesting mines in combination with nets. The idea was to have a barrage of overlapping light steel wire nets about 200 feet square, each net carrying two mines, one attached at the top of the net, to be a mine with a hydrostatic firing mechanism, and a second, attached to the center of the net, to have a firing mechanism actuated by a propeller in such manner that a submarine carrying away the net would tow the mine and explode it after a short distance. The hydrostatic mine was intended to explode in the event that the submarine submerged it to a certain depth. It is needless to go into detail regarding the construction of this net and the designs of the mines, since nothing ever came of it. The plan was submitted to a board, but during the board's consideration of the project, information was received of the latest test of the new mine-firing device, which was so favorable that further discussion of the plan before it seemed useless, and the matter was dropped with the understanding that the bureau would concentrate on the development of the new mine, which was thereafter to be known as the Mark VI (up to this time, during its experimental stage, it had been known as the type "X" mine).

In the early days of the mine-barrage project very little official correspondence took place in the matter, principally for the reason that it was desired to keep the matter a profound secret, since it was probable that any type of mine produced would sooner or later bring about methods of counteracting it. It was felt that if information concerning it could be kept until the material had been produced and placed in use, the enemy would not have time to devise protective methods against it.

A decision in the premises favorable to the mine-barrage project was daily becoming more imperative in order to accomplish the laying of the barrage during the best weather of 1918; and, therefore, the bureau had prepared by Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy, chief of the mines and net section, a second memorandum, dated June 1, 1917, which, bearing a strong favorable indorsement by the Chief of the Naval Bureau of Ordnance, was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, this memorandum recommending certain projects for the future conduct of the war and laying particular stress upon the necessity of the northern barrage as being a most promising offensive operation. In fact, the President had addressed the officers of the battle fleet and stated that, as it was nigh impossible to destroy hornets (i. e., German submarines) after they had escaped from their nests, these hornets must be confined to their nests or destroyed before reaching the vast wastes of the ocean.

Realizing that it is difficult to obtain quick action on a novel scheme of such magnitude as the one under discussion, and especially in view of the unfavorable attitude shown by the British, the chief of the mine section, as a representative of the bureau, departed from the policy of secrecy to the extent of discussing the as yet indefinite plan with several officers who were in a position to further the scheme, notably with a member of the General Board, with an officer close to the President, and with representatives of the Office of Naval Operations. He also discussed the matter with Commander C. D. C. Bridge, a British officer then officially visiting this country, who was shortly to return to London. While the type of mine to be used had not yet been developed, it was important to see to it that the idea of a northern barrage should be accepted as a sound and indispensable measure to defeat the enemy submarine. The Bureau of Ordnance, from the first, took the attitude that if the idea of such a barrage were only adopted, the project would be carried through in some way or other, as the only question then would be merely a choice of methods and material; and the bureau had no doubt that the material question could be solved in a satisfactory manner. It may be added that the measures above referred to bore fruit, since the project was adopted by the Navy Department without much loss of time after the Bureau of Ordnance reported that a suitable mine had been developed. Furthermore, the President's attitude was known in advance to be favorable, and the project, when adopted by the department, was promptly approved by him.

One of the earliest and most enthusiastic proponents of the northern barrage project was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to whom was given a copy of the memorandum of April 15, 1917, and with whom the matter was discussed

a general way. The Assistant Secretary's keen interest in the matter was very apparent throughout the early phases of the project; and it is understood that he took up with the Bureau of Yards and Docks the problem of a net barrage across the North Sea. While the details of this study are not known, it is assumed that effort along that line was stopped when it became known that the Bureau of Ordnance had a suitable type of mine, which, of course, was readily accepted as far preferable to any net plan.

In the month of May, 1917, the Department of Commerce became interested in a barrage proposed by certain officers of the Coast and Geodetic Survey; and the Secretary of Commerce took up the matter with the Navy Department and strongly urged that the two departments collaborate in designing and putting down such a barrage. It is needless to go into details regarding its design, and the mere statement will suffice that it was to be composed of nets in combination with mines, and that the net was composed in part of insulated wire, the breaking of which wire by a submarine would fire a mine. There were several conferences, one of them presided over by the Secretary of Commerce and attended by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, Commander Fullinwider, and Lieut. Commander Castle. The Bureau of Commerce was not favorably disposed towards this plan, because it felt that, even if the necessary quantity of material could be obtained, which was doubtful, it would be a very difficult project to carry into execution, and furthermore, that it would be quite impossible to maintain it in waters such as the North Sea. Plans were adopted to carry out tests in deep water, but interest in this plan ceased when Mr. Roosevelt became convinced that the Bureau of Ordnance had developed a satisfactory mine for a barrage.

The foregoing is mentioned only to show the active and growing interest at that time in the idea of a barrage. It also became a favorite problem with inventors. In short, by the time the bureau had demonstrated to its satisfaction that the new mine would be effective, the closing of the North Sea was quite recognized in America as the best possible solution of the antisubmarine problem. It remained to convert the British naval authorities to this view.

The adoption of any plan for a barrage to close the North Sea was, of course, dependent upon the suitability and availability of the material, and so the development of the project was largely the development of the Mark VI mine. It should be stated in this connection, however, that the northern barrage would undoubtedly have been realized whether or not the Mark VI mine had been adopted for the purpose. There were other designs of mine available, but the Mark VI was deemed the most promising in sight at that time.

In April, 1917, Mr. Ralph C. Browne, a citizen of Salem, Mass., an inventor associated with the L. E. Knott Apparatus Co., Cambridge, Mass., brought to the department a description of an invention which he called the "Browne submerged gun." Assistant Secretary Roosevelt referred him to the Bureau of Ordnance, and the invention was duly considered by the chief of bureau and Commander Fullinwider and Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson. The invention in the form offered may be briefly described as follows: A buoy or float carried, as an integral part, a so-called gun or short tube extending vertically downward. The buoy carried also a copper wire hanging vertically. A high-explosive shell was carried in the tube or gun. This shell contained in its base a propelling charge of slow-burning powder intended to give the projectile a velocity of about 50 feet per second through the water. The shell was provided with guides to restrict it to travel along the wire. The float carried also an electrical relay mechanism, all parts so related that the contact of a submarine or any steel vessel with the pendent wire would produce a sea-battery current of sufficient energy to actuate the electric relay, which in turn would ignite the propulsive charge in the base of the shell and send the shell along the wire into contact with the submarine, where the shell was expected to burst and rupture the hull. The design was very ingenious and novel as a whole; but in its then proposed form it was deemed by the bureau to be wholly impracticable for naval use. Commander Fullinwider saw, however, that the electric principle involved might be applied to a mine-firing device, and after making a study of the matter with Capt. S. J. Brown (Math.), United States Navy, and Lieut. Commander Wilkinson, and after reference of such study to the chief of bureau, he suggested to Mr. Browne that he collaborate with the bureau in applying the new principle to an antenna mine. This Mr. Browne was loath to do, as he felt that his invention would be more effective than would a mine. After about two weeks' investigation, including considerable pressure by the chief of bureau himself, however, Mr. Browne agreed that he would defer to the bureau's judgment in the matter and consented to collaborate with the bureau in the development of a mine-firing device based on the use of a sea battery.

Mr. Browne immediately took up the work, and on June 18, 1917, a crude model of a mine-firing device was tested with promising results at the submarine base, New

London, Conn. Further tests were held on July 10; these tests were conducted by the experimental officer of the bureau. It was immediately subsequent to these tests that it was finally decided to adopt the new firing device, and the bureau proceeded to design and develop a mine in which this device could be used.

The bureau was convinced by the tests that the device, which was thereafter to be called the K-1 device, was correct in principle, but realized that in the short time available for development and experimentation, it could hardly be hoped to obtain reliability in the mechanical features of the design. However, since it was essential that mines for the barrage should be ready in large quantities by the following spring, it was decided to proceed with the manufacture of the devices and trust to making any necessary modifications after getting into production, and in the meantime to proceed with tests, so far as tests could be conducted without complete mines.

It may be stated here that, although the design of the complete mine had not yet been decided upon and could not be completed for several months, the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance was sufficiently assured of the successful development of the mine to submit tentative plans to the chief of bureau, and he took the responsibility of formally committing the bureau to this method of closing the North Sea.

On July 18, 1917, the bureau addressed the following letter to the Chief of Naval Operations announcing the development of a new type of mine-firing gear which would be suitable for mines for a northern barrage:

Confidential.

JULY 18, 1917.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Submarine mine barriers, material for.

1. The bureau has developed a new type of mine, at present referred to as Mark VI (Type X) which it is confidently believed will facilitate the establishment of submarine barriers. The mine is radically different from other mines in its firing gear, which has been tested out with excellent results, and the bureau is now proceeding with the design of the mine as a whole and expects to complete it within two weeks.

2. The new mine will be as easily planted as the ordinary types of naval defense mines, and therefore the time and the number of vessels required to establish a barrier will be reduced to a minimum. This mine can be rigged so as to be safe as regards surface vessels, but effective against craft operating below the surface.

3. The mine will be comparatively simple in design, and it is believed that it can be manufactured at a minimum rate of 1,000 per day, which means that the number required for about 300 miles of barrier can be produced within about three months from the beginning of deliveries or within four months from the placing of orders.

4. The bureau requests that a decision be reached at the earliest practicable moment as to the desirability of establishing complete barriers to prevent enemy submarines from gaining access to the Atlantic. The bureau assumes that such a project is desirable, as no other means of stopping the submarine peril appears to be in prospect, and, since it is going to take four months to obtain the necessary material, the bureau believes that it should be authorized to proceed immediately with arrangements for procuring the material.

5. Theoretically, only 72,000 mines will be required for 300 miles of barrier, but 100,000 should be provided to allow a reasonable excess for replacements, etc. In addition, a number, say 25,000, should be provided for our own coast defenses, it is believed, making a total of 125,000 mines, which, at an estimated cost of \$320 each, gives a total cost of \$40,000,000. This estimate is designedly liberal.

6. The bureau is of the opinion that the design, manufacture, and assembly of the new mine should be carried out with the utmost secrecy, and is taking the necessary precautions accordingly, since advance information of such a mine would be of the greatest aid to the enemy in devising means to counteract it.

7. The above estimate as to time is based upon our success in securing the necessary quantity of T. N. T. or other high explosive.

8. In considering this project the use of high-speed mine-laying vessels such as liners and merchantmen in addition to destroyers and light cruisers will be required, and such vessels must be provided. The mines can be dropped accurately at any speed by time devices. The whole barrier should be laid as one operation and be protected as far as possible. If isolated mines are planted it is probable that a device to defeat the mine-firing mechanism will be developed by Germany.

RALPH EARLE.

While awaiting the department's action, the bureau proceeded with the design of the mine, with a view to being prepared at the earliest possible date to undertake its manufacture.

On July 30, 1917, the bureau addressed a second communication to the Chief of Naval Operations, submitting more complete information regarding the new mine and

proposing an American-British joint offensive operation in the form of a northern barrage. A copy of this letter follows:

JULY 30, 1917.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Proposed British-American joint offensive operations; submarine barriers; Mark VI mines.

1. In its letter No. 32957 of July 18, 1917, the bureau announced the development of a new type of mine that is peculiarly adaptable for use against submarines.

2. The firing mechanism of this mine is based on a very recent discovery in the electrical field and, although there has been little time for development, the tests which have been carried out with an experimental mine by a submarine leaves no doubt, in the bureau's opinion, of the success of this invention.

3. The mine will have the following characteristics:

a. A spherical mine case carrying a charge of 300 pounds of T. N. T. having a destructive radius of about 100 feet against a submarine.

b. The anchor may be either the automatic type such as that now in use or a simple mushroom type, depending upon the conditions under which mining operations shall be carried out.

c. The firing mechanism comprises an electrical device carried within the mine case and an antenna of any desired length, the end of which will be supported by a small buoy as near the surface of the water as may be desired. A second antenna may be suspended from the mine where the depth of water renders this necessary.

d. A steel vessel coming in contact with the antenna will fire the mine.

4. The mine has the following advantages over other types:

a. In depths of less than 100 feet, it may be planted on the bottom where it is least affected by wave action and current. In this case a buoyant mine is not necessary or desirable and it can be made smaller and cheaper than a buoyant mine. In such circumstances there is no possibility of its getting adrift and it can not be swept up in the usual way. It can, however, be fired by a mine sweep.

b. In depths greater than 100 feet, it is proposed to submerge the mine to a depth of 100 feet since 100 feet is about its destructive range against submarines. At this depth the mine itself is entirely protected from wave action and only the light float or buoy is exposed to such action.

c. Where conditions permit, the antenna may take the form of a net; or the antenna of adjacent mines may be connected by horizontal wires forming an impassable barrier.

d. If a floating mine be desired, this mine may be suspended from a buoy in such manner as to be harmless to surface craft but deadly to submarines submerged.

e. It may be used as a towing mine with antenna to give it a very large danger space.

f. It can almost entirely replace submarine nets of present types.

g. It can be used for mining very deep water more easily than can other types.

5. The mine, with its anchor, antenna, and buoy will be assembled and launched as a unit, so that it can be launched at high speed from destroyers if desired.

6. The bureau believes that with this mine it becomes practicable to close the North Sea, Adriatic, and other exits of enemy submarines, and that it gives us our opportunity to cooperate in carrying into execution a major offensive operation of a decisive character. Even if the proposed barriers should prove to be only 50 per cent effective the enemy's submarine campaign would surely fail.

7. It is suggested that the North Sea barriers must extend from the coast of Scotland to Norway and across the English Channel. The proposed line from Scotland to Norway must, to be all effective, extend into the territorial waters of Norway, thereby involving the question of Norway's neutrality. It would seem that if the German submarine is permitted by Norway to use her territorial waters, it becomes incumbent upon the Allies to take measures to prevent such use.

8. The proposed mine barrier scheme does not infringe upon the neutrality of Holland, Denmark and Sweden, except in the restricted sense that the vessels of those powers, as well as of Norway, would be required to pass through a gate in the barriers under the control of the allied forces. In effect, this would amount to the establishment of additional danger zones to be avoided by neutrals.

9. The bureau understands that the British Admiralty has objected to any barrier in the North Sea that would interfere with the freedom of the British Fleet. It is suggested that a gate should be left in the barrier at an appropriate place near the Scotch coast, not only for British naval vessels, but also for neutral merchant vessels. This gate would be, say, 8 miles long, with mines so planted that their antennae would not come within 40 feet of the surface at low water. In other words, the subsurface would be mined against submarines and the surface left open. This gate could be

effectively patrolled with a very few vessels and submarines attempting to pass on the surface could be destroyed.

10. If a decision should be reached immediately to proceed with the assembling of the material for these barriers, it would require approximately six weeks to complete the designs, place the orders and start production on a large scale. After starting production mines could be obtained at a minimum rate of 5,000 a week, and if the project were given the importance due it, there is no doubt that the manufacturers could be depended upon to increase this figure. In this connection, it is assumed that the British Admiralty would be willing to cooperate to the extent of furnishing a portion, at least, of the mine anchors, but it is believed that we should supply all of the mines, with the exception of the anchors.

11. It would require approximately 72,000 mines to establish barriers around the North Sea, assuming that the barrier will be composed of four lines of mines, placed 100 feet apart in each line; in other words, a barrier would require a mine for every 25 feet. To this 72,000 should be added at least 28,000 for renewals and as a reserve. If it should be decided to place the barrier across the Adriatic and to close the Dardanelles about 50 miles of barrier, or about 15,000 additional mines would be required.

12. It is estimated that 125,000 mines can be manufactured at a cost of \$40,000,000.

13. The bureau has made every effort to keep the discovery and development of this mine a military secret, and it is believed that this secrecy can be maintained by proper organization and administration until such time as it becomes necessary to assemble the completed mines to ship them to Europe. To this end, the various parts of the mine will be manufactured by different companies and no manufacturer need be informed as to the characteristics of the mine as a whole. The company which will manufacture the firing gear has taken such precautions that only three members of the company will know that the electrical apparatus used in the mine is intended for a mine.

14. In view of the importance of keeping this matter a military secret, it is considered desirable that the British Admiralty should not be informed as to the features of the mine until the mines shall have been manufactured and shipped. This view is taken because it is inevitable that information will leak out regarding the design if any considerable number of persons should become informed of it, and since it is proposed to manufacture the mines complete in this country, it would seem unnecessary to send any information regarding it abroad and would only invite the possibility of such a leak.

15. If the enemy should learn of this invention it would be easy for him to evolve a similar mine, which he could use to blockade the British ports. The principle of the firing mechanism is so simple that only the slightest clue would enable the enemy to duplicate it.

16. If this project should be carried out, the bureau is of the opinion that its execution will bring about a general engagement with the German fleet, which it is supposed is desirable.

17. The following is a summary of the cooperation deemed necessary to carry out this plan:

United States:

- (a) Provide mines, except anchors.
- (b) Send mines to England.
- (c) Assist in assembling mines in England.
- (d) Provide a number of mine layers.
- (e) Assist in laying.

Great Britain:

- (a) Provide anchors.
- (b) Assemble mines on anchors.
- (c) Organize and equip mine-laying force.
- (d) Lay all mines with United States assistance.

18. In the above it is suggested that Great Britain provide the anchors, for the reason that about 30,000 tons would be required and that the transportation of this tonnage should be avoided if possible.

19. Regarding the mine-laying part of this project it is understood that Great Britain has about 18 regular mine layers and that the United States could probably furnish 4, giving a total of 22, not including destroyers. A number of British destroyers are fitted to carry 80 mines and probably some of ours could readily be fitted to carry 40 to 80 each, so it is assumed that 40 destroyers may be available. The mine-laying program may then be assumed to be approximately as follows:

- (a) Twenty-two mine layers could lay 200 mines per day each. If they take one day to reload, they would lay an average of 100 per day each.
- (b) Forty destroyers could average 50 per day each.

- 19. All combined could lay 4,200 per day.
- 20. For the northern barrier about 60,000 mines are required. These, at the rate of 200 per day, could be laid in about 15 days.
- 21. For the English Channel barriers assumed lengths 50 miles, 12,000 mines would be required. At the rate of 4,200 per day, these could be laid in three days. It is assumed that two barriers each 25 miles long would be required in the channel to fully protect the channel crossing.
- 22. Lacking definite information as to the mine-laying facilities in the Mediterranean, but assuming that 10 vessels could be made available, the Adriatic barrier, 100 miles, could be laid in about one week, and the Dardenelles barrier in a shorter time.
- 23. As the manufacture and assembling of the material will be an immense undertaking, and as time is precious at this juncture in the war, a decision should be reached at the earliest moment practicable.
- 24. If this plan be adopted, it will be necessary to expedite manufacture by giving it work priority over certain other Government work, particularly in the matter of obtaining a sufficient supply of T. N. T. This will be made the subject of special report if the general plan be adopted.

KEARNEY, Acting.

On August 15, 1917, Admiral Mayo, commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, who was about to proceed to England accompanied by certain members of his staff, conferred with the chief of bureau and officers of the mine section regarding the new mine and its value for the proposed northern barrage. This discussion covered not only the material questions but also matters of strategy and tactics involved in such an undertaking. The bureau furnished Admiral Mayo for his information and for use in discussing the matter with the British naval authorities a memorandum embodying the ideas of the Bureau of Ordnance concerning the adaptability of the Mark VI mine for a barrage. This memorandum is quoted below for the reason that it set forth with fair accuracy the possibilities and limitations involved in the use of the new mine and, in connection with the above quoted letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, supplied the information necessary for an intelligent consideration of the northern barrage project.

Confidential.

AUGUST 15, 1917.

Memorandum for commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Mark VI mine.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Bureau of Ordnance letter to Chief of Naval Operations, dated July 30, 1917.

1. The following notes are intended to amplify and supplement the information contained in the inclosed letter.
2. From the early stages of submarine warfare, trap nets have been used to a considerable extent, but it has been found to be extremely difficult to maintain nets of sufficient weight and strength to stop submarines, and it has lately become known that submarines are equipped with cutters which enable them to cut their way through. Inasmuch as the submarine is free to go to a depth of 200 feet, a heavy trap net in deep water necessarily becomes a serious problem, not only to manufacture and plant, but also to maintain against the wear and tear due to storms and currents, etc. The bureau early became convinced that a trap net designed to offer passive resistance to submarines is not a sure solution to the problem.
3. Indicator nets of various designs have been studied and much information regarding foreign types of such nets have been fully considered with the conclusion that this type of net also is not a satisfactory antisubmarine device. Such nets must be suspended from surface floats and cables, are subjected to extreme conditions of wear and have a short life. But the principal objection to such a net, when it is not combined with bombs or mines, is that it merely indicates the presence of a submarine and that it requires a very large number of patrol vessels to keep a close watch on the net in order that a vessel may be near at hand to destroy a submarine whose presence is indicated. With a view to reducing the number of attendant vessels, a radio buoy has been developed to send out a call automatically in the event of a submarine pulling an indicator net, but the defect of this scheme is principally that a submarine has an excellent chance to get clear of such a net by the time a patrol vessel could arrive on the scene.
4. Nets in combination with mines or bombs are better, on paper at least, than either the trap nets or the indicator nets; but here again the difficulty of planting and maintaining such nets on a large scale—for example, the proposed North Sea barrier—would be prohibitive. The bureau has examined and carefully considered hundreds of inventions and suggestions relative to nets of all descriptions, and has come to the

forces. This would then insure the maintenance of an adequate and continuous patrol and the prevention of sweeping operations.

22. In planning for the material required for the North Sea barrier, the line from Buchan Ness, on the east coast of Scotland, to the coast of Norway was assumed as a possible line. This line is an extreme example of a barrier because of its length and the depth of water traversed, though its currents are favorable.

23. It is evident that such a barrier would restrict freedom of action of the British fleet based on the coast of Scotland, inasmuch as it would not be free to cross the barrier line at any point except where a "gate" had been established. This gate could be any width desired, say 15 or 20 miles, and there could be more than one gate.

24. Assuming that the North Sea was inclosed by effective barriers and assuming that the enemy had 200 submarines in the North Sea and confined thereto, it is to be expected that the enemy would attempt to trap the allied forces. For example, suppose that a gate 20 miles wide were left in the barrier, near the coast of Scotland, and that this was the only means by which the allied fleet could pass in and out of the North Sea. It is to be expected that the enemy might dispose his submarines in appropriate positions in the neighborhood of such gate, that he would then send his main fleet into the North Sea to make a demonstration and try to draw the British and allied forces into an ambush. The important question arises, therefore, as to whether the British and allied fleets could reasonably expect to cope with such a situation. It seems reasonable to expect that by means of patrols and sweepers a large area of sea adjacent to the proposed gate could be kept under control and made fairly safe for the fleet. However, denial to the German submarines of access to the Atlantic would intensify submarine activities in the North Sea. The enemy would also be likely to attempt to raid and sweep or destroy parts of the barrier. This would necessitate constant and vigilant patrol by fast light cruisers and destroyers, and it is to be expected that this condition would bring on heavy engagements with the enemy, if not a main fleet action.

* * * * *

27. Further tests are about to be made of a number of mines to demonstrate their reliability under varying conditions of service, and their safety in handling, but as the firing gear is the only really novel feature of the mines, and as that has stood every test yet applied to it, there appears to be no possibility of failure.

28. The manufacture of 10,000 mines for our own service has been started. This initial lot of 10,000 will prepare manufacturers concerned for production of larger quantities.

T. A. KEARNEY, *Acting*.

As will be subsequently seen, the tentative design of the mine had to be modified as a result of experiments and more mature study of the project. Notably, the use of a lower antenna was decided to be impracticable or inadvisable; and the spacing of mines had to be increased to 300 feet to reduce the danger of countermining. It was found, too, that the Bureau of Ordnance had been too optimistic in its forecasts relative to early completion of design and early production, due principally to the lack of sufficient experienced personnel in the early stages of the project.

The foregoing carries the history of the northern barrage to the point of its formal submission to the British Admiralty by the Navy Department through Admiral Mayo.

CHAPTER II.—BRITISH CONSIDERATION OF PROJECT.

A British Admiralty "History of northern barrage" states that:

"Toward the end of August, 1917, Commander (Acting Captain) Alan M. Yeats-Brown, D. S. O., R. N., after having made various proposals during the preceding two months with regard to antisubmarine measures, produced a paper entitled 'Antisubmarine mining proposals.' This paper was referred to the plans division. This division had already been considering these matters for some time, and, after consulting with Capt. Yeats-Brown on several points which he had brought forward, suggested certain modifications to the proposals and wrote an appreciation on Capt. Yeats-Brown's paper. The conclusions arrived at were brought up for discussion at the next allied naval conference by the first sea lord, who, it is believed, had previously discussed the matter with Admiral Mayo, of United States Navy."

The northern barrage project was taken up at an allied naval conference, at London, September 4-5, 1917, attended by Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy, where, as reported by him on September 8: "The British Admiralty put forward, as an alternative to a close offensive in German waters, the suggestion that the activity of enemy submarines might be restricted by the laying of an effective mine field or mine net

barrage." The mine net barrage was considered impracticable, and "as to the proposal to put down a mine barrage in the northern part of the North Sea, while it could be guarded against enemy sweepers, certain difficulties exist, such as lack of freedom of movement of the Grand Fleet, so that a very promising degree of success should be indicated before such an undertaking was begun." Further, "The conference, after discussion, agreed that the distant mine barrage could not very well be undertaken until an adequate supply of mines of satisfactory type was assured."

The British Admiralty history, in reference to the proceedings at this conference states:

Admiral Jellicoe put forward the suggestion of laying 'an efficient barrage so as to completely shut in the North Sea.'

He computed that 100,000 mines would be required. He remarked (a) "I do not think we get many German submarines by mines;" (b) "It appears that the result of our mine fields (in the Bight) is to force the submarines, or a very large proportion, to go in and out of the German bases through territorial waters or Dutch territorial waters;" (c) "There is the alternative of laying a mine field in the North Sea, in a position where the enemy sweepers can not reach without running very considerable risk. In view of our present experience, I do not think that would have much more result than our present policy; but if a mine is produced which is more effective against submarines than our own mines, the matter, perhaps, becomes somewhat different. * * * We get our mines slowly. Our problem is then: Is it better to put them down as we get them, or is it better to wait until we get a very large number and lay a complete barrage across the North Sea? * * * It is obvious a mine field so laid would have to be at some considerable distance from German ports, because it would require to be watched. * * * A great deal depends upon whether the mine is a satisfactory one. If we get a satisfactory mine, it might be worth while laying a barrage when we get a sufficient number."

Admiral Mayo approved the idea of a mine barrage involving patrol by the allied fleet, provided always that we had confidence in the efficiency of the mine which would be laid. He thought that this promised really more in the way of results than the proposed operations in regard to the convoy of ships.

Vice Admiral Sims said: "It must be successful completely, or it is not successful at all. Either the barrage is successful absolutely or it fails absolutely."

Sir Eric Geddes said: "I do not understand from the remarks of the first sea lord that the barrage should take the place of other offensive measures. It is not considered that the barrage can be sufficiently relied upon to take the place entirely of other measures for hunting and destroying submarines."

As for Sir Eric Geddes's statement, he was in exact accord with the American proponents of the project, who from the first advocated it in addition to other useful antisubmarine measures.

The results of the conference may be summed up as indicating a favorable attitude, in principle, toward the Northern barrage project leavened with doubt of its practicability. The reasons for this doubt are surmised to have been the generally unfortunate experience of the British in the development and use of mines. At the outbreak of war in 1914 the British had practically no mines, and, for want of a better one, adopted the Vickers-Elia type, which soon proved unreliable and ineffective. This was superseded by one of British Admiralty design, essentially similar to the Russian and German horn mines, but with a distinctly British sinker (anchor). This British horn mine, while perhaps an improvement on the Vickers-Elia, was not entirely satisfactory, being comparatively dangerous to handle, too susceptible to countermining, unreliable in automatic depth taking, and not of a type lending itself to rapid and economical manufacture.

For some reason, perhaps their own rather slow and unsatisfactory progress in the development of mines, British officials apparently were skeptical of the ability of the United States to produce quickly a more satisfactory type. This attitude first became apparent to the Bureau of Ordnance on June 2, 1917, when Admiral Sims in a dispatch to the department reported: "* * * the British Admiralty have concentrated upon the construction of mines to such extent that they now anticipate that by August the output will reach 10,000 a month. They consider it unwise from their previous experience with mines similar to those which we now have on hand to attempt to utilize our present available supply. They now consider * * * as our output of a different type mine would not be available in sufficient time that we can more profitably concentrate on other work."

An immediate result of the conference was the production on September 14, 1917, by the Admiralty plans division of a paper for Admiral Mayo, entitled "General future policy, including future mining policy," with an appendix, "Mine barrage across the North Sea." The following extracts from this paper bearing on the barrage project are quoted:

"The enemy submarine campaign now dominates and overshadows every other consideration, and any increase in the present rate of sinking might bring about an unsatisfactory peace.

"* * * It therefore appears that our future policy must be directed toward a more concentrated and effective control in the areas between the enemy's ports and our trade routes.

"Some form of barrage corresponding to that which was formerly established by the battle fleet * * * must be reconstituted in such a form that the enemy submarines can not venture into it without considerable risk to themselves.

"Broadly speaking, four forms of barrage may be considered:

"Firstly. A barrage of mines only * * *.

"Secondly. A combination of deep mines with surface and aircraft.

"Thirdly. Surface and aircraft patrolling a wide belt.

"Fourthly. Sealing the submarine exits * * *.

"The fourth form of barrage * * * is the only radical cure * * * but the difficulties * * * are so great that it is not recommended to attempt it.

"It is therefore proposed to use a combination of the first three.

"* * * The enemy submarine would thus be subject when on the surface to attack of one kind or another from shortly after leaving their bases until they cleared the Orkney-Shetland-Norway line, in addition to passing through a mine barrage. * * *"

The paper also dealt with the protection of the barrage, remarking, "* * * with our fleet based on Rosyth, we should be in a position to insure protection even to the area between the notified area and the Norwegian coast."

The use of neutral waters by enemy submarines was also dealt with: "* * *. This can only be overcome by converting the neutral into an ally or by ourselves preventing the enemy submarines from using these waters. * * * Should Norway come in on our side, Stavanger * * * could be used as a base for a fleet or for the light watching forces as desired. Should, however, the general situation render it undesirable to include Norway among the Allies, any development of the selective type mine would enable us to deal with the passage. * * *."

The appendix dealt with the details of the mine barrage, which it was proposed to establish on the Aberdeen-Ekersund line and was at that time of such importance to the further consideration of the project, particularly to the Navy Department, that it is quoted in full below:

APPENDIX I.—MINE BARRAGE ACROSS THE NORTH SEA.

The object of mining the North Sea is to prevent the enemy submarines from getting out, but it is most undesirable that any mine barrage should hinder the movements of our own fleet or lay our coasts open to attack, if it can be avoided.

Before considering the line to be selected, the requirements of an effective mine barrage will be considered.

The requirements are as follows:

(1) The mine field must be guarded; that is to say, it must either be—

(a) At such a distance from the enemy ports that he can not sweep it; or,

(b) We must watch it and drive off any sweeping vessels he sends out.

Obviously (a) is preferable. It is also an advantage to be far enough off the enemy aircraft bases to prevent interference to our patrols by seaplanes or aeroplanes. Zeppelins can be dealt with.

(2) The mine field should be as far from the enemy ports as other considerations will permit to enable our patrols to intercept any submarine damaged but not sunk outright by our mines.

(3) The barrage must consist of both deep mines and mines near the surface; or, if deep mines only are used, the barrage must be patrolled in order to force the submarine to dive to the level of the deep mines.

It is also an advantage if the barrage is in such a position that our main fleet can be based on the enemy side of it, as this will not only give freedom of movement to our own fleet, but in addition should enable us to intercept any enemy vessels which endeavor to interfere with our barrage or the vessels patrolling it.

Consideration of the line to be selected.—The line from Aberdeen to Norway is preferred for the following reasons:

(a) Its great distance from the enemy ports, which will render interference from the enemy difficult. Thus, every mine laid in this area will continue to be a menace to the enemy submarines until the end of the war.

(b) The line is shorter than any other, with the exception of the Orkney and Shetland-Norway line, which is considered impracticable owing to the depth of water and the strong tides in the Firth of Clyde Channel.

- The grand fleet, if based on Rosyth, is on the enemy side of the line.
- f. Any submarines damaged by mines will have a long way to get home and should be accounted for by our patrols.
- g. Whether Norway eventually comes in on the side of the Allies or not, the eastern end of the line will be far easier to guard than the northern end of the Goodwin-Hatland line, which has been suggested.
- h. It would be easier to bring pressure to bear on Norway to induce them to take steps to prevent submarines passing through their territorial waters than it would in the case of Denmark with their ever-present fear of invasion.
- i. The line Aberdeen-Norway deals with submarines using the Baltic exits as well as with those coming from North Sea ports.

Proposed mining policy.—The principles governing our policy to be:

- a. Never lay a mine which can be swept in such a position that the enemy can sweep it.
- b. Lay mines which can not be swept as close off the entrance to the enemy harbors as possible.

The practical application of this policy to take the following form:

1. Mine the Straits of Dover with deep mines and patrol the minefield to force the submarines down on to the mines.
2. Prescribe a mined area on the Aberdeen-Norway line.
3. Lay deep mines between the notified area and Aberdeen and patrol this line so as to force the submarines down.
4. Lay deep mines between the prescribed area and Norway when mines become available; in the meantime this area to be watched by hydrophone vessels.
5. Mine close to in the German harbors with destructor mines.

The British Navy to be responsible for mining the Straits of Dover and the entrances to the German rivers.

The American and British Navies to cooperate in mining the Aberdeen-Norway route.

It is absolutely essential that the whole of the mines laid in the Aberdeen-Norway barrage should be so constructed that they automatically become safe should they break away from their moorings.

Details of the Aberdeen-Norway mine barrage.—Reference: Chart No. 2182 B.

1. The total length of the barrage may be taken as 280 miles over the greater part of which the depth of water is less than 50 fathoms.

To mine any belt of water effectively there should be 3 lines of mines at each depth of 5 fathoms (e. g. the vertical distance between lines of mines will be 30 feet).

One line of mines at each depth will be referred to as a "system." Thus the complete barrage will consist of three systems.

It is not considered necessary, however, to lay mines at a greater depth than 200 feet (33 fathoms), as submarines will not willingly go below this depth.

2. The barrage is divided into three parts:

Area A, the Notified Area: This area has to be made dangerous from the surface to 200 feet below it.

Area A, B, and C: Deep mines with surface vessels and aircraft patrolling.

The above areas will be considered separately.

3. Area A: It is necessary to make this area impassible to submarines, whether diving or on the surface. Three systems of mines will be required. If British mines are used, each system will have lines of mines at seven different depths, whereas if American mines are used, each system will only require lines of mines at two different depths.

It is therefore proposed that American mines should be used for the area.

The barrage will consist of three systems of lines each, e. g., six lines of mines in all.

Suggested method of laying the mines.—(a) The northern edge of area A would be mined first in order to restrict the movements of our fleet to the southward as little as possible.

(b) The depth of area A is 56 miles, which will allow of the mine field being extended in a southerly direction without a further notification to neutrals.

(c) It is of great importance, however, to absorb as little of this space as possible on each occasion of laying mines, and for this purpose three lines of spar buoys will be laid in area A, as shown on Chart 2182 B.

(d) Only one line of buoys will be required for laying the first and second systems, the third system being laid to the north of the center line of buoys. The presence of three lines of buoys will confuse the enemy as to the actual position of the mines.

(e) The spar buoys will be laid at intervals of 10 miles and will be numbered so that the mine layers can ascertain where to commence laying on each occasion.

(f) The operation of laying the mines might be carried out as follows:
Two mine layers to proceed to No. 2 buoy and lay lines A1, A2, as shown on chart. These lines would form part of the first system. The lines A1 and A2 would be 11 miles in length, the first mine being dropped when 2 miles from No. 2 buoy.

NOTE.—The object in not laying mines until 2 miles away from the buoy is twofold:
(1) It enables the buoys to be approached if it is desired to remove them later on.
(2) The buoys will give no information as to the exact position of the ends of the lines of mines.

On the next occasion the mine layers would proceed well to the eastward of No. 2 buoy, then steer south until they reached the line of buoys, shape course for No. 3 buoy and lay lines A 1, A 2.

The second system of mines (lines A 3, A 4) would be laid in a similar manner, but to the southward of the line of buoys.

Number of American mines required.—It is assumed mines will be laid 40 yards apart.

First system=length of the line by number of lines \times number of mines to the mile.
 $= (11 \times 11) \times 2 \times 50 = 12,100$.

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 \times 12,100=36,300.

4. Area B: The barrage will consist of three systems. Each system will have a line of mines at each of the five following depths:

65, 95, 125, 155, 185 feet.

It is proposed that the mining of this area should be undertaken by the British. Each system will require 22,500 mines.

Therefore complete barrage=3 systems=67,500 mines.

5. Area C: It is desirable that American mines should be used for this area as the number of sinkers required is thereby reduced considerably. A decision on this point can only be arrived at when it is known what type of sinker can be used with the American mine.

Numbers required.

If American mines are used:

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 \times 2 lines=6 lines.

Number of mines in each system=length of line by number of lines by number of mines to the mile.
 $= 60 \times 2 \times 50 = 6,000$.

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 \times 6,000=18,000.

If British mines are used:

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 \times 5 lines=15 lines.

Number of mines in each system=60 \times 5 \times 50=15,000.

Complete barrage=45,000.

NOTE.—This number would be considerably reduced if the X attachment is used.

The copy of the above-quoted Appendix I, which was given to Admiral Mayo for the Navy Department, bore the following notation on its face: "Admiralty would be glad to learn whether Navy Department concurs in the plans as shown."

The Admiralty "History of northern barrage" states that "As a result of this paper it was decided to proceed with preparations for laying a barrage on the Aberdeen-Norway line," and adds that "The date of this decision is not known."

It is important to note that at this period the British Admiralty was apparently quite in accord with the Navy Department in regard to major features of the project, but differed with respect to some of the details. Pending the return of Admiral Mayo to the United States about the middle of October, the development of the project was almost at a standstill for want of information as to British intentions, except in the matter of design and manufacture of the new mines; but the British Admiralty proceeded with the formulation of policies and plans based on the decision to lay the barrage on the Aberdeen-Norway line. These activities will be referred to in detail later.

The location of the proposed barrage, with the proposed area which should be notified (as it was to contain surface mines as well as deep mines), together with the suggested arrangement of the mine systems, is shown in the reproduced chart (fig. 4).

CHAPTER III.—AMERICAN CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION OF PROJECT.

Upon the return of Admiral Mayo to the United States, a conference was held in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations on October 15, 1917. The following officers were present: Admiral Benson, Admiral Mayo, Rear Admiral Earle, Capt. F. H. Schofield, Capt. R. R. Belknap, Commander Fullinwider, and Commander King.

At this conference Admiral Mayo produced for consideration the above-quoted Appendix I setting forth the British Admiralty version of the plan for the proposed barrage. There ensued a general examination and discussion of the plan; and, the consensus of opinion being favorable, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson, after consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, then and there directed the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance to proceed with the procurement of 100,000 Mark VI mines. This action, so far as the adoption of the project was concerned, was only tentative pending a careful study of the British version; but it was regarded by the Bureau of Ordnance as tantamount to a decision to carry out the project and to provide all necessary material therefor without further delay.

Following the conference, the planning section of the Office of Naval Operations and representatives of the Bureau of Ordnance conferred informally as to details of the plan, and the papers in the case were then referred to the general board for consideration.

On October 17, 1917, while the barrage project was under consideration by the general board, the Chief of Naval Staff, British Admiralty, addressed the following dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations:

"It will be necessary to increase the number of lines of United States mines in each system in the North Sea barrage from two to three if there should be any difficulty in using the lower antennæ of United States mines for first supplies. Could you please state an approximate date when supply of complete mines and sinkers will begin, stating at what rate the supply will be maintained?"

"As all British mine layers will be fully engaged in laying British portions of the barrage, will you please say how many United States mine layers will be available * * * and the output of United States mines? It is estimated that each ship could make five mine-laying trips a month. As a base for United States mines and mine layers, it is proposed to use Cromarty. The question of facilities for assembling ready for use, storage, and embarkation is being investigated on the spot. It is suggested that it is desirable that United States officers should confer with ours on this question and examine proposed arrangements as to suitability for dealing with United States mines and sinkers; also to ascertain as to whether our depot system will be suitable for application to United States mines. It is proposed that the necessary assembling and testing of United States mines and sinkers on receipt and before issue to mine layers should be dealt with by depot staffs provided by you, if possible. It is hoped that you will be able to agree with this. United States officers if sent over can report numbers required.

"I should be much obliged if you would inform me as soon as possible whether you can supply sinkers for United States mines."

On October 20, on the recommendation of the General Board, the Navy Department cabled Admiral Sims substantially as follows:

"The department requests to be informed whether the plan for the placing of a mine barrage across the North Sea on the Aberdeen-Ekersund line has the approval of the Admiralty. It is believed that the great experience of the British naval forces in North Sea operations and their experience in naval mining during the present war puts them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme is practicable in construction and maintenance, and whether in the opinion of the Admiralty it is the best scheme in sight for limiting the operations of enemy submarines, provided that the Straits of Dover can be efficiently closed to the passage of submarines which, if possible in the opinion of the department, should be done at the earliest possible date."

The following reply, in substance, was received on October 23 from the Admiralty:

"The mine barrier has been approved by Admiralty and the Admiralty now confirms approval. The preparations are rapidly proceeding.

"Admiralty's cable of 17th indicates the assistance desired from the United States of America. This scheme is considered by the Admiralty to be best to be carried out at a distance from the bases of the enemy. The Admiralty are working on a supplemental scheme for operation close inshore, but any such inshore operation has the defect that a passage through for submarines can eventually be cleared by the enemy.

"No scheme yet tried has been effective in closing the Dover Straits to submarines, but measures are being constantly improved, and they are, at the least, always a considerable deterrent. Mining operations on an extensive scale against submarines in the Straits of Dover commence in November. Owing to the lack of effective anti-submarine mine, this has hitherto been delayed."

The general board completed its consideration of the project and submitted its report to the Secretary of the Navy on October 24, 1917. A complete copy of this report is appended, but a summary of its "conclusions" is quoted here:

"* * * the general board is decidedly of the opinion that of the measures discussed * * * the scheme of closing the North Sea offers the best chances of success; that is, to close the North Sea by the Aberdeen-Ekersund barrier approved by the British Admiralty and to similarly close the Dover Strait.

"The general board does not underestimate the practical difficulties that must be overcome in providing the necessary material and transporting, placing, and maintaining it in the face of the determined efforts of the Germans to render the barrier abortive. Further, the barrier, even when placed, can not be effective without an adequate patrol. The general board is, however, encouraged to give its indorsement to this plan because it has the approval of the British Admiralty; it is proposed by it as the best practicable plan to meet present war conditions; the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance stated the material, mines, anchors, moorings, etc., can be surely supplied and the accompanying memorandum of Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, who has been actively engaged in conducting mining operations, points the way to handling the details of transporting and planting.

"It is assumed that the British Admiralty in approving this plan, recognizes the vital importance of the necessary patrol; that is it clearly seen by it where the required number of vessels is to be obtained, and that the extent of the cooperation required of the United States in this regard will be communicated to the United States Navy Department.

"If it is decided to proceed with the construction of the Aberdeen-Ekersund barrier, the general board recommends that the preliminaries be arranged at once, and that suitable officers of experience in mining operations be sent to England to arrange for our participation in the work."

The report of the general board was approved by the Secretary of the Navy October 29, 1917; and on the following day the northern barrage project was favorably acted upon by the President at a Cabinet meeting.

On November 1, the Chief of Naval Operations cabled the Admiralty:

"Department concurs in project for mine barrier Scotland to Norway and has already taken steps to fit out eight such mine planters to sail February 1 * * *. Expected begin shipment of mines January 15. Will send officers to confer and arrange details in a few days."

CHAPTER IV.—STATUS OF BARRAGE PROJECT ON NOVEMBER 1, 1917.

The American and British authorities having formally adopted the northern barrage project, it is desirable to sum up its major features as understood by the Navy Department, and more particularly by the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, whose function it was to procure and provide the mines appropriate to the project.

Referring to the previously quoted Appendix I, which dealt with the details of the proposed barrage, which presumably was the basis of approval by the Admiralty as well as our Navy Department, and which was generally in accordance with the original proposition of the Bureau of Ordnance, the plan embraced the following features:

(a) "The British Navy to be responsible for mining the Straits of Dover" * * *

(b) "The American and British Navies to cooperate in mining the Aberdeen-Norway route."

(c) On the initiative of the British Admiralty, the northern barrage was divided into three parts:

Area A. The "Notified area." This area to be made dangerous from the surface to 200 feet below it.

Area B and Area C. Deep mines with surface vessels and aircraft patrolling.

(d) Area A. Middle area about 160 miles long. To be mined by United States with American mines (antenna type). Barrage to consist of three systems, each system to have a line of mines at each of two depths—100 and 200 feet. Total requirement, 36,300 mines.

(e) Area B. Western area, about 60 miles long. To be mined by British with British mines (Horn type). Barrage to consist of three "systems," each system to have a line of mines at each of five depths—65, 95, 125, 155, and 185 feet. Total requirement, 67,500 mines.

(f) Area C. Eastern area, about 60 miles long. The British plans paper, Appendix I stated: "It is desirable that American mines should be used for this area as the number of sinkers required is thereby reduced considerably. A decision on this point can only be arrived at when it is known what type of sinker can be used with the American mine." This, taken in connection with the British inquiry of October 17 as to whether the United States could supply sinkers for United States mines, which was answered in the affirmative, left no doubt in the minds of department and Bureau

Ordnance officers concerned that the United States would mine Area C. Required, (100) American mines.

The following additional points set forth in the above-mentioned British paper were taken at their face value by American officers, especially since these points were in accordance with the original American proposition:

- a. "The mine field must be guarded."
- b. "The mine field should be as far from the enemy ports as other considerations will permit to enable our patrols to intercept any submarines damaged but not sunk outright by our mines." This implies the maintenance of a patrol.
- c. "The barrage must consist of both deep mines and mines near the surface; or, if deep mines only are used, the barrage must be patrolled in order to force the submarine to dive to the level of the deep mines."
- d. "It is also an advantage if the barrage is in such a position that our main fleet can be based on the enemy side of it, as this will not only give freedom of movement to our own fleet, but in addition should enable us to intercept any enemy vessels which endeavor to interfere with our barrage or the vessels patrolling it."
- e. "The line from Aberdeen to Norway is preferred for the following reasons:
 - a. "Its great distance from the enemy ports."
 - b. "The line is shorter than any other, with the exception of the Orkney & Shetland-Norway line, which is considered impracticable owing to the depth of water and the strong tides in the Fair Island Channel."
 - c. "The Grand Fleet, if based on Rosyth, is on the enemy side of the line."
 - d. "Any submarines damaged by mines will have a long way to get home and should be accounted for by our patrols."
 - e. "Whether Norway eventually comes in on the side of the Allies or not, the eastern end of the line will be far easier to guard than the northern end of the Goodwin-Jutland line, which has been suggested."
 - f. "It would be easier to bring pressure to bear on Norway to induce them to take steps to prevent submarines passing through their territorial waters than it would in the case of Denmark with their ever-present fear of invasion."
 - g. "The line Aberdeen-Norway deals with submarines using the Baltic exits as well as with those coming from North Sea ports."

The British version of the plan differed from the American proposition in one most important particular; namely, that the eastern part of the barrage, Area C, was to be deep mined only, leaving the surface safe for traffic and depending upon patrols to prevent the passage of enemy submarines. This part of the plan was foredoomed to failure, since it was obviously impossible for patrols to effectively guard such a large area, as had been demonstrated by British experience in the much smaller area of the Strait of Dover; but for the time being the plan was accepted by American officials, with the understanding that, in case this part of the plan should prove ineffective, surface mining could be extended through Area C later.

It was on the basis of the above understanding of the project that the Bureau of Ordnance proceeded with the design and procurement of the required mining material and that the Navy Department undertook all other necessary preparations for the project. The planting of the barrage was to begin as soon as possible in the following spring, 1918, to assume its completion during favorable weather of the summer or early fall. Therefore, there was little time in which to complete the details of design of the new mines, launch the huge manufacturing project, and obtain production in adequate quantities not later than February, which was necessary in order that the mines could be shipped abroad, assembled, and made ready for use by April, 1918.

CHAPTER V.—COORDINATION OF PREPARATIONS.

To insure a proper coordination of all necessary preparations for the northern barrage project, Capt. R. R. Belknap of the Office of Naval Operations, was placed in immediate charge in that office of the plans for the entire operation, which involved in greater or less degree all bureaus of the department. The Bureau of Ordnance was to furnish the mines and mining material; the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was chiefly concerned in the structural conversion of certain merchant ships into mine layers; the Bureau of Navigation had to furnish the officers and men to man the new mine squadron; the Naval Overseas Transport Service was to allocate sufficient cargo tonnage to maintain adequate and regular shipments of mining material; the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts was to take measures to handle the shipments of mines and other material, and so on.

All the above and other preparations constituted only one of the major naval operations then in hand, and there was the possibility that some essential part of the preparation might not be given its due precedence, either within the department or at

some navy yard, unless the various activities were carefully watched and their importance kept constantly to the fore. This was all the more necessary by reason of the fact that the new mine and its objective use were shrouded in mystery, very few officers being let into the secret, which it was hoped could be kept from the enemy until we were ready to begin actual mining operations in the North Sea.

Throughout these preparations, the project was mentioned in writing as little as possible, information and instructions to those concerned being communicated orally so that secrecy might be assured.

It was principally by means of informal conference between officers concerned that the many bureaus and offices quickly and effectively solved the multitudinous problem incidental to such a project. "Red tape" and formal routine methods were for the time being abolished, and those officers immediately charged with the work of preparation were practically accorded carte blanche.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the Secretary of the Navy, at the time of the project's adoption, stated that it had the strong interest and approval of all in high authority; that he himself desired every effort made to expedite it; that all who might be called upon for assistance should be informed of his wishes in this regard so that they should cooperate to the fullest extent; and that he should be immediately resorted to in any case where his action or influence might be needed.

CHAPTER VI.—DESIGN OF THE MINE.

The possibility of the northern barrage depended upon the successful design of the new mines to a far greater degree than is usual in such matters. Had nothing better than the ordinary type of mine, such as that used by the British, been available the northern barrage project would have been utterly impossible of execution within the time allowed by reason of the enormous number of mines required for a barrage 280 miles long. The combined resources of the United States and the Allies, especially in the matter of high explosives, could not have produced the required number of mines, nor could the combined mining forces have planted them in a single year. By the use of mines of the American (Antenna) type, the number required was reduced to approximately one-third, and the project became possible, provided always that the design of the new mine was right.

On November 1, 1917, after the barrage project had been finally and definitely adopted, the only parts of the Mark VI mine that had been completely designed were the firing mechanism and the mine case. However, the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, under the immediate direction of Commander Fullinwider, felt no doubt of its ability to complete a satisfactory development of the new mine and to get it into production in due time, its optimistic view of the situation being based on the facts that the only radically new element of the mine was the firing mechanism, which had been fairly well tested out; that the war experience of the British had evolved a satisfactory type of mine anchor which doubtless could be adapted to the American mine; and that the remaining features were matters of mechanical detail certainly susceptible of quick solution. In the circumstances, it was absolutely necessary to take chances, else the project would be delayed a full year and therefore be too late. It was fortunate that Rear Admiral Earle, the chief of bureau, was willing to accept the final responsibility in this matter and that he had sufficient confidence in the mine section to give it practically a free hand.

If the bureau had been at all conservative in the matter of developing the design and placing contracts for the mines, the northern barrage would never have been laid. It is a well known fact that no mechanism as complicated as a mine, or even a much simpler one, can be confidently expected to function as designed until complete models have been tested under service conditions and the usual minor defects have been discovered and remedied. Ordinarily, it requires at least a year to prove out such a design before it is considered wise to put it into production. Judged by ordinary standards, the action of the bureau in bringing about the adoption of this great project before there was any certainty of the efficiency of the new mine, thereby committing two Governments to very large expenditures, was, to say the least, hazardous. The bureau accepted the hazard advisedly, as the only thing to be done in the circumstances, and well knowing the odium that would attach in case of failure.

The problem confronting the bureau was to build a mine around an entirely new principle in mining, and around a firing gear outlined but not perfected. This mine must be efficient and yet must be capable of manufacture and assembly in great quantities, with as little expense of money as practicable, and necessarily with as little expenditure of time as absolutely possible. The bureau had departed from the usual, or contact, mine with its new firing gear, and had then proceeded to wipe the slate clean and make radical developments in the entire mine.

Practically all mines, except the later German types, had been made, up to that time, with the explosive in separate charge chambers, which were, after loading, placed within the mine case proper. This presented the triple disadvantage of additional weight; cost of time and money in manufacture, loading, and assembly; and, most serious, the interposition of an air cushion surrounding the charge chamber between the first explosive force and the water, thereby greatly reducing the force of the water hammer below caused by the explosion, which blow was that relied upon to damage the submarine touching the antenna. These difficulties were all obviated by selecting an explosive, T. N. T., which could be readily cast and cooled, and casting this direct into the completed mine case, using no separate charge chamber.

In addition, similarly the practice of carrying the detonator fixed in the explosive was a source of great danger in case of accident or fire or in case the mine layers were engaged in action with the mines on board. The safety chamber device of service was adopted, so that the detonator might not be in contact with the main explosive until after the mine had been launched and submerged.

The design of antenna gear presented a problem that had, as far as was known, no precedent in the military or commercial arts, and required considerable initial design ability and experimentation.

As a matter of fact, the officers responsible for the mine freely admitted, to themselves, the certainty that the design would have to be modified more or less after service tests, and therefore shaped the design so that any one of its features could be modified during production with little or no effect on the others. In other words, every possible precaution was taken against possible loss of time and money. The result was very satisfactory; very few changes were necessary after getting into production; and when the first complete mines were assembled and tested under service conditions in March, 1918, they functioned as designed, and only very minor improvements, involving no delay in the project, were found to be desirable or necessary.

During the initial plans for the mine, the mine section of the bureau consisted of Commander S. P. Fullinwider, Lieut. (subsequently commander) J. A. Schofield, U. S. N. R. F., and, acting as the experimental officer of that section by virtue of his experimental duties in the bureau, Lieut. T. S. Wilkinson, jr. As the project began to take shape and became approved, the bureau added to the mine section certain line and reserve officers, who will be mentioned hereafter as their duties appear.

In the initial stages of design, Commander Fullinwider assumed cognizance of the mine case, anchor, and antenna gear, leaving Lieut. Wilkinson the firing gear, the extender, and the mine loading—that is, explosives and detonator. With the advent of other officers, these duties were further subdivided as follows: To Commander Schofield, the mine case; to Lieut. O. W. Bagby, United States Navy, and Lieut. S. W. Cook, United States Navy Reserve Force, the mine anchor, in conjunction with Lieut. Commander H. Isherwood, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (noted below); to Lieut. Commander W. A. Corley, United States Navy, the antenna gear; to Lieut. C. H. Wright, United States Navy, the firing gear and extender; to Lieut. B. W. Grimes, United States Navy Reserve Force, the explosives. This division of responsibilities held through the design stage and through the production of the parts of the mine, as described in the succeeding chapter of this history.

At various times during the period of design and experimentation the Bureau of Ordnance had the advantage of the advice and assistance of three experienced mining officers of the British Navy. On May 5, 1917, Lieut. Commander H. O. Mock, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, arrived in the bureau, having been thus assigned by the British Admiralty to assist and advise in matters pertaining to mines. This was in accordance with a plan adopted immediately upon the entrance of the United States into the war, whereunder each of the two naval departments undertook to furnish the other with information to their mutual advantage. Lieut. Commander Mock brought to the Bureau of Ordnance the latest information and experience regarding the British mines and mining, more particularly information concerning mine anchors.

During Lieut. Commander Mock's stay in the bureau the Mark VI mine-firing device (K-1 device) was evolved, and he was present during much of the experimental work in connection therewith, although he did not assist in the evolution of the design. He was an early convert to the value of the new device; and upon his return to England in October, 1917, a model of the new device was transmitted by him for the Admiralty's information, the question of whether or not the British would join the Americans in the barrage project being then under consideration. Lieut. Commander Mock considered the K-1 device of great promise, and looked upon the new mine then in process of evolution as being superior for purposes of antisubmarine warfare to any other then existing type.

Lieut. De Salis, Royal Navy, arrived September 3, 1917, having been sent to this country to examine the Mark VI mine and report to the British Admiralty as to its probable value for the proposed North Sea barrage. He was sent to this country on the initiative of the British Admiralty and apparently with a view to satisfying the Admiralty that our Navy Department really had what it had previously stated it had—a mine superior to existing types and peculiarly adapted to antisubmarine warfare. In short, the British Admiralty took this means of confirming the Bureau of Ordnance opinion and estimate of its own design and product before agreeing to cooperate in the establishment of a barrage.

After Lieut. De Salis had reported to the chief of bureau on the above-mentioned date, the chief of the mine section explained to him the characteristics of the new mine-firing device, and accompanied him that evening to the naval torpedo station, Newport, R. I., to witness tests. These tests were carried out, with inadequate preparation and facilities, on the two following days, September 4 and 5. Lieut. De Salis was soon convinced that the new device had merit. On September 7 he cabled the Admiralty in part as follows:

"The mechanism is safe and simple. Still in trial stage.

"It has worked perfectly for safety and bumping. No vessel really suitable was present, so trials were rather crude. Trial of countermining was not very satisfactory, but the faults revealed can be remedied.

"Mine designed is 33-inch diameter, and could be used with B. E. or Mark VI sinker. A 38-inch diameter mine would be designed if desired. No sinker is yet designed, and it is intended to copy ours.

"United States officials state that delivery of a thousand mines and mechanisms per diem is anticipated to commence December 1.

"Proposals are that combined operations should be worked out for use of these mines. They would provide the mechanisms and mines, while the British provide minelayers and sinkers.

"They offer a hundred thousand. Details of strategical proposals are known to Admiral Mayo.

"It is recommended that American offer should be accepted, our own output not being decreased in consequence.

"The questions to be settled subsequently are manufacture of sinker, size of mine, and supply of explosive. They have sufficient crude T. N. T. and are willing to supply it.

"I still adhere to the opinions expressed September 3, but advantages to outweigh them are: Simplicity, certainty of firing, large danger zone, and the element of surprise if the secret is kept."

On September 10 the Admiralty cabled Lieut. De Salis:

"Greatly appreciate offer of United States. Fully recognize the value of the increased danger zone near mines, but fear is expressed that if antenna only can fire mine, life in this climate would be limited by durability of antenna, which is necessarily short.

"Reply forthwith if antenna principle can be applied to horned mines, whose plans are now in America; or, conversely, if American mines can be fitted with a firing arrangement thoroughly reliable, or with horns, so that effectiveness as complete mines would remain after antenna has parted."

Lieut. de Salis, after consulting the Bureau of Ordnance, replied, September 11:

"Americans propose to fit fixed insulated projections of copper on mine case in parallel to antenna, so that mine will remain effective on same principle if it is hit whether the antenna is in place or not. Firing battery will then determine life of mine. It is sealed up, and no current is taken from it until moment of firing."

On September 12 Lieut. de Salis again cabled the Admiralty in part as follows:

"United States officers are extremely confident as to life of battery. In addition, halfway down antenna a float will be fitted, in which case wave action should not much affect lower half.

"Acceptance of the offer as it stands is strongly recommended.

"Design could subsequently be altered for fitting horns, should endurance trials which are now in hand prove unsatisfactory.

"Admiral Benson wishes to be informed of the proposed strategical use which may be decided on if offer is accepted, and of the numbers required.

"The bureau are requesting that a mine designer may be lent them to cooperate and insure fitting of mine on sinker."

Lieut. de Salis, during his connection with the Bureau of Ordnance, was an observer for the British Admiralty, and probably had much to do with the Admiralty's favorable consideration of the proposed joint project. In addition, Lieut. de Salis furnished the Bureau information of a general nature regarding British mines, mining equipment,

mining practice. He did not, however, have any influence on the design of the Mark VI mine. Lieut. de Salis spent much of his time at the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, where he conducted some tests with floats and antennae. He returned to England in December, 1917.

In the original proposition for a joint American and British barrage operation, it was proposed by the Bureau of Ordnance that the British should furnish the anchors and that the United States should supply all the mines. This proposition was put forth for several reasons: First, there was a shortage of tonnage available for the transport of the material abroad, and this shortage was growing more and more serious day to day as the result of the great activity at that time of the enemy submarines. The leadweight of the anchors alone required for the barrage was estimated at about 100 tons. Second, the British had a quite satisfactory type of anchor, which had been proved out during the war, and which, with minor modifications, could be adapted to fit the American mine. Third, it was originally contemplated that British mine planters would assist the United States Mine Force in the planting of mines, and therefore the mine tracks and mining equipment in general should be standardized in the two services. Fourth, it was considered only fair that, if the barrage were to be a joint operation, the British should bear a share of the cost and production of material.

After much delay in arriving at an understanding, it was finally decided to produce the anchors as well as the mines in this country. To facilitate the design of the anchor, and particularly with a view to making it standard with British mine layers' equipment, the British Admiralty was requested to send an officer to the Bureau of Ordnance who was competent to modify the British design of anchor to adapt it to the Mark VI mine. The Admiralty promptly acceded to this request, and Lieut. Commander Isherwood, R. N. V. R., arrived in the bureau early in October, 1917. He brought with him the detailed design of the British Mark VIII sinker (mine anchor), and this was found upon examination to require very little modification about the Mark VI mine. Lieut. Commander Isherwood, with the assistance of Bureau of Ordnance draftsmen, completed the redesign of the British sinker, referred to hereafter as the anchor, Mark VI; and on November 10 the design was ready for submission to the prospective bidders.

While the Mark VI anchor was very similar to the British Mark VIII sinker, it differed in detail sufficiently to have warranted thorough tests before its adoption, if the time been available. However, as not a day could be lost without correspondingly delaying the execution of the project, it was decided after very careful study of the design that it would be reasonably safe to proceed with production; and contracts were placed immediately with three prominent automobile concerns in Detroit, Mich. Lieut. Commander Isherwood remained in the United States until the anchors were well along in production and until after practical tests with complete mines had been carried out by vessels of the mine force just prior to their departure for the North Sea. The anchor proved most satisfactory in every respect, and, as it is now believed, superior in its functioning to the British Mark VIII sinker from which it was adapted.

The mine case was entirely a Bureau of Ordnance design. It was formed of two hemispheres of steel welded together at the equator. It had an opening in the top 7 inches in diameter to receive the firing gear, and a smaller opening in the bottom to take the booster charge and the detonator extender mechanism. Built into the lower hemisphere, in the axis of the case, was a steel tube which housed the booster charge and extender mechanism. The charge of 300 pounds of grade B trinitrotoluol was put directly into the lower hemisphere of the case, it being found by experiment that the charge was sufficiently anchored in place by the bond between it and the surface of the case and central tube and by four stay braces which supported the tube. This simple form of construction saved considerable weight and permitted of the mine case being kept within comparatively small dimensions, 34 inches diameter. The British mine had a diameter of 48 inches. The buoyancy of the Mark VI mine was 285 pounds, which is ample for mines to be used where the current is not greater than 3 knots. The mine case had welded to it a lifting eye, also hooks for securing the antenna system and the anchor. Four small holes in the case about 2 inches above the equator were provided for attaching firing "horns" in parallel with the antenna.

The extender mechanism, which carried the detonator in a retracted, or safe, position relative to the booster charge, and which, under a hydrostatic pressure corresponding to a depth of 25 feet, extended the detonator to its firing position in the axis of the booster charge, was a lazy-tongs device, which also was originated and designed in the mine section. This mechanism provided an excellent safety device, since a mine which floated or which was submerged to a depth less than 25 feet would be safe.

A similar hydrostatic safety device was incorporated in the firing mechanism: both of these devices would have to fail to make the mine dangerous on or near surface.

The antenna floats, the fittings in connection therewith, and the means of assembling the antenna system with the mine, proved the most troublesome parts to design, though they appear very simple. Experiments were first made with floats of waterproofed wood, but without success, since it was found impracticable to guard against their water-logging when subjected to deep submergence for considerable periods. Ultimately, three different types of float were successfully produced and used. For mines of the upper level a thin walled spherical copper float was used; for mines submerged 150 to 300 feet a spherical-cylindrical steel float with a wall thickness of 0.1 inch was used. The third type, which finally replaced the copper floats, was made up of balsa and skillfully waterproofed to withstand hydrostatic pressure safely to at least 100 feet submergence. For mines of the upper level, two floats were used on each antenna, the lower one being placed a little above the middle point of the antenna, so that, in the event of the upper float carrying away, no part of the antenna could possibly come into contact with the mine case and fire the mine.

The antennæ of the lower level mines were provided with a single steel float. These mines were at such depths as to be entirely unaffected by wave motion, and one float could be depended upon for an indefinite life.

The mechanism by means of which the antenna and floats were secured to the mine case until the mine reached a predetermined depth and then permitted the release in such a way as to avoid fouling, gave much difficulty, but the problem was very satisfactorily solved with the assistance of the *Baltimore*.

Discussion of many of the items of design, including that of the K-1 device and firing mechanism, is omitted here as unnecessary and because they are still regarded as confidential.

One of the most important and indispensable of the preparations was the trying out of the new mine under service conditions. In the earlier stages, complete mines were not available; and they did not become available until March, 1918. In the meantime, however, the *Baltimore*, which had been designated to carry out tests, performed such experiments as could be had with improvised material, and assisted in the design of some parts of the gear, notably the means of assembling the antenna floats with the mine and their release gear. This work continued until about December 20, 1917, when it became necessary for the *Baltimore* to go to the yard for fitting out for service abroad. It had been intended that this vessel should resume experiments and practice with the completed mines in March, but before that time it became necessary to send her abroad to assist in British mining operations.

The mine trials were taken up by the *San Francisco* in March, when the first mines were ready. Trials were carried out in the lower Chesapeake, later in Narragansett Bay, and finally off Cape Anne. The results of these trials were all that could be expected. With the exception of a very few minor mechanical faults, which were readily corrected, the mine and anchor functioned as designed; and the action of the Bureau of Ordnance in having proceeded with the manufacture of 100,000 mines in advance of such tests was thus validated. A most important result of the trials was the confidence engendered in the personnel of the mine force in the value and safety of the new mine.

It may be remarked in passing that the result of the trials lifted a heavy load from the minds of those officers of the Bureau of Ordnance who had staked all on a "paper design" and proceeded with an enormous manufacturing program in advance of complete tests.

CHAPTER VII.—THE MANUFACTURING PROJECT.

The firing mechanism for the new mine was in quantity production before any other part of the mine had been designed. The mine section had made tentative sketches of the several principal features of the mine, but none of the details had been decided upon. One reason for this was the fact that until the firing mechanism had been conclusively tested and adopted, late in July, there was insufficient information and data on which to proceed with the other points of design. Another point was that until November, 1917, there was insufficient personnel in the mine section to perform the duties of the bureau pertaining to mines and mining, depth charges, submarine nets, etc.

The Bureau of Ordnance, having anticipated the favorable outcome of the mine barrage proposition, had placed a contract for 10,000 mine-firing mechanisms (K-1 devices) as early as August 9, 1917, and another contract for 90,000 additional devices on October 3, 1917, nearly a month before the barrage project was definitely adopted.

In view of the fact that there were so many uncertainties entering into the design of the mine, it was decided that the only safe plan was to follow the practice which is quite common in the automobile industry—that is, to divide the mine into groups of parts, each group being quite a separate design problem, all so standardized that the several groups would assemble into a complete mine. Thus the mine was separated into the following groups: Firing mechanism, extender mechanism, mine case, anchor, antenna and floats, horn device, and release gear.

Each group was designed and tested out quite independently of the others, a very definite general plan for the mine, of course, being kept in view. This method permitted of modifications of any one group without detriment to the others.

Another reason for following this method of design was that it would facilitate manufacture. There was no plant in the United States that had had experience in the manufacture of mines except the Norfolk Navy Yard, which yard was overwhelmed with other work after the outbreak of the war and could not be depended upon for any considerable manufacture of mine material. By designing the mine as an assembly proposition, its many parts could be manufactured in commercial plants with great rapidity; and by carefully standardizing all parts, they could finally be brought together and satisfactorily assembled.

The general economic conditions of the country were such that at the time when it became necessary to manufacture the Mark VI mine the passenger-automobile industry became available for war work through a gradual decrease in output of automobiles. It is believed that the Bureau of Ordnance was the first of the war agencies to take advantage of the wonderful resources of the automobile factories; and no difficulty whatever was found in obtaining keen competition among these factories for the manufacture of parts. Generally speaking, the automobile plant is ideal for the production of mine material, with the exception of the firing mechanism, because the plant is organized for quantity production and the character of work and workmanship is practically the same for automobiles and mines.

Still another reason for pursuing this method of manufacture was that only by this means could secrecy regarding the characteristics of the mine be preserved. It is obvious that if 100 different parts of a mine are manufactured by as many different factories, most of which are kept in ignorance of the fact that they are producing mine material, no one would have sufficient information on which to visualize the complete mine, and therefore no one could possibly betray the secret to the enemy. This idea was carried still further. Even at the point of assembly of the material for transshipment abroad the parts were not assembled into a mine but were shipped in groups to the overseas assembly bases. In short, no mines were completely assembled in this country, with the exception of a few for test purposes on board vessels of the mine force in March, 1918. It is therefore believed that the enemy, notwithstanding his many sympathizers in the United States and his secret service, had no inkling of the character of the mine until long after it was placed in use in the North Sea. It was comparatively unimportant to maintain secrecy after the mines were once in use, for it was probable that the enemy could not devise any means of effectively counteracting or protecting himself against the mine within, say, a year after he gained knowledge of it, by which time it was expected that the war would be over. In this connection it may be stated that a number of American mines went adrift in the North Sea, as is usual in such operations, and were cast up on the coast of Norway, where they were recovered, disassembled, and examined by Norwegian officials, but assurances were obtained that information regarding these mines would be regarded as confidential.

The firing mechanism has been referred to above as a unit of the assembled mine; but as a matter of fact it was subdivided into its component parts and manufactured by more than a score of different factories, none of which was permitted to know that it was manufacturing mine material. Only certain officials of the private plant that assembled the firing mechanism knew that it was intended for a mine.

The Mark VI mine was designed to be very safe in handling; and that this object was attained is well demonstrated by the fact that 85,000 of these mines were loaded and shipped abroad and that about 57,000 of them were planted in the barrage without accident. This result is the more extraordinary for the following reasons:

(a) The mines had to be manufactured by quantity production methods, and rigid inspection was quite impossible under the then existing conditions.

(b) The inspection force was inadequate in numbers, and it was composed largely of inexperienced officers and men—inexperienced not only in mine material, but in inspection work in general.

(c) The manufacturers were inexperienced in munitions work, and almost every one of the hundreds of plants engaged in the work was an unknown quantity as to reliability, quality of product, possibility of sabotage, etc. Due investigation and

careful "sizing up" of the managing personnel of each plant concerned reassured the bureau in almost every case.

(d) The mine had to be loaded, shipped, assembled, inspected, and tested by personnel almost entirely without previous experience with mines and explosives.

During the period of purchasing supplies, in the task of which there was a multitude of details, Lieut. (Junior Grade) A. B. Peacock, Supply Corps, United States Naval Reserve Force, handled the purchasing matters connected with this vast amount of divers materials, a duty that required his working in close operation with the main section of the bureau.

It was owing to these adverse conditions, together with the fact that the mine was to be handled by the planters as "fixed ammunition," that it was designed to be as nearly fool-proof as possible.

The design and manufacture of the various elements of the mine was a work involving an immense amount of detail, which it is unnecessary to dwell upon here; but a few points are of special interest in their bearing on the success of the project.

It has been mentioned above that the new mine was designed to be issued to mine layers as "fixed ammunition." This was a radical departure from conventional practice, and British mining officers attached to the bureau apparently never became reconciled to the bureau's view that practically all necessary tests and inspection could and should be made prior to the receipt of mines on board. The new idea was adopted primarily because of the obvious necessity for rapid planting, the number of planters being limited. After having become committed to this plan, it was fairly easy for the bureau to design, manufacture, and inspect accordingly. For example, the mine case was designed to be as simple and fool-proof as possible, and it was given 100 per cent inspection at the factories for watertightness; so there was no good reason for subjecting the case to another such test at the overseas bases or after its receipt on board ship.

Another point to which the bureau gave careful attention was to insure that, in the event of a premature or accidental explosion of a mine, it would necessarily occur only after a safe interval after launching. As for taking mines aboard ship with the detonators in place the bureau adopted this plan only after conclusive tests had shown that a detonator in the "safe" position could not explode the charge.

The well-known fuel shortage in the winter of 1917-18, the almost unprecedented severity of the weather, the freight embargoes on the railroads and congestion of traffic generally, and labor troubles, all operated to delay the production of mine material and other essential preparations for the project. The situation was very critical for some weeks, largely because these conditions affected several hundred plants engaged, and the failure of any one of them to produce its share would have resulted in possibly disastrous delay to the whole project. Some delay did, in fact, result, but as there was a nearly corresponding delay in the completion of vessels of the mine force and of the overseas bases the failure to meet the manufacturing schedule proved of no particular consequence. It is estimated that the above-mentioned adverse conditions resulted in delaying the beginning of quantity production of complete mines about six weeks.

During the period of railroad freight congestion an immense quantity of mine material was handled by express shipments, in some cases whole trainloads being handled on passenger schedules from Detroit to the seaboard. It is believed that every known expedient was utilized to maintain production and expedite shipment; armed guards and traffic agents accompanied shipments; motor trucks were used when other service was unavailable; freight embargoes were lifted after great effort in special cases; tracing of missing shipments was a constant work; and shortage of fuel was met and overcome in many ways.

There was only one real failure of an important contractor to deliver material on time, and this resulted in a slight delay in mining operations. It was an almost invariable rule of the bureau to divide the order for any one part of mining material between at least two contractors in order to guard against a possible failure on the part of a contractor and consequent shortage of essential material. In the one case in which this rule was deviated from, the article being a comparatively simple one and the contractor being apparently more than able to meet his obligations, the contractor failed to deliver the specified production; and it then became necessary to tool up three other plants and cancel the original contract.

The bureau planned for a production of 1,000 mines a day, and it was found soon after getting into production that this rate could easily be exceeded if desired. In fact, it became difficult to hold the production of anchors and mine cases down to this figure. In other words, the bureau could have produced mines at any rate desired, except possibly in the matter of mooring cable, the wire-rope manufacturers being heavily burdened with orders for wire for aircraft, shipping, coal mines, etc.

CHAPTER VIII.—MINE LOADING PLANT, ST. JULIENS CREEK, VA.

An important item of preparation for the barrage project was the creation of a complete mine loading plant capable of receiving, loading, and shipping 1,000 mine cases a day, there being no plant in the United States at that time capable of handling any considerable number of mines.

The design of a plant that could handle the situation had to be made by the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Yards and Docks in consultation. Many proposals were sent out in order to obtain ideas upon automatic machinery, and finally a plan, modified somewhat after a scheme suggested by Boyle-Robertson Construction Co., was accepted and completed. The plant was built by the Boyle-Robertson Construction Co. of Washington, D. C. Commander Kirby Smith, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy, was responsible for pushing to completion, in the midst of many difficulties, both in design and construction, this mine-loading plant.

It was decided to locate this plant near the Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va., the point selected for the assembly and shipment overseas of all barrage material; and the only immediately available site being at the Naval Ammunition Depot, that point was chosen. Ground for the plant was broken on October 25, 1917; but bad weather set in early in November and continued with unprecedented severity until spring, so construction work was carried on under most adverse conditions. Aggravating the situation, there was a labor shortage. However, the plant was ready for work in March, 1918, or practically as soon as needed, there having been delays in all parts of the project due to extreme weather conditions, freight embargoes, fuel shortages, labor troubles, changes of barrage plan, etc.

This plant, with its accompanying barracks for the housing of its operatives, covers an area approximately 3,000 feet by 800 feet, including the wharf; and consists of 22 buildings, including a mine case storage building, 600 by 100 feet, capable of storing 100,000 empty cases; a melting plant, capable of melting and pouring T. N. T. for at least 1,000 mines a day; a cooling building, where the loaded mines were permitted to cool preparatory to shipment; a T. N. T. ready storage building, capacity 4,000,000 pounds; a heating plant; and a wharf.

The entire plant was excellently equipped with conveyors and labor-saving facilities; and all parts were planned and constructed to give the utmost efficiency consistent with safety. The rated daily capacity of 1,000 was exceeded by about 50 per cent on one occasion; and a total of more than 73,000 mines, involving the melting and handling of over 22,000,000 pounds of T. N. T., were loaded here without accident. In addition, 17,000 mines loaded by contract at the Du Pont Co.'s works at Barksdale, La., were received here and shipped abroad.

The loading plant cost approximately \$400,000, and its operating cost was at the rate of about \$412,000 per annum. About 400 enlisted men were required to man the plant; and, in addition, from 200 to 400 were employed in the shipment of mines; that is, in loading them into mine-carrying vessels.

A loading plant of this type and scale had hitherto been unknown, not only in this country, but abroad. Difficulties were encountered in the construction thereof, and a species of accident, fortunately unfulfilled, were made by visiting foreign experts killed in amateur plants. The Bureau of Ordnance, however, took every precaution to insure that the operation of this plant should be attended with the minimum amount of danger. The chief of the bureau took upon himself the limiting of the steam pressure to a maximum which he considered, from his experience with explosives, would result in satisfactory melting of T. N. T., and thus loading the mines, but reduced the danger of detonation in the process to the minimum possible. Exact knowledge upon this point is not yet to be had, as experience with this explosive has been too short to permit real conclusions. This decision was one that was very serious, as he had before him the fact that, in the melting of high explosives abroad, a detonation that destroyed an entire plant together with every person in the same had occurred and that the proposed automatic operation of loading mines was in a nature exactly similar to the work under way in that plant.

Petty officers and enlisted men of the Naval Reserve Force were secured for the operating personnel of this mine-loading plant. They accepted the risk, which they knew was a great one, together with the discomforts, such as working in an atmosphere of T. N. T. dust, working nights, and living in poor quarters in a very bad locality, so far as health is concerned, cheerfully, and with most successful results in the completion of the material for the northern barrage.

Commander W. L. Pryor, United States Navy, was in command of this mine-loading plant in addition to his duties in charge of the ammunition depot at St. Juliens Creek. Much work in connection with loading of mines upon the mine carrier after the T. N. T. had been cast into the mines devolved upon Commander Pryor. The

success and general efficiency of the plant was brought about mainly through the untiring efforts and care of Commander Pryor in dealing with the reserve personnel, making them acquainted with the necessity for care and the reasons they were called upon to bear so many discomforts and undergo the risks.

In order to prevent delay in delivery, which might have been caused by delay in completion of this Navy plant, the bureau arranged with the du Pont Co. to load mines direct at its T. N. T. plant at Barksdale, Wis., and some 17,000 mines were loaded there during the months of February and March, 1918.

The Army had plainly informed the Navy that it required all the toluol in the country for use in the manufacture of its own explosives, and for this reason it was imperative if the mine barrage was to be completed to secure some other explosive for use in the mines. The explosive effects of amatol, a substitute for T. N. T. in general use abroad, had been frequently criticized for lack of effectiveness. Amatol also required more toluol than the Navy could obtain without asking the Army to reduce its requirements. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. proposed to the bureau the use of trinitroxylol, which could be produced by the nitration of xylol, a by-product of coal-tar distillations at that time not widely used. Further investigation by Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, in collaboration with chemists of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., finally developed the fact that trinitroxylol was an explosive substance which would serve very acceptably as a diluent for T. N. T., and that the use of a mixture of these two substances in mines would be practically as satisfactory as the use of T. N. T. alone (the mixture adopted consisted of 60 per cent trinitroxylol and 40 per cent of T. N. T.), although the mixture was not quite as convenient to handle as T. N. T. Trinitroxylol was subsequently known as T. N. X., and the mixture of T. N. T. with T. N. X. for mine charges was called toxyl.

CHAPTER IX.—ASSEMBLY AND SHIPMENT OF MINE MATERIAL.

Since the Mark VI mines were not to be assembled short of Bases 17 and 18 in Scotland, and since all component parts had to be at all times available at those bases, it was essential that the flow of all material from the many points of manufacture to the overseas shipping point, Norfolk, and thence to the bases abroad should be maintained at the proper rate. Failure in this respect would result either in a shortage of material and consequent delay of the planting operations or in a congestion of an undue amount of material which could not be stored and properly cared for.

At the inception of the movement it was decided between the Bureaus of Ordnance and Supplies and Accounts that it would be necessary to commandeer one of the large export terminal piers in the vicinity of the navy yard, Norfolk, for the handling of mine shipments; and after a survey of the situation, Southern Railway Pier No. 4, at Pinners Point, Va., was taken over by the Navy. This pier, which is 875 by 270 feet and which can accommodate seven cargo vessels of the Lake type at a time, was ideal for the purpose. It, of course, is roofed over and has adequate rail facilities. The rental of the pier was \$81,000 a year and the annual cost of operation was about \$350,000.

When the project was planned it was contemplated shipping all mine material, including the loaded mine cases, from this pier, but the local authorities protested against the handling of explosives at this point because of the danger to Norfolk and Portsmouth, and it became necessary to load the explosive elements into the mine-carrying vessels at the mine-loading plant at St. Juliens Creek, about 2 miles above the navy yard. To this end, considerable dredging had to be done at the mine plant, fixed moorings were put down, and the dock facilities at the mine plant were enlarged and improved to accommodate the carriers. Provision was made for working 24 hours a day at the mine plant and at the pier when necessary. Only Navy personnel was employed. It would have been quite impossible to operate satisfactorily at either the pier or the mine plant with civilian labor, owing to the irregularity of working hours, the frequent necessity of night work in order to get vessels loaded in time to join the weekly convoys, and also the necessity of good discipline, safety, and secrecy.

Pier 4 was used for storage as well as for shipments. It had a capacity of about 40,000 mine anchors and other nonexplosive parts. A naval force of about 400 men was continually employed at the pier.

The receipt and shipment of mine material at the pier was under the cognizance of a supply officer detailed by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to that exclusive duty; but the Bureau of Ordnance also had its representative there to act as liaison officer between the bureau and the supply officer. To this liaison officer were communicated by telephone complete detailed instructions daily as to shipments, not only from the pier but also the mine loading plant, such instructions being confirmed to the supply officer in writing. There was never the slightest delay or confusion in

handling of the business, this because of the excellent cooperative spirit and zeal among all concerned in the project.

In the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, Lieut. Commander H. E. Fischer had as his principal duty, the maintenance of the flow of material from its source to final destination. By means of telephone and telegraph he was in constant touch with the material situation from the hundreds of factories to the bases overseas, and records at all times showed the exact condition of affairs. In all this, he acted in cooperation with the traffic and other offices of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts as well as with the officers of the mine section. He also was in close cooperation with the Office of Naval Operations regarding the loading and sailing of the mine carriers.

Weekly inventory sheets and monthly reports showing receipts and expenditures of mines and parts at bases 17 and 18 were received, but were not of much value, as they were about one month old when received. Therefore, in order to anticipate shipments, it was necessary to resort to speculation to a very considerable degree. The results were, however, quite satisfactory.

In the inception of the project, the Navy Department, secured the allocation of a fleet of 24 cargo vessels of the "Lake" class for exclusive use as mine carriers. These vessels, a list of which is appended, were armed for defense against submarines, were manned by Naval Reserve crews, and were handled by the Naval Overseas Transportation Service (operations). They were rather small, averaging about 3,000 tons dead-weight capacity, but by reason of their light draft were well suited to the purpose, since larger and deeper vessels could not have been so readily loaded or discharged at the terminals selected; in fact, the harbor of one of the discharging points designated by the British authorities could not accommodate ships drawing more than 20 feet. The carriers were selected also with a view to carrying a comparatively small number of mines in each hull, so as to minimize the effect on the whole project in the event of a vessel being lost. Among other preparations, requiring navy-yard work, was the fitting of these vessels with additional crew accommodations; the provision for additional cargo coal for themselves, as they were originally short-radius ships; and provision of facilities for carrying 300 to 500 tons of fuel oil cargo for naval vessels overseas. In general, a cargo was made up of 2,000 mines with anchors and fittings complete and of about 500 tons of such miscellaneous naval supplies as were safe to handle in conjunction with high explosives, the remaining 1,000 tons of cargo space being assigned to extra bunker coal and fuel oil, the latter carried in the double bottoms. The mines were shipped disassembled to economize space; but it would have been undesirable in any event to ship them otherwise, in view of the fact that the work of handling, testing, and inspection at the overseas bases was facilitated by shipping them disassembled.

Sailings of the carriers averaged about two ships every seven or eight days, half in Norfolk convoys and half in Halifax convoys. It took a ship in a Norfolk convoy about 20 days to make the trip across, and in a Halifax convoy 21 days. From 65 to 70 days were required for a round trip or complete cycle.

Of the 24 carriers, only one, the *Lake Moor*, was lost, sunk by an enemy submarine off the coast of Ireland on April 11, 1918, unfortunately with the loss of most of her crew, and of about 1,500 tons of mine material, mostly anchors.

CHAPTER X.—OVERSEAS MINE BASES 17 AND 18.

On account of the great demand for shipping, it was early realized that in order to conserve cargo space, and for other reasons, it would be necessary to ship the mines or the North Sea barrage disassembled. In this manner it would be possible for a vessel to carry approximately three times as many mines as she would have been able to do had she been loaded with assembled units. On the other hand, this procedure necessitated the erection of elaborate assembly establishments in Great Britain; but this consideration was of secondary importance when compared with the great necessity for economizing shipping. It may be mentioned in this connection that there were no mine assembly facilities in the United States, since all ammunition depots were congested with other work, and new assembly plants would have had to be created in any event, either at home or abroad.

It will be remembered that in the early stages of the consideration of the barrage, one of the proposals made was that Great Britain should furnish the men necessary to assemble the American mines. Accordingly, a board was appointed by the Admiralty on October 6, 1917, which has generally been referred to as the Lockhart-Leith Committee, to investigate and report on the various suitable localities for mine depots for this project. The report of the committee, dated October 26, discussed in detail the possible locations for such bases, reviewed the transportation facilities, and

gave as their decision that the most suitable locations were the Dalmore distillery at Dalmore, Alness, and the Glen Albyn distillery at Inverness. The report went into considerable detail, outlining exactly what buildings would be required as well as the new construction and machinery, and estimated the personnel requirements. This report and its recommendations were approved by the Admiralty; and the distilleries at Dalmore and Glen Albyn were at once commandeered for use as mine bases.

Under date of October 26, 1917, the Bureau of Ordnance cabled Admiral Sims informing him that the bureau was preparing to manufacture mines in sufficient quantity for the operation contemplated, and that it was expected that the shipment of these mines would commence soon after the 1st of January, 1918. This cablegram further stated that the bureau desired to send Commander O. G. Murfin as its representative, under the force commander, to be placed in command of the mine depot which was to be established at Cromarty; also that several officers from the bureau were being trained in the assembling and handling of mines and would be sent to assist him. This cablegram was followed by a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance dated October 31, 1917, in which the subjects referred to in the cablegram were commented on at length.

On November 1, 1917, the Chief of Naval Operations cabled Admiral Sims to the effect that the department concurred in the project of the mine barrier from Scotland to Norway and was taking steps to outfit eight mine planters to sail about February 1, and that they were also expediting the completion of 12 mine sweepers. This cablegram further stated that it was expected that the shipment of mines would begin about January 15, and that officers would be sent to confer and to arrange details within a few days.

The report of the Lockhart-Leith Committee was transmitted by the Admiralty to Admiral Sims, in London, who, in order to give the department early information relative to the selection and requirements of the two bases, sent the following cable on November 2:

"Admiralty committee has investigated bases for northern mine barrage and Admiralty's full report on suggested organization of bases for assembling American mines is being forwarded. Plan calls for United States base at Invergordon, handling 2,000 mines per week and at Inverness, handling 1,500. Combined personnel required from United States approximately 182 mechanics, 620 skilled laborers, 690 laborers, 40 clerks, and for dock work parties, 45 boatswains mates, 25 coxswains, 400 seamen and ordinary seamen. Most important that all these be enlisted men to insure military discipline and control and to avoid labor complications here. Commanding officers at depots should have rank of commander and each should have five or six other officers as assistants. Large distillery buildings will be taken over, but there will be small amount of new construction required. Shops must be fitted up. Scarcity machinery, cranes, etc., in this country, would make very welcome arrangement of United States could furnish some of these. At least one of officers sent for conference mentioned Opnav 925, should have had experience in manufacture mines in United States navy yards as Naval Constructor Knox has had. Some of depot staffs should come at same time as officers who return after conference, so they will be in touch with work from beginning. Intended ship some mines by Lock Alsh and rail via Dingwall, but ships for Kyle must not exceed 280 feet length nor 20 feet draught. Other mines will come via Fort William and by barge through Caledonian Canal. British Rear Admiral will be senior officer in general charge joint operations, these and British bases in Firth of Forth. Admiralty desires verify immediately understanding that sinkers as well as mines will be furnished from United States. Furnish information concerning general character eight mine layers sailing 1 February and whether any other craft will be used for mine laying. Would also like to learn approximate number and kind of mine carriers. Will reply concerning Old Colony later. For localities mentioned see B. A. charts 115, 2182B, 2167, 2635, 2676, 3547."

In reply to the questions contained in the above cablegram relative to the United States supplying enlisted men for assembling the mines at the bases instead of employing British civilians, the Chief of Naval Operations cabled on November 8 that drafts of approximately 200 enlisted men per week would be sent over as soon as the bases were ready to receive them. Upon receipt of this information the Third Sea Lord wrote Admiral Sims as follows:

"The Admiralty are most grateful and the decision of the Navy Department relieves us of very great anxiety. * * *"

In accordance with the requests of the Admiralty and the desires of the Bureau of Ordnance that American officers who would be associated with the establishment of the bases and their operation should be sent to Great Britain as soon as possible, Commander O. G. Murfin, United States Navy, accompanied by Commander T. L.

Johnson, United States Navy, sailed from the United States on November 13, 1917. The Chief of Naval Operations cabled Admiral Sims on November 18:

"Commander O. G. Murfin under orders to proceed to England. Is authorized to speak for Bureau of Ordnance, discussing all details depot arrangements, machine-shop equipment, unloading and transportation arrangements with British Admiralty representatives, and make decisions in these matters. Commander Thomas Lee Johnson accompanies to assist Commander Murfin in plans and returns here with detailed information."

Commander Murfin and Commander Johnson arrived in London on November 23, 1917, and reported to the commander United States naval forces operating in European waters. The force commander issued orders to Commander Murfin assigning him to be in charge of all matters relating to the establishment of United States naval mine depots in Great Britain and to duty in charge of such depots upon their establishment; he was further ordered to make his headquarters in London during the preliminary negotiations in connection with the bases.

On November 26, 1917, Commander Murfin and Commander Johnson left London to inspect the sites selected for the United States mine bases. They were accompanied by Capt. Lockhart-Leith, Royal Navy, Engineer Capt. Gaisford, Royal Navy, Mr. Heap from the Admiralty's Controller's Office, and Surg. Thompson, United States Navy, from the United States naval headquarters. The party arrived in Inverness on November 27, spent four days inspecting the base sites at Invergordon and Inverness, and the two shipping points at Kyle of Loch Alsh and Corpach, and then returned to London. Commander Johnson left England on December 6, 1917, for the United States.

At the time of this inspection whisky was being removed from the distillery buildings preparatory to proceeding with the work of establishing the bases. At Dalmore sound had been broken for a branch railroad line to connect the distillery with the Highland Railway. Other work was being held up, pending decisions to be made by Commander Murfin. These decisions having been given, plans for expediting the work of establishing and outfitting the bases were proceeded with.

Much of the material for these bases could not be procured in Great Britain, because of the drain upon that country's supplies made by the war, and at the bureau the mine section secured the assistance of Capt. (then Commander) G. C. Schafer, Supply Corps, United States Navy, in connection with providing cranes and equipment of all kinds, assembly of material, and assuring delivery to the mine bases abroad, remaining in Washington until, deliveries being assured, he proceeded overseas in March, 1918, and resumed this work at the mine bases as a member of the staff of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, United States Navy, the commander of the operation of laying the barrage.

The Navy Department designated the base at Inverness as base 18, and the one at Invergordon as base 17.

The work of preparing and outfitting the mine bases was done by contract through the Admiralty. The construction work was done under the immediate supervision of the superintending civil engineer. Invergordon Dockyard; and the tools and equipment were supplied through the controller's department of the Admiralty. Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, Royal Navy, was the admiralty's representative in general charge of the work, and desired alterations or additions to buildings or equipment were ordered on his approval. The construction was somewhat delayed due to inclement weather conditions and to lack of suitable labor; but in spite of these handicaps good progress was made from the beginning. Commander Murfin kept in direct touch with the work by correspondence, by frequent visits to Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker's office at the Admiralty, and by frequent visits to the bases themselves.

The first draft of men arrived in Liverpool on the steamship *Philadelphia* on November 27, 1917. Lieut. Commander Edwin A. Welleson, United States Navy, who arrived on the same vessel, was put in charge of the 37 rated men in this draft, and went with them to the British mine depot at Portsmouth for instruction at the mining school at that place. The remainder of the men in the draft were sent to Queenstown for distribution to the destroyer flotilla, owing to the fact that the bases were not yet ready to receive them.

On December 3 the second draft arrived at Liverpool on the steamship *New York*. Twenty rated men from this draft were sent to Portsmouth to join the detachment there, and the nonrated men were sent to Queenstown, to be held until accommodations could be provided at the mine bases. Lieut. Commander L. M. Stewart arrived in London and reported at headquarters on December 4, 1917, and was sent to Portsmouth to assist with the instruction of the men already there.

Lieut. Thomas Newhall, United States Naval Reserve Force, reported at headquarters in London on December 10, and was assigned to duty as assistant to Com-

mander Murfin. On December 26 Lieut. Newhall was sent to the bases as Commander Murfin's representative for keeping in touch with the construction work.

On January 7, 1918, Lieut. Commander Stewart with 23 men was sent to base 18 and Lieut. Commander Wolleson with 22 men was sent to base 17. These parties arrived at their destination on January 8. These small forces were assigned to the bases to assist in the arrangements for housing the personnel at the bases and to form the nucleus upon which the organization could be started. As the men's living quarters at the two bases were in an unfinished state, the men at base 18 were quartered in the old Muirtown Hotel, which was one of the buildings taken over for base purposes and which was later made into the sick quarters. The men at base 17 were quartered in the residence of the manager of the distillery, which was one of the buildings taken over in the grounds and was subsequently converted into the sick quarters at that place.

Commander Murfin left London January 25, 1918, and arrived at Inverness on January 26, taking direct charge of the work at the bases and establishing his headquarters at base 18 and in the house which had formerly been the home of the manager of the Glen Albyn Distillery.

The United States national ensign was officially hoisted over the office at base 18 on February 9, 1918, and at base 17 on February 12. The raising of the flags at the two bases were made functions at which British civil and military officials, as well as the officers and men attached to the bases, were present and took part.

At the outset the question of transportation appeared to be the greatest problem that would be encountered. The estimated weekly output of mines required for the mine layers was 3,500. The railroad from Kyle to base 17 could only handle about 2,000 mines per week and the Caledonian Canal, running from Corpach to base 18, could transport approximately 1,500 mines per week. This made it necessary to use two bases instead of one large base, for Inverness Harbor could not accommodate the full mine-laying force, nor could the mines going through the Caledonian Canal readily be shipped to Invergordon. Although the bases were separated by a distance of 10 miles by rail and 25 miles by water, no difficulty was encountered in unifying the efforts of the two establishments and coordinating and directing the divided mine squadron anchored in the two harbors.

At Corpach mine carriers anchored in the stream opposite the entrance to the Caledonian Canal. Their cargoes were discharged into power lighters and dispatched to base 18. The work of discharging the cargoes of the carriers into the lighters was done by a detachment of 65 men from base 18 permanently stationed at Corpach. The lighters, owned by the British, were manned by British ratings and their movements were directed by the British senior naval officer at Inverness. After the lighters arrived at the canal quay at base 18 they were discharged by the United States forces at that base.

Vessels arriving at Kyle were taken alongside a small pier and their cargoes discharged directly into railroad cars, thence taken to base 17 via Dingwall. The work of discharging the cargo into the railroad cars and shunting them across to the main line from the pier was done entirely by the 65 men from base 17 who formed the detachment at Kyle. After being placed on the main line, the cars were delivered on the siding at base 17, from where they were again handled by the United States personnel.

The first stores forwarded from the United States were sent via Liverpool, and were received at the bases January 20, 1918: The first mine carrier, U. S. S. *Ozama*, arrived at Kyle of Loch Alsh on February 18, with stores and equipment but no mining material. The second carrier arrived at Kyle on March 21, with general stores and equipment; the third was also routed to Kyle, arriving there April 3, with mine anchors and other mining material. The first mine carrier routed to Corpach arrived April 5, 1918, with mine anchors and other mining material. The first carriers containing mine spheres were the U. S. S. *Ozama*, which arrived at Corpach on May 21, and the U. S. S. *Lake Superior*, which arrived at Kyle on the 29th.

Officers and men reported for duty at the two mine bases from time to time until, on March 30, 1918, there were 18 officers and 414 enlisted men on duty at base 17, and 23 officers and 359 men on duty at base 18.

On March 1, 1918, both bases had reached such a state of completion that mines could have been received and assembly work could have commenced, although operations at this time would have been somewhat handicapped by the fact that a considerable part of the work at the bases was still in an unfinished condition.

By April 1, 1918, the main construction work was practically completed and the bases ready in every respect for the purpose for which they were established. Actual assembly work did not begin until May 29, 1918, the date upon which the first mines were received.

In general, the following work was done at Dalmore in establishing base 17: The distillery was commandeered and taken over; some of the existing distillery buildings were refitted and made into barracks for the enlisted personnel, and others were refitted as storehouses for general stores and mine equipment; buildings were used for work shops for mine assembly, for storage of mines and mine material, both in assembled units and in component parts; railroad tracks were laid in the base on the main line of the Highland Railway and from the base to the pier at the dockyard, Invergordon; wagon roads were built connecting various buildings within the base; fire mains were laid, water systems provided; wash rooms, bathrooms and other sanitary devices were installed; and commissary and messing facilities provided. An electric light and power plant was built, and other necessary equipment and adaptations to a base of this nature were provided.

At base 18 the same provisions were made as at base 17, with the exception of the electric light and power plant—the lighting and power at base 18 being received from the city of Aberdeen.

At Kyle four huts were erected as barracks, mess hall, galley, and storage spaces for the men of the detachment at that place.

At Corpach a large private residence was taken over and converted for use as barracks, mess hall, galley, and storehouse for that detachment.

After unloading the mine parts from the railroad cars at base 17 or the lighters at base 18, the various parts were sorted and placed in bulk store. These stores were, in general, adjacent to the assembly sheds, so that miscellaneous parts could be readily supplied as required.

The work of assembling the mines was a highly organized process developed in accordance with the present standards of manufacturing efficiency, wherein each man performs one specific task over and over again as the mines are moved along in front of him for the various stages of assembly.

As soon as the commanding officer of the bases was informed of the quantities and types of mines which would be required at each base for the mine layers, the work of assembly began. The various component parts for the mines began to pour into the assembly sheds from the bulk storage rooms. The two principal parts constituting the mine were the anchor and the mine sphere. As the anchors arrived they were placed upon assembly tracks extending across each bay. Along these tracks were stationed groups of men, each group making some special adjustment, testing the rake tension, release mechanism, etc., as the anchor was rolled along the track. By the time the anchor reached the end of the track the mine case, which had at the same time undergone preparation and testing while moving along a traveling table, was completed, and the two parts were ready to be married to each other. This done, a few final adjustments were made, and the mine was ready to be placed on board a mine layer. From here the completed mines were either rolled into ready-issue sheds directly opposite the assembly bays or else were loaded directly into railroad cars to be sent to the ships.

From the railroad cars the assembled mines were carried back to the canal siding at base 18 or to the dockyard at base 17, where they were loaded into barges. The barges carried from 50 to 60 assembled mines and were towed out to the ships and placed alongside while the ship's crew whipped the mines aboard and stowed them on the tracks ready for planting.

The original estimates prepared by the British as to the rate of transportation from Kyle to base 17 and from Corpach to base 18 were far below that actually accomplished. The rate of assembly and the possible rate of planting mines also much exceeded the original expectations. Therefore, the rate originally fixed for shipping 3,500 mines per week from the United States was increased to 6,000 per week. In spite of the greatly increased amount of work in assembly which developed on account of defects discovered in the actual mining, the rate of assembly at the two bases was increased from the original estimate of 500 mines per day to as high as 1,340 mines per day. Similarly, the time required for the mine layers to refuel, take on water, embark mines and necessary supplies had been so systemmatized that only two days in port were necessary before they were ready for the next excursion. This made it possible to carry out excursions every four or five days, depending upon the distance it was necessary for the vessels to proceed in order to lay their mines. As will be seen, delays almost heartbreaking occurred which kept the squadron in port from two to three weeks between excursions. While none of these delays could be foreseen, the mines from the United States continued to arrive until the storage facilities were most severely taxed. The original plan of the bases called for a total storage of 12,000 mines at both places. At one time as many as 20,500 had accumulated. Wise foresight, however, on the part of the commanding officer of the bases had made it possible to stow them all under cover, protected from the incessant rain of northern Scotland.

The headquarters of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, commander mine force, and Capt. Murfin were at base 18. The two mine bases were so organized that there were two executive officers, representatives of the commanding officer, in complete charge of all administrative and industrial activities at their respective bases. Each base was organized with military, industrial, supply, medical, and transportation departments.

The industrial officer was responsible for the assembly of mines, which work was organized along lines similar to those obtaining in automobile plants in the United States. The various component parts of the mines were received and stored and inspected preliminary to assembly separately. In the assembly process, the major parts, the mine case and the anchor, moved along on small trucks on rails, the various minor parts being assembled progressively, to a point where the mine case and anchor were "married" together, and thence placed in the "ready-for-issue" stock or loaded into cars for delivery to the mine layers. This system, under which separate groups of men, highly specialized, performed the same function for each mine case and anchor, proved most efficient and produced results never before attained in the rapid handling of mines.

Admiral Mayo, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, inspected the bases September 25-27 and October 5-7, 1918, and reported most favorably on their condition. Quoting from his report: "The personnel throughout, both commissioned and enlisted, appeared to be satisfactory as to number and selection; their military appearance, bearing, and uniform made a favorable impression. The men are granted liberty freely and the relations with the natives of the towns and surrounding country appeared to be excellent." Quoting further: "Owing to the relatively late start of the operations, it has been necessary for the entire force, ashore and afloat, to work at high pressure in order to complete the original and later plans before bad weather sets in. The response of the personnel has been excellent and is considered indicative of a highly satisfactory state of morale."

Admiral Mayo concluded his report with the remarks:

(a) "The arrangements in force are remarkable for their conformity to the plan prepared at home before the mine force crossed the Atlantic."

(b) "The inspection of the mine force and bases and of the activities in connection with the work incident to mine laying in the North Sea, revealed a highly satisfactory condition and reflect great credit on the commander mine force and on his assistants."

CHAPTER XI.—ORGANIZATION OF MINE SQUADRON AND SELECTION OF NEW MINE PLANTERS.

Prior to the decision to proceed with the northern barrage project, the mine force of the United States Navy included only two mine layers fit for the project, the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*. This force possessed very small mine-laying capacity, and it became necessary, as one of the first steps in preparation for the project, to greatly enlarge the force by taking over a sufficient number of merchant ships and converting them into mine layers; to obtain and train the officers and crews for these vessels, and to secure the requisite merchant tonnage for transporting the mines and other material to Europe.

On the basis of an estimated output of 5,000 mines a week and of one mine-planting operation a week, the department concluded that the mine force should have a capacity of at least 5,000 mines ready to plant, which, if all went well, would insure the planting of the northern barrage in three months.

The *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* had a combined capacity of only 350 mines. It was necessary, therefore, to create practically a complete new mine squadron to secure the requisite capacity. Vessels were desired of ample size, yet handy in tactical formation; serviceable condition as to engines, boilers, pumps, etc.; good cargo-handling equipment adaptable for handling mines; internal arrangements suitable for installation of mine tracks on two or three decks; speed of 14 to 20 knots and generally seaworthy. From data on file in the Navy Department it was found that four vessels of the Morgan Line, running between New York, New Orleans, and Galveston, were generally satisfactory for the purpose. They had been built by the Newport News Shipbuilding Co. to replace vessels of the *Prairie* class, purchased by the United States Navy in the Spanish-American War, and were in good condition. They were 391 feet long, 48 feet beam, and 20 feet draft when loaded as mine planters. They were capable of a sustained sea speed of 14.5 knots and had ample bunker capacity. Their capacity was estimated at 800 to 850 mines each.

The Secretary of the Navy personally informed Mr. Hurley, president of the Shipping Board, about the projected barrage operation; and the department's request for the four Morgan liners was promptly granted, notwithstanding the prevailing dearth

shipping and despite the fast-mounting demands for tonnage. The vessels were turned over to the Navy as soon as they had discharged the cargoes then on board or dinged. The first taken over, the steamship *El Dia*, renamed *Roanoke*, was delivered November 16, 1917, at Tietjan and Lang's shipyard, Hoboken, N. J., where work of conversion into a mine planter was promptly undertaken. *El Rio*, renamed *Housatonic*, followed at the same yard November 25; and *El Siglo* and *El Sol*, becoming the *Canandaigua* and *Cononicus*, respectively, arrived at the Morse yard, South Brooklyn, November 22 and 24.

Some high-speed vessels were desired for the mine force, but there were few such vessels under the American flag. On the Atlantic coast there were only three of suitable size and build, one of which, the *Old Colony*, had been promised to the British Navy; The others were the *Massachusetts* and *Bunker Hill*. These last two were taken over by the Navy, were renamed the *Shawmut* and *Aroostook*, and were delivered at the navy yard, Boston, November 6 and 10, for conversion. These vessels could each carry about 300 mines on one deck. They had a speed of 20 knots and a very short steaming radius, about 2,300 miles at economical speed.

Two more vessels, the *Jefferson* and *Hamilton*, of the Old Dominion Line, plying between New York and Norfolk, were requisitioned by the Navy and taken over November 2 and 6, 1917. They were renamed the *Quinnebaug* and *Saranac*, respectively, and the work of conversion was undertaken at Robbins repair yard, Erie, Pa., and James Shewan & Sons' repair yard, both in South Brooklyn. Their speed was about 16.5 to 17 knots and their capacity 600 mines each, carried on two decks.

Thus, a total of eight vessels were acquired for conversion into planters, which, with the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*, formed a squadron of 10, with a total capacity of about 5,500 mines.

The conversion of the Morgan mine layers (*Roanoke*, *Housatonic*, *Cononicus* and *Canandaigua*) was an undertaking of extensive detail. It involved enlarging the forward or top deck; making a reserve bunker in the hold forward of the boiler room; replacing the existing upper bunkers, which were cleared off the third deck; making a separate compartment in the hold for the elevator pumps, and rearranging smaller compartments for the dynamo room and machine shops; closing the cargo ports and providing chutes for coaling over all with mines on board; cutting stern ports for launching the mines through, and raising the rudder quadrant to give the needed clearance; repairing (largely renewing) and reeathing the second and third decks; enlarging the officers' quarters to accommodate the more numerous naval complement; providing commissary, messing, and berthing arrangements for a crew of about 200, including bakery, scullery, and a naval galley—no easy matter with the large amount of interior space to be reserved for the mines; building storerooms, magazines, water tanks for storage and distribution, washrooms, and closets, installing a fire system and magazine sprinklers; replacing the anchor engine and windlass with one of more power to handle larger chain and heavier anchors, stowing on billboards; on deck, building gun platforms forward and aft, lookout stations, and navigating and signal bridges, together with speaking tubes and accessory apparatus for fire control and other communications; making and altering hatchways for crews' use and for mine handling; altering boat stowage and davits for heavier boats; and installing davits and booms for embarking mines. Watertight subdivision far below the ordinary naval standard had to be accepted, on account of the limited time available; but some improvement was effected by making existing bulkheads stronger and, with their openings, watertight where possible, and by building two new bulkheads, one forward and one aft, to divide the largest compartments, so that the ships would have a chance of keeping afloat, if only one compartment were flooded.

On the main machinery, the work to be done was chiefly overhaul and repair; but to the auxiliary machinery much had to be added. The electric plant was more than doubled. An evaporator and distiller for fresh water, special hydraulic pump installation for the mine elevators, refrigerating machinery, a larger radio-telegraphy plant, a considerable number of additional winches for embarking and handling the mines, a steam heating system, and a machine shop were all new.

The provision of adequate ventilation was a problem. In these cargo ships it was entirely lacking where the crew were to be. In the region where the ships were to operate, keeping the large hatches constantly open for airing out below decks could not be counted upon. In the crowded condition that would obtain when the ships were at sea with mines on board, considerable supply of fresh air and exhaust for the foul was very important to ordinary comfort, as well as for the prevention of possible spread of respiratory infection. The principal difficulty encountered was to obtain ventilating blowers in number and capacity to meet the minimum requirements. In this respect the conversion of these ships was least satisfactory.

The two Old Dominion liners (*Saranac* and *Quinnebaug*) required somewhat different treatment in conversion. Their state of preservation was comparatively poor, and their original construction, in general and in details, much inferior to that of the other ships taken. A considerable part of the light upper passenger decks had to be removed, the parts retained strengthened by extra side plating and interior stiffening. Their general arrangement as mine planters, however, differed from that of the *Merza* Liners only in detail and in their carrying mines on two decks only, instead of three, with correspondingly fewer elevators. The extra space above the main deck made a better provision possible for officers and chief petty officers, with consequently more room for the men below, and gave better ventilation generally; but the additional height above water was otherwise of no advantage. The single, low mast, which was all they had at first, was afterwards lengthened by a topmast, to give the necessary hoist for signals and radio.

In common with all other ship alterations in hand at the time, the original plan had to be based on what could be done within a reasonable time with material and labor scarce. There was no available data for mining installations on the scale we had undertaken. Some British mining memoranda were received, and later a few blue prints from some of their plans. Also, Lieut. De Salis, R. N., placed all his experience at our disposal. But as other nations had not made a success of mine elevators or gone in for mine carrying capacity to the same extent we had, little of their data proved applicable. The experience of the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* during the past two years, however, was invaluable, enabling the decision of many questions of detail, both before and during the conversion, to be made with confidence that subsequent results confirmed as well founded.

The plan finally arrived at for the mining installation of the new ships consisted of two tracks for mines on each side of the second or launching decks, extending about three-fourths the length of that deck. On the deck below there were likewise two long tracks; and inboard, aft, four or more short stowage tracks. In addition to these the four large minelayers—*Roanoke*, *Housatonic*, *Canonicus*, and *Canandaigua*—each had stowage tracks on the enlarged forward or top deck. Cross tracks and turntables connected all tracks at points sufficiently distributed to insure against a breakdown at any point cutting of the mines beyond. Mines were transferred from the lower stowage decks to the launching deck by elevators. This was a unique and typically American feature of these vessels. Elevators had been abandoned by other nations as impracticable. After considering various possible methods of transferring mines from the lower decks to the upper decks so as to permit the whole cargo of mines to be launched in one continuous string, the elevators were chosen in preference to launching from two decks, or to installing inclined planes, conveyor machinery, or ordinary whips and trolleys. Rather than attempt to design a new elevator, the representatives of the Otis Elevator Co. were called in at the outset and informed of the requirements. These representatives stated that they would meet the necessary requirements, which was more than borne out in the actual installation. The elevators were of two types—electrical and hydraulic—with automatic stop and levelling devices, capable of carrying two mines and designed to make a round trip in one minute, including the time of loading and unloading the car. This rate was eventually doubled in use.

On the four large layers there was only room for one launching port on each side of the deck. It was therefore necessary to install a switch so that the mines on the two tracks on each side could be planted from their respective ports without using a turntable. This was also a novel feature which had been abandoned more or less as impracticable by the British, but which gave most excellent service as installed. On the other four new mines planters there was sufficient room aft to cut four launching ports—one for each track—thus eliminating the necessity of switches. The *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* had but one port each, and, due to the limited space, it was impossible to install another. All ports were closed by a substantial watertight door, the section of track in its wake being hinged back when the door was closed.

In the process of planting, the mines on the lower decks were brought forward to the elevators; hoisted to the launching deck; then hauled aft to the launching trap after those originally stowed on the launching deck had been planted. To haul the mines along the tracks, they were made up in "fleets" of 20 to 40 mines, and moved by means of a wire rope rove around a "bogie" attached to the end of the last mine anchor and thence led to a winch. To keep the mines moving at the necessary speed on all sections of the track required an installation of as many as 13 winches on the largest mine planters. As the mines arrived near the launching trap, the "bogies" were disconnected and the mines were run aft into the trap by hand. The trap consisted of a simple lever device, designed to release one mine at a time, allowing it to roll

erboard along the slanting section of the track extending through the launching

The mines were embarked from the upper decks, using the regular cargo booms or cranes specially placed for the purpose. Small hatches were cut for embarking the mines so they could be struck down one, two, or three decks, and landed on tracks on which they could be run to their stowage positions. By this method it was possible to embark mines simultaneously at four points with such speed as to load the largest layers in less than five hours.

Shortly after the ships had been taken over and sent to the various shipbuilding yards for conversion, the commanding officers and executive officers were ordered to their ships to hasten the work by keeping in constant touch with the various items in which least progress was being made. About Christmas the *San Francisco* and the *Baltimore* were sent to the navy yard at New York for their final outfitting before sailing for Europe.

The *Shawmut* and *Aroostook* having been constructed mainly for navigation between Boston and New York by the inside route, there was doubt of their structural strength in the open seas. Thorough examination showed that their steel hulls, though of shallow depth, were well built, requiring no underwater strengthening, and that by doubling the main deck stringers and sheer strakes, running a light plate deck and stiffening the structure above the main deck, in order to secure longitudinal stiffness, they could be made thoroughly seaworthy. These ships, of 4,500 tons displacement, 155 feet long, 52 feet beam, 18 feet extreme draught, were twin screw, oil-burning, of 16 knots speed with possibilities under naval management and good fuel of making 21 or more. They could readily be given a fuel capacity of 4,000 miles at 10 knots and 1,000 miles at 20 knots. Through unremitting efforts, in view of the tactical value of these ships as a fast wing in general mining operations or for "repairing fences" after such operations, they were taken over November 6 and 10, purchased outright, and their alteration begun. The objection to the inclusion of these ships in the force was directed against their seagoing qualities and the extent of the work required to convert them. This conversion meant stripping them down to the main deck and rebuilding upward from that point, for, as passenger ships, their entire upper structure was of wood.

The *Shawmut* and *Aroostook* were placed in commission at Boston Navy Yard, December 7, 1917, and the assembling and organizing of their crews proceeded concurrently with their conversion. Upon removal of the superstructures, the crews were scattered to available spaces in yard shops, and subsisted temporarily on various ships. This continued during a most severe winter with the thermometer many degrees below zero while the work was in progress. The men were finally transferred to temporary quarters on a hospital barge moored nearby. The ship's officers were established in a part of the removed superstructure landed on the dock alongside. This included the pilot houses, in which the officer of the deck was located. The captains organized their crews in industrial gangs for structural work, as well as for their duties in the ships. These gangs were made up chiefly of members of the crews who had had previous experience in the industrial trades of riveters, caulkers, ship-fitters, carpenters, and were placed in charge of officers who had a knowledge of structural steel working. They conformed strictly to yard hours, including overtime—a normal condition—except that for their overtime hours, the enlisted men received no additional pay.

Both ships were completed the same day, June 10, 1918, and in all respects so thoroughly that only six days later they sailed for Scotland.

CHAPTER XII.—TRAINING THE PERSONNEL AND COMMISSIONING THE SHIPS OF MINE SQUADRON ONE.

The sudden expansion of the mine force from 2 mine layers to 10 entailed a proportionate expansion of mining personnel, which offered considerable difficulty. In comparison with the projected Northern Barrage operation, the United States Navy had had very little experience in mining, and this experience was confined to a very few officers and men. It was partly for this reason that the Bureau of Ordnance designed the Mark VI mine in such a manner that it could be handled on board ship practically as "fixed ammunition", so that a minimum of experience and training of the ships' crews would be necessary to its successful use.

The officers and crews of the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*, together with selected officers and men who had had previous experience in our small mine force, afforded a nucleus around which to build up, and with which to train, the new force, and this last most important work was promptly taken up.

In October, 1917, when the Northern Barrage plan assumed definite form, the *Dubuque*, which had belonged to the force but which was too small to be of much use in extensive mining operations, was in use as a training ship at Annapolis; and the tugs were temporarily attached to the train, Atlantic Fleet, leaving only the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* for work in connection with preparations for the barrage operation.

On the request of the Bureau of Ordnance, the *Baltimore* was detailed to carry out certain practical experiments involved in the evolution of design of the Mark VI mine. Thus the *San Francisco* was the only vessel wholly available for the training of men for the crews of the new mine planters.

One of the first measures taken to train the new personnel was the establishment by the Bureau of Navigation of a mine force training camp at Cloyne Field Barracks, Newport, R. I., a part of the cantonments provided for the second district Naval Reserves. Accommodations were provided here for 1,050 men, who were subsisted and carried for pay locally but were under the commander of the mine force in other respects. This camp was established on November 11.

The officers who were detailed to conduct the training at this camp had had duty in mine ships. The men for each of the new ships were grouped under officers of their respective ships. As the ships went into commission their crews were withdrawn from the training camp. Capt. Belknap, in his *History of Mine Squadron (One)*, gives the following account of the training of the crews and the commissioning of the new ships:

The training was general, including seamanship, mines, gunnery, signals, infantry, and boats. For five weeks the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* were present, giving practical instruction and experience in mine handling. A part of their regular crews were transferred to the barracks and replaced by new men. These would be on board for a week or 10 days; then another lot would come. There was not time to cover all men in this fashion, but it was expected the information picked up would spread. During the summer of 1917 a detail of 150 reserves, later increased to 400, had been sent from Newport to New London, Conn., to work with the mine force on antisubmarine net making and planting. The work being completed, a considerable number of the first 150 were obtained for the new mine ships. Along with the net making they had been given a regular and systematic training by the *Dubuque's* officers, which was now to prove of direct benefit in the mine force. During this training-camp period at Newport the weather was at times biting cold, but the results were well worth while. The *Sonoma* and *Ontario* helped at this time in practical seamanship, signals, and quartermaster training until withdrawn to assist the Shipping Board to get vessels out of the St. Lawrence River ice. The *Patapsco* and *Patuxent* carried on the same work after completing repairs, about February 1 and March 1, 1918.

For radio instruction a class was established in mid-November on board the *San Francisco*, consisting of likely material from the training camp. When the *San Francisco* went to Shewan's yard, December 18, 1918, her radio force was largely augmented by the best men from this class, and instruction was continued during her overhaul. This included visits to shops and to the radio laboratory at the navy yard, Brooklyn. The remainder of the original class continued instruction under one of their own number at the training barracks. When the *San Francisco* was about to leave Shewan's yard early in March her excess radio men were distributed among ships fitting out in New York, to assist with the installation of their equipment and become familiar with it. Later, when the squadron assembled, training in British procedure was taken up, enabling the squadron radio force to adopt it within a day after arriving in Scotland.

For instruction in signals, especially British, flags, and procedure, a class was formed at Newport January 29, to which signal quartermasters and signalmen from all ships were sent for about a month's training. To these 50 more were added from the signal class at the Newport training station. All were divided into groups by ships and given an intensive course in all kinds of signaling and quartermaster duty. Capt. E. H. Campbell, commanding the Newport training station, placed all desired facilities at the disposal of the force, and for practice afloat first the *Patapsco* and then the *Patuxent* also were available. The value of this preliminary instruction was later demonstrated by the excellence of the signaling during the mining operations. Great credit is due to the leading chief quartermaster, William H. Kerens, of the *San Francisco*, and the other chiefs for the quick and accurate communication by signals which they made possible.

The importance of a well organized and trained lookout service was early given attention, resulting in an excellent arrangement of stations, communications, and procedure.

For various reasons the full number of 1,050, for which training-camp accommodation had been provided, was at no one time complete, but the training was supplemented elsewhere, so that few if any wholly untrained men were received by any ship. As soon as she was ready for them, three gun crews trained in the battleships were drafted to each ship. Similarly the engineer department personnel were assembled at Philadelphia and kept under training until wanted. The quotas of experienced petty officers, artificers, and lower ratings began to be assembled on board the receiving ship at New York in January, but the constant demands from her quarters interfered much here. Permanent association of men with ships on a satisfactory basis hardly began much before the ships went into commission.

For the officers similar measures were taken to put them in touch with the methods and the results of experience in the mine force. A conference of all new commanding officers and executives with Capt. Belknap and Commander Butler was held on board the *San Francisco* in Newport on December 3, at which the operation in hand was described, along with the doctrine and other matters peculiar to the force and to the particular service of the ships. The mine force training instructions were reprinted and issued. Matters pertaining to training and organization were taken up at the subsequent conferences held at New York and Boston, through the winter, and though the ships were as yet neither assigned to the mine force now in commission, the acting commander mine force, Capt. Butler, sent them for guidance copies of all orders and instructions likely to be of useful information. In addition, the mining officers were given practical instruction on board the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* in late November, and during the mine experiments conducted by the *San Francisco* in the spring in Chesapeake Bay, at Newport and off Cape Ann.

The association of the new ships' officers at New York with one another and with those of the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* during January and February made for good progress in working out the organization and future procedure on board the new ships during mine planting. Study of the blue-print plans made the officers fairly familiar with the ships' installations, so that by the time they moved aboard and began actual drills and try out, much of the preliminary work had already been done. To facilitate the early establishment of routine on a regular basis so that time might sooner become available for specially training, the *North Dakota's* routine book was revised so as to be suitable for the new mine planters, its adoption in whole or part, however, being optional with each commanding officer.

The first ships to be commissioned were the *Shaumut*, Capt. W. T. Cluverius, and *Brookstock*, Commander J. H. Tomb, at Boston December 7, 1917. Their crews had been built up and organized comparatively early, their own labor considerably hastening the completion of the ships, as told elsewhere. The popularity of their respective service was a great stimulus. Many applicants of all ratings from ships visiting the Boston yard, keen to go across on the mine-planting expedition, volunteered to the captains of these two ships.

Next to commission were the *Roanoke*, Capt. C. D. Stearns, and *Housatonic*, Commander J. W. Greenslade, on the 25th of January, 1918. Conditions in the neighborhood of their shipyard and on board the ships made an earlier date impossible without retarding their conversion. Living conditions were extremely rough amid the dirt and disorder, made worse by the slush and mud in the unpaved shipyards; but the presence of officers and men on board exerted constant forward pressure on the work, while they at the same time were becoming acquainted with the details of their ships. At the Morse yard conditions were not favorable for commissioning until March 2. The decision of the appropriate time for commissioning was left to the respective commanding officers, who, watching the work's progress from day to day, were in the best position to choose. The *Canandaigua*, Commander W. H. Reynolds, and *Yanonicus*, Commander T. L. Johnson, commissioned March 2; the *Quinnebaug*, Commander D. P. Mannix, not until March 23, but most of her crew had been assembled, organized, and accustomed to the ship from a much earlier date. Last to commission was the *Saranac*, Commander Sinclair Gannon, April 9, 1918.

CHAPTER XIII.—COMPLETION AND SAILING OF MINE SQUADRON.

The date of departure of the mine squadron had been fixed tentatively at February 1, 1918, partly because it was believed originally that this program could be met if all went well and partly because it was feared that other work no more important might be given precedence. It was soon found, however, that the date for completion would have to be postponed because of unavoidable delays, and consequently February 24, March 15, and March 21 were successively worked for.

Throughout December to March crowding in the shipyards, scarcity of material, congested transportation, shortage of fuel, and severe weather made a con-

of difficulties especially unfavorable for outside work on the mine planters, of which there was a good deal to be done. By constant urging, anticipating probable cause of delay, and persistently following up behindhand deliveries, the work as a whole kept always progressing, if at times slowly. Work on the Morgan liners was undoubtedly helped by having them in pairs at two shipyards, a good arrangement for mutual assistance and emulation; and, as the time for completion drew near, a spirit of competition was aroused between the managers of the two yards. On the other two ships at New York, which were placed singly, the *Saranac* at Shewan's yard was greatly delayed by some apparent disaffection among the shipyard employees and by partial strikes. Special measures had at last to be taken in her case, finally getting her to sea six weeks behind her sister, the *Quinnebaug*.

A great deal of the delay was undoubtedly due to lack of interest on the part of workmen. The subsequently successful campaign of addresses to the workmen by good speakers, explaining the need for the ships and the men's own interest in doing their best, did not begin until some time in February, and then only in a small way. Another serious retarding cause, constantly present, was insufficient supervision of the work. The contractors were new to Government work, the vessels were of a type for which no model existed, and plans were not forthcoming as fast as wanted, nor often in the logical order. Several delays or losses of material in transportation held up other work, and one of the trades—ship fitter—in which labor was shortest was the one on the completion of whose work much of the other work was dependent. Finally by the end of the first week in April five ships had been sufficiently completed to leave the shipyards and go to sea. Yet these ships, which with the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* represented three-fourths of the total mining capacity, late as they were, were not behind the time the mines were ready, the manufacture of these likewise having suffered from the prevailing unfavorable industrial conditions.

First away from the shipyard, April 4, 1918, was *Roanoke*. She had been the first of the Morgan liners taken over, but to get her away even then it was necessary to take her to the Brooklyn Navy Yard for a few days to concentrate on her electric wiring. Several items were incomplete, but a break had to be made away from the shipyard, and it did not become necessary to send her back. The *Housatonic* followed close afterwards, April 6, similarly incomplete; then *Canandaigua* April 8. The latter had a long list of unfinished or poorly finished items, including the ice machine and partial installation of the ventilation system. *Quinnebaug* and *Canonicus* on April 14 and 16, respectively, made a total of five ships ready about the same time. Among these the shortest time under alteration was 4 months and 12 days; the longest 4 months and 24 days.

A tentative schedule prepared by the British Admiralty in the early part of December, 1917, named May 1 for the completion of one system of the mine barrage, allowing one month to do the mine planting. Subsequent events made that date impossible to meet, in spite of all efforts; but the ships' officers were doing all they could to advance their preparations for active service without retarding the work of the shipyards, so that when the vessels did leave, they should be coaled and stored as completely as the state of supply market permitted. A memorandum had been issued to them on February 28, outlining the tentative employment of time prior to going across, as follows:

(a) On leaving the yard, each ship was to drop down to Gravesend Bay to receive 50 Mark IV mines to be used for training; these to be turned in before departure for abroad.

(b) Each ship was to proceed to sea independently for one week, for a shakedown, general clean up, and preliminary ship drills, finishing the cruise at Hampton Roads. At discretion, ships were to go into Chesapeake Bay for part of the time, keeping clear of the rest of the fleet.

(c) One week was to be devoted mainly to training in mining, first taking half of the ship's capacity on board, for working out the handling of winches, parbuckles, fleets, elevators, and cross-overs. During the following week, enough more mines were to be taken to fill to capacity, less one track load on each side of the launching deck. This was afterwards changed to leave one deck clear of mines, to make room for extra men carried to fill the mine bases. At the end of two weeks, two to four days were to be spent in coaling, completing with stores, and other final preparations.

(d) On the passage across there were to be tactical and gunnery exercises and ample opportunity for moving mines about as desired for training on board.

The final aim was to arrive at destination ready, after loading with mines and coal, to begin planting. It was estimated that 45 days after leaving the shipyard would suffice for the completion of this whole program. The squadron was, therefore, working without a definite date but within a definite lapse of time. Its arrival at the mine bases in Scotland, during the night of May 25-26, was on the fortieth day

at the time the last ship left the shipyard. On arrival all were ready, requiring only coal and mines.

Having completed her final fitting out and conducted successful experiments with the new mine in Chesapeake Bay, March 13-15, in Narragansett Bay March 21-21, and Cape Ann April 1-5, the *San Francisco* returned to Hampton Roads; and there, on Wednesday, April 10, 1918, Capt. R. R. Belknap having been detached from the office of Naval Operations, assumed command of the mine squadron, with additional duty as chief of staff to the commander of the mine force. Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had already proceeded to the mine force headquarters at base 18, Inverness, Scotland.

On April 12, 1918, the first of the new mine planters, the *Roanoke*, stood into the Roads, followed the same day by the *Housatonic*, and the next day by the *Canandaigua*. Immediately upon arrival, these vessels proceeded to take their complement of mines from the mine carrier *Lake Superior* and Southern Railroad Pier No. 4 at Minners Point.

So far, all had gone smoothly; but early Monday morning, the 15th, the *Housatonic*, getting under way from Pier 4 broke the side of her hot well casing, completely disabling the main engine beyond repair in less than 10 days. The work was taken in hand immediately by a force from the Norfolk Navy Yard, and at noon Tuesday she was towed to the yard, where every effort was made toward early completion. There was no choice but to wait and take advantage of the time in completing and improving such work as had not been done to satisfaction at the ship yards. In this respect the enforced delay was a benefit, as some navy yard help was given other units too, which relieved the small repair gangs of the ships from a discouraging amount of pressing work, hopeless of accomplishment unaided.

It became evident by Thursday the 18th that the unfinished items on board *Canandaigua*, which was the worst of any vessel in this respect, could not be completed without navy yard help by the time the *Housatonic* would be ready. The commandant at the Norfolk yard was applied to that night by radio, and he and the officers of the industrial department, appreciating the urgency for getting this force off for the war zone, promptly took in hand every item of unfinished work that could be completed simultaneously with the work on the *Housatonic*.

On Wednesday afternoon the *Quinnebaug* stood in, and on Saturday, April 20, the *Canonicus*, both reporting themselves ready, making the squadron for the time complete. Except the *Roanoke*, no ship had taken advantage of a full week for preliminary shakedown. The last two ships took only three and four days. All of them, however, experienced bad weather which tested their seaworthiness rather severely for so early in their new career.

It has been planned to supplement the preliminary specialty training of these new ships by giving them the assistance of experienced petty officers and men from the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* during the two weeks period before sailing for abroad.

An urgent request had come from the British Admiralty about March 1, however, for the services of one or two mine planters to help out in planting a field in the North Channel to the Irish Sea, using British mines. The *Baltimore* was sent in response to this, sailing March 7, via Halifax. Consequently a double burden fell upon *San Francisco* alone, of testing the completed mines and giving some assistance to new ships in their training. Beginning at Hampton Roads, two instruction parties, of experienced gunner's mates, with an officer, were transferred temporarily to the new ships in turn, for practice, instruction, and supervision of all the operations of testing, assembling, and preparing a mine for planting. This was supplemented on deck by sending to some of the new ships one or more experienced signalmen from *San Francisco* in temporary exchange for equal numbers.

A change in plan came about at this time in compliance with the wishes of the commander, mine force, for one or more planters to be sent in advance of the others to assist the *Baltimore*, so that they might together complete the mine field, on which *Baltimore* alone was engaged, in time to join the squadron from the northern barrage operations. For such an early departure the *Roanoke* was the only one that could be considered: Capt. Stearns declared his ship would be ready to proceed as soon as some practice had been given in actual mine planting. Inspection of the crew and ship by the squadron commander confirmed this. Held only 16 days after leaving the shipyard, the inspection showed that the time had been utilized to the best advantage, the crew and the ship throughout being in a state most creditable to Capt. Stearns and his officers and crew.

The following Monday *Roanoke* held some mine planting exercises off Cherrystone, Va. Returning that night, she transferred to other ships all but 160 mines, retaining these for drill, and at noon on Wednesday she sailed, the first of the new mine planters to proceed on active service. At Newport, R. I., she received a draft of 250 men for

the mine bases in Scotland, proceeding thence via New York for the Clyde. As it turned out, all this was fruitless except for getting the men to the bases. The *Roanoke* was detained a few days in New York, waiting to join a convoy, and after arrival in the Clyde took no part in the *Baltimore's* mining operation, although prepared to do so. She arrived at naval base 17, Invergordon, Scotland, a week before the rest of the squadron.

By Friday, April 26, as promised, *Housatonic's* repairs were completed, and she went alongside the *Lake Superior* at the explosives anchorage to obtain her loaded mine cases. Next day at noon the *Canandaigua* did likewise; and by *Housatonic's* working all Saturday night the squadron was at last ready for its first cruise in formation at sea.

The four seagoing tugs, *Sonoma*, *Ontario*, *Patapsco*, and *Patuxent*, which had for some years past been performing the duties of fleet tenders, and for some months after the outbreak of war been engaged with the mine force in submarine net planting and in mining experiments, were fitted out to accompany the mine force abroad. The *Patuxent*, Lieut. J. B. Hupp, commanding, and the *Patapsco*, Lieut. W. S. Benson, were temporarily detached to escort a convoy of submarine chasers abroad via Bermuda and the Azores to Brest, but finally arrived at United States Naval Base 18, Invergordon, Scotland, June 24, 1918, where they were subsequently employed for inspection and observation of mine fields and for communications between the mine bases. The *Sonoma* and *Ontario* remained with the mine planters until their departure for Europe. The *Sonoma*, Lieut. J. S. Trayer, accompanied the mine squadron on its trip across. The *Ontario*, Lieut. Edmund Delavy, accompanied a group of submarine chasers abroad and was then diverted to Queenstown for submarine patrol duty. Although it was originally intended to have 16 tugs, including the 4 above mentioned, attached to the mine squadron as mine sweepers, it developed that their services in this capacity were not needed. Two tugs were able to handle the miscellaneous work at the bases; and, in view of the valuable wrecking equipment on the *Sonoma*, she was released on July 11, 1918, and ordered to Queenstown, where she could be more profitably employed.

Sunday morning, April 28, Mine Squadron One, consisting of *San Francisco*, *Quinnebaug*, *Housatonic*, *Canonicus*, and *Canandaigua*, got under way for Provincetown, Mass., where standardization trials and mine tests were carried out. On Monday, May 6, the squadron proceeded to Boston, where Mark IV drill mines were landed and the quota of Mark IV mines intended for the *Shawmut*, *Aroostook*, and *Housatonic* were disembarked. That same night the squadron got under way for Newport, R. I., the point of final departure, conducting subcaliber practice and tactical exercises en route. The remainder of the week was spent in fueling and provisioning the ships and making final preparations for departure. A draft of 500 men destined for the mine bases in Scotland was distributed among the four large mine layers. The fuel ship *Jason* loaded with aviation stores destined for Killingholme, England, was ordered to cross in company with the mine squadron.

At midnight, May 11 and 12, the squadron, consisting of the *San Francisco*, flagship *Housatonic*, *Canonicus*, *Canandaigua*, *Quinnebaug*, and *Sonoma*, got under way for bases 17 and 18. During the forenoon of May 12 the *Jason* joined the squadron. On the first two days out heavy fog was encountered. The succeeding days were used for gunnery exercises, training and tactical exercises. Wednesday morning, May 15, the *Quinnebaug* showed the breakdown flag. She was taken in tow by the *Sonoma*, the squadron slowing to 7 knots. At the end of 24 hours repairs were completed and the *Quinnebaug* stood on under her own power. May 16 gunnery practice was held on a target towed by the *San Francisco* in which all of the new ships were enabled to exercise their guns. On Friday the wind and sea increased until by 4 o'clock the *Jason* was unable to keep in formation, having to head off the course in long zigzags. Fortunately she had sufficient reserve speed to overtake the squadron when the weather moderated, regaining her position at about 7 p. m. the following day. She was again lost sight of on May 22 during another spell of bad weather. The steering gear of the *Housatonic* broke down on May 21, disabling her approximately for one hour, and again the following day, necessitating reducing the speed of the squadron while repairs were being made.

In the meantime the *Sonoma* was sent on independently. By the original plans she should not have been in company with the squadron but should have turned off several days before to the Azores; but on reaching the separating point, she had proved so seaworthy and useful that it was decided to keep her with the squadron in case of further emergency. In making this decision, the chance had to be taken of bad weather separating her from the other ships on account of her not being able to make the necessary speed or hold the course. She was, therefore, sent on ahead while the rest of the squadron remained with the *Housatonic*. Up to this time the services of the *Sonoma* had been most useful. In addition to towing the *Quinnebaug* while she

was broken down, she was of great use in carrying guard mail between the ships while they were en route and in assisting in the gunnery exercises. On Thursday morning, May 23, the *Sonoma* was overtaken and again joined the squadron. On this day the weather was the worst of any experienced. The wind and sea on the quarter caused such heavy rolling that the *San Francisco* found it expedient to strike mines from the main to the second deck and fill her boiler and engine room double bottoms with salt water to improve her stability. There were no accidents, however, all ships standing the test very well. During the night and early morning the weather moderated, but the fog had set in which continued until noon May 24. At daylight Saturday morning, the *Jason*, missing for four days, was sighted coming astern. Fifteen minutes before the squadron was due at the rendezvous she took her position in the formation, thus making the unit again complete. At 4.52 a. m. four British destroyers appeared out in the haze ahead, then two to the southward and a little later three more to the northward, nine in all with H. M. S. *Anzac*, half leader of the fourteenth flotilla, the flagship. This flotilla escorted the squadron past Cape Wrath, through Pentland Firth and down Moray Firth to Cromarty, where the squadron arrived at 12.40 a. m. Sunday, May 26. Pilots, charts, and mine force instructions were placed aboard the ships at the whistle buoy. The *San Francisco*, *Canandaigua*, *Canonicus*, and *Sonoma*, then proceeded to Inverness Firth and anchored off United States Naval base 18. The *Housatonic*, *Quinnebaug*, and *Jason* proceeded into Cromarty Firth, base 17, where the *Roanoke* was already lying. That forenoon, in reporting to the commander mine force, the squadron commander reported that all ships were ready for their intended duty.

The remainder of the squadron, consisting of the *Saranac*, *Shamut*, and *Aroostook*, cleared the yards where converted on May 23 and June 10, respectively. They were not delayed by uncompleted work, as the others had been; but the standardizing runs over the Provincetown course proved that the *Shamut's* and *Aroostook's* fuel consumption was much larger than had been reckoned, making their fuel capacity insufficient for the passage across. This threatened an indefinite delay, but the difficulty was solved by Capt. Cluverius and Commander Bulmer securing enough oil hose for the *Black Hawk* to fuel the ships at sea. By expeditious management, the three mine planters, together with *Black Hawk*, were able to sail in company on June 16. The only oil hose obtainable quickly was of 4-inch diameter, nearly twice as heavy as that ordinarily used for fueling at sea. The first fueling was done in a gale of wind, and it was a novel undertaking for all concerned. Yet it was successfully accomplished; the second time fueling was done, it was easier; and without further noteworthy incident, the detachment arrived at bases 17 and 18 in the evening of June 29. The *Benmore*, having finished her mine planting off the north of Ireland under the direction of the British Admiralty, joined the others at base 18 on June 2, thus making the squadron of mine planters complete.

CHAPTER XIV.—COMMANDER MINE FORCE—APPOINTMENT; ARRIVAL IN EUROPE; PREPARATIONS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF MINE LAYING.

As preparations progressed it became apparent that our mining operations were developing into one of the major war activities of the United States Navy, and it was desirable that it should be commanded by an officer of appropriate flag rank. Accordingly Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss was appointed commander mine force, United States Atlantic Fleet, relieving Captain R. R. Belknap, the middle of February, 1918.

This appointment was particularly suited to the capabilities of Rear Admiral Strauss, who had spent a large part of his service in the development and design of ordnance, and had preceded Rear Admiral Ralph Earle as the chief of that bureau. The mine-laying program now in hand called for a vast expenditure of money for the production of mines which, as a type, were unknown and untested. Minor tests had, of course, been made of the constituent parts and were individually gratifying; but in any complex mechanism such as a mine, a torpedo, or a gun mount, an actual test of the completed unit under service conditions is the only true proof of its efficiency. At the outset it would seem that a mine should be extremely simple to design and construct. Such is far from the case. Prior to the development of this mine the United States Navy had never produced a really satisfactory mine. The demand for immediate antisubmarine measures was so urgent in order to prevent the loss of merchant ships from reducing the available tonnage below that required to successfully prosecute the war that, tried or untried, it was necessary to begin at once, on a large scale, the manufacture of this new American mine.

After receiving his appointment as commander mine force, Rear Admiral Strauss spent several weeks in Washington on temporary duty in the Office of Naval Operations, familiarizing himself with all information bearing on the operation and with the prep-

arrangements then in hand, also reviewing the status of the work being done by the Bureau of Ordnance in connection with the production of the mines. Several days were spent in inspecting the new mine layers being fitted out at New York and Boston. Then arrangements were made to proceed to Great Britain to complete the preparations necessary to enable mine laying to begin immediately upon the arrival of the squadron.

After reviewing the correspondence in Washington relative to the nature of the proposed mine barrage as then agreed upon, which, in addition to leaving Pentlands Firth open, left a clear passage nearly 10 miles wide between the Orkney Islands and the western end of the barrage, besides some 110 miles which were deep mines only, Admiral Strauss wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations on March 7:

"In considering the scheme to which the mine force's efforts are to be devoted I desire to invite attention to the following necessary conditions to insure success:

"First, every outlet to the broad sea must be closed by mine barriers. This includes the outlets to the Atlantic provided for in the proximate plans, as well as those to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles and the Adriatic. There must be no leaks anywhere. While it would afford a serious check to submarine attack were our enemies' submarine bases confined to the Mediterranean, nevertheless an enemy so enterprising must not be given even so restricted an opportunity.

"As to the means for accomplishing the end sought, (the Mark VI mine), I think it too soon to predict success for this factor of the problem. I believe that the Bureau of Ordnance has done its work carefully and with the greatest intelligence, and we can only hope for the best results. I am prevented from a feeling of assurance, however, by the fact that actual experience with the mine is very limited. Unfortunately faults develop in every new mechanism no matter how much skill and precision has been employed to close every avenue of failure. It would be too much to hope for the complete success of the new mine, and we must be prepared to make alterations in the mines at the operating bases, where the first reports of extensive tests will be received. At this date, as nearly as I can learn, no complete mines have yet been delivered for shipment, but parts have been delivered and complete mines are expected shortly."

On March 12, 1918, Rear Admiral Strauss accompanied by Lieut. Noel Davis, United States Navy, who had reported the previous day for duty as Aide, sailed from New York City on the Steamship New York. Arriving in Liverpool, England, March 23, he proceeded at once to London and reported that afternoon to Vice Admiral Wm. S. Sims, Commander, United States Naval forces, European waters.

The following five days were spent at London headquarters going over the recent developments in the status of the barrage and in calling on the various officials at the British Admiralty interested in the enterprise.

On March 28 Admiral Strauss with Lieut. Davis left London arriving at Grangemouth, Scotland, the same day to call on rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R. N., who commanded the British Mine-laying Squadron which had been allotted to cooperate with us in the North Sea Barrage. Grangemouth, which is situated on the Firth of Forth about 18 miles west of Edinburgh, was the British Mining Depot from which their First Mine-laying Squadron operated. The afternoon was spent discussing the plans for mine laying and in inspecting the assembly plant.

The following morning, March 29, 1918, Admiral Strauss arrived at Inverness, where he was met by Capt. O. G. Murfin, United States Navy, commanding officer of United States naval bases 17 and 18. The day was spent inspecting base 18 and establishing the headquarters of the commander mine force in the office building at that base.

The following week was occupied by inspection of the various stations under the jurisdiction of the commander, mine force—base 17, Kyle of Lochalsh and Corpach—and this time the work of construction at the bases had progressed to such a point that it would have been possible to begin the assembly of mines had the necessary mines and mine layers been ready.

On April 10 Admiral Strauss visited the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow and called upon Admiral Beatty, commander in chief, to discuss the contemplated mine barrier. It was apparent that the commander in chief was anything but enthusiastic about a mine barrier across the North Sea. British mine laying had begun in area B and skimming sweeps had showed that some of the mines had not taken the designed depth and would have been dangerous to surface vessels crossing the field. This undoubtedly alarmed the commander in chief, and, together with the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the fleet imposed by such a barrage, it is only natural that he was not enthusiastic. The main result of the visit, however, was to make definite arrangements for the escort of our mine layers while out at sea. No American destroyers were obtainable and the mine squadron was thus totally dependent on the Grand fleet for escort and could not leave the bases until such escort was provided. The number and type of escorting vessels was to depend upon the disposition of the German fleet at

the time of the mining operations. If the enemy fleet was at sea, it would necessitate sending out a portion or possibly all of the Grand Fleet. The commander in chief, requested Admiral Strauss to telegraph him 48 hours before the squadron was ready to go out and escort would be arranged.

Capt. H. E. Mulleneux, R. N., was ordered to Inverness as liaison officer between the two services and as the representative of Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker at Grange-mouth. Capt. R. E. Chilcott, R. N., was ordered to Invergordon in a similar capacity. While the bases were under construction (which was largely controlled by Admiral Clinton-Baker) these officers were of much assistance. However, as the construction drew to an end and the work of organization and administration became the predominant factors the usefulness of liaison officers was very much lessened. One of the fundamental stipulations in the agreements for the execution of the barrage was that we should have entire freedom as to the manner in which our mines were to be laid.

In our operations we were associated principally with the following British officials: Commander in chief, Grand Fleet; Rear Admiral, Invergordon, and the senior naval officer, Inverness. As we were supplied with all the various British secret and confidential publications, the question of communications, etc., became in a few weeks, equally as simple as our own, and to transmit all requests, communications, etc., via the liaison officer simply complicated matters and added an additional link to the chain. The result was, obviously, that there gradually became so little for them to do that they were finally ordered to more important duty. Just prior to the arrival of the minelayers the Admiralty, at the suggestion of the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, kindly offered to send one or two experienced officers to be attached to the staff of Admiral Strauss to assist with the administrative and communication work. Up to this time no difficulties of any kind had been encountered and their services were accordingly declined.

Much concern was caused when the U. S. S. *Lake Moor*, the fifth mine carrier dispatched to the bases was torpedoed and sunk in the North Channel to the Irish Sea on April 11, 1918. The vessel was attacked about 11 p. m. and sank very shortly after being struck. The night was dark and rescue work was difficult. Fifteen survivors were picked up. The cause of alarm, however, was from a totally unexpected source. When the torpedo exploded it opened up the hold in which the firing devices for the mines had been stowed. The success of the North Sea barrage depended in a large measure in maintaining the secrecy of this device and the most stringent measures had been followed from the place of their manufacture until the mines had actually been planted.

Each device was packed in a separate wooden box near the top of which hand-holes had been provided to facilitate handling. The top end of the firing device was heavier than the bottom and as soon as it fell into the water it toppled over with the heavy end down and the air trapped in the bottom of the case kept it afloat.

Four of these cases were picked up by a patrol vessel. As soon as this information was received arrangements were made to have the coasts in the vicinity searched and all cases found shipped to Base 18. Besides the possibility of an enemy submarine picking up some of these floating boxes, the accident occurred close to the Irish coast and just at a time when the Irish situation was most critical. Fortunately, however, it appears that none of these devices fell into improper hands. The Germans, at any rate, did not learn the secret of the American mines until possibly months later when it might have been obtained from mines washed ashore in Norway.

In response to a cabled request, Lieut. W. K. Harrill, United States Navy, reported at Inverness on May 8 for duty on the staff of Admiral Strauss as force radio officer. During the war the Grand Fleet had greatly developed radio telegraphy and established special rules for transmitting messages so as to prevent enemy stations from ascertaining by radio compasses the whereabouts of allied men of war. Lieut. Harrill was immediately sent to the Grand Fleet to familiarize himself with the current practice and the equipment which would be required for our vessels in order that they might be brought up to the necessary standards as soon as possible after their arrival. Special arrangements were made for immediately supplying them with radio buzzer sets and rejector circuits, etc. As soon as possible after the ships arrived each radio force including the communication officer was given one to two days thorough instruction by the force radio officer, assisted by Lieut. Grant, United States Navy, radio officer from the U. S. S. *Delaware*, with special attention to the numerous confidential publications and also the salient points in British radio procedure. This was supplemented by a school established at Base 18 for ships in the harbor. When the squadron sailed on its first excursion, June 7, all ships were equipped with the special apparatus, and on the next excursion the mine force conducted all radio communication in accordance with British procedure.

The work of establishing a suitable organization to coordinate the bases with the vessels and the preparation of instructions for the force was the most important task of the commander mine force during the months of April and May. Mine parts were beginning to arrive and it then appeared that sufficient would be on hand by the time the squadron arrived to enable an excursion to go out immediately. It was mandatory therefore, that no administrative oversight, such as insufficiency of provisions, supplies, current recognition apparatus, etc., should cause a delay in the operations.

The mine force instructions were drawn up to include not only the necessary instructions with regard to liberty, leave, patrols, repairs, routine reports, etc., which commonly comprise such a publication, but also specific instructions for passing the harbor defenses at Inverness and Invergordon, obtaining water, coal, and provisions, the proper means of obtaining miscellaneous supplies from Admiralty stores; special instructions for handling the various classes of mails; censorship regulations; train schedules; arrangements for handling liberty parties by British drifters allotted for this purpose; the various recreation facilities on shore for officers and men—in fact, effort was made to include in the one set of instructions all possible information which were prepared in loose-leaf form, so that when it became necessary to make changes or additions it might readily be accomplished to maintain in one volume practically everything necessary for the operations of the force and to eliminate the necessity of hundreds of miscellaneous letters on equally as many subjects, which are always most confusing because they are so difficult to keep in touch with.

Special contracts were arranged by the force supply officer with local dealers for the supply of meats, vegetables, and other fresh provisions at fixed prices. A channel was dredged in Inverness Firth to permit mine layers to go farther up the firth to Beaully Basin which is adjacent to base 18. The Firth, which is shallow, was surveyed and a new chart published. Moorings were laid to accommodate the mine layers in the more restricted anchorages.

Taut wire measuring gear was obtained for each vessel and held in readiness for installation on their arrival. This gear proved most valuable for navigational purposes. It consists essentially of a drum carrying 140 miles of fine piano wire. A suitable weight is secured to the end of the wire and dropped overboard. The wire as it is paid out is measured by a recorder which shows with a remarkable accuracy the actual distance traveled over the ground.

Arrangements were made for the commander mine force to act as the distributing authority for all United States and allied secret and confidential publications. British chart portfolios were obtained for each ship. Special apparatus required for making recognition signals was also procured and held ready for the ships.

By the time that the squadron was due to arrive all preliminary work had been completed. The mine-force instructions and necessary harbor charts were taken on board by the pilots sent out to meet the ships and bring them into Invergordon and Inverness upon their arrival.

CHAPTER XV.—CHANGES IN BARRAGE PLAN.

In view of the formal approval by the Navy Department and the British Admiralty of the northern barrage plan as it existed on November 1, 1917, the department, and more particularly the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, naturally assumed that such changes as might become necessary during the operation would be only of a minor character and that the major features, notably the location of the barrage on the Aberdeen-Ekersund line, could be regarded as definitely fixed, and on this assumption the manufacture of the immense quantity of material required was taken in hand and pushed to the utmost. This assumption soon proved, however, to be without foundation, and from December until the cessation of hostilities there were so many changes in plan and so much resultant confusion in the manufacturing and shipping projects that the whole operation was seriously delayed, its success gravely hazarded, and its effect undoubtedly much reduced below what was to have been expected from the execution of the original proposition.

A communication of December 6 from the Admiralty to Admiral Sims, written after the subject of the laying and patrol of the barrage had been discussed in consultation with the commander in chief, grand fleet, stated that: "It has become clear that there will be considerable difficulty in patrolling the eastern portion of the barrage as at present proposed, and in affording support by light cruisers, etc., if no Norwegian port is available as a base * * *. An alternative position for the barrage has accordingly been worked out on the line Orkney-Bergen in place of Aberdeen-Ekersund." The various advantages and disadvantages of this change were outlined and the suggested change submitted to the United States for approval. The question was referred by Admiral Sims to the Navy Department for decision as soon as the proposal

of change was received (Dec. 7), which replied that: "Unless reasons for change are fundamental, advantage of new location would not offset loss and delay by derangement of plan for mine material."

In this connection the British "History of northern barrage" states that the Admiralty in its communications to the commander in chief, grand fleet, and to Admiral Sims, made the following points among other relative to the proposed change:

"The mine barrage is of no value unless the deep portions are patrolled, and the patrols must be adequately supported to be effective * * *."

The provision of the 42 destroyers for the patrol of the eastern area would also prove extremely difficult without assistance from the grand fleet.

The material will be equally suitable for the new line.

"The proposed alteration should not delay completion."

The last two points quoted were entirely in error so far as American mine material was concerned, since the proposed new location of the barrage in deeper water would necessitate increased lengths of mooring ropes and, as to manufacture of material was well along, delay was inevitable.

The proposed change was based on the broad strategical and tactical grounds, and the Navy Department was forced by circumstances to agree to it, though most reluctantly.

In reply to the Admiralty communication of December 6, a memorandum was prepared by the planning section of Admiral Sims' staff and issued January 1, 1918, which reviewed the entire situation and set forth the views of the United States in part as follows:

"The second position considered in this memorandum is the one now proposed by the British Admiralty and accepted in principle by the Navy Department. There are many factors pro and con that entered into a choice as between the two positions, but of these a single factor controlled, viz—that the new position is deemed best by the Grand Fleet upon which will rest the responsibility for the support and patrol of the barrage. The new position gives greater freedom of movement and greater ease of support to surface vessels, while it imposes corresponding difficulties upon the operations of enemy surprise vessels. The change in position accepts the handicap of an average increase in depth of water about 15 fathoms. This handicap might be considered serious were it not for the fact that the whole barrage is based on the assumption that an effective mine field can be laid in 1,000 feet of water. If this assumption be true, then whether a portion of the mine field be laid in 40 or in 60 fathoms of water is not material, except as the changes in plan introduce delay.

"It will be noted that the original line extended from mainland to mainland, while the new line extends from island to island, and has in it passages completely navigable to submarines. This condition is, in our opinion, undesirable:

"The proposed character of the barrage does not provide for the full accomplishment of the mission. The proposed barrage will not close the northern exit from the North Sea because—

- a) The barrage is not complete in a vertical plane in areas B and C.
- b) The barrage is not deep enough.
- c) The Pentland Firth is open.
- d) The waters of the Orkney Islands, for a distance of miles, are open.
- e) Patrol vessels on the surface are not sufficiently effective in barring passages to submarines, as witness the Straits of Dover.

The barrage is to be a great effort. It is our opinion that nothing short of a sound design will justify the effort.

"The requirements of a sound design are, the extension of the barrage complete in the vertical plane from coast to coast.

"The necessity for an opening in the surface barrage is recognized, but it is held that this opening should be in the surface barrage only, and that the deep barrage should be widened so that the difficulties of navigating the opening submerged may be practically prohibitive."

In conclusion it was tentatively decided (by United States planning section):

1. To accept the new position in barrage as outlined by the British Admiralty.
2. To urge that the barrage be completed in the vertical plane from coast to coast, except an opening in the surface barrage at the eastern end and in Norwegian territorial waters.

3. To carry the barrage to 295 feet (British plans 200 feet).

4. To have surface mines fitted with 70-foot and other mines with 100-foot antennæ.

As then proposed, the barrage was divided into three areas designated and located as follows:

Area B. A 20-mile wide section extending 50 miles to the eastward of the Orkney islands.

Area A. A section 50 miles wide extending 134 miles to the east-north-east end from the eastern end of area B.

Area C. A 50-mile wide section extending from the east end of A 60 miles east-south-east to Norwegian territorial waters.

The United States was to furnish the mines and material for and lay both deep and surface fields in area A. Great Britain was to provide and lay deep mine fields in areas B and C and furnish trawlers and fast vessels to patrol these two areas.

The British Admiralty Plans Division answered the above memorandum with the opinion that:

"The stopping power of the mine barrage should not be over rated. It is the patrol craft armed with various antisubmarine devices on which we must rely to kill the submarines. It is on the mine fields that we rely to give us intensity of patrol. Until we have proved the efficacy of the American mine field, we must look on it as a bluff. We must not attempt to put the bluff too high by notifying an area up to the 3-mile limit of Norway. The navigation of Pentland Firth by submerged submarines is considered impracticable. As it is the patrol craft we rely on to destroy the submarine it is not considered that leaving the approach to Pentland Firth uncovered is of vital importance."

It was further stated that it was not considered necessary to carry the barrage to a vertical depth of 300 feet, that there was no reason why the American portion should not be laid in accordance with the United States views but that the Admiralty would be prepared to extend their barrage to a greater depth, if found necessary, and to mine the surface if that should become desirable.

In view of these differences of opinion the United States planning section prepared a memorandum of January 12, containing its understanding of the status of the mine barrage and submitted it to the British planning section for confirmation in order to reconcile the various points and further unify the effort, by reducing to writing a concrete plan which would be acceptable to both navies. Further than the agreement regarding the supply of all mine-laying operations and the assignments of provision and laying of mines in the areas as previously noted, these efforts met with failure in so far as formal agreement on a written plan was concerned, the British apparently desiring to reserve the privilege of altering the plans when expediency so dictated while considerable skepticism existed as to the ability of the Americans to execute satisfactorily their part of the project. The above-mentioned characterization of the American mine field as a mere "bluff" was more or less indicative of the British attitude.

The Admiralty did, however, accept the principle of surface mining in areas "B" and "C" should experience indicate that the surface barrage be more effective in preventing the passage of submarine than the surface patrol.

After this discussion the planning section of the Admiralty not being in a position to enter into any definite signed agreement, nor to definitely recommend it to the Admiralty, Admiral Sims requested the status of the plans in so far as the Admiralty's agreement with them was concerned. This resulted in a statement of January 13 which included:

"United States to be responsible for provision of mines and mine layers for area A. Great Britain for areas B and C. Area A to be mined from 10 feet below surface to as near 300 feet as the American mines will permit.

"Areas B and C to be mined for 65 feet below the surface to 200 feet.

"When this belt is effectively mined the question of extending the mine fields to a greater depth will be considered.

"The desirability of extending the deep mine fields to the surface of areas B and C will be considered when the situation has developed further * * *."

Thus early in January the character of the proposed barrage became so modified as to bear little resemblance to the original plan and the original faith of its proponents in its effectiveness was no longer felt to be justified. It was felt in America, in view of the attitude of the Admiralty and the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, that the British had no real faith in the American mine and were not whole-heartedly supporting the project. In particular, the allocation of both ends of the barrage to the British to be mined with an inferior mine in an incomplete manner, and the further decision that the American part of the barrage was not to be patrolled were most discouraging.

Not the least discouraging feature of the situation, to the Bureau of Ordnance, was the state of flux of the barrage plan and the obvious reluctance of the Admiralty to commit itself to definite plans. The British authorities had the appearance of not daring to give up the whole operation for fear of possible later criticism and at the same time of not being willing to cooperate to make it successful.

In Admiral Sims's review of the activities of his command it is stated, in effect, that throughout the discussion of the barrage project it became apparent that the Admiralty was influenced by two considerations which may not clearly appear in the correspondence and records but which should not be underestimated in considering the mine field historically.

First, the proposed effort on the part of the United States Navy Department was such a handsome offer from an ally that, even if there were doubts of its success, it would be poor policy to put only discouragement in the way of those who were willing and anxious to go ahead with the project. The Admiralty naturally wanted to avoid any possibility of not having tried the mine barrage, and subjecting themselves to possible later criticism on the score that it was necessary and would have worked had it been tried. In other words, the Admiralty at first was very dubious of the success of the field but considered the proposals for the above reasons more favorably than they otherwise would have. As the details of the plans developed and the reports of Mark VI mines were received, there was very notable increase in the enthusiasm for the project. At the start there was no enthusiasm at all. Later there was to be considerable.

The second consideration which should be mentioned in explaining the Admiralty's policy toward the project was its effect on possible fleet actions. The Navy Department considered it almost entirely in the light of an antisubmarine measure. It was apparent that although nominally under the Admiralty in London, the planning for the Admiralty in such matters as would in our organization be dealt with by the Chief of Naval Operations rested almost exclusively with the officers of the Grand Fleet, in spite of the existence of a plans division in the Admiralty. Naturally, they considered it largely from their own viewpoint, and in studying possibilities of the barrage they were influenced by the fact that even if it did not work it might be something which would force a general fleet action. If there were a serious attempt made by the Germans on the mine barrage itself, or raids on the vessels engaged in working on it, cruiser actions at least would be probable, and with the arrival of supporting units it was quite possible that the two fleets might meet. They thought that even if it did not work as a mine barrage it might be a bait for a fleet action. It would make it harder for raiders to get out. So long as the Grand Fleet did not have its freedom of movement restricted (and the fleet was by no means so thoroughly convinced of the safety of the British mines in the deep mine fields as the Admiralty was), they had no objection to it and were rather inclined to favor it for the reason that it might help them meet the German High Seas Fleet. These reasons were at times mentioned and were very apparent in discussions, but are hardly evident in the records and were certainly not emphasized by the Admiralty in the correspondence. It appears very essential, however, to a good historical understanding of the northern barrage that they should not be overlooked, but should be most particularly mentioned.

Another thing which might be mentioned in this connection is that later in the discussion when the policy of the extension of surface mines into the end areas was considered, this project was proposed and pushed by the United States planning section and was always fairly well considered by the planning section in the Admiralty, but an extremely large percentage of what opposition there was to it came from the Grand Fleet, and it was only very grudgingly that the Admiralty, considering the views not only of its own planning section, but also the recommendations from the fleet, consented to the modification of the mine barrage which later resulted in putting surface mines in areas which were at first intended to have deep mines only, although the United States had argued for surface mines as well in these areas.

The fundamental idea on which the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance designed the new mine and proposed the northern barrage was that the barrage would be complete from coast to coast and that it would be patrolled so that enemy submarines could be forced by the presence of patrols either to turn back or to risk almost certain destruction by trying to pass the barrage submerged. Any departure from this principle meant ineffectiveness.

The following remarks quoted from a memorandum prepared by an officer of Admiral Sims's staff, at the time the change in plan was under discussion, are interesting:

Position.—The more northern position accepts disadvantages as regards depth of water in order to obtain certain strategical advantages. This statement, however, is no more true now than it was when the southern line was previously decided upon by all concerned. If we are disinclined to admit that a mistake was made in the original instance by choosing the southern line, we must now show that the reasons for the shift to the northern position are new reasons or things which did not hold true at the time of the other conference. The only new conditions mentioned are that

whereas previously it had been hoped to obtain a Norwegian base one is now not considered possible. The other reason is the increased activity of enemy surface craft. Taking the first of these reasons, I am inclined to suspect that there is not much to it. I think that a Norwegian base now is just as easily possible as one was previously. I base this on a recent conversation with Col. Breckinridge, Naval Attaché in the Scandinavian countries and who had just been in Norway. There is probably no useful point, however, to trying to get behind this reason if the admiralty really sees fit to advance it. The second reason of the increased activity of enemy surface craft looks like an excellent one after the losses of the two Norwegian convoys recently. Steps have been taken to improve the Norwegian intelligence service as to information about the enemy craft coming out of Shaagerak but this will probably be offset by the increased incentive for the Germans to send our mines.

"In looking over all the papers I can not help but believe that in the early conferences the fleet was not so very thoroughly represented, and there were people from the mining division who explained that sending the fleet over a deep British mine field was nothing to hesitate about. The fleet was in Rosyth, south of the present barrage, and was generally expected to stay there. Now with the fleet back in Scotland I believe that they are beginning to assert their views to a greater extent and at least a large part of their insistence to move the southern end north to the Orkney arises from their disinclination to navigate over British deep mine fields. This is not a reason which there is much point in emphasizing from the admiralty's standpoint so it was really not presented but the argument was made along other lines. Even as a matter of being perfectly frank with us I do not think that it matters so very much whether the real reasons for the change in the position of the barrage are those which they mention or others, equally good ones, which they hesitate to talk about. In my part, I believe that the fact that Admiral Beatty, who is going to support this mine field, says that it must go in the northern position finished the whole discussion and is something that we need not go behind.

"*Character of barrage.*—I believe that the width of the C area along the Norwegian coast is much too great. Leaving it this wide seems to have been based upon the idea

"(a) It is not good policy to unnecessarily crowd the Norwegian coast with a notified area if it can be avoided.

"(b) They have an idea of wanting to do the whole project on a fifty-fifty basis and the deep mine fields of this width are symmetrically arranged. This is no reason at all.

"I can not help but doubt when I compare the width of this area with the Straits of Dover and consider all conditions existing in that locality, that the deep mine field particularly on the Norwegian coast, will not be efficient and it will have to be largely modified by strengthening with surface mines. I have met officers in the Admiralty who privately expressed the same opinion and stated that in the end they would be proved correct by the addition of surface mines in area C.

"*Length of antenna.*—Seventy feet for the top mines and 100 feet for the other row. This is based on the hope that at greater depths 100 feet may be effective and that at any rate it will probably drive the boat to the surface, in which case the 70-foot antenna of the top row of mines, which should be nearest to the edges of the field, should get the boat and destroy it. Seventy feet all around would be better, perhaps, but submarines can now go so deep that it becomes a necessity to try to stretch out the barrage vertically, even at the expense of some other small advantages.

"*Character of mine fields on the Norwegian coast.*—The whole mine barrage scheme is more or less of a tentative nature, because it is so big an undertaking that it can not in all ways be perfectly designed to meet every conceivable counter measure. Also it would be uneconomical and inefficient to try to plan it with any such final ideas in mind. The final appearance of the barrage before the end of the war is something which one would have to be extremely rash to care to prophesy. There are a few things which our personal opinion leads us to believe will be the most urgent modifications and the ones which we will see first. In my case, I look to see the Norwegian end of this field protected on the south by perhaps one system of antenna mines before any great time has elapsed and the notified area appropriately extended. This will relieve patrol craft in the C area of part of their difficulty.

"The question of who takes the C area has not yet been decided. We have gone ahead and made mines with long lengths of specially small diameter mooring line which will do in this place. I foresee that we will eventually have to do something with mines of this nature and think it would be a very good thing to make a careful analysis of conditions in area C, even although it is not our own area, with the idea of seeing whether later on we may be able to use these mines additionally. Mines intended for deep water like these can be laid in shallow water, but mines with short lengths of wire (and the diameter of the wire is different) can not be used in deep

Can we not compromise in our present disagreement as to who takes the Norwegian area by finding both kinds of mines are needed and helping to do that, too? In area B the necessity is by no means so great. The fleet does not want any surface mines to obstruct its passage, but after finding patrolling rather difficult it may look favorable upon a project of extending the surface mine area. The water is not deep in this place. We will need no surface mines here until after area C is taken care of. It is not safe to look beyond that point * * *."

In order to focus attention upon the various points still unsettled there was then prepared by Admiral Sims a paper dated February 19, setting forth the different items in parallel columns and this was submitted to the Admiralty. This was answered on February 26, but as stated in a letter from Admiral Sims to the Office of Operations on March 2, "It appears that although a number of the points have been cleared up * * * there still remains a decided difference of opinion in regard to certain important points."

It is believed that the Admiralty's disinclination to extend Mark VI mines to the end areas until their efficiency has been demonstrated in area A is not based on sound reasoning, for with the efficiency of the mine in area A or in any other area the success of the barrage stands or falls * * *. If the more efficient mining of these end areas is delayed, until the inefficiency of patrols in these areas is demonstrated, it is believed that much valuable time will be lost in a case where time is a vital element."

Anticipating the necessity for this end area surface mining Admiral Sims, on April 1, applied to the Navy Department requesting preparation of mines for area C. Meanwhile deep mining had been commenced by the British in area B, but, owing to unexpected difficulties with the British mines themselves, the operations were suspended before one complete line had been run.

The commander in chief of the Grand Fleet was much disturbed by these unsatisfactory results and the Admiralty felt that they could not continue laying the barrage in area B until the faults had been discovered and removed.

Shortly after this in a letter of April 18, 1918, to the Office of Operations Admiral Sims stated:

"Owing to the apparent uncertainty in the Admiralty as to the further execution of the plans of the northern barrage, I caused the matter to be brought up at the staff meeting this morning, at which I proposed the following: We lay two single lines of surface mines over the southern portion of area C; British to lay one system of deep mines over the northern portion of area C; area B to be deep mined as already planned, except that the mines are to be carried close up to the coast (islands) without leaving the 7-mile channel now shown on the chart."

The proposal, in so far as it applied to area C only, was accepted by the Admiralty formally on April 20.

Thus it will be seen that the original contention of the United States authorities in regard to the need of a complete barrage, including surface mining in the end areas was not allowed to rest upon the proof of ineffectiveness of surface patrols, for this particular barrage, but the inefficiency of such patrols, as amply demonstrated in previous mining efforts was at last permitted by the Admiralty to outweigh their desire for wide passages for the Grand Fleet.

But this was still only a partial conversion to the idea, for area B still remained in question. Here all mining was stopped. The failure of the British deep mines was responsible for this, and although the necessity was still acknowledged, as noted in the Admiralty's letter of May 10 to Admiral Sims, it was said:

"The deep mine-field in area B can have no effect in restricting the areas through which the submarines can pass and should not therefore be considered an essential part of the scheme."

Although a verbal agreement was made that as soon as the defects of the deep mines could be remedied the laying of area B would proceed, the safety of ships passing over the field could never be guaranteed and in the memorandum of the deputy chief of naval staff (Admiralty) received by Admiral Sims on July 25, the conclusions were that either area B was to be swept and left clear or that it should be completed with deep and shallow mines. Also that if the latter were done "the channel between the western extremity of area B and the coast line would be so narrow that it would not be available for general purposes."

The width of this channel according to a report of the technical committee (Admiralty) "will be eventually decided with the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, but in view of experience at Dover and difficulty of antisubmarine patrolling without mines, it should not be unduly wide."

To further the desire to actually complete the barrage the Bureau of Ordnance was asked on July 31 to prepare American mines for area B. Then as a result of a

considerable irregularity in the bottom and much variation from the survey soundings which were used for setting the fixed moorings. This was particularly true in the northeastern part of the field.

Prior to the discontinuation of the planting operations by the *Baltimore*, it appeared as though it would be impossible for her to complete this mine field in time for the mine squadron for the first operation in the North Sea barrage. Accordingly the Navy Department was requested to send either one or two of the new mine layers which were most nearly completed to assist her in order that all vessels might be available as soon as operations could begin in the North Sea.

In response to this request the *Roanoke* sailed from the United States on May 25. Before her arrival, however, the *Baltimore's* operations in the North Channel had been discontinued. The *Roanoke* remained several days at Lamlash, then sailed to base 17, where she arrived a week ahead of the other mine layers.

The *Baltimore* remained on the West Coast for several weeks in order to perform experiments for the British in connection with mine laying and mine sweeping. She then proceeded to base 18, where she arrived on June 2, 1918.

In the meantime preparations for the commencement of mine laying had been completed. Early Sunday morning, May 26, 1918, the *San Francisco*, flagship of the mine squadron 1, accompanied by the *Canonicus*, *Canandaigua*, *Housatonic*, *Quinnebaug*, arrived at bases 17 and 18. The squadron commander reported that the vessels would be ready to commence mine laying as soon as they had been water-bored and refueled. The delivery of mine parts, however, had not come up to expectations and prevented the beginning of operations at once. All of the necessary mine parts were on hand except the antenna floats for mines planted at the lower levels, and it was necessary to wait until a mine carrier had arrived before sufficient of these floats were on hand to enable the necessary numbers of mines to be assembled for the first excursion.

The first excursion was to be a joint operation between the British mine laying squadron, which had been designated by the Admiralty as the first mine-laying squadron, and our vessels which they had named the second mine-laying squadron. We reported that our squadron would be ready to go out on June 6, but it was necessary to wait one day while the British completed the assembly of their mines. The United States squadron left the bases, rendezvoused outside Cromarty Firth with the British destroyers sent to escort them, then proceeded via the swept channels and across the North Sea until Udshire Light was sighted on the coast of Norway. This was used as the point of departure, being the nearest point of land to the position at which the mine laying was to commence.

No difficulties were encountered by any of the vessels with their mining installations or the lack of experience of their crews. The mines were laid with accuracy and precision and the ships, in spite of the various types which constituted the squadron, maneuvered well together.

When the mine field was first proposed it was intended to plant the mines at intervals of 150 feet, but tests conducted by the *San Francisco* while in the United States showed this distance to be impractical on account of the damage done to adjacent mines when one mine exploded. As a result of these experiments it was finally decided that 250 feet was the minimum distance at which mines could safely be planted, and this spacing was used on the first excursion.

Shortly after mine laying had commenced mines began to explode prematurely. This continued as long as the squadron was in touch with the mine field, but the frequency of the explosions decreased rapidly after the laying was completed. By counting the explosions it was estimated that between 3 and 4 per cent of the 3,385 mines laid had blown up. Some of these explosions took place almost immediately after the mines went overboard, severely shaking the vessels from which they were laid. Others did not explode until days after they had been in the water. These explosions, which occurred after each excursion, presented the most baffling problem which the mine force was called upon to solve. Although a loss of 4 per cent of the mines did not seriously reduce the efficiency of the barrage as a whole, such a condition, was, nevertheless, undesirable, and every effort was immediately applied to ascertain the cause.

There appeared to be some doubt as to whether the spherical cylindrical buoys, which were dropped upon completion of the mine laying to mark the end of the field so that the next excursion could commence as close as possible without danger, would survive the weather until the ships again went out. The commander in chief, Grand Fleet, was therefore asked to send two sloops or trawlers to stand by these buoys and assist the squadron in finding them when taking their departure on the following operation. These vessels while performing this duty were able to supply much valuable information to the commander, mine force, as most of them were fitted with listen-

devices, which enabled them to hear and record the explosions occurring between successive operations. From 1 to 11 explosions were noted daily for seven days. At that time practically all explosions had ceased. This seemed to indicate that gas leakage was probably causing these later mines to fire.

Of the 12 marker buoys which were dropped at the end of the field only 3 broke apart during the following three weeks. Their endurance was sufficient for the purpose intended, and the commander in chief was informed on July 27 that vessels would no longer be required to keep watch on the buoys.

The British mine-laying squadron proceeded separately to area C, where their mines were laid on the same date that ours were put down.

As a result of the joint studies of the American and British planning sections, a somewhat radical but beneficial change in the nature of the field in area A was adopted early after the commencement of active mine laying.

As originally agreed upon the American mine field in this area was to consist of three systems, each system comprising one line of mines at 80 feet, one at 160 feet, and one at 240 feet. This arrangement gave an equal density of mines from the surface to the bottom of the barrage. Since, however, there was to be no patrol in area A, submarines attempting to cross the field would undoubtedly do so on the surface, where the damage in case of striking a mine would be the least. Also, submarines being pursued by slow vessels would prefer to proceed on the surface where their chances of escape were best.

Accordingly it was decided that the third system, instead of consisting of one row of mines at each of the three depths, should consist of three rows of surface mines, i. e., 80-foot submergence.

Immediately following this alteration it was decided to double the number of rows of mines in area A. The original plan had called for mines to be laid 150 feet apart, but due to the damage caused by the explosions of neighboring mines and the possibility of countermining, this distance had been gradually increased until it had become 300 feet, just twice the original figure. It was therefore necessary to double the number of systems to give the field the same approximate effectiveness as originally planned.

After the above two changes the barrage in area A was to consist of 10 rows of mines at 80-foot submergence, 4 rows of mines at 160-foot submergence, and 4 rows of mines at 240-foot submergence. As the mooring ropes for the mine anchors were cut in different lengths to correspond with the three depths at which mines were laid, the above change necessitated supplying a great many more anchors for 80-foot mines and fewer for the deeper levels. Fortunately the Bureau of Ordnance was able to meet the new demands without causing delay in the operations.

Shortly after mine laying had begun in area C the Norwegian Government issued a decree to the effect that belligerent submarines equipped for use in warfare must not leave or stay in Norwegian territorial waters except by reason of stress of weather to save life. Breach of this prohibition would expose them to armed attack without warning. Norway also reduced the limits of her territorial waters from 4 to 3 miles, since the former figure was not recognized by the principal belligerent nations. This decree, rigidly enforced, would have had the same result as if British and American mines had been laid right up to the Norwegian coast instead of stopping at their territorial waters, but there was good reason to believe that the decree was not enforced against German submarines.

After the completion of the first excursion further mine laying by the United States mine force was temporarily prevented by the nonreceipt of mining material. The first excursion had used up all but three of the antenna floats for the lower level mines. Tests were conducted in Loch Ness to ascertain whether the antenna floats designed for the upper level mines would withstand the deeper immersion.

There were plenty of these floats on hand, and they could have been used and been available. They would not, however, hold up when submerged to the necessary depth. The only other possible alternative for continuing mine laying was to lay the two lines of surface mines in area C, which we had recently agreed to do, but here again we were delayed. Although it was expected that the British would agree to laying surface mines in this area and the mines had actually been ordered several weeks before the concession had been obtained, there had not been sufficient time for these special anchors to reach the mine bases.

In the meantime the British mine-laying squadron had completed its second and third operations on June 18 and June 30.

The necessary number of anchors for laying two rows of mines in area C finally arrived, and four of the mine layers got underway June 30, laying their cargoes of mines on the following day.

Again approximately 4 per cent of the mines exploded prematurely.

After the first excursion the probable causes which were thought might be responsible for the premature explosions were gone into and at the same time it was believed that they were largely caused by inaccuracies in assembly and testing, due to the inexperience of the personnel at the bases. The problem was not, however, allowed to rest on this conclusion. Tests were undertaken in Loch Ness and Loch Lomond to determine the accuracy of the depth-taking mechanism and the ability of the mine cases to withstand the pressure when planted at the lower level (240 feet). The depth-taking performance was not particularly satisfactory, but the principal cause was discovered and remedied before the second excursion. Out of the 22 mines merged to a depth of 300 feet in fresh water 6 of them were crushed and leaks were discovered in 7 others. At 240 feet in fresh water no mines out of 38 planted were crushed and a leak was discovered in only one. It is probable, however, that the factor of safety of the mine case was so small that leaks might be started in adjacent mines by an explosion. This consideration made it desirable to increase the distance between mines from 250 feet, which was used on the first excursion, to 300 feet, which was employed on all following excursions.

The possible causes of premature explosions were many. Soluble washers which were designed to dissolve about 20 minutes after the mine had been planted were found to be very erratic, some of them dissolving in less than a minute after the mine had been planted. The antenna release mechanisms were not entirely satisfactory. Sometimes the shock of the mine striking the water was sufficient to release the floats allowing the antenna coils to foul the mine and fire it as soon as the soluble washer had dissolved. Leaks in the mine case could cause short circuits, which would operate the firing mechanism. In the original design of the mine it had included a circuit breaker in the antennæ circuit which prevented the mine from firing in case the antennæ fouled the mine case or the antenna floats carried away. The production of the circuit breakers had, however, been delayed, and none had been on hand for the first and second excursions. After carefully going over all the probable causes of premature explosions it was impossible to attribute them to any specific cause, and it was hoped that by using the utmost care in the assembly, adjustment, and planting of the mines the percentage of explosions would be further reduced.

After the completion of the second operation it was again necessary to await the receipt of mining material before the succeeding operation could take place. The Bureau of Ordnance had been requested by cable to ship antenna floats by a fast steamer as soon as a sufficient number could be obtained from the manufacturers in order to allow the mining to continue with as little delay as possible. Thirty-five hundred of these floats were shipped on the *Justica*, which arrived on July 10.

On July 6 information was received that several groups of American mines had been found on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Bergen. As it was most important to learn the cause of their breaking adrift, arrangements were made to send Lieut. O. W. Bagby, United States Navy, to Norway to obtain all the particulars available. His efforts were fruitless. The Norwegian Government would not permit him to inspect the mines they had recovered, and, after waiting several days, he returned to Base 18. Later information received stated that about 30 mines had been washed ashore and there were no signs of any mooring arrangements. This indicated clearly enough that the moorings had parted at the mine cases. The British had experienced similar difficulties and had found it necessary to use a spring buffer between the mooring cable and the mine case to prolong the life of their mines. Such a device would at least not be detrimental and might materially reduce the percentage of mines which were breaking away from their moorings, so the Admiralty were asked to supply us with the necessary buffers, which was promptly done.

Some of the mines recovered by the Norwegians were disassembled and the principle of the firing mechanism obtained. The Germans probably obtained the secret of our mine shortly afterwards, but, as far as can be learned, they took no defensive measures to protect their submarines while passing over the barrage.

In order to ascertain if the explosions were still continuing and if mines which had broken adrift were floating in the vicinity of the mine field, the *Patapasco* and *Patuxent* were sent out on July 9. After picking up the western end of the first excursion, several additional marker buoys were dropped and the tugs then steamed along the southern side of the United States fields laid in areas A and C. No explosions were heard nor were any floating mines observed.

The fourth British operation was carried out on July 12, again in area C.

Preparations were made for our third operation to commence on July 14. On July 11 a cable was received from the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, that mining was to be done to the westward of the Greenwich meridian. The excursion as originally planned was to extend from the leaving-off point to the first operation completely across area A, thus finishing the first system of mines. This change was

not serious so long as it was only temporary, although it was, of course, desirable to complete one fence of mines all the way across the North Sea as soon as possible. The question was taken up with the Admiralty by Admiral Sims and, in view of the fact that it was intended only as a temporary measure, it was acceded to.

The assembly and loading arrangements were altered, and by working night shifts it was possible for the squadron to adhere to the original date of readiness, getting underway for the third excursion on July 14. The following day 5,395 mines were laid in 4 hours and 22 minutes, the largest number so far laid in a single operation. By this time the mining installations had proved most flexible and reliable. Each ship was able to lay its entire quota of mines in one continuous string at a speed of 10 to 13 knots.

Approximately 5 per cent of the mines exploded prematurely—a slight increase over previous performances. This time it was definitely determined that part of the explosions were caused by countermining. On previous excursions groups had gone off almost simultaneously but it was generally thought to be more or less a freak occurrence of several mines individually exploding at practically the same time or due possibly to the reverberations of an explosion which sounded like several mines individually exploding at practically the same time when it really was but one. Now, however, it was proved beyond a doubt that one mine frequently was responsible for the detonation of several others. Curiously, mines sometimes as much as half a mile away were countermined, while the adjacent mines laid only 300 feet away remained intact. Upon completion of the operation, fog was encountered making it impossible for the ships to check their position while proceeding down the Scottish coast to Cromarty Firth. The swept channel was narrow and close inshore, which added to the difficulty by denying them the prerogative of keeping well clear of the coast. Unfortunately Capt. Belknap, commanding the mine squadron, had issued an order with respect to the danger of sounding, that caused three of the commanding officers not to sound. At 4.20 a. m., July 16, while just north of Cromarty Firth, one of the escorting destroyers sheered close in to the *San Francisco* and reported that they were too close inshore. The squadron turned out, stopped and backed but before headway had been checked the *Roanoke* and the *Canonicus* had grounded. The *Canonicus* was able to back off but attempts to clear the *Roanoke* were unsuccessful. She was lightened as much as possible and came off easily on the following high tide. No damage was sustained by either vessel. The commander of the mine force recommended no further proceedings and the matter was disposed of by Admiral Sims in a letter, in part as follows:

"The force commander is of the opinion that a court of inquiry should have investigated the causes for the grounding of the *Roanoke*, on July 16, 1918. It is, however, and has been, impracticable to order officers of sufficient rank, to compose such a court; it is noted that damage to the *Roanoke* and other vessels concerned, was slight, and that their availability for duty was not impaired.

"In view of the foregoing, no further action will be taken by the force commander, and the papers in the case will be forwarded to the Navy Department for such action as may be deemed expedient."

About this time the question of the length of antennæ again arose. It will be remembered that the original design of the mine called for antennæ 100 feet long. Early in 1918, however, data became available which showed that the mine charge was insufficient to do material damage to a submarine at this distance. The antennæ was then shortened to 70 feet. Later on further experiments showed even this distance to be too great to seriously cripple a submarine on the surface. It was therefore decided to reduce the length of the antennæ on the upper mine to 55 feet. This change had no sooner been decided on than actual experience showed it was desirable to still further reduce this length. The second week in July a German submarine while attempting to cross the mine field on the surface struck a mine, which exploded but did not do sufficient damage to prevent her reaching port. She reported her condition by radio, which was intercepted and deciphered. The Grand Fleet immediately dispatched fast vessels to attack her. She was able, however, to make sufficient speed to reach her base before this could be accomplished. Upon the representation of the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, and the desires of some of our own representatives, it was decided to further reduce the antennæ for surface mines to 35 feet, planting the mines 45 feet below the surface.

The fifth British operation was carried out on July 21 in area C.

Several days' delay was encountered before our fourth operation on account of again having to wait for mining material. The squadron was reported ready to sail July 25, but it was necessary to wait four days more for the escorting and supporting forces from the Grand Fleet. The British and American operations had recently been overlapping each other in such a manner that one squadron was out at sea while the

other was loading in port. As this necessitated keeping a large part of the Grand Fleet at sea almost constantly, the commander in chief desired that we should wait until the British squadron had again loaded, so that it would only be necessary to send one force to support both squadrons.

The antennæ for the surface mines were not shortened on this excursion, since the mines had already been assembled and loaded on board the layers. The squadron sailed on July 29, laying 5,399 mines the following day. The premature explosions were much more numerous than on any of the previous excursions, approximately 14 per cent of the mines going off. This was most disconcerting. Instead of the explosions decreasing as experience was gained in the assembly and laying of the mines, the percentage had been gradually increasing, and then had suddenly jumped to 14 per cent on this excursion. Losses of 3 to 4 per cent could possibly be tolerated, but this latter figure was absolutely prohibitive, and the causes of the explosions had to be definitely determined and eliminated.

The same date the mine layers left their bases Admiral Strauss, accompanied by Lieut. Noel Davis, left base 18 to represent the United States at an allied naval conference to be held at Malta to consider mine laying operations in the Mediterranean.

Due to the large number of premature explosions which occurred in the fourth operation, the force commander ordered the suspension of further mine laying operations until the cause of the explosions had been ascertained and corrected. All conceivable reasons which might be responsible were again gone over and further tests were conducted. Of these, two seemed to offer the only possibilities of solution. Circuit breakers had been used in the antennæ circuits for the first time. This device consisted of a mercury cup which broke the circuit in case the antennæ was not released from the mine, or if the floats were carried away allowing the antennæ to drop down upon the case. In what adverse manner the circuit breaker might affect the firing device could not be imagined, still, there was a possibility that it was at least partially to blame. The other cause was believed to be due to difficulties in installing the horn bushings in the mine case. Unless this was most carefully done there was danger of grounding the circuit of the firing device on the mine case which would cause the mine to fire as soon as the soluble washer had dissolved.

Believing that the difficulties could be most quickly solved by actual planting, arrangements were made for the next excursion to begin on August 8. Mines were assembled with the electric circuits to the horns disconnected, but in all other respects the same as before.

This was again a joint excursion by the British and American squadrons, the British laying surface mines in area C to the southward of those laid by us on July 1. This was a departure from the original scheme by which the British were only to lay deep mines in this area, but it was in line with the recent change in policy that the surfaces should be more densely mined than the lower depths. Besides this, all our mines had been laid in area C had 70-foot antennæ which were unquestionably too long to insure the destruction of submarines on the surface.

The efforts to cure the premature explosions on this excursion were found even less successful than before. After laying 1,596 mines the operation was discontinued and the squadron returned to the bases. Approximately 19 per cent of the mines had exploded.

Evidently the horn circuit could not be at fault and it must be something else. Numerous experiments were again carried out in hopes of discovering the secret of the explosions and another possible cause was developed. It was found that the rubber insulation between the copper plates on the firing device caused sulphates and sulphides to be formed with the copper which, when immersed in salt water, set up a slight current in the firing circuit in the direction necessary to operate it. Although the current was in most cases small, there was a possibility that if it were eliminated the mines would then have sufficient stability so as not to explode after they had been planted.

In order to carry out the practical part of the experiments after the theoretical tests had been completed at the bases, the *San Francisco* proceeded to the mine field on the 12th of August. The copper plates of the K71 devices were carefully cleaned and circuit breakers were fitted on half of the 166 mines which were to be planted. Seven of this number exploded prematurely, four of which were due to the antennæ fouling the mine cases. In order to obtain definite data in regard to countermining the mines were set to fire as soon as the soluble washers dissolved. Each of these caused one additional mine to explode. A depth charge was also dropped in the vicinity of the field which caused six mines to go off. •

The improvement obtained in this test was sufficient to enable mine laying to be resumed after cleaning the copper plates on all mines. It was further decided to omit the circuit breakers as they were additional complications of unknown value. The

upper horns of the mines were also shortened to mere points to reduce the possibility of the antennæ becoming hooked around them.

The squadron sailed on the sixth excursion on August 18 and the mine laying was completed on the 19th. The British squadron proceeded at the same time to complete our lines of surface mines in area C. Twelve per cent of our mines exploded prematurely. The majority of these were due to countermining. The real cause of the premature firing evidently had not yet been discovered, but the improvement obtained was sufficiently encouraging to permit another attempt to be made.

On August 5 the commander in chief Grand Fleet lifted restrictions he had placed on mining to the westward of the Greenwich meridian. The next excursion was correspondingly planned to complete the first fence of mines across area A.

Admiral Strauss returned from the Malta conference on 22d of August. After the excursion another probable cause of the premature firing was discovered which proved to be the final solution of the difficulties. The first lots of firing devices shipped to the bases were adjusted to fire at a voltage between 25 and 40 millivolts. The Bureau of Ordnance decided, from experiments conducted in the United States, that this voltage was unnecessarily high and reduced it so that the mines would fire between 10 and 25 millivolts. It was not known when this later type of firing device first began to be installed. The original type was undoubtedly used on the first three excursions when a comparatively low percentage of the mines exploded. After that it was probable that the majority of the mines were assembled with the firing devices which had been adjusted to fire at the lower voltage.

It was therefore decided that on the seventh excursion the first 600 mines planted should be adjusted to fire between 20 and 35 millivolts; then, if the observations on this part of the field indicated sufficient improvement, this adjustment should be used on subsequent excursions.

The squadron got under way 26th of August and stood out toward the mine field. The *Saranac* broke down shortly after leaving the base and had to return to Inverness with her full cargo of mines. The remaining nine ships, however, continued and carried out the operation. Unfortunately dense fog was encountered practically throughout the operation, so thick at times that it was impossible for the vessels to see the next ship abeam, distant only 500 yards. These conditions made observations extremely difficult for the *Patapsco* and *Patuxent*, which were sent out with the squadron to follow astern while planting was in progress and count the explosions to determine the percentage which occurred. From the data obtained from the mine layers and the tugs it appeared that only about 3 per cent of the first mines exploded prematurely. In the remainder of the field, which had the low-voltage regulation, approximately 12 per cent went off.

The adjustment of the firing device was undoubtedly the solution we had sought for, but in order to test it further and to complete the deficiency in this field caused by the breakdown of the *Saranac*, the *Shawmut* and *Aroostook* were loaded with mines adjusted to fire between 20 and 35 millivolts and sent out on August 30. Of the 600 mines they planted, only 3 per cent exploded. This was the first opportunity we had had to use these two vessels for their originally intended purpose; that is, as a fast wing to the mining squadron. Both ships proceeded to the field and planted their full quotas at a speed of 17 knots with no difficulty. They could plant as easily at their maximum speed as they could at 12 knots.

This final solution of the premature explosions was a great relief. It explained, in addition, the probable reason for countermining. The tests conducted to ascertain the effect of the copper sulphate deposits on the plates of the firing device showed that as much as 10 millivolts could be generated. This was sufficient to rotate the armature of the firing device through a considerable portion of its arc so that a slight additional shock, which might readily be caused by the explosion of a nearby mine, would be sufficient to shake the firing ball from its cup and detonate the mine. By increasing the tension of the hair spring on the armature, the voltage necessary to fire a mine could be raised to the desired amount.

In the latter part of August information was received that another enemy submarine was damaged while attempting to cross our barrage, and had been compelled to return to its base on the surface. These repeated instances of submarines deprived of their principal means of defense pointed more strongly than ever to the necessity of having patrol vessels stationed at intervals along the barrage to attack submarines which had encountered mines but had not been completely destroyed.

The question of mining area B again came up and a decision was finally reached to mine it with both surface mines and deep mines. The commander in chief, grand fleet, however, objected to mining completely up to the Orkney Islands, and it was decided that a gate 10 miles in width would be left which should be closed later when conditions indicated this step to be necessary.

The mines which had been laid in this area by the British in March, 1918, had in the meantime been swept up. The British had also placed a series of mine nets to the southward of area B, extending part of the way between the western end of area B and Duncansby Head. These had not proved successful and were also removed before the mining in area B was resumed.

The eighth excursion was intended as a surprise excursion. Neutral nations had not been notified that area B was dangerous to shipping, and with this knowledge enemy submarines were constantly passing through it on their way to the Atlantic. It was accordingly decided not to notify the area but to secretly route all shipping so as to avoid it, with the hope that submarines might still attempt to use it after it had been mined. In order to prevent the enemy observing the mining while it was in progress, an elaborate patrol was arranged, beginning the day before the operation and continuing until after its completion.

British and American mining squadrons rendezvoused off the Orkney Islands on September the 7th and proceeded to carry out the operation. We laid six lines of surface mines across area B while the British laid one line of surface mines parallel to ours. This was really the first joint operation carried out by the British and American squadrons. On several previous occasions both squadrons had been at sea at the same time, but had not been working side by side, so as to necessitate appointing one officer to command the expedition. On this occasion Admiral Strauss was designated to take general charge of both squadrons while mining was in progress.

In spite of the high voltage adjustment of the firing devices, 13 per cent of the mines exploded. About five-sixths of this number were due to countermining, indicating that the mines were still too sensitive and that the voltage must be still further increased. Tests that had been made indicated that contact of the antennae with the hull of the ship invariably gave voltages about 100 millivolts, and it was therefore considered entirely safe to further increase the adjustment of the firing device to operate between 30 and 45 millivolts. This was done for all subsequent excursions.

An interesting sidelight on the activities of the mine force were the tests and experiments which were almost constantly in progress. Besides the difficulties encountered in solving the problem of premature explosions, numerous other questions arose in connection with the new American mine. The facilities at hand were ideal for mining experiments. The chain of lakes forming the principal part of the Caledonian Canal, which terminated at base 18, offered smooth water with depths varying up to 800 feet, which corresponded to the maximum depth encountered in the North Sea barrage. The only drawback was that the water was fresh instead of salt. During July, the British had conducted a series of experiments to ascertain the accuracy with which their mines took their prescribed depth. The results were not entirely satisfactory, and since our mine anchor had been largely copied from the one they were using, it was also probable that ours were not behaving as designed. Tests were carried out in Loch Lochy during the first week in September when 50 mines were planted with anchors adjusted to moor the mine 45 feet below the surface. The average depth actually taken was 44.6 feet. The shallowest mine was 39.2 feet and the deepest one at 48.7 feet. The results were entirely satisfactory and were all that could be expected.

All the mines which had thus far been laid in area B were surface mines, and since this was still the weakest part of the barrage, it was decided that the following excursion should also be placed in this area, laying two rows of mines at each of the three standard depths.

A delay of nine days was occasioned waiting on the British mining squadron, since it was desired that both the British and American squadrons should lay their mines on the same date in order to reduce the possibility of the enemy observing mining operations in this area. Delays of this nature were most serious. It was realized that mine laying operations would be interfered with if not altogether stopped during the winter months on account of the severity and frequency of the storms in the North Sea. It was also extremely desirable to complete the barrage at the earliest possible date in order that operations in the Mediterranean might be undertaken.

The work of assembling mines at the bases, refueling the ships, and embarking new loads of mines had reached such a stage of efficiency that it was possible to reduce the length of time that it was necessary for the ships to remain in port to two days. The vessels were ordinarily away from the bases two or three days, thus making it possible to complete an operation every four or five days. At the same time mines were being shipped at a faster rate from the United States, in anticipation of the speed with which they could be laid. Delays therefore caused most serious complications at the bases on account of the difficulty of stowing the material in the limited space provided. Another phase which should not be overlooked was the effect on the morale



of the personnel aboard the mine layers. It was always necessary to load the layers as soon as possible after their return to port since delays could seldom be foreseen. This resulted in the vessels remaining in harbor with cargoes of mines on board for a considerable period of time. This caused serious inconvenience to the personnel since practically all of the living space on board was occupied by mines, making it necessary for the men to sleep on deck between the tracks or wherever it was possible to find sufficient space to spread a hammock. Messing arrangements as well as nearly all of the other accommodations existing on board ship were badly interfered with. These delays became more frequent and of longer duration as the completion of the barrage drew near. Sometimes it was due to having to wait while the British squadron was being loaded, but more frequently was attributed to movements of the Grand Fleet making it impossible to supply the necessary destroyers to act as our escort. Had it been possible to obtain sufficient of our own destroyers for this purpose it could have enabled the barrage to have been completed by approximately the 1st of October.

In the early morning of September 20, while the United States mining squadron was on its way to the mine field to carry out the ninth excursion, a submarine was sighted off Stronsay Firth. She was immediately attacked with depth charges by the escorting destroyers and at the same time a smoke screen was put out by both the escort and the mine layers. Shortly afterwards she was again sighted just ahead of the *San Francisco* and was again attacked. The behavior of the submarine was most unusual. Although both times she was sighted she was in good position and at a comparatively close range no attempt was made to fire a torpedo. It is highly probable that she had been sent to this position to the southwestward of the lines of mines which had shortly before been laid in area B, in order that she might make observations of the positions in which mines were being laid in this area.

The squadron proceeded through Westray Firth and thence to a position about 6 miles to the northward of the western end of the field which was laid on the 7th of September, where the mining began. In this excursion, 5,520 mines were laid in 3 hours and 50 minutes—the record number that has ever been laid by a mine-laying force in a single operation. At the same time, the British squadron laid 1,300 mines in a single line parallel and to the northward of those laid by us. Rear Admiral Strauss was in command of the United States layers on board the *San Francisco*. Rear Admiral Clinton Baker commanded the whole expedition.

During the mine-laying, when about midway between the ends of the previous field which had been laid in area B, one of the escorting destroyers sighted the body of a dead sailor floating in the water. He was recognized to be a German by the type of life preserver he wore. Since no engagements with the enemy had occurred within miles of this position, it is extremely probable that an enemy submarine had been destroyed by one of the mines which had been laid on September 7.

The reduction of premature explosions on this excursion was a marked improvement, being between 5 and 6 per cent as compared with 13 per cent on the previous operation. The firing devices had been adjusted to operate between 30 and 45 millivolts, and this regulation could not readily be increased, on account of the construction of the mechanism. It was perhaps as well that it should not be further raised, as the mine might be possibly made too sensitive to operate when a poor contact was made by the antennæ.

After completing the ninth excursion, work was resumed in area A. On September 27, 5,450 mines were laid, slightly over 4 per cent of which exploded prematurely. Only nine of the mine layers took part in this operation.

On account of the great depths of water in which it would be necessary to lay mines in the Mediterranean, it was necessary to develop a special type of mine. A satisfactory design had been evolved by the Bureau of Ordnance, but it was essential to conduct a series of practical tests before beginning the manufacture. No vessel was available in the United States for this purpose, so the *Baltimore* was ordered home to carry out the required experiments. She proceeded as far as Pentland Firth in company with the squadron on their way to the mine field for the tenth excursion, where she was detached to Scapa Flow to obtain routing instructions across the Atlantic from the commander in chief grand fleet.

The eleventh operation was carried out on October 4, again in area A, and approximately 6 per cent of the mines exploded prematurely. Losses up to this amount had, however, come to be accepted as normal for this type of mine. The Bureau of Ordnance also considered this figure a reasonable loss on account of the various defects which are invariably encountered in the production of material in such vast quantities.

Since the operation in the Mediterranean would probably have kept the mine force engaged until well into the summer of 1919, it was considered advisable to have the mine layers docked prior to their departure for those waters, where such facilities would

be extremely limited. After the completion of the eleventh excursion the *Shamrock* and *Aroostook* were detached from the squadron and proceeded to Newcastle-on-Tyne for this purpose. It was intended to send two vessels there after each operation, having them return in time to take part in the second following excursion. Permission was obtained for the ships' crews to do the work in connection with scraping and painting the ship's bottoms—an arrangement which had been found to very materially expedite the time required for docking.

With the mining of area B, the problem of enemy submarines gaining access to the Atlantic became serious. Several submarines had encountered mines in the barrage but had managed to reach their bases bearing material evidence of the existence of the barrier. It was only natural, therefore, that the enemy should look about for whatever means remained of reaching the Atlantic without risking passage across the mine fields. Small submarines occasionally successfully ran the blockade at the Dover Channel, but this was apparently not attempted by the larger boats. Pentland Firth and the 10-mile gate to the eastward of the Orkneys were heavily patrolled. Submarines evidently would not risk passage through Pentland Firth while submerged on account of the dangerous currents. The only remaining passage was through Norwegian territorial waters. Although Norway had issued a proclamation that belligerent submarines using her waters for this purpose would be fired upon, this risk seemed less than any of the others and there was no apparent hesitancy in using it. One enemy submarine while passing through these waters even went so far as to stop on a Norwegian vessel. These repeated violations resulted in a statement on September 29 by the Norwegian Government that mines would be laid in the vicinity of Udsire Island in order to prevent belligerent vessels using her territorial waters for purposes contrary to the provisions of international law. This mining is understood to have been completed by them about the 7th of October and had the effect of completing the barrage from the end of area C to the Norwegian coast.

On October 11 the British squadron laid two partial rows of surface mines in the southwestern portion of area B. These proved to be the last mines laid by them in the North Sea barrage prior to the armistice a month later.

The United States mining squadron completed the twelfth excursion on the 13th of October, losing 4 per cent by premature explosions. The *Roanoke* and *Canandaigua* proceeded to Newcastle for docking upon the completion of the operation.

Eight days' delay were encountered before the 13th and last operation could begin. On account of the sequence of the British and American operations in areas A and B it had been impractical to extend the mine fields so as to overlap each other. This left a gap between the two areas approximately 6 miles wide. In order to close this the next excursion was planned to consist of six rows of surface mines to the southward of the gap, continuing with two rows into area C so as to complete the four rows which the United States had agreed to lay in this area.

The first of the winter weather was encountered in this operation, when it was necessary for the squadron to wait one day after having reached the mine field before the sea moderated sufficiently to enable the mines to be laid. Even then the ships were rolling as much as twenty to thirty degrees on each side of the vertical. This provided an excellent test of the mining installations with the result that no difficulties were encountered by any of the ships, either in the stowing of their mines or in the actual planting under such severe conditions. The operation was completed October 20, having laid 3,760 mines, of which slightly over 4 per cent were lost by premature explosions.

Although the United States mining squadron was again ready for the next excursion by October 30, it was necessary to wait until the British squadron had completed the operation which they had planned before escort could be furnished us. Reliable information indicated that enemy submarines were crossing the eastern portion of area A, and the British had decided to lay surface mines in this position to the southward of those laid on our first excursion so as to strengthen this part of the field which was the least effectively mined part of the area. Weather conditions, however, prevented them from going out for several days, and, in the meantime, the series of events during the latter part of October and 1st of November brought the end of the war so plainly in view that further mining would have been an unnecessary waste of time, effort, and material. The British squadron did not carry out their contemplated operation, nor likewise did we. With the signing of the armistice on November 11 with Germany—the perpetrator of ruthless submarine warfare against both allied and neutral commerce—came the end of building the North Sea mine barrage.

CHAPTER XVII.—FINAL STATUS OF BARRAGE AND RESULTS OBTAINED.

On November 11, 1918, when hostilities ceased, upon the signing of the armistice, status of the northern barrage, as set forth in an Allied Naval Council Annual report, dated December 16, 1918, was as follows:

The northern barrage extends from Norwegian territorial waters to within 10 miles of the Orkney Islands, and lies in the area contained by the following positions:

60° N., 4° 54½' E.
 60° 21' N., 3° 10' E.
 59° 30' N., 50' W.
 59° 20' N., 2° 5' W.
 58° 50' N., 2° 27' W.
 58° 50' N., 50' W.
 59° 24' N., 3° 10' E.
 59° 12½' N., 4° 49' E.

2. The barrage has been divided into three areas, A, B, and C. Area C extends from Norwegian territorial waters to the meridian of 3° 10' E. Area A extends from the meridian to 5' W., and area B from the western extremity of area A to within 10 miles of the Orkneys.

3. Mine laying operations were commenced in March, 1918, by Great Britain, and in May, 1918, by the United States of America, British and American mines being used. Up to November 11 a total of 56,760 United States and 16,300 British mines have been laid.

4. The original intention was, that the United States mine layers should lay the mines in area A, and the British mine layers in areas B and C, and this arrangement has for the main been adhered to, but a certain number of United States mines have also been laid in areas B and C. This was done in order the more effectively to deal with the submarine situation at the moment, and to make the best use of the greater mine-laying capacity of the United States mine layers.

5. The completion of the barrage within Norwegian territorial waters has been effected by Norway herself.

In July, 1918, conclusive evidence was obtained that German submarines were actually using Norwegian territorial waters. Representations were made by the British Government to the Norwegian Government that the only effectual way of ending the observance by Germany of the Norwegian Royal Decree was for Norway herself to mine these waters herself, or to allow the allied and United States Governments. After protracted negotiations, during which evidence as to the identity of submarines reported on various dates to have been seen in Norwegian territorial waters was furnished to the Norwegian Government, a note was received from the Norwegian Government, by the allied and associated governments on the 28th September protesting against the violation of Norwegian regulations by a British submarine in a case which had been previously admitted by Great Britain and stating in view of the numerous cases of infringement of her territorial waters by submarines which had been established with certainty, it had been decided to lay mines in certain localities.

On 29th September, 1918, an official announcement appeared in the leading Norwegian Government organ to the effect that mines would be laid in Norwegian waters between latitudes 59° 8' N. and 59° 25' N., and to the westward of longitude 4° E., and that these waters would be closed for general traffic from 7th October.

AREA A.

The depth of water in this area is from 50 to 80 fathoms. The approved minefields in this area will, when completed, consist generally of three lines of United States mines, dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at surface depth.

Three lines of United States mines, at a depth of 160 feet, the mines having a dangerous area above the mines of 70 feet.

Three lines of United States mines, at a depth of 240 feet, with a similar dangerous area.

More operations were required to complete the approved minelaying in this area.

Any reinforcement of the minefields in area A would depend on the submarine situation at the time.

AREA B.

8. The depth of water is from 40 to 75 fathoms. At the present time the following lines of mines have been laid across the area:

One line of British mines dangerous to surface craft.

One line of British mines at 95 feet deep.

Eight lines of United States mines dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth.

Two lines of United States mines at 160 feet deep, having a dangerous area (about the mines) of 70 feet.

Two lines of United States mines, at a depth of 240 feet, with a similar dangerous area.

Two further lines of British mines have been commenced across the area. The submarine situation will determine any future action in this area.

AREA C.

9. The depth of water is from 65 to 160 fathoms. At the present time the following lines of mines have been laid across area C:

Two lines of British mines dangerous to surface craft.

Two lines of British mines at 65 feet deep.

Two lines of British mines at 95 feet deep.

Two lines of British mines at 125 feet deep.

Four lines of United States mines dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth.

Six lines of United States mines dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth have been laid across the junction line between areas A and C.

Any further mining in area C will depend upon the submarine situation at the time.

GATES.

10. There are no gates in the barrage, the only free passage through being the 10-mile gap at its western extremity which, however, is not used more than is absolutely necessary.

PATROL.

11. The barrage is not patrolled.

Rear Admiral Strauss has summoned up the final status of the operation and the results obtained from it is as follows:

Had it been possible to carry out mine-laying operations as fast as the necessary mining material was received and assembled, the American portion of the North Sea barrage could have been completed by the latter part of September, 1918. The frequent delays, especially during the latter part of the work, which were principally due to the necessity of awaiting for escort to be supplied by the Grand Fleet, or for the British mine squadron to complete its preparations so as to be able to go out at the same time, prevented the barrage from being completed prior to the signing of the armistice with Germany on November 11.

In all, 70,263 mines were laid, 56,611 being American mines, laid by the United States mining squadron, area A, which was originally allotted as the United States portion of the barrage, was completed except for 6,400 mines more, which could have been laid in approximately 10 days. Besides mining area A exclusively, the United States mining squadron had laid 10,440 mines in area B, and 5,980 mines in area C. Thus it will be seen that in addition to mining the part of the barrage originally assigned to the United States Government, we had in addition laid more mines in the British areas, B and C, than they themselves had put down. One more small excursion in area B by the United States mine force would have given it the same density of American mines as area A. Area C was the weakest portion of the barrage. The British had originally agreed to mine this area only to a depth of 200 feet but were only able to complete the work to a depth of 125 feet. This figure was just one-half the effective depth of the remainder of the barrage.

Until the animosity incident to warfare has disappeared and the freedom of discussion of war-time secrets can be attained, it will be impossible to accurately determine the actual results achieved by the North Sea barrage. Such information as has been possible to collect bears witness to its efficacy notwithstanding the short time the barrage was in operation.

After the first two American excursions had been completed, two enemy submarines were damaged in attempting to cross area C. The first, the U-86, was damaged

on July 9 while passing homeward, reaching port successfully and bearing tangible proof that the North Sea barrage was a reality and not a threat. The other, the U-22, was to have passed, but nothing has been heard from her since. The enemy of course immediately routed his submarines through area B, which had not been proclaimed, or through Norwegian territorial waters. On August 10, U-115 was damaged in the barrage on an outward bound trip and was forced to turn back. The surprise mining in area B on September 7 obtained immediate results. It will be remembered that when it was decided to place mines in this area no notification was given to neutral nations that it would be dangerous to navigation. Instead a heavy patrol was placed around the area to guard it and keep down enemy submarines while mines were being laid. Just prior to the mining operations a large convoy was routed across this area in order to deceive enemy submarines which might possibly have seen the convoy and thus lead the enemy to believe that this area was to be maintained free of mines. On September 8, the day following that on which the mines were laid, the U-92 was sunk in this area while another submarine was so severely damaged that it was forced to return to its base immediately. This occurred while the submarine was outward bound. Rather than risk a passage again through the same waters, she proceeded to area A, recrossing the barrage in that position without further damage.

After this it appeared that passages were attempted directly across area A, which, due to the United States participating in the mining of areas C and B, was comparatively poorly mined. The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth excursions, however, during the latter part of September, and the first part of October, added a great deal to the effectiveness of area A, so that the loss of U-156 on September 25 and U-123 on October 18 can most certainly be attributed to this area.

With the information at present available, it appears that a total of 6 submarines were destroyed in the barrage and possibly an equal number were severely damaged. On account of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information, such a short time after the armistice was signed, it is highly probable that subsequent data will show even greater damage to have been done.

It is well to remember that a mine barrage of this nature can never be an absolute barrier possessing 100 per cent efficiency. On account of the necessity of laying the mines at a distance of approximately 300 feet apart in order to reduce the possibility of countermining, it would always be possible for a submarine with a beam of approximately 30 feet to successfully cross such a barrier no matter how many parallel lines of mines may be laid. The danger in crossing, of course, increases with the number of rows of mines but not in direct proportion. The object, then, in constructing a barrage must be to make the danger incurred by the passage of a vessel sufficiently great to prevent submarines from taking the risk involved. The American portion of the barrage was designed to offer the following resistances to the passage of submarines.

A vessel passing on the surface or submerged above a depth of 50 feet stood one chance in three of making a successful passage; submarines passing submerged between depths of 50 feet and 250 feet had approximately two chances out of three of passing the barrage without encountering a mine.

The object of making the passage across the surface barrage more dangerous than at the lower levels was largely psychological, for even though a submarine which was forced to cross the barrage might know that the danger on the surface was the greatest, the moral factors involved were usually sufficient to induce them to accept the greater hazard on the surface rather than face the danger of striking a mine while submerged.

In connection with the enemy's attitude toward antisubmarine measures taken by the Allies, it is interesting to note the statement of a captured German submarine commander who had had considerable experience on that particular type of vessel. He expressed the opinion that of all the antisubmarine measures which had been taken, mines were by far the most dreaded by the German submarine personnel, principally because there was nothing to indicate their presence. Also because the quality of allied mines had recently been improved in a most unpleasant manner; the former practice of fishing them up and taking them home for conversion into punch bowls for submarine messes had now been entirely abandoned, he said.

One feature of the barrage which offered several possibilities but was never more than partially put into operation was the question of patrols to guard the mine field to force submarines into the deep mines and destroy those which had not been completely disabled. This measure had been argued for from the very beginning, although no definite agreements were ever reached. The first arrangement was that areas B and C should be deep mined only and that the surface should be guarded with patrols. Area B was not mined, however, until comparatively late in the work on the barrage and during this time was only indifferently patrolled, thus affording a comparatively safe passage for enemy submarines through this area. The United States Government

had been asked to lay two rows of surface mines in area C early in the history of active operations and this had been done on July 1. Two lines of mines, however, formed a very ineffective barrier and patrols in this area would have been of the greatest assistance, not only in driving submarines into the lower level mines, which were more closely spaced but also in preventing submarines from using Norwegian territorial waters to get by the barrage. This latter measure could have been effected by hydrophone vessels lying outside the Norwegian territorial waters where enemy submarines could easily have been detected when attempting such a passage. The question of patrols, especially for catching crippled submarines after it became known that many of them were not disabled when exploding a mine at a distance of 70 feet, arose continuously but on account of the tremendous demands for such vessels both for active submarine work in other waters and for escorting coastwise convoys, it was impossible to obtain any vessels for this purpose.

Although the enemy undoubtedly obtained the secret of the American mine story after the first mines were washed ashore and recovered in Norway in the early part of July, it is interesting to note that apparently no attempt was made to fit their submarines with protective devices which would have enabled them to pass safely through the American mine fields. Such a device, although it was unknown until after the armistice, was readily devised when the necessity arose for protecting vessels which would be employed in clearing the North Sea of mines after the end of the war.

Information had also been received indicating that the Germans had built special vessels called mine barrier breakers of a practically unsinkable character, so that they could be used to clear passages through mine fields. Evidently none of these vessels attempted operations in the North Sea barrage.

The mine as a weapon of nautical warfare now presents greater possibilities than ever before. The United States in less than one year was able to construct a squadron of mine layers and produce sufficient mines to keep them constantly employed, laying on each excursion in less than four hours more mines than the United States had ever possessed prior to her entry into this great war. Too much credit can not be given to those who designed the mine. Clever, simple, and effective, this mine proved, perhaps, the most efficient single weapon against the enemy's submarines. Equally as remarkable as the invention of the mine itself was the development and production by the Bureau of Ordnance. Any complicated instrument of this nature ordinarily requires years of experiments and modifications before it finally becomes sufficiently satisfactory and reliable to allow it to be used. Time, however, was the supreme factor. Every minute counted in order to save the merchant shipping and the wise forethought and judgment of those to whom the production of the mine was intrusted should go down in history as one of the most worthy achievements of the war. Minor defects and difficulties, of course, were encountered in the actual operation and handling of the mines, but these were also met and solved on the spot by the United States mine force.

Mine laying, like the havoc wrought upon the battle fields by the destruction of property, leaves its effects to be felt after peace is obtained. Thousands upon thousands of mines have been laid in European waters, a major portion of the work being concentrated in the North Sea barrage. With the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of free shipping these mines constitute an ever present danger to the vessels on the seas. Many of them break adrift and, carried by the wind and tide, often appear in waters which were thought to be clear of mines. One of the first steps after the armistice was to divide the work of clearing the seas among the various nations involved. At an allied naval conference the United States volunteered to remove all mines which they had laid and arrangements were immediately taken in hand to carry out this work. A method of sweeping this peculiar mine, together with the development and the organization of the force required, had been completed and actual sweeping operations were commenced before the treaty of peace had been signed.

APPENDIXES.

APPENDIX B.

Confidential.

JUNE 1, 1917.

From: Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy (retired).

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Chief of Naval Operations).

Via: Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.

Subject: Proposed plan of American operations in the war.

1. In accordance with article 1534 (4) United States Navy Regulations the following brief plan of operations is suggested for consideration.

2. From published information regarding prospective war measures of the United States, I gather that our Government intends to send an army of 500,000 or more men

reenforce the Franco-British lines in France. It is suggested that, while this is a moral and popular measure, its execution will involve very grave difficulties for the following reasons:

a) There is little doubt that Germany is constructing submarines faster than they are being destroyed. If this be true, one is forced to the conclusion that, unless some more successful means is quickly found to curb the submarine menace, Great Britain and France will be defeated if Germany can prolong the war.

b) Plans for bottling up the enemy's submarines by means of a mine barrier from Scotland to Norway and across the English Channel are under consideration, but the success of such a plan is problematical and can not be definitely relied upon. At any rate it could not be carried into full effect inside of six months. Therefore the difficulty of supplying Great Britain and France with munitions and food is bound to increase until next spring if not indefinitely.

c) If in the next few months we send a half million men to the "west front," we will increase very greatly the heavy burden of the Atlantic transport systems since we would have to supply our Army with all the supplies and munitions it would require.

d) The loss of some American transports with thousands of men might have a very grave effect on American public opinion and would correspondingly encourage the German people.

e) If Russia should fail us and make a separate peace, Germany would be able to secure supplies from the east in abundance and would grow stronger actually and relatively.

3. If, instead of sending more than a division or so to France, we were to send 500,000 or 1,000,000 men to the "east front," say, to Galicia or Roumania, many of the above-mentioned difficulties would disappear and victory would be more assured for the following reasons:

a) While our line of communications via Vladivostok to the east front would be very long, it would be absolutely safe, since it is not conceivable that Germany can extend her submarine warfare to the Pacific for lack of bases. The distance from Puget Sound to Vladivostok is only about 1,500 miles greater than from New York to England or France. The rail route from Vladivostok to the front presents a problem, but Russia in her war with Japan transported to Manchuria and supplied an army of half million men on a single-track road, and that road is now double-tracked for the most part.

b) By physical as well as moral and financial backing we would probably hold Russia firmly in line and prevent any possibility of a separate peace on her part.

c) An American army in Russia, would obtain the greater part of its supplies, except munitions from Russia, thus relieving us of the necessity of shipping great quantities of provisions and other supplies from this country. It should be practicable also to establish American munition factories in Russia to help supply our Army, thus still further simplifying the transport problem.

d) An American army in Russia would account for a greater German force than could the same army on the west front, owing to the difference in conditions in the two fronts, and thus the pressure on the French and British lines would be greatly reduced.

e) A successful American-Russian campaign on the east front would give greater assurance of saving Roumania and Serbia.

f) The post-bellum relations between Russia and the United States would be all that could be desired as a result of close cooperation in a victorious war.

g) Russia and the world would be freed of the danger of a German ascendancy in her economic life.

h) Japan would be forced "to show her hand," which might be desirable or not, according to the point of view. In all probability Japan would decide that it would be in her interest also to put an army in the field alongside ours.

i) For transports in the Pacific we could utilize, of course, the *Vaterland* and other passenger ships. We could use for this service also wooden ships and others that are undesirable or unsafe for transport or freight service in the danger zones of the Atlantic. Possibly also Japanese ships would be available as transports.

j) Transports, instead of returning home empty, probably could bring cargoes of provisions from Russia, thereby reducing the drain on our food resources.

4. I think that we may assume without question that Great Britain and France could hold their present lines until such time as we could place a million men on the east front; then victory would come quickly, much quicker than if we try to fight it out on the west front, leaving Russia to "find herself" unaided.

5. To summarize, I suggest that our plan for the further prosecution of the war should be:

- (a) Send a large army to Russia.
- (b) Close the North Sea by means of mine barriers.
- (c) Continue and increase our operations against submarines in the open sea.
- (d) Build as many cargo ships as possible.
- (e) Give the Franco-British forces a decisive preponderance in air craft..
- (f) Give the American-Russian forces on the east front supremacy in the air as well as on land.

S. P. FULLINWIDER.

APPENDIX C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, October 24, 1917.

Confidential.

From: Senior member General Board.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Proposed measures to prevent German submarines from operating against allied commerce in the Atlantic.

Inclosures: (a) Memorandum dated October 23, 1917, by Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, re proposed mine barrage, Scotland to Norway; (b) General Board letter No. 425 (serial No. 776) of October 20, 1917, inquiry re mine barrier across North Sea; (c) memorandum of October 23, 1917, from British Embassy quoting Admiralty reply to reference (b). (d) Memorandum of October 18, 1917, from Chief of Naval Staff to Chief of Naval Operations re mines and cooperation of United States in mining operations. (e) General Board letter No. 425-5 (serial No. 777) of October 22, 1917, plans for opposing enemy submarine activity in Atlantic trade routes by mine barrage at entrances to North Sea.

1. The General Board has been requested by the Navy Department to consider the possible offensive operations against German submarines bases and to recommend that form of offensive which, in cooperation with the British naval forces, promises to most quickly and effectively limit submarine depredations upon allied commerce.

2. German submarines now operate from bases in three widely separated localities Kiel Bay in the Baltic; Helgoland Island and the mouths of the rivers emptying into the North Sea; and from the Zeebrugge-Ostend region on the Belgian coast. Submarine operations are much facilitated by the safe passage afforded in neutral waters through the Kettegat and Skagerrack from bases on Kiel Bay; and boats leaving the Helgoland region or Belgian coast pass into the Atlantic through the Dover Strait or around Scotland. The situation is further complicated by the Kiel Canal, by which submarines may operate either from Helgoland Bight or Kiel Bay.

3. Obviously the most effective method of combating submarines is to stop them, if practicable, at their bases. Failing this, to take preventive measures as near these bases as possible before they have had an opportunity to scatter on the trade routes. If neither of these measures is practicable, submarines must be hunted down in the open sea by the methods now employed.

4. The offensive against submarine bases may take three forms: (1) An attack by heavy ships, smaller surface craft, submarines, and aircraft, with a view to the occupation or destruction of such bases; (2) closing outlets to them by channel obstructions, mines, and a close surface and submarine blockade; (3) by the construction and maintenance of more distant mine barriers which will prevent the passage of submarines into the North Sea or into the Atlantic.

5. Each of these operations has its distinctive advantages and disadvantage for each locality, and a choice and recommendation of the most practicable under the conditions of this war follows by a process of elimination from a consideration of each on its merits and in the light of three years' war experience.

6. *Mission of the United States.*—In cooperation with allied forces to prevent German submarines from operating against allied commerce.

7. *Enemy strength, dispositions and probable intentions.*—(1) Submarines now operate from German bases on the Baltic, from bases in Helgoland Bight and from bases in the Zeebrugge-Ostend region, Belgium.

(2) Nothing is known of the batteries protecting Helgoland and the adjacent coast from the heavy batteries, over 200 guns of 4-inch caliber and above on the Belgian coast about Ostend and Zeebrugge, which protect Zebrugge effectively against attack

in the sea, it must be assumed that even heavier and more formidable batteries have been devoted to the defense of the vastly more important Helgoland region. It is known that the sea area of Helgoland Bight is extensively mined, and that it is further protected by a large number, probably in the neighborhood of 100 submarines, which might be utilized for this purpose.

3. Egress via the Kattegat and Skagerrack is assured from German Baltic bases until such time as Norway, Denmark, and Norway, or Denmark, Norway, and Sweden decide to cooperate with the Allies.

4. To attempt to penetrate the Baltic with the allied fleet to attack the German bases in Kiel Bay is considered inadvisable while Denmark, Norway, and Sweden remain neutral.

5. The probable intention of the enemy is to continue operations from the above positions, utilizing the Skagerrack and North Sea exits via either the Dover Strait around Scotland, to reach the hunting grounds on trade routes in the Atlantic. If the Zeebrugge and the Helgoland vicinity were rendered untenable as bases for submarines, probably the Germans would take possession of the littoral of Holland and Denmark for such bases, and continue using the Skagerrack outlet from the Baltic seas.

6. *Our forces and courses open to us.*—The Allies have a great preponderance of surface force especially in the heavier types. Destroyer forces are about evenly balanced considering the dispersion of destroyer strength required to protect commerce; submarine preponderance is decidedly with the Germans.

We may attempt to—

1. Reduce the Helgoland region and close exits for submarines.
2. Reduce the Zeebrugge region and close exits for submarines.
3. Enter the Baltic and close exits for submarines from the Baltic bases.
4. Prevent Danish and Dutch territory being used for submarine bases.
5. Construct and maintain mine barriers about the Helgoland region.
6. Construct and maintain a mine barrier in the Skagerrack or Kattegat.
7. Construct and maintain mine barriers in the Zeebrugge region.
8. Construct and maintain a mine barrier across the North Sea.
9. Close Dover Strait to submarines by a mine barrier and surface patrol.
10. To prevent submarine operations, (a), (b), (c), and (d), all are necessary; or (d), (f), and (g), all are necessary; or (h) and (i) are necessary.

Of course, a combination is practicable of a mine barrier at one point, Zeebrugge for example, with a reduction of Helgoland fortifications and destruction of submarine bases in that region, or vice versa.

10. *As to (a).*—The proposition to reduce Helgoland and close exit for submarines has been under consideration by the British naval authorities for three years, and their experience leads them to the conclusion that, with the means now available, the attempt could not succeed. Failure is assumed to result from the following causes:

- (1) The British in their attacks against the Zeebrugge region have been able to make little or no impression upon the shore defenses. It is known that over 200 guns and mortars capable of inflicting damage on attacking ships are in place. Dangerous fire from some of these batteries against attacking vessels has been delivered at a range of about 36,000 yards. Monitors bombarding Zeebrugge, at a range of 26,000 yards, have been concealed by a smoke barrage to prevent their destruction. Fire control is most difficult because of German control of the air, and smoke barrages employed on shore. After a year's operations the base is still in use, and no injury that has not been speedily repaired has apparently been inflicted. It is entirely probable that the superior importance of Helgoland region has resulted in even a more complete and comprehensive defense. (2) There is nothing known as to the changes that may have been made in the Helgoland region defenses, and no guide as to the force necessary to overcome them and no way of estimating the chances of success. (3) The Germans control the air in the Helgoland region, and without air reconnaissance, it is not possible to locate their batteries or control the fire against them. (4) There is a 12-foot rise and fall of the tide, with swift currents which would seriously interfere with mining operations or the placing of the hulks it would be necessary to sink to close the ports. (5) It is estimated that the Germans have about a hundred submarines available for operating in Helgoland Bight, and there is no method of protecting ships operating in narrow waters where they would have to alternately anchor and then maneuver when firing on land defenses. (6) The vulnerability of ships at battle ranges of heavy guns and the difficulties of controlling fire against land batteries. (7) Operating so close to a German base, the difficulties of supply and communication and adequate protection against submarines and aircraft. (8) The certainty that even if Helgoland were taken, a greater problem would confront the naval forces in the necessary reduction of mainland batteries and the further certainty that submarines bottled up at the

North Sea end of the Kiel Canal could continue operations from Baltic bases through the Skagerrack.

11. Closing Helgoland Bight would undoubtedly weaken the morale of the German forces and might incline Germany to peace, but the military disadvantages for Germany are not of such an overwhelming character, as the Baltic exit for submarines and the base at Zeebrugge would be still available.

12. While the united Navies of the Allies are greatly superior to the Navy of Germany in heavy ships, the loss of even predreadnoughts would bring the contending sea forces nearer to an equality. In a heavy ship attack on the land fortifications of the Helgoland region, the Germans could withdraw their heavy ships into the Baltic if necessary.

13. *As to (b).*—The shallow coast prevents deep ships from getting close enough to the Belgian shore batteries successfully to bombard them. Operations with monitors have only resulted in temporary damage. Control of the air is with the Germans. To silence batteries and approach the shore closely enough to cover a landing of the fleet is judged to be impossible with the German army in occupation. If Zeebrugge is taken, it must be from the rear by the allied armies.

14. *As to (c).*—With Norway, Sweden, and Denmark neutral, to operate on the Baltic coast so close to the Kiel Canal presents insuperable obstacles, in view of its mine defenses, land defenses, submarines, and a concentration of the entire German power at the Baltic end of the canal. It appears that the German fleet, operating in its own waters, among its own mine fields and assisted by shore batteries and submarines, is stronger than any fleet the Allies could send into the Baltic.

15. *As to (d).*—In case the Helgoland region and Zeebrugge-Ostend region were controlled by the Allies, Denmark and Holland must be prevented from falling under German influence sufficiently to use their ports as German submarine bases.

16. If the reduction of the German submarine bases is considered impracticable, there remains the resort to mine barrier obstructions (e), (f), and (g), which contemplate efficient barrier constructions (1) from the Danish coast to the westward of Helgoland to German territory; (2) between neutral countries, Denmark and Norway, across the Skagerrack, or between Denmark and Sweden, across the Kattegat; (3) to the westward of Zeebrugge-Ostend, striking the Belgian coast to the northward and southward of these points.

17. *As to (e).*—British opinion after three years experience is that it is impracticable to maintain a mine barrier inclosing Helgoland and the mouths of the Elbe, Ems, and Weser, which would be effective against submarines, because (1) the proximity to the German bases and Kiel Canal outlet renders concentration against the patrol of mine fields so easy as to drive it off in places, and thus make practicable breaches in the barrier; (2) the distances from British bases make it very difficult to reenforce the patrol at any one point, in time to meet an attack; (3) it would be very difficult to maintain a strong enough force at the barrier to be everywhere equal to such attacks, because of the ease with which German heavy ships can reenforce the smaller surface craft, do their work and return to port; and therefore (4) to meet such attacks a force stronger than the German fleet must be constantly at the barrier; (5) this is considered inadvisable because of the certainty of attack by submarines; (6) the Germans control the air and the patrol would be constantly under fire from the air; (7) international complications sure to arise with Denmark over the effort to make the barrier off the Danish coast, within the 3-mile limit, effective; (8) the difficulty of maintaining a barrier off the Belgian coast, under fire of German guns.

18. *As to (f).*—A barrier across the Skagerrack or Kattegat has the following disadvantages: (1) Having both ends abutting on neutral territory; (2) the end of a barrier off the Danish coast would surely be brought under the fire of German guns erected on that coast; (3) the Skagerrack barrier, 60 miles long, would be exceedingly hard to protect against attacks delivered by submarines and surface craft through the Skagerrack and Kattegat from German Baltic bases; (4) the usefulness of the Skagerrack or Kattegat barrier, depends upon Helgoland region having been similarly inclosed, or the fortifications there reduced and exit to Kiel Canal closed.

19. *As to (g).*—The British after three years operations off the Belgian coast have been unable to construct and maintain an efficient barrier off Zeebrugge, in the face of the operations from nearby German bases of both submarines and surface craft. Both ends of the barrier must remain under the fire of German shore stations, or extend into Dutch waters. Effectively closing Zeebrugge may result in German occupation of the Scheldt River, or other parts of the Holland littoral, for submarine bases.

20. The closing of the North Sea by barriers laid from Scotland to Norway, and in the vicinity of Dover Strait, should not interfere with local attempts in any of the above discussed fields of endeavor to limit German submarine operations. But these two barriers, if effective, would, so far as egress from the North Sea is concerned,

the operations, either by attempts at occupation or by the laying of barriers at the Ligerak, Helgoland Bight, or Belgian coast, unnecessary.

21. *As to (h).*—The further advantages are: (1) One end of the barrier rests on England, close to British naval bases; (2) the entire barrier is much nearer to British fleet bases than to any German submarine or surface craft base; (3) the discouragement of the Germans that will follow if the rate of tonnage destroyed decreases more rapidly than the allied merchant tonnage construction increases; (4) the corresponding encouragement to our allies.

22. The difficulties in the way of laying and maintaining an efficient barrier across the North Sea are such that the British have, until recently, considered them insurmountable. With the use of the American mine, and with full American cooperation, the barrier promises sufficient success to warrant undertaking it. The disadvantages are: (1) The difficulty of supplying the material on the spot and laying the barrier;

(2) the constant danger of interruption by the enemy while in progress of construction and concentration of German effort upon the barrier when completed; (3) supplying the patrol craft necessary to protect the construction while in progress and patrol the barrier afterwards. If the barrier is pushed out in successive sections from the British coast, a small patrol will be required at first, then constantly increasing in numbers as the work progresses.

23. *As to (i).*—The necessity to close the Dover Strait is imperative. Whatever other measures to control submarines are employed, it is self-evident that no single measure would do as much to prevent merchant-ship destruction as to deny a passage for submarines to the Atlantic by this route. Closing this strait would compel the smaller submarines to pass around Scotland to the Atlantic, thus very materially reducing their season of active operations against commerce. In the heavy weather to be encountered on this route in the winter months probably none but large submarines would attempt to operate in the Atlantic.

24. *Conclusions.*—From the above considerations the General Board is decidedly of the opinion that of the measures discussed from (a) to (i), inclusive, the scheme included under (h) and (i) offers the best chances of success—that is, to close the North Sea by the Aberdeen-Egersund barrier approved by the British Admiralty, and to similarly close the Dover Strait.

25. The General Board does not underestimate the practical difficulties that must be overcome in providing the necessary material and transporting, placing, and maintaining it in the face of the determined efforts of the Germans to render the barrier abortive. Further, the barrier even when placed can not be effective without an adequate patrol. The General Board is, however, encouraged to give its endorsement to this plan because it has the approval of the British Admiralty; it is proposed by it as the best practicable plan to meet present war conditions; the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance stated the material, mines, anchors, moorings, etc., can be surely supplied; and the accompanying memorandum of Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, who has been actively engaged in conducting mining operations, points the way to handling the details of transporting and planting.

26. It is assumed that the British Admiralty, in approving this plan, recognizes the vital importance of the necessary patrol—that it is clearly seen by it where the required number of vessels is to be obtained, and that the extent of the cooperation required of the United States in this regard will be communicated to the United States Navy Department.

27. If it is decided to proceed with the construction of the Aberdeen-Egersund barrier, the General Board recommends that the preliminaries be arranged at once, and that suitable officers of experience in mining operations be sent to England to arrange for our participation in the work.

W. S. BENSON.

Approved:

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

NOTE.—Memorandum from Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, to the General Board, dated October 23, 1917, was inclosed with the above letter.

[Inclosure B, accompanying general board letter No. 425-5 (serial 778), Oct. 24, 1917.]

OCTOBER 20, 1917.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Inquiry re mine barrier across North Sea.

The general board recommends that the following inquiry be cabled and that an early answer be requested:

"The department requests to be informed whether the plan for the placing of a mine barrier across the North Sea on the Aberdeen side has the approval

of the Admiralty. It is believed that the great experience of the British naval forces in North Sea operations and their experience in naval mining during the present war puts them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme is practicable in construction and maintenance and whether in the opinion of the Admiralty it is the best scheme in sight for limiting the operations of enemy submarines, provided that the Straits of Dover can be efficiently closed to the passage of submarines, which if possible, in the opinion of the department should be done at the earliest possible date."

CHAS. J. BADGER.

[Inclosure C, accompanying general board letter No. 425-5 (serial 778), Oct. 24, 1917.]

From: Commodore Gaunt, Royal Navy, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.
To: Admiral Benson, United States Navy, Director of Naval Operations.
Date: October 23, 1917.

The following cable has been received from Chief of Staff for the Chief of Naval Operations (paraphrased):

"With reference to your cable No. 780 to Admiral Sims. The mine barrier has been approved by Admiralty and now confirms approval. The preparations are rapidly proceeding.

"My 513 (cable dispatched on 17th and received 18th October) indicates the assistance desired from the United States of America. This scheme is considered by the Admiralty to be best to be carried out at a distance from the bases of the enemy. The Admiralty are working on a supplemental scheme for operation close inshore, but any such inshore operation has the defect that a passage through for submarines can eventually be cleared by the enemy. Therefore North Sea passing northward also necessary.

"No scheme yet tried has been effective in closing the Dover Straits to submarines, but measures are being constantly improved, and they are at the last always a considerable deterrent. Mining operations on an extensive scale against submarines in the Straits of Dover commence in November. Owing to the lack of effective antisubmarine mine this has hitherto been delayed."

C. LANCELOT-GAUNT,
Lieutenant Commander, R. N. V. R.

[Inclosure D accompanying General Board letter No. 425-5 (Serial 778), Oct. 24, 1917.]

Paraphrase.]

OCTOBER 10, 1917.

From: Chief of naval staff.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

It will be necessary to increase the number of lines of United States mines in each system in the North Sea barrage from two to three if there should be any difficulty in using the lower antennae of United States mines for first supplies. Could you please state an approximate date when supply of complete mines and sinkers will begin, stating at what rate the supply will be maintained?

As all British mine layers will be fully engaged in laying British portions of the barrage, will you please say how many United States mine layers will be available to naval transport officer, Brest, and the output of United States mines. It is estimated that each ship could make five mine-laying trips a month. As a base for United States mines and mine layers, it is proposed to use Cromarty. The question of facilities for assembling ready for use, storage, and embarkation is being investigated on the spot. It is suggested that it is desirable that United States officers should confer with ours on this question and examine proposed arrangements as to suitability for dealing with United States mines and sinkers; also to ascertain as to whether our depot system will be suitable for application to United States mines. It is proposed that the necessary assembling and testing of United States mines and sinkers on receipt and before issue to mine layers should be dealt with by depot staffs provided by you if possible. It is hoped that you will be able to agree with this. United States officers if sent over can report numbers required.

I should be much obliged if you would inform me as soon as possible whether you can supply sinkers for United States mines.

[Inclosure E accompanying General Board letter No. 425-5 (Serial 778), October 24, 1917.]

OCTOBER 22, 1917.

From Senior member present;

Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Plans for limiting the activities of enemy's submarines in Atlantic trade routes by mine barrages established at the entrances to the North Sea area.

The General Board in its consideration of plans to prevent or at least substantially limit entrance and exit of enemy submarines to and from the North Sea area, including the Baltic, has not yet reached a final conclusion but it has proceeded far enough in its investigation to convince it that the effective closing of the Straits of Dover against enemy submarines is an essential feature of any plan that may be adopted involving the establishment of mine barrages.

2. The General Board, therefore, urges that operations for the closing of the Straits of Dover entrance to the North Sea be commenced at once.

3. The General Board is of the opinion that the closing of the Straits will render it much more difficult for the enemy submarines to reach the Atlantic trade routes or the English Channel itself and will materially reduce the number of enemy submarines working in those areas because of the longer and more difficult routes they would be compelled to take around the north of Scotland to their present cruising grounds in the Atlantic or the English Channel.

4. As to the assistance which this Government can render the General Board is informed by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance that 5,000 Mark VI mines complete can be ready for shipment to England by December 15 next and 20,000 more by January 15.

5. The personnel and the number of mine planters and other craft desired by the Admiralty to assist in the operations would have to be subject to further arrangement between our Navy Department and the Admiralty. The General Board recommends that if this or other cooperative mining plan be decided upon, the personnel to arrange for the details be sent to England as soon as practicable.

6. The General Board believes that the experience of the British Navy in mining, gained through three years of war and its familiarity with local conditions and resources best fits it to make the decision as to the location of the barrage but the General Board suggests the consideration of a barrage from the vicinity of Harwich to the vicinity of Dunkerque. This line though longer than the one across the Straits of Dover seems to possess certain advantages over the shorter route—the holding ground is better, the tidal currents less swift, advantage could be taken of banks and shoals along the route, and London and other Thames ports would be left open to the sea as at present. The patrol of this route does not appear to offer greater difficulties than does the present patrol of this region.

7. The General Board recommends that the British Government be informed of the substance of this letter by cable.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

APPENDIX D.

MINE CARRIERS.

The 24 vessels named below were utilized by the Navy Department for transporting mines to the advanced bases in Scotland. Twenty-three of these were taken over for exclusive use as mine carriers. The *Mercurius* was not so taken over, but the shortage of ships made it necessary to use her for one trip.

Lake Side, Manta, Lake Worth, Ozama, Choctaw, Lake Ontario, Lake Bridge, Lake Port, Kiowa, Lake Superior, Lake Wood, Lake Champlain, Lake Forest, Lake Erie, Lake Michigan, Lake View, Lake Shore, Sioux, Lake Placid, Mercurius, Lake Huron, Lake Tahoe, Carib, and Lake Moor.

Capt. PRATT. There has been a point brought up in Admiral Sims's testimony about our attempting to establish routing officers, and the idea was conveyed that these routing officers were intended to displace or disrupt the existing organization and plan, which was a British organization and a British plan, and thereby cause a certain amount of confusion, which is necessarily so in case you start to overturn a plan which is running passably well during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, in connection with convoy?

Capt. PRATT. That is in connection with convoy. That was not our idea. I know about it: I had to father the plan. I had the details in my mind constantly. I wrote the cables that went across. The idea was this, that we were very glad, and later when the submarine came on our coast did accept in toto the general principle under which the British were working. We reserved to ourselves merely a right to say how these vessels should enter our own ports, and when and where; but the officer who gave us the above assistance in fact was the British routing officer sent from the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, this plan had nothing to do with vessels going from our ports to the other side?

Capt. PRATT. No; they were handled entirely by the people on the other side. It would have been a great mistake, and we never interrupted to interfere with the plans or with how the vessels should be received on the other side. The establishment of routing even on this side was merely with the idea that later on, when we had become so thoroughly cognizant of their plans and so proficient in operating under the general joint scheme, we could relieve some of their officers for work abroad or in any place where they chose to put them, and thus take over and operate the offices which they had established in our own ports by our own people. And further, there was this idea: These offices were being established in South America, and it was a little point of pride with us that the South American countries, particularly Brazil, should be handled by our own people as soon as we knew enough about it.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a second call for a quorum of the Senate, and I think we will adjourn now until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock, Captain. You have finished that point?

Capt. PRATT. I have finished that point. There is no need of discussing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a paper upon that?

Capt. PRATT. No; I was just talking about it.

(Thereupon, at 12.27 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, April 21, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, will you continue?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

Capt. PRATT. Before starting in, I would like to correct, if I may have given an impression yesterday in my statement in regard to convoy, I would like to make a further addition to what I said in order that I might clear up any doubts that may exist in the minds of you gentlemen in regard to convoy. I said that although the principle of convoy was established early in 1917, and we approved of it in July, 1917, convoy did not take effect for westbound ships crossing the Atlantic at all during the war, although it was discussed before the armistice came on, and we were endeavoring to meet the demands. There is a difference between convoy and escort. I know that our troopships on their return voyage from France were escorted by destroyers and the patrol vessels outside of the immediate submarine zone, although that did not protect them from the cruising submarine that operated as far west as the Azores, down to the Canaries, off the Cape de Verdes, and later as far west as the United States. They were armed, with guards, and I think as far as it was possible to give them protection, the British merchant ships and our own merchant ships from Great Britain were escorted westward beyond the immediate submarine zone as far as it was possible to give them escort. The details of that I do not know, but that would be, in general, what they would strive to do. I do know, however, that the protection which could be given to westbound shipping was not as great as that which was given to eastbound shipping. It was not, in the nature of things, possible to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. They never came home in convoy?

Capt. PRATT. No; they did not. They split anyhow; if they did not split from their ports they split immediately after they came outside of the close-in submarine zone. And that helped. It was desirable to do it. It speeded up the flow, and that was recognized probably on the other side of the water far more than by us.

The CHAIRMAN. They split where the eastbound convoys would assemble, did they not?

Capt. PRATT. No; the eastbound convoys assembled in our own ports; but the ships returning to us always came in singly, having split at sea, or sailing from their own ports.

The CHAIRMAN. You were also to give us, I believe, the names of the ships which were sunk.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. As I said, I have had them looked up, and they have given me the names as the *Campania* and the *Moravia*. There was also a ship the name of which was not submitted yesterday, the *Vacuum*, which was sunk in April, when some people lost their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. There were others, also that were sunk?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; a great number of them. I just happened to mention those two.

Now, I come to the discussion, in what is called operating plans, of the Azores situation. I am making this explanation in no criticism at all, of the point of view which has been expressed on the other side, but rather to give you an expression also of our own point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "the other side"?

Capt. PRATT. Well, Admiral Sims's point of view. When I speak of the other side of the water, I speak of our people that were over there—Admiral Sims and his staff. There were two distinct points of view about the Azores.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you consider Admiral Sims the other side as far as you are concerned?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; not at all. I am speaking geographically. I was speaking of the other side of the water. I hope I am great friends with Admiral Sims, and always will be. There is no criticism one way or the other. I am trying to analyze it, and give you the Atlantic side, and he had, of course, the European point of view, and the only question is to adjust the two. We had from the very beginning made a study, and looked with a great deal of—it is difficult to get the right word. We appreciated, let us say, the position of the Azores for two distinct reasons. One was, for the small craft we were endeavoring to send across, even our 750-ton destroyers, there was the necessity of providing a place in mid-ocean from which these craft could refuel, and from there start farther east to the British and French waters. If Portugal had not been in this war, it would have been for us a tremendously difficult problem to have gotten any of the yachts, any of the subchasers, any of the tugs, and a large percentage of our destroyers across, for the simple reason that they did not have the steaming radius to cover the 3,000 miles of ocean lying between us and the British shores. For that reason it very early became a necessity for us to consider very definitely the value of a stopping place in mid-ocean. For that reason the Azores always possessed for us a very high strategic value.

Their practical importance was nil, except that it might offer a possible basing place for German submarines; and if, perchance, they were to gain possession of that spot, it would prevent us from using it and utilizing it to its full capacity, as we did later. I may say that had it not been for the Azores either on our eastward-bound expeditions in sending our small craft across, or westbound, when the armistice

tice was completed and we were sending them home, it would have been a very difficult problem for us to have accomplished at all.

Naturally, the point of view of the forces operating in London was centered more in the efforts around the British Isles, and rightly so; while we, being farther removed, could not but be impressed, and perhaps overimpressed, by the value of this stopping place in the Atlantic.

Moreover, we knew that shortly our troop movement was going to start across, and we knew that if the German submarines for one instant could base upon the Azores, they would flank our troop-transporting movement at its vital point, the point where it crossed the thirtieth meridian, being nearly there, and the point where it passed from the control on the Atlantic side to the British side of the water, and we were afraid of it, and for that reason we always sent forces there; and while they may have been more numerous at times than it was tactically right to keep there (that I will not say) its importance never left our minds, and for that reason we did have forces there rather more than for their usefulness in hunting the submarine.

The forces we had there practically amounted to the following. I am giving it in very general terms. A German submarine appeared off Punta del Gada and bombarded the place before we ever got there with any real fighting forces. We happened to have a collier in there with a gun on board. It was the *Orion*. I think we were landing coal, anticipating our future movements. She held the submarine off.

From that time on, a little later we commenced sending our forces there. Every subchaser convoy that went across had to go via the Azores. Our submarines that went over went via the Azores. Our tugs went that way and several destroyers. Some of the older ones of only 2,000 miles' radius had to either stop at the Azores or, as we in the very beginning had to do, to be fueled at sea. We had to establish a mobile oil base at sea, using some of our oilers, moving them about in the ocean very secretly, at which points our destroyers had to oil before they could go across, and we had to change the position of these oilers constantly for fear the Germans might get wind of their position and attack them.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the 2,000-mile radius destroyers coal or oil burning?

Capt. PRATT. Some oil and some coal. One, for instance, would be the *Henley*. I know she is not a good boat. The *Mayrant* would be another one. I am not qualified to speak of them, ship for ship, but it is the older type of our 750-ton boats.

The CHAIRMAN. They are mainly coal burning, are they not?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; there are only five 750-ton coal burners. There are quite a number of oil burners of 750 tons. I think that is about all that I want to speak of in regard to the Azores situation. I just wanted to say that, so as to clear up our point of view. It is a matter of adjustment more than anything else, I think.

Now, there is one other problem that has been mentioned in the course of Admiral Sims's testimony which, in the same way, I would like to clear up so that you gentlemen may get the point of view of operations on this side, and I would like to say, before going into the details of it, that I can not give too much praise to the planning section in London that Admiral Sims organized, after he got his men there.

Without their assistance we could not have done the work we did over on this side and I personally depended upon it, and upon Captains Schofield and Yarnell and others who were working in conjunction with the British Admiralty for them to send—and they did—just as complete plans as it was possible for any people to get out. Their cooperation was magnificent, and we tried to give them the same.

The battle cruiser raid plan did not in its inception start entirely with the first plan that Admiral Sims speaks of, of May 17, 1918. The idea that we all had all through 1917, and after the first German land drive in 1918, in March, was this: The main effort we shall have to protect our troops against will be a raiding effort, and they will use that type of light, fast ship which will serve best the purpose of raiding our troop convoys, and which also can be spared from the main fleet; because up to the time the Germans projected their land drive in March, 1918, I think we almost all of us felt that the land drive would come simultaneously with a fleet action, in this, that the Germans would make a united effort, not a disintegrated effort—one of sea and land—and that the submarine campaign was, in a way, a preparation for a united effort of great force. Therefore it would not have paid them, looking at the thing broadly, to have projected types into the ocean such as their battle cruisers, which would serve them a better purpose in the united sea drive of their total fleet.

So that Admiral Sims, I think, very wisely advocated, along with convoy operations, that we should send our older type battleships to go along with them. There was a difference of opinion there. Admiral Sims wanted the old battleships. Admiral Benson stuck to the idea that they should be held back as a reserve, and thought that sufficient protection would be given the troop convoys by sending the armored cruisers with them. The result was that the armored cruisers went, the old battleships did not, and we did not put the old battleships in until August of 1918. Whatever may be the theories regarding and the differences of opinion, the fact remains that Admiral Benson guessed right. They were not needed.

So we went on very much on the same line that we had been going until after the first land drive in March, 1918. That was a very critical time. But when that first wave was stopped on land, it began to be evident that the land wave, very much like the submarine wave of 1917 which culminated in April of 1917, was beginning to, or would very possibly, recede. In other words, exactly as they did in the first battle of the Marne, their first stroke was their great stroke, and it never went beyond that apex.

The same thing happened in April, 1917; the same thing happened in March of 1918; and that put a different complexion upon the problem which we had to study. That problem then became less one of two great fleet actions, and more the absolute necessity of Germany's stopping the land movement from our country across to France, and had she been wise I think, in my judgment, she would have used every effort of hers, even to sending her battleships out, to break that line; so that we began at once to feel that there must be a change of strategy necessary.

The London planning section had been thinking about that, too, and we had from them on May 17—which I will submit—a very excellent first plan, a basic plan. I will read you the decisions of that plan. It is not necessary to go into the details now, but you

will see, gentlemen, from the explanation that I made to you yesterday of the difference between a basic plan upon which you can generally prepare or get ready and make an initial move, that there is a difference between that and a definite operating plan, and as I think I have said before, we here in Washington were, by definite agreement with the Admiralty in London, responsible for the sea west of longitude 30, straight through north and south, and the British looked out for everything east of longitude 30. Therefore, it was a situation which we had to face over here, as well as Admiral Sims in London, because, regardless of whether or not a troopship had been sunk east or west of longitude 30, the first demand would have been made upon the office in Washington to explain to the people, and we would have had to have called upon Admiral Sims for the explanation in case it occurred in the waters over which the British had jurisdiction. Therefore, it became of vital necessity to see that we had a definite operating plan, which we felt would cope with the situation we might be called upon to cope with.

The CHAIRMAN. About where does longitude 30 run?

Capt. PRATT. It runs very close to the Azores. The Azores are just east of longitude 30. It is almost along that line.

Our idea of a plan of some sort was to divide the ocean practically into three parts. The area east of longitude 20 was well within the covering power of the vessels based in British waters. The area west of longitude 45 was well within the covering spots—that is, points toward which ships could retreat in case of an enemy in mid-ocean. But the area which lay between longitude 20 and longitude 45 was the disputed area, and a very dangerous area it was. I have figured out, during the days of our greatest troop movements, the number of troops that daily were crossing that doubtful area—a sort of no man's land. That number averaged 100,000 a day, almost daily; 100,000 of our men crossing that disputed area; and it was a dangerous area, too.

This was the original base plan furnished to us by the London planning office. The date of this plan is May 17, 1918. I will submit the entire plan:

[Memorandum No. 93.]

PLANNING SECTION—PROBLEM No. 13.

Subject: Battle cruiser raid.

General situation: As at present.

Required: An estimate of the threat of a raid by a German battle cruiser in the Atlantic.

Our constant naval mission in the prosecution of this war is, so far as it is related to raiders:

- 1) To destroy the raider.
- 2) To maintain sea communications.

ENEMY FORCES, THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

Enemy strength in this problem is assumed to consist of one battle cruiser—latest type—plus submarines.

The mission of the battle cruiser would be "to destroy maximum amount of shipping possible with special reference to troop convoys, and to return to a home port."

NOTE.—The accelerated rate of delivery of American troops in France will soon have a very important bearing on the military situation in France; this fact can not but be known to the enemy and may therefore cause him to take extraordinary measures to interrupt the supply of men from America.

The problem of the battle cruiser assigned to operate against shipping in the Atlantic naturally divides itself into three phases:

- 1. The escape from the North Sea.
- 2. The operations.
- 3. Return to a home port.

The battle cruiser in deciding upon the route by which to gain the Atlantic will consider the Dover Straits and the route north about.

Enemy knowledge of the barrage of the Dover Straits, the numerous mine fields in the narrow seas, the destroyers at Dover, Harwich, and in the Channel ports, of the monitors and other fighting vessels at Dover and in the Channel ports, will all serve to deter the battle cruiser from using the Dover Straits. In addition, his knowledge that all incoming transports and convoys are escorted by destroyers—that in the Channel there are numerous ports to which shipping can escape—that convoys outside the Channel would have about 24 hours' notice of his approach, that destroyers in the Channel could trail him, rendering secrecy of his movements impossible; that he would have to use high speed and thereby reduce his cruising radius; that it would be impossible for him to take fuel ships with him; that the probability of complete failure of the effort through loss in the Channel is great—are all arguments against the use of the Dover Straits route.

The north-about route has the advantages of:

- (a) Secrecy.
- (b) Moderate cruising speed until operating area is reached.
- (c) Possibility of taking one or more fuel ships along.
- (d) Possibility of using submarines as a scouting screen for the battle cruiser.
- (e) Small risk of loss when outward bound.

For these reasons the battle cruiser will undoubtedly choose the north-about route.

The fuel requirements for the two routes to an operating ground in the vicinity of the west coast of Ireland are not materially different.

In deciding upon the operations, the enemy will undoubtedly consider that the hazard to the battle cruiser is great and that in order to justify the hazard he must make certain that the results will be at least commensurate with the hazard involved. The operations possible are very closely dependent on the available fuel and consequent cruising radius of the battle cruiser—

Cruising radius at 10 knots, about 8,800 miles.

Cruising radius at 15 knots, about 6,000 miles.

Cruising radius at 24 knots, about 3,600 miles.

In planning fuel expenditure preceding the operation the enemy would probably formulate a table somewhat like the following:

| | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| Percentage of fuel supply necessary to reach a point midway between Faero Islands and Iceland outward bound on basis of two-fifths power... | per cent... | 16 |
| Percentage of fuel supply necessary as a reserve when returning by same route on basis of maximum speed..... | per cent... | 23 |
| Percentage of fuel available for operations south of Iceland, Faero Island line..... | per cent... | 4 |
| All cruising speed of 15 knots and radius for full speed on short notice at a 15 per cent extra expenditure of fuel. Then available cruising south of Iceland, Faero line is..... | miles... | 3,130 |
| If, however, provision is made for one day's steaming at 24 knots, the above cruising radius is reduced to about..... | miles... | 2,800 |
| Nearest point to a probable convoy route—north-about to Irish Sea, from Iceland, Faero line is about..... | miles... | 1,400 |
| The nearest point to a probable south-about route to Irish Sea is about... | miles... | 900 |
| The distance to Cape Finisterre via direct route is about..... | miles... | 1,200 |

From the above it appears that under the most favorable circumstances for the battle cruiser, she might steam at 15 knots, a total of 1,600 miles in an area where convoys might be encountered. This is equivalent to a total of four days' operations in the Atlantic, south of Lat. 55° N.

In considering the foregoing tabular statement he would undoubtedly conclude that it was necessary to take fuel ships with him.

In making his exit from the North Sea he will probably be preceded by cruisers and submarines acting as scouts to ensure the secrecy of his movements and may have in addition submarines posted in the general vicinity of our bases to observe movements that may indicate a knowledge on our part of his intentions.

Having made a safe exit the battle cruiser will probably re-fuel previous to beginning his operations, and will station his fuel ships at one or more points well clear of all traffic.

THE OPERATIONS.

In order to make the battle cruiser fully effective in the execution of its missions, the enemy will undoubtedly arrange for scouting by the numerous submarines he is able to send to sea; these submarines in order to be free to operate and to get contract with convoys beyond the region of destroyer escort would be stationed somewhere in the vicinity of the 20th meridian W. Other submarines stationed near ports from which convoys issue might be directed to trail them on their westbound course to sea and to keep the battle cruiser informed of progress.

Similarly eastbound convoys which may cross the scouting line of submarines would probably be trailed by submarines who would keep the battle cruiser informed of progress.

The battle cruiser would endeavor to make its first attack an overwhelming one, because thereafter it would expect a lively pursuit which would interfere with its operations.

As a successful attack in any area will unavoidably drive shipping from that area the battle cruiser will foresee this effect and plan to shift its operations to a second area, either farther west or to the Gibraltar route, submarines being stationed in that area also to give information.

The battle cruiser will expect the return of many merchant ships to port and in order to make full use of the possible panic his operations may cause, will station submarines in the vicinity of those ports nearest to the attack in order that they may operate against returning vessels.

After the first attack by the battle cruiser it is possible that it may withdraw to again refuel and in order for its scouting submarines to take up new positions.

THE RETURN.

The longer the operations last the greater the tendency toward dispersal of allied fighting forces. When the operations of the battle cruiser are finally concluded the greatest chance of success in returning to a home port would be for it to delay several days in a region remote from sea traffic before making the attempt.

SUMMARY AS TO THE BATTLE CRUISER.

- (1) Would use the north-about route.
- (2) It will take one or more fuel ships, fitted for refueling at sea.
- (3) Will operate against convoys outside of the zone of destroyer escorts.
- (4) It will use submarines as scouts to assist it in gaining contact with convoys.
- (5) It may remain at sea for many days, shifting its area of operations to suit conditions.
- (6) It may delay its return to port in order to increase its chances of success.
- (7) Increased submarine activity may be expected near ports nearest to the first attack by the battle cruiser.

OUR OWN FORCES, THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

No ocean escorts are now strong enough to oppose effectively an enemy battle cruiser. If we assume, as we have, that the battle cruiser can remain at sea for an indefinite period, fixed detours to avoid danger will not be effective, as the battle cruiser may estimate that just such detours will be made.

As to measure against the battle cruiser, two steps are necessary:

1. To get contact with one or more vessels, having speed equal to the speed of the battle cruiser.
2. To bring at least two battle cruisers against it.

The accomplishment of (1) should enable continuous warnings to be sent out and should further enable our own battle cruisers to bring the enemy to action.

Destroyers are suitable for (1) and will probably be nearest to the battle cruiser when it is first heard of.

In order to make use of them it will be necessary to reduce temporarily the number used in escort work. Available destroyers should proceed in scouting formation at moderate speed toward incoming convoys and adjust their movements to reported positions of the battle cruiser. If contact is gained the sole missions of the destroyer should be—

1. To keep touch with the battle cruiser.
2. To send out warnings.
3. To report positions.

Destroyers should exhaust their fuel and then drift rather than lose a contact gained. Fuel ships and tugs can be sent in relief of them.

Destroyers, if unsupported, can not destroy a battle cruiser, except under fortuitous conditions, so it is necessary to back up their scouting effort by battle cruisers to insure success of the operation. There are 10 battle cruisers available, but superiorities over enemy battle cruisers are needed with the Grand Fleet, three battle cruisers should be assigned to proceed toward the last reported position of the enemy battle cruiser. Since the cruising radius of our battle cruisers is small, fuel ships should be sent to sea rendezvous for their use if required.

As to protection of convoys, there are three principal methods of protection:

1. Evasion by predetermined plan.
2. Evasion in response to warnings.
3. Local protection.

Evasion by predetermined plan may be successful if battle cruiser can not reach and consequently is limited in its operations to four or five days in the area between latitude 55° N. and 43° N. In this case convoys might be sent to the southward of a circle 1,200 miles distant from the Faero-Iceland line. Eastbound convoys within this circle would in general shape their course for destination if east of battle cruiser making local detours as circumstances warranted. Westbound convoys that were east of battle cruiser position return to port—other convoys proceed, keeping station to reported position of battle cruiser until outside of 1,200-mile circle—Gibraltar convoys to continue if north of 45° N. and to take refuge as necessary if south of 45° N.

Evasion by predetermined plan is not so apt to succeed as evasion by a system of reliable warnings, leaving the route to be determined by the senior officer with each convoy. In addition evasion to the extent of new destinations will congest shipping and cause great loss of time.

Evasion in response to warnings is applicable to all situations and is now in practice. It requires—

- (a) Long distance radio equipment.
- (b) Good operators.
- (c) Continuous radio watch.

Two general principles should govern—

- (1) Convoys to proceed to destination whenever reasonable safety is assured.
- (2) If obliged to run, run directly away from last reported position of battle cruiser until a safe offing is made, then proceed according to circumstances, and if possible toward destination.

Local protection.—The only efficient local protection to convoys against battle cruisers is superior gun power in a battle cruiser or a battleship. No battle cruisers are available as escorts. The only battleships that are available are United States battleships. A modern battleship is a sufficient escort to a convoy, as the battle cruiser would have to accept battle in order to attack the convoy unless convoy dispersed, which of course it should not do. One predreadnought can be outranged by a battle cruiser, and therefore is not so good a reply, but two predreadnoughts are considered adequate to discourage an attack on a convoy by one battle cruiser.

An examination of this problem indicates the desirability, in fact, the very great desirability, of having additional battle cruisers conveniently situated for intercepting any enemy battle cruiser effort on our lines of communication with America.

This point is so important that it is recommended that an effort be made to have the battle cruiser division of Japan transferred to European waters.

NOTE.—The situation at the Dardanelles is another situation of the same general type as the one now under discussion, and one which could best be met by two or three battle cruisers supported by destroyers.

DECISIONS.

1. To scout for the battle cruisers by destroyers and other light vessels having sufficient speed that may be available.
2. To instruct the scouting vessels to trail the battle cruiser.
3. To support the scouting effort with two or three of our own battle cruisers, in order to destroy the enemy.
4. To send fuel ships to sea rendezvous for the use of our battle cruisers and scouting force.
5. To adopt the principle of evasion by convoys in response to warnings, rather than the principle of evasion by predetermined plan.
6. To protect important convoys by battleships of the United States fleet during the time when battle cruisers are out—or believed to be out.

In regard to these decisions I would say in regard to the second, "To instruct the scouting vessels to trail the battle cruiser," of course, the battle cruiser was the real danger. It was a faster type of ship than anything we had and a very powerful type of ship, second only in power to our own dreadnoughts.

In regard to the third decision, "To support the scouting effort with two or three of our own battle cruisers in order to destroy the enemy," when he says "our own battle cruisers," that means in this case with joint convoys. It is the joint plan of our people in London working with the people of the Admiralty, so that "our own battle cruisers" means British battle cruisers, because we did not have any battle cruisers.

Now, you must realize that at this time we were not escorting any of our troop convoys by battleships—not by old battleships—and had we been escorting troop convoys by our old battleships, I think I shall have to disagree with the testimony of some one officer—I have forgotten who it was—who thought that they could beat off battle cruisers with one of our old battleships. I do not think they could. That is merely opinion, but I do not think that the old battleships were equal to the new battle cruisers of the Germans. For that reason it became very essential that we should hold at positions where they could most adequately strike in case of necessity our dreadnought types, being the only ships which could cope at all with the German battle cruisers. A point of difference was this: The London office rather wanted us to make an immediate disposition of force.

That, from a military point of view, I believed to be wrong. If you have in the army a line at the front and one flank is to be threatened, you send to that flank a covering force. You send it there as a reserve to use when the other man has taken the initiative and you know what you are up against. But if you deploy that force before he has made his deployment, he has the jump on you, and you do not have it on him. So that that is why we wanted to send our dreadnoughts to the best place in Europe, one division, and move another division up to the most available place in the United States, which was Halifax, to hold them contained until we got information of the jump by the Germans, and then we would not have to throw out one or two, but we could throw out that body united, and the German never knew what we were going to do until he made a move himself. That is the reason we held the dreadnoughts together, so as to be able to throw them out to the flanks; and in that cablegram to Admiral Sims that was really the determining idea, to draw our force to the two places where we believed we could use them in the method which we believed to be the most approved of in the Army.

Now, personally, I always felt that this decision, which was rendered by the London planning section and contemplated the return of the German battle cruiser, had one fault in it. In the past we knew of one case where a German submarine interned in Spain had violated the neutrality of that country and gone to sea. A German battle cruiser had, with her coaling capacity, just about four days' active work in that disputed area, between 45 west and 20 west, in which she could work havoc; and then if she did not want to go back, she could come down and intern in Spain, and possibly be ready for another move.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain the statement you made that 100,000 men crossed the line each day between 20 and 45 degrees of longitude? That would make something over 3,000,000 men in a month.

Capt. PRATT. No. Well, there were at that time 10,000 to 15,000 men, and sometimes even as many as 20,000 in a convoy, and I think the maximum number of ships in a convoy carrying troops, that I can remember, was somewhere between 30 and 40. Now, it takes a long time to go across. We used to work it out each day, and we kept in the office an absolute track of every troop convoy and every cargo that crossed, and at 8 o'clock each morning the positions of those vessels were corrected up to date. They sailed according to sealed orders, all of those United States convoys which were personally directed, and their speed was such that we could plot from day to day exactly the position of each one of them. Now, when I said 100,000, I should qualify that by saying at any one day during the months when we were sending the maximum number across.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you mean on specific days only?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, absolutely, on specific days.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to get that straight.

Capt. PRATT. Not when we were sending only 25,000. It would have been only maximum months. I remember one day I plotted seven convoys in that zone during that congested month. Now, at an average of 15,000 men to each convoy, which is a fair average, because they run from 10,000 to 20,000, I gave it as a fairly low figure that during that time there might be 100,000 men in that zone.

The CHAIRMAN. And that might happen two or three times during the month?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. It did not happen——

Senator PITTMAN. How long did it take them to cross that zone?

Capt. PRATT. The average speed would be about 12 knots. The distance between 20 west and 45 west would be about 1,500 miles, and I think probably 5 to 7 days they would be in that zone, depending upon the speed of that convoy.

Senator PITTMAN. Then that would be 5 to 7 days they were in that area, and during any one month others would be following them up?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. That is not like crossing it in one day.

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. You would count each one of those five to seven days that they were in there?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I thought that was perfectly clear. The lowest speed of a convoy that troops were ever sent in—and that was a concession that was made during the critical months of the spring of 1918—was 10 knots. Our standard which we tried to live up to was nothing less than 15 knots, because speed is one of the most important factors in meeting the submarine menace. Remember, I am not giving you this explanation in any spirit of criticism at all of the attitude that Admiral Sims has taken, because we did not think there was any criticism; just a matter of adjustment, that is all, and I wanted to explain, because the question had not been entirely thrashed out fully.

O—Simson—8.

VPT.

MSADUS:

Reference planning section, memorandum 26, battle cruiser raid. The department is of the opinion that raid by a battle cruiser against the supply lines to European ports, particularly against troop convoys, is a possibility, and that even if the chance be remote it should be guarded against. The department further notes that the decisions arrived at as modified by the action actually contemplated by the Admiralty, while guarding shipping leaving port after notice of the escape of an enemy battle cruiser has been promulgated, is in the nature of a negative decision and affords only partial relief to shipping then in transit between United States and European ports. The department therefore proposes the following definite plans for consideration and action: General note, plans to be applicable to United States troop convoys, cargo convoys to French bay ports, and convoys carrying United States troops, other convoys to utilize plan if considered desirable by the Admiralty. Plan drawn on line of battle cruiser escaping by way of the North Sea around north end of Scotland, though with slight modification it is applicable also to enemy battle cruiser escaping from Black Sea. Definite information of escape of enemy should be given to all forces before enemy has crossed Scotland to Ireland lines or has gotten clear of Aegean Sea. Plan applicable to both eastbound and westbound shipping. Special details: The Navy Department has asked the State Department to request of Japan that she detail four battle cruisers to base with the Atlantic Fleet at Hampton Roads. The North Atlantic to be divided into three areas, first west Atlantic 45 W. to United States Coast, and mid-Atlantic 20 W. to 45 W., east Atlantic 20 W. to east Atlantic destination. The United States to station division 6, consisting of the *Utah*, *Nevada*, *Alabama*, at Queenstown or Brest, preferably the former port or vicinity, to act as wider guard against battle cruiser in the mid-Atlantic and eastern section. To hold the eighth division, consisting of *Arizona*, *Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, *Pennsylvania*, to cover the west Atlantic section or to proceed where necessary. To use the Japanese battle cruisers, if they are detailed to work with our forces, for the purposes of direct pursuit. Eastbound convoys, all convoys between 45 and the United States return to the nearest United States or Canadian port, there to await for adequate escort. Furnish two old battleships as escort for each convoy carrying troops.

If practicable expend the same escort to cargo convoys, and where this is not practicable use two armored cruisers for escort to cargo convoys; all convoys east of meridian to proceed to destination at top speed; convoys between 45 W. and 30 W. divert immediately to Azores and make for an anchorage or lee under island San Miguel; convoys between 30 W. and 20 W. divert to San Miguel or proceed to destination or nearest port as circumstances demand, depending upon estimated position of enemy cruiser relative to position and speed of convoy. Westbound shipping: Shipping between 15 W. and European ports return to port to await adequate escort or divert to San Miguel, Azores, depending upon submarine situation; ships between 15 W. and 45 W. to Azores or to nearest United States or Canadian port, depending upon their proximity to those points. Ships to westward of 45 W. route to destination or to nearest port. Utilize the *Delaware* and *North Dakota* with divisions 2, 3, 4, 5, battleship force, to escort troop convoys; utilize cruiser force to escort cargo convoys; hold division 8, battleship force, with one division destroyer force instant readiness to proceed; dispatch division 6 with two divisions of destroyer force in European waters to proceed at top speed to Azores, San Miguel. Use Japanese battle cruisers as pursuit division if they are detailed to cooperate with United States forces and if such plan is agreeable to them.

Above plan to become effective immediately upon agreement and to be put into operation upon receipt of broadcasted radio and cable stating that enemy battle cruisers had escaped from North Sea. The Navy Department to maintain an adequate supply of coal and oil in European waters and Azores to meet the logistic needs of division 6, battleship force. This above plan is suggested a possible counter to any enemy battle cruiser or small force of enemy ships escaping from the North Sea and attempting to raid our lane communication before interning in some neutral port or escaping to other seas. Modification suggested for raiding force escaping from Adriatic or Dardanelles. Shipping east or west bound between meridians 20 and 45 and north of latitude 45 proceed to destination or to nearest port at top speed.

OPNAV.

Notation made by Capt. Pratt.

Sent 30 or 31 July, 1918.

Chief of Naval Operations, which he complains of, seem to me to be based on a misconception of his position relative to that of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The office of Naval Operations—that office which is charged with the preparation and operation of the fleet and of all naval forces, committed errors, some of which were as stated in Admiral Sims's letter; but that we in particular, and the Navy Department in general did not enter whole-heartedly into the campaign, I can, with authority deny. How we could best get into the campaign in the shortest time was all we thought about. With all the foresight imaginable, with all the preparation possible, it takes time to get into a war in full force. The problems which confronted us were stupendous, and Admiral Sims seems to have overlooked these difficulties, or at least he has not mentioned them. His was the task of asking for things, ours the work of supplying them. There were not issued to Admiral Sims any instructions beyond the simple statement of July 3, 1917, above referred to, for the reason that the department did not, during the entire war change its general attitude toward the policy therein indicated, though it allowed itself the right from time to time to make such concessions as would best further the allied cause. It was best fitting that this broad outline of our naval policy should go to the State Department direct and that Admiral Sims should be furnished with a copy. The department relied on him, in close touch with the Allies, while guided by its fundamental principles, to formulate all general war plans within the area of his command and to send them back to us as the basis upon which we could begin our work. Plan after plan of his was handled that way. It is a proof of the cooperation we gave him that these matters were handled in this manner.

Admiral Sims himself says, in his statement of the case, that the department did accept all of his plans and policies some six months after they were first made, but he does not seem to realize that they were the basis upon which we worked from the start. As to the adequateness of plans made ahead of time to cope with the particular situation which confronted us upon entry into the war, it can be said that the general board, which was the father and custodian of plans, had in its files many of them made in peace. None fitted this particular case in war. And none could ever meet this situation efficiently until Admiral Sims, as he himself has told us, could get in touch with the Admiralty and with the naval departments of the Allies and find out from them the real needs of the war. And he does not know, or at least he does not state that upon the basis of this information, in the early part of June, the process of switching the entire building program of the Navy from its battleship construction to chasers, destroyers, tugs, aircraft, and supply ships was begun. More destroyers were added in an entirely new program and room made on the ways for merchant ships. To-day I can find nothing in the evidence presented which makes me change my mind as to the soundness, in the main, of the policies indicated as the department's policies. In war, the Secretary of the Navy must lean on his naval adviser, the Chief of Naval Operations, who with his aides must assume the responsibility of the general conduct of the naval operations of the war. Subject to instant removal from office by the Secretary, if he is derelict in his duties, or fails to have the broad

grasp of the situation which the gravity of war necessitates, the naval head must have military control in naval matters, and must accept the responsibility for the same.

This situation was accepted, the operations of war conducted along these lines. To have interfered in military matters would have been folly, and this the Secretary of Navy (for he represents the Navy Department) did not do, so far as plans, policy, and operations are concerned, at any time when I was acting Chief of Naval Operations, while Admiral Benson was absent aboard. The competency of the military head to make decisions on military matters was not questioned. That there were delays, that there were mistakes, that it took time before we got into this war in full force, is fully and frankly admitted, but that the guiding and directing heads in Washington of our naval establishment had, in the main, any misconception of their mission, or lacked in their willingness to fully cooperate with the Allies, I deny. Some of the reasons why our Navy did not more quickly enter into the war in full force are perfectly natural reasons, and will happen in any war. With the knowledge gained in this war, some might be avoided in future. Some of those which I think might be avoided are, lack of material preparation in the ships commissioned, lack of adequate supplies, and supply and repair bases, lack of sufficient personnel and facilities to train same; a building program planned specifically to meet the needs of the war the country intends to engage in, modern methods of organization and administration, and the maintenance of these nucleus organizations in peace, a budget system, an adequate sum of money ready at hand to be used at once as necessity dictates, a sum not to be mortgaged for any other purpose than that of national defense. But behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people, expressed through the proper authorities, that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time, and that within this limit of time they will give, through the proper channels, to their military leaders the power and means to so prepare and organize, that at the appointed time these organizations may strike.

This practically presupposes a military and autocratic form of government, for in no purely democratic government do I believe this instant preparedness will ever exist. The two forms of preparedness, and the most efficient which it is thought a democratic government will ever sanction lies first in its fleet and second, in certain essential methods of training of the youth of our country. Behind the barricade of our fleet all other war preparations may ripen. The readiness to strike instantly has always been the military man's dream. This thought is aggressive. It savors of the motives that have impelled the great military nations of the world. It grips our naval and military men's minds, though they be thoroughly democratic at heart, because the habits of a life time and thought have tended to make them see more clearly along the straight road of mechanical efficiency, than down the more devious but natural paths that human nature treads. The truths of my assumption are, I believe, to be found in the history of Great Britain, one of the greatest democracies in the world. Especially would I point to her position at the time this great war broke. With an experience in European wars much greater than ours, with a warning of what might take place well ahead of time, the initial stroke found her un-

prepared to wage an aggressive war. Behind her fleet she was forced to build up her military strength. Behind the bulwarks of the allied and of our own fleets, we built up our full military and naval strength. A democratic government will, in my opinion, never be prepared to wage aggressive war in full strength, at the start.

Admiral Sims has presented his evidence against the department and particularly against the Office of Operations, with a great array of facts. Facts are like bricks; properly assembled they form an imposing edifice, but if this structure is to be enduring, these facts must be united by the cement of sound reason. In making any just estimate of the situation which confronted our Navy, both at its entry into and during the progress of the war, no one man's opinion, however important be his post, can be given undue weight, but all of the conditions and influences here and abroad which acted on our naval war problem as a whole must be put in the balance and weighed. This problem was never localized. Our total naval effort had to be so adjusted that its weight was thrown to greatest advantage against the enemy forces as a whole. To this end it was necessary that we coordinate both abroad and at home our efforts with those of all our allies and with our own military and civil forces. This the Navy did successfully, as its record shows.

There is one charge, and only one, in this whole controversy which is grave, and this was not in the original letter. It is as follows:

I am convinced that our failure to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during these first six months seriously and unnecessarily jeopardized the outcome of the whole war. In my opinion, it undoubtedly resulted in lengthening the war by several months, through the increased losses in merchant shipping that resulted therefrom. I believe that this failure, combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous, and the few months subsequent, to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months. Since the average loss of life per day was about 3,000 and the total daily cost was more than \$100,000,000, it can be appreciated what this delay meant to humanity, and how serious was any fault that resulted in materially prolonging hostilities.

I have told you of the Navy's struggle to prepare after war was declared. You have the figures showing the number of our destroyers, the best type of antisubmarine craft in the world, and other antisubmarine craft sent to Europe. You have been told of the plans made to build more destroyers. You have had testimony as to our willingness to cooperate in every way possible. What does Admiral Sims mean by the words, "I believe that this failure, considered with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous, and the few months subsequent, to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months." What does he mean? Can we, a nation at peace, and bound by the laws of neutrality, can we, no matter what our inclinations may be, perform those overt acts of preparation, which are only justified as acts of war? A mass of figures, cables, and data have been submitted to substantiate the assumption made that our delay put victory four months behind, and cost humanity the price stated. This I deny. I wish to introduce a bit of evidence which controverts Admiral Sims's assumption that the few remaining craft we had on this side of the ocean could have been an influencing factor upon the early termination of the war. That power did not lie in the relative

distribution of our forces but in the relative distribution of the forces of the British Navy.

I have here a plan of January 21, 1918, from the London planning section, of which I wish to submit only extracts. I will hand this manuscript to you gentlemen so that you may read it. You will see there are certain statements made in that plan which it would not be wise to publish. You can read the figures that I have taken and put in this memorandum so as to see that I have made no mistake about the figures.

The CHAIRMAN. You cover everything in the memorandum that you wish to submit?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think so; but I hand this to you because I would like to have you see the reasons, down there, why I would prefer not to submit it as a whole. [Reading:]

Memorandum showing the relative proportions of destroyers with the Grand Fleet and engaged in antisubmarine warfare exclusively. Date, January 21, 1918.

When I make this statement in regard to the destroyers with the Grand Fleet, remember that I do not say they were not used to a certain extent on convoy operations. They were. I have inquired of Admiral Rodman as to exactly the operations that they participated in. But I do state that this was a minor function of theirs, and that their major function was the screening and operating with the Grand Fleet; so that their antisubmarine operations, therefore, were not of as great importance as those of the craft that were detailed exclusively for antisubmarine work. [Continuing reading:]

This data is taken from the plan furnished by Admiral Sims's planning section in London. The figures are, therefore, their own. The problem is known as Problem 2. It was worked out on January 21, 1918, and the figures fairly well represent the conditions that existed throughout the summer, spring, and fall of 1917. In the solution of this problem it was decided that the basic naval mission was "To further a successful decision on land."

The general mission was, "To obtain command of the sea."

The immediate mission was, "To obtain subsurface command of the sea, while retaining command of the seas."

Translated into ordinary language it meant just what Admiral Sims meant, "Get everything after the submarine you can, and get after him as hard as you can, provided that in so doing you do not jeopardize your chances of control of the surface of the sea." To maintain surface control the Grand Fleet had to be held ready at instant notice and it had to be guarded by destroyers, the best antisubmarine craft known. It is all granted. However, the interesting feature in this as bearing very distinctly on the antisubmarine efforts going on around the British Isles lies in the distribution the British themselves made of their destroyers. I will quote the figures:

With the Grand Fleet, 111 destroyers.

In British Isles, apart from Grand Fleet, 213 destroyers, of which 37 were United States destroyers.

NOTE.—The above vessels are engaged in escort duty and antisubmarine work.

The CHAIRMAN. That is taken from this manuscript of this memorandum?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. The 213 vessels were engaged in escort duty, in antisubmarine work. I will submit another paper bearing on the same subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any objection to putting this complete manuscript in with the paragraphs to which you have referred deleted?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The British would have no objection to that being done?

Capt. PRATT. I do not think they would.

Senator PITTMAN. Then, we will put that in, following your discussion of this subject?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing else objectionable except the paragraphs you have marked?

Capt. PRATT. I would like to scan that a little more closely. Mr. Chairman, and then I will just put red marks through what should be left out.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The memorandum referred to, and the plan of the London office with necessary omissions, are here printed in the record as follows:

RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF DESTROYERS WITH THE GRAND FLEET AND ENGAGED IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE EXCLUSIVELY.

JANUARY 21, 1918.

This data is taken from the plan furnished by Admiral Sims's planning section in London. The figures are therefore their own. The problem is known as problem 2. It was worked out on January 21, 1918, and the figures probably fairly well represent the conditions that existed throughout the summer, spring, and fall of 1917. In the solution of this problem it was decided that the basic naval mission was "to further a successful decision on land."

The general mission was, "to obtain command of the sea."

The immediate mission was, "to obtain subsurface command of the sea, while retaining command of the seas."

Translated into ordinary language it meant just what Admiral Sims meant. "Get everything after the submarine you can, and get after him as hard as you can, provided that in doing so you do not jeopardize your chances of control of the surface of the sea." To maintain surface control the Grand Fleet had to be held ready at instant notice and it had to be guarded by destroyers, the best antisubmarine craft known. It is all granted. However, the interesting feature in this as bearing very distinctly on the antisubmarine efforts going on around the British Isles lies in the distribution of the British themselves made of their destroyers. I will quote the figures: With the Grand Fleet, 111 destroyers; in British Isles apart from Grand Fleet, 213 destroyers, of which 37 were United States destroyers.

NOTE. The above vessels are engaged in escort duty and antisubmarine work.

[Memorandum No. 8.]

LONDON PLANNING SECTION—*Problem No. 2.*

JANUARY 21, 1918.

General situation: As at present.

Special situation: The Allies and the United States have decided to continue the war to a victorious peace.

Required: Estimate of the general naval situation in relation to the war as a whole.

CONCLUSION REACHED.

General: (1) To provide for united action of allied naval efforts in conformity with the naval missions and irrespective of local situations and special interests; (2) to unify commands where desirable in certain areas, such as the English Channel and the Adriatic; (4) to reinforce the Grand Fleet with United States battleships if the barrage operations require it, or, if thereby troops in Great Britain can be released for service in France; (5) to develop plans for concentrated air attacks on enemy submarine bases in the North Sea and the Adriatic; (6) to develop plans for attacks with surface vessels against enemy Adriatic bases; (7) to prepare to destroy Russian Baltic ships should their capture by the enemy become imminent; (8) to give special study to the matter of mine barrages in the English Channel and the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

Antisubmarine: (1) To devote the maximum possible antisubmarine force to offensive operations; (2) to develop with the greatest possible rapidity hunting groups equipped with listening devices and manned by the best trained personnel available from all sources; (3) to equip vessels engaged in antisubmarine warfare with adequate means for taking the maximum tactical advantage of every contact with an enemy submarine; (4) to arm heavily (with full gun's crews for each gun) about 1 merchant ship in 10, of each general class, in the North and South Atlantic; and as far as practicable to escort convoys with such heavily armed merchant ships.

DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM.

The following discussion of the problem was set down by the planning section in order to clear up their understanding of the problem and thereby facilitate its solution.

The problem proposed is the most general of all naval problems of the war now in progress.

From the standpoint of joint naval action the statement of the special situation and of what is required in the solution must be accepted as sound. If we aim at anything less than a victorious peace, we are led to put forth less than our maximum effort and we commit ourselves to a military policy which can never support properly the aims of belligerents. War has for its object to impose our will upon the will of the enemy. The surest method of achieving this object is by victory, for then the enemy is compelled to submit and the maximum degree of permanency is given our achievement.

If we determine upon lines of procedure that are not in proper support of the war as a whole, we thereby favor special interests and introduce friction among Allies that may create dangers of the first magnitude.

METHOD OF SOLUTION.

The solution of a problem so general as this one is the first step in the formulation of a general plan of action. The first step in the solution is to determine a statement in concise form of that which the conditions of the problem require should be accomplished. This statement in the first instance takes a sufficiently inclusive form to cover the entire task to be undertaken. A further examination of the task thus determined in connection with special circumstances may enable us to determine upon a more concrete statement of the task. When the most thoroughly concrete, and at the same time, inclusive statement of the task is determined, we thereafter investigate the ways of accomplishing the task determined upon and finally decide upon a definite way for its accomplishment. Thereafter, whenever any related question arises for decision, we must examine it in the light of the task to be accomplished and decide the question in the way best calculated to support the effort to accomplish that task. If the most concrete statement of the task is not sufficiently general to guide us in our decision, we must refer our question to the next more general statement of the task, or, as we call it, the mission.

In the problem under consideration, we approach the determination of our naval mission as follows:

DETERMINATION OF OUR NAVAL MISSIONS.

The fundamental end in view, of sea power is the support of land power. Success on the sea alone can not force peace terms as favorable as those to be gained by corresponding success ashore. The effectiveness of sea power is, therefore, to be measured by the degree of success with which it fulfills its rôle as the support of land power.

From these considerations are deduced the basic naval mission in this war: "To further a successful decision on land."

The best general means of bringing about sea conditions favorable to shore success, lie in the establishment of command of the sea. Such command is useful only insofar as it furthers command of the land, and is not, therefore, within itself an ultimate objective, but merely one of the preliminary means essential to that end. When it is accomplished, the resources of the friendly and neutral world are made available for the logistical support of our Army and people, and we gain the strategic freedom offered by the sea to strike with, or at, shore power in otherwise inaccessible places, while the enemy is at the same time correspondingly restricted.

The general naval mission is therefore: "To obtain command of the sea."

Command of the sea may be established either by destroying enemy naval forces, by effectually containing them, or by so nullifying the effect of their activities as to reduce it to negligible proportions.

At the present time, partial command of the sea has been established by the forces of the Allies and the United States. The enemy's surface craft are effectually contained by an overwhelming force within the immediate vicinity of his home waters—the Adriatic and the Baltic. The enemy fleet commands the Baltic and is free to enter the North Sea, but no movement on its part in these waters can have a serious influence upon our land operations.

The high seas fleet is rendered practically impotent by the mere presence of the Grand Fleet covering the exits of the North Sea. On the other hand, the submarine command of the sea has not been even approximately established. The enemy submarines enter freely the Atlantic and prey upon commerce with the avowed object of impairing the supply and morale of allied civil populace and armies in the field. In other words, submarine warfare is directed against land power, upon which sea power rests and for the maintenance of which it exists solely.

The enemy is making of submarine warfare his principal naval effort, thus conforming directly with his basic naval mission of "furthering a successful decision on land." We are concentrating our major effort on maintaining surface command of the sea, which is doubly assured, while by virtue of his command of the subsea the enemy is placing our land power in serious jeopardy.

Our tonnage losses, with corresponding shortages of fuel, food, and munitions, are already having a great influence on the morale of the civil populations, elevating the enemy's morale, depressing our own. These losses and shortages are already affecting seriously the main land strategy in Italy and France. They have already made it impossible for the United States to develop quickly its full strength on the western front.

Sinkage of and damage to shipping due to torpedoes, mines, and accidents attributable to the submarine warfare, continue greatly in excess of repairs and new construction and at a rate which is alarming when viewed from the standpoint of that support to the land power that is essential to prevent defeat.

Our special and immediate mission therefore becomes: "To obtain subsurface command of the sea, while still retaining command of the surface of the sea."

Enemy forces—their strength, disposition, and probable intentions.

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES.

British Isles (British and United States).

- (a) Grand Fleet (6 Jan.):
 41 dreadnaughts.
 11 battle cruisers.
 31 light cruisers.
 7 cruisers.
 13 flotilla leaders.
 111 destroyers.
 12 T. S. mine sweepers.
 36 trawlers.
 18 sloops.
 38 submarines.
 5 hydrophone ships.
 3 seaplane carriers.

ENEMY NAVAL FORCES.

North Sea.

- (a) High Sea Fleet:
 19 dreadnaughts.
 5 battle cruisers.
 10 light cruisers.
 2 mine-laying cruisers.
 88 destroyers.
 50 torpedo boats.
 30 M. boats.
 45 trawlers.
 (b) Harbor flotillas:
 13 destroyers.
 24 trawlers.
 (c) Naval forces in Flanders:
 15 destroyers.
 16 torpedo boats.

(d) Naval forces in Baltic:

- 3 light cruisers.
 42 destroyers.
 8 torpedo boats.
 6 M. boats.
 116 trawlers.

(e) Submarine force (including Flanders force):

- 5 light cruisers (old).
 9 destroyers.
 16 torpedo boats.
 6 U. cruisers.
 54 U. type.
 50 U. B. type.
 20 U. C. type.

(f) Training center:

- 8 old battleships.
 3 light cruisers.
 12 destroyers.
 5 torpedo boats.
 20 submarines.

(g) Vessels not embodied in regular formation:

- 10 old battleships.
 6 coast-defense ships.
 3 cruisers.
 13 light cruisers.
 2 mine-laying cruisers.
 33 mining vessels.
 21 destroyers.
 51 torpedo boats.
 50 armed merchant vessels.
 6 auxiliary mine layers.

Summary of British (and United States) forces available for fleet engagement.

Assuming that forces (b), (c), and (f) are available, also local defense destroyers at Scapa Flow, there can be assembled to meet the enemy force—

- 41 dreadnaughts.
- 11 battle cruisers.
- 43 light cruisers.
- 7 cruisers.
- 22 flotilla leaders.
- 184 destroyers.
- Submarines.

If the above assumption shall not hold, the Grand Fleet will have—

- 31 light cruisers.
- 13 flotilla leaders.
- 111 destroyers.

Probable additions by July 1, 1918.

4 dreadnaughts (United States).

Summary of North Sea Forces.

The following summary gives the maximum number of vessels that Germany could bring to bear in a general fleet engagement:

- 19 dreadnaughts.
- 5 battle cruisers.
- 34 light cruisers.
- 4 mine-laying cruisers.
- 196 destroyers.
- 146 torpedo boats.
- 18 old battleships.
- 3 old cruisers.
- 6 auxiliary mine layers.
- 150 submarines.

The torpedo boats are of no value except perhaps in an engagement near the German coast. Probably not more than 8 or 10 of the old battleships are in condition for sea.

Probable additions by July 1, 1918.

- 2 dreadnaughts.
- 2 battle cruisers.
- 2 light cruisers.
- 2 mine-laying cruisers.
- 12 destroyers.
- Torpedo boats.
- 70 submarines.

Total forces in British waters apart from Grand Fleet (a).

- 13 light cruisers.
- 213 destroyers.
- 9 flotilla leaders.
- 15 monitors.
- 68 submarines.
- 64 torpedo boats.
- 23 sloops.

The above vessels are engaged in escort duty and antisubmarine work. (Does not include trawlers or small patrol boats.)

Possible addition of Russian Baltic Fleet.

It is possible that the following units may be captured or turned over to Germany:

- 4 dreadnaughts.
- 3 predreadnaughts.
- 9 cruisers.
- 60 destroyers (approximately).

French forces in Atlantic.

- 24 destroyers.
- 59 torpedo boats.
- 25 submarines.
- 92 trawlers.
- 40 sweepers.
- 100 patrol boats.
- 10 gunboats.

These vessels are distributed in the channel and Bay of Biscay ports.

United States naval forces in French Atlantic.

- 30 armed yachts and trawlers.
- 7 destroyers.

French forces in Mediterranean.

- 7 dreadnaughts.
- 8 predreadnaughts.
- 4 armored cruisers.
- 6 old cruisers.
- 75 destroyers.
- 48 torpedo boats.
- 37 submarines.
- 17 gunboats.
- 160 trawlers.
- 250 vessels (miscellaneous).

British forces in Mediterranean.

- 3 predreadnaughts.
- 4 cruisers.
- 12 light cruisers.
- 14 monitors.
- 28 sloops.
- 45 destroyers.
- 18 torpedo boats.
- 12 submarines.

Austrian Fleet (Mediterranean).

- 4 dreadnaughts.
- 6 predreadnaughts.
- 4 old predreadnaughts.
- 2 cruisers.
- 10 light cruisers.
- 16 destroyers.
- 42 H. S. torpedo boats.
- 2 mine layers.
- 54 submarines (including German).

Probable additions by July 1, 1918.

- 2 dreadnaughts.
- 3 light cruisers.
- A few destroyers and submarines.

Turkish Fleet.

1 old battleship.
1 battle cruiser.
2 light cruisers.
8 destroyers.
8 torpedo boats.
? submarines (German).

Italian forces in Mediterranean.

5 dreadnaughts.
4 predreadnaughts.
5 old predreadnaughts.
7 cruisers.
10 light cruisers.
7 flotilla leaders.
43 destroyers.
26 H. S. torpedo boats.
50 submarines.

Japanese forces in Mediterranean.

14 destroyers.

United States forces in Mediterranean-Gil.

4 destroyers.
20 other craft.

Summary of Mediterranean forces.

12 dreadnaughts.
20 predreadnaughts.
23 cruisers.
22 light cruisers.
7 flotilla leaders.
181 destroyers.
92 torpedo boats.
100 submarines.

Summary of Mediterranean forces.

4 dreadnaughts.
11 predreadnaughts.
1 battle cruiser.
2 cruisers.
12 light cruisers.
24 destroyers.
50 torpedo boats.
60 submarines.

From an examination of the above disposition of enemy forces we see that they are divided into three general groups:

- (1) The North Sea group.
- (2) The Adriatic group.
- (3) The Sea of Marmora group.

In every case the surface craft are contained and the submarine have exit to the high seas.

Political considerations.—The entire subordination of the military and naval strategy of the enemy to his State policies requires that we have in mind his state policies and his present condition.

Military policy.—The only guide to the future policy of the German Army which we can follow is the presumption that the policy it has pursued in the past will be continued. We may assume that Germany plans to hold the western front and to direct her military offensive first against the remaining weak points of her enemies, the Palestine front, the Salonika front, and the Italian front, unless—

(1) Conditions in Germany are such as to demand an immediate decision on land, or—

(2) The Germans believe that their reinforcements on the western front, together with some recently developed surprise weapon, may give them reasonable assurance of victory.

In examining the probable intentions of the enemy, we have first of all to consider the mission imposed upon his naval forces by his situation and aims.

The war that the enemy is waging is a land war. He must succeed on land if he is to dictate the terms of peace. In order to dictate the terms of peace, he must break down the will of his strongest enemies. His strongest enemies are on the western and on the Italian fronts. If he succeeds on both of these fronts, he will win the war. His strategy to date has been to strike on the weaker fronts, while holding the stronger fronts. He has endeavored to deprive one front after another of the ability to take the offensive. He has been successful in this on all important fronts, except the western front. He has utilized his successes to strengthen his forces on the more important fronts.

From the beginning of the war, he has realized that the great effort of his enemies on the western and on the Italian fronts had to be supported by way of the sea. He has organized the support of his own forces and directed his own land strategy so that he could do without sea communications outside the Baltic. His basic naval mission has, therefore, been to give the maximum support to his land forces in obtaining a successful decision on land.

The special features of his strategic position have caused him to conclude that he could best support his land forces by naval effort if he concentrated that effort on—

The maximum possible sustained attack on the sea communications of the Allies.

There can be no question but that this is the governing mission of his active naval forces to-day and that it will continue to be their governing mission. Knowing this

But we must not lose sight of its importance nor fail to avail ourselves of the opportunities that the knowledge gives us. The enemy thinks and acts according to his training. He has been taught the doctrine of concentration of effort so long that now it is a part of his nature. He first determines his mission and then devotes all his energy to the accomplishment of that mission. He never loses sight of his mission. Side effort is no part of his plan, except it promises more toward the accomplishment of his mission than direct effort. He sees his goal and goes toward it with all the power at his disposal.

The enemy has found that his high seas fleet can not attack the sea communications of the Allies. He has found that his submarines alone are capable of a sustained attack on the sea communications of the Allies. These facts compel him to assign the principal active rôle in the accomplishment of his naval mission to his submarines. Such assignment appears to leave his high seas fleet without a clearly defined mission. This, however, is not the case. His submarines can not do their work unless they have access to the high seas. His submarines are incapable of maintaining for themselves a freedom of exit to the high seas, but must depend for this upon the high seas fleet.

The mission of the high seas fleet is therefore so far as their principal activity is concerned—

To further the submarine campaign to the maximum degree.

This mission includes as an immediate and continuous mission to maintain freedom of passage to and from the high seas for submarines.

Enemy surface craft in the Heligoland Bight, in the Adriatic, the Kattegat, and the Straits of Dover, have always striven to keep clear the way for his submarines to the open sea. Their activities have not indicated any other definite intention—any other mission than that given above. We do not refer here to isolated instances of raiders and raiders.

The high seas fleet serves other and very important purposes for the enemy. Without the high seas fleet, Germany could not even dream of an invasion of England; with the high seas fleet the threat of invasion is sufficient to immobilize a large number of troops in England that might otherwise be on the western front. Further, the high seas fleet, by its mere existence in readiness, compels the immobilization of a superior naval force that must be held ready to meet any move the high seas fleet may make, which force might, except for the existence of the high seas fleet, be used in anti-submarine effort. It would obviously be unsound for the high seas fleet to engage in any enterprise that would greatly impair its threat or its holding power, unless that enterprise gave promise of a favorable decision of the war.

The enemy's strategy on land is closely associated with his strategy on the sea. The enemy attack on the communications of our armies is not for enemy naval forces alone. Enemy armies participate in this attack. The defeat at the Dardanelles was a distinct blow to our communications. It denied to us the war treasures of the Black Sea, and equally denied to the Russians a channel of reinforcement. The enemy advance in Belgium to the coast was a distinct attack on the communications of our armies on the western front. It opened the Belgian ports to his submarines and gave them the great advantage of proximity to areas congested with our shipping. We are now in a position to examine the probable intentions of the enemy and then to make use of these in determining upon our own courses of action.

In striving to accomplish his missions, we may expect the enemy to:

- 1) Continue his present submarine campaign.
- 2) To enlarge the theater of submarine activity as fast as our antisubmarine measures become effective in congested waters.
- 3) To operate his cruiser submarines in distant waters to encourage a dispersal of our forces and to give his cruiser submarines greater tactical freedom. The locality in which a vessel is sunk is no longer of great importance. Quantity of tonnage sunk is what the enemy desires first.
- 4) To continue to control the Heligoland Bight, the Kattegat and the Baltic with his high seas fleet.
- 5) To concentrate his air activity in support of his land forces except in so far as aircraft may be required for the protection of naval vessels near their bases.
- 6) To intensify his submarine campaign in support of his military offensive—wherever that may be.
- 7) There is one possible intention of the enemy that needs careful consideration. He must assume that he knows of the proposed barrage. He must know that we expect to make that barrage effective. He will surely see that we would not make so great an effort without at the same time closing the Straits of Dover. The two efforts, if successful, mean the blocking of his submarines. The mission of his high

seas fleet is to prevent such a blockade. How will that fleet accomplish that mission? On account of his numerical inferiority in surface vessels, the enemy will foresee the necessity for a base nearer to the barrage than any base that we possess. He will not hesitate to secure the great advantage such a base would give him.

OUR OWN FORCES—STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

Strength and disposition: As shown above.

COURSES OPEN TO US.

It is well to repeat the mission of the allied naval forces:

"To obtain subsurface command of the sea, while still retaining command of the surface of the sea."

The attainment of the subsurface command of the sea is to-day of paramount importance to the allied forces. Victory or defeat depends upon an immediate solution of this problem. Submarines have sunk 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping since the beginning of the war, and the sinkings continue at an average rate of 500,000 to 600,000 tons per month. The effect of the shortage of shipping is apparent on the whole allied front from the North Sea to Mesopotamia.

CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT AND UNITY OF ACTION.

These conditions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, and are especially so in the antisubmarine campaign, where the maximum effort of all the Allies is essential and where escort requirements have led to a great dispersal of force.

Greater results can probably be obtained with our air forces and with inshore forces by placing all operations in certain areas, such as the English Channel or the Adriatic, under one command.

The Allies and the United States are handicapped by the lack of central direction to political, military and naval effort, and by the difficulties of coordination, due to differences of language, race, and political aims, as well as to lack of common doctrine of war.

Individually we are handicapped by a less perfect system than that employed by the enemy to harmonize military effort, naval effort and state policy, and to organize and use the entire resource of the state for war. The success or failure of the present military and naval councils will depend on the extent to which they can harmonize and coordinate the allied efforts and bring about unity of action for the purpose of winning the war.

COMMAND OF THE SEA.

"Command of the sea" includes two distinct ideas:

(1) The free use of the sea for one's own forces and commerce.
(2) The denial of such use of the sea to the enemy. Both of these advantages may be obtained by driving all enemy fighting craft from the sea. During the period when the command of the sea is not complete, we require two forms of military effort:

(1) Offensive effort directed against all enemy vessels and where possible against their bases.

(2) Defensive effort, which in general gives local protection to vessels at sea.

SURFACE COMMAND OF THE SEA.

The Allies have retained surface command of the sea since the beginning of the war. Isolated raiders have escaped from the North Sea, and attacks have been made on the English coast, and Norwegian and Dutch convoys, but such enemy action cannot be entirely prevented, and has but a small influence on the course of the war.

The Grand Fleet has superiority of nearly 2 to 1 over the high sea fleet in all units except destroyers.

The mission of the high-seas fleet is "To further the submarine campaign to the maximum degree."

We are reasonably certain that the high-seas fleet will never seek decisive action nor place itself in serious jeopardy, unless it is necessary to secure the free passage of the submarines to the open sea.

The following present and future features of the North Sea situation may render an increase of the Grand Fleet necessary:

(1) The possible addition of the *Prinzess Alice* to the enemy forces—4 dreadnoughts and about 60 destroyers.

2 The added sense of security that the Grand Fleet reinforcements will give to Great Britain against any fear of invasion.

3 Future developments in connection with the North Sea barrage which may require considerable detachments from the Grand Fleet.

4 The escape to the Atlantic of enemy battle cruisers and commerce destroyers. The addition of Russian battleships to enemy forces can be met by the transfer of United States battleships to European waters. The Russian destroyers may be met by new construction, the transfer of destroyers from antisubmarine operations, or the addition of Japanese destroyers.

Our submarines in the Baltic may destroy Russian ships when danger of the enemy reaching them over becomes imminent. It is important that the enemy be prevented from getting many Russian destroyers, if possible.

Large detachments for the protection of the North Sea barrage, or for running down enemy battle cruisers in the Atlantic, battle cruisers are of great value.

In the Adriatic, surface command is held in great force by the Allies over the Austrian and Turkish fleets. Even the withdrawal of Italy would still leave a sufficient excess of force.

Owing to future probable difficulties of maintenance of capital ships in the Mediterranean, the destruction of the Austrian fleet is of importance. Of greater importance is the destruction of enemy submarine bases, which may be undertaken by our surface and air forces.

ATTACK ON ENEMY BASES.

The destruction of the submarine bases would be an effective method of solving the submarine problem.

The enemy North Sea bases may, however, be considered as impregnable. Apart from fortifications, the physical features of the coast, with the extensive banks and shoals, low land, and narrow and tortuous channels, leading up to the principal naval bases, render a combined naval and military expedition against them a desperate undertaking with practically no chance of success.

The destruction of these bases depends upon the future development of air craft. Present machines have insufficient radius to attack Wilhelmshaven or Kiel.

Zeebrugge, however, is within easy air distance of England or France. Numerous raids have been made on this place, but owing to the provisions made to protect submarines from air attack, and to the advantage offered by the Bruges Canal to disperse and hide submarines, it is probable that the results have been small.

Zeebrugge appears to be of sufficient importance to warrant the concentration of adequate air power to maintain a permanent air superiority, and to continue bombing until it becomes untenable as a submarine base. Such an effort will also undoubtedly have a direct result on the military campaign in France.

The Adriatic bases are all within easy air distance of the Italian coast, and an intensive attack on all these bases should be considered. The additional destruction of the Austrian surface fleet would have a valuable effect in releasing the colliers and supply vessels required for the Allied containing force.

Such a campaign on a large scale against submarine bases in both the North Sea and Adriatic will involve withdrawal of many air planes from present patrol work, and will require a reconsideration of the present plans of widely distributing air stations along the coasts.

During the month of December, British air craft covered 140,000 miles in anti-submarine work; 23 submarines were sighted, 20 attacked, and none were sunk. The effort seems out of proportion to the results achieved. Beyond any doubt, a concentration of this effort on a known base, easy of access, would have yielded greater results.

Concentrated offensive air power in Flanders and southeast England will not only accomplish greater results against submarines, but it will also relieve the air threat against London, definitely give us command of the air at a great strategic point, and directly assist the armies in the field—the ultimate object of all our naval and air effort.

MINING IN SUBMARINE BASES.

This has been tried, both off Zeebrugge and off Heligoland, during the war. While it may have resulted in the losses of some submarines, the general result has been a failure, as the enemy soon clears a passage. In such future operations it may be assumed that to be effective the barrage must be patrolled. The laying of mine barrages in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas should receive consideration.

DOVER AND NORTH SEA BARRAGES.

At present there is under way the placing of the Dover and North Sea barrage in an effort to contain submarines in the North Sea.

As this effort is on as great a scale, certain features which involve its success or failure should be discussed in full.

We have recently had an example of a barrage patrol in the Strait of Otranto. The supporting bases were near. The weather conditions better than in the North Sea. Capital ships in comparatively great strength were in the near vicinity, and yet it was not practicable to maintain a patrol barrage. The attacking force could attack and get away without serious danger of being cut off because it occupied an interior position. Information of its movements always came too late to permit any action by allied forces that were not at sea on the line of retreat. The patrol had to be abandoned.

We may expect similar action and similar results in the North Sea unless we station our supporting forces in advance of the barrage. Manifestly it is impracticable to hold supporting forces of large vessels continuously at sea in advance of the barrage. The Scotland-Norway patrol was abandoned because of submarine activity. The problem then is to find a way of holding strong forces in readiness between the enemy naval bases and the barrage. We see no way of doing this except by occupying a harbor on the Norwegian coast. Fanciful schemes of mined-in areas at sea might be discussed, but the conclusion would still be the same.

In considering harbors that may be available, we should give preference to those harbors having the greatest capacity that are capable of secure temporary defense. As the war progresses and the passive features of the barrage become more effective we must expect increased effort to break the barrage so that the attacking defense of the barrage may become a matter of fleets.

There is an advantage in selecting a base some distance south of the barrage, for the following reasons:

(1) Increased probability that a movement toward the barrage will be detected in time to give warning.

(2) Increased opportunity to intercept any force that raids the barrage patrol.

(3) Denial to the enemy of all positions north of the base selected.

The mission of the force will be "to intercept and destroy any enemy force of surface vessels that may approach the barrage."

Enemy forces that have operated so far from base as the barrage are of three classes—submarines, merchant-ship raiders, and light cruisers. If greater strength is needed in the raiding force, the next step would be to send battle cruisers.

Whatever is sent on these expeditions will have high speed. The mission of the expedition will be the destruction of patrol craft, since these are the vessels that block the way of the submarine. Having destroyed the patrol craft, the next mission of the expedition will be to get home. If it is pursued by slow vessels—battleships, for instance—it will experience no difficulty in getting home. We are, therefore, compelled to assign powerful high-speed vessels to operate from the proposed base. The number of these vessels should exceed the number of similar vessels likely to be sent against the barrage. They should be reinforced by an information service of light cruisers and of listening vessels capable of giving timely warning.

It is of course desirable that the base for patrol craft should be near the area they patrol.

We have now arrived at the following conclusions:

(1) The base for supporting vessels should be between the barrage and the enemy bases.

(2) The supporting vessels should be battle cruisers. Battleships may be used in addition, but would be of small use unsupported by battle cruisers.

(3) The supporting force should include an information service of light cruisers and listening vessels.

CONVOY OF SHIPPING.

This has greatly reduced the loss from enemy action, and must be adhered to until losses have been considerably reduced from the present rate. Convoy has serious disadvantages, however, among which are:

Reduction of efficiency of shipping (estimated to be about 50 per cent).

Losses by collision.

The loss of efficiency can be decreased by:

Better utilization of speed.

Convoys to make the best possible speed from port to port.

Thorough instruction of merchant officers in rules for convoy.

Placing all merchant vessels and personnel of the allied countries under Government control.

ENEMY ANSWER TO A CLOSE INSHORE OPERATION.

When operations inshore become too dangerous the enemy submarines will naturally move further offshore. Forcing them to this will be decided gain, as shipping will be harder to find and the maintenance of submarines on station more difficult. On the other hand, the greater number of patrol vessels are unsuited for deep-sea work, and the greater immunity of submarines will partially counterbalance the difficulty in finding shipping, and the disadvantage of the necessarily reduced number of submarines on station.

It is probable that the development of antisubmarine methods on the European coast will result in an attack in force on shipping along the United States Atlantic coast, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean. Submarine fuel carriers will permit of submarines remaining for a considerable period in the western Atlantic.

SUBSURFACE COMMAND OF THE SEA.

As has been stated, this is the greatest and most vital problem that confronts the Allies to-day. It must be solved, and solved quickly. The outcome of the war depends upon it. In its achievement the line of action will be guided by the following principles:

1. The offensive should be followed in every possible case.
2. Greater results are promised by action close to enemy bases.
3. A pure defensive leading to the dispersal of units over great areas has practically no hope of success. The effort involved is prohibitive as compared with that of the enemy.
4. Every contact with a submarine should be followed by the maximum tactical offensive effort for its destruction.

The present surface command of the sea is largely a passive effort governed by the idea of an offensive whenever the opportunity presents itself. Subsurface can be obtained only through offensive effort. All other effort is palliative. The conclusive effort must be offensive, even in its palliative measures. The offensive idea in anti-submarine warfare is of specially great importance. The submarine navigates in three dimensions. Every time it is forced to submerge it enters a danger zone disturbing to morale. Every time it is forced to submerge off soundings it enters a zone of special danger where any outward event may mean disaster. When we limit our antisubmarine measures to escort duties, we do the thing most calculated to favor the morale of the submarine personnel. The crews lead a comparatively placid life except when they are about to attack; then all hands are called and they go about their duties deliberately according to plan. If, however, we can convert this feeling of comparative security to one of constant tension, the effect will show immediately in increased submarine losses. Greater strain, more frequent emergencies, and the consequent general feeling of insecurity incident to being the chased instead of the chaser, can not but have a marked effect.

We, therefore, adopt as a principle that "The maximum possible antisubmarine force shall be devoted to offensive operations." Offensive operations against submarines finally culminate in tactical situations where one or more submarines are pitted against one or more submarines or surface vessels. The entire submarine problem as it exists to-day is nothing but the assemblage of a multitude of tactical situations of the above nature. The successful solution of two or three typical situations would mean the ultimate solution of the entire problem. The ultimate solution to the submarine menace is tactical and not strategic.

We understand that the enemy intrusts his submarines to skilled officers specially trained to perform their specific duties. If we are to detect an effort in which initiative clearly lies with the enemy, we must oppose skill with greater skill; we must make of our antisubmarine effort a major effort that claims the best brains and the best tactical skill of the naval services. We must assure ourselves on every occasion of contact with a submarine the maximum tactical use shall be made of that contact. To realize this aim, we must prepare both vessels and personnel for their mission.

As to personnel, the solution is to be found in the best available personnel thoroughly trained in the best known methods. We feel that every branch of the United States and allied naval services is fully justified in giving large numbers of its best people to the antisubmarine service. The recent rapid development of submarine detection devices is of such a nature as greatly modify the tactics of submarine search and attack. It is, therefore, necessary to train personnel in the new tactics as fast as possible. It is suggested that conferences at the Admiralty of the best qualified officers actually operating at sea in antisubmarine work would be useful in determining, improving and disseminating tactical methods.

As to vessels and their equipment, they must be ready to deliver the maximum possible attack. We may assume readiness as to the gun attack. The depth charge attack is still in an unsatisfactory condition, but rapidly being improved.

In reports from American destroyers there have been several instances of depth charges failing when, if they had not failed, the submarine would have been put down. Such instances indicate the desirability of adopting the rule of always dropping at least two depth charges simultaneously. Experience has demonstrated that the position of a submerged submarine is known with more accuracy immediately upon the arrival of the attacking vessel near the point of submergence than it is at any later time. This fact indicates the desirability of making the first depth charge attack a maximum effort. Vessels should therefore be provided with means for projecting depth charges from the stern and from the beams so that a large area of water—say, two or three hundred yards in diameter—may be covered by the simultaneous discharges and dropping of depth charges. Dropping gear for two depth charges with projectors for two depth charges located near the stern and three or four on each beam or quarter is suggested. In addition, as many depth charges as can be carried aft should be in readiness for running over the stern (mine-laying style), so that they may be laid on retiring curves. It should be a principle of action that—

The first contact with an enemy submarine shall justify the expenditure of all depth charges on board but two.

The after gun and torpedo tubes of destroyers used in antisubmarine work can be landed to make way for more depth charges, and the gear necessary for using them expeditiously.

To summarize our antisubmarine effort:

- (1) Emphasize the offensive as much as possible.
- (2) Put the best brains and skill available into the antisubmarine service.
- (3) Develop group tactics and organization by conference and otherwise. Disseminate results.
- (4) Make maximum possible use of each contact with a submarine.
- (5) Always drop at least two depth charges in first salvo, and as many more as possible. Expend all but two depth charges on first contact with a submarine.
- (6) Fit vessels to carry maximum possible number of depth charges in readiness for laying expeditiously. Remove after gun and torpedo tube on destroyers, if necessary.

The question of the cruiser-submarine is one very difficult of solution, because of its extensive field of operations. Tactically it is less efficient than the small submarine, except for the increased range of its guns. The tendency of our answer to the cruiser-submarine attack will be toward a further diversion of forces to defensive arrangements, and a further slowing up of shipping through extension of the convoy system. Even were it sound policy, it is impossible to guard shipping in distant waters against the torpedo attack of cruiser-submarines.

Greater zigzag areas, increased armament of merchant ships, increased numbers and skill of armed guards, increased vigilance regarding lights, radio signals, smoke, etc., all palliative measures, is the best reply available at present to the cruiser submarine. In connection with the increased armament of merchant vessels as a reply to the gunfire of the cruiser submarine, we suggest the special arming of about 1 merchant ship in 10 of each class with a battery of at least four 5-inch or better guns, and the assignment to these ships of a full gun's crew for each gun. As the convoy system becomes more fully organized, it will then be possible to place one specially armed ship in each convoy and thus be sure that in the absence of an ocean escort we will still have sufficient gun power with each convoy to reply to the gun fire of a cruiser submarine.

The Mediterranean situation is entirely satisfactory as to the containing of enemy capital ships, but the submarine situation is very unsatisfactory. Submarines cruise at will and safely throughout the Adriatic and Mediterranean, basing chiefly on Adriatic ports. The principal obstacle to patrol operations in the Adriatic has been the activity of enemy light cruisers and destroyers. We recommend no withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean, but that closer study of the Adriatic situation be made with a view of a greater concentration of offensive effort against enemy naval forces. We consider the entire naval problem of the Mediterranean and Adriatic a major problem in which the United States and the Allies are all greatly interested.

The successful solution of this problem might well mark the turning point in the war.

5. To arm heavily (with full gun's crews for each gun) about 1 merchant ship in 10, of each general class, in the North and South Atlantic, and as far as practicable to escort convoys with such heavily armed merchant ships.

DECISIONS.

General:

- To provide for united action of allied naval efforts; in conformity with the naval decisions and irrespective of local situations and special interests.
- To unify commands where desirable in certain areas; such as the English Channel and the Adriatic.
- To reinforce the grand fleet with United States battleships if the barrage operations require it, or, if thereby troops on Great Britain can be released for service in France.
- To develop plans for concentrated air attacks on enemy submarine bases in the North Sea and the Adriatic.
- To develop plans for attacks with surface vessels against enemy Adriatic bases.
- To prepare to destroy Russian Baltic ships should their capture by the enemy become imminent.
- To give special study to the matter of mine barrage in the English Channel and the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

Antisubmarine:

- To devote the maximum possible antisubmarine force to offensive operations.
- To develop with the greatest possible rapidity hunting groups equipped with listening devices, and manned by the best trained personnel available from all sources.
- To equip vessels engaged in antisubmarine warfare with adequate means for securing the maximum tactical advantage of every contact with an enemy submarine.

U. S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
May 31, 1918.

From: Force Commander.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Correction to Planning Section memorandum No. 8.

Enclosures: Two.

1. Inclosed herewith are corrected pages 17 and 18 for Planning Section memorandum No. 8, a copy of which was forwarded to the department on February 22.
2. The changes from the pages 17 and 18 previously forwarded are such as to eliminate from the memorandum all reference to the seizure of a base in Norway.
3. All copies of this memorandum which were furnished to the allied naval council and to the British Admiralty were altered in accordance with the inclosed corrected sheets.

SMS.

Capt. PRATT. I will submit this plan, also, because there is nothing in this that I think is in the least degree objectionable. It is dated 15th of March, 1918, and is by the London planning section.

PLANNING SECTION—MEMORANDUM No. 18—PROBLEM No. 10—ANTISUBMARINE
POLICY.

General situation.—As at present. The shipping situation is becoming more and more critical. Unless a check is placed on the enemy's submarines, it may become necessary to cease the transport of United States Army troops and stores to France in order to meet the urgent requirements of the Allies as regards food and raw material.

Special situation.—The British and United States Army planning divisions decide to review the antisubmarine policy of the immediate future, bearing in mind that the northern barrage can not be moderately effective before July.

Required.—Estimate of the situation and decisions as to antisubmarine measures that should be taken now.

ANTISUBMARINE POLICY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE—JOINT APPRECIATION BY THE
BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANNING DIVISIONS.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

Present policy.—Present submarine policy mainly a system of local trade protection. No concentrated attack on submarines except in the Dover area. Convoy escorts have the great advantage of getting in touch with the submarines, but their tactics are generally defensive, and they seldom kill. Lack of cooperation characteristic of the present system.

Suggested modifications.—Immediate policy, a concentrated offensive in North Sea consists combined with a modified system of local protection. Offensive patrol of the Fair Island Channel approaches. the crucial

question. The idea of inveigling the High Sea Fleet into a fleet action should be abandoned in favor of an antisubmarine blockade of the northern exit. The ship and organizing power of the Grand Fleet higher command and staff as well as a small proportion of its destroyers are essential to effective antisubmarine measures. The ocean escort destroyers and the coastal trawler patrols reduced by 30 and 50 per cent, respectively, to obtain the remainder of the required forces; probable results of these reductions. Offensive measures on a small scale recommended in certain areas to be brought about by a reorganization and consolidation of the coastal forces. Summarized conclusions.

PRESENT POLICY.

1. The forces directly employed fighting the submarine are to be found in three organizations: Convoy escort vessels and auxiliary patrol craft, the former escorting ships through the submarine zone, the latter being distributed round the coast.

2. These forces are given in the following table under the heading "escort vessels," "patrols," and "minesweeping."

[Sl.=Sloop. D1.=Modern destroyer, F. class and later. D2.=Older destroyer. P.=P. boat. S.=Submarine. T.=Trawler. W.=Whaler.]

| Nature of work. | Sl. | D1. | D2. | P. | S. | T. |
|----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|
| Ocean escorts..... | 24 | 110 | 13 | | | |
| Cross channel escorts..... | | 1 | 12 | 31 | | 246 |
| Coastal escorts..... | | | 24 | | | |
| Total escorts..... | 24 | 111 | 36 | 44 | | 246 |
| Coastal patrols..... | | | | | | 248 |
| Submarine patrols..... | | | | | 38 | |
| Mine sweeping..... | | | | | | 410 |

In addition to the above, a force of about 21 trawlers is being prepared, fitted with fish hydrophones for submarine hunting.

¹Includes 38 United States Army destroyers at Queenstown and 6 destroyers at Granton for naval convoys. Does not include any of Harwich force, which nevertheless is employed as Dutch escorts.

3. In addition to the forces in foregoing table, there are the Grand Fleet at Harwich and Dover forces. The task allotted to the Grand Fleet and its auxiliary policy is to be ready to engage the High Sea Fleet at any time and anywhere in the North Sea.

4. The number of destroyers allocated to the Grand Fleet is only sufficient for battle purposes, and this policy, therefore, immobilizes them from any extensive continuous antisubmarine operations.

5. In the South, on the other hand, the primary task is to bar the Dover Straits and the primary function of the Dover and Harwich forces is to support the bar at Dover, therefore, is the only area in which any concentrated attack is being made on the submarine. The results are seen in Appendix 1, which shows the sound results of this policy.

6. It is clear that the vast majority of the antisubmarine forces in the vicinity of the United Kingdom are spread over a wide field, and are not concentrated to destroy submarines. We try to be strong everywhere, and are strong nowhere.

7. Part of the protective system, viz, the escort of convoys by fast vessels, however, the great advantage of forcing the submarine to attack in the vicinity of the escort, and gives it a chance of counter attack. In practice, however, only a few submarines are destroyed under these circumstances. This may be due to the fact that the forces on the spot are insufficient to bring about results.

8. It may also be due to faulty tactics, and in order that full advantage may be taken of these contacts, it appears essential that the escorting destroyers should discharge their defensive rôle and assume a vigorous offensive, which should not only include immediate depth charge attack, but also a persistent hunt during the remainder of the day by a large proportion of the escort. The question whether any destroyers should remain with the convoy would depend on the locality and probability of further attacks.

9. So far as trawlers are concerned, they have little offensive value, except in combination with faster vessels, and this emphasizes the necessity of coordinating the use of all craft and weapons. Each type possesses a certain degree of offensive power, but unless these powers are used in combination, successful results can not be expected.

ated. The deep mine field is dependent upon surface patrols. Hydrophone trawlers are practically useless without faster vessels, and aircraft greatly increase the hunting power of destroyers.

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO PRESENT POLICY.

10. Instead of the above system of dispersion of force, it is urged that we should venturously aim at closing the northern exit by a great offensive effort in that area.

11. Decisive results will not be obtained until a very strong mine barrage is completed, and it would be inexpedient to abandon the local protection of trade until the hydrophone is more fully developed. It is urged, however, that a concentrated offensive effort, covering the reported track of submarines, be instituted in the northern area as soon as possible.

12. In February, about 70 per cent of the submarines operating outside the North Sea passed north about, and the number will tend to increase. Also, a certain number were probably damaged or defective on reaching this area, homeward bound.

13. At the present time, submarines passing north about confine themselves almost exclusively to the Fair Island Channel, the passages averaging one a day during February, 1918. The approximate times of passing through the channel are shown graphically in Appendix II.

14. An intensive patrol in this area could be quickly moved to another track, and could be flexible in its dispositions, enabling the utmost use to be made of any information available, which, at present, is certainly not utilized to its fullest extent.

15. It is most strongly urged that the success of the above policy rests on allotting certain definite antisubmarine functions to the Grand Fleet, for unless its present functions are modified, neither sufficient destroyers nor the necessary standard of organization will be forthcoming.

16. So long as the movements and dispositions of the Grand Fleet are based on the idea that the High Sea Fleet is likely to be inveigled into action by any other means than the defeat of the submarine, the most efficient part of the British Navy must play a comparatively minor part in defeating the enemy's primary line of attack. It must stand aside and leave the real battle to the militia of the sea—the trawlers, merchant marine, etc.

17. On the other hand, if the primary function of the Grand Fleet during the summer months is defined as the barrage of the northern exit to submarines, the High Sea Fleet will only become an object of immediate attack if it threatens the barrage.

18. The proposed policy amounts to exercising an intensive and immediate control over the northern area, while the control over the rest of the North Sea will be less immediate and less intensive. It involves certain minor risks such as exposure to bombardment, etc. These risks, which have been referred to in other papers, should be accepted and the necessary precautions taken. (Vide P. D. papers 049,37 and 053; also American P. D. Problem No. 2.)

19. By assembling the whole Grand Fleet at one base, and freeing it from the responsibility of dashing after the High Sea Fleet at short notice, except in support of antisubmarine operations, a flotilla of destroyers could probably be released for hunting submarines, but the commander in chief might allocate more or less according to circumstances.

20. In order to provide the remainder of the antisubmarine destroyers and patrol craft, it is proposed to reduce the escort destroyers, sloops and P. boats by approximately 30 per cent and the trawlers round the coast on patrol duties by about 50 per cent.

21. The withdrawal of trawlers from coastal patrol will probably not influence the shipping losses one way or the other. The effect of reducing the convoy destroyers can not be exactly foreseen, but no appreciable increase in sinkings is expected. The great initial success of the convoy system was due more to the concentration of shipping in a comparatively small space, and the consequent difficulty of locating it than to the protective power of the escort. This is illustrated by Appendix III, which shows how the enemy attempted to meet the convoy system by transferring his attack to the coastal and terminal areas, where his submarines would have a better chance of finding the convoys; also by the fact that, out of 57 attacks in which torpedoes were fired on ocean convoys between July, 1917, and March, 1918, in only two cases did the escort sight the submarine before the torpedoes were fired.

22. The proposed reduction in a destroyer escorts might be compensated by increasing the destroyers in the dangerous zones at the expense of the comparatively safe areas. For example, whilst the submarine campaign is mainly confined to the coastal areas of the United Kingdom, escorts to the westward of say 10° W. might be greatly reduced.

23. In addition to the proposed operations in the northern area, it is suggested yachts, older destroyers, and the remaining trawlers employed on coastal pa should carry out similar operations on the east coast, channel, and Irish Sea, in junction with drifters and mined nets, and that the coastal commands be consolidated into a few groups, so as to obtain greater flexibility and more economical employn of the available forces. The following grouping is suggested:

- (1) *Commander in chief*.—Grand Fleet; North Sea and antisubmarine operati from Firth of Forth north about to Hebrides, inclusive, with particular regard to blockade of the northern exit.
- (2) *East coast command*.—Coastal antisubmarine work from Firth of Forth to l mouth.
- (3) *Narrow-seas command*.—Yarmouth to Dover, inclusive, with particular reg to the blockade of Dover Straits.
- (4) *Channel command*.—English Channel (exclusive of Dover); including Fre Channel forces.
- (5) *Ireland command*.—Coasts of Ireland and approaches, including Irish Sea.
- (6) *Biscay command*.—French west coast.

Under the present system of scattered coastal commands it is most noticeable t submarines frequently operate for days in very limited areas without any large fo being brought to the spot, although they might be concentrated in a comparativ short time.

24. The foregoing may be summarized by saying that the principal factor in solution of the submarine problem is a new orientation of the functions of the Gr Fleet, and that if the commander in chief is allotted the primary task of prevent submarines passing north about and is freed from responsibilities which interfere t that duty, everything else will follow in due course. A consolidation and reorgan tion of the coastal commands are also required.

NOTE.—The British plans division has endeavored to reduce the proposals for intensive antisubmarine patrol in the north to a concrete form in Appendixes IV VI, VII, and VIII.

APPENDIX I.

[From information supplied by I. D. Section 25.]

Comparison of passage (submarines) through Dover Straits and North about.

| | North about. | Dov |
|-------------|-----------------|-----|
| December: | | |
| Out..... | 10 | |
| Home..... | 13 | |
| January: | | |
| Out..... | 12 | |
| Home..... | 7 | |
| February: | | |
| Out..... | 18 | |
| Home..... | 11 | |
| March 1-15: | | |
| Out..... | 7 | |
| Home..... | 14 | |

Comparison of passages (large submarines only).

| | Boats. | Passages. | North about. | Do |
|---------------|--------|-----------|-----------------|----|
| December..... | 21 | 12 | 17 | |
| January..... | 13 | 26 | 18 | |
| February..... | 21 | 42 | 39 | |

No large submarines are believed to have passed through Dover Straits since 18th of February.

Capt. PRATT. The above figures are the London Planning Section and the note refers to the destroyers apart from the Grand Fl There is no attempt made to criticise this distribution. The Bri Navy knows its business. Nobody admires it and its magnificent work more than I do, but please note this—111 with fleet, 213

antisubmarine work. All this time we had only 9 to 10 left available on our own coast, and they were convoying ships when they could. Does it seem reasonable on this item to make out such a grave case against our Navy as "failure to give adequate support with means at our disposal during the first six months seriously and unnecessarily jeopardized the outcome of the whole war," and "I believe that this failure combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous, and the few months subsequent to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months." Isn't this straining a point to make a case against our Navy? I grant you that everything within reason should go over to Europe to combat the submarine, but at a pinch could not nine destroyers leave the Grand Fleet and join the antisubmarine forces working around the British Isles? Are we as black as Admiral Sims paints? I leave it to your judgment to decide. No, gentlemen: the balance of power to decide the submarine campaign never passed out of British hands during the critical months in question. We came in as soon as we could, but the submarine's fate was settled—although we did not know it at the time—before it was possible, within the limits of reason, for us to get into the game in force.

In this connection I wish to refer to Admiral Mayo's testimony, page 45.

The British destroyers at Queenstown were withdrawn after the arrival of our destroyers, notwithstanding that the area of operations there was repeatedly spoken of as being the critical one. If British destroyers had been kept there and the number increased, some of our destroyers could have been assigned with our battleship squadron and our mining force instead of depending on the British destroyers as pointed out by Admiral Sims. Furthermore, the experience of our destroyers in all phases of their work would have been beneficial and this certainly was desirable.

This evidence, coupled with the distribution of destroyers to Grand Fleet, is fairly conclusive proof that the British thought they held the balance of power in their own hands.

In April of 1917 (the month we entered) the total ships sunk by submarine were 423; tonnage loss, 846,863 tons. This was the month we entered the war, before our ships could get across and operate efficiently. Yet note this was the apex of the submarine campaign. In May, the losses were 320 ships; tonnage 551,778. In June the losses were 314 ships; tonnage 628,249; in July 240 ships, tonnage 502,048; in August 185 ships, tonnage 488,072. The following months throughout the war showed a steady decrease in tonnage losses; while in the first quarter of 1918 the building program we had inaugurated began to make its weight felt. No, gentlemen, as much as I would like to believe that we could have played a major rôle in putting down the submarine, and that therefore the major responsibility was ours, facts and figures tell a different story. The British themselves got it under control in May, 1917, before we could have gotten into the war, even with wings, and thereafter we were a very essential but only a contributing cause to the defeat of the submarine. I submit the data for the above statement. I will submit the tonnage figures. These are complete data, and there is a paper prepared by the British admiralty and furnished by the Allied Maritime Transport Committee, which gives you the whole status from the beginning of war and all the tonnage sunk.

The CHAIRMAN. Month by month?

Capt. PRATT. For the whole year; yes, sir; month by month. These papers are as follows:

HISTORICAL SECTION, March 16, 1919

Table showing the total number and gross tonnage of all allied and neutral ships, schooners, and fishing vessels sunk by submarines only.

[Does not include vessels sunk by cruisers, raiders, mines or other causes. Arranged to show, by month to month and year by year, from August, 1914, to November, 1918, but inclusive. Also showing same from August, 1914, to Nov. 30, 1917. Source: British Admiralty Reports on file in Historical Section.]

| Year and month. | Number of ships. | Gross tonnage. | Total ships. | Total tonnage. |
|---------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|
| 1914. | | | | |
| August..... | | | | |
| September..... | | | | |
| October..... | 1 | 886 | | |
| November..... | 2 | 2,084 | | |
| December..... | | | 3 | 2,970 |
| 1915. | | | | |
| January..... | 7 | 17,126 | | |
| February..... | 11 | 18,123 | | |
| March..... | 27 | 72,602 | | |
| April..... | 33 | 40,345 | | |
| May..... | 55 | 107,934 | | |
| June..... | 113 | 117,484 | | |
| July..... | 86 | 98,594 | | |
| August..... | 102 | 169,222 | | |
| September..... | 50 | 121,240 | | |
| October..... | 17 | 63,004 | | |
| November..... | 42 | 138,196 | | |
| December..... | 25 | 99,761 | 568 | 1,063,731 |
| 1916. | | | | |
| January..... | 13 | 28,363 | | |
| February..... | 17 | 36,286 | | |
| March..... | 48 | 145,976 | | |
| April..... | 66 | 161,103 | | |
| May..... | 57 | 103,602 | | |
| June..... | 49 | 89,573 | | |
| July..... | 85 | 102,298 | | |
| August..... | 127 | 154,524 | | |
| September..... | 160 | 205,928 | | |
| October..... | 174 | 311,919 | | |
| November..... | 156 | 235,365 | | |
| December..... | 167 | 269,470 | 1,119 | 1,844,407 |
| 1917. | | | | |
| January..... | 181 | 298,188 | | |
| February..... | 259 | 467,751 | | |
| March..... | 325 | 500,699 | | |
| April..... | 423 | 846,863 | | |
| May..... | 320 | 551,778 | | |
| June..... | 314 | 628,249 | | |
| July..... | 240 | 502,058 | | |
| August..... | 185 | 488,072 | | |
| September..... | 174 | 332,254 | | |
| October..... | 160 | 452,108 | | |
| November..... | 105 | 200,903 | 2,686 | 5,268,923 |
| December..... | 151 | 354,374 | 2,837 | 5,623,297 |
| 1918. | | | | |
| January..... | 140 | 300,283 | | |
| February..... | 121 | 309,839 | | |
| March..... | 170 | 326,263 | | |
| April..... | 115 | 267,809 | | |
| May..... | 135 | 291,438 | | |
| June..... | 107 | 241,907 | | |
| July..... | 100 | 260,865 | | |
| August..... | 148 | 280,689 | | |
| September..... | 86 | 187,385 | | |
| October..... | 60 | 109,876 | | |
| November..... | 2 | 10,195 | 1,184 | 2,586,549 |
| Total ships and gross tonnage by submarines only: | | | | |
| 1914..... | 3 | 2,970 | | |
| 1915..... | 568 | 1,063,731 | | |
| 1916..... | 1,119 | 1,844,407 | | |
| 1917..... | 2,837 | 5,623,297 | | |
| 1918..... | 1,184 | 2,506,549 | | |
| Five years..... | 5,711 | 11,120,954 | | |

World tonnage position, August, 1914.

[Data prepared by British Admiralty and furnished by Allied Maritime Transport Committee.]

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------|
| United Kingdom and colonies..... | 18,393,000 |
| France..... | 2,120,000 |
| Spain..... | 1,023,000 |
| Italy..... | 1,589,000 |
| Sweden..... | 670,000 |
| Belgium..... | 564,000 |
| Germany..... | 2,595,000 |
| United States..... | 976,000 |
| Japan..... | 899,000 |
| China..... | 806,000 |
| Denmark..... | 761,000 |
| Other countries..... | 1,207,000 |

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Total (not including United States)..... | 31,603,000 |
| United States of America (including Lakes)..... | 3,284,000 |
| United States of America lake tonnage amounts to slightly more than 2,000,000 tons. | |

Table showing gross tonnage of world vessels lost through enemy action during each month since the outbreak of the war in 1914 to the armistice, Nov. 11, 1918, also showing totals to May, 1918.

| Year and month. | All vessels except British. | British steamships. | British fishing vessels. | Total for months. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| 1914. | | | | |
| January..... | 18,075 | 40,254 | 4,438 | 62,767 |
| February..... | 9,127 | 88,219 | 1,032 | 98,378 |
| March..... | 9,829 | 77,805 | 283 | 87,917 |
| April..... | 10,065 | 8,888 | 460 | 19,413 |
| May..... | 17,382 | 26,035 | 790 | 44,197 |
| Total..... | 64,478 | 241,201 | 6,993 | 312,672 |
| 1915. | | | | |
| January..... | 15,705 | 32,054 | 222 | 47,981 |
| February..... | 23,549 | 36,372 | | 59,921 |
| March..... | 9,007 | 71,479 | 289 | 80,775 |
| April..... | 31,342 | 22,453 | 1,930 | 55,725 |
| May..... | 30,385 | 84,025 | 5,648 | 120,058 |
| June..... | 40,113 | 83,198 | 8,117 | 131,428 |
| July..... | 52,366 | 52,847 | 4,427 | 109,640 |
| August..... | 34,512 | 148,464 | 2,890 | 185,866 |
| September..... | 49,749 | 101,690 | 445 | 151,884 |
| October..... | 34,378 | 54,156 | | 88,534 |
| November..... | 58,388 | 94,493 | 162 | 153,043 |
| December..... | 48,651 | 74,490 | | 123,141 |
| Total..... | 428,145 | 855,721 | 24,130 | 1,307,996 |
| 1916. | | | | |
| January..... | 18,614 | 62,288 | 357 | 81,259 |
| February..... | 41,619 | 75,860 | 68 | 117,547 |
| March..... | 67,401 | 99,089 | 607 | 167,097 |
| April..... | 50,258 | 141,193 | 216 | 191,667 |
| May..... | 64,453 | 64,521 | 201 | 129,175 |
| June..... | 71,879 | 36,976 | | 108,855 |
| July..... | 32,987 | 82,432 | 2,796 | 118,215 |
| August..... | 117,718 | 43,354 | 1,672 | 162,744 |
| September..... | 121,077 | 104,572 | 4,811 | 230,460 |
| October..... | 176,274 | 176,248 | 1,138 | 353,660 |
| November..... | 141,099 | 168,809 | 1,600 | 311,508 |
| December..... | 172,411 | 182,292 | 436 | 355,139 |
| Total..... | 1,075,790 | 1,237,634 | 13,902 | 2,327,326 |
| 1917. | | | | |
| January..... | 212,835 | 153,666 | 2,020 | 368,521 |
| February..... | 223,042 | 313,486 | 3,478 | 540,006 |
| March..... | 236,777 | 353,478 | 3,586 | 593,841 |
| April..... | 329,825 | 545,282 | 5,920 | 881,027 |
| May..... | 242,892 | 352,289 | 1,448 | 596,629 |
| June..... | 268,240 | 417,925 | 1,342 | 687,507 |
| July..... | 190,394 | 364,858 | 2,736 | 557,988 |
| August..... | 181,678 | 329,810 | 242 | 511,730 |
| September..... | 155,291 | 196,212 | 245 | 351,748 |
| October..... | 182,199 | 276,132 | 227 | 458,558 |
| November..... | 115,565 | 173,500 | 87 | 289,152 |
| December..... | 145,611 | 253,087 | 413 | 399,111 |
| Total..... | 2,484,349 | 3,729,785 | 21,744 | 6,235,878 |

Total tonnage lost by all nations, by years, from August, 1914, to Nov. 11, 1918.

| Year. | All vessels except British. | British steam- ships. | British fishing vessels. | T |
|------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----|
| 1914..... | 64,478 | 241,201 | 6,993 | |
| 1915..... | 428,145 | 855,721 | 24,120 | 1, |
| 1916..... | 1,075,782 | 1,237,634 | 13,902 | 2, |
| 1917..... | 2,484,349 | 3,729,785 | 21,744 | 6, |
| 1918..... | 967,197 | 1,694,749 | 4,996 | 2, |
| Total..... | 5,019,951 | 7,759,090 | 71,765 | 12, |

Total losses, all nations, by years, from August, 1914, to Nov. 30, 1918.

| | |
|-----------|------|
| 1914..... | 31 |
| 1915..... | 1,30 |
| 1916..... | 2,32 |
| 1917..... | 6,23 |
| 1918..... | 2,66 |

Total August, 1914, to Nov. 30, 1918..... 12,85

Total losses, all nations, by years, August, 1914, to May 1, 1918.

| | |
|-----------|------|
| 1914..... | 31 |
| 1915..... | 1,30 |
| 1916..... | 2,32 |
| 1917..... | 6,23 |
| 1918..... | 1,24 |

Total to May 1, 1918..... 11,43

| Year and month. | All vessels except British. | British ships. | British sailing vessels. | To m |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|---------|
| 1918. | | | | |
| January..... | 126,310 | 179,973 | 375 | |
| February..... | 91,375 | 226,896 | 686 | |
| March..... | 142,846 | 199,458 | 293 | |
| April..... | 62,935 | 215,543 | 241 | |
| Total, Apr. 20, 1918..... | 423,466 | 821,870 | 1,595 | 1, |
| May..... | 102,580 | 192,436 | 504 | |
| June..... | 91,958 | 162,990 | 639 | |
| July..... | 94,963 | 165,449 | 555 | |
| August..... | 136,558 | 145,721 | 1,536 | |
| September..... | 50,880 | 136,859 | 142 | |
| October..... | 59,330 | 59,229 | | |
| November..... | 7,462 | 10,195 | 25 | |
| Total, 1918..... | 967,197 | 1,694,749 | 4,996 | 2, |

Admiral Sims gives tonnage available to Allies May 1, 1918, not including Americans..... 31,50
Total tonnage lost, all nations, to May 1, 1918..... 11,43

Tonnage available May 1, 1918, not including new construction or vessels captured..... 20,00

Allied maritime transport committee.

Total tonnage available to Allies, not including America (1914)..... 31,60
Total tonnage lost, all nations, to May 1, 1918..... 11,43

Tonnage available May 1, 1918, not including new construction or vessels captured..... 20,15

Comparison of allied and neutral tonnage gains and losses, from August, 1914, to June 30, 1918.

| Period. | Tonnage losses. | New construction. | Captured for enemy. | Resultant (+ -). | Net loss (-), net gain (+). |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| | 312,672 | 1,012,920 | 1,178,500 | +1,878,748 | +1,878,748 |
| | 1,307,996 | 1,202,000 | 19,000 | - 86,996 | +1,791,752 |
| | 2,327,326 | 1,688,000 | 300,000 | - 339,326 | +1,452,426 |
| | 6,235,878 | 2,703,355 | 1,080,500 | -3,783,855 | -999,597 |
| May 1, 1918. | 1,246,931 | 1 870,317 | | | |
| June 1, 1918. | 295,520 | 1 1,242,274 | | | |
| June 30, 1918. | 255,587 | | | 314,553 | 685,044 |

1 First quarter.

2 Second quarter.

Table showing construction of merchant shipping, gross tonnage, complete since the beginning of the war for the United Kingdom, United States, and for other allied and neutral nations, 1914 to October, 1918, inclusive.

| Period. | Quarter. | United Kingdom. | United States. | Other allied and neutral nations. | World totals. |
|---------|------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| | | 675,610 | 1 120,000 | 217,310 | 1,012,920 |
| | | 650,919 | 225,122 | 325,959 | 1,202,000 |
| | | 541,552 | 325,413 | 821,036 | 1,688,000 |
| | | 1,163,474 | 1,034,296 | 505,585 | 2,703,355 |
| | First. | 320,280 | 328,541 | 220,496 | 870,317 |
| | Second. | 442,966 | 558,939 | 240,369 | 1,242,274 |
| | Third. | 411,395 | 834,250 | 232,127 | 1,477,772 |
| | October. | 136,100 | 357,532 | 50,000 | 534,632 |
| | 10 months. | 1,310,741 | 2,080,262 | 742,992 | 4,133,995 |

1 Estimated.

Statement by British Admiralty showing British and world's merchant tonnage lost through enemy action and marine risks since the outbreak of the war to Oct. 31, 1918.

[Received by O. N. I. Dec. 28, 1918. Historical section, Mar. 20, 1920.]

| Period. | British. | Other nations. | Total for world. |
|-----------------------|-----------|----------------|------------------|
| 1914. | | | |
| August and September. | 341,824 | 85,947 | 427,771 |
| First quarter. | 154,728 | 126,688 | 281,416 |
| 1915. | | | |
| First quarter. | 215,905 | 104,542 | 320,447 |
| Second quarter. | 223,676 | 156,743 | 380,419 |
| Third quarter. | 356,659 | 172,822 | 529,481 |
| Fourth quarter. | 307,139 | 187,234 | 494,373 |
| 1916. | | | |
| First quarter. | 325,237 | 198,958 | 524,195 |
| Second quarter. | 270,690 | 251,599 | 522,289 |
| Third quarter. | 284,358 | 307,681 | 592,039 |
| Fourth quarter. | 617,563 | 541,780 | 1,159,343 |
| 1917. | | | |
| First quarter. | 911,840 | 707,553 | 1,619,370 |
| Second quarter. | 1,361,870 | 875,064 | 2,236,934 |
| Third quarter. | 952,938 | 541,535 | 1,494,473 |
| Fourth quarter. | 782,889 | 489,954 | 1,272,843 |
| 1918. | | | |
| First quarter. | 697,668 | 445,668 | 1,143,336 |
| Second quarter. | 630,862 | 331,145 | 962,007 |
| Third quarter. | 512,030 | 403,483 | 915,513 |
| Fourth quarter. | 83,952 | 93,582 | 177,534 |
| Total. | 9,031,828 | 6,021,958 | 15,053,786 |

This figure includes 210,653 gross tonnage interned in enemy ports.
NOTE.—Tonnage lost by enemy action and October 31, 1918.
Total to November 11, 1918, British, 9,043,744; other nations, 6,024,117; for world, or 67,861.

Capt. PRATT. I am comparing the two drives, one a sea drive and the other a land drive. There are points of contact between the German submarine drive in the spring of 1917 and the land drive started in March, 1918. In April, 1917, we entered the war, and that month showed the greatest losses from submarine sinkings. This in itself is worthy of note, for it would indicate that the purpose of the campaign was not alone directed at the sinking of ships, but was also a campaign of propaganda directed at striking terror into the hearts of our people, in an effort to frustrate our troop movement across the Atlantic. Without the additional man power on the western front which the United States alone could furnish, there was danger of a stalemate and of an indecisive peace. The campaign opened against the United States in 1917, with the Germans using the same tactics and the same methods of propaganda that they had used earlier in the war, and also did later. Just as in March, 1918, the first land drive was the worst, so in April, 1917, the first submarine offensive was the worst and the succeeding months saw the submarine efforts spending themselves with receding force. The course run by the submarine campaign was not alone determined by the countertactics of the Allies, but was to a great degree influenced by the strategy of the great German General Staff. In the spring of 1918, the building curve of tonnage replacements crossed the curve of submarine sinkings. From that date it became merely a question of how long before our Army could cross the Atlantic and participate in the land operations of the western front. The final outcome of the war was certain, once the Allies held firm on land. Had it been possible to do so, it might not have been bad policy for the Germans to have launched this land drive, with the warning of the submarine effort, before the psychological effects following failure were felt.

I should like to submit another paper on the question of available ship tonnage, for the lack of protection of which we have been so severely criticized by Admiral Sims. If one were to rely entirely upon his statements, you would come to the conclusion that our so-called reprehensible delay had driven British shipping to such straits that they could neither take care of their own supply needs nor assist in handling our troops to an extent which promised failure for the allied land campaign. The following paper which I will read was submitted by Admiral Sims's plans section in London, January 10, 1918. This paper refers to the employment of British merchant ships as auxiliary cruisers in their naval service. [Reading:]

PLANNING SECTION, MEMORANDUM NO. 5, JANUARY 10, 1918, EMPLOYMENT OF
AUXILIARY CRUISERS.

One of the most urgent problems of the hour is the immediate increase of tonnage to augment the supply of food and munitions. Actual sinkings by submarines do not give a true indication of actual losses in carrying capacity incident to submarine warfare. To the sinkings must be added:

- (1) Vessels damaged by submarines.
- (2) Vessels damaged in collisions incident to convoy operations and to running without lights.
- (3) Losses in ton-miles per day due to convoy operations.
- (4) Delays in port due to inadequate port facilities.
- (5) Employment of merchant tonnage in naval operations.

All of these factors are cumulative and of such a serious nature as to demand the closest scrutiny to determine if it is not possible to reduce their unfavorable effect.

We have considered especially the employment of merchant tonnage as auxiliary cruisers. It is used for patrol and escort duties. It is in no sense at any time a reply

the submarine but rather an additional target in each instance. The principal usefulness of merchant vessels as auxiliary cruisers is protection of convoys against raiders. There are no known raiders at sea now. The present situation requires that no move in the game be lost and that some risk be accepted if we are to continue the war. We therefore recommend the immediate acceptance as a principle of action: "The maximum possible employment of all auxiliary cruisers in the ocean transport of food and munitions for the support of the war."

The following-named vessels of the Royal Navy appear to be employed in a manner not in harmony with its above principle:

| Name. | Gross tonnage. | Name. | Gross tonnage. |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Antonic..... | 9,984 | Marmora..... | 10,509 |
| Chumbella..... | 8,292 | Andea..... | 15,620 |
| Katian..... | 18,485 | Arlanza..... | 15,044 |
| Edlebrand..... | 6,991 | Avoca..... | 11,073 |
| Rotava..... | 5,980 | Ebro..... | 8,480 |
| Antua..... | 10,885 | Almanzora..... | 16,034 |
| Alia..... | 6,103 | Orcoma..... | 11,571 |
| Alura..... | 6,103 | Moldavia..... | 9,500 |
| Arginian..... | 10,757 | Himalaya..... | 6,929 |
| Lotagua..... | 5,977 | Gloucestershire..... | 8,124 |
| Languinola..... | 5,978 | City of London..... | 8,917 |
| Edinburgh..... | | Princess..... | 8,684 |
| Castle..... | 13,326 | Morea..... | 10,890 |
| Armadale..... | | Knight Templar..... | 7,175 |
| Castle..... | 12,973 | Mechanician..... | |
| Siklonan..... | | Wyncote..... | |
| Castle..... | 9,692 | Currian Head..... | |
| Oranto..... | 12,124 | Coronado..... | |
| Orvieto..... | 12,130 | Bayano..... | |
| Opheir..... | 6,942 | Discoverer..... | |
| Bulgarian..... | 17,515 | | |
| Victorian..... | 10,635 | 41 vessels..... | 1 400,000 |
| Macedonia..... | 10,512 | | |

¹ Approximate.

While we are being so severely criticized for failure to protect shipping, Admiral Sims's own plans section is criticizing the British Navy for improper allocation of their own shipping. This list does not include the *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* for which the War Department was bargaining, and which did not get actively into troop transporting until 1918. Economy in the use of shipping, proper allocation, speed in turn around, are all quite as important factors as protection, and the fate of our troop movement depended on all. It might be interesting for you to know, as reflecting on the efficiency of our Navy, that the troops carried by our transports average 7.19 men per 1,000 tons per day, while in the British ships they averaged 3.71 per 1,000 tons per day. Finally, it was not the submarine which decided this war or delayed victory, it was the land forces of the allies, side by side with our soldiers who won this war on land, as everybody knows. That has been stated a number of times.

These soldiers were transported during the critical spring and summer months of 1918 when the total world tonnage available was less than during the same critical months in 1917.

The world's output of shipping crossed the world's losses and began to show gains in the first quarter of 1918. To substantiate same I submit sheet "Transport and escort duty," which I have marked "P."

*Report by months of transport and escort duty performed by U. S. and foreign n
up to signing of the armistice.*

Report by months of transport and escort duty performed by U. S. and foreign navies up to signing of the armistice—Continued.

| Month. | Per cent carried by other ships, French, Italian, etc. | Per cent carried by U. S. N. transports and other U. S. ships. | Under U. S. escort. | Under British escort. | Under French escort. | Per cent under U. S. escort. | Per cent under British escort. | Per cent under French escort. |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1917. | | | | | | | | |
| January..... | | 67 | 258 | 1,285 | | 17 | 83 | |
| February..... | | 93.5 | 15,032 | 59 | | 99 | 1 | |
| March..... | 2 | 41 | 10,063 | 2,566 | 247 | 78.5 | 20 | 1.5 |
| April..... | 11 | 28 | 12,259 | 4,129 | 3,015 | 63 | 21 | 16 |
| May..... | | 41 | 17,432 | 12,898 | 3,258 | 51.5 | 39 | 9.5 |
| June..... | 5 | 62.5 | 36,893 | 3,134 | | 92.5 | 7.5 | |
| July..... | 8 | 46 | 13,246 | 10,476 | | 56.5 | 43.5 | |
| August..... | | 77 | 42,783 | 6,032 | | 87.5 | 12.5 | |
| September..... | | | | | | | | |
| October..... | | | | | | | | |
| November..... | | | | | | | | |
| December..... | | | | | | | | |
| 1918. | | | | | | | | |
| January..... | 4.5 | 53 | 35,827 | 12,228 | | 75 | 25 | |
| February..... | | 81.5 | 48,795 | 444 | | 99 | 1 | |
| March..... | 2 | 65 | 73,095 | 12,615 | | 85 | 15 | |
| April..... | 1.5 | 57 | 91,308 | 28,764 | | 75.5 | 24.5 | |
| May..... | 1 | 40.5 | 220,463 | 26,652 | 599 | 88.5 | 11 | .5 |
| June..... | 1.5 | 43.5 | 244,631 | 30,912 | 4,891 | 87.5 | 11 | 1.5 |
| July..... | 4 | 36 | 258,332 | 46,329 | 6,698 | 83 | 15 | 2 |
| August..... | 5 | 44 | 237,920 | 22,572 | 25,883 | 83 | 8 | 9 |
| September..... | 2 | 43 | 224,298 | 20,681 | 14,691 | 86 | 8 | 6 |
| October..... | 1 | 42 | 130,274 | 51,454 | 2,335 | 70.5 | 28.5 | 1 |
| To November 11..... | | 12 | 7,451 | 4,673 | | 61.75 | 38.25 | |
| Grand total..... | 2.5 | 46.25 | 1,720,360 | 297,903 | 61,617 | 82.75 | 14.125 | 3.125 |

Report by months of transport duty performed by U. S. Navy and all other ships, United States and foreign, in returning troops and other passengers to United States prior to signing of armistice.

| Month. | Carried by cruiser and transport force. | Carried by all other ships, United States and foreign. | Total carried, all ships. | Per cent carried by cruiser and transport force. | Per cent carried by all other ships. |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1917. | | | | | |
| January..... | | | | | |
| February..... | | | | | |
| March..... | | | | | |
| April..... | | | | | |
| May..... | | | | | |
| June..... | | | | | |
| July..... | | | | | |
| August..... | | | | | |
| September..... | | | | | |
| October..... | 41 | 6 | 47 | 87.3 | 12.7 |
| November..... | 37 | | 37 | 100 | |
| December..... | | | | | |
| 1918. | | | | | |
| January..... | 66 | 1 | 67 | 98.6 | 1.4 |
| February..... | 274 | 86 | 360 | 76 | 24 |
| March..... | 402 | 86 | 488 | 82.3 | 17.7 |
| April..... | 508 | 46 | 554 | 91.7 | 8.3 |
| May..... | 544 | 39 | 583 | 93.3 | 6.7 |
| June..... | 368 | 101 | 469 | 78.4 | 21.6 |
| July..... | 946 | 23 | 969 | 97.6 | 2.4 |
| August..... | 1,920 | 67 | 1,987 | 96.6 | 3.4 |
| September..... | 1,710 | 56 | 1,766 | 97 | 3 |
| October..... | 3,436 | 306 | 3,742 | 91.8 | 8.2 |
| To November 11..... | 959 | 183 | 1,142 | 84 | 16 |
| Total..... | 11,211 | 1,000 | 12,211 | 91.8 | 8.2 |

U. S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,

U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP.

30 GROSVENOR GARDENS, LONDON, S. W. J., June 28, 1918.

From: Force Commander.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Office of Naval Intelligence).

Subject: Forwarding of chart showing tonnage situation.

Inclosure: One.

1. The force commander is forwarding you herewith copy of a chart, which has been prepared by the intelligence section of the force commander's staff. The chart is designed to show both the tonnage situation and the German submarine situation from the beginning of the war to the 1st of June, 1918.

2. The top curve shows the amount of tonnage available for the use of the Allies month by month with indications as to the tonnage added and lost.


3. The second curve is designed to show the number of submarines available to the enemy each month with indications as to the number added and lost during the month. Attention is called to the fact that the information contained in this second curve is considered by the Admiralty to be highly secret.

W. M. KITTRIDGE.

By direction.

KEY TO CURVE CHART.

The following explanation will assist in reading the accompanying curve chart. Let the indicated sketch represent any section of the upper or lower curve.



Then for the lower curve, the line a-b indicates the number of submarines available for any given month; the distance b-c shows the number of submarines added during the month (where the smallest unit of the vertical scale represents one submarine).

the distance *c-d* shows the number lost during that month. The line *d-e* then states the resultant or new figure of submarines available for the following month. If the upper curve, the smallest unit of the vertical scale represents 50,000 gross

The line *a-b* indicates the total tonnage available to the Allies at the end of a month; the distance *b-c* shows the tonnage added during the month by construction and otherwise. The distance *c-d* would be the tonnage lost through enemy air and marine risk, leaving the line *d-e* as the total tonnage available for the following month.


spt. PRATT. The memorandum and attached diagram R give a graphic representation of the point where the building curve crossed the sinking curve.

Senator PITTMAN. What was that date, Captain?

Capt. PRATT. In the first months of 1918, somewhere in January to March, according to this. The figures vary a little bit from the curve.

(The diagram referred to is as follows:)

Diagram R.



MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. PRATT—MERCHANT TONNAGE AND THE SUBMARINE.

In March last a memorandum was issued with relative tables on the merchant tonnage and submarine situation. The figures of this memorandum have been revised and brought up to date by the addition of the figures for the first 10 months of 1918.

These statements are attached, showing for the United Kingdom and for the world, the period August, 1914, to October, 1918:
Losses by enemy action and marine risk.
Merchant shipbuilding output.
Enemy tonnage captured and brought into service.
Since the issue of the previous memorandum, the output of the merchant tonnage of the world has overtaken the losses, and during the seven months, April to October, construction has exceeded losses by more than a million tons.
The rate of output of merchant tonnage in the United Kingdom has not yet overtaken the rate of British losses in any completed quarter; but if the tonnage purchased abroad is taken into account, the losses during the five months, June to October, are exceeded by the gains.
The following table summarizes the position of world tonnage on October 31:

| | Gross tons. |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | 15, 053, 786 |
| New construction..... | 10, 849, 527 |
| Enemy tonnage captured..... | 2, 392, 675 |
| | <hr/> 13, 242, 202 |
| Net loss..... | 1, 811, 584 |

Source and date: British Admiralty; August, 1914, to December, 1917-1918.
Copied from pamphlet in O. N. I., Navy Department.

W. V. PRATT.

I present for the use of the committee, not to be reproduced, the War Department annual report of the Chief of Transportation Service for 1919, with special references to pages 7, 15, 28, 36, 73, to 87, inclusive, 118, 119, 120, 142, 149, 154, 160, and 161. Pages 73 and 74 to 87 are the most important to read. It shows where the original plan of the War Department to send a certain number of troops was changed. They submitted A, B, C, and D plans, and while there was a very grave question in their minds as to the ability to furnish the supply of tonnage necessary they did meet it, and the resources are there, and the number of tons I do not recollect, but it is set down there in the War Department's report, and they did meet the necessities both in troop transport ships and in supply ships for a very much increased program over what they had originally intended, so much so that we were able to increase the transportation during the very decisive months of the spring and summer of 1918. I have put slips in at those places in the book, and I submit the report for the use of the committee, those pages, 73 to 87, showing the increase in the War Department's program.


The grave charge made has not been substantiated by the mass data presented, and this imputation remains to-day as unproved the day it was made. Mr. Hoover, though admitting the gravity of the situation, refused to be drawn into the controversy or to make the charge against our Navy. The submarine campaign came like a disease, ran its course. None regret the loss of life and ships entailed more than we brother followers of the sea; but the statement made at our failure to contribute antisubmarine forces in quantity immediately upon our entry into this war jeopardized the ultimate success of the war can not be substantiated.

It must be evident that the Office of Operations could take no local view of this war. However important the viewpoint of its representative in England might be, the office could not be unduly influenced by local color. In his letter and in the testimony submitted Admiral Sims evidently regards the submarine campaign as

Capt. PRATT. In the first months of 1918, somewhere in January to March, according to this. The figures vary a little bit from the curve.

(The diagram referred to is as follows:)

Diagram R.



MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. PRATT- MERCHANT TONNAGE AND THE SUBMARINE.

In March last a memorandum was issued with relative tables on the merchant tonnage and submarine situation. The figures of this memorandum have been revised and brought up to date by the addition of the figures for the first 10 months of 1918.

ys so much stress, was assured to us. For from the very beginning the sts. due principally to the preponderance of sea power vested in Great ad so assured the security of the sea that we were able to make our prepara- a comparative degree of security. Therefore, that prime essential, security being assured us, it no longer became part of our province to attempt to augment that preponderance, but it became our principal mission to throw e of our naval forces into those operations which would tend to strengthen s in which the Allies were weakest. In most previous wars, the dual mission wv had been, first, either to force offensive fleet action or to seek defensive i the best terms, and to build up reserves during the period while we were ag for the balance of sea power. Now, however, being relieved from the se of sea activities, this war took on for us a special character. The Navy's was principally one of protecting the line of sea communications and of up its reserves to the maximum required.

GENERAL POLICY.

ving definitely decided upon the character of the naval war, it became neces- outline our general policy. Briefly speaking, the naval mission of the Allies s, while maintaining control of the surface of the sea to make every effort to control of the subsurface of the sea. This mission applied to the fighting which we were to send to operate against the enemy. Likewise, the problem ling up our reserve forces, and of expanding the present organization to meet wth, was a matter which had to be carefully considered. It was then decided e present departmental organizations, if expended in an intensive but progres- anner, would meet all demands made upon it. It was further decided that unite of the fleet which could not be actively engaged against the enemy, be used to full capacity to develop the upbuilding of our reserves. In the ime, while so engaged, they should be placed where they could be moved or o best advantage for the allied cause.

ARMING OF OUR MERCHANT SHIPS.

Almost the first problem which faced the Navy was to secure, as far as possible, fety of our merchant fleet engaged in carrying food, munitions, and supplies to ilitary forces at the front. Germany, in attempting her submarine war, in the ning naturally chose to use her submarines in the way that would net her the and quickest returns. She, therefore, instead of using torpedoes attempted to by gunfire or by bombs all the merchant ships that fell in the path of her subma- . The department quickly realized that an answer to this, which would immedi- reduce submarine efficiency, and confine its activities to underwater activities, to arm our merchant ships. In so doing, we were forced to make use of the means and rather than do what we desired to do, but immediately plans went forward to ipate Germany's next move, which afterwards appeared in the form of her cruiser narines. The cruiser submarine was Germany's counter to the arming of our mer- it ships, but by the time those submarines were in operation the best of our chant fleet had been armed with a caliber of gun which was able to cope with the viest gun of the cruiser submarine. In the first part of this war some of the most resting encounters were those between our armed merchant ships and single my submarines, and there are cases on record where our armed guards have fought il the ship under them went down or they were forced to abandon the ship in nea.

SENDING OF DESTROYERS.

Immediately upon our entrance into the war, there was a demand for us to send troyers abroad. To some extent the request was sentimental, it being thought ecessary that our flag should be seen on the other side, and our destroyers being the ps most readily available for this purpose. Therefore, a division of destroyers was patched abroad and proceeded to base at Berehaven, Ireland, where they were n busily engaged in convoying ships and in antisubmarine operations. However, as soon discovered that these little hornets of the sea had a very distinct use apart m any sentimental value, and almost immediately we were requested to augment r force of destroyers abroad to the maximum. Admiral Sims, in his many reports the department, dwelt upon the extreme necessity of sending all antisubmarine ft abroad, and it was then that the department determined that every craft which s capable of being used in antisubmarine operations should be dispatched to the er side. This policy has been strictly adhered to throughout the war, despite the orts of the enemy, who later made every effort to divert us from strict adherence this rule by carrying submarine warfare to our shores.

the main issue to be considered. From them you ^{re assured to} the ^{preparation} of the sea. We admitted the gravity of the situation and made ^{the security}. Th meet it, but can not admit it was the only issue to ^{no longer became} the main issue. Our first and prime naval mission ^{force} but it beca the service of supply and transportation in con ^{those operation} Army that every resource of this great country ^{to force offensive} into the balance to aid most efficiently the allies ^{build up reserves of} the broader viewpoint to take. We believe th ^{power}. Now, how conception of our mission, which you may info ^{we took on for us a s} read from the plans formulated before our ex ^{protecting the line of} the early stages of the war. The Office of O ^{minimum required}

to exercise the very functions it exercised dur ^{GENERAL POLICY}. dinated the bureau's efforts in furnishing th ^{the character of the na} it held a general directing hand over all ^{Briefly speaking, the na} fronts. There can be no thinker on naval w ^{of the surface of the sea} say the right of the office to perform these ^{the sea}. This mission would state that they should be exercised ^{ate against the enemy} our Government. In viewing the general ^{of expanding the present} we entered, starting with exactly the same ^{to be carefully considered} that we had in April, 1917, it is difficult ^{is made upon it}. It was f campaign would be changed if we had to ^{not be actively engaged a} That, gentlemen, gives the viewpoint ^{develop the upbuilding of our} or at least my viewpoint as a member of ^{could be placed where they c} this date, April, 1920. But what is of pa

gentlemen, of course, is to get our viewp ^{MERCHANT SHIPS} because we are all liable to change our ^{the Navy was to secure, as} time, unintentionally but perhaps unav ^{in carrying food, munitions, a}

I have here a report from the Chief of ^{in attempting her submarine} ber 15, 1918, a paper which shows the ^{instead of using torpedoes} Operations at the time of the armistice ^{ships that fell in the path c} bally for this report in order that he n ^{an answer to this, which wo} I think it has nowhere come into pri ^{its activities to underwater} Benson approved it when I took it ^{we were forced to make use of} Chief of Naval Operations at the time ^{wards appeared in the form of} ing the views of the Office of Operati ^{lines were in operation the be}

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would b ^{of gun which was able to cope} Capt. PRATT. It is very long and ^{the first part of this war some of t} gentlemen. ^{our armed merchant ships and}

The CHAIRMAN. You might read ^{cord where our armed guards have} Capt. PRATT (Reading): ^{they were forced to abandon the s}

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: General character of the operation

1. In reply to your verbal request for ^{the war, there was a demand for us to s} our naval forces during the present war, I ^{quest was sentimental, it being thou}

Therefore, a division of destroyers w ^{Berehaven, Ireland, where they we}

2. The present war had been going on ^{of the sea had a very distinct use apar} possible for the department to make a f ^{Admiral Sims, in his many reports} should take in it were we called upon to ^{necessity of sending all antisubmarine} that the part we were to play differed ^{operations should be dispatched to} had we gone into this war sooner or ha ^{erred to throughout the war, des} preparations before being attacked by ^{effort to divert us from strict} namely, control of the sea, or at least

" parts of the world all of
war and concentrated
watched to Euro-
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which

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ate and
methods
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ed by the
perience of
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g fully 20 per
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ater experience
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applied to both
ent. It consisted
intervals along es-
ainst raiders, and of
sent into effect with
s continued ever since
the operations which
or it deprived the sub-
s unprotected ships and
which were protected by

enter the danger zone and
e victim. In these convoy
ler cruisers, and later the old
k had been conducted winter
It has been a hard, grinding
act that some two million troops
ip carrying troops under the pro-
the action of an enemy submarine.
naval forces have taken part, due to
rt such a large number of our military
is a chapter in itself. Suffice to say,
id will, in the future, stand as a monu-
is probably the greatest troop transport-
ross the seas. The work is not finished.
still a naval problem and it will be under-
ized the convoy of our troops to Europe

VARIOUS FORCES ABROAD.

elf and when, at a later period, it is possible to
ports which have been submitted by the naval
abroad, it will make a very interesting addition to
avy. Without, at this stage, attempting to go too
say that our naval forces have operated in European
he White Sea. At Corfu, Gibraltar, along the French
ish Channel ports on the Irish coast, in the North Sea,
our naval forces have been stationed and have done
will probably form the most interesting and exciting
of this war, and it is the work which has been most eagerly
del, but owing to the character of the operations which our
n to take part in, it has been not possible for all of our naval
red it, to engage in operations at the front, and a large part of
ed on quietly at the rear. This work, while not so brilliant,
y, and without it our forces at the front could not have carried
paign that they did.

stress, was assured to us. For from the very beginning the
ncipally to the preponderance of sea power vested in Great
of the security of the sea that we were able to make our prepara-
e degree of security. Therefore, that prime mission to attempt to
us, it no longer became part of our province to seek defensive
reponderance, but it became our principal mission to throw
ces into those operations which would tend to strengthen
lies were weakest. In most previous wars, the dual mission
either to force action or to build up reserves during the period while we were
nd to build up reserves during the period while we were
if sea power. Now, however, being relieved from the
his war took on for us a special character. The Navy's
of protecting the line of sea communications and of
maximum required.

GENERAL POLICY

he character of the naval
essy speaking, the
he surface of
sea, to
r, it became ne-
sion of
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but
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they could be moved or

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Of a
mer-
best of our
hich was able to cope with the
t of the name of the most
merchant ships and single
armed guards have fought
nd to shadow the ship in

mand for us to send
it being thought
rriers being the
destroyers was
re they were
However,
t use apart
augment
reports
marine
which
in the

SENDING CHASERS ABROAD.

6. The submarine chaser, a 110-foot boat, was created especially for the present war. The first object in building this type was that we should have a craft which might defend our own shores in case our other ships, more purely fighting craft, were dispatched to other waters. But it soon became evident that if these small craft could go abroad they should be sent abroad, and the same policy was adopted toward them as had been with our destroyers, namely, all that could possibly be spared should be sent abroad. It was late in the summer of 1917, and in the fall, before our chaser flotillas were constructed, organized, and trained sufficiently to be able to undertake the difficult task of getting these small craft across the water during the winter months. At first it was believed that they would have to be towed, and this was first attempted, but later they were sent over in flotillas under the protection of heavier escorting ships and with a mother ship to take care of their material needs. It became a matter of concern to get them across materially fit and with the personnel in fighting trim, so it was decided to route these ships via the Bermudas and the Azores. Having formulated the general plan of getting our chasers across, it was necessary to secure for them certain base facilities on the way over. To that end, negotiations were entered into with the Portuguese whereby we received from them the use of a temporary base at Ponta del Gada in the Azores. This base was built up to such an extent that we were able to care for the needs of our small and other craft that might require the use of a base while passing to and fro across the Atlantic.

SENDING OF BATTLESHIPS.

7. In order that there might be no question as to the preponderance of sea power in favor of the Allies, it was decided that a division of our dreadnought force should be sent abroad to cooperate with the Grand Fleet. This step was taken in the late fall of 1917, and Rear Admiral Rodman, in command of Division 9 of our fleet, was sent abroad and joined the naval forces operating in the North Sea. This division has been there ever since, has taken part in the various activities of the Grand Fleet, and, as one of the units of it, has stood ready to engage in any major operation in which this North Sea Fleet might be called upon to engage.

SENDING OF AIRCRAFT.

8. One of the problems which we were called upon to undertake was the establishment of various air stations on the coast of France and Ireland, from which, operating with seaplanes, dirigibles and kite balloons, we might operate offensively against the submarine and afford protection to the shipping converging in those waters. Likewise, steps were taken to provide the necessary aircraft to operate from these bases, as well as to provide for the necessary aircraft which would operate from our own shores, in case hostile submarine operations extended to our coast. There were, therefore, established abroad a matter of some 26 air stations from which our air forces operated, or were to operate from. Coincident with the establishment of these stations, the building of our aircraft was undertaken and as fast as these craft came along the same policy of sending them abroad, as had been adopted with our destroyers, was adopted with them.

SENDING OF SUBMARINES.

9. The principal antisubmarine efforts were at first carried on by surface craft, but it was later realized from the lessons learned by our Allies, that the submarine itself is the enemy of the submarine, especially when enemy submarines are forced to work upon the surface, as they sometimes are. Therefore, it was decided to send certain numbers of our submarines to the Azores, to keep that base clear and also to the coast of Ireland to operate from that general strategic area. In the late fall of 1917, and winter of 1918, two groups of our submarines were dispatched across the water and after a hard winter passage made their ports and have been operating from those localities ever since. Before our submarines had been dispatched abroad, the process of concentrating our reserves in these craft on our Atlantic coast, there to prepare for future contingencies, had been undertaken.

GENERAL POLICY IN REGARD TO SENDING SHIPS AND SUPPLIES.

10. Besides the specific types mentioned, there were various other smaller ships which could and were made available at the beginning of the war, such as yachts, Coast Guard ships, lighthouse craft, tugs, and tenders. These were armed and dispatched abroad as fast as they could be made ready for service. At the same time

The general policy went into effect of withdrawing from all parts of the world all of our fighting ships which could in any way aid in the present war and concentrated them either in European waters or on the Atlantic coast. Those dispatched to European waters engaged in antisubmarine operations. Those concentrated on the Atlantic coast stood ready to go abroad or engaged actively in convoy operations, which formed so great a part of the naval work in this war.

ESCORTING OF TROOP AND CARGO SHIPS—CONVOYS.

11. In the summer of 1917, the submarine problem having become acute and the losses to merchant ships great, it became necessary to definitely revise the methods of handling merchant shipping, in order that a greater degree of safety should be afforded. The solution of adopting the convoy of ships was first broached by the Admiralty. The problem to us was a new one, but they had had the experience of nearly four years ahead of them and finally decided that the method of convoys was the only solution to the problem. At the very beginning the department was not inclined to look with favor upon this solution. It slowed up shipping fully 20 per cent and the dangers of collision and the difficulties attendant upon carrying through his scheme successfully were very great. But in view of their greater experience the department yielded to the wishes of the Admiralty, and the convoy system of protection against the submarine was adopted. This system was applied to both cargo and troop ships and its success was almost immediately apparent. It consisted in gathering together certain numbers of vessels, sailing at regular intervals along established lanes, under the guard of heavier ships to protect against raiders, and of smaller destroyers to protect against submarines. This system went into effect with the first of our troop convoys which crossed in June, 1917, and has continued ever since to the day the armistice was signed. It is probably one of the operations which succeeded in breaking the back of the submarine operation, for it deprived the submarine of the benefit he derived from attacking individual unprotected ships and forced him to devote his efforts, for the most part, to ships which were protected by destroyers.

To engage with a convoy, the submarine was forced to enter the danger zone and frequently, it was he and not our ships which became the victim. In these convoy efforts, all of our destroyers, our armed cruisers, our smaller cruisers, and later the old battleships of our fleet have been engaged, and this work had been conducted winter and summer from June, 1917, until November, 1918. It has been a hard, grinding work, but that it was well done is attested to by the fact that some two million troops have been sent abroad, with not the loss of a single ship carrying troops under the protection of our forces on her eastbound voyage, due to the action of an enemy submarine. The history of the convoy operations in which our naval forces have taken part, due to which we have been able to so successfully transport such a large number of our military forces abroad, and so many supplies for the Army, is a chapter in itself. Suffice to say, it is probably our major operation in this war and will, in the future, stand as a monument to both the Army and the Navy, in what is probably the greatest troop transporting effort which has ever been conducted across the seas. The work is not finished. The problem of bringing our forces back is still a naval problem and it will be undertaken with the same spirit which characterized the convoy of our troops to Europe.

OPERATION OF OUR VARIOUS FORCES ABROAD.

12. This is, indeed, a chapter in itself and when, at a later period, it is possible to make a history out of numerous reports which have been submitted by the naval officers in charge of our various forces abroad, it will make a very interesting addition to the history of the United States Navy. Without, at this stage, attempting to go too much into detail, it is sufficient to say that our naval forces have operated in European water from the Mediterranean to the White Sea. At Corfu, Gibraltar, along the French Bay of Biscay ports, at the English Channel ports on the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at Mourmansk and Archangel, our naval forces have been stationed and have done creditable work. Their work will probably form the most interesting and exciting portion of the naval history of this war, and it is the work which has been most eagerly sought by all of the personnel, but owing to the character of the operations which our Navy has been called upon to take part in, it has been not possible for all of our naval forces, much as they desired it, to engage in operations at the front, and a large part of our work has been carried on quietly at the rear. This work, while not so brilliant, has still been necessary, and without it our forces at the front could not have carried on the successful campaign that they did.

THE WORK OF OUR NAVAL FORCES IN THE RESERVE.

13. Generally speaking, the work of the naval forces in reserve—that is, our fleet afloat—is divided into several classes. The mission of the battleship fleet became twofold. The dreadnaughts were drilled and trained to the minute, holding themselves as a reserve force, ready to be thrown into any strategic area where their presence might be needed, to reinforce any fighting force at the front, and to guard our lines of communications in the rear. This force was held strictly in readiness for battle. The mission of the older battleships became primarily one of training. In view of the enormous expansion in naval personnel, and the fact that our country had long ceased to produce seafaring men in great numbers, it became immediately necessary for the Navy to provide for the trained personnel to man not only its battleships but the auxiliaries and merchant ships, which it was later called upon to man. Our old battleship force, held in reserve for this purpose and operating from a strategically located base on the Atlantic coast, served as a nucleus for this training effort. It was a dull, grinding work, with none of the brilliancy attending the operations at the front; it was a work which required the utmost determination on the part of the naval personnel engaged in it, but it was one of the essential war works. And the men and officers engaged in this work are entitled to the same consideration as are their more fortunate brothers who took a more brilliant part. The cruiser force, while to an extent engaged in training, led a more active life, in that they were the first ships to go in to undertake the work of convoy, for in so far as the services of heavier ships were not absolutely needed in convoy work, it was unwise to put them in to an extent which would interfere with the training of personnel. It at all times was a balance between what had to be done and the policies the department desired to carry out. In this work of convoy there were engaged, not only the armored and heavier cruisers, but cruisers of all classes down to the very smallest.

ORGANIZATION OF OUR SHORE FORCES.

14. At the very outset it became apparent that should our purely naval forces be dispatched abroad, it would be necessary to organize along the lines which would give us an amount of naval protection for our own coast adequate to meet the forces likely to be sent against us. The chances of any raid on our coast by heavy surface craft could be discounted. It would not have been good policy for the German to have so scattered his efforts, and the amount of military good accomplished by the enemy in such an effort would have been nil. Such an attempt on the part of Germany was therefore discounted, and, moreover, we held a mobile force in reserve for that purpose quite sufficient to cope with any such effort. There was, however, the likelihood of the Central Powers attempting submarine efforts against us largely directed against our convoys, and possibly against our own coast. In order to afford adequate coastal protection, to develop an organization fitted to undertake the handling of the mining, sweeping, antisubmarine operations, the routing of merchant ships, and the convoy work, it was necessary to organize what were called naval districts.

These districts extended the entire stretch of our coast, both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and the Great Lakes. The various military activities were centered in the commandant of the district, who had at his disposal the various Naval forces attached to that district. Associated with the more purely military operations were those which pertained to the repair, supply, and handling of the merchant ships which were either directly taken over in the Navy, or were operated by the Navy for the Army. These activities also came under the commandant of the naval districts. Within each district but set apart for more purely Naval work, were our navy yards. These yards were under the general supervision of the commandant of the district yet had a mission of their own which was entirely apart from any purely military operations. The enormous expansion of our repair facilities and the increasing demand made upon the yards rendered it necessary that these organizations should be disturbed as little as possible from continuing the very necessary industrial activities without which our Navy would not receive its proper share of material nourishment. Therefore, a clear line of demarkation was drawn between the purely industrial activities centering in our navy yards, and the military activities centered under the commandant. There was however, one section of our coast, or waters adjacent thereto, which had to be treated in a somewhat different manner. The problem of the Gulf and the Caribbean did not lend itself to the same manner of treatment as did our coast from Cape Cod to Key West. To forestall enemy submarine operations in the Gulf and Caribbean a force was established called the American Patrol Force, and its headquarters was in the vicinity of Key West. While the coastwise shipping could be adequately pro-

ed by routing close along our coast, the problem became a different one than it entered the Gulf and Caribbean areas, and it was this problem and the problem of antisubmarine operations which the American patrol detachment had to undertake. As was foreseen, the protection of the oil supplies from the Gulf to our coast and then abroad were quite vital to the success of the general campaign, and these supplies the patrol detachment were prepared to safeguard by adopting at the time the convoy system the instant they were threatened.

OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US.

5. The wisdom of making a clean-cut line of demarkation between the military and industrial activities on our coast and of foreseeing the character of hostile operations against which we should make preparation, was clearly shown when the enemy directed his operations against our coast. About the middle of May, 1918, the enemy evidently decided that he must make an effort to stop us from sending more military forces abroad, if possible to do so, or at least to so distract our efforts that we would be more concerned with protecting our own coast than we were in sending our forces abroad. About the 2d of June, evidences of the operations of enemy submarines began to appear. It had been determined before by the department that the logical military objective would be our troop and cargo convoys, but these were well guarded that the submarine evidently preferred not to engage with them, but devoted his efforts against our coastwise trade, and principally against our unarmed sailing vessels. Along with this campaign of destruction, which had no military value whatsoever, the enemy adopted the practice of strewing our coast with mines. This nature of his campaign had been anticipated and our sweepers had been actively engaged in clearing the channels through which our convoys regularly sail. It was natural, however, with the long expanse of sea coast which we had to protect that the enemy should succeed in laying detached mine fields which more than once proved destructive to our coastwise shipping. Up to the time that an enemy submarine appeared off our coast, it had been the practice to allow coastwise ships to sail direct, and as far as practicable lights were burned and the ordinary aids to navigation were kept going. Immediately upon their arrival on our coast, without the slightest degree slowing his efforts to diminish the rate of flow of troops and supplies abroad, all coastwise shipping was hauled in under the protection of our district forces and a series of ratings, escort, and air patrols were started, which rendered reasonably secure the vessels that plied up and down our coast. In order to further render our shores secure, and to force the submarine to operate further afield, there were immediately sent out against him our own submarines. Hunting groups of destroyers and chasers, which had been formed and were in readiness, were sent out against him. The net result was that very soon, from a military point of view, the hostile submarine's efforts became practically nil and he was forced to operate further afield, that is well out into the Atlantic, where his principal prey became the single unarmed ships returning home on their westbound voyages. This move on the part of the German submarine had been anticipated and for the greater part westbound ships rarely returned home singly, but usually in company with another craft which carried a gun sufficiently large to cope with that of the submarine. On the whole, the operations of the enemy submarine against our coast can be spoken of as merely one of the very minor incidents of the war, and had he chosen to carry his operations into the Gulf, or even to the coast of Brazil, he would have found that preparations had been made to anticipate them.

ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF.

16. At the outstart it was necessary to take stock of the existing organizations to see whether they would best function along their present lines or whether it would be necessary to radically reorganize for war. It was found that the bureau organizations were capable of expansion within themselves, and all that was needed to make an efficient war machine was the closest cooperation between the various bureaus and of the various bureaus with the Office of Operations. A close-knit organization of this sort having the power of decision in its own hands, acting upon established policies and in touch with the active operations of our naval forces, appeared to be the most efficient. The weak point in such a link must necessarily be the cooperation between the various departments, and that the Office of Operations set itself out to remedy. There was consequently first of all established an efficient information and communication service, for it was realized that without these two prime essentials all of the various bureaus and operations itself would be groping in the dark. To that end the office of Naval Intelligence was enlarged and expanded until it reached a point of efficiency. Important work was handled immediately by the

cable and radio. There was established within the Office of Operations itself a organization wherein was gathered all information known as operating information so that it could be immediately accessible not only to the Office of Operations but to all bureaus, to the fleet, and to all other naval forces. However, efficiency could not have been realized had not Admiral Sims, commanding our European Fleet, fully realized the immense importance and the power that full information had for he established a similar system in London which was in complete touch with information on the other side and which he immediately routed to our central office. It thus became possible through the centralization of information and by means of the channels of communication which have been highly developed to largely centralize in the matter of detailed instructions to our forces, and thus to confer initiative to a large extent upon those leaders who were handling independent operations. It was thus possible to convey ideas and to give general instructions which would be thoroughly understood with a minimum of confusion.

The result is shown in the fact that during the entire course of the war there has been remarkably little confusion and very few changes from established plans. In addition to the service of information and communication it was necessary to establish an efficient inspection service of all sorts, particularly in relation to merchant shipping. This was efficiently handled under the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence. It was also necessary to establish strict censorship over the press and radio and this was most efficiently handled by the Office of Naval Communications. It was likewise necessary that the public be properly informed as to the aims, motives, and operations of our Navy, and this was most efficiently done through the committee on publicity, who acted in the closest cooperation with the Office of Naval Operations.

COOPERATION WITH ALL DEPARTMENTS.

17. Not only was it necessary to secure the closest cooperation within our own department, but it was also most important that the closest harmony and accord should exist between the Navy Department and the various other departments of the Government, particularly with the State and War Departments. There were consequently detailed for this work special officers whose duties were to coordinate our activities with those of the various war organizations which had sprung up during the war. During the entire course of this war there has been the closest accord between the Office of Naval Operations and the State Department, War Department, Treasury Department, Department of Justice, Post Office Department, War Industries Board, War Trades Board, the Shipping Board, and the Alien Enemy Custodian. Even such organizations as the Fuel Administration, Food Administration, and the Red Cross came constantly in touch with the Navy Department. It was also necessary that the closest cooperation should be maintained between the various naval representatives of the different nations with whom we were united in fighting the war. During the entire course of the war there has been the closest harmony and cooperation between all of the various allied nations and ourselves. We have been furnished with all information that they themselves possess and we in turn furnished them with all the information we had. At the suggestion of the Navy Department the British commander in chief moved his headquarters to Washington where he was in constant touch with the Office of Operations. Had not this close liaison been established it would have been exceedingly difficult to have coordinated the various naval movements which had to be carried out jointly and which covered a great many fields of activity.

THE CHANGE IN THE NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM.

18. As soon as we entered the war it became evident that unless we radically changed the naval building program then in process, it would be impossible to wage the most efficient war against the hostile submarine. Having determined that the war against the submarine, the service of supply, and the guarding of the lines of communications were our principal missions, it was immediately apparent that a switch in our naval program was needed. Therefore the department almost immediately decided that construction on our battleships, battle cruisers, and scouts, except in cases of ships nearly completed, should practically cease, and every effort was devoted to the construction of destroyers, chasers, and later of Eagle boats. In addition to the numbers of destroyers laid down, a new plan was prepared for additional destroyers, which was approved, and the work of construction continued until late in the summer of 1918, when, it being apparent that the hostile submarine was being controlled, it became evident that plans should be laid looking to a resumption of our former building program, in order that we might regain the ground lost in the previous year and a half.

THE NAVAL PART IN THE UPBUILDING OF OUR MERCHANT MARINE.

19. The Navy has always had very much at heart the upbuilding of a merchant marine, for from this source it must largely draw its supply of seafaring men needed to man our Naval craft. Therefore it very early became a matter of extreme importance to the Navy as to the best way in which this large merchant fleet which was being built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and which had been requisitioned by the Shipping Board, could be put to efficient war work. Plans were worked out in cooperation with the Shipping Board and with the Army whereby all of the ships turned over for Navy purposes, the cargo ships turned over to the War Department for supplying their Army abroad, and vessels of a certain size running through the war zone, could be manned by naval crews. Had the war been of a different character, it is possible that merchant shipping might not have been dislocated to the extent it was, for the character of the war was such that practically every commercial interest disappeared and all interests became military in their character. The needs of the Army alone, both in troops and supplies, were so great as to practically demand the turning over to their use, not only all of our own available tonnage, but such allied tonnage as could be chartered. It therefore appeared quite necessary that this tonnage operating for a military purpose should be under strict military control, which in so far as transporting across sea was concerned was a naval matter.

Above all, the character of the warfare waged by enemy submarines was such that at no time could the seas be called free and there was the constant menace to crew and cargo which required the highest technical skill to combat. For these reasons it became necessary to man those vessels that crossed the war zone with naval crews and in this matter the Shipping Board and War Department heartily concurred. The troop transports were, from the very beginning, manned with naval crews, as it was recognized that the lives of our soldiers could only, on the seas, be entrusted to those whose experience fitted them to give the maximum amount of safety. The wisdom of this policy is shown by the results, in the number of troops and cargo safely transported across the Atlantic. With the end of this war, another problem will face the Navy. If it is considered to be the policy that the feeding of the Central Powers and Russia still remain a Government problem, to be administered by us as a Nation, rather than as a commercial enterprise, then it seems probable that the feeding of these starving millions may have to be handled by the various Government organizations best fitted now to cope with the problem. If this be the case, the military problems of the past year and a half merely merge themselves into economic problems similar to those which we as a Nation have just successfully coped with. Then it may be that the Army organizations which have so successfully administered to our forces in France will be called upon to supply food for the starving millions. If that be so, then, it seems likely that our Navy will be called upon to man the ships used by the Army for this purpose and while the process of demobilization will go on, in so far as our lesser purely military units are concerned, it may be necessary, for a number of years to come, for the Navy to take a very active part in the administration of our merchant marine.

THE WORK OF THE PLANNING SECTIONS.

20. It was early realized that no naval operations or successful campaign against the enemy could be inaugurated and systematically carried out without the aid of officers specially trained to do the planning. Apart from the major plans of campaign, which it has been the province of the General Board to formulate, there was constantly occurring opportunities for local operations, and even for operations of a major character which it is very necessary that officers who are not engrossed with administrative details should give their attention to. At first the department was swamped with a mass of administrative detail. This was quite natural and was inevitably due to the sudden transition from a peace to a war footing. But eventually it became possible to pick out and assign certain officers specially qualified whose mission it was to devote themselves to the work of planning.

In the late fall of 1917 it became possible to augment Admiral Sims' staff with officers who had no other duties except to work upon various plans. A similar planning section was also formed in the Office of Naval Operations. Both of these planning sections were in the closest touch with the Admiralty Planning Section and jointly considered the various subjects which arose in the course of the war. In cooperation with the General Board and with the various bureaus, such plans as the northern barrage plan, the Adriatic mine barrage, the Aegean mine barrage, the plan for operating our great guns in Europe, the northern bombing project, the general policy of our aviation efforts, the systematic hunting of submarines, and numerous other plans were

worked out. The department had at all times a good working knowledge of the best things to do in the emergencies, and in addition it was also able to some extent forecast the trend of enemy operations, and to a degree to plan a counter. Without such organizations it is very doubtful if a clean-cut, well-thought-out plan of campaign can be conducted, and the value of these planning sections has shown itself many times over. Had the war continued longer their value would have been doubly increased. The existence of these two organizations working in close harmony with each other, one across the water and one here, is making far simpler the process of a systematic demobilization.

ACTIVITIES AND POLICY ON OTHER STATIONS.

21. The process of reduction of forces on our stations, except the North Atlantic and in the war zone, went into effect immediately at the beginning of the war. There were, however, reasons apart from military reasons, where it was not desirable to strip the Asiatic, South Atlantic, and other stations of all the vessels that were there. On the Pacific coast there was left a bare modicum of ships to attend to purely local needs. In South America, under Admiral Caperton, there were at least four armored cruisers stationed there at the time when a few hostile raiders were at large. But the danger from raiders having passed and the convoy needs growing greater, the admiral on this station was left with only sufficient force to enable him to successfully carry out his mission, which was largely one of cooperation with the Brazilians. This he most successfully did. At the Brazilian war college to-day there are representative United States naval officers, who are closely in touch with the activities of this college, and there are other officers who are working in harmony with the Brazilians and establishing friendly relations between their Navy and ours.

The cruises of our ships in the South Atlantic took them as far afield as Valparaiso on the west coast and to Liberia on the coast of Africa. In Asiatic waters the center of effort naturally was around the Siberian ports. Admiral Knight, on the *Brooklyn*, has been a student of the situation there and has kept the department constantly informed of the varying changes in the Siberian situation. At Mourmansk, in Russia, one of our ships was dispatched to act in cooperation with the Allies, and was instructed to particularly carry out the policies of the State Department. Since the armistice had been signed the *Scorpion*, which was interned at Constantinople, has been recommissioned and is now showing our flag in the Dardanelles and Black Sea. In the Adriatic one of our cruisers, with several destroyers, has been recently dispatched in order that our forces may be represented in the activities taking place within that area. In Canada we were requested to establish seaplane stations to aid in hunting the submarine, and this was done.

NAVAL POLICY TOWARD THOSE ALLIES WITH WHOM WE WERE ASSOCIATED.

22. It was realized that one of the reasons for causing this war to drag along as it did for a number of years was the lack of close cooperation between the Allies engaged in it fighting against the United Central Powers. Therefore, our position being particularly unique one, and it being evident to all concerned that the United States could have no ulterior motives, it was fitting that the policy of the Navy Department toward those with whom it was associated should be one of the utmost frankness and straight dealing. We never expected to receive anything but the most open and fair treatment and in return we gave the same. It is a pleasure to state that so thoroughly have the Allies responded to our attitude, or even anticipated it, that there has never arisen an occasion where we felt that there existed the slightest ulterior motive. This office has received at all times fully and freely all information, no matter how secret its character, which has aided us in our planning and in our operations particularly. We are especially indebted to the free access which we have had to the information obtained by the British Admiralty intelligence service.

RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW.

23. Since it is the province of the Office of Operations in outlining any campaign of war not only to take cognizance of immediate operations but to determine upon the policies to be carried out and to initiate plans and campaigns, it was of importance that the character of warfare which we waged should at the end of the war be open to inspection. For that reason, in every operation that was planned the tenets of international law were strictly regarded and the motto was adopted which was scrupulously adhered to, not "that the end justified the means" but that "the end must be justified by the means."

24. The Office of Operations takes pleasure in expressing its deep appreciation to the various branches of the Government, of the naval shore establishment, and of the naval forces afloat, without whose close cooperation and assistance it could in no wise have accomplished any of the problems with which it was confronted.

W. V. PRATT,
Acting Chief of Naval Operations.

I have here the report of Admiral Mayo to the Navy Department of requests for assistance to the United States following the international naval conference in London, September 4 and 5, 1917, with notes made on the original in my handwriting. I submit that to show that when Admiral Mayo made his report, exactly what we were doing with it and the steps we were taking. He went over, you will remember, in August, 1917, and so it seemed essential that this should go in to show that we were not asleep, and that we were trying to do the things he asked for, and on looking over the original letter files I found this. We were very busy in those days, and there was not very much time for writing, and we would often take the original letter and write upon it, saying "Yes; doing it," or something of that sort; so that I submit this original copy of that report of Admiral Mayo, showing what was being done in certain cases.

The CHAIRMAN. With your notes on it?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the notes can go in as well as the report?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. This report is as follows:

REPORT OF ADMIRAL MAYO TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT OF REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL NAVAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON, SEPTEMBER 4 AND 5, 1917.

[Notes (printed in brackets) made on original in handwriting of Capt. Pratt.]

PASSAGE, LIVERPOOL TO NEW YORK,
S. S. *St. Louis*, October 11, 1917.

File 8012, confidential.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Specific requests for assistance from the several allied powers.

References: (a) Report of international naval conference in London on September 4 and 5, 1917—extracts; (b) memorandum from first sea lord of British Admiralty, dated September 22, 1917; (c) memorandum of requests from France; (d) memorandum of requests from Italy; (e) memorandum of requests from Russia.

1. The following summary of specific requests for assistance from the United States made by the several allied powers is assembled from the references and from notes made in interviews with Government representatives.

2. It is recommended that immediate and careful consideration be given to these requests and that decision or views in the premises be communicated to the several Governments concerned as soon as possible, in order that the necessary arrangements for cooperation and coordination of assistance to be rendered may be made, as in practically all cases the time element is of very great importance.

3. Not only should there be the least possible delay in replying to the several requests in order that the Governments concerned may plan accordingly, but where material assistance is involved, care should be taken to concentrate effort on the production of material already found even fairly satisfactory for the purpose intended, rather than to institute research and experimental work for development of new apparatus, or for the improvement of existing apparatus, thus causing delays in production which would operate to markedly reduce, and perhaps even to nullify, the value of the assistance rendered.

4. The summary of requests is arranged as follows: (a) Requests made during international naval conference in London September 4 and 5, 1917, inclosure A; (b) requests made by Great Britain, inclosure B; (c) requests made by France, inclosure C; (d) requests made by Italy, inclosure D; (e) requests made by Russia, inclosure E.

5. The commander in chief has made no written recommendation regarding these several requests but is prepared to discuss them and to explain the points that were presented in connection with them when they were made.

H. T. MA-

There has been established in European waters a destroyer force under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, and 28 destroyers have been despatched abroad for service, together with 2 destroyer tenders. Two supply ships, under destroyer command, have been despatched to France, carrying cargoes of much needed material for that country.

By agreement with the allied powers definite areas of patrol in the North Atlantic and off the east coast of Brazil have been taken over by the United States Navy; a scout force has been despatched to cover the area assigned our forces in the North Atlantic, under the command of Admiral W. B. Caperton.

There has been established in the Pacific a patrol of the Pacific Coast, including Mexico and Central America as far south as Panama Canal, under Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam.

There has been organized a force of small craft designated for patrol service in waters adjacent to the coast of France, and Captain W. B. Fletcher has been placed in command of the first contingent of this force, which will complete its fitting out in a few days and start for its field of operations.

There has been organized a system of convoy service under general charge of Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, in readiness for the convoy of any troops which may be despatched to France.

In addition to the foregoing, armed guards have been or are in process of being placed on all vessels, about 150 in number, plying between the United States and Europe, and the Atlantic Fleet has been given the duty of training the crews for the armed guards of merchantmen and transports.

The organization of the several forces, the regulations for convoy service, the instructions for the operation of merchant vessels supplied with armed guards, and the instructions for United States merchant vessels have all been prepared and issued by the planning section of the office of operations.

A board, of which Capt. Pratt of the office of operations is chairman, has been appointed to consider plans and devices connected with submarine warfare, and holds an almost daily session and conference with the research committee of the Joint Committee on National Defense.

Definite and effective steps have been taken toward the organization of measures to take over the control of the routing of all merchant vessels leaving United States ports. At present this function is being exercised by representatives of the British Admiralty stationed in our ports.

Preparation and distribution of various publications and ciphers for use in communication between merchant vessels and men-of-war of the United States and of the allied powers is well advanced. The communication office has been greatly enlarged to meet the demands of the increased work brought about by the state of war, the taking over of all radio service, and the establishment of the censorship over cables. It is contemplated to establish a service of officer-messengers for the distribution of secret and confidential publications, and ciphers.

NAVAL DISTRICTS.

The work of the naval districts has been extremely active, especially in districts 1 to 5 inclusive, because of their greater strategic importance and because of the trans-Atlantic traffic passing to and from the ports within their limits. The sixth, seventh, and eighth districts are filling up their organization, but are not developed to the same extent. Those districts on the Pacific coast and in Hawaii have not yet been fully organized. Defensive sea areas have been declared and have been enforced in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Cape Henry, Hampton Roads, and Charleston, as fast as the number of patrol boats become available efficiently to exercise control over the areas. Other areas will be enforced as the organizations grow.

Six hundred and twelve small vessels have been inspected and found suitable for naval use; 152 have been taken into the naval service and assigned to scout service and as mine sweepers; 138 have been ordered taken over but have not yet been delivered. Those accepted are now actively at work patrolling and mine sweeping or are being fitted out as rapidly as possible for work. All the small craft acquired by the naval district commandants have been manned by enrollment of Naval Reserve men within the districts, and the personnel by active employment are rapidly becoming trained and accustomed to the line of work which the defense of the district demands. Mine sweeping is being carried out at Boston, New York, Delaware Bay, and Chesapeake.

The obligations under the emergency appropriation of \$115,000,000 incurred in equipping the naval districts is indicated in the attached table.

MADE BY GREAT BRITAIN—FURTHER ASSISTANCE DESIRED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

[Memorandum from first sea lord.]

Further assistance desired from the United States from available forces or as follows:

Coal-burning battleships of the dreadnought type to replace three or four dreadnought battleships which it is desired to send to foreign waters to replace battleships which are being paid off for want of personnel. [Yes.]

Increase in the number of destroyers, in order to enlarge the convoy system and give better protection for each convoy. [Yes; when we get them.]

Increase in the number of convoy cruisers for the same reason. [We cannot have not the ships available.]

Increase in the number of patrol craft, tugs, etc., for antisubmarine work. [Yes.]

Speedy building of merchant ships. [Doing it.]

Supply of a large number of mines for the proposed barrage between Scotland and Norway, and assistance toward laying them by the provision of United States laying vessels. [Yes; doing it, but the vessels to lay them should be sent now.]

As the increase in the number of destroyers during the war has forced the older capital ships to provide trained personnel for the light cruisers, destroyers, and destroyers. This policy must still continue, as officers and crews are needed during the next 18 months for the 19 light cruisers, 12 flotilla leaders, and destroyers now in various stages of construction.

The United States Government see fit to send over four coal-burning dreadnoughts would be attached to the Grand Fleet and form an integral portion of it together as a division of a battle squadron.

United States destroyers are more suitable for convoy work on the western coast of Great Britain than British destroyers, owing to their size and greater endurance. Any increase possible in this direction would enable more British destroyers to be used in the North Sea to operate offensively against enemy submarines.

Increase in the number of convoy cruisers would enable the number of convoys to be increased, or, alternatively, the number of merchant ships in each convoy to be increased and better control and protection be assured.

The proposed barrage of mines between Scotland and Norway will entail the employment of large numbers of patrol vessels. Any assistance from the United States will be most welcome, either to cooperate in patrolling the barrage, or, alternatively, to release British patrol vessels for this purpose.

[Staff D. C. N. S., September 22, 1917.]

With regard to mines: (a) It is considered essential that mines used in a patrol craft are numerous should become inoperative upon breaking their moorings.

The British Admiralty desires to know what type of sinker can be used with the mines.

[Situation: (a) The situation with regard to fuel oil is still unsatisfactory. Amount on hand for naval use is approximately 600,000 tons. Of this possibly as 150,000 tons will not be available at the particular point where it is required, leaving a real available supply of approximately 450,000 tons. [Foley; under consideration.]

Normal monthly consumption under the present conditions of operation (including immobilized) is 225,000 tons. [We need three more tankers now.]

Amount on hand available is therefore approximately two months' supply. Greatest efficiency in oil supply can only be obtained by pooling the tonnage of oil companies and controlling their sailings by a joint committee of the United States and Great Britain.

REQUESTS MADE BY FRANCE.

At the time the commander in chief was in France conferences were held with Gen. Pershing, United States Army, Vice Admiral DuBon, chief of staff of the Navy, and with officers of the United States Navy on duty in France.

On suggestion of Lord Derby and Gen. Murry, Gen. Pershing had already suggested to the United States suggesting that he proceed to London for a conference with Gen. Pershing and Admiral Mayo, to fully consider all of the demands which will be required for shipping in order to supply the United States Army and the necessities of the campaign. He had received an answer to the effect that the President did

There has been established in European waters a destroyer force under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, and 28 destroyers have been despatched abroad for service, together with 2 destroyer tenders. Two supply ships, under destroyer command, have been despatched to France, carrying cargoes of much needed material for that country.

By agreement with the allied powers definite areas of patrol in the North Atlantic and off the east coast of Brazil have been taken over by the United States Navy and a scout force has been despatched to cover the area assigned our forces in the North Atlantic, under the command of Admiral W. B. Caperton.

There has been established in the Pacific a patrol of the Pacific Coast, including Mexico and Central America as far south as Panama Canal, under Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam.

There has been organized a force of small craft designated for patrol service in waters adjacent to the coast of France, and Captain W. B. Fletcher has been placed in command of the first contingent of this force, which will complete its fitting out in a few days and start for its field of operations.

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In addition to the foregoing, armed guards have been or are in process of being placed on all vessels, about 150 in number, plying between the United States and Europe, and the Atlantic Fleet has been given the duty of training the crews for the armed guards of merchantmen and transports.

The organization of the several forces, the regulations for convoy service, the instructions for the operation of merchant vessels supplied with armed guards, and similar instructions for United States merchant vessels have all been prepared and issued by the planning section of the office of operations.

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The work of the naval districts has been extremely active, especially in districts 1 to 5 inclusive, because of their greater strategic importance and because of the great trans-Atlantic traffic passing to and from the ports within their limits. The sixth, seventh, and eighth districts are filling up their organization, but are not developed to the same extent. Those districts on the Pacific coast and in Hawaii have not yet been fully organized. Defensive sea areas have been declared and have been enforced in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Cape Henry, Hampton Roads and Charleston, as fast as the number of patrol boats become available efficiently to enforce control over the areas. Other areas will be enforced as the organizations grow.

Six hundred and twelve small vessels have been inspected and found suitable for naval use; 152 have been taken into the naval service and assigned to scout patrol service and as mine sweepers; 138 have been ordered taken over but have not yet been delivered. Those accepted are now actively at work patrolling and mine sweeping or are being fitted out as rapidly as possible for work. All the small craft acquired by the naval district commandants have been manned by enrollment of Naval Reserves within the districts, and the personnel by active employment are rapidly being trained and accustomed to the line of work which the defense of the district demands. Mine sweeping is being carried out at Boston, New York, Delaware Bay, and in the Chesapeake.

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OPERATIONS ON SHORE.

The naval government of the Virgin Islands of the United States has been established under the governorship of Rear Admiral J. H. Oliver, and steps have been taken to provide at least a partial land defense of the islands by mounting eight 5-inch guns distributed between the islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix. Steps have been taken looking in view the establishment of quarantine services, medical research services, and agricultural services in the islands.

Affairs in the island of Haiti, involving the peace of the Republics of Santo Domingo and Haiti, have progressed satisfactorily, and the authority of the established governments of these Republics has been maintained. In the two Republics there are now forces of marines aggregating 2,000. In Santo Domingo a guardo nacional under the military government and under the direction of United States marines has been formed and is undergoing a course of training, while in the island of Haiti the gendarmerie is reported to be in a very efficient condition. A small coast-guard service has been established in Haiti and vessels repaired in ports of the United States assigned to this service have recently been delivered under United States naval escort. In addition, there have been employed in the disturbed districts of Cuba, caused by the recent revolution in that country, a varying force of marines for the protection of American interests there. There are at present about 450 marines maintained in the island. An information service throughout the island has been organized.

We have maintained constantly in Mexican ports and along the coast a patrol by our vessels, giving especial interest to the port of Tampico, in the vicinity of which the vast oil fields constituting a large and important source of the world's supply of oil. From two to four vessels have been maintained continuously at this port.

MATERIAL.

The vast work of equipping and repairing the fleet has brought upon our various navy yards and shore establishments demands which have taxed their utmost capacity. Not only has it been necessary to complete the overhaul and repairs of our regular naval vessels but repairs to the seized German merchant vessels and the fitting out and equipping of ships taken over for service have multiplied the work required to be done.

Repair work on the battleships left unfinished before the movement of the fleet south has been taken up and practically all naval vessels have been made materially ready and put in service. The fitting out of vessels for distant service is nearly completed, 15 German ships badly damaged by their crews before seizure by this Government are being fitted out for naval purposes, and 8 German ships are being repaired for the Shipping Board.

AERONAUTICS.

The naval aeronautic program was considerably accelerated upon the severance of diplomatic relations February 3, 1917, and the present program of naval aeronautic expansion may be considered to have begun on that date.

Enrollments in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps were begun under definite standards supplied to commandants of the various naval districts, and arrangements for accelerating the training of personnel at Pensacola and for establishing various other schools of training were made. There are five such schools now in operation.

Contracts were authorized for such aircraft as could be turned out for the Navy by July 1, including in this number 16 coastal dirigibles, and contracts are being made for additional aircraft as fast as they can be accepted by the manufacturers. Two hundred and eight aircraft have been ordered but not yet delivered. There are under construction at Pensacola 12 temporary hangars, a dirigible shed, and a large hydrogen plant.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic Cognizance, sites for coastal air stations were examined and selected, and complete plans for the development of such stations were drawn up. Money for the acquisition of these stations is not available, but is included in an appropriation now pending. One site, however, has been obtained through permission of the use of land from the city of New York, and the construction of an air station there is now under way.

An allotment from the emergency fund of \$3,000,000 was made to aeronautics. Of this sum \$1,025,000 has been obligated and the expenditure of a further sum for the purchase of air craft equipment costing approximately \$1,244,000 has been authorized. The balance of approximately \$731,000 remains available.

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W. S. BENSON.

Expenditures for patrol vessels, mine sweepers, etc., in naval districts.

Vessels taken over:

| | |
|------------------------------------------|-------|
| Patrols..... | \$1,1 |
| Sweepers..... | 3,0 |
| Vessels ordered taken over..... | 1,1 |
| Vessels taken over by special board..... | 1,4 |
| Total..... | 7,9 |

I have here a personal letter, or a letter written in a personal by me dated July 2, 1917, to Admiral Sims. I got this out of official files of the department. I found it when I came back. It is a letter which expresses very clearly our attitude at that time the way we felt in the matter. I shall read this letter, and this is the original, straight from the files of the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote that letter?

Capt. PRATT. I did. It was made official by having Admiral Sims's sanction to it. The letter is as follows. [Reading:]

JULY 2, 1917

DEAR SIMS: Will try to get a letter off to the cheer-up admiral.

Did you see the article of Reuter Dahl in the Saturday Evening Post? As a matter of policy I shall try to get you off a news budget from time to time, in order to keep you in touch with the situation. Don't get down on your luck—I know you won't. You are the man for the job and constantly we over here hear the nice news about you. If the cables are not answered on time, cheer up. We will do our best, rotten as that is. Here goes for a spiel on policy as I see it.

OUR POLICY IN BUILDING.

Through efforts on the part of Schofield and all of us, crystallized into definite plans we have presented a clean cut outline of the policy which we deem is absolutely necessary to follow if this affair is to be brought to a successful conclusion.

Briefly speaking, it is this. To push the immediate construction of destroyers, submarines, and merchant ships, not only push what is contracted for but to devote building energy to those ends and to the building up of the ship-producing facilities.

To carry out the design above outlined, we have recommended the abandonment of the present of all dreadnought battle cruiser and scout cruisers, except the dreadnoughts almost completed.

To further these plans the Navy is cooperating to its utmost with Gen. Goethals, as the head of the merchant-ship building program, is a tower of strength. He has asked for a naval board of advisors and it has been appointed. Admiral Benson is strong for it and every effort of his will be directed toward getting the Secretary to make a decision.

We all feel that this must be done, though we realize that such a policy may leave us with our guard down in the case of future complications. There, however, is where we must come in, and we must trust to your good offices, in your diplomatic way, to make the situation safe for the future. That is the happy solution, and it is a solution which I hope from the bottom of my heart may be accomplished for the future well-being of the entire Anglo-Saxon race. Whatever might be the outcome, even were we forced to result, England's fleet must never go elsewhere except to join our own, and portions of it as we might need in future contingencies ought to be at our disposal. There must be no mistake about that. But willy-nilly, we of us here who may have a iota of say in directing our policies are turning every effort in the direction of a successful solution of this problem, leaving the future to take care of itself.

MINES.

In one of your earlier cables you expressed the desire that we should undertake the construction of great numbers of mines. Later, you cabled our mine was so satisfactory and that the Admiralty did not desire it. You are by now in receipt of our later cable requesting a definite statement of policy. We, as I understand, stand ready to undertake the construction of very excellent mines in great quantities without interfering with our other efforts. The Admiralty expert, Commander (I think), has, so I am told, expressed his satisfaction with the mine. Personally I think the mine will play a great part in the ultimate solution of the war, and mine class I put the torpedo, the depth bomb, and the aerial bomb (the great all) as well as the mine true. About 30,000 tons of steel are being held up on this situation pending an ultimate decision.

STRATEGIC FIGHTING AREAS.

The North Sea, (2) the Adriatic, (3) other areas. It has always seemed to me, and in this I am not alone, that areas (1) and (2) were offensive areas, and that, outside of these, the (3) class, other areas, were largely defensive in a broad strategic sense. England and the Allies have tried everything in (1) and (2) from the fleet to a patrol on the surface and, as you said in your cables, a limited mines operation. If I may be pardoned for saying so, and though she has learned through hard experience, I think the cart has been put ahead of the horse. Two years ago when the fleet contained the German High Sea Fleet, everyone said Mahan was vindicated, the silent pressure of the fleet was to save the situation. That is just as true to-day as it was then—the silent pressure of the fleet is there, but it is the conception of the strategic area in which it must operate to be effective, that is gumming the game. It has been borne home to me more and more when I compare the similar attitude of mind which exists in our own fleet. To be effective, the powers that control the movements of our fleet decided that it must come north on our own coast. There were several of us who said "No" to that proposition, "the best results will be gained by sending it to the Pacific" or where it can drill fit to the minute at sea. The other side thought that a reasonable proximity to the scene of possible action was the first requisite. That I am trying to drive at is this—the fleet, Admiralty's or ours, is a strategic proposition. Its effect will be felt even if it does not attempt the physical control of the North Sea with its component members. If it in any way hampers the tactical facilities of those fighting agencies which can do a better local work in that region, then the local agencies must not be sacrificed to the fleet, but the fleet must adjust itself to the immediate need. The immediate need—the mission—is the strongest possible offensive in the North Sea and the Adriatic against the submarine. As it seems to be working out, the strongest offensive agency capable of effectively working against the submarine is the mine in some form—whether it be projected from a submarine, a destroyer, an aircraft, or whether it be planted in the water. Therefore when the Admiralty decides that certain areas can not be mined because it will interfere with the operation of the High Sea Fleet, I say the Admiralty, or whoever makes the decision, decides wrong, and I am going to stick to it like a stubborn mule. The North Sea and the Adriatic must be offensive mine areas, and the tactical disposition of the forces concerned must be such that the most mobility of action along the lines indicated be gained. With the barrage of mines by the thousands, with the areas inside that barrage filled with the friendly submarines operating in areas under orders, with the friendly aircraft operating against the land inside the barrage and against the sea outside the barrage, with the patrol and escort outside the barrage, with the fleet in general support outside, there is a general strategic plan. I do not accept as a valid excuse the statement that the fleet must be in readiness to repel an attempt by major ships of the enemy to raid the east coast. It is not sound under the circumstances, and the answer to it lies in your own submarines, or else you admit at once that the enemy submarines can do more than you can. It is a great mistake to attempt to make a tactical issue of the fleet when its rôle will, at the beginning at least, be strategical, and only when the local issue is forced by the minor units can you hope to draw the enemy to an action. I have talked to a great many men like Chase, Schofield, McKean, and they are in the main in agreement as to the soundness of the general strategy and in the insistence that local tactics should never be allowed to cloud correct strategic conceptions.

I don't care whether you call me a fool or not. I have studied a thousand or more plans and schemes, as I must from the nature of the duty of the board of which I am head, and more and more do I see that the aim of every good solution lies along the lines I have indicated. It is not my scheme. It, like the conference, represents the consensus of opinion on the subject, and the sounder the character of the men making the solutions, the nearer do they seem to approach to something like what I have tried to indicate above.

PERSONNEL.

You are all right in asking for all the officers and men. They ought to go and would were it a physical possibility to give them. There are many great demands—the yachts going abroad, the drifters, the number of Army transports which are coming under direct and complete Navy control, the necessity of preserving intact the skeleton of the structure of the fleet so that it shall in no wise lose in efficiency, the putting into commission the huge number of small craft, and the reserve battleships (to be used to train up new personnel)—the great increase in the numbers of officers

needed in positions of responsibility on shore and the impossibility of turning - of these duties over to untrained inexperienced men, all make the greatest demand upon the trained personnel. We must not and can not make the mistake England did in her first expeditionary army. You know it is sound just as well as I. But the spirit is with you, to give you all that can be spared, and if the staff asks for more, remember we are trying to do our best. After reading over all you had to say, Emmet's letter, I prepared the cable which put the number of reserves at one (Naval Reserves, untrained, but let us hope bright, useful men). You can work them into shape. I hope the admiral signed it. He said he would. I believe it is the best that can be done now. But remember the will is to give you all that can be spared, not only for your own use, but on the principle, which we all hold here, that a man gets the best training at the front. I have personally wanted to go with you the worst way. Chase and the others insist that this is my job, that I am giving a greater equivalent to the Government, and as you know that is out War College training.

ESTABLISHMENT OF STATIONS FOR UNITED STATES FORCES ABROAD.

As you know, if this war is going to last, and it looks now as though it would - time longer, we have only just begun to bite into the apple. It appears to me that there is a crying need for more of our forces of the antisubmarine patrol type, not only for the British areas, but for the French coast, and the Mediterranean as well.

We have established a nucleus now on the Irish coast. It is only a beginning, I hope. We are all in accord on that. It should and will be increased, compatible with our home needs, and to the supply abroad of our forces at other points.

As to our home needs, don't for a moment get the idea, or let any of those around you get it, that we are here asleep at the switch, or are being fooled by Fritz. We feel that Fritz sent the U-53 over here deliberately to impress us with what he intends to do to us, and would do to us, if we went into the war. He also might, at the very beginning, had that warning not been sufficient, sent over a few subs to strafe us. Undoubtedly there was a big war party that advocated it. But, and this is a big point, Fritz has learned that perhaps it won't pay to stir a hornet's nest up too much. He feels that if we are allowed to plod along without too much personal contact with the war, we will be slow getting under way, and moreover he dearly needs a future triumph, when this war is over. Fritz is in a quandary, he hates us and would dearly love to strafe us. He hates us even more than he does England if that be possible, but unless it be in the last final burst of rage, it hardly seems possible that there will ever be many subs sent to this side. If they do come, our answer is a dragging net for mines, off our principal ports, and a close search for possible bases with our coast guard in certain localities. These precautions, coupled with sufficient antisubmarine craft, of the general chaser or destroyer type, to give shipping an offing, is all we need on this side. I think every one on this side appreciates the situation.

Now, as to other needs abroad. We have sent Fletcher with seven yachts to a French port. A division of nine more yachts is fitting out to join him as soon as they can be made ready. They ought to be in shape very soon, perhaps by the end of this month. In addition, 12 menhaden fishermen are being fitted for service abroad. They are good boats. They ought to be ready soon. Orders are also out to get 12 submarines in shape for distant service. There is no question of the necessity of establishing an escort service on the coast of France, through the danger zone.

It has been decided to send the five destroyers in the Philippines to European waters. They will be ready to start on August 1. The 12 destroyers ordered to get ready for distant service are having their difficulties. It is doubtful if they could be gotten ready. It would be wise for you to lay down certain general requisites in the matter of type and armament for submarines which we ought to consider in our building program. As you are on the spot such recommendations would be of extreme value. About 40 more yachts will become available for distant service through the commandeering bill which has just been passed. It would be some little time before they could get across owing, to a large extent, to a lack of guns. It is the intention to push them for distant service.

There is also another locality where our efforts may be needed, that is in safeguarding shipping into the entrance of the Mediterranean. This may require a station at Gibraltar. Now, whether we should undertake operations in the Mediterranean is another question. I don't know, but it might well be discussed. However, it appears to me that the three positions outlined above come well within the scope of our future operations. If the ideas outlined above under strategic areas were considered favorably I am inclined to believe that our submarines could do good work in the North Sea area, assisting the British submarines, but I think it would be the greatest mistake to splash them around indiscriminately.

ARMED GUARDS.

This is the general name we have given to the class of operations comprised under the head individual ship protection self-contained. It has been gone into very thoroughly on this side, probably because it was the best effort we could make immediately. Schofield fathered it, and with his usual thoroughness it has been beautifully done, as far as our resources would permit. The secret of the recent successes has been the fact that it was considered a major objective, and not one of the minor considerations. I am not blaming the English—they had so many other things to think about. It has, with them, not received the proper consideration it should as one of the best defensive antisubmarine defenses. The opinion I have formed from talks with British officers seems to be this—their attitude toward the subject is this: "Any old gun will do to keep the submarines under." That is not enough. You've got to make the submarine realize that he runs a very considerable danger in attacking a ship, even if he be submerged, provided he can be detected.

This requires the most painstaking efforts along the following lines: Lookouts, maintenance, care of guns, adequate guns' crews, competent petty officers for each crew, an efficient control for each armed guard on each ship, a central control at the department which regulates the assignment of guns and crews, the proper decentralizing of this central control through the district commandants in order to secure efficient administration, and last, but not least, a proper supervision and inspection system. This supervision system requires a report from the armed guard commander for each voyage. This report is sent to Washington. The officer brings it himself. If there are glaring faults discovered, a board of investigation is ordered. At certain times the ship and armed guards are inspected by a competent officer. Plunkett does the inspection, and you can bet it is done. His inspection and the reports submitted do not stop at the armed guards. They go intimately into company methods, ship discipline, loading, discharge, and a thousand things all having a bearing on getting cargoes across safely and at speed. He is just in, and I will give you a little extract from his report. One of the ships just ready to sail (our own), the passengers coming aboard over the gangway. Near them a gun—at the gun working over the mechanism right in the midst of the bustle one of our gun crews, oiling and adjusting the mechanism, getting ready for target practice next day after clearing New York.

Near by lay the *Cretic* and *Cedric*, both of them much better and more valuable ships belonging to the White Star Line. This is what Plunkett reports: One 4-inch gun of the vintage of 1896, mounted aft, manned by two nice be-whiskered old gentlemen. This tells the story. He recommends that some of the guns on one of our liners be immediately put on the *Cedric* and *Cretic* in the general aid of shipping across.

You can't beat it. You can't dodge it. There are the facts. These cargoes are going across for the benefit of England and the Allies. They must improve on their system. There is no use saying it can't be done. It can; but to be successful it must be treated as a major objective—conservation of shipping—just as important, more, in fact, than building new shipping.

One of the inside secrets of getting results is this: Our central office in the department is in constant touch with the War Risk Bureau, under the Treasury Department. They have agreed not to give insurance, to cancel insurance, at the call of this central office. What is the result? One of the companies, say, does not want to incur a certain expense, which we consider necessary for the safety of the ship. Our agent wires to Washington. We call up Treasury, stating case and requesting cancellation of insurance. Done. Owners get busy and come through. Another case, and this is authentic: Armed guard commander reports captain as inefficient. Result: Communicate to Commerce and Labor. License canceled, after we have refused to furnish guns or guards to any ship employing that man as captain. Get me. That is the stuff that gets results.

Another thing. The petty officer of the *Silver Shell* sinks a submarine. The petty officer of the *Moreni* puts up as pretty a fight as one wants to see. Result: If these facts are authenticated these men will probably be recommended for commissions.

Schofield is the father of the scheme and he deserves an unlimited amount of credit. It is not perfect, but it is systematically done, and it is bringing home the results. I do not see the same attention to these details on the part of British ships. I am not blaming anybody. I understand perfectly why all this should appear to be of minor importance to the Allies. It was up to the 1st of February last, but it must be taken seriously now. Push it.

BOARD ON ANTISUBMARINE DEVICES.

This is a board of which Grant is at the head. It has the practical test of all sorts of devices which the other boards pass upon and consider worthy of a practical test. There are other boards, one of which I am the head of, "Devices and plans for anti-submarine war." We are in close touch with Grant, the Physical Research Council, and the Naval Advisory Council. I am telling you this because possibly you may wonder why so many schemes which on the face appear unsound, are sent over to you. I am largely responsible for it, and the idea and policy of it is this. The face value of the article presented is frequently nil, but in every case there has appeared to me to be an underlying principle which would bear scrutiny, and for that reason it has been sent over. Incidentally, I feel sure that in the course of time there will be developed on this side some form of detector which will go far to neutralize if not exterminate submarine warfare. I am not given to over exaggeration as a rule, and when I say that we may feel very hopeful, I think I am expressing what the results of recent experiments give us the right to hope for. If entirely successful, it is only a small matter and a question of short time before these detectors will be installed in great numbers. All types of craft will have them. They should be a great improvement on anything you have now.

COOPERATING OFFICERS (ESPECIALLY GENERAL STAFF).

In some of your cables and in Emmet's letter, the need for liaison officers is touched upon. That is granted. I believe the bureaus have sent representatives over to get in touch. Of course this does not fully comply with the object of your cables, but as the increase in your personnel is actually given you, then you will have a force to work with composed of some very fit men, even if taken from the Naval Reserve.

The various naval attachés from the Allied countries while the best of that particular type, do not quite fill the position which, I think, should be filled by some representative from the other side, especially from England. It does seem to me that we would get closer in touch if we had over here in this office a representative of the Admiralty General Staff. We ought to be able to talk to him every day. He is to fill us with their point of view and we to fill him with ours. He should be a man able to speak with certainty as to the point of view which is held in the Admiralty. If we are at fault, he can correct it. If we have any ideas that are worth considering he will glean them. You on that side of the water represent us, but the Admiralty is now represented over here in the way I mean. This country represents a great military reserve which is marshaling its powers to take the offensive. As your history will tell you, Wellington laid great stress in his reserves, and Wellington was one of the few men of history who, in addition to being a master tactician, was also a master of policy and strategy. Those are rare qualities to combine in one man. I feel that we do not get enough of the point of view over there, and moreover I want to know what the point of view of the man from over there will be when he comes over here.

You can not in cables give an altogether clear conception of the big point of view. We know when you want a thing, because you ask, but the underlying motives and the reasons why, and especially the British point of view which actuated you, we lose. And that has a big influence on the results of the individual requests you make. It may be all wrong, if so we want to find it out, but there has been done a vast amount of thinking on the general plan of campaign, right in this office, and many general decisions which we believe are being made we would like very much to have presented at close range. You know the American characteristic, which is, "Show me," and you know it well enough to realize that it is not sufficient, much as we regard and highly as we respect the Admiralty decisions, to absolutely accept them without close scrutiny. Neither is it a wise thing to do it, for the point of view of the man somewhat removed from the scene of strife, while it may not be of great value, is still a point of view, and it may contain food for much thought. Especially is this apt to be true in the consideration of the broader schemes. And it must be definitely realized that while we may have very little actual contact at present on a big scale at sea, yet as a reserve force of power in the future we may have a weighty part to play, and the general decisions and schemes concern us vastly. Therefore, I say, we must be in touch with the Admiralty's policy, not after the manner of a man who has something to show to an inquisitive child, but after the manner of two men respecting each other's ability, and wishing each to give and to learn from the other. They get our point of view through you, and in every way, even to gossipy correspondence, we try to keep you in touch. In your cables you do us, to the Queen's taste, undoubtedly better than it has ever been done before, but there is still that

break in the complete circuit. If you had time (and I have heard this comment before) I would write home here some of your newswy, gossipy letters. There is no necessity of censoring your letters to us. It would be the height of absurdity to do it, because the facts, the cold facts, are what we need. The only thing to do is to safeguard their transit.

I have heard the admiral, time after time, say practically the same thing. We are more than willing to cooperate in every sense of the word. This office does not have to be scared into sending ships because we do not realize the seriousness of the situation. We do. Every man jack in the plans department has laid awake nights. The admiral is willing to recommend anything, any forces, so long as he knows, and he wants to know, not in any critical spirit, but in the spirit of utmost cooperation, what the Admiralty's strategical and tactical conceptions are. Just what is their major plan? Is its fundamental conception offensive or defensive? What are the tactical details in general by which this plan is to be solved? Those are the things we want to know, and these are the things we have a right to know, especially as we are directing every effort, building, conserving, of shipping to arrive at a successful conclusion of this war, even to the possible sacrifice of our own individual good later. We could work so much more intelligently toward the same united ends if we knew a little more. And there is where a big Admiralty Staff man comes in. The liaison on little things is all right, but this war won't be won so much by the collection of details properly arranged as it will by the correct conceptions of the proper strategy and policy to pursue. It will be won all right, England can do it herself, but we can shorten the process. There are many problems, present and future, which can't go down in black and white on paper, but which might be much more satisfactorily approached had we a man on the spot in the full confidence of the Admiralty and representing them.

TRANSPORT SERVICE.

After dint of working on the subject, in conjunction with the General Staff of the Army, the conclusion has been arrived at that the transport service of the Army must be under complete naval control. So, to that end, there has been a big effort to get into the transport service some of the interned German orphans we fell heir to. That is going through, I believe. Through the insistence of Secretary Baker, who, by the way, is one very big man, this bill will be signed by the President, we have every reason to believe. This immediately puts a strain on the naval personnel, but it is one we believe we should assume. It also helps to explain why it is so difficult to meet your demands in the way of trained personnel. As our transport and convoy system stands to-day it is a cumbersome affair, and the putting of the right ships under naval control is going to vastly simplify the situation, to say nothing of safeguarding it. The ships we have taken over will be able, without strain, to put the entire Army raised over on to the shores of France in something less than a year. Submarines or no submarines, you can rest assured that army will be there in less than one year, and with it from 5,000 to 10,000 trained aviators.

People abroad do not fully realize that America has found herself and come into her own. We are slow, we are not thoroughly awake yet, but the spirit is there, and those that are directing affairs are, in the main, in this fight to the finish. I have time and again heard the possibilities discussed, of the United States being the sole one in at the finish. Of course that is overdrawn, but it means just this, if Russia quits, if France is forced to quit, if Italy is knocked out, still with England and the United States in the ring, there will be no end until the Kaiser is on his knees and on his way with his whole family to St. Helena. You have only to think of how we swallowed conscription, lock, stock, and barrel, to see how America is taking the matter. With conscription, we know nobody can touch us. It can't be done. On this continent there is a stronghold for Anglo-Saxon freedom and democracy, if everything else fails. The Army, too, understands that. There is no effort to underestimate or to hang back. It is a grim determined lot. Its one desire is to be fit and then get there. It is slow, but this time it is a sure hunch. All the Allies need to do is to hang on and one more spring, I believe, will see Fritz break. I don't care how much grub and supplies he gets then, he is going to break, and the God he profanes every day of his life won't stop him. I am constantly thrown with earnest-faced men, professors, intellectuals, scientists, all representing the best of this country, who are giving their time and talents without hope of a return except to serve in some small way. It has been a revelation, and if there are any doubts on that score, in England, you can tell them to the contrary.

The German ships we are taking into the Navy for transport service are the *Vaterland* down, 14 to 16 of their best, and we are going to see that the troops get across.

ESCORT AND CONVOY.

In your cables you have insisted upon the necessity of adopting what you call a convoy. Your assumption that merchant shipping should be escorted through the danger zone is absolutely correct. There has been no dissent there. Also what you insist upon the impracticability of escorting individual ships through is correct. The only difference lies in the details of the scheme. As I understand it, the Admiralty favors a convoy across all the way. Why? There are no raiders; if so, then a high sea patrol ought to settle that. If it is to control the merchant ship across, to see to it that he arrives at the proper rendezvous, that of course is another matter, but it does seem to me that this matter ought to be arranged in a simpler manner and in a way which ought not to interfere with the ability of the individual ship to make its best time to the point of rendezvous. You also eliminate the waste effort of assembling the different parts of the convoy, if the steady stream of shipping is kept up. What you are trying to arrive at is escort through the danger zone, in bulk and in toto, in a manner which will interfere least with the other duties falling to a lot of the vessels used for escort purposes.

I think that can be arranged in another way. If the Admiralty were to appoint a certain number of days a week during which, at certain hours, they would guarantee the escort through the danger zone in bulk of merchant shipping, and if in addition they would predict for, say, a week ahead the different rendezvous shipping bound for certain ports should arrive at, together with the hour of arrival, then the matter is in their hands. If long on escort ships, they could make the arrivals three times a week. If short, they could cut it in two. The method of procedure would be as follows: The Admiralty cables to their head men here, Gaunt, that all transatlantic shipping will be escorted in on the following days for the week ending ———. That gives them the liberty to change the days for every week, if they choose. Then they cable Gaunt that the following rendezvous are appointed for the ports indicated for that same week, ships to arrive at rendezvous at such and such a time. You are likewise informed as a check, and you inform us. Gaunt informs his shipping officers and we inform the district commandant, who is in touch with our head shipping officer at each port and has an office in the customhouse. He or they inform all shipping leaving that they must arrive at certain rendezvous at such and such a date on the hour named. The individual ship then makes the best of his way to the spot. The penalty for failure to arrive is easily arranged for our ships, being merely cancellation of war insurance unless good explanations are given. This puts the company on its metal and does not throw the onus on the conveying craft, and it does not slow up the stream. If now the Admiralty deemed it wise, just before the time of arrival at the different rendezvous, to change these rendezvous, it is an easy matter to arrange for that, by broadcast signals as at present would settle it. The matter of forming the convoy at the rendezvous is not specially difficult, if the United States officers cable to London from each office the probable dates of arrival and the numbers arriving at those dates. If one or two less turn up on the first date set, you know they will be along on the second. The inspectors for the armed guards have merely to classify the ships according to speed and have a joint agreement—A class, 8 to 10 knots, say, and mark on her side—B 10 to 12 knots, say. Give each individual ship, a number, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., and let the escort gather the A ships in one group, lowest numbers leading, the B group, lowest numbers leading, etc., and there you are. It is exceedingly simple in our case, because we have competent trained officers or petty officers on board our armed guards. Just now we are more concerned with getting the cargoes bound for the allied countries in the war zone hustled along with safety. I can not do anything the matter with that scheme, and it beats the convoy a mile, and then some. If the raider is the trouble, that can be attended to when that bridge is reached. It might necessitate periodic sailings of one of our cruisers, or it might mean the far-flung scouting line. With this scheme as a starter it is always possible for us at this end to hold up sailing days and make one sailing day, taking all vessels leaving on that day under one cruiser escort. But the crux of the matter is that the Admiralty must fix dates and points of arrival for arrivals on the other side and that we must fix them for arrivals on this side, if the necessity ever arrives for doing, due to a transfer of submarine operations to this side, and that is the very point which the Admiralty scheme never touched upon, though to us it seems the heart of the solution.

INCREASE OF FORCES ABROAD.

It ought to be definitely understood, that as a matter of policy on the part of the Admiral, there is never any objections on his part to furnishing any of the forces that may be considered necessary for the successful conclusion of this war. And I am also positive in the assertion that whatever he may say in his cables to you or

the Admiralty, or whatever he may allow to pass his censorship in the matter of letters, nothing must be considered in the light of criticism. When the matter was taken up with Gaunt, of sometimes directly communicating with the Admiralty, for the express purpose of getting in touch and cooperating fully, he insisted upon that point. In the matter of sending forces abroad, he wants to send the kinds that are wanted, and he wants to send them where it is thought they will do the most good. In all these matters, we must be guided by your judgment, after the frankest and freest expression of general policy and plan on the part of the Admiralty. The forces which I have mentioned as available soon have already been listed under the head Establishment of stations abroad. In addition to those spoken of we have placed contracts for some 360 of the 110-foot chaser type. This does not mean that all those ships will be sent abroad, but it is well for you to know what we are doing in the matter of trying to accelerate things, and if the urgent needs are presented clearly and frankly enough, we stand ready to do everything in our power to help the united cause. The deliveries of the 110-foot chasers should be coming along shortly, perhaps in another month.

OUR FLEET—TRAINING AND READINESS.

The policy in regard to this unit has been as follows: It has been thought wise to put every fighting unit in commission. There are several reasons for that. In the first place nobody can entirely foretell future eventualities. There might be a sudden call for parts of it to do service in any quarter of the world; in the second place we ourselves must be in a position to forestall any policies or plans which might be inimical to us or to the United interests; in the third place, with the tremendous increase in personnel (amounting already to over 120,000 men, and in the near future to perhaps 170,000 men) there must be facilities afforded where we can train the new men and officers thus suddenly enrolled. It can not be done efficiently at the shore stations alone, and the fleet is the reservoir which must be used for the purpose of gradually absorbing these units and welding them into a compact fighting force.

Moreover, aside from the uses these new men can be put to in the fleet, there is a growing demand for trained guns' crews and officers to put on the merchant ships to which we assign armed guards. And in this connection, before I forget it, the admiral has talked with Gaunt, has gone over the situation with Navigation and Ordnance, as to the advisability of furnishing armed guards for those ships of the Allies, or those in their service, which the Admiralty might desire us to furnish armed guards for. It only requires an expression of their desires and policy for us to take the matter under advisement. And in that connection, wherever request has been made in the past an endeavor has been made to meet the wishes expressed.

As far as the fleet itself is concerned, the first objective has been to put it in material readiness throughout. After that is accomplished it is the admiral's desire to see it trained to the minute as a fighting unit, especially in the matter of gunnery. The Admiralty expert who was here made a searching inspection of it in order to develop any of the weaknesses which the British experience at Jutland showed might exist. It has been of tremendous advantage to us to have the benefit of such candid judgment, and we feel that the Admiralty is to be heartily thanked for so freely giving us the benefit of its experiences. The necessary changes will be undertaken at once. In the matter of training, the admiral feels that a fleet to be efficient as a fighting unit must be a mobile unit and trained at sea. It can not efficiently train in too inclosed waters, and it must develop the sea habit.

Not only must the fleet be trained to the minute as a compact fighting unit, but those who are concerned with the intimate direction of its affairs must constantly have the broadest point of view and the most unlimited information, in order that at any moment it may be able to adjust itself to changed conditions or to increased activities. For that reason, while the entire freedom of initiative was given in your instructions to meet any situation which might arise abroad, it was thought that the commander in chief of the fleet should be kept informed of so much of the situation as he might need in order to formulate any plans which might at some future time contemplate the use of our entire fighting force as one unit.

In order that the fleet may be in closest touch at all times with every phase of the situation, not only on this side of the water but also abroad, the admiral has endeavored to establish the closest sort of cooperation and information service between the fleet and this office, and I feel sure that he would view with favor any effort on their part to establish permanent relations, even to a desk here, between this office and the grand staff of the commander in chief. Such a move on their part I feel sure would tend to broaden the point of view of the fleet—get them more away from local issues, which can easily be attended to by the battleship and other staffs, and at once put them au courant with affairs abroad.

There is a question pending of sending the commander in chief with a part of his staff and a representative of this office to discuss questions with the Admiralty, and get first-hand information and impressions. An ultimate decision has not been reached.

A general statement of naval policy along certain lines concerning the Allies has been prepared, and when it stands approved, will be cabled to you. It is the intention to keep you posted by cable with whatever policies are decided upon as being the policies to be adopted.

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

A cable was sent you the other day as you remember, asking you to outline the character and extent of operations in the air which our naval air forces might at some near time be called upon to undertake in the service of the allied operations. It is necessary to know this in order to make the proper estimates of numbers of craft and personnel to ask Congress to appropriate for. These aircraft abroad must be additional to the units considered necessary to retain in the United States and with the fleet.

As you perhaps know from seeing it in our papers, there is being made by the Army a very decided drive at a huge increase in the flying force for the land. There are some 600,000,000 of dollars being asked for. I am personally heartily in favor of an intensive drive in this direction by the land forces, for to me it seems the line of least resistance their efforts can take. Moreover, it is the one effort which can be intensified most rapidly and it is essentially adaptable to the qualities of our newly enrolled personnel.

It is, however, essential that we know the relations which are supposed to exist abroad, between the sea flyers and the land flyers, and the scope of their individual efforts. Would our sea flyers be asked to undertake land operations, perhaps against naval bases, or would their efforts be confined to the antisubmarine and patrol efforts at sea? This is asked because the papers print news from time to time of the efforts the British sea flyers are making on land, and if such an effort were to be asked of us it would be well to be prepared in the matter of machines and instruction of personnel.

Moreover, with such a concentrated drive on the part of the Army for material, it behooves the Navy to have its plans laid else it will be driven out of the market. There is also an effort on the part of certain forces in this country to establish an entirely separate air service, one which is a function by itself and apart from either the Army or the Navy. I can not speak for the Army, but it appears to me that an air service working at sea in conjunction with the Navy must be an integral part of the Navy in order to give efficient service. Still those are matters of which we have had no practical experience in war, and any information bearing on that subject, especially the Admiralty's policy toward their flying units, would be of value. The technical information in the matter of machines, engines, etc., we are getting, notes on the training of flyers, are coming in, but the underlying policy is somewhat hazy and we would be glad to get anything you might have to tell.

FUTURE EVENTUALITIES.

Those are difficult to foretell. Personally, I feel strongly that if we do our best to cope with and surmount the present situation, the future will take care of itself. Nevertheless, we on this side of the water ought to have the absolute assurance that our future interests will be safeguarded. It is much like the wife who says to her husband "I know you love me, but it would be awfully nice if you would tell me so once in a while."

FINALLY.

I met Arthur Pollen for a moment the other day. He said, "That man Sims has simply taken the country by storm; besides, he is so preposterously good looking over 6 feet 3." There speaks the Englishman, and we realize the pith of your statements when you say that whoever we send over must have good presence. He said, as an example, and it takes one who knows the English character to appreciate the foothold you have gained, "I say, do you realize Sims is the only foreigner that has commanded a fleet practically entirely made up of British units for over 400 years?" That tells the story as nothing else could do it. It shows, and I think everybody here realizes, that you are essentially the man for the job. So I beg of you when you read my amateurish attempts to say something, you will have patience and much forbearance. Though ignorant, I am willing and always trying to be cheerful. I am going to ask the admiral to censor this, as I do not want to be guilty of expressing opinions, however innocently, that are incorrect wherever I refer to any expressed policy of his or the department's.

Poor old Chase dies last Sunday night (June 24) suddenly. His heart gave out. He went to sleep in his bed and never awoke. I feel his loss keenly, as I have always regarded him as one of the brightest thinkers this Navy has ever produced. He had the faculty of the broad gauge of being able to visualize events. Moreover, I was personally very fond of him, for his kindness of nature and charity toward others was a lesson to all of us. He can not be replaced. The admiral has directed me to temporarily look out for his desk until he chooses his successor.

Your two letters just received. They clear matters more than anything I have heard yet. Also pardon the amateur strategist. Some day, if I live long enough, I may learn, but I have my doubts. Give my best to Babby and Daniels. They are towers of strength. Your weekly mail just in. I am noting the lack of information which ought to go to you directly and will hunt up the source of the trouble. Did you get the cable about appointing rendezvous for *Celtic*? I tried the direct method in this case, instead of routing through Gaunt, which I find has been the method of procedure. There is a screw loose somewhere, probably, and we will try to hunt it up. That is my hobby, learned from destroyer experience, that and cooperation. I remember with much pleasure the system established by Babcock with the able assistance of Daniels and Sparks.

Pardon the intricacy of expression. I can not use a typewriter, think, and spell at the same time, even with one finger.

Yours,

PRATT.

P. S.—H. H. Ward, you know him, wants to get in the game. He has had a lot of naval experience, is a very keen man, and would like to serve abroad. I told him I would suggest his name to you if he had no objection, and he said very glad if I would.

Finally presuming that I may be asked the direct question (1) "Were we prepared for war April 6, 1917?" and rather than answer offhand, I prefer to give an answer after making a study of the situation as it existed at the above date. This is a difficult question to answer honestly without unintentionally giving wrong impressions on one side or the other. If this question means (2) "Were we on the above date, April 6, 1917, with the forces we had at our command, materially fit and adequately manned ready to cope with Germany alone?" the answer must be emphatically "No." A comparison of the naval forces available for a fleet engagement at that date would read approximately as follows:

German high seas fleet, April 6, 1917:

19 dreadnoughts.
5 battle cruisers.
34 light cruisers.
4 mine-laying cruisers.
196 destroyers.
18 old battleships.
3 old cruisers.
6 auxiliary mine layers.

150 submarines, of which only a certain number would be available if the engagement took place in the western Atlantic. The number of destroyers would also be reduced probably. This represents the maximum German force.

United States forces fit and ready to fight, April 6, 1917:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 13 Dreadnoughts (<i>North Dakota</i> not ready). | 0 cruisers, first class. |
| 0 battle cruisers. | 1 cruiser, second class. |
| 2 old battleships. | 2 light cruisers. |
| 2 armored cruisers. | 0 submarines. |
| | 23 destroyers. |

The answer to such a comparison of forces named must naturally be "No," although I still believe that, ship for ship, our dreadnoughts could more than take care of an equal number of the enemy dreadnoughts, and were in splendid shape as those admirals who were in the fleet certainly know.

If the original question means (3) "In case every available unit of the United States were mobilized in one spot and were in every respect ready to fight, would we be prepared on April 6, 1917 to meet

Germany alone?" this question requires a still further estimated forces.

German high seas fleet, April 6, 1917: Same as outlined above.

United States forces prepared under hypothetical assumption made above:

14 dreadnoughts.

0 battle cruisers.

19 old battleships, excluding *Iowa*,
Massachusetts, *Oregon*, *Indiana*.

9 armored cruisers.

4 first class cruisers.

8 light cruisers.

51 destroyers.

17 submarines (of the H class and late types which might be used in an engagement in the western Atlantic).

This force comprised our total fighting Navy which could be considered as in any way useful for fleet action. Making a comparison of forces and allowing for the long Atlantic trip on the one hand (that of Germany) and of our new personnel on the armored cruisers and old battleships, I am of the opinion that the answer is still "No," owing to the disparity in dreadnoughts and battle-cruiser types more than to any other reason, though I do believe it would have been a wonderful battle and the German fleet would not have been worth much after it was over.

In order to further accentuate this hypothetical condition, I wish to ask myself another question: (4) "Suppose that on April 6, 1917 the United States fleet had been forced, in the state of preparedness it then was, to meet single-handed the German high seas fleet, in the state of readiness the high seas fleet was supposed to be in on that date, what would be your opinion of the state of preparedness we were in?" My answer to this question would be, "I would consider such a state of affairs to be criminal."

However, these are hypothetical conditions. They are not the conditions which confronted us April 6, 1917, and I only consider them because the committee has chosen to ask so many questions along this line, that I wish to give correct and accurate opinions in so far as I am able to do so. The real situation was this: The German fleet was contained in their home waters, had been so contained for a long time, and to meet our fleet would have to fight its way past the British grand fleet, a force consisting of the following

British grand fleet:

36 dreadnoughts.

11 battle cruisers.

43 light cruisers.

7 cruisers.

22 flotilla leaders.

184 destroyers.

Some submarines.

Therefore in the light of hard cold facts, and we naval men must fight facing facts and not hypothetical conditions, let us ask ourselves another question: (5) "On or about April 6, 1917, if the high seas fleet had forced itself past the British grand fleet, would the United States fleet, just as it stood on that date under the conditions stated in question (2), would it have been prepared to meet the German high seas fleet?" The answer must be emphatically "Yes," and that was the opinion of every naval man I know at the time.

Let us once more facing the actual conditions ask another question: (6) "Suppose that on April 6, 1917, our entire naval force had been ready and mobilized and had sailed on that date for Europe would we then have been prepared to wage war under the actual

conditions existing at that date?" This requires still another estimate of our forces that have sufficient capacity to cross the Atlantic.

Estimate of United States forces under condition (6):

| | |
|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| 14 dreadnoughts. | *3 converted yachts. |
| 0 battle cruisers. | 7 tenders. |
| 0 armored cruisers. | About 12 tugs and special service ships |
| 1 battleships. | (repair ships, etc.). |
| 0 scouts. | 22 fuel ships. |
| 4 cruisers, first class. | 5 supply ships. |
| 3 cruisers, second class. | 4 transports. |
| 15 cruisers, third class. | *10 gunboats. |
| *51 destroyers (750 tons and greater). | Perhaps 15 submarines (very doubtful). |
| *16 coast torpedo vessels (420 tons). | *About 4 coast guard ships. |

This would represent 100 per cent of efficiency if everything worked like clockwork. Of all these ships the only ones which can be called real submarine fighters are the 51 destroyers of 750 tons. The 16 coast torpedo vessels are of very doubtful value, old and not good sea-keeping craft of small radius of action; the 3 converted yachts, the 10 gunboats, and the 4 coast guard ships are not fighters, but might be useful for escort and patrol. The other types, except the cruisers for convoy, are not wanted on the other side. Therefore absolutely disregarding our own needs, our own patrol and our own fleet needs, are we still prepared to wage efficient war against the submarines, if every one of the craft enumerated, valuable for antisubmarine work April 6, 1917, sail at once. The total at utmost is 99, counting submarines. Let us make a comparison of this effort with the antisubmarine effort the Allies were making, as nearly as I can estimate:

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Total British and French antisubmarine forces around British Isles and in Atlantic..... | 967 |
| French, British, and Italian forces in Mediterranean..... | 736 |
| Total..... | 1,703 |

In other words, our total effort in that line, if we could have executed it instantly, could not have exceeded a ratio of 1 to 17, provided we neglected everything else and everything worked like clockwork, or between the 5 and 6 per cent stated by Admiral Sims (my conclusions being worked out independently). Therefore, if we could have instantly applied our forces, with its good, indifferent, and its bad antisubmarine factors in it, to the aid of the Allies during the month of April, and taken to ourselves our proportionate share of the April losses in merchant tonnage, what would have been our share? It ought to be in proportion to the relative force we might have applied; that is, we might have had a maximum 1 to 17, or 5 per cent interest in it. The April sinkings were by long odds the greatest, amounting to 846,863 tons for that month as against 558,712 tons average, if we take the six very worst months, including April, and so on. So on the 5 per cent proportion of our interest of the worst month, April, we had to our discredit a maximum of 42,343 tons of shipping, or a total of 254,058 tons for the next six months, provided we had not done a thing, and the submarine had been able to sink his 846,000 tons, month by month, which, of course, we know he did not do. On the average six months' loss, 558,212 tons basis, our monthly discredit share is 27,910 tons, and our total six months' discredit share 167,460 tons. Two things stand out now with some emphasis, (a) the statement that we are responsible for two and one-half million

tons shipping loss is not so, looking at it in the light of cold figures; (b) the somewhat novel point of view that we would not have been prepared for this war had we been prepared for war as under assumption (6).

Let us make another assumption (7): Suppose the Navy Department had so advanced its program of preparedness that on April 6, 1915, its naval force consisted of all the craft available for use April 6, 1917, plus all of the five year program of 1915 additional, every ship thoroughly manned and fit to sail immediately on April 6, 1917, would we then have been adequately prepared to enter this war as it existed April 6, 1917?

Statement of United States forces April 6, 1917 under assumption (7):

24 dreadnoughts.
6 battle cruisers.
9 armoured cruisers.
10 scouts.
*101 destroyers.
9 fleet submarines.
4 cruisers, first class.
3 cruisers, second class.
15 cruisers, third class.

*16 coast torpedo vessels.
*3 converted yachts.
Over 40 fuel ships, transports, supply ships.
About 10 gunboats.
*About 4 coast guard ships.
*Perhaps 15 smaller submarines (doubtful value).

To have maintained this fleet for two years including personnel alone, including first cost, would at the very lowest figure come to over five hundred and thirty millions. Would we still have been adequately prepared?

Our actual effective antisubmarine increase would have been in 50 destroyers approximately, making our total effective antisubmarine force approximately 150 under assumption (7) as against about 100 under assumption (6). The ratio to allied antisubmarine effort would now be 150:1700 or about as 1:11. Whereas the total pool to that date consisted of five nations, United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, or 1:5. Our antisubmarine effort was 1:11 or about one-half of what as a nation we ought to contribute on a 50-50 basis for all, even taking into consideration our wealth, the expenditure of over five hundred and thirty millions and our evident eagerness for preparedness on a great scale. What would have been our gain? (a) The ability to whip Germany alone on any sea; (b) the trained personnel we would have. What would be our loss. (c) Still unprepared to enter this war as it opened up April 6, 1917; (d) the expenditure of at least five hundred and thirty millions, which represents approximately 260 destroyers. The answer to assumption (7) would have to be, "No; still not prepared for this war." A vital question now is, this, (8) To what extent did the shortage of personnel, did the lack of preparedness in personnel, affect our efforts in this war? This is the guage by which efficiency or inefficiency is measured in this respect, and it is the last test.

To answer this a résumé of our war operations is necessary.

WAR OPERATIONS.

(1) Fleet action or operations: No action probable; does not operate in face of the enemy.

(2) Raiding: Yes, probable; to be met by cruisers, escort ships.

(3) Antisubmarine tactics, escort: Yes, very important; to be met by destroyers, yachts, gunboats and all antisubmarine craft.

- 4 Transportation of troops: Yes, necessary; to be met by manning troop transports with naval crews.
- 5 Supplying troops: Yes, necessary; to be met by manning merchant supply-ships with naval crews.
- 6 District or coast defense: None probable except for mine sweeping.
- 7 Armed guard: Yes, necessary; for ships operating in war zone and not fully manned by naval crews.
- 9 Patrol: Not necessary; in vogue at time we entered war; advised by British in April, 1917; abandoned by them when convoy was adopted; abandoned by us the instant its uselessness was seen.
- 10 Submarine efforts: A limited necessity; to be met by manning submarines.
- 11 Submarine hunting by sound: Very doubtful value; met by manning submarines.
- 12 Aircraft efforts: Yes, valuable; to be met by organizing Air Service.
- 13 Offensive mining northern barrage: Yes, important; to be met by manning mine craft.
- 14 Great naval guns on western front: Of value; met by organizing great gun forces.
- 15 Shore bases and other shore activities: Important; met by manning shore bases.
- 16 Create personnel: Most important; met by enlisting and training.

This represents probably a résumé of our operations. Of these, the operations which stand out in importance at once April 6, 1917, and must be attended to are (2), (3), (7), (9), and above all (16). Hence every effort as it came up had to make way for those mentioned above, and especially for (16). Our reserve lay in (1). (3) particularly had to be attended to at once, and we were particularly fortunate and prepared in having our gunboats, most small cruisers and most destroyers, manned. They were, therefore, except for certain material repairs which constantly occur, ready for operating at once. (7) was the next immediate necessity and that was handled by adjustments among our regular personnel. (4) and (5) came along simultaneously, but later, because the troops were not ready at once in appreciable numbers, consequently time was at hand for manning troop and supply ships. (15) could be handled with a nucleus and was used in conjunction with (16), so that (1) and (15) became great centers for developing (16). (2) had to be considered immediately, and as most of the larger cruisers were not adequately manned this had to be undertaken at once. This was the work of the Bureau of Navigation, and it was accomplished.

I was in charge of operations, personally in touch with them all from the date I became aid, and I can not recall now where our operations were held up for lack of personnel. We operated, and that is the final test. Do not get the impression that I, as a naval man, and always looking for the 100 per cent efficiency mark in our naval operations, subscribe to a policy of insufficient personnel. I do not believe it is the proper policy to have an inadequate personnel equipment. All I say is that the responsible heads had sized up the situation, or, say, the situation so adjusted itself that our Navy was equal to meeting its operating obligations, great as they were, with a degree of efficiency which placed it in the satisfactory class so far as accomplishment was concerned.

Let us again consider this problem from still another angle. (9) "If now, in spite of our great preparations as enumerated in (7) we are still not prepared to enter this war, what must we do to make us prepared for this particular war?" A recapitulation of (7) shows us that building a fleet sufficient to wipe Germany off the seas at an expenditure of half a billion dollars, will not do it.

What else can the Navy do to aid? Is there anything? Yes: (a) More destroyers could have been built earlier. We could have laid down a program in 1915 of 200, similar to that asked for in July, 1917. Was any man wise enough to see it, or, seeing it, could our Government have started such a program without committing an overt act; for, unlike a program for a balanced fleet, under the conditions then existing, the building of 200 destroyers could be directed at but one object—a counter to the submarines, Germany's sole operating sea force.

However, for the sake of argument, let us admit the point and say it could be justified. What other acts could the Navy do? (b) We could have started taking over and manning troop and supply ships. This would have been an overt act. But this would have availed the Navy no more than its great fleet of assumption (7) availed it, unless two other acts, entirely outside of naval jurisdiction, had happened at the same time. (c) One was the mobilization of our civil industries on a war basis and (d) the other was the mobilization of our man power on a military basis. Gentlemen, these last two acts are overt acts of war and were so regarded by at least one nation, Germany. The contributing effort of the Navy toward its greatest military achievement in this war—the safe transport of troops—could not be accomplished, however, without the actual accomplishment by other forces than the Navy of (c) and (d). Yet, on lesser ground than these, the whole question of our naval preparedness seems to be revolving. Had it been possible even for us to have concealed our gigantic efforts from Germany, would it have been worthy the dignity of a great nation to have deviated one hair's breadth from that straight path of neutrality, on which we had staked our national word of honor until the day when, exasperated beyond endurance, the Nation, through its representative heads, declared war?

Was the Navy on April 6, 1917, prepared for war—that is, as prepared as human effort working under a democratic form of government could make us fit? That is what our country wants to know, and that, to my mind, is what you gentlemen have a right to know.

The above analysis is relative to our fighting forces, their strength and disposition; but is that all? No; there are certain basic principles upon which sound organization and administration must rest. The Navy exists for a purpose. It is the will of our country that its Navy should be the first barrier which the enemy must smash before it reaches our shores. It is, further, the right arm of the united people in maintaining right and justice. Therefore, the Navy must be sound from top to toe. But no organization is sound unless you give the power where it rightly belongs and fix the responsibility for its proper administration. The law on the subject of the organization of the Navy Department is as follows:

NAVY REGULATIONS.

SECTION 1.—*Organization.*

101. There shall be at the seat of government an executive department, to be known as the Department of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Navy, who shall be the head thereof. (Sec. 415, R. S.)

102. (1) An Assistant Secretary of the Navy is authorized by law, who shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or required

law. Acts of July 11, 1890, and Mar. 3, 1891.) All orders issued by the Assistant Secretary in conducting the duties assigned him shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary and shall have full force and effect as such.

2. In case of the absence of the Secretary of the Navy his duties shall be performed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. (Sec. 177, R. S.)

103. (1) There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations, who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act, Mar. 3, 1915.)

2) Hereafter the Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving as such Chief of Naval Operations shall have the rank and title of admiral, to take rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and shall, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, receive the pay of \$10,000 per annum and no allowances. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there shall be assigned for this exclusive duty not less than 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps: *Provided*, That if an officer of the grade of captain be appointed Chief of Naval Operations he shall have the rank and title of admiral, as above provided, while holding that position: *Provided further*, That should an officer while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be retired from active service he shall be retired with the lineal rank and the retired pay to which he would be entitled had he not been serving as Chief of Naval Operations. (Act Aug. 29, 1916.)

(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy the Chief of Naval Operations shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy. (Act, Mar. 3, 1915.)

104. (1) The business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper among the following bureaus:

First, a Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Second, a Bureau of Equipment.

Third, a Bureau of Navigation.

Fourth, a Bureau of Ordnance.

Fifth, a Bureau of Construction and Repair.

Sixth, a Bureau of Steam Engineering.

Seventh, a Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Eighth, a Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. (Sec. 419, R. S.)

(2) The several bureaus shall retain the charge and custody of the books of records and accounts pertaining to their respective duties, and all of the duties of the bureaus shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall be considered as emanating from him and shall have full force and effect as such. (Sec. 420, R. S.)

(3) The Judge Advocate General of the Navy shall perform such duties as may lawfully be required. (Act June 8, 1880.)

You have by law appointed a head, but have not definitely placed responsibility. As the head of an organization, there is the perfectly natural inclination to perform such acts as in his judgment he deems wise, but upon these acts depends the entire present and future of our Naval Establishment, its development, maintenance, and operation. To efficiently effect this requires the most intimate knowledge of the Navy and the power to coordinate its many activities. As its development, maintenance, and operation is conducted, so fares the fate of the country's first line of defense.

To administer the duties of chief executive of this department there is called a civilian. Gentlemen, please do not misunderstand me. Under no circumstances should the supervisory head be other than a civilian, who in this capacity is best able to coordinate the Navy's activities with Congress, and who in his person is the strongest connecting link between us and the people. He comes to the office

as an individual, a splendid man, able, efficient, highly trained in some subject, but not technically trained in the activities of the Navy nor a student of the art of war. This system functions after a fashion in peace, but it does not function when preparation for war becomes necessary nor does it function in war. It is necessary that at the outbreak of hostilities the military head should assume the direction of and responsibility for the conduct of military operations, for whose preparation he has had, by law, no direct control nor authority to coordinate in peace. Such is the system we work under to-day and did at the outbreak of war. Thanks to the voluntary and hearty cooperation of every distinct departmental organization, including the Secretary, the Navy was able to pull itself together and to work exceedingly well in war.

If any lack of preparation existed within the naval service prior to our entry into the war, if any lack of harmony existed then or exists now within our Navy, it can be laid more justly to the system of organization the department labors under than upon the shoulders of any individual.

That completes my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will adjourn until to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1.25 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 22, 1920, at 11 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 1920.

**UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11.30 o'clock a. m. in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and Crammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Capt. Pratt, the committee looks on you as a source from which much valuable information can be drawn, so that we shall probably ask you quite a number of questions.

Capt. PRATT. Aye, aye, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties at the outbreak of the war, April 6?

Capt. PRATT. I was in the Office of Operations, in a subordinate capacity, as one of the members of the planning section, having been ordered exclusively to duty in operations from the Army War College. Previous to that duty I had had additional duty in the Office of Operations, beginning about the 1st of February, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. Until April 6?

Capt. PRATT. Until April 6, when I went on duty in operations exclusively.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your duty from the 1st of February until the 1st of April in the Office of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. In the plans section, doing the same work that I am doing exclusively from April 6 until June 25.

The CHAIRMAN. And your work was exclusively that of working the plans section?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you definitely assigned to duty as assistant to the Chief of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I was assigned duty as aide for operations or assistant operations—I do not know exactly what the legal expression is—June 25. The office of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had not been created—has not been created by law. I was appointed some time later, by an order from the Secretary, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I practically assumed that duty when Acting Chief of Naval Operations immediately upon Admiral Benson's first departure to Europe, in the fall of 1917. The aide for operations was recognized as the policy aide, and he was the officer who automatically succeeded to the chief's functions whenever the chief was absent.

third man. We had all been students of the Naval War College, as was Admiral Sims also; and so in talking things over we had rather a definite idea of what we thought should be done.

The CHAIRMAN. You say, then, that the plan of February 10 is the only one you recollect which was drawn up to meet the plan of warfare in which the Navy might be engaged, and that that was lost? Now, did you make any effort to prepare plans for that purpose?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your testimony shows that you did.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think most of those that I submitted I wrote myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were definite plans?

Capt. PRATT. It is very difficult, sir, to quite draw the line where policy melts into plan and where plan passes from its general aspect into definite action. Those plans that I outlined looked behind, looked at the time we were in, and tried to look ahead; and a great many of them passed from the atmosphere of policy into definite action.

The CHAIRMAN. But how did they so pass?

Capt. PRATT. They passed because I afterward became the operator.

The CHAIRMAN. Until you became the operator did they so pass?

Capt. PRATT. I think a great many of them did. Every one of these that I made out I laid on Capt. Chase's desk, and he took them home with him and studied them, and we used to talk over the subject a great deal, and while of course, as the executive, he knows exactly what he did and I do not——

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Chase was aide or assistant for operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The position you afterwards filled?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your plans were more or less in the nature of suggestions and memoranda for him?

Capt. PRATT. That is exactly what they were intended to be.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did not have to be specifically approved by the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. No—yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Not as coming from you but as coming from Capt. Chase?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; my suggestions would not have weight with him at that time. Anything from me would have to pass through my more immediate head, Capt. Chase. I did not see the Secretary at that stage of my existence.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no knowledge that they were used officially as the plans of the department, officially approved by the Secretary in any case?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no sir. We can only judge of that by the events, and the data which I have submitted. Those can only be passed upon in the light of the cold facts which I have presented. Dates of sailing of ships, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Others were also making suggestions at the same time.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; Capt. Schofield——

The CHAIRMAN. Others in the planning section?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; Capt. Schofield and Capt. Scott.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know of any general plan that was adopted officially prior to the declaration of war or immediately thereafter?

Capt. PRATT. I am afraid, sir, that a general plan such as I understand you to mean would not work other than to fit us and to project the first movement. I found frequently—I found once—that leaving the department for two days and not being in touch with movements that happened during that time, I lost touch.

A general plan such as I think you mean would soon have been so far behind in the race that it would never have caught up.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you know of any special plans that were prepared and put into operation at that date, officially approved.

Capt. PRATT. Why, the sending of ships is the actual result of a special plan.

The CHAIRMAN. But not a previously prepared, written out plan that was understood to be a policy of the Navy Department.

Capt. PRATT. That as I told you, sir, I do not know about.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about whether Capt. Chase approved of all of your suggestions?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know what became of them; except as they were put into operation by you when you succeeded Capt. Chase?

Capt. PRATT. I do not. He died, and I was not in touch with his papers to that extent. I do know definitely of two plans that he told me to go ahead on, and push through. One of them was that plan which I told you had been worked out in great detail, the taking of guns off our cruisers and old battleships to arm merchant ships. I took that plan along with me and executed it.

Also there was a plan for getting the German ships into our service and manned.

The CHAIRMAN. You were given the execution of those two plans yourself?

Capt. PRATT. I executed those plans myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to your appointment as head of the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and I also submitted that plan which I submitted here in full, the plan of the board of antisubmarine devices, in which we went a trifle beyond our province and recommended 200 destroyers; I was the head of that. I do know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time between April 6 and June 25, when you became aid or assistant for Operations, do you know what procedure was followed in handling dispatches from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I know that. The method was somewhat as follows: It was very poor. The communication between us and any officers we might have abroad followed a system which had been in vogue for a long time. It was this: It was more of a diplomatic way of doing things than what I should consider a practical way. Admiral Sims's cables came to the Office of Naval Intelligence. They were translated there—decoded—sent to the Office of Operations and there the reply was written out. This reply was then sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, there coded, and if our codes, which at that time were not good, were not adequate, the reply was put into the P or Q code, which were British codes, and sent through the British officials,

third man. We had all been students of the Naval War College, and Admiral Sims also; and so in talking things over we had rather a definite idea of what we thought should be done.

The CHAIRMAN. You say, then, that the plan of February 10 is the only one you recollect which was drawn up to meet the plan of warfare in which the Navy might be engaged, and that that was lost? Now, did you make any effort to prepare plans for that purpose?

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The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know of any general plan that was adopted officially prior to the declaration of war or immediately thereafter?

Capt. PRATT. I am afraid, sir, that a general plan such as I understand you to mean would not work other than to fit us and to project the first movement. I found frequently—I found once—that leaving the department for two days and not being in touch with movements that happened during that time, I lost touch.

A general plan such as I think you mean would soon have been so far behind in the race that it would never have caught up.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you know of any special plans that were prepared and put into operation at that date, officially approved.

Capt. PRATT. Why, the sending of ships is the actual result of a special plan.

The CHAIRMAN. But not a previously prepared, written out plan that was understood to be a policy of the Navy Department.

Capt. PRATT. That as I told you, sir, I do not know about.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about whether Capt. Chase approved of all of your suggestions?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know what became of them; except as they were put into operation by you when you succeeded Capt. Chase?

Capt. PRATT. I do not. He died, and I was not in touch with his papers to that extent. I do know definitely of two plans that he told me to go ahead on, and push through. One of them was that plan which I told you had been worked out in great detail, the taking of guns off our cruisers and old battleships to arm merchant ships. I took that plan along with me and executed it.

Also there was a plan for getting the German ships into our service and manned.

The CHAIRMAN. You were given the execution of those two plans yourself?

Capt. PRATT. I executed those plans myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to your appointment as head of the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and I also submitted that plan which I submitted here in full, the plan of the board of antisubmarine devices, in which we went a trifle beyond our province and recommended 200 destroyers; I was the head of that. I do know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time between April 6 and June 25, when you became aid or assistant for Operations, do you know what procedure was followed in handling dispatches from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I know that. The method was somewhat as follows: It was very poor. The communication between us and any officers we might have abroad followed a system which had been in vogue for a long time. It was this: It was more of a diplomatic way of doing things than what I should consider a practical way. Admiral Sims's cables came to the Office of Naval Intelligence. They were translated there—decoded—sent to the Office of Operations and there the reply was written out. This reply was then sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, there coded, and if our codes, which at that time were not good, were not adequate, the reply was put into the P or Q code, which were British codes, and sent through the British officials,

from the embassy here to the foreign office, and there given to Admiral Sims—a very roundabout way. That was our system of communication as it existed when we went into the war. It was not efficient, and it was changed.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these dispatches from Admiral Sims circulated through all the bureaus and divisions concerned?

Capt. PRATT. That I can not say, sir. I managed to get hold of some of them, and I endeavored, whenever they were not given to me, to get in touch with every one of those cables that I could. I have since found—since we have reorganized the office—that some of those cables that Admiral Sims sent are missing. Previous to the time when we changed the system there seemed to be a lack of definite filing system, or something of that sort, so that I have been unable to get the consecutive numbers down to the A, B, C, the beginning of things, and to get a complete record.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you change the system?

Capt. PRATT. That date is a pretty hard thing to fix, but the idea of that really is due to Commander Ingersoll and Commander Carter. Very shortly after I came in they showed me the necessity of a more business-like way of doing things.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, after you came in as aide?

Capt. PRATT. And I acquiesced very readily, and the system was changed and developed. The exact date I can not say.

Senator BALL. Was it gradually put in?

Capt. PRATT. Gradually, as we could get the men. You can not disrupt an existing system at once; or, it is difficult to do it. But we established it, and it grew and expanded.

The CHAIRMAN. These dispatches were shown to you personally in all cases?

Capt. PRATT. I could not say whether I saw them in all cases, not, but I saw a great many of them.

The CHAIRMAN. To assist you in your work of planning?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; oh, yes. I may say I was in touch with the situation, and I had ways of getting in touch which were outside of official channels.

The CHAIRMAN. But officially your duties were purely planning until June 25?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in executing the plans also, in certain cases?

Capt. PRATT. Only those which were definitely given me to carry out; and, as I have said, I know three which I did carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your duties were not exclusively planning but also the carrying out of the plans?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; so far as I would be assigned to that duty by Capt. Chase.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about that. I believe in the original plan, the planning division was provided for and the duties of those who were in that planning section were purely to draw plans?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; and I think everybody was in agreement of that, in theory. Practically, however, we were very short of men so much so that it was almost impossible—in fact, I think it was impossible—during the war, to set aside anybody of men whose functions or duty it was to deliberate alone. The only body that I know of that preserved that capacity was the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Purely the capacity of planning?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; of planning.

The CHAIRMAN. And their plans were lost. Do you know whether any special effort was made to take prompt and favorable action on these recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know what luck we might have. I tried personally very frequently, and would go with these cables, acting myself as a sort of nuisance, possibly, on the subject, to get this done. I have no doubt that we were all doing this. I think we were thoroughly impressed with the necessity of doing it; but not being the actual executive, I should hate to make a flat-footed statement, and say that I know that every one of these was carried out as strictly as a machine would operate.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not recall any instances where you personally were in favor of holding up any of these recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. In favor of holding up? No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On the contrary, in every instance you were in favor, personally, of going ahead and following them out?

Capt. PRATT. I did not see anything to it except that the war was over there.

The CHAIRMAN. After you became aide for naval operations, you made a change in the method of handling Admiral Sims's dispatches?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that change, substantially?

Capt. PRATT. The change may be spoken of as a double change. To my mind, the two most important things to successfully operate are, first the collection of information and its proper reception and distribution, which comes under the part you are speaking of now; but in order to be able to collect and distribute properly, the man who does the operating must constantly have before him either information tabulated, or graphically expressed, and must also have before him means at his right hand whereby he can translate the information instantly. So there was taken over from the office of Naval Intelligence that portion of its information which they had previously held in their files and which I called operating information. It was immediately taken over into the office of operations, and instead of being worked on the card-index system it was projected graphically into a visual system. Having this visual system before you, you then must be in a position to instantly project it out through our cables, in your communication system. So that, when we established the communication system, by taking over the communications from intelligence, we were likewise at the same time forced to develop the information system, let us say, and get that operating system right where we were in touch with it. So that is why I say it was a dual change. It would not have been complete by handling the cables alone, if you did not have immediate access to the information about which those cables referred.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, before you became aide or assistant for operations, these cables and messages came from Admiral Sims to the Chief of Operations, did they not?

Capt. PRATT. Not directly to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they not addressed to him, or to the secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, they might be; but they would not go that way. I told you the system of communicating was a roundabout one. They might be addressed to the chief, but they came through what we called our more or less attaché system. They came by the foreign office. That is the way our foreign cables were handled, I think. Then, after being decoded, they came into Naval Operations and to the Secretary of the Navy by that rather roundabout way.

The CHAIRMAN. But no action could be taken on them in any case until they came to the Chief of Operations and the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I assume, as far as you practically could work in that roundabout way, they came as soon as possible to their notice?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think that is probably true.

The CHAIRMAN. At that period was any delay that you know of in answering those messages from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know definitely. In general, I would say that there would be bound to be delay in a cumbersome system.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the system of answering them?

Capt. PRATT. That dispatch—say a dispatch from Admiral Sims—after having gone to Naval Intelligence and been translated, would come to Capt. Chase, I think. He would take it in to Admiral Benson. They would discuss it. Admiral Benson would come to whatever conclusion he chose to arrive at, and he would discuss it with the Secretary. The dispatch, whatever its nature might be, would be drawn up. It would be given to Capt. Chase, who would send it to Intelligence, and then it would go to Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it would go back immediately after Admiral Benson gave it to Capt. Chase, or at least as immediately as would be possible under that system?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there were any delay more than the reasonable delay that would occur under that system, it would be on account of the action taken by Admiral Benson and the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes, sir; if you will also add to that any reasonable delay which might be due to discussion of the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; that would all be part of it. But I mean, it would be in their handling of the matter?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After you went in, you provided for a shorter way of getting the cables and messages to Admiral Benson, and a shorter way of returning them after they had taken action, did you not?

Capt. PRATT. The shorter way lay in the communication system. I handled dispatches this way: Every morning before we opened business hours I had all the dispatches collected in the various books and laid out before me in the communication office. I went over each one of those personally, initialing them, indicating the line of action I wished taken, and then had them distributed immediately to the heads of the different business organizations we had there for their work.

Then the dispatches concerning policy and movements of ships I made notes on as to the action I advised, whether we could do it or

and all important ones I immediately took in myself to Admiral Benson, or, in his absence, to the Secretary of the Navy, advising immediate action or not, whatever the case might be. Now, all the work I did was almost entirely done through dispatches in order to get quick action.

The CHAIRMAN. Before June 25 do you recall any specific delays in answering the dispatches of Admiral Sims—the cables or messages from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I would not be in a position to remember right now. There might be and there might not be. I should hesitate to say that at present, as I recollect to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. If I should later call your attention to some specific cases, you could identify them?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After June 25th do you recall any specific instances of delays?

Capt. PRATT. I recall specific instances of delay and certain instances of disagreement. I know one. For instance, take the dispatch of the four battleships abroad. I think I prepared a favorable reply immediately, recommending that they be sent. That reply was not immediately sent, because the matter was under advisement between Admiral Benson and the Secretary of the Navy, but later —

The CHAIRMAN. Was any reply sent?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; a reply was sent later, and it was not favorable.

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time no reply of any sort was sent to the recommendation?

Capt. PRATT. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take up with the Secretary of the Navy personally any of these recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Never, in the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. Never prior to June 25?

Capt. PRATT. No; and after that I do not recollect of having personal dealings with the Secretary until Admiral Benson went abroad, in the fall. Those matters would naturally be conducted between Admiral Benson and the Secretary. There may have been cases, but I do not recall them. After the Admiral went abroad I did. I had occasion many times to take these dispatches into the Secretary personally. But before that, if I recollect correctly, my dealings were entirely with Admiral Benson, and he dealt with the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never personally dealt with the Secretary of the Navy before you were made acting chief of Operations in the absence of Admiral Benson on his trip abroad.

Capt. PRATT. I can not remember when I ever did. I may have but I do not recollect it now.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I think, in your testimony that while you were acting chief of Operations there was no delay on the part of the Secretary in approving any plans.

Capt. PRATT. I know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there at any time, to your knowledge, any such delay?

Capt. PRATT. Why, that, sir, I think could better be answered by Admiral Benson himself.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about as far as you were concerned I am asking as far as you were concerned.

Capt. PRATT. You mean a delay in my doing my part of the job?

The CHAIRMAN. No; delay on the Secretary's part in not hurrying matters along.

Capt. PRATT. I am not exactly qualified to speak about that, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. There were none, then, that came under your personal observation? I ask you this because a number of witnesses have testified that they found it very difficult to get the Secretary to take action on important matters that were placed before him.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman; I protest against this character of statement on your part. I do not think it is necessary to state that, that there are a number of witnesses that protested against the difficulty of getting action from the Secretary, because that is a conclusion which I positively deny, and which there may be considerable debate on. You have a habit of doing that, and you will pardon me for calling attention to it, but when it appears in the record in that way and goes undenied, it appears as an admission that such testimony does exist; which I deny to be the fact.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very easy to determine from the testimony. All I said was that it is contained in the testimony.

Senator PITTMAN. If the witness does not question the fact that there is that in the testimony, it goes as an admission that it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony bears that out.

Senator PITTMAN. I differ with you on that question; and that is entirely a matter of conclusion.

Capt. PRATT. What is the question that you want me to answer?

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to that particular point; I have asked you whether any specific instances came to your attention of a lack of promptness on the part of the Secretary in dealing with matters of importance that came before him.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know what difficulties, if any, Admiral Benson may have had. I am only qualified to speak of my dealing with the Secretary directly. I had heard all sorts of rumors, but when I came definitely to deal with him on certain specific plans I got an immediate decision. I can tell you one case, specifically. This is while I was acting Chief of Naval Operations. There were two cases in fact. Admiral Benson was abroad, and he sent a cable over recommending that the battleships be sent over. I handled it directly with the Secretary, and he approved it right off, and directed that Admiral Mayo be sent up in conference, in order to settle the details. I got a decision right off.

Another case was the case of the northern mine barrage. Capt. Belknap, who had worked the organization of the forces up very definitely, had reached a conclusion where it was necessary to have a final decision in the matter before we could proceed to carrying it into operation, because that meant projecting this body of ships and men abroad into European waters, and naturally, being a joint agreement, we had to get the Admiralty's approval to it. I went in with Capt. Belknap about 6 o'clock one evening, Admiral Benson being

abroad, and laid the question before him, and he approved it off.

CHAIRMAN. I will put in the record here some testimony that given by Admiral Palmer to substantiate what I said a few days ago.

ATOR PITTMAN. I will state that I have no objection to that; but it is perfectly proper in laying the foundation for such a question as you asked, to call attention to any evidence of that character by any particular witness, because that is a fact; but the statement that a great number of witnesses have testified to that fact, I think, is hardly the correct way of putting it.

CHAIRMAN. I did not say "a great number of witnesses." I said some of the witnesses had so testified.

ATOR PITTMAN. I think you said a number of witnesses.

CHAIRMAN. Yes; a number of witnesses.

ATOR PITTMAN. The only one you are putting in the record now is Admiral Palmer.

CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; I am also going to put in Capt. Laning.

ATOR PITTMAN. There is no objection to calling attention to any testimony that you want the witness to comment on so long as it is needed. I only objected to your making a statement which poses as a conclusion and not a statement of fact.

CHAIRMAN. Capt. Palmer's statement appears on page 1084 of the typewritten record. It was in regard to the recruiting of men for the Navy. Here is what he said [reading]:

"The chief of naval operations frequently said, 'It is probable you will have to man these ships of this kind, and you had better get the men for them.' The important thing for me to know was when those men would be required; and in each case operations were applied. 'We want them as soon as we can get them. We would like to have them now, or within a few weeks.' Of course, I knew we could not recruit men and equip them and get barracks for them in a few weeks. So that after one or two orders of that kind in regard to things that operations could not have foreseen the need of, I felt that it was up to me to be prepared for any operation they might have, and to take the responsibility of going ahead and working this organization into a production keeping it up to peak load all the time, so that I would be prepared for anything that might happen."

CHAIRMAN. And you took matters in your own hands and went ahead?

PALMER. Yes; I did. I did not do that, however, until after I had exhausted every other means to get the thing done.

CHAIRMAN. On the part of the Secretary?

PALMER. Yes, sir; I was forced—

CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary give you any reasons for delaying the carrying out of the plan?

PALMER. Well, no reasons, of course, that appealed to me or appealed to people that were charged with personnel; but he would say, "We have no reserves now. We don't want any more."

Capt. Laning, on page 962 of the typewritten record, stated as follows [reading]:

"Coming on now to the fifth particular, it would be impossible to explain the situation just described without touching on a matter that I speak of only with great reserve and hesitation. I would not introduce it were it not essential to a clear understanding of the reasons why plans were not approved and why delays occurred in taking action on many important matters. But as the personal characteristics of men very often have profound effect on the organizations they direct, an understanding of those characteristics is essential to an understanding of the workings of that organization. In this case it was the personal characteristics of the Secretary of the

Navy that often made it impossible to get approval of the really important policies found this myself, and many others found it. If more information is desired on the point, I can give you the names of such officers.

Senator PITTMAN. I think that is very fair. It seems that there is a difference of opinion between the present witness and those other two.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me those quotations from the record bear out my statement.

Senator PITTMAN. Oh, your question stated that there were a number. I doubt if that means a number.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read you what Admiral Plunkett says. Here is what Admiral Fiske says [reading]:

The officers try continually to make the enlisted man think we are his friends and not his overlords to too great a degree. Any question along that line, any personnel question, the Secretary was always glad to talk about, but he seemed to me to have a curious characteristic of not looking at the Navy as a whole. That impressed me at the time. For instance, for a long while after he first came into the Department the question of chaplains occupied him a great deal. But even that was not so much in regard to their connection with the Navy as the chaplains themselves and the effect of their teachings on the enlisted men, which, of course, was fine. But he never seemed to think about the Navy as a whole, and as far as I could make it out it has always seemed to me that he was always absolutely convinced in his own mind that there never would be any war. I found after a while that it was not a good thing to say anything to him about war. He did not seem to be ready to start on any subject connected with war at all.

Senator PITTMAN. He procrastinated about chaplains, as I understand it. That is a very serious matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The record speaks for itself. I think we will let it go at that. I think that shows that a number of officers did testify about the delay or inaction on the part of the Secretary.

Senator PITTMAN. Wherever he decided against them, apparently they called it procrastination.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the record will bear that out.

Capt. Pratt, after June 25, you consider that Admiral Sims's recommendations were answered promptly?

Capt. PRATT. Of course I did not always get a "yes."

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; but I am referring to attention being paid to his communications.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I tried to—I paid attention to every one of his dispatches.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think, Captain, that this question refers to you, at all.

Capt. PRATT. I know that it does not, but of course I have to think of what my part in it was, because I had to sort of outline it or did outline it, and sketch it out to my chief. So that I have to find out, myself, whether I have not been negligent in some way, and I have been trying to see wherein my negligence might lie, if such existed. That is, possibly, why I think it over a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. But I do not assume there was any delay, as soon as you received the communications, in submitting them to your chief?

Capt. PRATT. I suppose you want to know, when a specific thing came up, whether it was replied to immediately or not. I do not think I can tell you that, sir, with the great many dispatches that we had before us. I can give you far better my intent in the matter than I can a definite statement, with the thousand and one dispatches

it we had. Most of Admiral Sims's dispatches concerned his material needs which had to do with the bureaus. They were routed immediately to the bureaus, and I could not say after they passed out my hands whether they were acted upon or not. It went to them immediately, though.

Now, with regard to the plans that I had to do with myself, or the dispatches that I had to do with myself, it is difficult for me to say at this date, whether every one of those was answered. I know one thing. I can speak for myself. I did not keep Admiral Sims as fully in touch as I ought, and he used to kick at it a good deal, and I told him I just did not have time.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is a question of outside communication with him, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it is; but we were trying to work together, hand in glove, to get things done, and so something may have slipped by.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as my recollection of the testimony goes - and I apologize to the Senator from Nevada for alluding again to the testimony - you did try in every way in your power to hasten along with the following out of the recommendations of Admiral Sims's?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I wanted it done.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Palmer stated in his testimony that he knew nothing of Admiral Sims's early requests for personnel. Do you know whether these requests were ever referred to the Bureau of Navigation?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. What date does that refer to?

The CHAIRMAN. I think, to the first month of the war.

Capt. PRATT. I could not tell that. Some of those dispatches may have been lost, and they may have gone through.

The CHAIRMAN. Repeatedly, throughout the early months of the war, Admiral Sims was making requests for additional personnel on his staff in Europe?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he did that. It was not sent to him.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was not sent to the Bureau of Navigation?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. According to Admiral Palmer's testimony.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Palmer was Chief of Navigation?

Capt. PRATT. He would know. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. What general recommendations about matters on the other side, aside from Admiral Sims's recommendations, were received by the department?

Capt. PRATT. In the first month, I know nothing except through Mr. May and the testimony that has come up. Admiral Badger has testified, I think, that it was Admiral de Chair who was over here and made representations; but I did not see Admiral de Chair and had nothing to do with that conference. You see, it pretty much depends on how we got started right at the very beginning, because the war never took on, as far as the naval forces are concerned, any more than the general phase that it had at first - that is, the suppression of the submarine - and then for us on this side our more impor-

tant problems at home, the building up of our reserves, the getting everything ready to launch this huge army over in France; and in the main we relied on suggestions from Admiral Sims. When Admiral Grant, of the Royal Navy, was here in Washington——

The CHAIRMAN. That was at a much later period, though, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, much later. We used to talk things over nearly every day.

The CHAIRMAN. But prior to Admiral Grant's coming over, aside from what you got from Admiral Grasset and Admiral Browning when they were over here——

Capt. PRATT. Oh, we relied on Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. You relied entirely on Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Grasset and Admiral Browning did not go very definitely into the submarine situation, did they?

Capt. PRATT. No; their point of view would be apt to be colored a good deal by conditions outside the war zone. Very frankly, I would consider that after a man had been outside of the scene of operations for any length of time his opinion would not be as good as that of a man who was sitting right on the job day by day.

The CHAIRMAN. However, Admiral Browning did speak in his statement he made at the conference of April 11 about the importance of the submarine situation?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; he may have had some direct instructions from the Admiralty which possibly he did not show to us.

The CHAIRMAN. But in his statement he did refer to the criticalness of the submarine situation, did he not? Were you at that meeting?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I have submitted a copy of the dispatch he sent, but I was not at that meeting. And, as I understand, at that meeting, and also, as Admiral Badger has testified, at the later meeting, that was talked over. I have not seen any minutes of it and am not conversant with it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your principal knowledge about matters on the other side was clearly gotten practically exclusively from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, absolutely; almost entirely. He was our representative there and was sent there for that purpose, and I would like to say in addition there is no man I know of in the Navy who appreciates the value of information and its proper distribution to the extent that Admiral Sims does. He had had a tremendous experience once before, in the Spanish War, when he was sent over to Paris in very much the same capacity, and that, with his War College training, enabled him to appreciate to a degree that I really think no other leading officer in our Navy did, the value of information and its proper distribution. He built up a wonderful service, and I have often said myself that if Admiral Sims had not been there in London handling that service I do not know what we would have done. I have said it to myself, if I have not said it to others, many a time. It was a very wonderful information service which he created. Not only that, but he started other lines at work. For instance, the Admiralty began later automatically sending us all of their reports. Their letters call it their foreign office. They began sending us in

their pamphlets regarding the political situation throughout Europe. And, in fact, all over the world. Of course, those things were directed—or Admiral Sims had been instrumental in starting the flow of information. In fact, after that system began working we became the center of information collected from all over the world, and it was a very wonderful system that he created. Naturally we depended on him. We might from time to time receive direct information from the Admiralty, but it would be more of a specific nature—something that they wanted done. But, as the source of information, he was the head and shoulders of it. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. When he was sent over, he was not given any very specific plans to follow, was he?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; and judging from myself, knowing the way we have worked together in the past, I should say he would not want to be handicapped.

The CHAIRMAN. That it was better for him not to be given specific instructions?

Capt. PRATT. That it was better for him not to have them?

The CHAIRMAN. But I assume when he was sent over he was informed of all the department's plans up to that date.

Capt. PRATT. That I do not know. That took place very quietly between himself and Admiral Benson. In fact, his going was absolutely secret. He dined with me the night before he left for New York, and he had a very broad smile on his face, and I knew that something was up, but he let me guess, and he would not tell me; so that what his instructions may have been I could not for the life of me say.

The CHAIRMAN. After he had gotten over on the other side and was performing his duties over there, if the department inaugurated any plans, it would have been proper to have kept him in touch, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; yes, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). With practically all the plans of the Navy that might in any way conflict with himself, over on the other side?

The CHAIRMAN. Was he in any way so informed?

Capt. PRATT. No; I do not think he was; and in that way I hold myself rather, very negligible, if I may say so. I did not keep Sims up to date the way I should, and he used to jump on me for it, and I would tell him, except as I would write a letter somewhat of the character of the one I submitted yesterday—he had to guess. But we were all brought up in the same school, all thinking along the same lines, and I always felt that Sims knew more about what we were thinking of than perhaps we did about what he was thinking about.

The CHAIRMAN. For instance, the Azores plan; he was not given any information of that?

Capt. PRATT. Well, that was not the plan——

The CHAIRMAN. About putting it into effect?

Capt. PRATT. He was supposed, just as any War College man would, to look at the chart. I will show it to you right here. He had one of these charts. We usually travel around with one. It is rather illuminating. (Exhibiting chart.) It helps to give you a good perspective of things. No War College man would have to

look at that more than about a minute to appreciate at once the strategic importance of the Azores; so that I do not believe it would ever occur to me to say to Sims—to try to impress upon him the strategic importance. I knew that he knew about it; knew about it better than I did.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least you would let him know if you were sending ships over, would you not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, he knew we could not get those chasers and other things across that we were trying, without going to the Azores, in the wintertime. As a sailor man, he would know that. They did not have the capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but I do not think he was informed, if I recollect rightly, when the Azores proposition was first established.

Capt. PRATT. You mean we did not tell him in time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. I dare say I did not. It would not surprise me at all if I forgot it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it would have been better to have informed him?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, much; much! I omitted so many things of that sort. If I had just had more people to sort of help out, I would have done it in a minute. There was no intention to omit it, but I think there were many omissions of that sort, without doubt, which I hold myself very responsible for, and remiss in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. In Admiral Sims' testimony it appears that prior to the end of June he received very few replies to his cables and messages, but that after that time he received replies much more promptly, and that, I take it, was due to the change that was made when you went in as aid or as assistant for operations.

Capt. PRATT. Well, I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give any particular reason why the department failed before that time to answer to Admiral Sims' messages?

Senator PITTMAN. I object again. That is assuming that they failed to answer Admiral Sims' cablegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. If they did fail? Can you give any reason why they failed if they did fail?

Senator PITTMAN. That is better.

Capt. PRATT. You see, I am here testifying under oath, and I would like to testify to facts. I may, when I am not under oath, express a great many opinions, as most of us do; but I would rather you would ask that question of people that know. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know any reason why the department failed to act upon Admiral Sims' dispatches or to reply to them?

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know that they failed, in the first place?

The CHAIRMAN. If they so failed?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, either way; either one way or the other.

Senator PITTMAN. That is absolutely essential to fairness of the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very willing to put it in, "if they did so fail."



Senator PITTMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You have read Admiral Sims' testimony. I take it?

Capt. PRATT. He knows. If he did not get answers, he knows whether he did not get them or not. If Admiral Sims says, "I did not get an answer to this," why, that stands; he did not get it.

The CHAIRMAN. And in cases where he says he did not get answers, do you know anything about the circumstances why he did not get an answer, or action?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I may have guessed, yes, and I may have had opinions; but you are asking me now to state definite facts, and I do not like to state opinions where I should state facts. I think it is better for you to ask the people that actually handled those dispatches.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give me the names, please, of the people who would know?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; Admiral Benson would know; and Capt. Chase would know, but he is dead. Admiral Benson would know all about it; and I might guess a good deal about it, but I do not like to state guesses when I am under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. You prefer to leave the answer to that question to Admiral Benson?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes, sir; I would much prefer to leave it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims and Mr. Hoover have both testified to the seriousness of the submarine menace during the early months of the war. Was that seriousness realized by the department from April to July, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I realized it. I do not know whether anybody else realized it the same way that I did. It was realized after I came in as aid for Operations, because then I could talk to my chief, and I know he realized it then. And he is really the responsible man, and he can tell you how he realized it and what his attitude toward it was. I can tell you what my attitude was, and of course can tell you the absolute facts and truth in the matter. I thought it was so serious that, personally, I would have sent everything. I never had any other attitude than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the general attitude in the department?

Capt. PRATT. Why, yes; it was from the time I came in, in an executive capacity; yes, I can say so.

The CHAIRMAN. No; that was June 25. I am referring to April and May.

Capt. PRATT. I can not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was talked over, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, it was discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. By all the officers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; by all of the officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hoover returned early in April to this country and made a report of the seriousness of the situation?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the officers of the Navy familiar with the fact that he had made such a report? Was that generally known?

Capt. PRATT. I think so. I will not say then, but later, I think Mr. Hoover and also the various members of different organizations that we had in this country, the various members who went abroad, and our communication system for the purpose of sending their

reports. I recall seeing a great many of what we called ship mission cables, and I think Mr. Hoover used that system later, and in a general way, I think we were all very familiar with Mr. Hoover's opinion in the matter. I know one officer, I can say quite definitely, who had exactly the same idea that I had on the subject, and that is my associate in the planning section, Capt. Schofield, because I was constantly in touch with him; we were working side by side; and we were very much impressed, from our studies, with the seriousness of the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend now until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning, Captain, and will you be here at that time?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

(At 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, April 23, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, yesterday I referred to Mr. Hoover's report of the seriousness of the submarine menace and asked you whether the fact that he had made such a report was generally known in the department, and in general whether the seriousness of the submarine menace was realized in the department, and you stated that you thought that the fact that Mr. Hoover had made such a report was known in the department.

Capt. PRATT. I think so, from general knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. And the general seriousness of the situation was known at that time?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was known after Admiral Sims sent his report in to us. I very much doubt if we fully realized the seriousness of the situation until his original cables were received, because while I was not at that time in an executive capacity, yet I knew that the British were not telling us all they knew until after we came into the war; so, therefore, the information that we might get at the very beginning from them on that subject, would be most guarded. But I can not see how anyone would fail to realize the seriousness of the submarine situation after the first cables from Admiral Sims were received.

The CHAIRMAN. And the first cable was April 14, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I have not my personal files with me, but I had sent to me later that cable complete, and I have a very distinct recollection now that I was very fully impressed with the seriousness of that situation very soon after we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims's cable of April 14 deals with this question?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I have a personal copy of that; not an official copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if the seriousness of the situation was realized even as early as April 14, why was there such a delay as there was in sending antisubmarine craft to the other side?

Capt. PRATT. That I can not tell you definitely, sir, if there was a delay. The best I can state on that subject is this: I have submitted in my original testimony the numbers of destroyers that were in Europe, and in that table of April 6, 1918, the exact date of sailing of every ship that went over, so that that is all I can speak of as to facts. I do know, however, from my knowledge of the condition of ships—that is, antisubmarine craft—that there were only three yachts at that time with real capacity for going—that is, the *Yankton*, the *Scorpion*, which was interned at Constantinople, and the *Mayflower*, the President's yacht. The dates when the destroyers sailed speak for themselves. Those are facts. Anything else I could give would be merely a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not stated in your testimony, as I recollect it, that there were no delays in answering Admiral Sims's cablegrams.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; I have not said that. I do not know. Every way that I could possibly take, myself, I endeavored to have expedited; but I could not say after they passed out of my hands what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims stated in his testimony that all of the vessels sent to European waters up to March 1, 1918, should have been available in April, 1917.

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; that——

The CHAIRMAN. For what reasons were they not sent? Were they available?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; that is a mistake. If I had that list before me I could even point out one by one, almost, why they were not; but, generally speaking, we had to get a lot of yachts, and at the very beginning, before the commandeering bill was passed, we had to depend very largely, to a certain extent, on gifts—people gave outright, and they sold, and those craft were fitted out as soon as it was possible for them to go. We could not get any tugs given to us, and when the commandeering bill was passed, I think it was June 15, that put more power in the hands of the Navy Department, and they were able to get many more smaller craft, which were not available at first.

The CHAIRMAN. But if all the vessels that were sent to Europe by March 1, 1918, had been thoroughly equipped, thoroughly ready in personnel and in material on April 6, could not those vessels have been sent over during the month of April?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, if we had foreseen to the extent of commandeering them and getting them ready.

The CHAIRMAN. Aside from commandeering? I am referring to the vessels of the Navy now.

Capt. PRATT. Let me get that list out and look over them one by one, and then I can just point out the vessels that we had to take. [Examining list of April 6, 1918.] Now, apart from the material condition and personnel condition, which I will assume has been rectified before April 6, 1917——

The CHAIRMAN. Apart from what?

Capt. PRATT. Apart from the material and personnel conditions, which I assume, according to your statement have been perfected, and that they are all ready to sail, I will try to point out those vessels

side of the Navy which we would not have been able to get unless the act had been passed. Running down the list——

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you more especially, Captain, about the vessels of the Navy.

Capt. PRATT. That is just what I am trying to answer, but in order to do it I have to take the list of April 6 and go right down and scan, in my mind, and sort them right out, in order to give you a total; don't you see, sir? There should have been, providing we could have withdrawn from the neutrality duty which some of our destroyers were on—the exact number I do not know, but I think about 20, this duty having been continuous for some time in and around the port of New York and the principal ports, inspecting all vessels and following them out to see that our neutrality laws were not violated—I say that if they had been available to go immediately across and had been removed from this neutrality duty, then we should have had about 51 destroyers, about 6 tenders for the destroyers, about 7 gunboats, 2 cruisers, and about 12 submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. These are all of the vessels that went over before March, 1918, which would have been available on April 6, 1917, if they had been all ready?

Capt. PRATT. If they had been put in shape; oh, yes. They belonged to us.

There also would have been available 5 coast guard cutters. Now, there are a number of ships mentioned on this list which would not have been available because we took them into service from outside sources; yachts, fishing craft, and so forth. That number foots up to about 27 yachts, about 12 tugs, and about 4 mine sweepers that would not have been available.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were vessels that were not in the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; not in the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But of the vessels that were in the Navy at that time, how many could we have had over in April, 1917, had they been prepared in material and personnel, and ready to go at once?

Capt. PRATT. I gave you the list, sir; I gave them. I specified the types and the numbers; 5 coast guard cutters, 12 submarines, 7 gunboats, 6 tenders for destroyers, and 51 destroyers.

Senator KEYES. Did you not mention 2 cruisers, in your first statement?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I did; the *Birmingham* and the *Chester*.

The CHAIRMAN. Why were those vessels not sent in April?

Capt. PRATT. That, sir, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Those of the regular Navy?

Capt. PRATT. That I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not?

Capt. PRATT. They were only sent as I specified in the list, which shows the numbers that were sent, the dates of sailing on this list, the date for each ship being given, when it left, and when it arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. So that the record is perfectly clear. That is fact. That, of course, I can testify to. But why they were not sent, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the record shows, does it not, that of the 51 destroyers only 6 were sent over in April?

reports. I recall seeing a great many of what we called ship m cables, and I think Mr. Hoover used that system later, and in a eral way, I think we were all very familiar with Mr. Hoover's op in the matter. I know one officer, I can say quite definitely, wh exactly the same idea that I had on the subject, and that associate in the planning section, Capt. Schofield, because I was stantly in touch with him; we were working side by side; ar were very much impressed, from our studies, with the seriousness the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend now until 10 o'clock to-m morning, Captain, and will you be here at that time?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

(At 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-m Friday, April 23, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

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UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

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Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, yesterday I referred to Mr. Hoover's report of the seriousness of the submarine menace and asked you whether the fact that he had made such a report was generally known in the department, and in general whether the seriousness of the submarine menace was realized in the department, and you stated that you thought that the fact that Mr. Hoover had made such a report was known in the department.

Capt. PRATT. I think so, from general knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. And the general seriousness of the situation was known at that time?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was known after Admiral Sims sent his report in to us. I very much doubt if we fully realized the seriousness of the situation until his original cables were received, because while I was not at that time in an executive capacity, yet I knew that the British were not telling us all they know until after we came into the war; so, therefore, the information that we might get at the very beginning from them on that subject, would be most guarded. But I can not see how anyone would fail to realize the seriousness of the submarine situation after the first cables from Admiral Sims were received.

The CHAIRMAN. And the first cable was April 14, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I have not my personal files with me, but I had sent to me later that cable complete, and I have a very distinct recollection now that I was very fully impressed with the seriousness of that situation very soon after we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims's cable of April 14 deals with this question?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I have a personal copy of that; not an official copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if the seriousness of the situation was realized even as early as April 14, why was there such a delay as there was in sending antisubmarine craft to the other side?

Capt. PRATT. I can only tell you, sir, what I would do myself if I had wanted to get those boats——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you that. I am asking you if they were ready, if they were available at that time, so far as personnel is concerned.

Capt. PRATT. But I have got to make a little bit of an analysis in order to answer your question honestly. That is what I am trying to do. If I had wanted to send those boats over then, I would have gotten them fit, and I would have taken men off the battleships and put them on and sent them. Yes, we could get personnel and cut down something else; put them on the boats. It is a question of adjustment.

The CHAIRMAN. As long as you are saying what you would have done, in that case if you had wanted to send them over, what do you think——

Capt. PRATT. Do I think it could have been done?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have sent them over?

Capt. PRATT. I would.

The CHAIRMAN. In April?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the policy of the department in the early months of 1917—January, February, and March—with regard to the dreadnoughts and the main fighting forces of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, sir. That is before I came in. I can not tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of that time you were in the planning section?

Capt. PRATT. I was in the planning section a part of that time. I was also in the War Department—in the Army War College. I did not go to the Navy Department until 1917, until about February. I was out of it altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in January you were in the War College?

Capt. PRATT. I was in the Army War College.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you have no knowledge as to the policy of the department at that particular time, as to the dreadnoughts and the main fighting force?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. I think Admiral McKean can answer that far better than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know at that time whether there was a plan to use these ships in case we went into war, to defeat the Germans, or whether we were contemplating holding them back in case we had to meet the Germans after they had met the British fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Why, I know what the policy was which we wrote in a letter, because I wrote that letter. But in my own mind, I discounted the question of our fleet having to engage the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter you refer to?

Capt. PRATT. July 3. That is the fixed-policy letter in which we stated——

The CHAIRMAN. No; I was asking you about the policy during January, February, and March, before we had gone into the war.

Capt. PRATT. Oh; and I said, sir, I can not tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything about it?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know anything about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I am not referring in any way to your letter that you wrote at a subsequent date. That had nothing to do with it.

complement basis. But I do note a few exceptions to that, were they had not been on March 31 raised to the war complement. For instance, one boat here I note right away is the 750-ton oil burning destroyer, having a complement on 1 of 60. She should have about 94.

CHAIRMAN. How many of them, then, were not in condition as personnel was concerned, on April 6, 1917?

PRATT. I will count the number up. My table does not April 6 but on March 31, which is pretty close to it.

According to the figures, when I go over it in detail, I should say 30 were not up to full complement. Their complements had decreased from what they were on January 17, but about 20 were at full complement, to my mind.

CHAIRMAN. Leaving, then, how many that were in full complement as to personnel?

PRATT. Well, the difference between 20 and 51.

CHAIRMAN. Thirty-one?

PRATT. I should say, roughly.

CHAIRMAN. Those were all destroyers of 750 tons?

PRATT. Or greater.

CHAIRMAN. Or over?

PRATT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. There were also a few smaller ones, were there not?

PRATT. Yes, sir; there were about 16 of 400 tons. They were light craft, and we never did get more than those that came—those that came around by Asia got in, and later, I think, we got in as the Azores.

CHAIRMAN. So that there were substantially 31 destroyers at the the beginning of the war that could have been sent during the month of April, 1917, if it had been deemed advisable to send them?

PRATT. That is the way it appears to me.

CHAIRMAN. And how long would it have taken to put the boats that were not fully filled up as to personnel into commission, as personnel was concerned?

PRATT. I do not quite understand you. Which others do you mean?

CHAIRMAN. Those vessels that did not have the full complement—them—the destroyers that did not have the full complement.

PRATT. Why, it seems to me that if I had wanted to get them and have them, I should have had the whole 51 ready to go at that time.

CHAIRMAN. Within a few days?

PRATT. As far as personnel was concerned.

CHAIRMAN. As far as personnel was concerned?

PRATT. I would have found it.

CHAIRMAN. What?

PRATT. I would have found it. I would have gotten it.

CHAIRMAN. So that, so far as personnel is concerned, the 51 boats that were over by March 1, 1918, could have been sent April, 1917, if it had been deemed advisable by the department to send them over?

Capt. PRATT. That matter, sir, lies between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary. The cable was handled immediately. That is, a favorable answer was prepared, as I think I stated in my testimony. It was held up for discussion between Admiral Benson and the Secretary, and between them they made the decision not to send them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you stated in your testimony that in all cases where cables came over, as far as you were concerned, there was no delay in transmitting them to the Chief of Operations and to the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; as far as I can remember, I do not know of a delay.

The CHAIRMAN. And when the reply came from the Chief of Operations and the Secretary, there was no delay then in sending the reply back to Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I know that, because I frequently wrote the replies, and if I got an O. K. on it I shot it out immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. And the delay, if there was any, therefore, would have been either on the part of the Chief of Operations or on the part of the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. If you call it a delay, sir, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, if there was any delay.

Capt. PRATT. If there was any delay, it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. Or any trouble in not answering letters.

Capt. PRATT. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. You could not answer the letters yourself, could you Captain?

Capt. PRATT. I would have answered them.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I say these messages that came from Admiral Sims to the Chief of Operations or to the Secretary had to be answered by them? It was not within your province to answer them?

Capt. PRATT. Only to write them.

The CHAIRMAN. Only to write them after you received orders to do so.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, but let me clear that up a little further. We did not do much business by letter. Things moved too fast.

The CHAIRMAN. The same applies to the cables?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. It was almost all transacted by cable; and as I explained my method of doing business, yesterday, those cables were indorsed, recommending action to be taken, and those things were settled before business hours of each current day, and they went in immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but there were many requests made by Admiral Sims where there were no replies made to them, and no attention paid to them, as far as he knew.

Capt. PRATT. The admiral has not made a very clear distinction, when he says "requests," as to what he means. Now, some of those requests, if they concerned material things, would go directly to the bureaus for action. If, in his requests, he means plans and policies and operations, they went directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and then to the Secretary; so that is a fairly large blanket statement. We have got to make a distinction between the two.

The CHAIRMAN. For instance, Admiral Sims wrote on April 14th—
wrote or cabled—

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Cabled, I think, and again on April 23rd, on April 29th, and on May 8th, and on May 24th, in each case asking for tugs to be used on the other side. No answer was received from the department until August 8th. That would look like somewhat of a delay, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; that would be a delay in answering. But about tugs along—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking about the merits of sending them over; I am asking now about the question of delay in attending to the request, or giving information about sending them.

Capt. PRATT. Some of those cases, of course, when it comes to details, I hold myself responsible for not giving Admiral Sims as full information as he gave us. I tried to do what was humanly possible in keeping him informed, but I have no doubt that I made many slip-ups.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Captain, I do not think that you had anything to do with it. It looks to me as though he made requests for certain things and it rested with the department as to whether they would grant these requests, and the department, of course, would act through the Chief of Operations and through the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And until they acted you would have no authority to follow out the admiral's recommendations, would you?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I had a good deal to do with advice; and I can tell you about the tugs. I advised not sending the tugs.

The CHAIRMAN. My point is the lack of information to Admiral Sims, the lack of answer to what he asked for, whether it was a favorable or an unfavorable answer.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; of course. Speaking theoretically, and as we would be able to handle business to-day in times of peace, yes, he ought to get it; but those were pretty strenuous times, and no doubt a lot of the information he wanted and should have had he did not get; even though we wanted to give it to him and meant to give it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about the refusal or delay as to sending a division of coal burning dreadnoughts to reinforce the Grand Fleet.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain that?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I can not explain it other than to state what I already have stated, that that matter rests between the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what led to the department's change of attitude in this matter in November?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; the admiral went over himself, and when he got there he saw what the situation was, himself, and then he sent a cable over. On receipt of that cable I took it in to the Secretary. He approved it and the ships were made ready and sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Thus bearing out the advice Admiral Sims had sent over many months previously?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not insist on getting all the details; they made their decision in any cases that you recall?

Capt. PRATT. No—well, yes; I may have to modify that. He was given a free foot in the execution of it; but explanation was asked. Really, until the Plans Section was established over in London I do not remember of a single what you call a clean-cut plan that Admiral Sims ever sent over to us. I knew thoroughly what he meant. It was just as good, for my own purposes, as though he had written the most theoretical plan in the world. I knew that he wanted ships, I knew he wanted a particular kind of ship: and it was our idea to send them over to him, and when they went over to him he should use them where it was best. I think a great many explanations probably were asked of him.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the decision was made. Now, take up the convoy question. The Allies decided on adopting the convoy plan on May 1, 1917. Admiral Sims's cables reads as follows. [Reading.] Sent: May 1st, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

British admiralty has decided to give trial to the convoy scheme described in my last dispatch. Instead of present plan of naval forces operating independently against raiders, there will be a high sea convoy against raiders, such convoy to be established as quickly as possible on all main trade routes, and on approach to dangerous areas on this side, will be met by destroyers and escorted into port. Hampton Roads and New York have been proposed as assembly ports for eastbound vessels on our coast and gulf, with convoys sailing every fourth day. Plan decided on after long consideration by Admiralty and War Council, and is considered absolutely necessary. It will strain British resources of personnel and ships to the limit, and we must agree by taking one route, at least, if the plan is to be carried out. Admiralty desire to be informed whether we can provide escorts for convoys sailing from the rendezvous at New York. British estimate about 14 ships will be required for New York service, and larger numbers for other routes, including Mediterranean and South America. Escorts should have sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots and six inch guns. I very urgently recommend favorable action. Through British Naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary.

Sims.

The Admiral then said:

"I received no answer to the message I had sent on the 1st of May, and in fact no communication whatsoever from the Navy Department with regard to the convoy proposal until June 20th, nearly two months later."

In this letter of June 20 the Secretary stated:

In regard to convoy, I consider that merchant vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

Now, can you tell me why the Department delayed so long in putting the convoy system in operation in cooperation with the Allies?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was because they thought they had a perfectly legitimate right to discuss a question of that magnitude, in which the whole plan of operations was being changed from one system, that of patrol, to another, that of convoy, especially as our movement later on across the ocean was bound to be a very large one. I think it was largely a question of discussion. I know that at the very beginning we looked upon convoy rather askance until the British had proven it—we had a definite system. After, I think it was, May 31st, if I remember the cables, when they reported the first convoy arrived safely (I think Admiral Sims has reported so), it was definitely accepted, I said July 5th, but I think it was about

d. Anyhow, it was along in the first part of July; and during the department was balancing the problem. It was not, a British problem alone. It was more or less of a combined

CHAIRMAN. That is, they were studying the details before making the decision?

Capt. PRATT. I think so.

CHAIRMAN. And they were not ready to accept the decision by the forces on the other side or by the Allied Council?

Capt. PRATT. Why, I think that is a sensible view to take, sir, on that movement of that sort.

CHAIRMAN. Did not the convoy system have a good deal to do in meeting the submarine menace?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; it was a success. But, like many things which proved to be successful, hindsight is a great deal better than sight.

CHAIRMAN. But would it not have been a good thing if we had have adopted it earlier than we did?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; it would have been a good thing.

CHAIRMAN. That is also true of the question of sending destroyers over to the other side, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. It is also true of the question of sending officers over to assist Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. If that is true, and it would have been a good thing to comply with these recommendations of Admiral Sims when he made them, instead of several months later, as the department did do, would not that have had a material effect in checking the submarine menace earlier than it was checked?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I have made a calculation of figures as well as could. It would have helped, but I do not believe that we were prepared at that time to have had as much effect on the submarine menace as perhaps we thought we had. The spirit should have been there though to help all we could, but the actual material advantages or disadvantages I do not believe are as great as we thought.

CHAIRMAN. That is, you do not believe that it would have shortened the war by four months?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no, sir; I feel perfectly satisfied it would not.

CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would have shortened it three months?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Or two months?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

CHAIRMAN. Or a week?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Or a day?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Therefore you say that what we did over there in relation to the submarine menace had nothing to do with shortening the war?

Capt. PRATT. That is what I mean to say.

CHAIRMAN. Now, our Navy took an active part in the war, did they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; we took an active part.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they do?

Capt. PRATT. We sent craft over to operate against the submarine and we sent our battleships over, and our shore activities, before we finished, were quite great.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the big 14-inch guns?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and we built a radio station over there, and Admiral McKean can tell you; we put up some oil tanks, and we ran an oil-pipe line across Scotland for the use of the Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give that as the main activity of the Navy during the war?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The shore work?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. Our main activities were in two things—the transporting of troops across, I believe, stands as the major naval effort of the war. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. The transporting of ships across?

Capt. PRATT. Of troops across.

The CHAIRMAN. Of troops across?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I believe that is the major effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Including the transport of cargoes to feed them?

Capt. PRATT. We had not gotten into that in force yet. We were only beginning to arrive when the armistice was signed. The major effort was in troops, and during the critical months of 1918—this is my recollection—I used to attend some of the conferences in the War Department, and the British officers seemed to be quite insistent that we should get the troops across and they would look out for the supplying of them for a limited period of time if it were necessary to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. They could not have supplied them, with the food conditions as they were in Europe, for any material length of time without our assistance?

Capt. PRATT. I do not think they planned for any material length of time, but what they wanted was men, right then and there.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but men have got to be fed.

Capt. PRATT. So they have, but in 1918——

The CHAIRMAN. And were not the Allies sending over largely for troop supplies when they got over there?

Capt. PRATT. Naturally, of course, they were. But you can pull your belt in a notch.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the feeding of those men was all a part of the general submarine situation, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; but all I am trying to say is that, at a pinch, you can do a little less, and the first concern was men.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but is not the transportation of troops directly connected with the handling of the submarine menace?

Capt. PRATT. Just what do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Why, these troop transports, I suppose, were liable to attack by submarines, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they were.

The CHAIRMAN. And the sending of ships over to that side to assist in the putting down of the submarine menace was also an assistance in the sending of troops over, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Of course, it was an assistance. I have never for one minute tried to say that it was not of assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. It was of material assistance, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Well, it was in proportion exactly as the ratio of the numbers we could send to the total numbers on the spot. We can not claim more than our share. I would like to claim it all if I could, but I can not do more than the figures show me is there.

The CHAIRMAN. After the 1st of July we had 31 destroyers over there, did we not?

Capt. PRATT. If you want the exact number I will have to get down to my papers.

The CHAIRMAN. That can be verified from the record. I thought it was 31.

Capt. PRATT. I will assume that that was exactly what we had, 31, if that was what it was, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think on June 11, 36 destroyers had arrived on the other side.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony has shown that there were a large number of vessels used against submarines?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That includes in that list something like 1,400 by all of the Allies?

Capt. PRATT. I figured it out as about 1,700. Well, say 1,400.

The CHAIRMAN. Fourteen hundred or more?

Capt. PRATT. Fourteen hundred or more, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, those were not all destroyers. That included vessels of all kinds?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; of course it did.

The CHAIRMAN. But the destroyers were the most effective in the submarine operations, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, absolutely; but the number of destroyers we had compared to the number that Great Britain could bring to bear, and the French plus the Italians, was not very great. They had 111 with their grand fleet alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but those were not used against the submarines?

Capt. PRATT. That is just exactly it. You have hit the nail right on the head, there. If it was as strenuous as all that, why did they not use them against the submarine?

The CHAIRMAN. Because, I suppose, they had to keep the German fleet cooped up, and without those destroyers their fleet would have been in the same condition as our fleet would have been in if we had gone over in 1917 against the German fleet.

Capt. PRATT. There is the hitch, right there. The British grand fleet thought one thing, and they held a lot of destroyers up above there, that we always felt and believed they ought to have shot down and used in antisubmarine work.

The CHAIRMAN. They could not do it. They had to protect their fleet.

Capt. PRATT. I would have done it if I had had the doing of it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would have left your fleet without protection?

Capt. PRATT. If it was as dangerous as all that—the submarine. But, they, in sizing the situation up, did that. That is what makes

me think that the British Admiralty—they are pretty wise old birds—knew what they were doing. They wanted us to come in and do all we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not to their interest to keep the British fleet in the best possible fighting condition in case the German fleet came out?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, but a little later on an idea began to crop out, and I know it got into our plans department, that the British were a little too apprehensive of that fleet coming out; and in the light of events, of what did happen, they were altogether too apprehensive. They scared the Germans pretty thoroughly in the Battle of Jutland, together with the demoralization which set in of the German navy, they had them whipped before they knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. But if the German fleet had known the British fleet was lacking in some of its principal component parts, it might have attacked?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know whether they would have taken the chance.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to say was in regard to the submarine, that in proportion, the assistance we gave in putting down the submarine menace was far greater than the proportion of 36 to 1,400?

Capt. PRATT. If that is what you mean, I have got enough pride in our own boats to say that I will make the proportion, destroyer to destroyer alone; I mean our destroyers to the total destroyers of the Allies on the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. And even at that, our destroyers were probably in better shape than the destroyers of the French and the other allies.

Capt. PRATT. They were, and for this reason, I think. Great Britain and the French and Italians were war weary, and they had lost a lot of their men, and they had to cut down the crews of their boats, and we came over with our destroyers, with our picked men on them. You could not find a better lot. And boat for boat, they did just as much as the other man, and I believe a little more.

The CHAIRMAN. So that our forces over there were really of material help in putting down the submarine menace, whether or not they had anything to do with shortening the war, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they contributed.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that our greatest naval effort was the protection of troops going over?

Capt. PRATT. Transporting troops. That is my opinion, merely, alone. If I was asked for an opinion, I would say that that was our greatest achievement.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not include the provisioning of the troops?

Capt. PRATT. We had not gotten into that, in full force. The Navy had not gotten hold of the supply ships in the numbers that were beginning to flock in when the armistice came.

Senator KEYES. It was necessary?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, absolutely necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. But we were sending large amounts of supplies abroad at that time?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and many of those supplies, as I think the records will show, went in British bottoms—in British ships.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you do not give us any particular credit for that?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I wish I could. I wish our merchant marine had been built up there, so that we could have done it all. We were coming, but we had not yet arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least we did our part in protecting those British ships that were sent over with supplies?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; trying to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and the Navy did that?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that was an important part of taking care of the armies on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; an important part.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we did?

Capt. PRATT. Protecting——

The CHAIRMAN. We contributed largely to that by putting our antisubmarine forces at work? We contributed largely to the sending over of supplies by sending our antisubmarine forces to the other side?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; the antisubmarine forces, unless I misunderstand you, did not contribute to getting the supplies across.

The CHAIRMAN. To the sending of them over safely?

Capt. PRATT. They helped to protect the supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. That is contributing to getting them over, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. Looking at it that way; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about the convoy system. When was serious consideration first given by the department to the convoy system?

Capt. PRATT. I think that the question was taken under discussion immediately Admiral Sims' telegram was received.

The CHAIRMAN. Of May 1?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think it was being discussed right along, and the pros and cons of the matter weighed.

The CHAIRMAN. And when was it first put fully into effect, requiring all ships sailing from American Atlantic ports to establish and join convoys?

Capt. PRATT. That did not lie within our province. The part we took was to furnish the cruisers they asked for. The system was entirely of British inception, handled by their own methods and by their own people, and they had their own officers in our ports. What they wanted from us was the contribution of a certain number of cruisers so that no convoy would leave a port without having a cruiser to guard it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they not also want us to agree to have our ships go according to the convoy plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they wanted to; and, in general, we were willing to do that, but——

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is when we decided to do that?

Capt. PRATT. We acceded on July 5.

The CHAIRMAN. July 5?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did we send cruisers there?

Capt. PRATT. That is the time. We put them right into the convoy that they were asked for. We simply would tell the British authorities, "We have so many cruisers. Take them when you want them and put them in." Now, let me explain one thing about the holding of a ship out from a convoy. That does not break it. That does not hurt it. Suppose, for instance, you take the St. Paul, an 18-knot ship, with Americans on board and a valuable cargo of material. They want to put her in an 11-knot or 8-knot convoy touching at Halifax. She has not got the coal to do it. It breaks the line up right away. All we would say is, "Agree to convoy, but run that ship separately. They will take a chance on that." The only thing they have to know is on a certain day to avoid certain areas; submarines in there; and they cable when they arrive. That does not break up a convoy because a certain ship does not sail in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did those ships that did not sail in the convoy get any protection?

Capt. PRATT. They asked for it if it could be granted.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they asked to join a convoy on the outside at an assembling point?

Capt. PRATT. Not if they went separately.

The CHAIRMAN. That was separate from the convoy—a separate movement?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it was on June 20 that Secretary Daniels said he believed that merchant ships having armed guards were safer when sailing independently. When was that idea given up?

Capt. PRATT. I think that is just one of the points referred to. I think he possibly referred to some of our own ships. In fact, he must have referred to our own ships, because they were really the only ones that had armed guards on board.

The CHAIRMAN. It was about 2 weeks after that that we subscribed, as you have said, on July 5, to the convoy plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. That is, the British could always put their own convoy plan in, any time that they wanted it. We contributed first not so many ships to the convoys, because we did not have them. What they wanted from us was our cruisers to help to protect their own.

The CHAIRMAN. Later, on July 5, we practically subscribed to the whole plan?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims's first messages were fully borne out by later developments, were they not, about the convoy plan?

Capt. PRATT. You might call those the Admiralty messages, because the Admiralty, they were the ones that put that scheme through.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but the Admiral particularly asked that it be acceded to—the plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, he asked for it.

The CHAIRMAN. He made such a recommendation?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he made it. I merely state that I thought the subject of that importance was worthy of a little discussion, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be your reason for the delay in adopting the convoy?

Capt. PRATT. I think that would be a reason, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of tugs, what effort was made by the department to accede to the requests of the Allies and the recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. No; I can not agree with him there.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I say, what was done to accede to the requests of the Allies?

Capt. PRATT. The main thing that was done was to collect together the wrecking companies, coordinate them, and detach as many of them as were not needed on this coast; organize them and get them abroad to help the British raise some of their ships. Now, with regard to the tugs, because Admiral Sims happens to ask for tugs, that is not any reason you should send them, really. I was against sending tugs over there. If we had broken up towing our coal barges the winter we had that—you remember that very severe winter. Those tugs had to take our transports as they came in, sometimes six to eight to a transport, turn them around, run the coal barges, do all that sort of thing—our supply at the rear would have broken down. The tug is really a commercial proposition, and I think those tugs were needed over here first. That, of course, is a matter of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the reason for the delay in sending tugs over was because there were no available ocean-going tugs at that time to send over when the request was made?

Capt. PRATT. That we could get, and take away from our tremendous industries which were being built up here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. I think they were needed over here more than they were over there.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the department first begin the construction of additional ocean-going tugs?

Capt. PRATT. I think I will have to refer you to Admiral McKean for that particular date. That is within his province, more—the construction. I know that we advised with the Shipping Board immediately, or early in the year, and advised them very strongly to start in building tugs.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any delays in getting the necessary approval of the authorities for building new antisubmarine craft, and particularly destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Of course I do not know what conferences may have taken place between the secretary and the bureau chiefs and the secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations. I do know this, that is the head of a board of which I have already submitted the plan, we worked up that scheme, and then went outside of our own province and recommended 200 destroyers and wrote out the sheet whereby the secretary was to put his approval, making it effective.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you do that?

Capt. PRATT. It was signed July 6, the same time it was handed in. He approved it right off.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not proposed before that time?

Capt. PRATT. It may have been. As I said, I can not tell you what discussions he had with his bureau chiefs.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know, though, of a plan that was proposed in April for the construction of new destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Destroyers or submarine chasers?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, both?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I do not know that; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, destroyers or submarine chasers?

Capt. PRATT. Submarine chasers. I have been told by Admiral McKean—this is within his province, you know, to know all that and I am not supposed to know about these things definitely. Besides, in April I was not in the office in an executive capacity, and what I would tell you about this would be only hearsay. I could not tell you about that. You had better ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral McKean can answer those questions?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I told you about this, about that particular recommendation of 200 destroyers. I know definitely about that. But I like to confine myself to facts, if I can.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the testimony shows that Admiral Sims was not consulted concerning the first convoy of troops abroad until after all the plans had been made. Can you explain that?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think I can explain it a bit. The Army wanted to send over these troops, and they wanted to do it very quietly—very secretly. It was necessary to get our men over into France, if for nothing more, to cheer them up by the presence of our soldiers. Admiral Sims at that time had submitted no definite plan for getting our troops across, so Admiral Cleaves, who was in charge of troop transportation on this side, came to Washington and made his plan out. He sailed with his ships about June 14. The plan was made entirely by Admiral Gleaves. And further, let me say, about all the details of arranging for troop transportation that all had to be done on this side. The only plan that Admiral Sims had anything to do with was what is called the routing plan, and his routing plan, which, of course, involved the point or longitude where the authority shifts from this side to the other, and the point or the place where his escort should take on, that is his province. That is the only part of the transport plan that he ever had anything to do with at all.

Now, where the trouble comes in is here. In arranging details of the plan, Admiral Gleaves, instead of putting them all over and crossing a certain meridian at a certain date, thought that it would be wise to split them up into four parts. That made added escort necessary, and took more destroyers to protect those troops than was really economical. That was the first move. Admiral Sims protested against that, and suggested different routing and method of routing, which came after Admiral Gleaves had sailed. There was no question about that, it was accepted immediately; but the Army wanted us to get those ships off as soon as they could go, and they just went.

The CHAIRMAN. Should not Admiral Sims have been notified of it——

Capt. PRATT. He was notified when they sailed.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Before the plan was made, so that he could take part in the plan?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no, sir; he would not really have any more part in going into the details of that sort of thing than we would in interfering in a lot of work over on his side.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not have anything to do on the other side when the troops arrived in the war zone?

Capt. PRATT. He escorted us. His was the duty of escort.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, of course, was an important duty?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Should not that matter have been a part of the general plan, and in making the general plan should not Admiral Sims, who was familiar with all matters on the other side, have been consulted?

Capt. PRATT. Why did he not get his plan over to us a little earlier, that is all? He has got some part in this to play. It is not all one-sided.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he asked to get his plan over earlier?

Capt. PRATT. He knew, as any sane man, that we would——

The CHAIRMAN. Was he told when the troops were to be sent over so that he could get his plan here?

Capt. PRATT. He has got to be a little forehanded, like everybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was not asked to do so, was he?

Capt. PRATT. I would not ask him any more than I would ask any other officer to think about these things. He had his plan. He did not get it over quick enough with his routing instructions. They came after we left.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was not asked to do so as commander of those forces?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; but as commander of the forces in European waters I think he was wise enough and big enough to send it over himself. I am not criticising him at all, but just trying to look at it fairly.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what information were these plans based?

Capt. PRATT. Just what do you mean, sir? I do not quite——

The CHAIRMAN. Information about the general situation on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Why, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean about troops, but about the general naval situation.

Capt. PRATT. That was when Joffre came over here and that was taken up. He impressed upon us the need of getting troops there just as soon as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I mean. I am referring to the general naval situation on the other side, as to matters of escorts, and things of that sort.

Capt. PRATT. I am still a little at sea. Will you straighten me out on that again?

The CHAIRMAN. I ask from whom you got information about conditions in the war zone in regard to what escort would be needed and at what particular places the escort should meet the troops, and matters of that sort?

Capt. PRATT. Oh. When we wanted to route a ship we would cable to Admiral Sims and say, "Such and such due to sail a certain date. Please appoint rendezvous and furnish adequate escort." He did the rest. He cabled back to say where those ships should be, the point they should proceed to, and then he would cable back the number of escort he would furnish, and then we informed the ships sailing.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent was he responsible for the safety of the transports in the war zone?

Capt. PRATT. He was responsible for them. I think his jurisdiction, we may say, was from longitude 30, where our agreement was made with the Admiralty. I put longitude 30. He did not meet them at longitude 30 necessarily. He met them wherever he thought was the right place.

The CHAIRMAN. He was responsible for them after they had crossed that longitude?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. We left that entirely to his own judgment, as to where he would meet them. He knew more about that than we did. We never interfered with him in matters of that sort. It was up to him.

The CHAIRMAN. So that he was responsible for them during a number of days during the latter part of the trip over?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet he was not consulted about plans of sending them over?

Capt. PRATT. No. Just what do you mean by that? I do not quite get you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not consulted?

Capt. PRATT. He was told about routing.

The CHAIRMAN. About the number of vessels that would go at a certain time?

Capt. PRATT. He furnished the routing instructions for those ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I say he was not consulted about the plans, just how many were to go at a certain time?

Capt. PRATT. No; but it was not——

The CHAIRMAN. The number of ships that were to go?

Capt. PRATT. No; and it was not necessary. That was not a part of his job.

The CHAIRMAN. When was he notified of the sailing of the first ship convoy?

Capt. PRATT. I do not recall; but if it followed our usual custom, he would be informed at about the date of sailing, which would be about six or seven days, probably, before they had arrived at rendezvous. You see, they had quite a time, five or six days, say, before they would arrive at the rendezvous.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did it take him to have his escort ready at longitude 30, if he decided to send the escort out?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know the details of that. Admiral Bayly arranged all that. Admiral Sims did not.

The CHAIRMAN. About how long would it take for the ships to sail from Queenstown out there to meet the troop convoy?

Capt. PRATT. It takes about half an hour for them to get up steam on the oil burners, and they are always lying there ready; and there were always a certain number on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. And then they could get out to longitude 30 in what time?

Capt. PRATT. They never went out as far as longitude 30; 19 to 20 was about the place. Admiral Sims or Admiral Bayly varied it himself whenever he wanted to. We never bothered them in that respect, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to find out is—it may or may not be material——

Capt. PRATT. ✓

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). How long did it take the Admiral to get his ships out to meet the convoys? You say it would take the ships about six or seven days to get to the place where he would meet them.

Capt. PRATT. You are asking me questions I have got to do a little figuring on. Let me get my map out. [After making calculation.] About two days to get out there.

The CHAIRMAN. About two days, which would give him four or five days after his plan for the escort in the war zone was accepted?

Capt. PRATT. His routing instructions did that, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. From the start?

Capt. PRATT. After that first convoy.

The CHAIRMAN. After the first convoy?

Capt. PRATT. There was only one time after that when there was any question of going against a recommendation which he made in that respect, and after some discussion he accepted it, and that was when the German submarines were working pretty extensively on the northern lanes that he had laid out, he prescribed the crossing between certain latitudes. We suggested moving down 5 degrees further south, and adding that into the routing instructions, as being a little safer. There was some discussion over that in three or four cables, but he agreed to that, and we included that area, and I believe it helped some.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the department's action in the case of the first convoy based on the belief that full information regarding all details of sending it was available in Washington?

Capt. PRATT. No, the War Department did not know anything about it. Their sending of troops was based entirely on the information, I imagine, that Joffre gave them here.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I did not say the War Department. I said the Navy Department's action.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I thought you said the War Department. Will you let me have that again?

The CHAIRMAN. Was the department's action in the case of the first convoy based on the belief that full information regarding all details of sending it was available in Washington?

Capt. PRATT. I do not believe I know what that means.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that you did not have Admiral Sims' plan for the convoying escort for the first convoy?

Capt. PRATT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had them after that?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And did the department feel that it had information enough on which to send it over without such a plan, when the first convoy was sent over?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it did. It got it over.

The CHAIRMAN. And afterwards it changed its plan?

Capt. PRATT. It changed it because it was an uneconomical distribution of force, which we recognized immediately after Admiral Sims protested. But as far as available knowledge went, why, yes.

Just let me explain a little further, so that you will see how fully conversant we were with the situation. There was not a submarine on the other side that moved that Sims did not give us information of constantly, as nearly as the British could give it to him. We plotted on an enormous sheet which we kept day by day the actual position

of every submarine that was known to be operating around the British Isles, on the Bay of Biscay coast, and off the Straits of Gibraltar. Those markers were moved daily, and sinkings were put down opposite them, and at the end of every 15 days we took a tracing of that sheet and put it away for future reference; so that we had exactly the same information as to the submarines and times of sailing as they had, because the British themselves kept us very well informed.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me, if after the first convoy was sent over Admiral Sims sent you new plans for a convoy and escort and those plans were immediately adopted by the department, it would have been just as well to have consulted Admiral Sims before the first one was sent, and to have gotten his plan of escort.

Capt. PRATT. I am perfectly willing to grant the point.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there ever any difficulty in getting the Navy Department to take action in taking over the troop transports?

Capt. PRATT. Any difficulty in getting the Navy Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. My recollection of the way that was handled is this: We very early saw the necessity of taking the transports under complete naval control. The first group of ships that went over were manned under the auspices of the Shipping Board in which the crews were not under strict military jurisdiction, that is rather a dangerous procedure when you get into the submarine waters, because if a fireman wants to work under the eight-hour law, and stops firing, steam is likely to go down. The General Staff of the Army recognized that it would be a good thing—I am not speaking of naval officers alone—and were very anxious to have them under naval jurisdiction. But then there was a third party, the Shipping Board, who were interested in these ships. That had to be adjusted. So that after we picked out the number that we wanted, it became a question of getting the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy and of the Secretary of War and of Mr. Denman of the Shipping Board. When the original plan was drawn up, I think through an oversight, the place for Mr. Denman's name was omitted, it was forgotten that he had really an interest in these ships, and a very active one. I think Secretary Baker was the first one to sign it. I think Secretary Daniels signed it next, and then the question came up of Mr. Denman's signature before it could go into effect. Like all plans of considerable magnitude of that sort, it takes time to get them going. Whether the Secretary signed immediately or whether he delayed a day or two, if that is what you mean, or something of that sort. I can not say, but it does not appear to me—I think Mr. Denman delayed a day or two in signing.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning testifies that there was a considerable delay in getting the department to put through this question of having the Navy Department have charge of the transports for troops. Do you recall any delay?

Capt. PRATT. I do not just exactly know what he means. You see, it is a joint operation, to begin with, and it involves shifting over from the Army to the Navy. Really, the Army quartermasters run the transport system. We have always wanted to get it under naval control, and they have always been a little loath to give it up. Then in comes a third party, the Shipping Board, with a very good claim, as they think, upon these ships; so that we are laboring under

three forces, and the Navy always wanted—at least, the naval officers always wanted—to get absolute control of the transports so that we would know from the start to the finish of the voyage that they would be given the best protection that was possible. All these were matters of discussion and adjustment, and it is very possible that is what he means.

The CHAIRMAN. I read from the testimony of Capt. Laning at page 980-q, of the typewritten record [reading]:

There is perhaps no achievement of the Navy that has been as favorably commented on as its work in transporting troops across the ocean during the war. I will now point out how hard it was to get the Navy Department to take any action that would enable the Navy to get control of and operate the transports.

In connection with my duties in regard to Navy material, early in May, 1917, after carefully studying the situation, I prepared a memorandum on the subject of the Navy manning and handling the transports that would be utilized in carrying troops abroad. Unfortunately I did not save a copy of that memorandum. However, about May 24, 1917, no action having been taken on the matter and a letter having been received concerning the use of the *Vaterland* for transport duty, I took the occasion to prepare a department letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, who at that time had possession of the seized German ships, setting forth the necessity of having troop transports manned and operated by the Navy and requesting that 16 of the largest, fastest, and most suitable of the seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out for that purpose. The letter followed closely the lines of the memorandum I had previously prepared. It reads as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington (penciled), May 25.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22, forwarding a copy of the letter from the collector of customs of New York, in which he recommends that the *Vaterland*, not being suitable for a cargo ship and being especially suitable for a transport, should not be intrusted to a merchant crew but should be under the command of an officer of the department that would operate her in the transportation of troops.

I most heartily concur in the collector's view and recommend that not only the *Vaterland* but also such other of the seized German ships that are required for use as troop transports be turned over to the Navy Department to be prepared, fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy in that service.

In this connection I invite your attention to the necessity of the Navy operating all vessels used in the transport of troops during war and especially of these vessels operating in waters where the enemy may be encountered. Unless such ships are manned and operated by the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased; and, since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such a loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight of munitions and lives. It follows then that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection, and especially so against submarine attack.

The ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under command of the convoy commander. It is evident that the haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops, with personnel untrained to maneuvers or even to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting colossal disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be justly likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial Navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting Navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping places them in the greatest possible danger.

While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports. These are:

- (1) The selection of vessels of suitable type, with sufficient capacity and speed.
- (2) The personnel and operations of the vessels.

The selection of ships for transport service requires care. Ships suitable have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons. First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship from attack.

Next comes the question of grouping the transports according to speed. If we have ships of various speeds in one group of transports, the speed for all of the group becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24 knots speed, in a group containing one ship of, say, 15 knots speed, the *Vaterland* becomes for that group a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows then that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service we must select ships of uniform speeds for each group and sufficient groups to carry out our task.

From a study of the possible requirements of our overseas operation it would seem that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed each group could make a round trip about once each month and this would give us a constant steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the most suitable for the purpose, the Navy Department is convinced that the best available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to carry troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is possible to use them, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes are least interfered with. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose, and of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are grouped as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, probably as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the present situation as it is. These groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity based on an allowance of 4 tons per man carried:

| | Estimated troop capacity. |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| First group: | |
| Vaterland..... | 10,000 |
| Kronprinzessin Cecellie..... | 3,000 |
| Kaiser Wilhelm II..... | 3,000 |
| Von Steuben..... | 2,500 |
| Second group: | |
| George Washington..... | 8,000 |
| America..... | 7,000 |
| Martha Washington (Austrian)..... | 3,000 |
| Third group: | |
| Hamburg..... | 3,300 |
| Grosser Kurfurst..... | 4,000 |
| Konig Wilhelm II..... | 3,000 |
| Princess Alice..... | 3,300 |
| Princess Irene..... | 3,300 |
| Fourth group: | |
| Cincinnati..... | 5,000 |
| President Grant..... | 6,000 |
| President Lincoln..... | 6,000 |
| Frederick der Grosse..... | 3,300 |

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle about 100,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have the personnel trained to operate by naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship but also to the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signaling outfit, and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these and yet on them depends the ship's safety.

Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be supplied and equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be entrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret, and to allow them to fall into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition but the whole operation that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships, carrying the most precious and vital part of our war forces, must be entirely manned by men tried and true in the methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping, if used in obtaining crews for our transport service, leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathisers to get into the crews of these vessels, and they can carry out any nefarious design they wish. We must man transports from captain to coal passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents

above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on the ships carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the expedition, it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the duties of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination every unit of the expedition, can success be expected, and with the coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added danger by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unaided assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there is any doubt.

We strongly urge that this matter be given careful attention, and that not only the *U.S.S. Albatross* but all the other vessels listed above as necessary for transport that are not now assigned to the Navy, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and equipped as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expedition but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this, it should be decided on now and not wait for terrible disaster to show us the necessity of adopting any other plan.

Sincerely yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Respectfully,
Honorable the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

PRATT. What date is that: early in May?

CHAIRMAN. May 25.

PRATT. Well, I do not know about that. I know that when the case came up.

CHAIRMAN. After reading that letter, Capt. Laning continued his [reading]:

As later I prepared a letter to the Secretary of War asking the War Department assistance toward getting the troop transport service turned over to the Navy to be established on a sound basis. This letter, which was returned to me later from Admiral Benson's office unsigned and marked "hold," reads

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington.

and note: "Hold, (Capt. McKean.)"

There is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter I am this day sending the Secretary of the Treasury, suggesting that certain seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy as troop transports. The Navy Department does not desire to change the arrangements already made by the War Department concerning the immediate transportation of troops across the Atlantic, it feels that the ultimate problem is so essentially naval that it is incumbent on the Navy in its duty if it did not point out what it believes to be the most efficient and safe method of carrying out its part of the general mission.

The Navy is concerned in transportation of troops only from the time they go on board troop ships until they leave the ships, but during that time it is entirely responsible for the expedition. The points of embarkation and debarkation marking the beginning and end of the Navy's responsibility, and in view of that responsibility demands a well-planned and carefully organized service.

The Navy Department is of the opinion that the transportation of troops should be accomplished as little as possible with shipping now engaged in transporting supplies across the Atlantic, and to that end proposes that certain seized German ships, especially those designed for use as transports in war, be fitted up for the purpose. The ships should be repaired immediately, but when repaired, equipped, and properly manned should be the best ships possible for the work. The ships named in the letter will give good service and will probably handle the transport question fully, enabling the Navy to deliver in the neighborhood of 70,000 troops per month on the western coast. It is not proposed that all supplies for troops be sent on these transports, but that they will, of course, carry all that their capacity permits. Munitions, animals, and other heavy freight, as a general rule, be transported by merchant ships, while fresh troops with their baggage will go forward on transports.

The arrangements for the Navy handling this service are set forth in general terms in my letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, and in view of the necessity of at once establishing the service on the best possible basis, I request that the War Department, if it concurs with the views set forth, assist in every possible way to establish the service as soon as possible, and ended at the earliest possible time.

Sincerely yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Respectfully,
Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

Then he says:

As I said before, that letter was not signed, and was returned to me marked "Holt". Even as late as July 3, 1917, I was still hammering away the little I could to get the transports turned over to the Navy. This is evidenced by a memorandum submitted by me to the Chief of Naval Operations on July 3, 1917, and which I will place in the record.

I will ask the stenographer to put this also in the record at this time.

The memorandum referred to is here printed in the record as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 3, 1917.

MEMORANDUM.

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter addressed to the President by the Chairman of the Shipping Board, in which it is requested that all seized ships not already turned over to the Navy be transferred to the Shipping Board.

It is noted from the letter that while the Shipping Board is apparently averse to turning over to the Navy or Army any of the seized ships that are to be used as transports, they suggest that the President give the matter consideration and that a decision as to what branch of the Government shall operate troop ships should be reached only after the arguments of all concerned are heard.

It is further noted from the letter that the board states that there is abundant time to make this decision before the ships are ready to load. This statement would be true if a merchant ships were ready for use as a transport whenever she is ready to load, but such is not the case. A very considerable change must be made in merchant ships before they are suitable for transport use and to delay making these changes will merely delay the readiness of the ships for the service. The decision should be made at the earliest possible time and the fitting-out work started.

From conversation with Shipping Board representatives it is understood that they agree that some of the German ships must be used as transports, but they are of the opinion that such ships should be officered, manned, and operated by the Shipping Board and taken by the Army on "time charter" whenever it becomes necessary to transport troops. They apparently fail to grasp the idea that if we are to transport a large number of troops to France it will require a special service of large, fast ships, and that the ships engaged in that service will be worked to capacity and can not do any cargo carrying other than to bring such cargo from their ports of call in Europe as may be ready when the ship is about to return. Inasmuch as the transports can not engage in commercial work at all, it hardly seems proper that the board should insist that they be officered, manned, and operated by civilian complements.

To operate troopships in the submarine danger zone with any but the best disciplined and most loyal crew available is merely inviting colossal disaster. The Shipping Board plans to officer and man its ships as all merchant ships are officered and manned. One has but to read the reports of the officers in charge of our armed guards to realize the absolute menace to any ship by employing that method: yet it is the Shipping Board's plan to apply it to ships carrying invaluable munitions and thousands of men on whom our success in war depends.

Unless troopships are manned and operated under the trained and loyal men of the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased, and since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troopship the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight of munition and lives. It follows that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection to troopships, especially against submarine attack. When attacked, the ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under the command of the convoy commander. It is evident that the haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops, with personnel untrained to maneuvers or even to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting colossal disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be just likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping places them in the greatest possible danger.

While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops, there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports. These are:

1. The selection of vessels of suitable type, with sufficient capacity and speed.
2. The personnel and operation of the vessels.

The selection of ships for transport service requires care. Ships suitable must have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons: First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship from submarine attack. Next comes the question of grouping the transports according to speed. If we mix ships of various speeds in one group of transport, the speed for all the group at once becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24 knots speed, in a group containing one ship of say 15 knots speed, the *Vaterland* becomes for that trip a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows then that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service we must select ships of similar speed for each group and sufficient groups to carry out our task.

From a study of the possible requirements of our overseas operation it would seem that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed, each group can make a round trip about once each month, and this would give us a constant and steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships most suitable for the purpose, the Chief of Operations is convinced that the best ships available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to carry troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is advisable to use them, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes will be least interfered with. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose, and of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are grouped as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, probably as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as it is. These groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an allowance of 4 tons per man carried:

| | Estimated troop capacity. | Speed, knots. |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|
| First group: | | |
| <i>Vaterland</i> | 10,000 | 24 |
| <i>Kronprinzessin Cecelle</i> | 3,000 | 23½ |
| <i>Kaiser Wilhelm II</i> | 3,000 | 23½ |
| Second group: | | |
| <i>George Washington</i> | 8,000 | 19 |
| <i>America</i> | 7,000 | 17.5 |
| Third group: | | |
| <i>Hamburg</i> | 3,300 | 16 |
| <i>Grosser Kurfurst</i> | 4,000 | 15.5 |
| <i>Konig Wilhelm II</i> | 3,000 | 15.5 |
| <i>Princess Alice</i> | 3,300 | 15.5 |
| <i>Princess Irene</i> | 3,300 | 15.5 |
| Fourth group: | | |
| <i>Cincinnati</i> | 5,000 | 15 |
| <i>President Grant</i> | 6,000 | 14.5 |
| <i>President Lincoln</i> | 6,000 | 14.5 |
| <i>Frederick Der Grosse</i> | 3,300 | 14.5 |
| <i>Barbarossa</i> | 3,000 | 14 |

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle about 70,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have a personnel trained to operate in naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship, but also the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signaling outfit, and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these things and yet on them depends the ships' safety.

Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be intrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition, but the whole Navy that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships carrying the most precious and essential part of our war forces must be entirely manned by men tried and true. The methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping if used in obtaining

vessels in our transport service leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathizers to work into the crews of these vessels and they can carry out any nefarious designs they might wish. We must man transports from captain to coal passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents.

From the above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on the ships engaged in carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the convoy after sailing it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination between every unit of the expedition can success be expected and with the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added dangers by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unorganized assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be any doubt.

This matter should be given careful attention and all the vessels listed above as necessary for transport duty, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and put in service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expeditions but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, the correct decision should be reached without waiting for terrible disaster to show us the error of adopting any other plan. The best service possible is none too good for taking our troops across the sea and that best service is the service of the Navy.

It is not contemplated to use these vessels as naval auxiliaries, but only to take them under complete naval control during such time as they are employed in carrying troops for the Army. The Navy Department does not wish these ships to remain permanently in the Navy, but to have them revert to the Shipping Board when the transportation of troops has been completed.

Capt. PRATT. It looks as though Capt. Laning had a little hard luck.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently the letter he had prepared for the Secretary to send was held. It was marked "hold." Do you know anything about those circumstances?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know anything about that letter, but I do know—I can not say the time—but some time before June 25 Capt. Chase turned over to me and said, "Get those transports;" or something like that. I went to work at it, and I got them. The President signed the proclamation July 6, I think. That necessitated getting the Secretary's signature and Mr. Denman's signature and the signature of the Secretary of War. I do not know anything about Capt. Laning's letter.

The CHAIRMAN. It shows that the transports turned over about July 10 were the very ones suggested in the first memorandum.

Capt. PRATT. Admiral McKean, I think, knows more about that than I do. I was only planning, along about that time; but I know that when they turned that job over to me, we got them after a while, and the President signed it about July 6. Admiral McKean can supply the details.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid we shall have to adjourn now, Captain. There is a matter upon the floor of the Senate in which we are all interested and we must be there. We will adjourn until Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, April 26, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 26, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Pittman, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, I have a number of questions to ask you this morning, and I hope that as far as possible you will make your answers as short as you can. I do not want to suppress any information, at all, but I think we would like to get along as fast as we can with the hearing.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Pratt, I have been impressed with the great amount of work that you and your brother officers of the Bureau of Operations have had to do during the war. Now, I want you to tell me what the Navy Department would have done if there had been no Bureau of Operations.

Capt. PRATT. I think, sir, it would have fallen to pieces, not because the bureaus were not thoroughly efficient and headed by men who thoroughly understood their own duties, but because it was necessary to have a coordinating head, some one who looked at the plan and policy alone, in order that each bureau should play its appointed part.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is responsible for the creation of the Office of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir. Admiral Benson knows more than I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that included in the Fiske plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I think he broached the idea first.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that Fiske did?

Capt. PRATT. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the Secretary use his influence to strike out of the original bill the word "responsible," the one word which would have given the Chief of Operations authority over the bureaus and authority to coordinate them under that section?

Capt. PRATT. I think you had better ask Admiral Benson that question, because I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that the word "responsibility" should be there?

vessels in our transport service leave to work into the crews of these vessels they might wish. We must man transportable men available, so that agents.

From the above it is evident that engaged in carrying troops. If the convoy after sailing it can not permit requirements of the duty, to operate in coordination between every unit of the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with dangers by putting any phase of the and unorganized assistants, or in the there can be any doubt.

This matter should be given careful consideration necessary for transport duty, be assigned to be properly fitted and equipped for the transports at the earliest possible time but also the success of our whole campaign. A correct decision should be reached without error of adopting any other plan. The transportation of our troops across the sea and that best.

It is not contemplated to use these vessels under complete naval control during the carrying of troops for the Army. The Navy vessels remain permanently in the Navy, but when the transportation of troops has been completed.

Capt. PRATT. It looks as though it is a matter of luck.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently the matter was held. It was nothing about those circumstances.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know. I do not know—I can not say the time. Capt. Chase turned over to me the proclamation or something like that. I went to the President signed the proclamation. I got the Secretary's signature and the signature of the Secretary of War about Capt. Laning's letter.

The CHAIRMAN. It shows that the July 10 were the very ones suggested.

Capt. PRATT. Admiral McKean, I was only planning, and that when they turned that job over to me, and the President signed it. I can supply the details.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid we shall have to be there. There is a matter upon the floor of interest and we must be there. morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the Monday, April 26, 1920, at 10 o'clock

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Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that the Chief of Operations should have the responsibility of preparing the Navy for war, and authority under the supreme authority of the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think that he should have the same authority, practically, that the Chief of Staff of the Army has: that is, military authority only, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy, under the President.

The CHAIRMAN. With the responsibility?

Capt. PRATT. With the responsibility; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And with that responsibility the chief of operations should have the power to bring his views before Congress?

Capt. PRATT. I think he should, sir; and if he then does what he ought not to do, the Secretary can replace him by another man and should replace him. If, on the other hand, he finds that he is not being supported by the Secretary, he can bring his opinion directly before the proper authorities.

I further believe, however, that the general board should be created by law and not be a board appointed by the will of any person, because the general board acts in the capacity of the "elder statesman," you might say, within the Navy Department; and they, if created by law, would have a great check upon the Chief of Naval Operations in case he overstepped his authority, and they would also be in a position to write up documents which would clear the whole situation. It would be a check both ways.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask you, Capt. Pratt, later on to submit any suggestions that you might have that have been derived from your experience during the war in the Bureau of Operations, for any changes that might be profitable in the organization of the department.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I can answer that question right now. I have already drawn up such a paper, and have also submitted it to the Chief of Naval Operations, with the request that he call a conference—ask the Secretary to have a conference between himself and all bureau chiefs and everyone else concerned in order that there would be no dissenting opinion when it came up. I have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. With a view of giving that to the committee?

Capt. PRATT. I did not mention the committee, sir. It passes out of my hands.

The CHAIRMAN. That is for the department?

Capt. PRATT. That is for the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee a copy of that plan?

Capt. PRATT. I can, sir, at any time you wish it.

The CHAIRMAN. I will write you about that.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would have happened during the war if there had been no division of material and no planning section in the Division of Naval Operations with plans for carrying on the war?

Capt. PRATT. Without a division of material we would have fared badly. Without the planning section, once we got into the war, we would have had to depend largely on Sims's planning section, and as a matter of fact that is what we did do except for matters that occurred in the United States. We used the papers that Sims's planning section sent over to us, and they did a wonderful work.

Capt. PRATT. In a very general way, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you consider that those systems constituted a good beginning upon which to base an organization to prepare and conduct a war?

Capt. PRATT. I think that is correct as far as it goes. The difference between that organization and the organization I would have in my mind, is this: Those aids are coordinated directly to the Secretary of the Navy. I would say those aids should be coordinated directly under the military head or Chief of Naval Operations under the Secretary. That would be the difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you repeat the first part of that? I could hear it.

Capt. PRATT. As I understand the Moody plan, the various aids are coordinated directly under the Secretary. In other words, there might be exactly as much strife as regards the plan and policy under the present system as there is under the present. Under the present system the bureau chiefs coordinate directly under the Secretary of the Navy. I would have the aids for material, personnel, and inspection coordinated directly under one military head, under the Secretary; in other words, I would provide that they should be coordinated under the Chief of Naval Operations instead of directly under a civilian head, but the civilian head always exercising that right of authority to discharge his policy man whenever his policies conflicted with the Secretary's.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt just a minute to ask any questions, but, approximately, how long do you think it will be before you are through with Capt. Pratt?

The CHAIRMAN. I hope to get through this morning.

Senator PITTMAN. There is a meeting of the Naval Affairs Committee, as of course you know, at 10.30 this morning, and the chairman of the committee has asked that we be over there. He is trying to get a quorum and wants to act upon some amendments that have been agreed upon between the House committee and the Senate committee. If you will excuse me, I will go over to that meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

At this point Senator Pittman left the hearing.)

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Pratt, do you think it was wise to destroy and discredit the Mahan system and return to the bureau system with only an aid for operations who had no authority to coordinate the bureaus?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; it is a return to an older order of things which was not as wise.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it was not wise to do this?

Capt. PRATT. I do think it was not wise.

The CHAIRMAN. You have excused our lack of preparation for World War by saying that such preparation would have been an overt act. Is there any principle in international law which forbids a neutral nation to prepare in anticipation of being forced into war?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no. The overt acts that I spoke of were those that would have to be accomplished in order to make our Navy roughly efficient. I do not mean by that that the Navy itself should not be prepared to the minute, because I believe it should

It is always good insurance.

people who have to suddenly jump from peace-time activities to war-time activities.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would have changed your plans, of course, to a considerable extent?

Capt. PRATT. Not the general basic plan. The details of the plans would have been changed.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not draw up the basic plans, did you? These were detailed plans?

Capt. PRATT. Well, let us say the basic conception of the planning. The details could have been carried out more promptly.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been to the Naval War College, Capt. Pratt?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In time of peace do you not think it would be wise to appoint a graduate of the Naval War College as Chief of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I think the Chief of Naval Operations should always have been a graduate of our war college.

The CHAIRMAN. And especially so if there were a war impending?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In your direct testimony you made the following statement:

"To administer this department, there is called a civilian—and under no circumstances should the supervisory head be other than a civilian—a splendid man, able, efficient, highly trained in some subjects, but not technically trained in the activities of the Navy nor a student in the art of war. This system functions after a fashion in peace, but it does not function when preparation for war becomes necessary, nor does it function in war. It is necessary that at the outbreak of hostilities the military head should assume the direction of and responsibility for the conduct of military operations for whose preparation he has had by law no direct control nor authority to coordinate in peace. Such is the system we work under to-day, and did at the outbreak of the war. Thanks to the voluntary cooperation of every district departmental organization, including the Secretary, the Navy was able to pull itself together and to work exceedingly well in war.

"If any lack of preparation existed within the Naval Service prior to our entry into the war, if any lack of harmony existed then or exists now within our Navy, it can be laid more justly to the system of organization the department labors under than upon the shoulders of any individual."

That is a quotation from your testimony?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would appear from this that the organization of the Navy Department prior to the World War was by no means perfect and should be changed. Is that your opinion?

Capt. PRATT. That is, sir. I think the organization is not fitted to conduct war efficiently.

The CHAIRMAN. And also prior to our going into the war?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the general plan of organization proposed by the Mahan-Moody Commission and the Swift Board and the aid system, all of which sought to coordinate departmental agencies under the Secretary?

t. PRATT. It looks to me as though we had given advance

CHAIRMAN. And we could have laid down any program we d without its constituting an overt act?

t. PRATT. I should think so.

CHAIRMAN. You have said in your statement:

behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people, ed through the proper authorities, that they desire and will declare war within n specified limit of time, and that within this limit of time they will give, the proper channels, to their military leaders the power and means to so and organize that at the appointed time these organizations may strike.

you tell me exactly what that means? Do you think that ess should declare war one year from date?

t. PRATT. Well, of course not; but take the history, compare istory of the British Empire and the German Empire. The an Empire does not say she is going to declare war, but a few se who are on the inside probably know that that is exactly they are preparing for, and when that spirit exists and when iver exists in the hands of the ruler or the heads to bring that to pass, it is an easy matter to determine when and how you rike. Now, they have never been able, so far as I know, to do n Great Britain, and the history of our past wars, I think, bears irly well the fact that we are never quite ready at the begin-

We do not want to have that power. It is fundamentally a f the spirit.

CHAIRMAN. But you state that "behind all these details there be the determination of a united people." That could take in ountry, could it not?

t. PRATT. Oh, yes.

CHAIRMAN. And you continue, "expressed through the proper rities." What would that mean in the case of this country?

t. PRATT. You gentlemen have a deciding head.

CHAIRMAN. No; but I want you to explain to me just what lea means. Whom do you mean when you say "expressed gh the proper authorities"?

t. PRATT. I mean those authorities who have the right to e war.

CHAIRMAN. That is Congress?

t. PRATT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. And you say "that they desire and will declare ithin a certain specified limit of time." Say, one year?

t. PRATT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Then you would say that Congress should meet elare war within one year from a specified date?

t. PRATT. Let me explain what I mean by that. Let us start out with a nation in peace. We see that certain acts are being itted against us, because I do not think that the spirit of this y would ever permit us to say, "We will plan deliberately to e the territory of some country or to commit aggressive acts t her." But let us say that things have been running on to pass that we feel that we must, to support our honor, do cer-efinite things which amount or lead to war. Then, if we want thoroughly prepared, so that we strike at once, there must be horough understanding between all the Government depart-

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know of any principle of international law that would forbid a nation to increase its navy if it saw fit?

Capt. PRATT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Without committing an act against neutrality?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I think it is perfectly legitimate, unless the increase is so evidently directed at a particular country that you can not avoid having that country make a protest.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Captain, as a student of international law, even in such a case you would not say that there was any rule of international law prohibiting it, would you?

Capt. PRATT. No; you are quite right; not in defense, but as an aggressive act there might be some question.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an aggressive act simply to prepare and to build? The aggressive act would come afterwards, would it not, in using the prepared Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Well, let me perhaps note a difference. If Germany had built a navy and had created military forces sufficient to have guarded her own boundaries, no one could protest at that; but if she were to build up a military organization which she is evidently planning to use for some specific purpose, that I believe is going beyond the strict rights of a neutral nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would say in every case that the building of a naval program should be practically agreed to by all friendly nations?

Capt. PRATT. By no means.

The CHAIRMAN. Or by any friendly nation?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no. We have a perfect right to lay our cards right on the table and say what we will do. If we have made a statement to the effect that we will use everything in our power to preserve our rights of neutrality, then I believe we have a right to increase our power just so far as we will, if we have given advance notice of what we are going to do, to protect ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, you would not have to give any advance notice at all. We have a perfect right to do anything we want to do in the line of building, and if another nation did not like it they could protest or not as they saw fit; but it is not an overt act, an act of war, is it?

Capt. PRATT. As I said before, I draw the line between preparation for defense and preparation which oversteps the mark and becomes an aggressive act. I suppose that is a hypothetical question, is it not; that is, it is one of these questions where you are assuming two countries at peace?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am assuming the state of affairs that existed before we went into the war.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, that is a little different, I think. Under those circumstances I think we had given ample notice to the effect that we would protect our neutrality to the utmost. It seems to me that we had very frequently stated so, and that being the case, I see no reason why we could not have——

The CHAIRMAN. Laid down any plans of a building program we wanted?

Capt. PRATT. It looks to me as though we had given advance notice.

The CHAIRMAN. And we could have laid down any program we wanted without its constituting an overt act?

Capt. PRATT. I should think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You have said in your statement:

But behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people, expressed through the proper authorities, that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time, and that within this limit of time they will give, through the proper channels, to their military leaders the power and means to so prepare and organize that at the appointed time these organizations may strike.

Can you tell me exactly what that means? Do you think that Congress should declare war one year from date?

Capt. PRATT. Well, of course not; but take the history, compare the history of the British Empire and the German Empire. The German Empire does not say she is going to declare war, but a few of those who are on the inside probably know that that is exactly what they are preparing for, and when that spirit exists and when the power exists in the hands of the ruler or the heads to bring that spirit to pass, it is an easy matter to determine when and how you will strike. Now, they have never been able, so far as I know, to do that in Great Britain, and the history of our past wars, I think, bears out fairly well the fact that we are never quite ready at the beginning. We do not want to have that power. It is fundamentally a case of the spirit.

The CHAIRMAN. But you state that "behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people." That could take in this country, could it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you continue, "expressed through the proper authorities." What would that mean in the case of this country?

Capt. PRATT. You gentlemen have a deciding head.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but I want you to explain to me just what the idea means. Whom do you mean when you say "expressed through the proper authorities"?

Capt. PRATT. I mean those authorities who have the right to declare war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Congress?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say "that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time." Say, one year?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would say that Congress should meet and declare war within one year from a specified date?

Capt. PRATT. Let me explain what I mean by that. Let us start right out with a nation in peace. We see that certain acts are being committed against us, because I do not think that the spirit of this country would ever permit us to say, "We will plan deliberately to absorb the territory of some country or to commit aggressive acts against her." But let us say that things have been running on to such a pass that we feel that we must, to support our honor, do certain definite things which amount or lead to war. Then, if we want to be thoroughly prepared, so that we strike at once, there must be that thorough understanding between all the Government depart-

ments and the authorities who can declare war, so that there will be no indecision on the part of the Navy or the Army as to exactly what steps they must take to get ready, and those who provide the funds must give the funds for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not mean that they must declare war at any future time, or state that they intend to declare war?

Capt. PRATT. No; they must have such a thorough understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, a secret understanding. An open understanding would give too much information to the enemy, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. An open understanding would; but I would rather do it in the open, myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what would happen under an open understanding, that the enemy with whom we proposed to fight, if we gave her a year's notice that we were preparing, would fight at a certain time?

Capt. PRATT. I have mentioned that contingency, or indirectly mentioned it once before, that to prepare ourselves I think our fleet must be so strong and so well prepared that we, behind it, can always develop our full power to wage war.

The CHAIRMAN. But even at that, the year's notice would give the other side quite an opportunity to get ready.

Capt. PRATT. You should not have a year's notice with the fleet. The fleet should be always ready.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I say a year's notice of your intention to declare war. It is rather an interesting idea. I wanted you to develop it, that is all.

Capt. PRATT. I understand; it is an interesting idea. Now, a great many people thought Germany was going to declare war. It was talked of abroad, and yet she went right on building up, and Great Britain had not increased her army, with all the warning she had. Her fleet was always ready, but the rest of her military resources were still undeveloped when she went into the war. That has been her history, and I think that is liable to be our history.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the World War there was no country that intended to make war or that gave notice through their proper authorities that they were to go to war, was there? Germany had a date fixed, but she did not make it public?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, that is true. I do not mean we should make our own dates public. I mean that if you want to have the Navy and the Army ready to go to war, it is not necessary for you to openly say so, but you have got to thoroughly understand that that is what you intend to do.

The CHAIRMAN. But this does not say to have your Army and Navy ready, necessarily. It says, "that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time." That is more than having their army and navy ready for defense.

Was Germany's submarine campaign developed in 1915 and 1916 sufficiently to indicate to naval experts the general lines along which preparations to meet it should be made?

Capt. PRATT. I do not believe I can answer that question definitely, because we had to learn as war progressed exactly how we would meet the necessity?

Capt. PRATT. And then the three of us who were in the planning department just went at it.

The CHAIRMAN. And made these memoranda that you have already referred to in your testimony?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, from our general knowledge of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. But there was no specific plan that finally went to the Secretary for his approval?

Capt. PRATT. Not that I know of. I have never seen one.

The CHAIRMAN. Did all of the bureaus know exactly what to do and how to expend the money wisely, as soon as war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. I can not answer that question, because I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be part of the general plan, would not it?

Capt. PRATT. It should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want to take up the question of the sending of the letter by Admiral Sims. This letter was an official communication, was it not, from the admiral to the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. You mean the letter

The CHAIRMAN. The letter of January 7, 1920.

Capt. PRATT. I suppose it was.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is no question about that.

Capt. PRATT. I think there is no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was brought out at the request of the subcommittee on Naval Awards.

Capt. PRATT. I believe that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And was not made public by Admiral Sims except at the request of the subcommittee?

Capt. PRATT. I understand that is so.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no criticism in the letter, so far as you know, of the Navy itself or any officer of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I have read it carefully and I do not see any criticism.

The CHAIRMAN. But he does point out the magnificent achievements of the Navy during the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I will correct that by saying no person by name; but of course there is a criticism of certain operations of the war which naturally reflects upon the officer in charge of operations; it is no personal mention of anyone by name.

The CHAIRMAN. And he speaks specifically about the fine work that was done by the Navy after the department had organized and things were running along properly?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he speaks of that.

The CHAIRMAN. And what he finds fault with principally is the faulty principle of organization in the Navy, the lack of preparation, the indecision and procrastination by the department, which prevented officers from quickly using ships, men, and material against the enemy? I am simply asking you to see whether this is your idea of the letter.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is my idea.

The CHAIRMAN. And he did not indulge in personalities, as you say?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. And was not the purpose of the letter to insure a better national security by preventing a future repetition of the errors and delays of 1916?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir. I know nothing about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Either the department or Congress?

Capt. PRATT. I know nothing about that, sir, because I did not come into the office at all in any active degree until after February, 1917. I had never been on duty in Washington before.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the plan submitted by Capt. Laning to Admiral Benson after the outbreak of the war?

Capt. PRATT. A plan about what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. A general plan—war plan?

Capt. PRATT. No. Capt. Laning was in Admiral McKean's department. He would know about that. He can answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know about that, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about any plan of Capt. Laning that Admiral Benson referred to Capt. Schofield to be amplified?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not recall any.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the office of operations have a plan when you went in as aid—a war plan?

Capt. PRATT. We had a number of plans which we evolved as it became necessary. If that means a basic plan, such a plan is of more use in preparing themselves for the war than it is for actually carrying war on, because the basic plan had to be altered continually as the conditions change.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no particular base plan that was altered as conditions changed?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir, not that I was familiar with.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not the law give to the Bureau of Operations the responsibility of preparing plans for war? Or, if you do not want to use the word "responsibility", is not that a part of the duty of the Bureau of Operations under the act of Congress?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it is; and that is just exactly one of the points that I have never been able to quite settle in my mind. The general board is responsible for plans. The Office of Operations is responsible for plans. And there was not any real planning section in Operations; and that is why I say there is something the matter with the system.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, regardless of the general board or of what they should have done, should not Operations have had its plans, also?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, we should have had a planning section.

The CHAIRMAN. You did have a planning section.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, but it was a pretty small one.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the first general plan that Operations got out and put up to the Secretary for his approval?

Capt. PRATT. I personally do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the first one that you know anything about?

Capt. PRATT. The first thing that I know anything about was, as I said, this letter of February 10th, written by Capt. Chase and asking the general board to prepare a plan or to modify the original plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That was lost, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. That was lost.

The CHAIRMAN. The plan that was made was lost.

Capt. PRATT. And then the three of us who were in the planning department just went at it.

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Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is my idea.

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Capt. PRATT. No, sir; he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. And was not the purpose of the letter to insure a greater national security by preventing a future repetition of the errors and delays of 1916?

Capt. PRATT. I have always accepted that myself as being the reason of the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that the admiral had the right to address such a letter to the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I think he had a perfect right to address it to the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Navy Department the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; the Navy Department is the controlling head of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is possible to criticize the department without criticizing the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Might not the Navy Department or the Secretary of the Navy who rules the policies of the department prevent preparedness and prevent quick action in time of war if he saw fit to do so?

Capt. PRATT. I think, under the present system, it would be possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Might not a criticism of the Navy Department and its policies be a defense of the Navy, and the defense of its officers, against the possible charge of neglect on their part to prepare and act promptly?

Capt. PRATT. I suppose it could be looked at in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Then where can you find any justification in the charge that has been made by certain of the witnesses who have come before us, that Admiral Sims had attacked the good name of the Navy or reflected upon its officers, when he merely points out the defects and errors of organization and administration of the Navy Department?

Capt. PRATT. Of course this is my opinion only.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is what I want.

Capt. PRATT. I feel that had he omitted that accusation which I pointed out as a grave one, that the Navy was responsible for the loss of so many ships and so many lives, there would not have been so much feeling aroused in the service. I can not help feeling that that was a loose statement.

The CHAIRMAN. If he had said "The Navy Department," would that have changed that, in your opinion?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; because after all, we can not draw a line between the Navy Department and the rest of the Navy. We want to be one big service and we want to work thoroughly as a band of brothers; so that if you are going to draw a line of demarkation between the Navy Department and the Navy proper, there will always be lack of harmony.

The CHAIRMAN. But might the Navy not be itself all on tenter-hooks, ready to do anything that they could, and the Department hold them back?

Capt. PRATT. Of course that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. In which case the men of the Navy who were ready would not be to blame, but the Department, who controlled its policy and held them back, would be responsible?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; if the Department held them back, that state of affairs would be true, naturally.

the CHAIRMAN. When you came in, who seemed to be the leading person in the department, the Secretary, or Admiral Benson, or who? Capt. PRATT. Why, the Secretary must always be the head; and he should or ought to be guided by the advice that the Chief of Naval Operations would give him. Now, just to what extent he influenced the Secretary, I could not say.

the CHAIRMAN. When the question came up of acting, was it really the Secretary that inspired action, or some officer of the department?

Capt. PRATT. To act as an inspiration requires a great deal of inventive genius, and one must have a great deal of imagination to see these things. A departmental organization may be very good and may run along well; but the heads have got to be free to look along broader lines. I have felt that if there was a lack, if there might be a lack of a broader point of view, it is due to a system which puts a great many of the details upon the responsible heads, not giving them time enough to take up the broader point of view. I think that was the failing, perhaps is the failing to-day of the Government, very much as ex-Secretary Lane has expressed it. I think his criticism of the departmental organizations in Washington is very true, and that we all labored under—at least the department of the Navy labored under—certain disadvantages which he has set out.

the CHAIRMAN. I hope that in the plan you are going to submit that you will go into that question for future reference.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I have outlined it. I have not discussed it very much, but simply to arrive at a decision; but I will embody

the CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the statement of the Secretary of the Navy in his report for 1918, that the Navy was prepared from stem to stern when war was declared, was justified?

Capt. PRATT. That, I think, would be more in the nature of a question of speech. No; as a naval man, having to handle an organization, say, to go out and fight the next day, I would hardly say that we were fit from stem to stern.

the CHAIRMAN. Was the Navy ready for war, would you say, as far as personnel, when war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. Not the way I would like to see it.

the CHAIRMAN. In the early stages of the war, were our operations ever delayed because of lack of personnel, or material conditions of the ships—poor material conditions of the ships?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I do not know, between April 6 and June 25, before that date I was not held up; but before that date Capt. Chase and Admiral Benson would have to speak for themselves, whether personnel and material held the sailing of the ships up. I do not know, between April 6 and June 25. But I was not held up for lack of personnel after that, to an extent that prohibited our operating.

the CHAIRMAN. But it would necessarily change the form of your operations, if you were short of personnel, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. It was necessary to make adjustments with personnel.

the CHAIRMAN. Now, if there was a lack of preparedness in personnel when the war started, whose fault was that?

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you the other day a question more or less of this same kind, and I think you stated that there were rumors about the matter, but you did not state what sort of rumors. Can you tell me what sort of rumors were around?

Capt. PRATT. Why, the Secretary has not always been popular in the service, and it is rumored that he has held up papers, and lost them. Admiral Benson is not altogether popular with many people, and you could hear those rumors; and I can not recall now, but I know such rumors existed. But for me to state as a fact that those things existed——

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask you as a fact. I asked you if there was a general feeling in the department about the matter?

Capt. PRATT. I can not say that the feeling is general. I simply know that the things I have stated have been spoken of.

The CHAIRMAN. And you prefer not to answer the question whether there was a general feeling?

Capt. PRATT. Because I do not know that. It seemed to me that within the department the feeling was more or less cordial. It is outside of the department more than inside that that feeling existed. I thought.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a question of cordiality. It was simply a question of fact, as to whether matters were being held up, and preparedness was going along slowly.

Capt. PRATT. That is just what I tried to confine myself to, is the question of fact. I was not, as I said, thrown into contact with the Secretary until I became Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and I tried to think up some cases where he had held me up, and he never held me up.

Senator TRAMMELL. Mr. Chairman, I think if you are going to inquire into rumors, or insist on his stating about rumors, he ought to be permitted to say what his own experience was and what his own idea was so far as his connection with the department himself was.

The CHAIRMAN. He has already done that. I have no objection in the world.

Senator TRAMMELL. I thought you objected to it. You said that it was not a matter of cordiality, congeniality, or courtesy at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That was purely explanatory.

Senator TRAMMELL. There is as much in courtesy and congeniality and cordiality as there is in rumors. Rumors are mighty bad things. If all rumors were true, all of us would be in the penitentiary, instead of being on this committee, I expect. I think I would.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, as far as you know, prior to your going in as aid for Operations, the Secretary was acting with the wisdom and foresight and force of a great executive?

Capt. PRATT. I would not say that, either. I will say I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. When you came in did you find any feeling in the Bureau of Operations that indicated a failure of the secretary to realize the necessity of acting forcibly and quickly in an emergency?

Capt. PRATT. No; I am ignorant about that. Admiral Benson would not discuss with me those things; and he, of course, is the one man who knows just whether things were held up or whether they were not, and he would not discuss that with me.



The CHAIRMAN. When you came in, who seemed to be the leading spirit in the department, the Secretary, or Admiral Benson, or who?

Capt. PRATT. Why, the Secretary must always be the head; and he must or ought to be guided by the advice that the Chief of Naval Operations would give him. Now, just to what extent he influenced the Secretary, I could not say.

The CHAIRMAN. When the question came up of acting, was it generally the Secretary that inspired action, or some officer of the department?

Capt. PRATT. To act as an inspiration requires a great deal of creative genius, and one must have a great deal of imagination to foresee these things. A departmental organization may be very sound and may run along well; but the heads have got to be free to work along broader lines. I have felt that if there was a lack, if there might be a lack of a broader point of view, it is due to a system which throws a great many of the details upon the responsible heads, not leaving them time enough to take up the broader point of view. I think that was the failing, perhaps—is the failing to-day—of the system, very much as ex-Secretary Lane has expressed it. I think that his criticism of the departmental organizations in Washington is very true, and that we all labored under—at least the department of the Navy labored under—certain disadvantages which he has set forth.

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The CHAIRMAN. But it would necessarily change the form of your operations, if you were short of personnel, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. It was necessary to make adjustments with personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if there was a lack of preparedness in personnel when the war started, whose fault was that?

Capt. PRATT. As the system of organization stands to-day, the Secretary is responsible, sharing a degree of responsibility with whomsoever advises him to commit himself to a policy of inadequate personnel. I consider that any naval officer that advised the Secretary that it was efficient to have an insufficient personnel, must be held responsible for the advise he gives.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not lay the responsibility to Congress provided the Secretary had not put the matter up to them?

Capt. PRATT. I can not see how Congress is responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the department did everything that could have been done after Ambassador Bernstorff had been given his passports, to prepare the Navy, and up to the time war was declared on April 6, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know enough about that to want to say. I could only give opinions in the matter. Admiral Benson, who, of course, must know definitely, I think could state as to facts.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your opinion: that everything was done that could have been done to prepare the Navy between those dates?

Capt. PRATT. Why, of course, if a man wants to get in and drive, nothing is impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that a time to drive?

Capt. PRATT. If you ask me personally, I certainly would.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not think there was much driving?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Or do you think there was much driving?

Capt. PRATT. It seems to me that the facts pretty well speak for themselves; that if we had intended to immediately dispatch our destroyers abroad, we could have had them in material shape, thoroughly manned to the minute. That is not an impossible thing to do; and if it was not done, it is because steps were not taken to get them ready for it. It could have been done, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same with other operations, or possible operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think we could have had our cruisers manned; but the question of getting the yachts and the other submarine craft was more difficult. They had to be commandeered and fitted out. I think the delay in fitting them out was harder to overcome than any personnel delay. They are boats that are not adapted to war purposes, and have to be altered very materially, and guns put on them.

The CHAIRMAN. Should we not have had the personnel of the fleet trained so that we would not have had to break into them for armed guards, or so that after we had broken in they would still have had an adequate personnel on board?

Capt. PRATT. If we had had enough personnel in the Navy, it would not have been necessary to have broken into the fleet. We could have drawn the armed guard from other sources, which was done to some extent later. We drew the armed guard from shore bases as well as from the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any time in the early stages of the war when there was a lack of funds to provide types of vessels that were needed against submarines, after we had gone into the war?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that. I did not handle funds. What is that? Was there any lack of funds?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any lack of funds in the early stages of the war to provide types of vessels that were needed against submarines? You say you do not know?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know. I think Admiral McKean can look that up.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know, either directly or indirectly, of any attitude of the Secretary of the Navy or any other Navy Department official that in any way tended to reduce the possible efficiency of the Navy in carrying on the war?

Capt. PRATT. Why, no; when we got into the war it seemed to me that the desire to wage it successfully was just as strong as the desire to keep out of war before we got it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you have said that owing to previous lack of material and personnel it was not possible to place the naval forces in the war zone ready to operate as soon as desired. Who was responsible for this lack of preparation that rendered our forces incapable of quick action?

Capt. PRATT. The Secretary, of course, was the responsible head.

The CHAIRMAN. And had we no warning, you say, of war?

Capt. PRATT. Why, when you send an ambassador out of the country, that is always to my mind warning enough.

The CHAIRMAN. And also the sinking of the *Lusitania* was in the nature of a warning, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You also say that neither the organization nor the administration of the department was such that it lent itself to efficient handling of a great war at the beginning. Why was the organization and administration defective?

Capt. PRATT. I think I have explained that in the last part of my prepared statement. It was principally due, to my mind, to the lack of a coordinating military head upon whom definite responsibility is placed.

The CHAIRMAN. And who was responsible for that?

Capt. PRATT. The laws under which the department was organized.

The CHAIRMAN. And if the plan that was put up to Congress and which was finally enacted into law had been left as it was put up, with the responsibility on the Chief of Operations, would not that have been remedied?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it would have helped a great deal.

The CHAIRMAN. So, if we had made an attempt to anticipate the war, the organization and the administration of the department would have been made ready to function?

Capt. PRATT. I think so, for this reason. The military head, say the Chief of Naval Operations, makes a definite study, or he has his studies submitted to him. He goes to the Secretary and he says, "Mr. Secretary, it is absolutely necessary that we do certain things." Then if the Secretary does not agree to that, he assumes that responsibility himself, and it is nothing more than proper for the Chief of Naval Operations to say, "I must leave, sir—leave office—and you must find another man." That, of course, would bring an immediate show-down, which is what is needed under all such cases.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that in order to make our organization effective under conditions as they were in the war, the entire building program would have had to be

more regular officers and more of the regular enlisted men in proportion than the other types in the service were.

The CHAIRMAN. That was at the commencement of the war?

Capt. PRATT. At the very commencement. Of course it was also true, in fact, because our cruisers were not manned, and older battleships were not fully manned, and his vessels as they came over to him were fully manned, and throughout the war he had trained officers and men in proportion to the other types in service than existed elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. After Admiral Mayo's forces came north of the West Indies in 1917, was it not necessary to take nearly one-third of the officers and many of the men out of each of the battleships and man other vessels?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know the proportion, but it was necessary to take quite a number of the officers and men out of the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. That made the battleship force unreadiness for battle, did it not?

Capt. PRATT. They were not in the pink of condition, of course, after the trained officers and men were taken from them.

The CHAIRMAN. And such a condition should not be allowed to exist in the future, should it?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; it is not wise to allow a condition of that sort to exist?

The CHAIRMAN. After the *Lusitania* was sunk, would you say that it would have been common prudence to man the ships of the Navy and mobilize the fleet in the Atlantic in 1916?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I would like to have seen it done.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary give instructions to operate so far as you know, in 1916, to mobilize the fleet?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Or to prepare the Navy for war?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, sir. I was not in the department at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary, to your knowledge, ever suggest to himself or urge others to exert themselves to prepare for war when war was practically upon us, so far as you know?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not, so far as you know?

Capt. PRATT. He did not; and neither could I say that he did not. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not an efficient air service important?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we have it?

Capt. PRATT. We did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not such a service have been of great value against submarines in protecting our coast and fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Better than protecting our coast and fleet. If we had had it we could have sent them abroad immediately, wherever they were needed. We did not need much on this point. The place for all antisubmarine craft——

The CHAIRMAN. Was on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Was on the other side, with very, very few exceptions. We were called upon through agreements with the Ar-

ain a few antisubmarine craft on this side. We had to do even though they would have been tactically more efficient on the other side. That is because it was not——

CHAIRMAN. You do not think that we ever had to make preparation for submarines on this side?

MR. PRATT. No, I do not think we needed to worry very much about that at all, except the question of being prepared for their attacks.

CHAIRMAN. What is that?

MR. PRATT. The mine layers; the mine laying submarines. That is the only effective operation which they performed on this side, the laying of mines on our coast. We lost quite a number of our ships by mines.

CHAIRMAN. That was the only thing we had to fear?

MR. PRATT. That was the only thing we needed to worry about, as submarines were concerned.

CHAIRMAN. And that was so at the beginning of the war; the thing that we needed to fear?

MR. PRATT. I looked upon that exactly the same way.

CHAIRMAN. If an efficient air service was urged by Admiral Clegg and the General Board in 1913, who was responsible for the fact that we did not have it in 1917?

MR. PRATT. I do not know that, sir. Admiral McKean says that he can answer that question.

CHAIRMAN. If the Secretary of the Navy cut the estimates \$13,000,000 as recommended, to \$2,000,000, would you not say that he was responsible rather than Congress?

MR. PRATT. Of course; he is the deciding authority. He must assume the responsibility for all cuts that he makes in appropriations.

CHAIRMAN. In your written statement you admitted that we were unprepared for war, and you stated that the German fleet, having been blockaded by the Grand Fleet, we were free to make preparations with little danger of attack, did you not?

MR. PRATT. I did not hear the last part of your question, Mr. Chairman, on account of the noise.

CHAIRMAN. In your original statement you admitted that we were unprepared for war. I can quote your statement if you would like to.

MR. PRATT. Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN. Do you want to have me quote it?

MR. PRATT. I made so many of them, I would like to know which you refer to. I made so many hypothetical statements.

CHAIRMAN. It is paragraph 10 of your statement. It reads as follows:

"Statement of fact in the paragraph correct, but the statement of the conclusion 'but without producing the desired result,' misleading and subject to question. It produced the desired effect at once and every effort was made to put naval forces desired in the war zone, but owing to our previous lack of preparation in material and personnel, it was not possible to place them at the front, and ready to use as soon as was desired. Nor was the organization or administration of the Government at home, such that it lent itself to the most efficient handling of a great war from the beginning."

Therefore I repeat that in your original statement you admitted, or not, that we were unprepared for war, and you stated that the German fleet having been blockaded by the Grand Fleet, we were free to make preparations with little danger of attack, did you not?

more regular officers and more of the regular enlisted men in proportion than the other types in the service were.

The CHAIRMAN. That was at the commencement of the war?

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The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary, to your knowledge, ever exert himself or urge others to exert themselves to prepare for war until war was practically upon us, so far as you know?

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Capt. PRATT. Better than protecting our coast and fleet. If we had had it we could have sent them abroad immediately. That is where they were needed. We did not need much on this coast. The place for all antisubmarine craft——

The CHAIRMAN. Was on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Was on the other side, with very, very few exceptions. We were called upon through agreements with the Army to



CHAIRMAN. But it would have been imprudent, would it not, to withdraw many destroyers from the Grand Fleet for other reasons in view of the fact that the German fleet might come out at any time to attack?

C. PRATT. No. You have got to adjust and veer and haul. I think the British commander in chief would like to keep a number of ships which would insure him superiority over the German fleet type for type; but in war that is an impossible condition. He has got to be satisfied, I think, with a 60 per cent superiority; so that if the British has 60 per cent and the other man has 40 per cent, right straight away, when you size up the fleet as a whole he has got to be satisfied to engage. No matter how much he would like to have held his own with all of them--with the fleet, the Admiralty, of course, had to make its estimate of the situation and require that the Grand Fleet keep certain destroyers. Undoubtedly they endeavored to have the destroyers operate in purely antisubmarine movements as close to the Grand Fleet as possible, in order that they would always be in position to meet any lines with reference to the German fleet; that is, if the German fleet came out the British destroyers operating as antisubmarine craft could, at a pinch, under hurry orders, join in with the British Grand Fleet. I can not conceive of any other way in which they would get the requisite number of destroyers in case of action to cope with 198 of the Germans.

CHAIRMAN. But, at least, would you not think that they ought to keep as many as they could on hand to cope with them?

C. PRATT. Oh, yes; of course they should do that.

CHAIRMAN. And if you had been in command of the British fleet you would have been very loath, in view of possible attacks by the German fleet, to let any of them go?

C. PRATT. Yes, naturally. That is the commander in chief's

CHAIRMAN. Did not the destroyers of the Grand Fleet afford protection to our battleship division and to the North Sea mine operation also?

C. PRATT. Yes; to the mine barrage and also in convoy work. They operated there wherever they could. The Grand Fleet protected the Norwegian convoys that went across. The protection was usually by a division of battleships and a certain number of screening cruisers, and also screening destroyers had to go out with them so that to a certain extent they did operate against the submarines.

CHAIRMAN. I can not see, Captain, how you can justify the statement that you made in your testimony on Friday, that in view of the fact that the Grand Fleet was the main defense of the world against the victory of the German fleet, the destroyers of the Grand Fleet should have been used elsewhere.

C. PRATT. No; I did not exactly put it that way. I put it this way. We only held back on this coast, of destroyers, some 5 or 6 of the big ones, and a few of the smaller ones, and I put it this way. The submarine menace was so great, why, the British Grand Fleet, of course, would have had to have sacrificed 9 or 10, and they have done it.

CHAIRMAN. That was late in the season of 1917?

Capt. PRATT. Not so very late. We got our destroyers over submitted a table showing the time we got them over. Our destroyers were really the very first craft to go over there, and we got destroyers over there when we had nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. We had some destroyers; yes.

Capt. PRATT. I have given the exact figures. I could read over again. Those dates show that the destroyers went over early.

The CHAIRMAN. They, of course, did not sail immediately April 6, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. No; I think six of them arrived during the first days of May.

The CHAIRMAN. May 4?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; six of them got there.

The CHAIRMAN. And 24 of them had arrived before the end of May?

Capt. PRATT. I had the exact figures and gave them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they arrived June 11.

Capt. PRATT. The point I made was that the British always maintained the balance of power, and could have adjusted their destroyer effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that possibly has already been put in.

Capt. PRATT. That has already been put in; yes, sir. That is better than any opinion, exactly what we did, and the tables show the dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your idea is that the British could have sent their destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; could, and I think would have done it, in that situation had impressed them as being sufficiently grave to warrant it. I do not believe that the commander-in-chief of the grand fleet would have hesitated to go out into action, with the superiority of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers and light cruisers and flotilla leaders that he had. I do not think that he would have hesitated for one moment.

The CHAIRMAN. With very few destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he would not have hesitated even with a few destroyers. He had the Germans right where he wanted them. Their morale had been pretty well shattered by that time, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but the testimony of some of the witnesses I think, has shown that in the spring of 1918 the Navy was looking for a great offensive on the part of the German Navy, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. We were looking for an offensive.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was after the date that you say we had their morale pretty well broken?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; but the fact remains that they never accepted it.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they did not.

Capt. PRATT. All that is, to my mind, rather conclusive evidence that the German morale had been pretty well shot to pieces at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. But of course that was not known at that time.

Capt. PRATT. No; it was not known; but the Germans ran, at Jutland. They turned tail and went in and never came out afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it was better to bunch our available destroyers at Queenstown and along the French coast than to put them in service with the mine-laying fleet?

. PRATT. Oh, yes; that was wise. I think, to keep them at town and those other ports.

CHAIRMAN. And the best policy of cooperation did not demand they be scattered?

. PRATT. I think it was best to keep them together.

CHAIRMAN. You have stated that because we furnished only one-seventeenth of the antisubmarine craft operating in European waters, our influence in downing the submarine and in shortening the war was very inconsiderable?

. PRATT. Did I say inconsiderable?

CHAIRMAN. Very inconsiderable in proportion to what they did.

. PRATT. Well, our forces were inconsiderable in comparison with theirs.

CHAIRMAN. But you think that our coming in had a very considerable effect on it, do you?

. PRATT. No, sir; our entering the war had considerably more

CHAIRMAN. I mean on the submarine situation.

. PRATT. Oh, it had more effect than an actual comparison of forces would show. It had a very appreciable material effect and was one of the contributing causes toward helping to down the submarine. Our destroyers, ship for ship, were in better shape, I think, than the British.

CHAIRMAN. You think that the mere size of the reinforcement determines its influence?

. PRATT. No, sir; I do not think it does.

CHAIRMAN. Do you not think, for instance, if you had two teams that were practically even in strength, and one team had an extra man, it would make a difference?

. PRATT. It makes a great deal of difference.

CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that would make a great deal of difference--much more than one-twelfth?

. PRATT. Of course, it would; and I will tell you the reason I drew that just exactly as I did. It was because Admiral Sims in his original paper had laid so much stress on all the types that we have put in--submarines and yachts and all antisubmarine craft. So I treated the matter very much in the same manner as he treated it.

CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that if we could have thrown our destroyers and gunboats and antisubmarine craft that were not available, or that might be available if they had been thoroughly concentrated, in April, 1917, at the critical time, into the war over there, they would have contributed greatly to the moral effect?

. PRATT. The moral effect?

CHAIRMAN. Toward the ending of the war?

. PRATT. The moral effect, I agree with you, would have been a greater factor than possibly the material increase.

CHAIRMAN. And the moral effect is to be reckoned with, is it?

. PRATT. It is one of the strongest things you have to reckon with in war.

CHAIRMAN. Were all of the 1,700 British and allied destroyers and antisubmarine craft employed in British waters or along our coast in France?

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Capt. PRATT. I had the exact figures and gave them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they arrived June 11.

Capt. PRATT. The point I made was that the British always held the balance of power, and could have adjusted their destroyer efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that possibly has already been put in.

Capt. PRATT. That has already been put in; yes, sir. That shows better than any opinion, exactly what we did, and the tables show the dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your idea is that the British could have used their destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; could, and I think would have done it, if the situation had impressed them as being sufficiently grave to warrant it. I do not believe that the commander-in-chief of the grand fleet would have hesitated to go out into action, with the superiority of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers and light cruisers and flotilla leaders that he had. I do not think that he would have hesitated for one moment.

The CHAIRMAN. With very few destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he would not have hesitated even with few destroyers. He had the Germans right where he wanted them. He had their morale pretty well shattered by that time, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but the testimony of some of the witnesses, I think, has shown that in the spring of 1918 the Navy was looking for a great offensive on the part of the German Navy, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. We were looking for an offensive.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was after the date that you say we had their morale pretty well broken?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; but the fact remains that they never projected it.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they did not.

Capt. PRATT. All that is, to my mind, rather conclusive evidence that the German morale had been pretty well shot to pieces at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. But of course that was not known at that time!

Capt. PRATT. No; it was not known; but the Germans ran, after Jutland. They turned tail and went in and never came out afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it was better to bunch our available destroyers at Queenstown and along the French coast in places rather than to put them in service with the mine-laying force?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; that was wise. I think, to keep them at Greenstown and those other ports.

The CHAIRMAN. And the best policy of cooperation did not demand that they be scattered?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was best to keep them together.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that because we furnished only one-seventeenth of the antisubmarine craft operating in European waters, our influence in downing the submarine and in shortening the war was very inconsiderable?

Capt. PRATT. Did I say inconsiderable?

The CHAIRMAN. Very inconsiderable in proportion to what the Germans did.

Capt. PRATT. Well, our forces were inconsiderable in comparison with theirs.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think that our coming in had a very considerable effect on it, do you?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; our entering the war had considerably more effect—

The CHAIRMAN. I mean on the submarine situation.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, it had more effect than an actual comparison of figures would show. It had a very appreciable material effect and is one of the contributing causes toward helping to down the submarine. Our destroyers, ship for ship, were in better shape, I think, than the British.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the mere size of the reinforcement always determines its influence?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not think it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think, for instance, if you had two football teams that were practically even in strength, and one team was given an extra man, it would make a difference?

Capt. PRATT. It makes a great deal of difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that would make a great deal of difference—much more than one-twelfth?

Capt. PRATT. Of course, it would; and I will tell you the reason why I drew that just exactly as I did. It was because Admiral Sims in his original paper had laid so much stress on all the types that we could have put in—submarines and yachts and all antisubmarine craft. So I treated the matter very much in the same manner as he treated it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that if we could have thrown all our destroyers and gunboats and antisubmarine craft that were available, or that might be available if they had been thoroughly repaired, in April, 1917, at the critical time, into the war over there, it would have contributed greatly to the moral effect?

Capt. PRATT. The moral effect?

The CHAIRMAN. Toward the ending of the war?

Capt. PRATT. The moral effect, I agree with you, would have been a stronger factor than possibly the material increase.

The CHAIRMAN. And the moral effect is to be reckoned with, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. It is one of the strongest things you have with in war.

The CHAIRMAN. Were all of the 1,700 British and allied antisubmarine craft employed in British waters and main line in France?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; they were scattered.

The CHAIRMAN. Throughout the Mediterranean, some of them, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Throughout the Mediterranean; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Something over 900 of them were along the British coast and in France, and 700 and some odd were in Mediterranean waters; so that if we had contributed these 100 antisubmarine vessels they would have been much more than one-seventeenth of the force that was around in British waters, operating in British waters and along the coast of France?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I only handled the subject that way because Admiral Sims handled it with us that way. He totaled up antisubmarine craft. A fairer comparison, of course, is destroyers against destroyers, because, after all, I believe the destroyer is the only real antisubmarine fighter. The experience of the war did not lead us to any particular confidence in the other types.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, destroyer against destroyer, in that particular zone, which was the zone of greatest importance to us, we had what proportion of the allied destroyer strength in that zone?

Capt. PRATT. I will have to do a little figuring on that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a very large proportion, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. We had 51 destroyers, and they had a great many; over 300 or 400, I should think. I could give the exact number.

The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred or 400 operating in that zone?

Capt. PRATT. In British and French waters, I should think.

The CHAIRMAN. Not counting destroyers that were with the Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I count those.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were adequately engaged on other duty. I am talking about destroyers that were engaged against the submarines.

Capt. PRATT. I think it is fair to consider all the figures.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you would say that our contribution toward the downing of the submarines in the Atlantic was greater than 1/17?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. I have made a few figures with regard to that, Mr. Chairman, roughly, and calculating what the efforts would be, at the ratios of destroyers, and destroyers alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give them?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. If we were to throw over 51 destroyers, the ratio of those 51 to the total French and British destroyers operating in the North Sea and the Atlantic in antisubmarine work alone, and exclusive of those with the Grand Fleet, the ratio would be about as 1 is to 4½.

If we included in this calculation the destroyers in the British Grand Fleet, that is, comparing totals with totals, it would be about as 1 is to 6.8.

Now, if out of those 51 we had to deduct the 9 which we were more or less obligated to keep to use in convoying our troopships, and had neglected screening our fleet at all, the ratios then would be about as 1 is to 6, or as 1 is to 8½; so that, comparing destroyers alone, the ratio is considerably less than 1 to 17.

The CHAIRMAN. And the destroyers are the most efficient vessels!

Capt. PRATT. By all means. Consider them the only real antisubmarine fighters.

The CHAIRMAN. Were only nine of our destroyers used to help protect our troops in going over?

Capt. PRATT. Only nine. As a matter of fact, the numbers that we had available were less than nine of the 750-ton craft. We used to use, as far as we could to piece out with, the 400-ton vessels on his side.

The CHAIRMAN. What other vessels did we use for the protection of the troops?

Capt. PRATT. We used the destroyers and our own submarines. We used to put our own submarines in convoy and let them tag on astern out of sight of the convoy, and we used them and the destroyers that we had.

The CHAIRMAN. And our battleships or cruisers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, the cruisers were as a raider guard. But they, of course, were not really protection against the submarine. I was speaking more of the antisubmarine arm. That is all we gave them.

The CHAIRMAN. But our naval vessels that were used for the protection of troops consisted of these nine or less destroyers and a few submarines?

Capt. PRATT. And our cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. And our cruisers. How many cruisers did we use for that?

Capt. PRATT. We used all of the *Denver* type and all of the armored cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not particularly valuable as against submarines?

Capt. PRATT. Not valuable at all against submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you say that was the major job that was done by the Navy during the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I can not help thinking so. You see, there is a difference between the convoy and the escort. When I say the major job, I refer to the chaps who handled our transports themselves, and went through the submarine zone day after day. They did not stop short of it. Our escort from this side stopped short of it, but the chaps with the convoy went through the submarine zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Armed guards?

Capt. PRATT. Not armed guards. On those ships, they were fully manned naval ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Fully manned naval ships?

Capt. PRATT. Fully manned naval ships. They consisted of the German liners that we took over, the *Leviathan* (the old *Vaterland*), and the *Mount Vernon*. They were manned from top to bottom with strict naval crews.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they frequently attacked?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know how frequently. The *Mount Vernon* was torpedoed.

The CHAIRMAN. On the return trip, however?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, on the return trip. Of course they would have preferred to take them on the trip over, because that would mean a loss of troops as well as the ship.

The CHAIRMAN. We lost none on the trip over?

Capt. PRATT. No, we lost none on the trip over. They were very well protected.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was a great record, of course.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1920.

**UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.**

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Ball?

Senator BALL. No.

Senator KEYES. I have none.

Senator TRAMMELL. Captain, there were some questions asked here yesterday in regard to rumors—unfavorable rumors, I judged—in regard to the Secretary of the Navy. I believe you stated that so far as your relations were concerned with the Secretary of the Navy, they were pleasant and agreeable. Now, as far as any facts that you had in your mind are concerned, did you give any particular importance to any of those rumors that you might have heard, so far as any facts that you knew of yourself personally?

Capt. PRATT. I think I can best answer that question by telling you exactly what I told the Secretary of the Navy. I said to him, "Mr. Daniels, I came into this office without knowing you, and you did not know me. You held a post. I regarded the post and not the man. As I have often told my chief, my loyalty is to the cause and not the man, and so long as he stands for the cause I am loyal to him."

I had no personal relations at all with the Secretary of the Navy until I acted as the relief of Admiral Benson when he went abroad, and my relations were entirely of an official character. When I put anything before him I presented it in a manner which possibly he signed it; that is as far as it goes.

As far as rumors are concerned, it has been my policy to cut them out. I do not listen to them.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is ordinarily a very wise policy. Is it not?

Capt. PRATT. I think it is the best thing for us all to do.

Senator TRAMMELL. Rumors do not amount to much, and more frequently they are falsehoods than they are truths. I did not attach any special importance to that. I have had men write

letters jumping on me in the newspapers, and they would not even sign their names; and yet that would be the basis for a rumor, perhaps; and then when you would answer it and challenge the fellow to come out in the open with his name, he would not do it.

You were asked some questions in regard to Admiral Sims's letter and I take it from the nature of the questions that they wanted to carry with them the idea that Admiral Sims's letter was entirely a criticism of the Secretary of the Navy and not of the Navy, drawing a distinction between the two. Did you so construe his letter?

Capt. PRATT. I must answer that exactly as I told my late chief, Admiral Benson; I accept the statement at its face value. I am not a partisan of Admiral Sims or of Admiral Benson or of the Secretary or of anyone. Admiral Sims said that letter meant a certain thing. On the face of it, of course it is a criticism; but I accept Admiral Sims's intent as he said it, as I would accept any other person's.

Senator TRAMMELL. When you consider the organization of the Navy Department and the procedure there in transacting the business of the department and of the Navy, does not his letter, if it is a criticism at all, reach further than the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Of course, such a thing might be, and an officer's language might be construed to reach further. I can not say what was in Admiral Sims's mind, and his intent. I think he sometimes is very impulsive—I know he is from my experience with him—and I think it was exceedingly impulsive of him to say that we were responsible for the loss of ships. What was in his mind when he wrote that letter I can not say.

Senator TRAMMELL. The reason I am asking you questions about that is that you were queried upon the same subject yesterday by the chairman of the committee. If Admiral Sims centered out the Secretary of the Navy and attempted to point out that he had been guilty of various and sundry mistakes, and intended to relieve all of the department heads and all of the Navy officers from any criticism whatever, what do you suppose prompted him and actuated him, if he was laboring in the interest of the service, in not pointing out mistakes of Navy officers as well as of the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I really think that the letter, as I think I stated in my testimony, was a drive directly at the office of Operations, of which Admiral Sims was a part. It seemed to me in reading his letter over that I found more the intent to criticize the office of Operations than the Secretary. I construed the letter, myself, as being a pretty general criticism. I do not think it was restricted to the Secretary of the Navy in particular, so far as I am concerned.

Senator TRAMMELL. The reason I am asking these questions, though, is that it looks a little as though some had construed the letter to be more a criticism of the Secretary of the Navy. If the Secretary of the Navy is responsible and answerable for all mistakes, and he is the one that the criticism is directed at in particular, would not the spirit of fairness give him the credit for all of the achievements of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is fair.

Senator TRAMMELL. I say, if that is true.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is fair.

Senator TRAMMELL. A spirit of fairness would give him the credit, if there were any accomplishments, if you are going to condemn him for all alleged mistakes. Of course, I do not entertain that idea. I



think that all of the Navy officers and heads of departments, etc., rendered a good service, and I think that the Secretary of the Navy rendered a good service. That is my view about it, from what we have heard before this committee.

You were asked the question whether the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian, was capable of preparing war plans--plans for naval battles. As a matter of fact, as far as any plans that might have been prepared, if they were prepared, do you know whether the Secretary of the Navy attempted to take the initiative in that, or did he leave the initiative to the naval officers in preparing and suggesting plans?

Capt. PRATT. I think that he expects the General Board to prepare plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, does not the record here disclose that he called upon the General Board to prepare plans, in a particular instance, at least?

Capt. PRATT. That is what they are there for.

The CHAIRMAN. February 17, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. I do not recall the date, quite.

Admiral McKEAN. The letter was February 4. The report was February 17.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is one particular instance. I do not mean that that is the only instance in which he might have called upon them, but that has been made specific mention of, indicating that the Secretary of the Navy was not attempting to assume that he would make out all of the technical military plans of operation, and so on.

Capt. PRATT. Why, of course not. I do not believe anybody expects the Secretary to make out detailed plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. You take it in your planning section. Did the Secretary of the Navy attempt to act in the rôle of the initiative power in connection with the plans, and all, that were projected through your planning section?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. He did not?

Capt. PRATT. He did not take any such steps. Those details could be rather out of his province. He would expect the planning section to attend to that.

Senator TRAMMELL. On the question of any lack of personnel, any existed at the outbreak of the war. I do not believe you stated to whom the responsibility was with, in regard to that; I mean, in regard to the facts in connection with it. Of course, technically speaking, I believe you stated that the Secretary of the Navy was responsible, but you did not attempt to state that the facts would indicate that he had not made an effort to increase the personnel.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know what attempts he made or did not make. That is none of my province. As the system of organization stands, we have not any actual military head who is responsible. The responsibility, in a degree, rests upon the Secretary, because he is the head. He is the head of a tremendous establishment. As a naval man, I consider that a man who wrongly criticizes him shares that responsibility, but you have got to get down to a more definite basis than that. The Secretary, no matter how wise a man he may be in his own particular affairs, must

SENATOR TRAMMELL. In dealing with the question the General Board makes recommendation, or it is the chief of the Bureau of Navigation makes recommendation seems that in 1915 the General Board suggested an increase in the personnel. This recommendation was considered by the Bureau of Navigation and the chief of the Bureau of Navigation stated that they had sufficient men and perhaps had a surplus, I think, of some 300 men. Now, the Secretary of the Navy might have accepted a report of the Bureau of Navigation and the views of the Bureau of Navigation division under which personnel came directly, would that that was a question of the Secretary of the Navy consulting with the naval officers, and not giving consideration to naval officers?

Capt. PRATT. Of course he did. That is just what he accepted the advice of Rear Admiral Blue, and another man who thought very much on the subject thought that was dead wrong.

SENATOR TRAMMELL. Now Admiral Sims or anybody else criticizes the question, certainly criticizes naval officers, criticizes the Secretary of the Navy, does he not?

Capt. PRATT. Of course he does, or should. He is responsible for the advice he gave, and he ought to be.

SENATOR TRAMMELL. Then in 1916 Rear Admiral Sims of the Bureau of Navigation, and he recommended an increase in personnel, and the Secretary of the Navy might have accepted him, possibly, two or three or four thousand; but he did not accept him, he cooperated with him in going before the committee, and got a very large increase in the personnel in 1916. Did they because they might have differed to the extent of 3,000 men? They agreed in the main, that the Secretary of the Navy

moniously, in the main, with the naval officers who were experts in their particular line, and were capable of giving technical literary advice? That is what I want to find out, as a matter of fact. Of course I think that he could do that in the main; that is my view. But I want to find out whether he did or he did not. There seems to be the opinion of some that he did not give any consideration, practically at all, or very little, to the Navy officers. Capt. PRATT. Naturally, I can not say what he did with Admiral Sims or Admiral Blue, or even my own chief, on personnel. I know that when I had a business proposition to put to him I got an answer.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is a matter of record, this matter I am discussing now, of personnel.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. It has been testified to here before this committee, and in the main I have been impressed with the fact that he is trying to cooperate with the Navy officers in the matter of rearing and building up the personnel of the Navy, beginning back 1915 and 1916. Of course, if he was not doing it, I would like to know, but that is the impression I have gotten—that he was doing it.

Capt. PRATT. I had no trouble with him.

Senator TRAMMELL. You testified more or less in regard to the attitude that was given to Admiral Sims, and the spirit of cooperation that you witnessed in regard to carrying on the operations with him. In your official connection there, did you know of any specific acts or any consequence where the Secretary of the Navy was attempting, you might say, interfere with his jurisdiction or his discretion in regard to matters that came under his command abroad?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; not after I came in the office in an executive capacity, June 25, 1917; I do not recall any specific instances now. Before that date, I should prefer to have Admiral Benson speak of it.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as your knowledge, then, Admiral Sims was given such latitude and such authority as seemed to be necessary and proper in the position which he was occupying, was that not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; in general, I think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was the impression I got from your testimony. I believe that in your direct testimony you disagreed with Admiral Sims that practically all of the operations should have been handled from London, did you not?

Capt. PRATT. If that was the intent of his letter.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. I must disagree. They could not have been handled in London entirely. Operations at the front must be handled in London, but there are a great many other operations which have to be handled and directed from the rear.

Senator TRAMMELL. The operations at the front were handled in London, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. In the main, yes. I think in certain minor instances may have interfered with him in the details of ships; but I do not regard those interferences, if such existed, to have been material. They might have been vexatious, but they were not material.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those interferences were largely caused on account of the officials here being more familiar with the question of the availability of ships, and probably having a more general knowledge of the entire situation than he had in London, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Some of them may have been, but I think in one or two instances we issued direct orders to ships that were over there, when it would have been wiser to have turned them over to him bodily and said to him, "Order them where you please." Those, however, are mistakes that are liable to happen under all conditions. I do not think they were very material.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those are mistakes that are liable to happen; just like Admiral Sims might occasionally have made a mistake in requesting something or requesting you people on this side to do something that you could not do or that you did not think it was advisable to do on account of probably having a more general knowledge of the entire situation than he had, are they not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, of course those things are liable to happen, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, I suppose little differences like that always arise in connection with the operations of war.

Capt. PRATT. It would be impossible to avoid them, I dare say.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those little mistakes or differences within themselves do not indicate any lack of intensity of a desire to proceed and accomplish results, do they? Nor do they indicate any lack of a general spirit to cooperate and harmonize, do they?

Capt. PRATT. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Because your particular branch of the service might have disagreed sometimes on matters of no such great importance, with Admiral Sims, did you construe that to mean that you were out of harmony, and that you were not trying to cooperate to the general end?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; I thought we were cooperating very successfully.

Senator TRAMMELL. I remember, in regard to one or two orders here, Admiral Sims said that the man who issued that order must never have seen the sea, and must never have been on a boat. If that order was issued at the suggestion of a naval officer, would not that kind of a criticism reach the naval officers as well as the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Why, of course it does; but whoever the naval officer was that that hit, he would regard that as one of Sims's hyperboles of speech.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am not after arousing antagonisms. I do not want to do that. But I want to show that Admiral Sims can not pick out the Secretary of the Navy and try to bombard him, without hitting a good many naval officers.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; sir. I think Sims hit me in that, and I rather regarded it as a joke. He and I never had any quarrels over that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think I have any further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, was not Admiral Sims's letter principally a criticism of the policies that were followed out by the department in relation to his recommendations?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. And in each case did not those policies have to be finally determined by the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

Senator BALL. Subject to his approval?

Capt. PRATT. Subject to his approval; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore he had the final say about the determination of the policy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, he must, as the head. I feel, though, that his naval advisers must share in any degree of criticism, if such criticism exists.

The CHAIRMAN. That may well be; but if the purpose of the letter was criticism so that improvement could be made in the future, would it not be the best policy to follow to criticise the one who had the final determination? As far as the individual acts of officers of the Navy may be concerned, what they had done was over, and there was no particular advantage one way or the other in blaming or not blaming these men. If, as I interpret it, the letter was constructed and was written for the purpose of improving matters in the Navy, what we would want to get at would be the cause of the failures, and not the individual acts of officers of the Navy. I think I am right, am I not?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely; that is what would be wanted; and the simplest and plainest exposition I believe is the best. A straight, honest way is always the best, no matter how direct it is.

The CHAIRMAN. And if the system proved faulty, and if a Secretary, under the then existing system, could tangle things up, would it not be well to revise the system.

Capt. PRATT. I think it would be right to revise the system.

The CHAIRMAN. And a letter that was written so as to improve matters in that respect would be a perfectly proper letter, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Without doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell asked you whether the Secretary had written to the Planning Section asking to have a plan made, and you referred to one letter from him dated February 10, I believe.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know whether the Secretary originated that letter or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a letter to the Planning Section of Operations or to the General Board?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir, I refer to —

The CHAIRMAN. Was to the General Board?

Capt. PRATT (continuing). The letter of February 10 was prepared by Capt. Chase, was signed by the Secretary, and was to the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, then that was the letter the answer to which was lost?

Capt. PRATT. That is the letter the answer to which was lost.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it is not very material. If he did write such a letter to the General Board, apparently there was nothing done about it?

Capt. PRATT. They submitted an answer which has disappeared.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was not used?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no. I did not use it, and I do not know of any other persons who did.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any other instances where the Secretary wrote to the General Board or to the Planning Section asking for specific plans?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir, he never wrote to the Planning Section that I know of; but I would not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether he wrote to the General Board?

Capt. PRATT. I would not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. When Admiral Blue made up his list in 1914, showing, as he claimed, that the Navy had already had more men than it needed, do you know anything about that list?

Capt. PRATT. No, I do not know the details of that. I only know in a general way that it was an attempt to run our ships in full commission with less men than most naval officers believed to be the full complement quota. I believe they created a complement which was called the peace complement, which was supposed to work in peace, but it was not a war complement.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there not at all times in the naval personnel a large number of men who are not available?

Capt. PRATT. You mean on account of the specific duties they are performing?

The CHAIRMAN. No; because of sickness or otherwise?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; sick men.

The CHAIRMAN. And others; running up to quite a large percentage at all times.

Capt. PRATT. Well, in personnel as in material there must always be a factor of safety to provide for casualties, sick men, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not these sick men used in making up that list of Admiral Blue and other unavailables?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, sir. Admiral McKean may know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no further knowledge about that?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, in regard to this letter, whether or not it was the best policy to direct the entire criticism at the head of the Navy, as a matter of fact did the criticism as made apply only to the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. You mean his letter of January 7?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; that particular letter and its application.

Capt. PRATT. I did not take it quite that way. In my direct testimony, on page 4, I made the statement:

Admiral Sims has presented his evidence against the department, and particularly against the Office of Operations, with a great array of facts.

Being in the Office of Operations, I naturally assumed that we were coming in for a full share of that, as we should if we had done anything wrong.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral Sims has taken the position that the Navy officers were much more competent to do the planning and to prepare, you might say, the military programs, and so on; and if that is true, and the men of the Navy that were called to these different positions of responsibility largely did make out the plans and direct matters, even though they might have done it under the Secretary of the Navy, and it had to have his final approval, would they not share in the responsibility for what was done?

Capt. PRATT. Why, sir, there is not a naval officer who is worth his salt who want to duck one bit of responsibility.

Senator TRAMMELL. If the Chief of Operations, for instance, with his corps of able assistants, prepares a plan and takes it to the Secretary of the Navy, who is not a trained naval man, and not technical, and he gives that his approval, and somebody comes along and criticizes it or alleges that it was a mistake, who is, you might say, the more responsible for the plan of the two, the naval officer or the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Why, sir, as I said before, every naval officer is anxious to assume all the responsibility that he can, and even a little more, sometimes. Every naval officer who is worth his salt has got to assume responsibility, and wants to. That is our life. We can not go out and fight battles unless we have that spirit and are willing to do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am not trying to place any criticism.

Capt. PRATT. No; I know you are not.

Senator TRAMMELL. Because I have not any criticism to make, myself.

Capt. PRATT. But I am trying to tell you how we feel about it.

Senator TRAMMELL. There seems to be a disposition to want to place a great deal of criticism on the Secretary of the Navy in particular, but I have no disposition of the kind. I dare say, if we turned the searchlight onto the record of Admiral Sims, while in the main he rendered good service, I think we might find where Admiral Sims probably changed front or maybe made some mistakes, which could be perfectly natural; but I rather measure a man's service in the broader sense, not picking out some little technical mistake he might have made, and criticising it; so that I do not mean it as any criticism of naval officers at all; and I also realize he was in better position to give technical, expert advice than a civilian would be; naturally so. But if they are in that position, and the Secretary of the Navy follows their recommendation in the main and in a general way, I do not think that the Secretary is entirely the party to blame if the mistakes were made. That is my position in regard to that. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose, Capt. Pratt, that if Admiral Sims had asked for six destroyers and had written the Secretary of the Navy to that effect and the Secretary of the Navy had turned the matter over to operations to decide upon it whether he should have the six destroyers or not, and operations should decide that he should have the six destroyers, the matter would then go to the Secretary of the Navy for his approval, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; when we started in this war, matters of detail had to be arranged through the Secretary, that way; but later we used to handle operations a little more directly. The Secretary could not attend to all such matters of detail; it would be impossible. So I think in many cases we acted directly, after the policy was once established.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that a cable would be received by you directly, before it would go to the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Well, if Admiral Sims made a specific request, say for a particular ship or so, I would take an answer approving it to my chief, Admiral Benson. If he approved it, it would be issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Without going to the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. I think, in many cases, that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. But in a case of sending over a large number of destroyers or sending over destroyers for the first time, the Secretary would have to approve it?

Capt. PRATT. He would have to approve of the general policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, after he had approved the policy, if Operations unduly delayed the sending over of those ships, then the fault would be with Operations, would it not, and not with the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Quite so.

The CHAIRMAN. But if, on the other hand, when the question was put up to the Secretary, he delayed action on it, pigeonholed it and kept it waiting for some time before making the decision, the responsibility would then be to him?

Capt. PRATT. Necessarily so.

Senator BALL. All general policies had to be approved by the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. They must be. He is the head of things.

Senator BALL. Those demands made by Admiral Sims for increases in personnel and ships, and so forth, had to be approved—that general operation plan had to be approved—by the Secretary?

The CHAIRMAN. They were all questions of policy?

Capt. PRATT. Naturally so. He must approve all general policies.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator BALL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all, Capt. Pratt, and you will be excused.

Capt. PRATT. Aye, aye, sir.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSIAH S. McKEAN, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral McKean, have you a statement to make about matters pertaining to this investigation?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; I have a statement, and I will submit from time to time in different sections the official documents, copied from the records of the Navy Department, to illustrate and substantiate the contentions; and I have here several complete copies of these documents.

Following the procedure that has heretofore been followed by the committee, I have prepared a memorandum showing what duty I was doing from time to time from the outbreak of the world war in 1914 [reading]:

MEMORANDUM.

MARCH 30, 1920

Service from beginning of the World War to date:

From August, 1914, to December 26, 1914, commanding U. S. S. *West Virginia*, Pacific Fleet.

From January 5, 1915, to July 1, 1915, Commanding U. S. S. *North Dakota*, North Atlantic Fleet.

From July 1, 1915, to February 15, 1918, assistant for material in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

From February 15, 1918, to September 15, 1918, commanding U. S. S. *Arizona*, North Atlantic Fleet.

From September 15, 1918, to January 5, 1919, assistant for material, Office of Chief of Naval operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

From January 5, 1919, to June 21, 1919, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Acting Chief of Naval Operations during absence of Admiral Benson in Europe.

From June 21, 1919, to September 25, 1919, date of Admiral Benson's retirement, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

From September 25, 1919, to November 8, 1919, Acting Chief of Naval Operations.

From November 8, 1919, to date, commanding Battleship Division 6, Pacific Fleet.

The absence of Admiral Benson continued up to June 21, 1919. Upon his return, and up to the date of his retirement, I was dropped back to my normal job of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. When on Admiral Benson's retirement, when Admiral Coontz became Chief of Operations, I was again acting chief.

Since November 8, 1919, I have been in command of Battleship Division 6, Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the *Arizona* stationed?

Admiral McKEAN. It was in the North Atlantic Fleet, mostly based in Yorktown. In the early stages of my sea tour we went to sea several times, and after that we limited our activities to the bay, and then just before I was detached, I took her to the navy yard, New York.

The CHAIRMAN. She did not get across the water?

Admiral McKEAN. She did not, with me. I was fortunate enough to be able to arrange that after I got in the department.

From a study of the original letter on which this investigation is based, and from listening to the testimony given by various witnesses, we have arrived at the conclusion that this whole controversy can be reduced to two main issues.

First, neglect of preparation before the United States went into the war; and, second, not putting the whole or not concentrating the whole efforts of the Navy Department and the fleet, ships, officers, and men on the antisubmarine menace in European waters, on April 6, 1917, on the declaration of war.

As to the first charge, neglect of preparation before the United States went into the war, this may be divided under three heads:

(a) That there were no plans.

(b) That the personnel was not ready.

(c) That the material was not ready.

The first requirement in war plan making is trained plan makers. That this was appreciated by the Secretary of the Navy the following incident will show. In late May or early June, 1913, shortly after the present secretary came into office, he visited the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., and at a dinner he was, at his own request, literally swamped with advice in reference to his duties and opportunities by all the officers present, among them Capt. W. S. Sims and myself, both at the time students at the college, and we contributed at least our share.

After a long session at the table, we adjourned to the drawing room, and thus the Secretary had his first opportunity to face the whole of his numerous advisers; whereupon he said in substance: "Gentlemen, you have given me a great quantity of valuable advice, which will take me a long time to digest. I have no doubt it is all good, but it is like a great deal of the advice given me by my official aides in Washington. It is not sufficiently concrete to put into immediate use. What I wish you would tell me is ~~the~~ the first and most important single act, which I can perform to ~~the~~ the Navy." Captain, now Rear Admiral Sims, immediately said: "What you want to do, Mr. Secretary, is to appoint a board of inquiry to immediately inter-

rupted Sims, with apologies, I hope, saying, "Pardon, me, Mr. Secretary, you do not want to appoint a board. The Navy Department cellars are full of boards' reports never acted upon. As I understand it, you wish to know now what single executive act of yours will do the most good to the Navy. My recommendation is that you send a wire to the aide for operations, informing him that hereafter he, the aide for operations, will be your sole military adviser and that his duties will be to coordinate the activities of the other aides, for personnel, material, and inspections, in the same way that they coordinate the activities of the various bureaus and divisions under each of them."

This recommendation met the approval of the officers present but the Secretary demurred; said he could not do that without great consideration, as he feared he would be giving up too much of his authority and avoiding what should be his responsibilities. After some discussion in an attempt to show the Secretary that he was not giving up any authority and that he could not possibly avoid his responsibilities, this recommendation was passed over and he asked what next we had to offer. In reply it was suggested by myself, or some other officer, that he send an order to the Bureau of Navigation directing that at all times thereafter, they were to have two classes, of not less than 20 officers each at the War College under training at all times. He agreed to this and since that time except during the war this condition has been maintained, and thus for the first time in the history of our Navy, we are providing for the training of something like an adequate number of officers for the duty of making war plans.

The second step in plan making is to collect the necessary information on which to base plans. This is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence, a division of the Office of Operations.

Once again, we have never had sufficient personnel to have an adequate staff of officers abroad collecting information, and of the small number we have had, few of them were selected solely because of their superior training for the job.

The War College must provide these trained officers in addition to the plan makers.

The third element in plan making is that there must be some head to the plan-making body. This head was provided under law March 3, 1915, establishing the office of Chief of Naval Operations [reading]:

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations, who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy not below the grade of captain for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war: *Provided*, That if an officer of the grade of captain be appointed Chief of Naval Operations, he shall have the rank, title, and emoluments of a rear admiral while holding that position.

During the temporary absence of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy.

As will be seen from this law, the Chief of Naval Operations was given two duties:

(a) He was charged with the operations of the fleet and (b) with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, which, per-

other way, would be that he was responsible, first, for the preparation of plans; second, for the preparation of the fleet to carry out plans; and, third, the execution of the plans.

An essential step was, I believe, made law under the urgency of war. Richmond P. Hobson, Member of Congress from Alabama, made law, while absolutely essential and filling a long-felt want in the Department organization, did not fully meet the situation. The law defines the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations, but does not confer adequate authority on him to meet his responsibilities.

It is, to come to the statement that there were no plans. There were general plans made by the general board as to the composition of the peace or A fleet, also of the war or C fleet. There was an intermediate plan, B. These gave the vessels to be used under the two conditions.

These general plans were first submitted in 1913, were brought up to date in 1915, and, with the World War going on and our entrance into it probable, were again revised in February, 1917.

These were the general basic plans with which we worked and, taken together, the base plan and the mobilization plan, were sufficient for the guidance of all concerned at the dates they were issued.

There were not detailed complete paper plans for the meeting of all possible conditions because the trained personnel to work out such detailed plans was not available, nor was the information. The general Board's plans were of necessity general plans, and it was necessary to add to and modify these by detailed plans for different conditions from time to time.

In this connection I would like to say that there has been a good deal of discussion by different witnesses about complete detailed plans.

That is pure theory. As Capt. Pratt showed, that is all right for an aggressive nation that is planning to take its neighbor's territory or to operate at the expense of somebody. They have got a definite objective. They have got a definite idea in their heads. They organize definitely for that purpose. They can work out to the minutest detail on the gaiters, as somebody said, the army and navy, and supplies, munitions, and the whole business. They can put it in infinite detail, and sublet from one planning section to the next and to the next, and it goes into detail until all the "i's" are dotted and all the "t's" are crossed. Von Moltke is the man of that, in the Franco-Prussian war, and that is the plan that these people are talking about. Von Moltke had such a plan, I believe. He worked it out very successfully, as we know.

His successor in 1914 undoubtedly had a plan similar to that. He tried to work it out. The Belgians delayed him two weeks; the Battle of the Marne turned him back; and his plans were gone; they were too far in advance; they had been projected too far in advance and in too much detail, and when they broke down, when one part of the detailed plan broke down, the machine went to pieces.

CHAIRMAN. Is it not possible to have a detailed plan of defense as well as of aggression?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; that is the first thing you should prepare for defense, before you launch the offensive.

We have built up a Planning Division in Operations to work out these detailed plans as soon as the officer selected for the head of this divi-

sion, Capt. F. H. Schofield, came back from sea and was available. We added personnel as it became available from time to time until we had a very efficient but small Planning Division, and even this we were finally compelled to transfer bodily to the London office, doing similar work for Admiral Sims.

The first break in it, or the first addition to the Planning Section, was after Capt. Schofield was with Capt. Pratt for half time—a sort of volunteer. Then we got him on full time. Then, on Chase's death, we took Pratt and put him in as assistant chief. Then we sent the rest of it over to Sims in London.

The committee's attention is here called to the fine compliments paid this Planning Division by Admiral Sims for the work they did in London. I believe they deserved all that he said of them for the work they did in London. I do not agree with Admiral Sims's estimate of the work the same men did in Washington being stupid or worse than worthless. I do not know what could have changed the mental capacity of these officers so suddenly. It has been suggested that it may have been afternoon tea or London fog. Some people thought it was Scotch mist. I do not know.

Now, as to personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. You had best keep all personalities out of it as much as possible.

Admiral McKEAN. I have not mentioned any names, and I do not think, Senator—I am not intending to go any further in personalities than I interpret the letter to be coming toward us as personal. I am not a partisan for either side. I am not an attorney for the Secretary of the Navy. I am not trying to damn Admiral Sims. I am an officer of the Navy; I worked in Operations; and this letter to me is aimed at Operations. It may have been aimed at the Secretary. The shooting was bad, and it hit Operations; and personally I feel that I am justified in defending in the same line that I was attacked.

The CHAIRMAN. However, we will have no personalities.

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; there are no personalities. I have none.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that borders on personality. I remember Admiral Sims provoked the applause of the audience on several occasions by some very snappy, witty observations, and I did not hear anybody object to that. The testimony is full of his snappy, witty expressions.

The CHAIRMAN. What we are trying to get is information here, and not snappy wit.

Senator TRAMMELL. You ought to have started on Admiral Sims. I wish you had started on Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think he criticised anybody.

Senator TRAMMELL. He said such things as that. Speaking of an order he said that the fellow that sent out that order could never have seen the sea or a ship. I think that is about as critical and personal as this.

The CHAIRMAN. If he thought that, that was a proper remark to make.

Senator TRAMMELL. The witness has a right to give his ideas here. I want them all treated alike.

The CHAIRMAN. I think everybody will have fair treatment.

Admiral McKEAN. I am not complaining, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Now if you will proceed, Admiral.

Admiral McKEAN. Proceeding to the matter of personnel, the next subhead was that the personnel was not ready. There is no question that we were short of both officers and men; the Navy personnel was too small for its job. The fleet had been built up serially, but neither the commissioned or enlisted personnel had kept step with the material. The officer shortage dates back, in my opinion, to the act of August 5, 1882, which law provided for honorable discharge of a large number of graduates of the classes 1881, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886, and 1887. At the same time by the same law, through the elimination of cadet engineering appointments, the number of appointments to the Naval Academy were reduced by 25 each year. The total effect of this law in the 35 years of its operation undoubtedly reduced the number of commissioned officers available at the time we entered the World War by about 750. The shortage of officers commenced to be felt in the service about 1893. It grew progressively worse in spite of increases in appointments to the Academy from time to time. There is no doubt that we did not have more than 40 per cent of the officers needed when we entered the war, but the responsibility for this condition dates back through many years and through numerous administrations. The question of the shortage of enlisted personnel has been fully gone into. We were short; I believe the primary causes of incorrect recommendations of the then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation were due to the use of that old delusion, "Peace complements for fighting ships." Although the expression "peace complement" has been used for years in congressional hearings and by some officers of the Navy, I have never been able to understand what was meant by a "peace complement" on a fighting ship. In my mind there are only two complements. These complements being based on the condition of the ship.

(a) What we usually mean by complement, that is, full crew for fighting. This is the only complement suitable for a man-of-war in full commission.

(b) "Reserve" complement, that is, the complement of a ship in reserve. We have at various times tried varying numbers for a reserve complement. My experience as commanding officer of ships which had been in reserve and especially my experience as Assistant Surgeon Material, has most entirely and completely convinced me that the minimum complement to keep a ship in reserve so that she may on the approach of war be put in commission in time and in condition to use in the war, is 50 per cent of all lower ratings and in addition all chief petty officers, making a total reserve complement about 60 per cent of the full or fighting complement. This is the minimum necessary first to keep the ship in proper material condition, second, to properly train the reserve, militia, or other personnel which is assigned to her on going into full commission to complete her full complement. This will give each reserve or other seaman a running mate in the same duties to coach him rapidly for his job. The full complement of warrant officers should be on board. The commanding officer, executive officer, other heads of the departments should be on board. This is, in my opinion necessary so that the ship may be taken to sea from time to time to train her own complement to train her recruits and reserves, and more important, to test out her machinery, mechanical and electrical devices, and by

limited target practice and cruising to prove her actual material readiness for war.

From a conversation I had with Admiral Blue in January, 1917, I am convinced that his error in estimating the total number of ships required in the Navy were due to the fact that he took the ships listed in the General Board's plans and figured them with what he called "peace complements," about the same complement that was used by the bureaus in arranging for berthing and other accommodations for the crews when the ship is designed. This last practice should also be changed, as we know now, and have known for some time, that owing to additions made from time to time in the mechanical devices on board ship, communication systems, signalling systems, fire control, etc., that the complement of a ship necessary to train her for war and to fight her in war, always increases with every new development in the art of war at sea.

Now there was a question, to clear up the question of the chairman this morning to Capt. Pratt about the mistakes in Admiral Blue's estimate. I know that he did not make any allowance for sickness or short time or shore station, and so on. His estimate was entirely wrong. I tried to convince him of it in his own office—he asked me what I thought of his business—and I said "You are wrong;" and I tried to show him why. He defended it and I believed in it at the time, and I suppose he so advised the Secretary.

You can train and you can fight a ship with a "peace complement" or you can train with a "peace complement" and then throw a load of recruits on board and go out to fight, but you won't either train or fight anywhere near the capacity of your ship. To make it plain to a layman just what I mean, a fighting ship's crew is the largest, most complicated, and should be the highest skilled and highest trained team known to anybody. There is more real "inside ball" and more "inside dope" in the training and handling of this team of about 1,500 men and officers than can even be dreamed of by anyone who has not had a hand in training of and developing at least a part of such a team. As you gentlemen know, you could train a baseball team of seven men and play at the game, but they can't help your score if you are playing against a nine-man team of the same quality.

Third subhead under lack of preparedness is that the material was not ready. This is the particular part that I am, through association and duty as assistant for material, most familiar with and most responsible for; and at the outset I will say that the fleet was not 100 per cent ready, is not 100 per cent ready now, and that it never will be 100 per cent ready at the outbreak of war.

The navy yards were not 100 per cent ready; they are not now, although the Atlantic coast yards are much better prepared than they have ever been before. The Pacific bases are not as near ready as were the Atlantic in 1917, and for the same reason—Congress has not appropriated the money, though complete plans with estimates have been submitted. In this connection the committee's attention is called to the work done by the so-called "Helm Commission," appointed by the President in accordance with a resolution of Congress, not by the Navy Department.

I bring this in here, although it sounds extraneous; but the fleet and the yards from which the fleet operates with me is the basis

whole trouble. That is where we start wrong; and, as I believe the purpose of the committee is to correct it, I speak of this commission and its report. This commission has submitted a series of the most valuable reports to Congress and the department of which I have any knowledge. It has completely covered the coast from Hatteras down to Key West, and then along the whole of the Gulf in the Atlantic. It has also covered from San Diego to and including Puget Sound on the Pacific. It has not covered the West Indies, the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, or the Philippines. I believe that there is nothing more fundamental than the selection of proper bases, and I recommend for the consideration of the committee that the Helm Commission be continued and that it cover the remaining part of our coast and the outlying stations, so that Congress may have before it for future reference a complete systematic and scientific study of our needs in this respect. I noted in the Washington Post of April 22 that a member of your committee had returned from a trip to the West Indies with a recommendation, so the paper said, that Port au Prince should be developed as a naval base for our fleet in lieu of Guantanamo, Cuba. This recommendation may be incorrect, but of the dozen or more complete studies made by boards of officers at different times and in different connections of bases in the West Indies, of all the studies that Admiral Mahan and other writers on the strategy of the Caribbean, this is the first and only one that I ever heard even suggest that Port au Prince, Haiti, would be of any value whatever to us as a naval base.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you are mistaken about a member of your committee having done that.

Admiral McKEAN. I am just speaking of what I saw in the Washington Post.

The CHAIRMAN. Possibly it was a member of the general Naval Committee of the Senate.

Admiral McKEAN. I do not know, sir, but I was just pointing out that I hoped somebody would be sent to study this thing, and that we would not get in wrong.

Senator BALL. The Helm Commission intends to continue its investigations.

Admiral McKEAN. I do not know, sir. It has never been dissolved, to my knowledge. It is a congressional commission, now, I understand.

Senator BALL. I know it has not been dissolved, and it expects to continue. We had them before a subcommittee of ours with reference to the Atlantic coast.

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But I think you are mistaken in saying that it was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee that made such a report.

Admiral McKEAN. I do not know that the Post quoted the name, but I think it said that it was a member of the committee. That is subject to correction.

Senator KEYES. I think it ought to be made clear in the record, as your testimony would indicate that some member of this committee was referred to.

Admiral McKEAN. Your committee here?

Senator KEYES. Yes.

Admiral McKEAN. Oh, I meant the Naval Committee.

Senator KEYES. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a mistake.

Admiral McKEAN. I will make a note of that, and if it is incorrect, I will correct it in the revision of my testimony.

(Senator King, of Utah, was the name in the article.)

There are plenty of officers and boards who doubt the present utility of Guantanamo. There are different reports recommending numerous places such as Samana Bay, Culebra Island, Fajardo Passage, St. Thomas, etc., but this is the first I have heard of Port au Prince in this connection. This is a big subject, gentlemen, and it would take weeks of as thoroughly competent a commission as the Helm Commission to cover this ground properly, making the necessary studies and thoroughly considered recommendations. It can't be done too soon.

The industrial supplies and ship supplies on hand were not adequate when I became assistant for material, July 1, 1915, but from that date on, the shortage of these supplies was in progress of correction, and we were in much better shape on April 6, 1917, than we had been for some years previous.

Now, to show what point of view I am testifying from, I say this in explanation of my duties and point of view, it was my understanding as assistant for material, that the functions of my office were to coordinate, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the efforts of the material bureaus, the navy yards and the fleet, so as to maintain the fleet in condition to carry out the military plans of the Chief of Naval Operations for the use of the fleet in war.

Very early in my duties my investigations confirmed my previous opinions acquired with the fleet, that our shore establishments, navy yards, supply bases, etc., had not been developed as rapidly as the fleet had been built up, and that they were not capable of maintaining the fleet materially fit for war.

To meet this condition the following steps were recommended by me and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date?

Capt. PRATT. I have those different things here, and they each have the date on them. They came at different dates. I started in shortly after I reached the department, July 1, 1915, and I was pretty constantly at it. For instance, here is the regular overhaul period, August 10, 1915. That is the first one of those, and I cite and will take up these policies later and explain each one of them and show when they were established and what I was trying to do in the way of general preparation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, this is the synopsis of what is here?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, the synopsis of what will follow here. These are the steps that were recommended by me and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy:

(a) The doing away with the repair period, through which the fleet had come to depend upon the yards for too many of its repairs and was losing its capacity, so economical in peace and so essential in war, of "self-maintenance."

(b) The increase of the number of repair and mother ships capable of making large repairs, which would otherwise require the vessel's return to a navy yard.

(c) The development and equipment of the various navy yards to enable them to promptly and efficiently make such repairs as the yards themselves, assisted by the repair ships, could not make.

(d) The board of inspection and survey was directed to thoroughly inspect all vessels on the Navy list, with the purpose of:

First, determining those having no military value or so little military value as to no longer justify expenditures to maintain them, thus eliminating them from the list and using the money for useful craft; and, second, to determine the needed repairs on useful craft with estimates of cost and time; to determine the charges against appropriations and the amount of work that would be required of the navy yards.

(e) To determine to what extent the yards should be developed. The General Board, at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, drew up a base plan adequate for a fleet such as was contemplated in the general war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the base plan for the yards?

Admiral McKEAN. That is the base plan for the whole fleet. That included navy yards, fueling stations, other supply stations, and bases; everything that the fleet needed on shore to successfully operate. The principal thing was the navy yards.

(f) At my request the navy-yard development board was organized to work out detailed plans for each navy yard and shore station to enable it to meet the demands of the General Board's base plan.

In explanation of the navy yard development board, that was, although we did not call it that, really the plans section for bases. I was chairman. The assistant chiefs of bureaus were the bureau representatives, and we took the demands made by the base plan of the General Board, took the yard as it was and then tried to develop it most economically and efficiently to meet the demands made in the base plan of the General Board. That board is still functioning, and the idea fundamentally was that we would get what we needed in navy yards. The old way was that navy yards grew, just like Topsy, and depended on local favor, etc., more than on the demands of the fleet. The fleet was used to keep up the yards, instead of the yards being used to keep up the fleet, and that was not either economical or efficient.

Senator BALL. What year was this that you made these recommendations?

Admiral McKEAN. 1915, in the fall; and the navy yard development board was the spring of 1916, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be much better if you would give the dates of these recommendations, so that we will not have to look them up in the papers filed.

Admiral McKEAN. I thought that I would make just a general statement, and then I will take them up in sequence.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to take them up in sequence later?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, to take them up in sequence; and give the headings, and the dates, so that the committee will know what they are, beforehand.

The logistic committee was formed with a representative from each bureau to determine what the minimum stock of industrial and consumable stores on hand should be, to enable the yards and supply bases to promptly meet the demands of the fleet, as contemplated in

ested and to get them trained for what they might expect to prepare for it; and the fleet were having practice runs along the coast as against an enemy, while we were having exercises in the department and in the navy yards, simulating what we could at that time, with the idea not that we were ready, but to find out where we were not ready; and in practice the efforts that we were making, theoretical.

One of the big things was the consolidation of the cable, and telegraph communications into the Communications Division of Operations.

The foundation of all success is communications.

This division handled 1,000,000 messages, averaging 100,000 per day for all departments and all activities of the Government during 1918, and controlled the censorship of cables and telegrams in the United States in all parts of the world.

The above preparations of the fleet for war were undertaken simultaneously in the fall and winter of 1915. It progressed as the appropriations would permit. After the declaration of war, the appropriations and allotments from emergency funds were obtained without difficulty, so that development of the fleet and the addition of other needed facilities to the fleet was secured. \$80,000,000 in Government-owned plants and about \$100,000,000 in private-owned plants to permit of their expansion and modernization, was secured.

There has been in addition to funds obtained for the development of the navy yards, and there has been before the war, a total of about \$300,000,000 spent on new naval stations, bases of various kinds, and industrial plants in the navy yards.

All of those developments are not completed yet, but are coming along fine, and if we had been a little earlier

Admiral McKEAN. Personnel in the navy yards is more closely related to material than anything else. I sometimes think it is aboard ship.

This can well be understood when it is realized that the total of the shipbuilding and ship repair trades at the beginning of the war amounted to an estimated 50,000; that the Shipping Board alone had in its employ at one time a maximum of 500,000. We were competing for this labor in the same market as the Shipping Board. Further, the committee's attention is called to the fact that this total of 75,000 mechanics in navy yards was all that, in my opinion, could be advantageously and efficiently used in these yards.

Our investigation of navy yards showed in the fall of 1915 that it was necessary for the Navy Department to establish separate bases for men, fuel ships' stores, etc., outside of the navy yards, and to use these yards exclusively for their primary purpose of docking, repairing, and building ships.

The Navy had grown, and the navy yard that used to be a training station, receiving ship, and supply base and fuel base and everything else could not handle the job any more.

The establishment of these supply bases was undertaken and proceeded with as rapidly as congressional appropriations permitted.

The General Board had revised and brought up to date the supplies they considered necessary to be carried in fuel bases, both coal and oil, and how much should be carried in each of the fuel stations. His revised plan required expansion of all the fuel stations to carry more coal; the building of tanks to hold more oil; coal and oil barges to transport this fuel and to carry a certain minimum stock afloat ready for emergency use.

This fuel problem was an expanding and difficult one, one of the most difficult of the war, but it was met by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts successfully. And early in the war we had reached an available position as to fuel, for we had not only what vessels then operating from each port required, but we had sufficient reserve to take care of any movement of vessels that might be switched to any port up to the full capacity of the port.

This should be limited to the Atlantic coast.

Senator KEYES. Just to make it clear: You say "early in the war." Do you mean when we entered the war, or what date?

Admiral McKEAN. I mean early in the war so far as we were concerned.

Senator KEYES. When you speak of the war, you mean when we entered the war?

Admiral McKEAN. Soon after our entrance into the war. No, not at the beginning of the European war. We did not have the money at that time—we could not get it.

No vessel to my knowledge was delayed on this side of the ocean for lack of fuel during the whole of the war. In addition, in the period of fuel shortage, a number of essential activities, such as light and power plants of cities and munitions plants working for the army, the Navy, and the Allies were only kept going by the use of the Navy's fuel reserves.

On our going into the war, the naval district organizations were expanded wherever needed and to the extent needed to undertake their war functions; among these functions in addition to the police-

ing and protecting of the port, was the taking over and altering for governmental uses, repairing, fueling, and supplying of vessels assigned to the districts of which came into the ports within the district and the district authorities utilized for these purposes whatever private facilities were necessary to supplement those owned or commandeered by the Government. Thus at the maximum war load, we were utilizing, in addition to our own navy yards, what has been estimated at 70 per cent of the total private ship building and ship repair facilities in our country.

The progress made in development of bases and the accumulation of supplies did not proceed as rapidly as it would have done under normal conditions, but it will be remembered that even in 1915 our material markets and labor markets were already meeting the demands of the Allies for a large amount of munitions and that these demands, with all prices for material and labor were increasing.

We did not pay so much attention to prices. We got them as reasonably as we could, but what I mean is the trouble about prices was that we could not get so much for the dollars that you gentlemen appropriated.

After we entered the war and practically unlimited funds became available, the markets for material of all sorts were swamped with new orders from the War Department, the Navy Department, the Shipping Board, the Railroad Administration, Food Administration, Fuel Administration, etc.; in addition to the already existing demands of the Allies, which were largely increased on our changing from a neutral to a belligerent. These conflicting demands could not all be met simultaneously and the supplying of many of them was delayed necessarily until facilities could be provided for their manufacture.

In addition to the shortage of material, of factories, of power, ship repair, and ship building plants, was the shortage of the prime essential—labor. As shown above, we did not have the supply of skilled labor called for in the whole country, and at first it was not distributed so as to best meet the demands. Most serious of all, the draft drew a large number entirely out of industrial life, put them on the Army, Navy, and Shipping Board ships as operating and consuming forces instead of producing forces.

We took men out of the navy yards, even.

The conflicting demands of different interests were met in so far as they could be met and as rapidly as they could be met by the various activities of the War Industries Board, primarily by the priorities division, which determined after full presentation of the claims of the various interests which should have priority on certain items, certain plants, certain power, etc., and what claim of priority each item should have. It was necessary to determine priorities, even as to fuel and transportation, sand, gravel, and cement for construction purposes.

This priority situation involved a number of officers working on the War Industries Board, at least one representative from each bureau a large part of his time, and I, as general liaison officer of the Navy Department, representing all the bureaus and the military policy of the department at the same time, spent on an average two hours each day in pushing our claims and securing the priorities required by the items that day before the board.

I am putting this in to show the difficulty that we had, and why we could not instantaneously respond to all requests for material.

To give me an unquestioned official foundation for my claims before the priority board, I made out a list of types of craft in the order of their then importance in the war program of the Navy, and the first three of these items were destroyers, aircraft for antisubmarine use, submarines for use in the war zone in antisubmarine operations. I had no difficulty in securing the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy to this list and presented it as the official Navy Department policy.

I had many contentions before the board with the Army and the Shipping Board to hold these priorities, and as an illustration of the attitude of the department, I met the claims of the Shipping Board for priority in securing of turbines for their ships over turbines for destroyers. Their plea was that the only way to defeat the submarine was to build tonnage faster than the enemy could sink it.

I argued that this was a purely defensive measure, necessary to be sure, but that the Navy insisted on the offensive at all times, and that while their (the Shipping Board) system was in effect, a scheme to "feed the submarines to death," the Navy's was to "poison" them and be done with them once and for all, besides saving the goods and guns which would be lost by the Shipping Board's system. Our system would, in addition, decrease the enemy morale. We iron, and destroyer material, labor, power, fuel, transportation, were given precedence over everything else for ourselves and everything else for our Allies, except what was shown by them to be actually needed at the front to enable their troops to hold on until we could get into the game in sufficient numbers to be of assistance.

I wish here to say that the same priority was given to the alterations and repairs of destroyers, yachts, chasers, etc., being fitted for duty overseas. This gave them precedence over capital ships of the fleet for repairs in the same way, and for the same reasons, that our whole building program for capital ships was absolutely stopped, so that men, materials, etc., could be concentrated for building destroyers, tugs, mine planters, chasers, etc., for use overseas against enemy submarines.

I wish to accent "overseas," for until this discussion came up, I never thought anyone had any doubt of the policy of the Navy Department that the war was in Europe and that Operations intended to keep it there.

The preceding narrative is intended to show:

First. That Operations was awake to the situation before the war and was doing its best within the appropriations to prepare the fleet for war, and to prepare the shore bases to maintain it in fighting trim during the war:

Second. That even before we became a belligerent the difficulties and prices were increasing daily, making progress slow and getting less for every dollar appropriated; and

Third. That when funds became available practically without limit, the demands on the material and labor markets were such that new facilities had to be built up to provide the material, and that unskilled labor had to be trained by hundreds of thousands to perform jobs calling for high skill and long training.

The above explains why it was impossible for the Navy Department or any other department to instantaneously or even in what

under normal conditions would be considered a reasonable time to meet the infinite numbers of demands made upon it.

As to the extent of these demands, there is submitted herewith a list of all types of vessels, completed and authorized or building on April 6, 1917, and a corresponding list of the date November 1, 1918, which shows that at the beginning of the war, April 6, 1917, we had 344 vessels of all types completed, 204 authorized or building, making a total of 548; that we had completed on November 1, 1918, 1,594 vessels of all types, that we had authorized or building 655, making a total of 2,249 vessels on November 1, 1918; that of this total there were on December 1, 1918, 463 vessels abroad, and in addition there were 100 other vessels traveling back and forth from Europe to the United States.

There is also submitted a memorandum of the head of the Division of Naval Districts, Rear Admiral Osterhaus, showing that we took over through commandeering, purchase, charter, or lease, 1,110 private vessels, motor boats, yachts, tugs, steamers, lighters, trawlers, and fishing boats, schooners, tankers, ferry and houseboats and barges; that in addition to this 1,110 we took over from other Government departments, Coast Guards, Lighthouse Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Immigration Service, Public Health Service, Bureau of Fisheries, Panama Canal, and borrowed from the Canadian Government a total of 135, making a grand total of vessels taken over, converted to Government use and equipped for Government service, 1,245 craft of all types, sizes, and kinds.

The CHAIRMAN. These were all taken over after war was declared?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir; we had no authority to take them over before.

The CHAIRMAN. We had not purchased or authorized any of them before?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; none of these.

That in addition to the above, we converted to troop transports and the Navy operated for the Army a total of 149 transports. This includes 25 of the Navy's battleships and cruisers; but even then we had to add some conversion work on them to fit them for troops.

That, in addition to the above commencing in February, 1917, we remodeled for armed guard and the carrying of guns 384 merchant vessels; including vessels for our allies as well as our own.

That, during the later part of the war, in addition to the fighting fleet and vessels given above, the Navy Department operated and maintained 378 vessels in the Naval Overseas Transportation Service.

Each and every one of these vessels referred to above required some alteration to adapt her to the new service. A great many required extensive repairs. All made demands on material and labor for maintenance throughout the time of their service. This was in addition to the building, repair and maintenance of vessels of the regular Navy, and these activities were carried on at the same time as the others, involving the building of new types and the repair of the main fleet units, but the work of the various classes was kept separate in so far as possible and placed in different yards, and when in the same yard, priorities were given in the order of relative importance and the urgency for each type, and the highest priority was, as previously stated, always given to craft for overseas, and first of these craft, to destroyers.

Now I give a list of activities that fall under material, but that has been covered before in general, except paragraph (g).

Among the activities requiring material, the following may be mentioned:

(a) The preparation, placing, and patrolling of mine fields, submarine nets, etc., for the protection of our own important home ports and bases.

(b) The alterations and items on Coast Guard craft, etc., for service.

(c) The building of a large number of submarine chasers, total order 450, including 30 for the French and 5 for Italy; the first of this type of craft being ordered at the Navy yard, Norfolk, before this country went into the war at all.

(d) The alterations of merchant vessels to fit them to carry guns and armed guard.

(e) The repair of German ships and their conversion into troop transports; the 16 large passenger craft most successful of all troop transports.

(f) The conversion of Shipping Board ships to carry troops.

(g) The supply of material for construction and operation of bases abroad.

In this connection a reference is made in previous testimony that carried the suggestion that officers were sent to Brest and Bordeaux to establish bases without detailed plans and instructions. This was undoubtedly true. How anyone in Washington could work up detailed plans and instructions and furnish detailed supplies for the establishment of bases in locations with which they were not familiar, I do not know. These officers were given whatever material the conditions at the time they left indicated would be necessary, and it was on their reports and at their requests that these bases grew from small units for the maintenance of the few yachts and destroyers we then had on the French coast, into bases that handled a very large percentage of our troop transports, convoys, etc., through the war; and while no doubt the people on the ground would have liked to have had the material and personnel to develop these bases faster, both the material and personnel were furnished from Washington as rapidly as we could get hold of it and get the tonnage to take it across.

I would like to say that they were not in a bit bigger hurry than we were.

One of the big items of material was the equipping of all ships used in our war activities with radio. That looks easy, but the electrical supplies were short, and early in the matter we had great difficulty, and we could not operate those ships in convoy or singly without complete radio outfits or without completely trained operators on board.

(h) The development of submarine-detecting devices and testing out of all the submarine schemes proposed.

That called for new material, new inventions; and we employed the best talent there was in our country, or they volunteered for it; but this was not with the hope of finding any "royal road to victory," but having in mind the failure of our Allies in over two years of war to overcome the submarine menace by the methods then in use, we were doing everything within the capacity of our material and personnel along every line that had proven even partially successful, and at the same time we were trying to improve on old methods and develop new ones.

(i) The material, labor, and tonnage required for the northern mine barrage, one of the greatest and most successful undertakings of the war, and one that had its share in breaking German morale.

No one supposed that any one scheme in operation or contemplated would prove 100 per cent efficient; but we did expect that with destroyers, armed guards, mine barrages, air patrols, subchasers, etc., we would reduce the submarine menace below the danger point, and we did hope these various methods combined would, in the end, break the enemy's morale; or, in slang, that we would "get the Hun's goat." We did, and the final smash of Hun morale started in Kiel, the home port of a large number of German submarines.

While there were and always will be delays, delays of subordinates in coming to conclusions on which to base their recommendations; delays in convincing superiors of the desirability or necessity of approving these recommendations; delays in getting the necessary appropriations; delays in obtaining material and men with which to carry out the plans. While each and every one of these delays is annoying to the man waiting for the completed results, as well as to the one in immediate charge of pushing the plan through, it is a fact that responsible authorities, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, the committees of Congress must each be given time for consideration and deliberation to enable them to act wisely.

I do not believe that the sum total of all these delays prior to our entering the war, or after our entering into the war, gives the slightest foundation for anyone to justly make the charge against the Navy Department that it was responsible for delaying the end of the war four months.

Nor do I believe that anyone, short of the good God Himself, has sufficient knowledge of the various elements and factors entering into the war and the causes of its conclusion to justify him for one moment in charging that the Navy or any of its officers were responsible for the loss of any part of the two and one-half million tons of allied shipping claimed to have been unnecessarily lost; nor for any part of the \$15,000,000,000 of the Allies' money claimed to have been unnecessarily spent; nor, least of all, do I believe that there is any human being with sufficient information and sufficient knowledge to justify him in charging the unnecessary loss of the life of one of the 500,000 allied soldiers charged to have been due to the errors of the Navy.

This monstrous charge has been or will be disproved in every item. Had it been made by any foreign official, allied or enemy, it would have aroused the indignation of the whole American people. Had it been invented by the inflamed, exaggerated, diseased ego of a patient in St. Elizabeth's, the Government Hospital for the Insane, no one would have been surprised. That it was made under oath by a Rear Admiral of the United States Navy on the active list, president of our Naval War College, in a hearing before a committee of the United States Senate, is, in my opinion, an insult to every officer and man now in the Navy, or who served in the Navy during the World War.

At this point the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, April 28, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keys, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSIAH S. McKEAN—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral McKean, will you proceed?

Admiral McKEAN. As I stated yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I propose to introduce a series of papers from the files of the Navy Department, commencing from the period when I became assistant for material, to the Chief of Operations, on July 1, 1917.

The first paper is, however, a letter from the Secretary of the Navy or an order from the Secretary of the Navy to me covering the same correspondence that was covered in the case of Capt. Pratt, directing in so far as my work comes under your request for documents, those documents asked for. You remember Capt. Pratt's case?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral McKEAN. It is the same letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you submitting documents to cover everything in that letter?

Admiral McKEAN. I have not all those dispatches, but they are being gotten together. I cover a certain part of it. Capt. Pratt covered certain other papers, and his dispatches, in so far as they could get them, are being collected now, I believe, in the department.

The first paper I wish to submit is the report of April 6, 1917, covering every vessel then in the Navy, giving her location on February 6, 1917, March 6, 1917, and April 6, 1917, and in two columns, the status of readiness, being readiness for distant service. The two columns are "Yes" and "No." And then in the remark column, where the vessel was unready, the reason for such unreadiness, whether from personnel or material, or both, as to every ship we had, taking the battleships first.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement does not give to what extent they were ready, does it?

Admiral McKEAN. No; except in certain cases of the destroyers some of them are marked "Unsuitable," and then in cases of tugs, some of them are yard tugs, which means that they are not available for distant service at all, are not of the right type, and some of them are too old.

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for unreadiness. |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| FUEL SHIPS. | | | | | |
| Hector..... | A ground on coast of South Carolina. | | | No..... | Aground, on South Carolina. |
| TENDERS TO TORPEDO VESSELS. | | | | | |
| Iris..... | Mare Island..... | | | No..... | Old. |
| Pompey..... | Olongapo..... | | | No..... | Not suited. |
| CONVERTED YACHTS. | | | | | |
| Alleen..... | Providence, R. I..... | | | No..... | Material and personnel. |
| Dorothea..... | Cleveland, Ohio..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| Elfrida..... | North Carolina Naval Militia. | | | No..... | Do. |
| Gloucester..... | New York..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| Hawk..... | Great Lakes..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| Huntress..... | Naval Militia..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| Sylvia..... | Norfolk..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| Vixen..... | Philadelphia..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| Wasp..... | New York..... | | | No..... | Do. |
| IN FULL COMMISSION. | | | | | |
| TRANSPORTS. | | | | | |
| Buffalo..... | Masatlan, Mexico. | San Diego..... | San Jose del Cuba. | No..... | Repairs required. |
| Hancock..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | St. Thomas..... | Yes..... | |
| Prairie..... | Philadelphia..... | Washington, D. C. | Philadelphia..... | Yes..... | |
| GUNBOATS. | | | | | |
| Quiros..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Yes..... | |
| Sacramento..... | Vera Cruz..... | En route New Orleans | New Orleans..... | Yes..... | |
| Samar..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Yes..... | |
| Villalobos..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| Wheeling..... | New Orleans..... | Gulf of Mexico..... | Vera Cruz..... | Yes..... | |
| Wilmington..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Yes..... | |
| Yorktown..... | San Diego..... | San Diego..... | Mare Island..... | Yes..... | |
| SUPPLY SHIPS. | | | | | |
| Celtic..... | En route New York. | Guacanayabo..... | En route St. Thomas. | Yes..... | |
| Culgoa..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Under repairs. |
| Glacier..... | Mare Island..... | En route Acapulco, Mexico. | San Diego..... | No..... | Age; hull structure considered by board of inspection and survey. |
| Supply..... | Cavite..... | Cavite..... | Guam..... | No..... | Material. |
| FUEL SHIPS. | | | | | |
| Abarenda..... | Asiatic station..... | Manila..... | En route Shanghai. | Yes..... | |
| Ajax..... | do..... | Asiatic station..... | Nagasaki..... | No..... | Do. |
| Arethusa..... | En route Charleston, S. C. | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | Yes..... | |
| Brutus..... | Mare Island..... | San Diego..... | San Diego..... | Yes..... | |
| Caesar..... | Alexandria, Egypt. | Alexandria, Egypt. | Alexandria, Egypt. | Yes..... | |
| Cyclops..... | Guantanamo..... | Guacanayabo..... | Norfolk..... | Yes ¹ | |
| Jason..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| Jupiter..... | En route Norfolk. | Guacanayabo..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Do. |
| Kanawha..... | Port Arthur, Tex..... | do..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | Repairs to be made. |
| Mars..... | En route Chile..... | Christobal..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | |

NOTE.—In all cases in which only one location is shown, the vessel was at that place at all three dates.
¹ For three months.

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| ARMORED CRUISERS. | | | | | |
| Pueblo..... | San Francisco... | San Francisco... | Pichilingue..... | No..... | Personnel. |
| Frederick..... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | Enroute San Francisco. | No..... | Do. |
| North Carolina... | Portsmouth.... | Portsmouth.... | Portsmouth.... | No..... | Personnel and material. |
| Huntington..... | San Diego..... | Mare Island.... | Mare Island.... | No..... | Material. |
| San Diego..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| South Dakota.... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | No..... | Personnel. |
| Montana..... | Guantanamo.... | Guantanamo.... | Wynne, Md..... | Yes..... | |
| Pittsburgh..... | Enroute San Diego. | San Diego..... | San Diego..... | Yes..... | |
| Seattle..... | Guacacayabo Bay. | Guacacayabo Bay. | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| CRUISERS, FIRST CLASS. | | | | | |
| Charleston..... | Canal Zone..... | Canal Zone..... | Canal Zone..... | No..... | Do. |
| St. Louis..... | Honolulu..... | Honolulu..... | Honolulu..... | No..... | Do. |
| Saratoga..... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | No..... | Material. |
| Brooklyn..... | Manila..... | Manila..... | Manila..... | Yes..... | |
| CRUISERS, SECOND CLASS. | | | | | |
| Chicago..... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... | No..... | Personnel. |
| Minneapolis..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Personnel and material. |
| Columbia..... | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| CRUISERS, THIRD CLASS. | | | | | |
| Marblehead..... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | Puget Sound.... | No..... | Personnel and material. |
| Montgomery..... | Baltimore..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Personnel. |
| New Orleans..... | Guaymas..... | Guaymas..... | Puget Sound.... | No..... | Personnel and material. |
| Salem..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Do. |
| Albany..... | Puget Sound.... | En route Canal Zone. | Newport..... | Yes..... | |
| Birmingham..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | Yes..... | |
| Chester..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Yes..... | |
| Cleveland..... | Mare Island.... | San Diego..... | Enroute Hampton Roads. | Yes..... | |
| Cincinnati..... | Shanghai..... | Shanghai..... | Shanghai..... | Yes..... | |
| Chattanooga..... | Mare Island.... | Mare Island.... | Mare Island.... | Yes..... | |
| Denver..... | Gulf of Fonseca. | Corinto..... | Canal Zone to Key West. | Yes..... | |
| Des Moines..... | Alexandria, Egypt. | Alexandria, Egypt. | Alexandria, Egypt. | Yes..... | |
| Galveston..... | Manila..... | Manila..... | Manila..... | Yes..... | |
| GUNBOATS. | | | | | |
| Annapolis..... | Topolobampo... | Topolobampo... | En route Charleston. | Yes..... | |
| Castine..... | New Orleans.... | Vera Cruz..... | Vera Cruz..... | Yes..... | |
| Dolphin..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | En route St. Thomas. | Yes..... | |
| Elcano..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| Helena..... | Shanghai..... | do..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| Machias..... | Guantanamo.... | Santiago..... | Nipe Bay..... | Yes..... | |
| Monocacy..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| Nashville..... | Tampico..... | Tampico..... | Tampico..... | Yes..... | |
| Paducah..... | Tunis de Zaza. | Tunis de Zaza. | Santiago..... | Yes..... | |
| Palos..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| Pampanga..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| IN COMMISSION IN ORDINARY. | | | | | |
| TRANSPORTS. | | | | | |
| General Alava..... | Asiatic station.. | | | No..... | Not suited. |

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for status unreadiness |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| TUGS—contd. | | | | | |
| Tecumseh..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Navy-yard tug. |
| Tillamook..... | San Diego..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Not suited. |
| Traffic..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Transfer..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| Triton..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Do. |
| Unadilla..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Do. |
| Uncas..... | Indianhead..... | Indianhead..... | Indianhead..... | No..... | Not suited. |
| Vigilant..... | Training station, San Francisco. | Training station, San Francisco. | Training station, San Francisco. | No..... | Do. |
| Waban..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | No..... | Old. |
| Wahnetta..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Old yard tug. |
| Wompatuck..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | No..... | Old: Asiatic tug. |
| TENDERS TO TORPEDO VESSELS. | | | | | |
| Alert..... | Pearl Harbor.... | Pearl Harbor.... | Pearl Harbor.... | No..... | Not suitable distant serv. |
| Bushnell..... | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Norfolk..... | Yes..... | |
| Dixie..... | Guaycanayabo.. | Habana..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | Under repairs; May 20, 1917 |
| Fulton..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | No..... | Not suitable distant serv. |
| Melville..... | Guayacanayabo.. | Yorktown..... | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| SPECIAL TYPES. | | | | | |
| Baltimore, mine depot ship. | Guaycanayabo.. | Guaycanayabo.. | Yorktown..... | No..... | Under exte repairs. |
| Dubuque, mine training ship. | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| Hannibal, surveying ship. | Gulf of Mexico... | General American waters. | En route Cristobal. | Yes..... | |
| Lebanon, ammunition ship. | Guaycanayabo.. | Guantanamo.... | Yorktown..... | No..... | Age and need general overh. |
| Leonidas, surveying ship. | San Blas, Panama. | San Blas, Panama. | Cristobal..... | No..... | Poor condition boilers, converted into chaser tender vember, 1917 |
| Prometheus, repair ship. | Guaycanayabo.. | Guantanamo.... | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| San Francisco, mine depot ship. | do..... | Santiago..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | In need of gen overhauling. |
| Solace, hospital ship. | do..... | Guaycanayabo.. | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| Vestal, repair ship. | Guantanamo.... | do..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| SUBMARINES. | | | | | |
| Ozark..... | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Broken prop shaft. |
| Tallahassee..... | Tampa..... | do..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| A-2..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | No..... | Not suitable, to age and type. |
| A-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-4..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-5..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-6..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-7..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| B-1..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| B-2..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| B-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| C-1..... | Canal Zone..... | Canal Zone..... | Canal Zone..... | No..... | Do. |
| C-2..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| C-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Not suitable & undergoing overhauling. |
| C-4..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Not suitable & age and type. |
| C-5..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| D-1..... | New York..... | New York..... | New London.... | No..... | Do. |
| D-2..... | do..... | do..... | New York..... | No..... | Do. |
| D-3..... | do..... | do..... | New London.... | No..... | Do. |

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| FUEL SHIPS—con. | | | | | |
| Maumee..... | Guantanamo..... | Guacanayabo..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Cracked cylinder jackets, main engines. |
| Nanshan..... | San Diego..... | Corinto..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Under repairs. |
| Neptune..... | En route Norfolk. | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Under repairs to Apr. 24, 1917. |
| Nereus..... | Vera Cruz..... | En route Key West. | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| Nero..... | En route San Diego. | La Paz, Mexico.. | La Paz, Mexico.. | Yes..... | |
| Orion..... | Olongapo..... | En route Nagasaki. | En route Canal Zone. | Yes..... | |
| Proteus..... | En route Hawaii | En route Guam. | Guam..... | Yes..... | |
| Saturn..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | En route Cordona, Alaska. | Yes..... | |
| Sterling..... | Norfolk..... | Newport News.. | New York..... | No..... | Age; general unsuitability. |
| Vulcan..... | Portsmouth..... | Port au Prince.. | En route Philadelphia. | No..... | Material. |
| CONVERTED YACHTS. | | | | | |
| Eagle..... | Whitehorse Point, Long Island. | Nipe Bay, Cuba. | Manita, Cuba... | No..... | Old; not suited. |
| Mayflower..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Yes..... | |
| Scorpion..... | Constantinople.. | Constantinople.. | Constantinople.. | No..... | Repairs required. |
| Sylph..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Not suited. |
| Yankton..... | Guantanamo..... | Guacanayabo..... | Key West..... | No..... | In need S. B. repairs. |
| TUGS. | | | | | |
| Accomac..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Active..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Do. |
| Apache..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Do. |
| Arapaho..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Not suited. |
| Choctaw..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Fortune..... | Tutula..... | Tutula..... | Tutula..... | No..... | Old Samoa. |
| Hercules..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Iroquois..... | Mare Island..... | Ensenada..... | Ensenada..... | Yes..... | |
| Iwana..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Navy-yard tug. |
| Massasoit..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Do. |
| Modoc..... | Philadelphia..... | Philadelphia..... | Philadelphia..... | No..... | Do. |
| Mohawk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Do. |
| Narkeeta..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Do. |
| Navajo..... | Honolulu..... | Honolulu..... | Honolulu..... | No..... | Not suited; under repair. |
| Ontario..... | Guacanayabo..... | Guantanamo..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Repairs required. |
| Osceola..... | Guantanamo..... | do..... | Guantanamo..... | No..... | Old; in need of repairs. |
| Patapasco..... | Guacanayabo..... | Guacanayabo..... | Norfolk..... | Yes..... | |
| Patuxent..... | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | Uncompleted boiler work. |
| Pawnee..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Pawtucket..... | Bremerton..... | Bremerton..... | Bremerton..... | No..... | Do. |
| Penacook..... | Portsmouth..... | Portsmouth..... | Portsmouth..... | No..... | Do. |
| Pentucket..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Do. |
| Peoria..... | Key West..... | Key West..... | Key West..... | No..... | Old; not suited. |
| Piscatagua..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | No..... | Tug; Asiatic station. |
| Pocahontas..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Pontiac..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Navy-yard tug. |
| Potomac..... | Port au Prince.. | Port au Prince.. | Port au Prince.. | No..... | Material condition. |
| Powhatan..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Navy-yard tug. |
| Rapio..... | Cavite..... | Cavite..... | Cavite..... | No..... | Do. |
| Rocket..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Do. |
| Samoset..... | Philadelphia..... | Philadelphia..... | Philadelphia..... | No..... | Do. |
| Sebago..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | No..... | Do. |
| Sioux..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Do. |
| Sonoma..... | Guayacanabo..... | Guayacanabo..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| Sotoyoko..... | Bremerton..... | Bremerton..... | Bremerton..... | No..... | Do. |
| Standish..... | Annapolis..... | Annapolis..... | Annapolis..... | No..... | Old boilers. |

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| TUGS—contd. | | | | | |
| Tecumseh..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Navy-yard tug. |
| Tillamook..... | San Diego..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Not suited. |
| Trafic..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Yard tug. |
| Transfer..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| Triton..... | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | Washington, D. C. | No..... | Do. |
| Unadilla..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Do. |
| Uncas..... | Indianhead..... | Indianhead..... | Indianhead..... | No..... | Not suited. |
| Vigilant..... | Training station, San Francisco. | Training station, San Francisco. | Training station, San Francisco. | No..... | Do. |
| Waban..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | No..... | Old. |
| Wahnetta..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Old yard tug. |
| Wompatuck..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | No..... | Old: Asiatic station. |
| TENDERS TO TORPEDO VESSELS. | | | | | |
| Alert..... | Pearl Harbor.... | Pearl Harbor.... | Pearl Harbor.... | No..... | Not suitable for distant service. |
| Bushnell..... | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Norfolk..... | Yes..... | |
| Dixie..... | Guaycanayabo.. | Habana..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | Under repairs until May 26, 1917. |
| Fulton..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | No..... | Not suitable for distant service. |
| Melville..... | Guayacanayabo.. | Yorktown..... | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| SPECIAL TYPES. | | | | | |
| Baltimore, mine depot ship. | Guaycanayabo.. | Guaycanayabo.. | Yorktown..... | No..... | Under extensive repairs. |
| Dubuque, mine training ship. | do..... | do..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| Hannibal, surveying ship. | Gulf of Mexico... | General American waters. | En route Cristobal. | Yes..... | |
| Lebanon, ammunition ship. | Guaycanayabo.. | Guantanamo.... | Yorktown..... | No..... | Age and need of general overhauling. |
| Leonidas, surveying ship. | San Blas, Panama. | San Blas, Panama. | Cristobal..... | No..... | Poor condition of boilers, converted into sub-chaser tender November, 1917. |
| Prometheus, repair ship. | Guaycanayabo.. | Guantanamo.... | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| San Francisco, mine depot ship. | do..... | Santiago..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | In need of general overhauling. |
| Solace, hospital ship. | do..... | Guaycanayabo.. | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| Vestal, repair ship. | Guantanamo.... | do..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| SUBMARINES. | | | | | |
| Ozark..... | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Broken propeller shaft. |
| Tallahassee..... | Tampa..... | do..... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| A-2..... | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | No..... | Not suitable, due to age and type. |
| A-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-4..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-5..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-6..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| A-7..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| B-1..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| B-2..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| B-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| C-1..... | Canal Zone..... | Canal Zone..... | Canal Zone..... | No..... | Do. |
| C-2..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| C-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Not suitable due to undergoing overhauling. |
| C-4..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Not suitable due to age and type. |
| C-5..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| D-1..... | New York..... | New York..... | New London... | No..... | Do. |
| D-2..... | do..... | do..... | New York..... | No..... | Do. |
| D-3..... | do..... | do..... | New London... | No..... | Do. |

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| da. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|---------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| do—con. | | | | | |
| | New London.... | New London.... | Newport..... | No..... | Defective battery. |
| | do..... | do..... | New London.... | No..... | Not suitable due to age and type. |
| | New York yard. | New York yard. | New York yard. | No..... | Undergoing overhauling; not suitable due to type. |
| | San Pedro..... | San Pedro..... | San Pedro..... | No..... | Material condition good, but not for distant service, due to type of engine and age of battery. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | Engine in bad condition; need of battery overhauling. |
| | Charleston..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Engine in bad condition. |
| | Hawaiian Islands. | Hawaiian Islands. | Hawaiian Islands. | No..... | Batteries in need of renewal. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | Tampa, Fla..... | Pensacola..... | Hampton Roads | No..... | Need of battery overhaul. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | Hawaiian Islands. | Hawaiian Islands. | Hawaiian Islands. | No..... | Batteries in need of renewal. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Defective battery. |
| | Mobile..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | Pensacola..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Need of yard work for various alterations before being ready. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| REB. | | | | | |
| | Boston..... | Guantanamo..... | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| | Philadelphia..... | Philadelphia..... | New York..... | No..... | Under repair until June 8, 1917. |
| | Guacanayabo Bay. | Entrance, Key West. | Charleston..... | No..... | Under repairs. |
| torpedo | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | do..... | No..... | Under repairs; not suitable. |
| torpedo | Annapolis..... | Newport News.. | Newport News.. | No..... | Do. |
| | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | Norfolk..... | No..... | Under repairs to turbines. |
| | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| | Philadelphia..... | Delaware Breakwater. | Philadelphia..... | No..... | External boiler repairs. |
| | Norfolk..... | Newport News.. | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Under repairs until May 31, 1917. |
| | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | Norfolk..... | No..... | In need of repairs to maneuvering valves. |
| | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | Yorktown..... | No..... | Repairs to maneuvering valves; completed May 10. |
| | do..... | Boston..... | Norfolk..... | Yes..... | |
| | Guantanamo..... | Guacanayabo to New York. | New York..... | No..... | Under repairs; completed May 9, 1916. |
| | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |
| | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | New York..... | Yes..... | |
| | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Asiatic station.. | Yes..... | |

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DESTROYERS—con. | | | | | |
| Drayton..... | Guacanayabo Bay. | Entrance, Key West. | Jacksonville..... | Yes..... | .. |
| Duncan..... |do..... | Guacanayabo to Boston. | Boston..... | Yes..... | |
| Ericsson..... |do..... | Guacanayabo to New York. | Yorktown..... | Yes..... | |
| Fanning..... |do..... | Guacanayabo Bay. |do..... | No..... | In need of repairs destroyer force letter R-34 (6) d Apr. 7, 1917. |
| Flusser..... | Charleston..... | New Orleans.... | New Orleans.... | No..... | Under repairs until Apr. 12, 1917. |
| Henley..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Under repairs to machine. |
| Jacob Jones..... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia... | Hampton Roads | Yes..... | |
| Jarvis..... | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | Philadelphia.... | No..... | Condenser bad completed May 15, 1917. |
| Jenkins..... | Boston..... | Pensacola..... | New York..... | No..... | Under repairs. |
| Jouett..... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... | No..... | Bad boilers; repairs to June 6, 1917. |
| Lamson..... | Baton Rouge.... | Beaumont..... | Norfolk..... | No..... | Machinery repairs until May 19, 1917. |
| McCall..... | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | Philadelphia.... | No..... | Repairs until May 23, 1917. |
| McDougal..... | Guacanayabo.... | Guacanayabo.... | York River..... | Yes..... | |
| Monaghan..... | Cookland..... | Beaumont..... | Key West..... | No..... | In operation, but in need of repairs; required from May 4 to June 14 to fit out. |
| Nicholson..... | Guacanayabo... | Guacanayabo... | York River..... | No..... | In need of repairs; ready by May 12. |
| O'Brien..... |do..... |do..... |do..... | No..... | In need of repairs to main air pumps; ready May 12. |
| Parker..... |do..... |do..... |do..... | No..... | In need of repairs. |
| Patterson..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Yes..... | |
| Paulding..... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... |do..... | Yes..... | |
| Porter..... | Guacanayabo.... | Guacanayabo.... | York River..... | Yes..... | |
| Preston..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Required new blowers; completed in June 1917. |
| Reid..... | Charleston..... | Brunswick..... | Key West..... | Yes..... | |
| Roe..... |do..... | Charleston..... | Savannah..... | Yes..... | |
| Rowan..... | Pensacola..... | Guacanayabo.... | York River..... | Yes..... | |
| Sampson..... | New York..... | New York..... | Norfolk..... | Yes..... | |
| Smith..... | New Orleans.... |do..... | New York..... | No..... | In need of 60 days' work on Mar. 1 overhauling begun in Charleston; completed June 30, 1917. |
| Sterrett..... | Baton Rouge.... | Beaumont..... | Charleston..... | No..... | Under repairs. |
| Stewart..... | Mare Island.... | Cristobal..... | At sea, Central American waters. | Yes..... | |
| Terry..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | No..... | Repairs to condensers; completed May 2, 1917. |
| Trippe..... | Boston..... | New York..... | New York..... | Yes..... | |
| Truxtun..... | Puget Sound.... | Cristobal..... | Cristobal..... | No..... | In need of repairs completed Aug 9, 1917. |
| Tucker..... | Guacanayabo Bay. | Guacanayabo Bay. | At sea, North Atlantic. | Yes..... | |
| Wadsworth..... |do..... | Guantanamo.... | York River..... | Yes..... | |
| Wainwright..... |do..... | Guacanayabo.... |do..... | Yes..... | |
| Walker..... | Norfolk..... | Norfolk..... | New York..... | No..... | Under repairs to June 9, 1917. |
| Warrington..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Under repairs to May 23, 1917. |

TABLE A.—Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917.—(Continued.)

| Vessels. | Feb. 4, 1917. | Mar. 4, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness— Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| DESTROYERS—CON. | | | | | |
| Thetis..... | San Diego..... | Cristobal..... | Balboa..... | No..... | Under repairs. Required new evaporators, com- pleted June 6, 1917. |
| Vixen..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | York River..... | No..... | |
| Vinslow..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | Yes..... | |
| MINERS, THIRD CLASS. | | | | | |
| Salmon..... | Salina Cruz..... | Salina Cruz, Mexico..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | Material. |
| Tacoma..... | Tampico..... | Tampico..... | Tampico..... | Yes..... | |
| Yorktown..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Yes..... | |
| MONITORS. | | | | | |
| Thetis..... | San Francisco..... | San Pedro..... | San Pedro..... | No..... | Repairs needed to propeller and stern tube. Unserviceable. |
| Monadnock..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | Asiatic station..... | No..... | |
| IN COMMISSION IN RESERVE. | | | | | |
| DESTROYERS. | | | | | |
| Hopkins..... | San Francisco..... | San Pedro..... | San Pedro..... | No..... | In reserve; no limited duty; had shafting. |
| Hull..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | |
| Lawrence..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | In reserve; had condensers. |
| MacDonough..... | Pensacola..... | Pensacola..... | Galveston..... | No..... | |
| Paul Jones..... | San Diego..... | San Diego..... | San Francisco..... | No..... | Reserve. |
| Perry..... | Key Port, Wash..... | Key Port..... | Key Port..... | No..... | |
| Preble..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | Mare Island..... | No..... | In reserve; repairs; new shafts re- quired. |
| Warden..... | Charleston..... | Pensacola..... | Galveston..... | No..... | |
| TORPEDO BOAT. | | | | | |
| Farragut..... | San Pedro..... | San Pedro..... | San Pedro..... | No..... | In need of repairs; reserve. |
| MONITORS. | | | | | |
| Amphitrite..... | New York..... | New York..... | New Haven..... | No..... | Not suitable. Do. |
| Monterey..... | Cavite..... | Cavite..... | Cavite..... | No..... | |
| GUNBOATS. | | | | | |
| Petrel..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | Guantanamo..... | No..... | |
| Vicksburg..... | Seattle..... | Seattle..... | Bremerton..... | No..... | |
| SPECIAL TYPE. | | | | | |
| Panther (tender)..... | Breton Channel, Cuba..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Repairs. |
| Vesuvius (torpedo practice ship)..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | No..... | Not suitable. |
| IN COMMISSION IN ORDINARY. | | | | | |
| MONITOR. | | | | | |
| Tonopah..... | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Need of new boll- ers. |

TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

| Vessels. | Feb. 6, 1917. | Mar. 6, 1917. | Apr. 6, 1917. | Status of readiness—Ready for distant service. | Reason for state of unreadiness. |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| TORPEDO BOATS. | | | | | |
| Barney..... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... | Philadelphia.... | No..... | In need of repairs, ordinary. |
| Biddle..... | Annapolis..... | Annapolis..... | Annapolis..... | No..... | Do. |
| Blakely..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | Newport..... | No..... | Ordinary. |
| Bahlgren..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | No..... | Repairs, ordinary. |
| De Long..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | In need of repairs, ordinary. |
| Dupont..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Under repairs, ordinary. |
| Foote..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | No..... | In need of repairs, ordinary. |
| Goldsborough.... | Puget Sound.... | Astoria..... | Entrance, Puget Sound. | No..... | Do. |
| Morris..... | Newport..... | New York..... | Newport..... | No..... | Ordinary. |
| Rodgers..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | In need of repairs, ordinary. |
| Shubrick..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | Charleston..... | No..... | Do. |
| Somers..... | Illinois Naval Militia. | | | No..... | Do. |
| SUBMARINES. | | | | | |
| E-2..... | New York..... | New York..... | Newport..... | No..... | Installing new machinery. |
| F-1..... | Mare Island.... | Mare Island.... | Mare Island.... | No..... | Need of new engines. |
| F-2..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| F-3..... | do..... | do..... | do..... | No..... | Do. |
| H-3..... | A ground on Humblot Bar. | | California..... | No..... | Aground; need of refit. |
| GUNBOATS. | | | | | |
| Don Juan de Austria. | Detroit..... | Detroit..... | Detroit..... | No..... | Out of commission. |
| Isla de Luzon..... | Rochester, N.Y.. | Rochester, N.Y.. | Rochester, N.Y.. | No..... | Do. |
| Marietta..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | Boston..... | No..... | Do. |
| Newport (New State school ship). | New York..... | New York..... | New York..... | No..... | Do. |
| Princeton..... | Bremerton..... | Bremerton..... | Bremerton..... | No..... | Do. |
| Ranger (Massachusetts State school ship). | | | | No..... | Do. |
| Sandoval..... | Great Lakes.... | Great Lakes.... | Great Lakes.... | No..... | Do. |

B is a table that I referred to in my statement, showing the vessels by types, battleships, and so on, the number of vessels completed on April 6, 1917, the number authorized or building, and the total. The same figures are given for November 1, 1918. And in another column is given the number of vessels of each type abroad on December 1, 1918. That is just taken as completing the turnaround, because we had the data of that date. That was after the armistice, but it was still the carrying on, bringing the troops home and that sort of thing. On December 1, 1918, we had not gotten much stuff back then. This shows the number that were running back and forth in the transport of troops, etc.

The table B last referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:

TABLE B.

| Type. | Apr. 6, 1917. | | | Nov. 1, 1918. | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| | Com- pleted. | Author- ized or building. | Total. | Com- pleted. | Author- ized or building. | Total. | Abroad on Dec. 1, 1918. |
| Battleships, single caliber..... | 14 | 15 | 29 | 16 | 13 | 29 | 10 |
| Battleships, mixed caliber..... | 23 | | 23 | 23 | | 23 | |
| Battle cruisers..... | | 6 | 6 | | 6 | 6 | |
| Armored cruisers..... | 9 | | 9 | 8 | | 8 | (1) |
| Monitors..... | 7 | | 7 | 7 | | 7 | |
| Cruisers, first-class..... | 5 | | 5 | 4 | | 4 | 3 |
| Cruisers, second-class..... | 4 | 10 | 14 | 4 | 10 | 14 | 3 |
| Cruisers, third-class..... | 16 | | 16 | 15 | | 15 | 10 |
| Destroyers..... | 51 | 57 | 108 | 92 | 250 | 342 | 90 |
| Coast torpedo vessels..... | 16 | | 16 | 15 | | 15 | 10 |
| Torpedo boats..... | 17 | | 17 | 17 | | 17 | |
| Submarines..... | 44 | 99 | 143 | 79 | 109 | 181 | 30 |
| Tenders..... | 8 | 3 | 11 | 17 | 3 | 20 | 10 |
| Gunboats..... | 28 | 2 | 30 | 37 | 2 | 39 | 25 |
| Transports..... | 4 | 2 | 6 | 56 | 1 | 57 | (1) |
| Supply ships..... | 4 | 1 | 5 | 5 | | 5 | (1) |
| Hospital ships..... | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 7 | (1) |
| Fuel ships..... | 22 | 3 | 25 | 21 | 3 | 24 | (1) |
| Miscellaneous steam and motor patrol vessels..... | 14 | | 14 | 692 | | 692 | 125 |
| Patrol boats (Eagle)..... | | | | 2 | 98 | 100 | |
| Submarine chasers..... | | | | 300 | 42 | 342 | 135 |
| Mine sweepers..... | | | | 88 | 40 | 128 | |
| Tugs..... | 49 | 2 | 51 | 77 | 81 | 158 | |
| Special types..... | 8 | 3 | 11 | 13 | 3 | 16 | 12 |
| Total..... | 344 | 204 | 548 | 1,594 | 655 | 2,249 | 463 |

1 Back and forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I made several requests to the Secretary for this information about the condition of the ships on April 6, and on dates prior thereto, and I did not get the information that I wanted. However, recently the Secretary has told me that you and Capt. Pratt would give me information on this matter.

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On April 21 I wrote a letter to the Secretary, which I will show you now, and which I will put in the record at this point, as well as his reply.

(The letters referred to, which were here handed to Admiral McKean and examined by him, are as follows:)

APRIL 21, 1920.

To HON. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is requested that the Navy Department furnish the following information to the Senate Subcommittee on Naval Affairs on or before Wednesday next, the 28th of April:

I. For each and every individual battleship on the Navy list on the 2d of February, 1917—

(a) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(b) State exactly where located then.

(c) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(d) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.

(e) State percentage of personnel then on board in terms of per cent of full war complements as 100 per cent.

II. For each and every individual battleship on the Navy list on the 6th of April, 1917—

(a) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(b) State exactly where located then.

(c) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(d) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.

(e) State percentage of personnel then on board in terms of per cent of full war complements as 100 per cent.

III. For each and every individual battleship on the Navy list on the 7th of April, 1917, which was then not in proper material condition for instant war service overseas and which then had not on board its full complement of officers and men:

(a) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was started.

(b) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was completed.

(c) State yard (or other place) where repairs were made.

(d) State date upon which each ship obtained its full war complement of officers and men.

IV. State for each and every individual battleship its apportionment of reserve shells for its main battery in terms of rounds for each ship calculated from the total reserve of shells ready but not on board on the 7th of April, 1917.

V. For each and every individual cruiser on the Navy list on the 2d of February, 1917:

(a) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(b) State exactly where located then.

(c) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(d) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.

(e) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complement being taken as 100 per cent.

VI. For each and every individual cruiser on the Navy list on the 6th of April, 1917:

(a) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(b) State exactly where located then.

(c) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(d) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.

(e) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complements being taken as 100 per cent.

VII. For each and every individual cruiser on the Navy list on the 7th of April, 1917, which was then not in proper material condition for instant war service overseas and which then had not on board its full war complement of officers and men:

(a) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was started.

(b) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was completed.

(c) State yard (or other place) where repairs were made.

(d) State date upon which each ship obtained its full war complement of officers and men.

VIII. State for each and every individual cruiser its apportionment of reserve shells for its main battery in terms of rounds for each cruiser calculated from the total reserve of shells ready but not on board on the 7th of April, 1917.

IX. For each and every individual destroyer on the Navy list on the 2d of February, 1917.

(a) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(b) State exactly where located then.

(c) State number of days when necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(d) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complements being taken as 100 per cent.

X. For each and every individual destroyer on the Navy list on the 6th of April, 1917

(a) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(b) State exactly where located then.

(c) State number of days when necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(d) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complements being taken as 100 per cent.

XI. For each and every individual destroyer on the Navy list on the 7th of April, 1917, which was then not in proper material condition for instant war service overseas and which then had not on board its full war complement of officers and men.

- a. State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was started.
- b. State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was completed.
- c. State yard (or other place) where repairs were made.
- d. State date upon which each destroyer obtained its full war complement of officers and men.

XII. State number of depth bombs for use on destroyers on hand and ready 7th of April, 1917.

It is requested that the Navy Department's report in reply be accompanied by separate tabulation for battleships, cruisers, and destroyers as per the inclosed forms.

Yours truly,

FREDERICK HALE.

DESTROYERS.

| Name of destroyer. | Par. I. | | | | | Par. II. | | | | | Par. III. | | | | Par. V. |
|--------------------|---------|---|---|---|---|----------|---|---|---|---|-----------|---|---|---|---------|
| | a | b | c | d | e | a | b | c | d | e | a | b | c | d | |
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CRUISERS.

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BATTLESHIPS.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| B | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| D | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| E | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

Washington, D. C., April 23, 1920.

MY DEAR SENATOR:

I am in receipt of your favor asking for certain information, and in reply I have to state that I have asked the Office of Naval Operations to prepare a statement which will give you the information requested.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

HON. FREDERICK HALE,

United States Senate, Washington.

Admiral McKEAN. This is the first time I have seen this letter, Mr. Chairman. I think that it is possible that I have submitted here what will answer your questions for each type of ship, under sub-heads "A" and "B," but as to the others, it will take the various bureaus of the department concerned some time, and in some cases it will have to be referred to the yards to collect that data, and I suppose that it is being done. I had not seen this before, but your letter would be rather to the bureaus. For instance, as to ammunition, it would have to go to the Bureau of Ordnance. Second, it would have to go to the Bureau of Navigation, and they will have to go through a great many things.

Then, as to the repairs, the two bureaus of Construction and Repair and of Steam Engineering may be able to answer that in the office of material, but in some cases they would have to refer to yards. I have some other tables taken in connection with this, and that will show for the battleships, the dreadnoughts, and the predreadnoughts, and the battle cruisers, the number of days repair in each of three years, 1917, 1918, and 1919. I got that up as illustrative material independent of this. I got the officers in the department to get it together for me.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to have some table that represents the whole matter clearly, so that we will not have to refer to different papers.

Admiral McKEAN. I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you see that it is made up in the form requested in this letter?

Admiral McKEAN. Will you let me have this copy?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and submit it to the committee as soon as possible, because we want to wind up the record.

Admiral McKEAN. It is going to take some time unless they have been working on it from the jump off. It will take some little time to get that data together and get it tabulated; but the department can do it, I am sure, and I will take it up.

As to the figures I have just cited, I gave those in my direct testimony yesterday.

Memorandum C is the memorandum I also referred to in yesterday's testimony from Admiral Osterhaus, showing the vessels taken over through the naval districts division during the whole period of the war through commandeering, purchase, charter, and lease, and also the total number of vessels taken over during the war from other governmental departments. That includes all sorts of vessels, motor boats, yachts, tugs, steamers, steam lighters, trawlers, and fish boats and barges, and so on, while the vessels taken from other Government departments include Coast Guard, Lighthouse Service and other vessels; cargo vessels converted to troop transports and operated by the Navy for the Army.

The list C last referred to is here printed as follows:

C.

MARCH 19, 1920

MEMORANDUM.

1. The following gives a grand summary of the total number of vessels of various types which were taken over through the naval districts division during the whole period of war, either through commandeering, purchase, charter, or lease; also the total number of vessels taken over during the war from other governmental departments:

1. Private vessels taken over by the Navy (through commandeering, purchase, charter, or lease):
- | | |
|----------------------------------|----|
| Motorboats..... | : |
| Yachts..... | : |
| Tugs..... | : |
| Steamers..... | : |
| Steam lighters and lighters..... | : |
| Trawlers and fishboats..... | : |
| Tanker (oil)..... | : |
| Ferry and house boats..... | : |
| Barges..... | : |
| Total..... | 1, |

Taken over by Navy from other Government departments and assigned duty in naval districts during war:

| | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Coast Guard..... | 41 |
| Lighthouse Service..... | 50 |
| Coast and Geodetic Survey..... | 4 |
| Immigration Service..... | 2 |
| Public Health Service..... | 1 |
| Bureau of Fisheries..... | 4 |
| Panama Canal..... | 6 |
| Canadian Government (loaned) (drifters and trawlers)..... | 27 |
| Total..... | 135 |
| Grand total..... | 1, 245 |

H. OSTERHAUS.

Total number of cargo vessels, etc., converted to troop transports and operated by the Navy for the Army:

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Cargo vessels..... | 70 |
| Battleships and cruisers..... | 25 |
| Ex-German..... | 9 |
| Ex-German and American passenger vessels carrying troops previous to armistice..... | 45 |
| Total..... | 149 |

Total number of merchant ships remodeled for armed guards and guns, 384.

Total (highest) number of N. O. T. S. ships, 378.

December 10, 1918.

Appendix D is the first of a number of departmental policies which I succeeded in having established as assistant for personnel, and which I referred to yesterday, and my effort was wherever I could establish a general policy that was applicable to a great many conditions and circumstances, I would write out this policy, that is, as to material, get my chief's approval and the Secretary's approval, so that we would not have to take up every individual case of every individual ship, and thereby cause delay with the bureaus or yards, and the fleet as well as the Secretary and the Chief of Operations; so that having established these policies, everybody would know the plans along which we were working and the effort was to reduce correspondence, reduce detailed orders, and reduce the time that I had to spend in getting signatures to separate papers. [Reading:]

D.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 10, 1915.

To: All bureaus and navy yards and stations, commandant Marine Corps, commander in chief, and board of inspection and survey.

Subject: Regular overhaul periods of vessels abolished.

1. The department announces the abolition of the regular three months overhaul periods for all ships. There will be two docking periods yearly, not to exceed two weeks each.

2. Only necessary repairs, beyond the capacity of the fleet, previously authorized and which can be done within the docking period, shall be performed by the navy yard.

3. Vessels will go to navy yards for yard work at other than docking times only when absolutely necessary to maintain their military efficiency, after recommendation by the board of inspection. The ship will not be ordered to the yard until the yard reports all plans and material ready to begin actual work, after approval of estimates, and work will be pushed to completion by ship and yard forces. In this connection the following is quoted from department's letter No. 28024-161 of July 29, 1915, relative to repairs on Delaware.

Then I quote an illustrative letter in regard to the *Delaware*. The ships had been going to the yards once every 15 months for a three months overhaul period, whether they needed the overhaul or not. The men were given leave, the officers got their leave, and it meant that your ship was in the yard at least for that 3 months out of every 15 months, besides the other docking period. We attempted to increase the number of available days for operating with the fleet, to reduce the number of days in the navy yard, to reduce the cost by making the ship's force do all they could, and the repair ship do all she could, before the ship went to the yard, and to keep ships out of the yards, because our yards were inadequate to sustain the fleet even in 1915; and it was along that line we were working in establishing that system. This letter is as follows: [Continuing reading:]

4. The *Delaware* is at that stage of her career where a complete and thorough overhaul is absolutely necessary to secure the safety of the personnel and the life of the metal and equipment. Owing to the service which she has been called upon to perform, the readiness in which she had been held, and the continual shortening of overhaul and docking periods, items of overhaul have been postponed until attention to them is imperative.

The department does not desire that any vessel be permitted to leave a navy yard after an overhaul in a condition that allows any doubt to exist as to the ability of the vessel to maintain its position in the fleet or respond to any full-power trial. The object of an overhaul is to place the vessel in the best material condition for battle, and while it is desirable to limit the stay of a vessel at a navy yard so far as possible, this should not be done at the expense of military efficiency.

We were preparing the fleet all the time, from my desk point of view, for fighting. That is the only reason we sent ships to the navy yards. [Continuing reading:]

4. Only such alterations will be approved as are clearly necessary to definitely and directly increase her military efficiency, either by increasing her "h. p. g. p. m.": her knots per hour or per pound of fuel, or by increasing the health and vigor of the crew, or decreasing their necessary routine labors which will increase their military efficiency.

5. All ship's spare parts and equipment at yards and on board should be immediately replaced when used or old ones repaired if advisable for replacement.

6. An "availability factor" is to be introduced in the "battle efficiency" computation.

That was to introduce the competitive business we had in target practice, a ship being self-maintaining, and being of use for more days in the year. I made up a table for the three previous years, which showed that the average ship had been 33½ per cent of her time in the navy yard, although the average steaming at that time was only, for a battleship, about 10,000 miles a year. Our effort was to increase her military efficiency and reduce that percentage of time in the navy yard, and we were getting along fine up to the time the war broke out. [Continuing reading:]

7. Leave periods will not be coincident with docking or repair periods for following reasons.

That was prolonging the stay in navy yards. The men got the idea—and the officers, too—that they could put off jobs that would last until they got their overhaul period, and then the yard would do it and they would not have to do it. [Continuing reading:]

7. Leave periods will not be coincident with docking and repair periods for following reasons:

- (a) Navy yard inspection now reduced to that done by ship's officers.
- (b) Ship's force should do all work within their capacity according to the provisions of law.

- (c) Time in yard will be reduced and consequent disorganization of crew minimized.
- (d) Leave period should follow overhaul to encourage everybody, officers and men, to reduce stay in yard to minimum.

Then, here is another policy which is important:

8. New construction will be used by the yards in endeavoring to maintain a uniform labor roll. In this connection attention is invited to policy already announced in department's letter No. 8557-167, of July 29, 1915, pertaining to work on *Tacoma*, which reads in part as follows:

"The industrial manager, Portsmouth Navy Yard, has requested that work on the *Tacoma* be postponed as necessary, partly in order to maintain a uniform labor roll at the yard, and partly due to insufficient money allotments.

"The department takes this occasion to announce the following policy: When a vessel suitable for war service arrives at a yard to be placed out of commission, in reserve or in ordinary, her full crew of officers and men will be kept intact until all authorized work is completed and the vessel is placed in the best possible material condition for battle. Work to this end will proceed with the utmost dispatch following approval of estimates after inspection by the board of inspection and survey. Such vessel will not be used for the purpose of maintaining a uniform labor roll (new vessels under construction should be used for this purpose); and such money allotments should be requested as necessary to carry out the general policy outlined above."

That was to provide for ships going into reserve being put into fit condition before they went into reserve, so that the reserve complement I spoke of yesterday could keep them fit, and so that we would know that when we called on them, they would be efficient for business. [Continuing reading:]

9. Sufficient time must be allowed officers and crew to perform routine overhaul and necessary repairs on board, as required, to the end that each ship will at all times be in first-class condition and able to properly maintain station in battle line.

That was necessary because always, when we get to sea, especially flag officers, we want all our ships all the time. That is the only training that a flag officer gets and he hates to see one of his ships drop out of his division, because then he only has three; and it is a good deal like an old hen with her chickens, he wants the whole crowd there all the time, because that is where he gets his training for fighting, and if you do not watch for and catch them, they are unconsciously and unintentionally liable to sacrifice the opportunities for repairs and improvement to their own training and operations. I am now looking at it from a different point of view from that at the time when I wrote that letter. I will probably have to be posted myself, now, to give the ships a chance. [Continuing reading:]

10. The department believes that the policy above outlined will materially increase the military efficiency of the fleet, and was largely influenced in its decision by the following favorable resultant items:

- 1. The military efficiency of the "fleet" becomes of first importance and yard activities supplemental thereto.
- 2. All officers and men on board to assist in and inspect work at yards.
- 3. Reduced expenditures for alterations which do not increase efficiency of ships.
- 4. Maintain continuous efficiency of each ship.

There is a thing that we had to watch all the time. Every captain and every officer of a ship wants for his ship—never mind what her vintage was—all the latest fittings, target practice and signals and all that. He wants his ship just as good as anybody else's, and it is very proper that he should feel that way; but we had to put time limits on some of them, and we could not take the *Kearsarge*, for instance, and remodel her to bring her up to the efficiency of the

Pennsylvania, because we would have had to rebuild a ship under the name of repairs and then we would not have had anything but an old one-horse shay, anyway; so that we limit and classify the repairs that can go on ships. One class we will bring up to date and another class up to another date, depending on their age, and we will save money and save the navy yards. [Continuing reading:]

11. The docking periods for the battleships of the Atlantic Fleet will be as follows: All ships at home yards October 1 to 15, 1915; April 15 to 30, 1916; and October 1 to 15, 1916.

12. Exceptions to the above policy will only be made on approval of the department. Work already authorized on ships for overhaul period October–December, 1915, will be carried out, but should be pushed to prompt completion.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

That was the previous overhaul period set for the ships before their going south to the southern drill ground in the winter of 1915–16.

Senator TRAMMELL. The date of that letter is August 10, 1915?

Admiral McKEAN. August 10, 1915; yes sir. I think I said that was the first policy, but I notice that the one previous to that was July 29, 1915.

The next memorandum is dated August 24, 1915. [Reading:]

E.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 24, 1915.

Memorandum for Chief of Operations.

Policy as to preparation of the fleet materially for war and its maintenance in readiness at all times.

(1) Active fleet: All vessels in commission with the active fleets in the Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet.

(2) Reserve fleet: All vessels in reserve, ready materially but with only reserve complements of officers and men on board.

(3) Coast-defense fleet (includes advance bases): (1) Coast-defense battleships, (2) coast-defense monitors, (3) coast-defense submarines, (4) coast-defense surface torpedo craft, (5) coast-defense hydroplanes, (6) coast-defense dirigibles, (7) coast guard patrols, (8) lighthouse tenders (patrols), (10) coast mine planters, (11) coast mine trawlers, (12) converted yachts, (13) gas power boats for offensive against subs.

Those are vessels that are not intended for foreign service under any conditions. They had been relegated to the rear rank, for coast defense pure and simple. [Continuing reading:]

1. The active fleet: All units of the active fleet to be kept in first-class condition at all times by the crews. Whenever repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force are found necessary, then the procedure laid down in department's letter No. 20392–560 to be followed.

2. The reserve fleet: All ships now in reserve to be immediately placed in first-class condition and then to be so maintained by the reserve complements assigned to them. To be at all times ready for immediate commissioning for service with the active fleet. Vessels hereafter going into reserve will follow the procedure laid down in department's letter No. 8557–167 of July 29, 1915.

3. Ships in ordinary: These vessels will be at once put in material condition to permit them to perform their war duties as coast defense vessels. The nucleus crews assisted by the organizations—Naval Militia and Naval Reserves—who will constitute the crews of these vessels in war will maintain them in efficient condition. They will only be sent to navy yards for docking repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force.

That is, we were not going to spend any more money on those ships than was necessary to keep them fit for that duty alone, of coast defense.

Next is the policy letter which I have marked "F." [Reading:]

F.

POLICY.

No. 20392-560.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 27, 1915.**To:** Commanders in Chief Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Pacific Reserve Fleet.**Subject:** Overhaul of ships.**Reference:** (a) Department letter 20392-560 of August 10, 1915, regular overhaul periods abolished.

1. In order to assist in carrying out the provisions of reference (a), the commander in chief will report to the department when it becomes evident that a ship will, in the near future, require considerable navy-yard work.

That is to give us notice in the yards.

2. Date when the ship can best be spared for overhaul should be noted. Also inform the department when the ship will be at her home yard for inspection, in order that the board of inspection and survey may be instructed.

3. The inspection should be held sufficiently in advance of time proposed for beginning work, to enable the yard to make its plans and provide material after receipt of approved estimates based on report of inspection.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Acting*.

You can see, there, the policy was to send the ships and to have them inspected, and based on that inspection to send them to the navy yard, and to make those plans and estimates and collect the material and as soon as the inspection was completed of a ship she went back to the fleet, and then she would not go to the yard until the yard reported to the commander in chief that they were ready to go ahead with her. Our plan was that when she came into the navy yard and the gangplank went out, the workmen came aboard ready to go to work.

The CHAIRMAN. What would become of her if the yard was not ready?

Admiral McKEAN. They would not let the commander in chief know, and if they did not make their dates, I or some one in my office went up to find out why.

The CHAIRMAN. But after a ship was reported ready for repairs, provided the yard was not ready to take her in, what would happen to the vessel? She would stay at the yard?

Admiral McKEAN. You see, she would first go to the yard for inspection, and then she would go back to the fleet and work with the fleet so as not to interfere with her drill and training of the men, until the yard was ready for her. Often the yard was not ready for her as quickly as we would have liked, because of lack of capacity to do the work that was to be done.

Here is a circular letter which I have marked "G," of September 3, 1915. [Reading:]

G.

CIRCULAR LETTER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., September 3, 1915.**To:** Commandants of navy yards and stations, all bureaus and commanders in chief.
Subject: Docking of vessels during overhaul

1. Hereafter when a vessel is to be docked during an overhaul period, the docking should take place as early as possible during the period in order that any defects developing from an inspection while in dock may be noted and full information pertaining thereto be available for the completion of any necessary work entailed within the period set for that overhaul.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Acting*.

The purpose of that was, we had a particular case; a ship had been in a yard for a month or two months, I have forgotten just the time, and we always liked to have her go out with as clean a bottom as possible. The next docking will be dated from the last. We had had this ship there for two months. We put her in the dock and pumped it out and found a defective shaft which we had to remove. We had expected her to go out in four or five days, but she was as long getting this shaft repaired as it took to do the other work. To avoid such things as that, we would put her in and clean her bottom, inspect it and inspect the fittings, and if there was work to be done on her of that sort we did it at the same time we did this other work above water, so as to save time. That was the beauty about having this policy developed. Everybody knew about it. I do not mean that it is a completely developed system yet, but it is better than none.

Here is a series of memorandums which I have marked "H." There is a good deal of this particular thing, but it is illustrative of what we were doing toward developing shore stations and navy yards to take care of ships, and, as I stated in my narrative yesterday, the first thing that I discovered was the absolute inability of the navy yards to take care of the fleet, and I was trying from the beginning to build up these bases so that they could. The policy had been that every dollar of appropriation should be spent and go to sea; and I have heard it very thoroughly approved of by members of both the majority and the minority of the House Naval Committee; and I had a hard time getting them to see it the other way; that we had to have our yards, and that you could not operate ships without bases to work them from. I was decidedly in the minority in the hearings for some time. This first memorandum is dated September 25, 1915. [Reading:]

H.

[Ref. A.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, September 25, 1915.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Navy yard, Norfolk, training station, St. Helena, etc.

1. The department now has before it for consideration several propositions affecting the whole future of this yard and station. They are interdependent and should be considered together and a final definite scheme for the development of this most important yard and station should be adopted and hereafter followed until the yard has reached the full limit of its usefulness.

2. The various subjects in the order of their importance are as follows:

1. The location of a new dry dock.
2. The location of torpedo-boat building ways.
3. The provision of the necessary fuel-oil storage.
4. The remodeling or abandonment of St. Helena as a training station, doing away with receiving ships, etc.
5. The location of a submarine shore base.
6. The widening of the channel between the yard and training station to permit of the safe handling of large ships.

3. In order that this whole question may be settled satisfactorily and a consistent plan be developed, it is recommended that a board, consisting of the Chiefs of Bureaus of Navigation, Construction and Repair, Yards and Docks, and the assistant for material in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy as chairman, be ordered to meet at once and consider and report on the whole subject and submit a definite plan at the earliest practicable date.



This was done. The report of the board is attached, dated October 12, 1915. It gives the general recommendations with reference to the development of the Norfolk yard. [Reading:]

[Ref. B.]

OCTOBER 12, 1915.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Report of the board submitting a definite plan for the future development of the Norfolk Navy Yard and Station.

1. In obedience to your order of October 6, 1915, the board met in the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy on Saturday, October 9, 1915, and considered all the previous reports, blue prints, and correspondence in connection with the various subjects before it.

2. In view of the ships built, building, and planned and the growing importance of the Norfolk Navy Yard to the fleet, the board considers it absolutely necessary to begin immediately the development of the Norfolk Navy Yard to meet modern conditions.

3. To make such development economically and efficiently, the board is of the opinion that the layout of the water front and its development is the first logical step.

4. There is attached hereto a blue print showing the general layout of the Schmoele tract water front, the location of the dry docks, the location of the building ways, the general location of the working basin, principal shops, and the turning basin.

5. The board took up for consideration the various subjects referred to it in the order given and submits recommendations thereon as follows:

(1) The location of the first new dry dock. The board recommends the location adopted by the department in its seventh indorsement of July 23, 1915 (No. 5267-479), as shown on Yards and Docks blue print 64669; also shown on the attached blue print.

(2) The location of torpedo boat building ways. The board recommends the location adopted by the department in its seventh indorsement of July 23, 1915 (No. 5267-479), as shown on Yards and Docks blue print No. 64669; also shown on the attached blue print.

(3) The provision of the necessary fuel-oil storage. In view of the interference with other more important developments and the danger of fire to shops, buildings, and ships at the yard, the board recommends:

(a) That there be no further oil storage located on the Schmoele tract.

(b) That there be no further oil-fuel storage located on St. Helena.

(c) That future oil storage be underground on a convenient site located on Hampton Roads, the James River, or the York River.

(d) That the oil-fuel storage be located on the new site selected for the training station, if there be sufficient room, and it can be made sufficiently accessible to ships, barges, etc., by piers or pipe lines.

(4) The remodeling or abandonment of St. Helena as a training station, doing away with receiving ships, etc.

After considering fully all the features of the training station, its defects and limitations, and having in mind the importance of this station to the fleet, the board submits the following recommendations:

(a) Abandon St. Helena as a training station as being inadequate and unsatisfactory in every way even for present conditions and numbers. Also do away with receiving ships and substitute therefor barracks. (The above with a view of economy of maintenance and efficiency.) The present station interferes materially with the full utilization of the navy yard for industrial purposes and military use as a submarine base.

(b) The purchase of a new site and the transfer thereto of the present training station as soon as possible. This new site to be located either:

First. On Hampton Roads, where in addition to serving as training station, it could be used for recreation grounds for the fleet, and as oil fuel station;

Second. On the James River; or

Third. On the York River, in the vicinity of Yorktown.

(5) The location of a submarine shore base. The board recommends that the water front of St. Helena be dredged back to give a minimum of channel of 800 feet between the present yard sea wall and the pierhead line on St. Helena and that the remainder of the St. Helena tract be filled, graded, and developed as a submarine shore base; that this work be provided for in the present appropriation bill, and executed as promptly as possible, all work except dredging and filling to be charged to appropriation for submarine shore base.

(6) The widening of the channel between the yard and the training station. Provided for as above in paragraph 5, by dredging the shore line of St. Helena, so as to give a minimum width of 800 feet between the yard and the pierhead on St. Helena.

(7) The board recommends that the development of the Schmoele tract be as outlined in the attached blue print, commencing with the dry dock and building slip and working toward the south. That coincident with this development the turning basin be dredged to a diameter of 1,500 feet (see blue print), and that the widening of the channel along the front of St. Helena and between St. Helena and the turning basin be proceeded with as soon as possible, this with the idea that the water front and channel development shall be entirely completed prior to the completion of the new Dry Dock No. 4, to permit its immediate use by the largest ships.

7. The board recommends that the following estimates be included in this year's appropriation bill to permit the undertaking of the most urgent of the above recommendations:

(a) Five hundred thousand dollars for—

(1) Development of the water front in the vicinity of the new dry dock and building ways.

(2) The dredging of the turning circle.

(3) Dredging of the channel and water front at St. Helena.

(b) Four hundred thousand dollars for the purchase of the new site for the training station and the removal of the station to such new site. The board recommends that this appropriation be made immediately available in order that the new station may be put in full commission as early as practicable to take care of the increased enlistments which will be called for by increased personnel provided in the present bill.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

VICTOR BLUE,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation.

D. W. TAYLOR,
Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair.

H. R. STANFORD,
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.

J. S. MCKEAN,
Captain, United States Navy, Assistant for Material.

That was followed by a memorandum of January 14, 1916 [reading]:

JANUARY 14, 1916.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Development of navy yard plans.

Mission—to make plans for the development of the various necessary navy yards to their full capacity and greatest efficiency at the least cost of time and money, so that they may be adequate for the use of the fleet in preparation for war and its maintenance in war.

That was our gospel in reference to maintenance and material, in reference to yards [reading]:

The necessary steps in the order of execution for the above are:

1. *A base plan.*—To be developed by the General Board showing all the naval bases necessary in war; the various duties of each of these bases to the fleet; what part of the fleet is to be based thereon; the functions of each arranged in the order of their importance.

2. *An ideal navy yard plan.*—This to be a complete general plan of an ideal navy yard, such as could and should be developed on a new site which had no limitations as to area, depth of water, currents, lack of railroad or other necessary facilities.

3. A general plan (lay-out) of each yard showing its individual best development, giving consideration first to the use of the yard as ordered in the approved base plan, and second to the approved ideal standard plan provided under paragraph 2.

(a) After the approval of the general plan of any yard the sequence of its development should be determined by stages which should be so selected that each stage would be complete in itself and could properly be provided for in the annual appropriation bill. There should be given stages to correspond to the approved building pro-

plan, so that the yards, with all their facilities, would keep step with the growth and development of the fleet and all should be completed by the time the approved building program is completed.

4. *Detailed plans of each yard.* -After the general plan for a yard, with the layout of water front, docks, dry docks, shops, and transportation facilities, has been approved by the department, a set of detailed plans for each dry dock, shop, storehouse, railroad track, etc., should be worked out, with all the specifications for their construction with bills of material and new machines, and complete and detailed estimates of the costs involved. This set of plans should be grouped under the various annual "stages of development" decided on in accordance with paragraph 3, subhead (a), and each stage should be included in the annual estimate for the year to which it belongs.

5. After the development of the detailed plans and their division and classification into logical and complete annual stages, the department will at any time have at hand exact plans and estimates necessary to complete the development of the yard up to its limit of availability in the maintenance of the fleet in war.

6. To carry out the above scheme it is recommended:

a. That the General Board be called upon to submit at the earliest date practicable the base plan called for in paragraph 1. This plan to show in detail all the activities of each yard arranged in the order of their importance, and classified under two headings: (1) Activities in preparation for war; (2) activities during war.

b. That the base plan under (a) when approved by the department be referred to a board to consist of one representative from each of the following bureaus: Navigation, Yards and Docks, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, Ordnance, Medicine and Surgery and a representative of the Major General Commandant, with the assistant for material as chairman, whose duty it will be to provide the ideal or standard navy yard plan and general plans of development layout of each yard. The above board would be too numerous to be effective except as an executive board, so that it would be necessary to designate, as recommended in the letter of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, a subboard or working committee consisting of the representatives of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Yards and Docks to do the actual work on development of the above plans ready to submit to the full board for final decision and approval. The above make certain that the necessities of no bureau have been overlooked or too much limited by the especial interest and appreciation of the activities of the bureaus represented by the working subboard.

c. On the approval by the department of the general plan for any yard, this general plan to be referred to the commandant of such yard, who will order a yard board to work out the detailed development in accordance with the approved general plan. This yard board will list the materials, new machines, cranes, locomotives, and various facilities needed; write the detailed specifications and make the itemized estimates to fulfill the detailed plans. When the above is completed it will be forwarded to the department board, which, if it meets their approval, will submit it to the department, and when approved by the department these detailed plans, specifications, and estimates will become a part of the approved base plans and be included in the portfolio of base plans covering this particular navy yard and will constitute a continuing policy on which the various bureaus will base their annual estimates for such yard.

J. S. McKean.

That is the navy yard development board. That is still working. It started at that time, and taking the most important yards, one at a time, we worked out the details for their development, what it would cost, and then we asked for the items to be put in the estimates each year, and got the appropriations and applied them; and if we had not started something of that kind we would have been less ready, by far, than we were.

Then here is a communication to the Secretary of the Navy as to a base plan for development of navy yards. It gives the thought as to what a base plan should include, and it is very complete. I will put it in the record for the consideration of the committee.

They even assigned ships to home yards by classification, and it was all approved and adopted, and we were working on this fixed plan quite a little while before the war; long enough to establish the habit.

The communication is as follows:

[Ref. D.]

G. D. No. 404-A (Serial No. 480).

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, March 4, 1916.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Base plan for development of navy yards.

References: (a) Navy Department's letter No. 20857-6, of January 20, 1916; (b) G. B. No. 414-1, May 29, 1913, development of fuel depots; (c) G. B. No. 404, December 30, 1913, comment on reports of inspection of Atlantic coast navy yards; (d) G. B. No. 425, January 3, 1916, berthing facilities at navy yards; (e) G. B. No. 404, January 12, 1916, new sites for naval stations at New York and San Francisco Bay; (f) Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; report on preparedness quarter ending December 31, 1915, Exhibit No. 4.

Inclosure: (a) Base plan.

1. The General Board believes that a base plan to be of value in the immediate future should contemplate the use to their greatest capacity of all Government and commercial facilities now available which are required to prepare the fleet for war in accordance with mobilization plans already approved by the department (14 days), and maintain this fleet during war.

2. The immediate development of Government facilities should be to meet these requirements, on lines best adapted to develop ideal conditions in the future, while not diminishing any of the present needed facilities until the ideal has been attained.

3. The navy yards of the country have grown up to meet the needs arising from time to time and their location and equipment is not such as would be now provided if the problem was one to be solved from the beginning at the present time. The consequence is that there is much duplication, stations are established close together, and there is a diffusion of effort, and consequent increase of overhead cost. Economy of administration demands as few naval stations as practicable to accomplish necessary results. This is the theoretical consideration, but the practical consideration which must govern at the present time and probably for some years to come, is that in time of war all the naval facilities that the country possesses will be needed.

4. Before proceeding with the development of the details of such a base plan, the General Board will, in order to avoid a confusion of terms, define certain terms which are used in the plan:

(a) A naval base is generically a center from which a fleet can operate and be maintained.

(b) Permanent naval bases are the fixed naval bases of the country; their numbers, location and character are questions of policy and grand strategy.

(c) Permanent naval bases divide themselves naturally into two classes: Home bases and outlying bases.

(d) Home bases are themselves divided into two classes, main and subsidiary.

(e) A main home base is a base within the continental territory of the country from which the fleet can operate at all times, and which is designed to maintain, supply, and upkeep the fleet at all times, both in peace and war. The base, in this sense, consists not only of the port harbor or estuary from which the fleet may act, but of all the territory and resources tributary to this port or harbor; and must contain all the elements necessary to the maintenance and upkeep of the fleet and for its own defense. A city, harbor, or a navy yard or arsenal in itself in no sense, singly or collectively, constitutes a naval base, though all are elements of such a base. If to a harbor giving sufficient anchorage we add a city or population giving a sufficient supply of labor, a navy yard or arsenal with the requisite docks, shops, etc., giving a sufficient means for repair and upkeep, a tributary territory with efficient means of communication furnishing the requisite supply and resources, and all behind a defense independent of the fleet, then we have a main naval home base.

(f) A subsidiary base is a base that contains elements of a main base in lesser degree; and which, while not capable of supporting and being the home of the whole fleet, may be such for lesser elements and portions of it.

(g) An outlying permanent naval base is one without the continental limits of the country, situated in outlying possessions and designed to be a strong point of support, from which the fleet can operate in war and from which it can be subsisted for limited periods in war.

(h) A navy yard is a docking, repair, and supply station and is always a necessary part of a permanent naval base, but it does not and can not of itself constitute a naval base of any kind, though so generally confused with one.

(i) Advanced bases are outlying naval bases of a temporary character; their location and strength being decided by questions of the immediate strategy and tactics of the campaign requiring them.

5. The General Board submits herewith inclosure A, a base plan in accordance with the foregoing, showing the present assignment and future development recommended.

6. The assignment of ships to home yards by squadrons, divisions, etc., has been considered, but the General Board believes that owing to the present divided navy yard facilities the assignment can be best made at the present time by name (as is now done in G. O. No. 137), on the advice of the technical bureaus as to the present facilities of navy yards, on the following general lines:

- (a) Largest ships to New York yard.
- (b) Next largest ships to Norfolk yard.
- (c) Next largest ships to Boston yard.
- (d) Next largest ships and all ships in reserve to Philadelphia yard.
- (e) Large cruisers to Portsmouth yard.
- (f) Largest vessels on Pacific coast to Puget Sound yard.
- (g) Supply ships to New York yard as far as practicable.
- (h) Colliers to Norfolk yard as far as practicable.
- (i) Oil fuel ships and transports to Philadelphia yard.
- (j) Small cruisers, destroyers, fleet submarines, fleet tugs, and auxiliaries not mentioned above according to yard best fitted at present to look after these vessels in addition to those assigned above.
- (k) Coast patrol ships to yard in or nearest district to which these ships are assigned in war.

7. In reviewing the reports of inspection of merchant vessels the General Board will recommend that repairs and alterations to merchant vessels required for war be undertaken at commercial yards (building or repair yard of ship when practicable) under the supervision of navy-yard authorities in that base, and to be made by such navy yard itself if facilities permit at the time.

8. The items of naval material to be manufactured at any navy yard or commercial articles supplied from any base should be decided by the particular facilities of the yard and market, according to the recommendation of the bureaus concerned as indicated in reference (f).

9. The General Board does not believe that an entire outfit of supplies should be carried at any base for all the ships based at that yard, as some stores will always be on board, and the amount carried should be the probable amount required to complete outfits (Title B, Title X, Provisions and clothing) for six months, as shown by experience.

10. For further detailed recommendations as to future development of navy yards, stations and fuel depots, attention is invited to references (b), (c), (d), and (e), the principles of which are summarized in the following:

- (a) The establishment and development to completion of four great naval home bases, two on the Atlantic and two on the Pacific coast.
- (b) That these four bases shall be at New York, the lower Chesapeake, Puget Sound, and San Francisco Bay.
- (c) That, for naval control in war over the western North Atlantic (including the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico) and northern Pacific, there shall be established two naval outlying bases, which shall be developed into permanent naval bases (arsenals) capable of self-defense against major attack by a strong enemy.
- (d) That these two bases shall be Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor.
- (e) The Isthmus of Panama may be considered as practically a naval base; for all Government facilities such as drydocks, repair shops, fuel, and other supplies will always be available to the Navy, but no regular naval station need be established there. The question of establishing an outlying base at Guam is left in abeyance pending the disposition of the Philippines.
- (f) That Philadelphia be continued as a subsidiary base, and developed as the principal ship construction navy yard.
- (g) That Key West be continued and developed as a subsidiary base for torpedo craft.
- (h) That Pensacola be continued as a subsidiary base and developed as an aircraft training and experimental station.
- (i) That for the time being, until the two great home bases on the Atlantic coast are developed to the point of maintaining the whole fleet, the naval stations at Boston, Portsmouth, and Charleston be continued as subsidiary bases.
- (j) That all other naval bases, navy yards, and naval stations be continued until such time as the development of the four main home bases and two outlying permanent bases, prove that any of these subsidiary bases, or stations, are no longer needed for the maintenance of the fleet in peace and war.

ROE DEWEY.

[First indorsement.]

AUGUST 28, 1916.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: General Board.

Subject: Base plan for development of navy yards.

1. The base plan for the development of navy yards, submitted by the General Board with its letter 404-A (serial No. 480), of March 4, 1916, is approved, except that in the respect of the designation and development of the outlying permanent repair and supply base in the Caribbean, the department's decision will, for the present, be deferred.

W. S. BENSON, *Acting*.

[Second indorsement.]

SEPTEMBER 6, 1916.

From: Secretary General Board.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Base plan for development of navy yards.

Returned, by direction of the General Board; contents of the preceding indorsement noted.

H. J. ZIEGEMEIER.

The next is dated June 21, 1916, from the board for the development of navy-yard plans to the Navy Department. I put that in as an illustration of the way that the Navy Yard Development Board made studies and estimates. This communication is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 21, 1916.

From: Board for the development of navy-yard plans.

To: The Navy Department.

Subject: Development of Norfolk.

References: (a) Joint letter of Naval Operations, Bureaus of C. and R. and Y. and D., April 29, 1916, C. and R. No. 7352-a-43-F.

(b) Report of Roosevelt Board dated October 12, 1915.

Inclosures: (a) Blue print showing land areas and tentative allotment of space.

(b) Chart showing site in relation to Hampton Roads.

1. It is considered of great importance that the development of the Norfolk Navy Yard should be undertaken at the earliest possible time, and in submitting the following recommendations the board considers that provision has been made for the commencement of the most important elements of its development along lines which will be consistent with the final arrangement of the station as a main naval base.

2. The recommendation contained in the joint letter of the Chief of Operations and the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Yards and Docks, contained in reference (a), is concurred in, as well as the report of the Roosevelt Board, reference (b).

3. In view of the recommendations contained in reference (b), the board has considered the question of the removal of the training station to the property on Hampton Roads known as the Jamestown Exposition Grounds. Careful investigation of the subject points to the necessity of a naval base at Hampton Roads adequate not only for the training station but for the following activities as well:

- (a) Fuel-oil storage.
- (b) Fleet stores, mines and mine sweeping stores and equipment.
- (c) Primary submarine base for the fifth naval district.
- (d) Fuel supply.
- (e) Berthing facilities for both large and small ships, for receiving and discharging fuel and stores.
- (f) Fleet drill, camp and recreation grounds.
- (g) Mobilization camp and drill grounds for Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces.
- (h) Primary aviation base and training camp for fifth naval district.

Inclosures (a) and (b) show the proposed site of such a naval base with a tentative distribution of grounds for the above activities, and indicates the various extensions which could be obtained by filling in the flats around the shore line.

Nine large piers are shown fronting on the dredged channel to Norfolk, where coal for the fleet in lighters could be secured and from which supplies, fuel oil, etc., could be delivered direct to the fleet, these piers being of sufficient size to accommodate the largest vessels of the Navy. Ample room on the hard ground inside the shore line is available for underground fuel-oil tanks, storage houses for fleet stores, and barracks for submarine crews.

The ground allotted to the training station is slightly greater than that at the Great Lakes Training Station and should be ample for the accommodation of 5,000 or more apprentices.

The board is informed that many of the buildings now on this property can be adapted to Government use. The board is also informed that the waters of Willoughby Bay are very suitable for aviation training. Hangars can be stationed along the present shore line and the buildings already erected on the plat in yellow assigned to aviation can be used for the accommodation of the personnel. By filling in the extension of 212 acres a level tract of ground can be obtained entirely bare of trees or other obstructions and suitable for airship sheds, aeroplanes, etc., necessary to a well-equipped aviation base for the fifth naval district.

Estimates received from the Fidelity Land & Investment Corporation of Norfolk, Va., place a value on this property as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| All buildings and grounds north of Ninety-ninth Street and east of Maryland Avenue..... | \$923, 187 |
| Pine Grove section north of One hundred and fourth Street and west of Maryland Avenue..... | 45, 000 |
| Deep-water pier, extending to the westward from Pine Grove..... | 10, 000 |
| Block of land bounded by Maryland Avenue, One hundred and fourth Street, Virginia Avenue, and One hundred and second Street..... | 78, 500 |
| Pine Beach Hotel property and riparian rights to the westward..... | 190, 000 |
| Property bounded by One hundred and first Street, Maryland Avenue, One hundred and second Street, and Maryland Circle..... | 42, 500 |
| Block No. 44, to the westward of Maryland Circle, and riparian rights to the westward..... | 67, 500 |
| Blocks No. 55, 56, 57, and 58..... | 115, 000 |
| Virginia Railway & Power Co. property between One hundred and first Street on the north, boundary line in red to the southward, and to the westward of blocks 56 and 57, including riparian rights..... | 20, 000 |
| Total..... | 1, 491, 687 |

4. The naval bill now under consideration includes the two most important items, namely, a new dry dock and structural shops. The additional projects which should be provided for at this session of Congress are as follows:

| | Authorized cost. | Appropriation, 1917. |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|
| Water-front improvements..... | \$3, 300, 000 | \$2, 250, 000 |
| Building ways for large ships..... | 600, 000 | 600, 000 |
| Purchase land for training station, etc..... | 1, 500, 000 | 1, 500, 000 |

5. The board, therefore, recommends that the following items be inserted in the naval appropriation bill as reported to Senate June 8, 1916, under Public Works, Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Page 22, line 20, insert after the semicolon the following items:

Water-front improvements (limit of cost, \$3,300,000), \$2,250,000.

Building ways for large ships, \$600,000.

"That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to acquire by gift, purchase, or condemnation such site or sites in the vicinity of Hampton Roads, Va., as shall in his judgment be deemed necessary or expedient for naval purposes, and the sum of \$1,500,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated for said purposes: *Provided*, That any unexpended balance of said appropriation may be used toward improving the site or sites so acquired."

I next present a memorandum dated March 30, 1917, which covers the bases. This is submitted with the purpose of showing that the material end of Operations, which as set forth, included the coordination of bureaus with the yards and fleet to maintain the fleet in war was at work. We were working along consistent, well-considered plans, and we knew what we wanted, we knew what we wanted to do with it, and we did it as fast as Congress gave us the money.

The CHAIRMAN. What war plans?

Admiral McKEAN. These are both. They are peace plans, fundamental plans necessary to get the fleet ready for war and to maintain it in war.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not most of these things that were in these plans also desirable in peace?

Admiral McLEAN. Absolutely necessary. This was peace, so far as we were concerned as a nation. But as I stated yesterday, Mr. Chairman, navy yards had grown rather haphazard. It depended largely on the commandant, for instance, his forcefulness and far-sightedness in planning yards. And then, if he got in touch with a good, strong Congressman in that district, or with a Senator who would back him up, they could come down here to Congress and talk their navy yard and get away with it; but when you came to consider the whole fleet and its preparation in peace and maintenance in war, it was largely a matter of luck. You understand that just as well as I do. The yards grew. One would get a start and then the next one would get a start. But there was not any system about it.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a comprehensive plan to cover all the yards?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; based on the military needs and not on local interests or desires. What the fleet needed is what we were trying to get.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were necessary in peace and more necessary in time of war, were they not?

Admiral McKEAN. Absolutely necessary at both times; and we did not ask for anything that was not necessary.

This last communication is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, March 30, 1917.

Memorandum.

Subject: Special estimates for appropriations.

DESTROYER TENDERS.

1. There are building and in service the following destroyer tenders: In service, *Panther*, *Dixie*, and *Melville*; authorized, 2; total provided for, 5. Allowing one tender for each flotilla of 18 destroyers, the authorized program shows a shortage of 11 tenders. Assuming that 50 additional destroyers may be authorized under emergency programs we would have a total of 176 destroyers, which would require 10 tenders. Therefore this emergency program should provide for the construction of at least two destroyer tenders. The cost of the *Melville* was \$1,310,000, and adding 10 per cent for increased cost due to increased cost of material and labor and rush work, makes the present cost \$1,441,000 per unit; and for the five additional tenders required, \$7,205,000.

SUBMARINE TENDERS.

2. All submarines now in commission are based on tenders and no other vessels are available for this duty. A submarine base at New London, sufficient to accommodate 20 submarines has been appropriated for. A submarine base accommodating 20 submarines will cost not to exceed \$1,500,000. A submarine tender to accommodate 6 submarines will cost \$1,000,000. The maintenance cost of the base for 20 boats would be about \$100,000 while that of a tender for 6 boats is \$195,000 per year. It is expected that the sundry civil bill will provide for a submarine base of 20 units at Coco Solo, Colon Harbor. Under present conditions and without hastening the building program it will be necessary to provide tenders for at least 11 submarines; in 1918 for at least 14 more; in 1919 at least 30. All fleet submarines require tenders. The navy yard commission recommends a large training base at Los Angeles and an advance base for submarines attached to the aviation base at San Diego.

Owing to the inadequacy of the present navy yards and their shop facilities to care for submarines, the fact that their presence at a yard repairing other ships is undesirable, that all navy-yard fronts have a very limited water front, and that experience has shown that submarines in the ordinary yard are very liable to damage by the movement of other ships, the flotilla commander has earnestly recommended that a

submarine repair station for all the submarines on the Atlantic coast be established at Philadelphia, where there can be provided adequate water front, fresh-water storage, with sufficient room for special shops, storehouses for batteries and torpedoes, barracks for crews, etc. This to the west of the causeway in the back channel.

Having in view the recommendations of the General Board, the flotilla commander, navy yard commission's recommendations, and the department's previous decisions, the following will be needed:

West coast:

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 3 main bases (exclusive of land)..... | \$3, 000, 000 |
| 2 tenders (6 boats each) | 2, 000, 000 |
| Atlantic coast: 3 main bases (1 to be a repair base at Philadelphia, with a capacity for caring for 20 submarines) | 3, 000, 000 |
| Pearl Harbor: 1 main base..... | 1, 000, 000 |

AVIATION.

3. There is now available and unallotted \$4,453,487.79. Of this sum \$750,000 is intended for station at San Diego, and \$500,000 at Pearl Harbor, leaving balance of \$3,203,487.79.

The following is a detailed estimate for expenditure under aviation to April 1, 1918:

New aircraft:

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 326 seaplanes..... | \$3, 912, 000. 00 |
| 54 dirigibles..... | 2, 160, 000. 00 |
| 16 kite balloons..... | 64, 000. 00 |
| 13 airplanes..... | 204, 000. 00 |
| 4 free balloons..... | 12, 000. 00 |
| 1 experimental rigid airship (one-half of cost)..... | 750, 000. 00 |
| Total..... | 7, 102, 000. 00 |
| Spare parts..... | 2, 000, 000. 00 |
| Coastal stations: 11 coastal stations, including land, construction, preparation, and equipment (except aircraft)—Maine coast, Provincetown, Block Island vicinity, New York, Cape May, Hampton, Key West, West Indies, Galveston vicinity, San Francisco vicinity, Puget Sound vicinity, \$300,000 per station..... | 3, 300, 000. 00 |
| Establishment of school at North Island, including land, construction, and equipment (except aircraft) additional to \$750,000 already appropriated..... | 250, 000. 00 |
| Establishment of station on exposition site for fleet aviation base, and experimental and development purposes, including construction, preparation, land, and equipment (except aircraft)..... | 1, 000, 000. 00 |
| Establishment of permanent station at Pearl Harbor, including land, construction, and equipment (except aircraft), additional to \$500,000 already appropriated..... | 250, 000. 00 |
| Maintenance and operation of all stations..... | 2, 500, 000. 00 |
| Total..... | 16, 402, 000. 00 |
| Available..... | 3, 203, 487. 79 |
| Required..... | 13, 198, 512. 21 |

The following paragraph is submitted for incorporation in the emergency naval appropriation bill:

“Aviation: For aviation, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy for procuring, producing, constructing, operating, preserving, storing, and handling aircraft and appurtenances; construction, equipment, maintenance of aircraft stations, and experimental work in development of aviation for naval purposes, \$13,198,512.21: *Provided*, That the sum to be paid out of this appropriation under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy for drafting, clerical, inspection, and messenger service shall not exceed \$100,000: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to acquire by purchase, lease, donation, or by condemnation, such land sites in the United States or any of its possessions as are immediately necessary for the establishment of school, experimental, and coastal air stations, the cost of such land not to exceed \$2,000,000 and to be paid from this appropriation.”

FLEET OPERATING BASE.

4. Demands on Norfolk Navy Yard and Training Station are making more and more urgent daily the establishment of a complete operating base for the fleet in the immediate vicinity of Hampton Roads. Such a base will relieve the yard of a large number of activities that now occupy space but valuable water front,

valuable areas and storehouses, and will permit the proper development and utilization of all these for their primary use—the repair and building of ships. The yard can not now properly care for the repairs allotted to it, and when the building of capital ships, as planned, is undertaken the necessity for the removal of these secondary activities from the yard will be imperative.

The fleet will of necessity be based on Hampton Roads and the lower Chesapeake a large part of the time, both in peace and war, and the Norfolk Navy Yard will be the primary repair base on the Atlantic.

The proposed operating base, located on the only available satisfactory site, i. e., the so-called Jamestown Exposition ground, extended to deep water on a 35-foot channel leading to Norfolk, should provide for the following activities:

FLEET OPERATING BASE (ACTIVITIES).

1. Training station for 8,000 men.
2. Submarine base for 20 submarines.
3. Aviation operating base for a double coastal unit and for the operation of Zeppelins when we have produced this type.
4. Coal piers, for berthing coal barges loaded and awaiting fleet's demands.
5. Oil fuel storage, for oil fuel, gas oil, gasoline and lubricating oil for fleet use, with piers piped for discharging cargo for fueling battleships, destroyers, submarines, and barges.
6. Fleet storehouses, to accommodate all fleet stores ready for delivery and thus permit the very limited navy yard storehouses and space to be used for the storage of yard material exclusively and avoid the expense and unnecessary rehandling of fleet stores in and out of the yard and yard storehouses, and at the same time avoid the now unavoidable delay in the delivery of such stores to the fleet.
7. Mine and net storehouses: There will of necessity be a large number of mines and nets used in the defense of the Chesapeake. These should be of course stowed somewhere in this region. The most convenient and accessible place would be at this place, where piers, tracks, cars, men, etc., would be available for handling this heavy and bulky material.
8. Torpedo storehouses: To store the spare and reserve torpedoes for the fleet in very large numbers, the storage of which and room for their proper handling and care will require a large storehouse located near deep water, with piers available for vessels to lie alongside when taking on board torpedoes or turning them in for overhaul.
9. Medical storehouse: A storehouse capable of storing sufficient hospital equipment and hospital stores to completely equip an advance base hospital, at least one hospital transport, and in addition a large reserve of these supplies for the fleet and hospital ships.
10. Recreation and drill grounds for men of the fleet, with athletic fields for all sports, swimming pool, clubhouse, etc., etc., a crying need that the fleet has recognized for years. This same field would serve admirably for a fleet drill ground for shore drills and as a mobilization camp for marines or other troops who are to be transported overseas on transports convoyed by the fleet. The piers provided for would permit of the transports coming alongside, being loaded and unloaded, and taking or discharging their men directly to this field. The space allotted for the above purposes would accommodate 10,000 troops.

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| The whole site referred to above can be purchased for the sum of | \$1, 300, 000 |
| The training station can be equipped for its purposes at an additional cost of | 1, 000, 000 |
| Submarine base, with barracks, shops and equipment | 1, 250, 000 |
| Aviation operating base, grounds therefor, barracks, shops, etc., equipped for double unit | 1, 000, 000 |
| Coal piers, 10, ultimately needed, including necessary grading, dredging, etc. (which would incidentally provide an extension for the plotted area) | 5, 000, 000 |
| Oil-fuel storage, piping of piers, etc | 500, 000 |
| Fleet storehouse (at least 1 double unit) | 800, 000 |
| Mine and net storehouses | 100, 000 |
| Torpedo storehouses | 100, 000 |
| Medical storehouse | 250, 000 |
| Recreation and drill grounds (grading and preparation of grounds, swimming pool, clubhouse, etc., all of which utilities would be available for the regular use of the training station, as well as for the fleet) | 500, 000 |
| Total cost of completed fleet operating base | 11, 800, 000 |

This sum, \$11,800,000, could not all be utilized immediately, but there should be appropriated and made available until expended not less than \$6,000,000.

General summary.

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| trooper tenders..... | \$7, 205, 000. 00 |
| marine tenders and bases..... | 13, 085, 000. 00 |
| ation..... | 18, 198, 512. 21 |
| st operating base..... | 11, 800, 000. 00 |
| Grand total..... | 45, 288, 512. 21 |

The next is a letter, which I have marked "I," from the Secretary of the Navy to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. [adding:]

I.

FOR POLICY FILES.

[Third indorsement.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *October 4, 1915.*

Commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, via Board of Inspection and Survey.
 Subject: Inspection methods; proposed augmenting of board and classification of repairs: battleship inspections.

The department concurs in the recommendations contained in paragraph 1 of commander in chief's letter as amended by paragraphs 4 and 5 of the first indorsement—that is, the fleet officers become members, but do not vote—this with the idea that the Board of Inspection and Survey is the department's agents and must be independent of both the fleet and the yards.

For the reasons stated above, the department concurs in the recommendation that the president of the Board of Inspection and Survey as to changes in articles 4305, 4306, and 4309, Naval Instructions, changing the word "augmented" to "assisted," and that the representatives of the navy yards become members but have no vote.

It is directed that hereafter the commander in chief be notified by the president of the board and the opportunity given for the detail of such officers of the fleet as may be available for duty in connection with the inspection as recommended in paragraph 3 of the first indorsement.

We were trying to revise and improve the inspection methods by adding to the board of inspection from the Navy Department certain officers from the fleet who, through familiarity with the conditions when the ships were at sea and in the fleet and matters came up there, could immediately give the Board of Inspection and Survey information in regard thereto, and call their attention to defects, so that well-considered recommendations came to them when the board met there; so that we put these officers from the fleet on the board to keep the fleet's advice constantly before the department, so that we would not get to be purely theoretical, and so that the bureaus of shore command or yards would not control the fleet's needs; and while it looks like a matter of rather minor importance, it is not. Paragraph 4, continuing, is as follows:

Referring to paragraph 2, the department's view is that the repairs on board ships come under three headings rather than two:

First. Those that can be done by the ship's force.

Second. Those that can be done within the fleet, with the assistance of the repair ships.

Third. Those that can only be done at a navy yard. It is the department's view that all repairs of the first class should be kept up to date and that the ship should be given opportunity for such repairs and the commanding officer should be held responsible for their being cared for; that repairs of class 2 should be brought to the attention of the commander in chief by the commanding officer of the vessel concerned, according to regulations established in the fleet, and that opportunity for repairs that can only be done by the repair ship would be afforded by the commander in chief. The Board of Inspection and Survey would then properly have only those repairs which could not be done by the fleet or the ship's force, but by a navy yard. This, of course, does not include certain work on underwater body, etc., that can only be done by the ship's force when the ship is in dock.)

5. With the above procedure in view, the department adopted the policy announced of having a ship sent to the yard and inspected in sufficient time before her repairs would take place, to permit the yard to assemble all materials and make the necessary plans for the repairs; and when this preparation had been completed, the commander in chief to be informed and he to direct the vessel concerned to be at the navy yard on the date set.

Then, here is another one [continuing reading]:

6. Should the Board of Inspection and Survey find work that they consider belongs to the ship's force or should properly be done by the repair ship, there would be an opportunity for this work to be done between the time of inspection and the return of the ship to the yard for navy yard repairs.

A commanding officer is kept up to his job through the inspection of his division commander. The repair ship is in the force commander's hands, or in the commander in chief's hands, and if the Board of Inspection and Survey says there is a job that could and should be done by the repair ship, that is up to the commander in chief. This is all for the purpose of relieving the yards of unnecessary work. [Continuing reading:]

7. The above is not to be understood as in any way reducing the assistance which the ship's force should lend the yard (within the limits of the law) while navy yard repairs are being made.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Next is a memorandum, "J," dated October 5, 1916, from myself to the Chief of Operations. [Reading:]

J.

OCTOBER 5, 1916.

Memorandum.

For: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Inability of the navy yards as at present developed and organized, and with their present forces, to maintain the fleet in the proper condition of readiness for war.

1. I have, through my experience at the material desk in Operations, become convinced of the following:

(a) Our navy yards are not properly developed and equipped as to shops in general, foundries, storehouses, power plants, and transportation facilities, to properly care for the fleet as it was a year ago, much less as it is now and will be in the immediate future.

(b) It is my belief that the present variety of organizations for administrative purposes, for manufacture and repairs, and for yard maintenance are too varied (to insure a proper standard) for the department to efficiently administer them or for the fleet to understand them.

Then I make recommendations as to how to correct the above conditions. There is a question of navy-yard organization. I have very distinct views on that, which I have stated in that paper. That memorandum was submitted and, in general, approved. The organization of the yards was not changed, and has not been yet.

The CHAIRMAN. That was signed by you?

Admiral McKEAN. That was signed by me; addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Where these memoranda are not signed, I think it would be well to put the name on, possibly.

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir. Whenever they are material, and I read them as a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations, that means that I signed them.

The CHAIRMAN. Any memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations not signed is signed by you?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; I forwarded it to my chief or took it in person.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral McKEAN (continuing reading):

2. To correct the above conditions, which to-day unquestionably exist as shown the futile efforts of the department to arrange for the completion of the required ~~work~~ and alterations in the fleet within a reasonable time and the necessity it has ~~been~~ under of accepting repeated postponements of repairs and alterations necessary put the fleet in efficient fighting condition, the following departmental actions ~~will~~ be taken at once:

a. Give the Board on Navy Yard Development the necessary drafting force, clerical ~~work~~, and the relief of certain members from other duties, to permit that board to ~~work~~ as rapidly as possible in the development of plans for the rehabilitation and ~~fixing~~ up of the material side of the present navy yards to fit them to meet the ~~present~~ demands.

b. Develop immediately a standard navy-yard organization.

c. That the necessary officers to efficiently administer the above recommended ~~organization~~ be ordered to the navy yards to undertake the work which those yards ~~will~~ do. This to include the administrative officers, superintending officers, that ~~heads~~ of the department subdivisions with their necessary subordinates and an ~~equivalent~~ number of inspectors to insure the yard work being done in the best way, the least cost, and in the least time. (This on the principle that self-inspection is delusion.)

d. That the yards be directed to immediately recommend methods of increasing the ~~present~~ available force of mechanics, laborers, etc., of all classes. Whether this be by ~~increase~~ of wages, the establishment of apprentice or training systems to train boys the various trades, a system of using the enlisted men, or whatever method they ~~may~~ suggest. The above is recommended because it is and has been apparent for ~~some~~ time that the repair forces in the navy yards are utterly inadequate to take care the fleet's work; that the wages paid on the outside are hardly practicable for Gov-
ernment work; that outside firms are now training numbers of boys and young men the trades and that the Government is not doing its share in the training of skilled ~~labor~~ to meet the present and probably future shipbuilding demands of our country.

3. The several remedies in the order of importance and briefly stated are:

(a) Expansion of number of employees beginning with the drafting force.

(b) Expansion and proper equipment of the yard plants beginning with increased ~~storage~~ space to provide for present stores and the necessary large increase of reserve ~~stores~~. After this, power plants, dry docks, additional piers, etc.

(c) Reorganization.

(d) A section of the Board of Inspection and Survey, who shall, on orders from the department, visit yards whose output is unsatisfactory from either the department's or the fleet's point of view, make the necessary investigations and recommendations ~~into~~ remedies to the department. This is a necessity to produce the highest efficiency, and will increase the general efficiency of the yards in the same way and to the same extent that inspections have increased the efficiency of ships, and for the same reasons.

McKEAN.

The next is a communication of October 13, 1917. [Reading:]

K.

[Second Indorsement]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *October 13, 1917.*

b. Bureau of Construction and Repair.

subject: Submarine construction, Portsmouth, N. H.

1. Returned, contents noted.

2. The recommendation in paragraph 3 of the first indorsement is approved in ~~no~~ ~~as~~ and only so far as it applies to submarine No. 107.

That belongs really to submarines, and it is brought in here to show the policy. Submarine No. 107 was a fleet type of submarine that Admiral Grant told the committee about. There were two built by each of the submarine companies, and one built by the Government. This No. 107 was the one built by the Government, and we were very anxious to get that type of boat, each of the three, out, so that we could test them, make comparative tests, and so on, to determine which was the best, and which parts of which were

better, and then from that data to get out a standardized type of fleet submarine. [Continuing reading:]

As the department has previously stated, the primary function of navy yards is the repair and maintenance of the fleet in commission. All building activities and manufacturing activities, except in emergency cases such as submarine 107, which will be indicated by the department, must give way to the repair and maintenance of the vessels of the active fleet.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 4, first indorsement, are approved.
JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Copies: All bureaus, all yards, C. in. C. (fleet).

There was where we had to keep pressure on the yards. They like to work on new work, the men like to work on new work. They can see their progress there and the yard can see it. Everybody is anxious for it. They hate a repair job, because it is never done and they are doing the same thing every day. But the importance of the navy yard to the fleet is in repairs. Private yards can do the building.

Here is another policy letter dated October 22, 1915, as to vessels of doubtful military value. [Reading:]

L.

POLICY.

OCTOBER 22, 1915.

Circular letter.

To: Commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, and to all bureaus.
Subject: Vessels of doubtful military value, procedure in authorizing urgent repairs.
Reference: (a) Article I-4335 (a).

1. The following addition will be made to reference (a):

"When requests for urgent repairs are received from vessels whose condition is such as makes it doubtful whether they are worth the expenditures necessary to make complete repairs, the commandant, before authorizing any work, shall immediately notify the department of the amount of work desired by such vessel, and request an inspection of the vessel by the Board of Inspection and Survey. No work will be undertaken without specific authority of the department."

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

That was to save spending money on useless stuff.

Here is another communication, dated October 23, 1915, from the Secretary of the Navy, on the subject of opportunity for the overhaul of machinery. Here was the urge put up to the commander in chief. [Reading:]

M.

POLICY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 23, 1915.

To: Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet; Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: Opportunity for overhaul of machinery.

1. The following recommendation has been made by the Bureau of Steam Engineering:

"The bureau desires to invite attention to the numerous comments on the Report of Engineering Competition, 1914-15, relating to the matter of adequate time and opportunity for overhaul of machinery during times vessels are away from navy yards. If overhaul periods at navy yards are to be reduced, considerable progress in this direction can be made by affording better opportunities for doing overhaul work by the ship's force. In this connection it is emphasized that an occasional period of several weeks will be of much more value than double or treble this time divided up into many periods of a few days' duration.

"It is suggested that this matter be called to the attention of commanders in chief and others in authority who may determine or direct the readiness of vessels for service. A proper consideration of this matter will, in the opinion of the bureau, result in great improvement in upkeep, reduction in repairs, and actual availability of vessels' machinery for continued service."

2. It is directed that the above recommendations be carefully borne in mind and that the work of the fleets be so laid out as to permit suitable time for the upkeep of machinery.

JOSEPHUS DAVIS.

There is an illustration of trying to accomplish something by indirection. I had quoted that so often that I was afraid they would get a little bit impatient, so that I got one of the bureaus to start the ball rolling and to put it through the commanders of the fleets. I was going to sea later on, I hoped, and I was afraid that I would not get a very warm reception if I kept disturbing their peace of mind too much.

The next is "N." dated December 3, 1915, in relation to vessels in reserve. This refers to the painful conditions shown by Admiral Fullam. I am going to refer to the admiral's letter in the statement; but the admiral's complaints were just, and to show that we had tried to do our part, he gave material credit for a policy being established in 1917. I do not know whether the admiral found this letter on his files or not, but it was addressed to all bureaus and commanders in chief of fleets, to the commander of the reserve torpedo flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet, to the commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, to the office of target practice and the division of naval militia affairs. [Reading:]

N.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 3, 1915.

To: Bureaus of Navigation, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, Medicine and Surgery, Commanders in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Pacific Reserve Fleet; commander, reserve torpedo flotilla, Atlantic Fleet; commandants of all navy yards and naval stations; office of target practice; and division of naval militia affairs.

Subject: Vessels in reserve.

1. The department announces the following policy relative to vessels in reserve:
2. The condition of all vessels in reserve commission shall be one of complete readiness in all matters of material and equipment to perform all their assigned duties in war as soon as their complements are filled.
3. When vessels are to be placed in reserve, all work necessary to put them in reserve condition shall at once be undertaken and pushed to completion.
4. The crews will be retained on board until the work incident to placing the vessels in reserve, required of the crews, shall have been performed.
5. All equipment for each ship shall be kept on board or in store and not diverted at any time for use on other ships.
6. In reducing the complements, great care will be exercised that the men selected for reserve crews shall include a sufficient number of trained petty officers and men to maintain alive the ship's organization and to insure that when strange men are added to fill the complements, the vessels will be ready for efficient service with the fleet after a short "shakedown."
7. Reserve crews will be expected to maintain the vessels constantly in efficient material condition and, as well, to exercise weekly at military drills.
8. Vessels in reserve should exercise underway at intervals, singly or in group, to demonstrate the preparedness of their machinery and mechanical devices.
9. Watch, quarter and station bills and detailed organization bills should be kept up to date and station bills be ready for issue.

That is the station for each man. When he goes aboard you will hand him his ticket and tell him where he eats and sleeps and where he works and what he does. [Continuing reading:]

10. Reserve torpedo vessels will be treated as other reserve vessels and will not cruise for long periods with the fleet. They will have periodic ascor-
maintain the preparedness of their machinery, and will hold sur pedo
practice and elementary gun practice as may be found pra e re-
quired of them.

better, and then from that data to get out a standardize fleet submarine. [Continuing reading:]

As the department has previously stated, the primary function of the repair and maintenance of the fleet in commission. All building and manufacturing activities, except in emergency cases such as submarine, will be indicated by the department, must give way to the repair and of the vessels of the active fleet.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 4, first indorsement, a

JOSEPHUS

Copies: All bureaus, all yards, C. in. C. (fleet).

There was where we had to keep pressure on the yard. The pair like to work on new work, the men like to work on new work. They can see their progress there and the yard can see it. I refer to is anxious for it. They hate a repair job, because it is a complaint and they are doing the same thing every day. But the fact he gave of the navy yard to the fleet is in repairs. Private yard do not know the building. But if it of fleets, to Atlantic Fleet, to the affairs.

Here is another policy letter dated October 22, 1915, as of doubtful military value. [Reading:]

L.

POLICY.

OCTOBER

Circular letter.

To: Commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, and to all bur

Subject: Vessels of doubtful military value, procedure in authorizing u

Reference: (a) Article I-4335 (a).

1. The following addition will be made to reference (a):

"When requests for urgent repairs are received from vessels whose condition makes it doubtful whether they are worth the expenditures necessary for complete repairs, the commandant, before authorizing any work, shall notify the department of the amount of work desired by such vessel, and inspection of the vessel by the Board of Inspection and Survey. No work undertaken without specific authority of the department."

JOSEPHUS

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Here is another communication, dated October 23, 1915, Secretary of the Navy, on the subject of opportunity for overhaul of machinery. Here was the urge put up to the commandant [Reading:]

M.

POLICY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Washington, October 23, 1915

To: Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet; Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Subject: Opportunity for overhaul of machinery.

1. The following recommendation has been made by the Bureau of Engineering:

"The bureau desires to invite attention to the numerous comments of Engineering Competition, 1914-15, relating to the matter of adequate opportunity for overhaul of machinery during times vessels are away from station. If overhaul periods at navy yards are to be reduced, considerable direction can be made by affording better opportunities for doing overhauls of the ship's force. In this connection it is emphasized that an occasional week or several weeks will be of much more value than double or treble this time into many periods of a few days' duration.

"It is suggested that this matter be called to the attention of commandants and others in authority who may determine or direct the readiness of vessels."

It is to be noted that the above recommendation be carefully borne in mind and that the fleets be so laid out as to permit suitable time for the upkeep of

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

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N.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 3, 1915.

Navigation, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Accounts, Medicine and Surgery; Commanders in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Pacific Reserve Fleet; Reserve torpedo flotilla, Atlantic Fleet; commandants of all navy stations; office of target practice; and division of naval militia

in reserve.

It announces the following policy relative to vessels in reserve: All vessels in reserve commission shall be one of complete material and equipment to perform all their assigned duties as their complements are filled.

To be placed in reserve, all work necessary to put them in shape shall be undertaken and pushed to completion.

They will be retained on board until the work incident to placing the crews of the crews, shall have been performed.

Each ship shall be kept on board or in store and not diverted to other ships.

In complements, great care will be exercised that the men selected shall include a sufficient number of trained petty officers and men to insure the ship's organization and to insure that when strange men are taken on board, the vessels will be ready for efficient service with the least delay.

It is expected to maintain the vessels constantly in efficient condition, as well, to exercise weekly at military drills.

They should exercise underway at intervals, singly or in group, to keep the machinery and mechanical devices in good condition.

Charts of their machinery and detailed organization bills should be kept on board and ready for issue.

Station bills be ready for issue.

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3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 4, first indorsement, are approved.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Copies: All bureaus, all yards, C. in. C. (fleet).

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L.

POLICY.

OCTOBER 22, 1915.

Circular letter.

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Subject: Vessels of doubtful military value, procedure in authorizing urgent repairs.

Reference: (a) Article I-4335 (a).

1. The following addition will be made to reference (a):

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Washington, October 23, 1915.

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Subject: Opportunity for overhaul of machinery.

1. The following recommendation has been made by the Bureau of Steam Engineering:

"The bureau desires to invite attention to the numerous comments on the Report of Engineering Competition, 1914-15, relating to the matter of adequate time and opportunity for overhaul of machinery during times vessels are away from navy yards. If overhaul periods at navy yards are to be reduced, considerable progress in this direction can be made by affording better opportunities for doing overhaul work by the ship's force. In this connection it is emphasized that an occasional period of several weeks will be of much more value than double or treble this time divided up into many periods of a few days' duration.

"It is suggested that this matter be called to the attention of commanders in chief and others in authority who may determine or direct the readiness of vessels for service. A proper consideration of this matter will, in the opinion of the bureau, result in great improvement in upkeep, reduction in repairs, and actual availability of vessels' machinery for continued service."

2. It is directed that the above recommendation be carefully borne in mind and that the work of the fleets be so laid out as to permit suitable time for the upkeep of machinery.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

There is an illustration of trying to accomplish something by direction. I had quoted that so often that I was afraid they would get a little bit impatient, so that I got one of the bureaus to start the ball rolling and to put it through the commanders of the fleets. I was going to sea later on, I hoped, and I was afraid that I would not get a very warm reception if I kept disturbing their peace of mind too much.

The next is "N," dated December 3, 1915, in relation to vessels in reserve. This refers to the painful conditions shown by Admiral Hallam. I am going to refer to the admiral's letter in the statement; but the admiral's complaints were just, and to show that we had tried to do our part, he gave material credit for a policy being established in 1917. I do not know whether the admiral found this letter on his files or not, but it was addressed to all bureaus and commanders in chief of fleets, to the commander of the reserve torpedo flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet, to the commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, to the office of target practice and the division of naval militia affairs. [Reading:]

N.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 3, 1915.

To Bureaus of Navigation, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, Medicine and Surgery, Commanders in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Pacific Reserve Fleet; commander, reserve torpedo flotilla, Atlantic Fleet, commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, office of target practice; and division of naval militia affairs.

Subject: Vessels in reserve.

1. The department announces the following policy relative to vessels in reserve:
2. The condition of all vessels in reserve commission shall be one of complete readiness in all matters of material and equipment to perform all their assigned duties at war as soon as their complements are filled.
3. When vessels are to be placed in reserve, all work necessary to put them in reserve condition shall at once be undertaken and pushed to completion.
4. The crews will be retained on board until the work incident to placing the vessels in reserve, required of the crews, shall have been performed.
5. All equipment for each ship shall be kept on board or in store and not diverted at any time for use on other ships.
6. In reducing the complements, great care will be exercised that the men selected or reserve crews shall include a sufficient number of trained petty officers and men to maintain alive the ship's organization and to insure that when strange men are added to fill the complements, the vessels will be ready for efficient service with the fleet after a short "shakedown."
7. Reserve crews will be expected to maintain the vessels constantly in efficient material condition and, as well, to exercise weekly at military drills.
8. Vessels in reserve should exercise underway at intervals, singly or in group, to demonstrate the preparedness of their machinery and mechanical devices.
9. Watch, quarter and station bills and detailed organization bills should be kept up to date and station bills be ready for issue.

That is the station for each man. When he goes aboard you will find him his ticket and tell him where he eats and sleeps and where he works and what he does. [Continuing reading:]

10. Reserve torpedo vessels will be treated as other reserve vessels and will not cruise for long periods with the fleet. They will have periodic tests at sea to ascertain the preparedness of their machinery, and will hold such proving and torpedo practice and elementary gun practice as may be found practicable and may be required of them.

That was necessary. We have found flag officers wanting the whole bunch. They would forget that the vessels in reserve only had partial crews, and they would take them out and they would work the crews to death and would run the machinery to death. It was enthusiasm and ambitious effort on their part to train the crews, but they could not see the material. That was inside. [Continuing reading:]

11. Reserve crews of torpedo vessels will be expected to maintain their vessels in efficient military condition when treated in accordance with the foregoing plan. They can not maintain this condition when cruising extensively with the fleet without incurring excessive repair bills and requiring extended periods of overhaul, thereby withdrawing them from availability for immediate service.

As will be noted in the delay of getting destroyers, that was exactly what followed. We could not keep their hands off, and we had to use these vessels in neutrality duty. [Continuing reading:]

12. All ships in reserve shall be docked annually.

13. Reserve ships shall be held in readiness to participate in annual fleet maneuvers, and those carrying guns will hold some form of target practice annually. (This applies to reserve ships assigned to receiving-ship duty.)

14. Every vessel in reserve will be considered subject to be drafted into active service in the fleet to replace an active ship withdrawn.

That is, in case of emergency or breakdown we would take a sister ship that was in reserve and swap crews and send her out to take her place in the fleet as soon as we could. [Continuing reading:]

15. Provisions will be made by the Bureau of Navigation to fill the complement of all reserve ships from designated sources.

That is, the Naval Militia, Naval Reserves, or wherever her war complement came from. [Continuing reading:]

16. Ships loaned to Naval Militia and receiving ships (and all other vessels not attached to the active fleet) will be under the control of the commanders in chief of reserve fleets, who will from time to time inspect them to assure their being maintained in satisfactory condition.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

That is the policy, wholly and completely stated, of the vessels in reserve, and we did our best, with the material that we had, with the yards we had, with the personnel we had, from the material side, to carry it out.

Here is a memorandum dated February 3, 1917, on the subject of material, repairs, building. I think this was just about the time Mr. Bernstorff was invited to leave Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. This was your memorandum?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

O.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 3, 1917.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Material, repairs, building.

1. From a material point of view our mission under present conditions is:

(a) Prepare all ships now built for war service at once.

(b) Complete new ships as rapidly as possible.

2. There are a large number of ships now being built in our yards on foreign orders. There is a much greater number being built on home orders. The above calls for a large amount of material and employs a large number of ship mechanics. Our navy yards are short of men, material, and machines. Our next difficulty will be the transportation of material and machines.

3. To secure the above men, machines, and material will require legislation. It is suggested that this legislation should authorize the Navy Department to—

(1) (a) Work overtime. (b) Pay double wages for overtime. (c) Increase all wages in navy yards and at other Government plants at once.

That is because we had to compete with the shipbuilding plants and the Shipping Corporation. [Continuing reading:]

(2) (a) Stop all foreign delivery of vessels, materials, or machines needed by us in the Navy or in our own merchant marine, and to compel the firms having such contracts to center their efforts on vessels needed by us, their surplus material, men, and machines to be available for transfer to Government plants or to private plants doing Government work.

4. Have all yards and bureaus list all machines and material needed and give them authority to commandeer them when not employed on other equally important Government work.

We got a good many tools and a good many ships, and we got a good many thousand tons of steel by doing that very thing, but it took legislation to do it. [Continuing reading:]

5. Have all mechanics employed in navy yards or private yards or plants on Government work released from all military service and listed as Government Service Corps.

6. Authorize Government inspectors to compel all yards and plants to give Government orders for material, machines, or parts right of way over all other orders, foreign or domestic.

7. Give Government materials, munitions, mechanics, or troops right of way over all other kinds of freight, express, or passenger.

8. Procure any submarines built for foreign Governments now in the United States. Take over any contracts for foreign Governments for parts to be assembled outside of the United States.

We did that.

9. Make arrangements with the English Government for obtaining heavy shells from Hadfields, or procure the method of manufacture.

They had been more successful in producing armor-piercing projectiles after that time than we had, by some process unknown to us, and that is a suggestion to get quickly that ammunition, which our producers had failed to produce, or the quality that would pass test. [Continuing reading:]

10. Procure from the English and French Governments rights and plans of their best types of aeroplanes and aeroplane motors; also all information they may have in reference to the Zeppelin type of dirigible.

The committee has asked about why we did not have some information before the war—before we went into the war—and why we did not send expert agents over. We tried. The Allies were closed up, tight. They would not tell us anything; and the further it went along the worse it got. They were sore at our not getting in, and they had the attitude, "Well, if you play the game we will tell you the rules;" and they did not loosen up on information to us until we did get in. Then they gave us everything. You can not blame them much for playing clam before, and they certainly did it. [Continuing reading:]

11. Select and equip the necessary bases for the operation of coastal patrol with dirigibles and aeroplanes.

12. Urge immediately on Congress the necessity of immediate appropriation of funds for the equipment of submarine and aviation base at Coco Solo Point.

That was a plan we had for the naval protection of the Panama Canal at this end, and it was important, as that was one of the foci of shipping that, in submarine raid or surface raid, they might

think a good place to hit, and disjoint our shipping from one coast to the other, and we had the plans and the canal authorities had the labor, etc., and we could go ahead and do it. [Continuing reading:]

13. Secure appropriation of \$1,400,000 for the purchase of the Jamestown Exposition site and \$5,000,000 for its immediate development—

That was to give us an operating base at Hampton Roads, which we needed very badly to get the supplies and personnel out of the way of the repair work. That is where I came in on it, on the material side. What I was trying to do was, I was trying to throw these other activities out of the navy yards, so that we could use them to capacity for material, and maintenance of the fleet materially and while some of these questions are not material questions, the motive behind them was to get room to handle material. [Continuing reading:]

13. Secure appropriation of \$1,400,000 for the purchase of the Jamestown Exposition site and \$5,000,000 for its immediate development, i. e., the building of piers, storehouses, oil fuel storage, fleet facilities of all kinds, and the equipment of part of the grounds of the training station site and submarine base for the handling of a large number of recruits, the money to be made available at once. This would provide the necessary aeronautic base on Hampton Roads. It is not believed that the Army base will be satisfactory for naval operations.

14. Authorize the construction, purchase, lease or rental, including the purchase of land if necessary, of the facilities for the receipt, storage, inspection, and shipment of material and stores of all kinds; also coal and fuel oil.

15. Secure necessary legislation and appropriation to authorize the purchase of material, reserve stores, equipage, and plans previously recommended.

16. \$1,200,000 for complete equipment of submarine base, New London.

17. \$5,000,000, rental, sites, and equipment, coast patrol stations.

That was for aviation.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what became of these memoranda of yours? Were they necessarily approved?

Admiral McKEAN. They were not always approved in toto; but, like other things, the suggestions came from different sources of what we should do to get ready for the war, and they were taken to the chief, the chief took them up or took them up with the Secretary; and I only cite those to show what we were thinking about and what we were trying to do, and I want to say that I succeeded in getting most of them done in time. We would take them up with the chief and we would discuss them in conference, some of them would be changed a bit, but we did get most of it through. And this is illustrative of the lines we were working along, and I did have the sympathetic support of my chief in this business and, within limits, also of the Secretary. He thought that I was a very extravagant individual, and so did Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. But no action was taken, necessarily, at once on these memoranda?

Admiral McKEAN. Well, if I did not get some action on a memorandum at that time, Senator, I followed it up pretty close.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you inform the committee when action was taken on these memorandums?

Admiral McKEAN. These things were appropriated for. For instance, we got Hampton Roads and we got Coco Solo and we got New London and we got the coastal bases.

The CHAIRMAN. How about A, "To buy all ships now built for war service at once"?

iral McKEAN. The precedents I will give you right away, in that paper.

CHAIRMAN. That may be, but they were not prepared.

iral McKEAN. They could not have been instantaneously, and I did not have been anything like as fast as we wanted it. They could not do it. I think the following memorandum will show. But these were the lines along which we were working, and the Department was sympathetically supporting us. It went through top to bottom. We had to push.

CHAIRMAN. Take suggestion No. 3 (reading):

Secure the above men, machines, and material will require legislation. It is desired that this legislation should authorize the Navy Department to:

(a) Work overtime; (b) pay double wages for overtime; (c) increase all wages in navy yards and at other Government plants at once, etc.

It was that legislation passed?

iral McKEAN. When war came it was done. We were authorized to work overtime.

CHAIRMAN. After war was declared?

iral McKEAN. Then we paid time and a half for overtime, as within our own capacity—

CHAIRMAN. You did not pay double wages for overtime?

iral McKEAN. No, sir; they did not. I am very glad they did not. They paid too much as it was.

It was recommended to "increase all wages in navy yards and at other Government plants at once." That was done by the wage board and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in conference with the Wages Appraising Board, and the other interests tried to stabilize wages in standards, and they all got together on that.

The foreign delivery of vessels was stopped.

CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to find out, in general, is whether because memoranda were made through the Chief of Naval Operations, they were of necessity followed out according to the recommendations?

iral McKEAN. No, sir; never in toto.

CHAIRMAN. Of course the memorandum indicates activity on the part in trying to get some things.

iral McKEAN. I am sure that I have not a thing here that does not meet my chief's approval, and there is not a recommendation in a single paragraph there, that ultimately was not in some way or other adopted, I think.

CHAIRMAN. But not according to the recommendation in the memorandum?

iral McKEAN. Practically, yes.

CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. You recommended that they pay double for overtime instead of time and a half.

iral McKEAN. No, sir; there is a variance; but it was along the lines recommended in the memorandum. I am very glad, as I have said before, that they did not. I think that I was too enthusiastic.

CHAIRMAN. But the point is that because the memorandum recommended it, that does not mean that it of necessity was followed?

iral McKEAN. No, sir; it does not.

CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to get.

iral McKEAN. But in this particular one it was practically followed.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your main object was to pay increased wages to stimulate and encourage people to come to the navy yards?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were emphasizing that more than you meant to emphasize double wages, were you not?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. If time and a half was sufficient, that was all you wanted?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the memorandum as it existed as a fact, with the recommendations it stated; and the recommendations in the memorandum were not of necessity followed exactly as they were there?

Admiral McKEAN. Oh, no, sir; that took the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations first, before I could even present them to the Secretary; and then it took the Secretary's approval before we could get Congress to act; and then it took the approval of Congress before we could do it.

Here is a communication of May 15, 1917 [reading]:

P.

MAY 15, 1917.

GENTLEMEN: The Navy Department announces, for your information, and guidance, the following order of precedence of work involved in the preparation for war under its cognizance:

(1) Delivery of material to vessels completed and undergoing overhaul or authorized alterations.

(2) Repair work for vessels of the fleet.

(3) Arming merchantmen.

(4) Arming merchant auxiliaries.

(5) Submarine chasers.

(6) Destroyers.

(7) Scout cruisers.

(8) Aircraft and their equipment.

(9) Submarines (large and small).

(10) Battleships.

(11) Fuel ships.

(12) Destroyer tenders.

(13) Submarine tenders.

(14) Hospital ships.

(15) Ammunition ships.

(16) Repair ships.

(17) Transports.

(18) Gunboats.

(19) Battle cruisers.

Very truly, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

CHAIRMAN GENERAL MUNITIONS BOARD,
Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.

NOTE.—Similar letter was also addressed to the following: Chief of Naval Operations, Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Navigation, Supplies and Accounts, Medicine and Surgery, Yards and Docks, General Board, Commandant, Coast Guard Service, Council of National Defense, The Secretary of War, United States Shipping Board.

That priority list was changed from time to time as the situation developed.

Here is an estimate of the situation made about June 1—a memorandum. Other officers recommended certain things. This was the material side, for the Chief of Operations, and along the lines you spoke of. It was not accepted in toto, but we ultimately got to

plan suggested worked out, not exactly along the lines of the memorandum, but in effect. [Reading:]

Q.

(About June 1, 1917.)

THE RAPID BUILDING OF A LARGE FLOTILLA OF DESTROYERS.

1. From the general estimate of the situation the decision was reached to build as rapidly as possible:

(a) A large number of submarine chasers.

(b) A large number of destroyers.

That had already been done. That was a part of the decision. [Continuing reading:]

In carrying out the above plan the following steps have been taken:

(1) A large number of small craft have been and are being purchased for use in harbor patrol and out to the 50-fathom curve.

(2) A number of yachts are being taken over and equipped for coast patrols under the commandant of the coast patrol force.

(3) Some 340 submarine chasers have been contracted for. These craft are of wood, 110 feet long, 660 tons, and it is hoped that they will prove satisfactory sea-patrol boats.

They were the ones that we were putting the listening devices on and used for developing that, and there were some of those contracted for before we went into the war. We did not give the order to a private yard, because we did not want the plans, etc., to get out, but we did order some at the Norfolk Navy Yard before we declared war, and as soon as war was declared we had the plans complete and ordered them in large numbers for ourselves and for the French. [Continuing reading:]

(4) A small number of tugs and steam trawlers have been purchased or chartered for sweeping, etc.

(5) A number of the fleet destroyers and coastal torpedo boats have been assigned to the coastal patrol force.

(6) We have now under contract some 52 destroyers, which is about the capacity of the firms heretofore engaged in building destroyers, and this source of supply can of course be speeded up, but can not be counted on for a large additional number at any one time.

To meet the above conditions and our excessive demands at the present time, the following plan is suggested:

Build the required number, whatever it may be—say 200—on the assembling plan, viz., build the hulls in one place, boilers in another, engines in another, and "assemble" them at certain navy yards or private yards.

The plan would call for complete standardization of hulls, motive machinery, boilers, pumps, lighting systems, etc.

The department would select standards from the most successful practice and would make complete detailed plans, write complete detailed specifications for each component, make contracts with the various works best fitted to undertake quantity production of each part, viz.: one group to furnish all hulls (all duplicates); another all boilers (all duplicates); all turbines and reduction gears (all duplicates); all auxiliaries (each class to be exact duplicates); no changes or variations to be permitted, so that when parts reach assembly yards any and all will fit, contracts to be made on the basis of cost plus percentage of profit, all works to be run in two shifts of 10 hours, with time and one-half for overtime, etc.

The details of inspection, transportation, etc., would have to be worked out so that the whole business would be taken over by the people on the ground, and only questions on appeal to be taken up through the general inspector with the department.

The assembling could probably best be taken over by the navy yards with forces organized at each, so as to carry on the simultaneous assembly of a division (6) at a time.

It might, and probably would, be necessary for the Government to advance the necessary capital to expand certain already organized producers' plants to provide for maximum production.

It is believed that under the above plan the first division of destroyers could be turned out in six months from date of completion of organization and plans, and that after that each assembly yard could complete one division (6) per month, or through yards one complete flotilla per month.

In the meantime, every destroyer possible to spare should be sent to the other side, for from information received to date, the most effective answers to the submarine so far formed are:

- (a) Armed merchant ships to keep them submerged.
- (b) Submarine chasers—and the best chaser under all conditions is the destroyer

Here is a memorandum dated June 2, 1917, for the Secretary of the Navy, a confidential memorandum. [Reading:]

R.

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR,
Washington, D. C., June 2, 1917.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

In reference to the Secretary's memorandum of May 31, the following is a summary of important work under the bureau since the declaration of war. Some of this work was inaugurated prior to the declaration of war, and some is still in hand.

The usual routine work of the bureau has shown an enormous increase in volume. The amount of correspondence handled had increased about 100 per cent over a similar period the previous year. The expenditures under the bureau's current appropriation have likewise increased by about 100 per cent.

Before the declaration of war the bureau started the necessary arrangements for increasing its force to handle the increase in work. The force in the bureau in all branches is now 229, as against 143 a year ago. Further additional increases in this force must be made and arrangements with this end in view are now in hand. In the navy yards there has been an increase in force since January 1 from 25,000 to more than 32,000 men. Further increases in these forces also must be made.

Contracts have been placed for all the vessels authorized in the naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1918, with the exception of three battleships, one destroyer tender, and one submarine tender. In connection with the placing of these contracts there has been developed and perfected an entirely new method of payment, namely, on the basis of actual cost plus a percentage of profit. This has involved a complete reconsideration and revision of the department's usual forms of contracts and has required the establishment of completely new machinery for handling matters of procedure in payment under the new form of contract. Arrangements have also been made with various contractors for these and previous vessels to speed up construction. Arrangements have also been made with the manufacturers of certain varieties of materials, notably steel materials, for the earliest possible delivery of all necessary materials for the construction of these vessels.

In addition to the vessels authorized in the naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1918, additional contracts have been placed for the construction of 355 submarine chasers, 15 destroyers, 24 mine sweepers, and 2 seagoing tugs.

The bureau has performed its part of the work of placing in active commission practically all vessels on the Navy list.

The bureau has performed the proportion of work under its cognizance in connection with the enrollment of about 600 patrol vessels and the assignment of battery to about 250 of these. In addition, although no merchant auxiliaries have as yet been taken over by the Navy, the bureau has accomplished a large volume of work in connection with the examination of plans of merchant vessels and the preparation of plans for their conversion into naval auxiliaries in case such action becomes necessary.

The bureau has performed a proportion of the work under its cognizance in connection with the arming of about 80 American merchantmen, 11 British merchantmen, and 10 Russian merchant vessels.

In addition to the purchase of the necessary materials under its cognizance for the prosecution of the increased volume of current work at navy yards, the following special material purchases have been made.

(a) Special plans have been made, and consultations are still in progress, in cooperation with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and other bureaus of the department, in connection with the purchase of large quantities of materials which are desirable to carry in stock during times of emergency.

(b) The necessary schedules have been prepared and contracts placed for about 50,000 tons of structural steel for special purposes in navy yards.

(NOTE: This does not include structural steel purchased direct by ship constructors for incorporation in new vessels.)

c. Schedules have been prepared and contracts placed for a large amount of auxiliary machinery and special appliances for stock purposes so as to be ready to meet emergencies.

d. In cooperation with the Bureau of Forestry, and the Lumber Committee of the Union Board, an investigation of large scope has been carried on with regard to the immediate and future lumber requirements of the Navy.

e. Large purchases have been made of mattresses, hammocks, clothes bags, and other equipment, to keep abreast of the constantly increasing enlisted personnel.

f. A satisfactory type of gas mask has been designed, and manufacturing facilities for the same have been developed and contracts have been placed for 50,000.

g. A type of rescue breathing apparatus which can be produced commercially in large quantities has been developed, and all arrangements completed for placing large orders for such apparatus.

h. The necessary manufacturing facilities have been developed and contracts placed for 5,000 sets of Very's night signal apparatus.

The designs and specifications for new vessels as referred to under previous paragraphs have been developed and completed. Work is still progressing on other designs. In addition a very large amount of special design work has been carried on in connection with special schemes and proposals. Suggestions from many sources as to matters in connection with the prosecution of the war are received in large numbers. The careful and intelligent consideration of these requires an enormous amount of careful investigation and thought by highly qualified technical employees. In addition, the bureau is continuing in increased volume its usual program of experimental work, especially in the model tank, and in connection with the development of protection of the stability and buoyancy of ships from torpedo attack, both for vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine.

In aeronautics the bureau has prepared specifications for 100 sea planes, and has placed contracts for 90 of these. In cooperation with the builders, designs and specifications have been developed for small dirigibles, and contracts for 16 of these have been placed. The necessary arrangements have been made for placing orders for 24 additional dirigibles of this type as soon as the necessary information has been obtained from the trials of the first ones. There have been prepared and are now practically ready for issue, complete designs and specifications for new type of small seaplane, suitable for use aboard ship. There has been developed, in conjunction with the manufacturers, the design of small kite balloons, suitable for use on board ship. In conjunction with joint Army and Navy Airship Board, there is being prepared preliminary designs and estimates for a large rigid dirigible, and when approved by the department arrangements will be made for its construction, and it will probably be completed at an early date.

In connection with the special appropriations in the last two naval bills, totaling \$18,000,000, the bureau has, in conjunction with the other bureaus involved, completed plans for the development of the Puget Sound, Norfolk, and Philadelphia Navy Yards. The necessary investigations have been made for the allotment of this sum between these and the other navy yards. The actual work in this connection has been started for the yards. Arrangements have been completed after much difficulty for the purchase and equipping of the machine tools necessary for the contemplated development of the various yards. In order to provide the increase in working force as referred to above, and for the probable further increases in these forces, large purchases of small tools, other equipment, etc., have already been made, and orders placed for additional quantities in order to obviate any possibility of delay from shortage of such equipment. The necessary forces at navy yards and arrangements are in hand to still further increase these forces in order to keep abreast of the increased number of workmen and the increased amount of work handled by the yards.

In special reference to work undertaken under the emergency fund of \$115,000,000, carried in the appropriation bill of March 3, 1917, the bureau's letters, No. 13516 A106 of May 31 and No. 16660 A 1 of June 1, contained complete statement of the obligations under the cognizance of this bureau against that fund. Briefly, the work in and under that fund is as follows.

Three hundred and fifty-five submarine chasers, 15 torpedo boat destroyers, 2 sea-going tugs, 24 sea-going mine sweepers, aircraft, and Very's night signal sets, also the measures taken with various ship contractors for expediting work on contracts on hand form an obligation against this fund estimated at a minimum of \$20,000,000.

D. W. TAYLOR.

Here is another confidential memorandum for the Secretary dated June 2, 1917. This begins:

In compliance with your memorandum of May 31, 1917, I submit the following summary of the work in the office of Naval Operations since the declaration of war.

It gives different things. They both of them have been referred to here at different times. It shows the organization of the different forces and their distribution. It shows the organization and the development of the districts, and the work that they had done up to that time. I want to call attention particularly to this:

Repair work on battleships left unfinished before the movement of the fleet south has been taken up and practically all naval vessels have been made materially ready and put in service.

That is June 7, 1917.

Also under the heading of aeronautics, here is the following:

Contracts were authorized for such aircraft as could be turned out for the Navy by July 1, including in this number 16 coastal dirigibles, and contracts are being made for additional aircraft as fast as they can be accepted by the manufacturers. Two hundred and eight (208) aircraft have been ordered but not yet delivered. There are under construction at Pensacola 12 temporary hangars, a dirigible shed, and a large hydrogen plant.

There is a very significant thing that I will refer to again in the memorandum on aeronautics. It was not because of the lack of desire or intent or appreciation on the part of the Navy Department that we did not have a complete air force, completely trained and complete in material and every respect. You did not have the manufacturers; you did not have the plants to produce it; you could not get it, it did not make any difference how much money you had. We were behind. We had ordered from everybody that gave us even a fair promise.

I happened to have aeronautics wished off on me for a time, and it was a strenuous time, and I worked with every man that had a feasible practicable idea. I would get an engineering and building and construction plan, and if they could produce drawings, plans, or anything that even gave us promise of success, we would give them an order for three machines, because we wanted to find out for sure whether there was anything in it, and we wanted to develop a new source of supply. We would give a man an order for three machines or engines in order to cover his expenses of development and work. His first one would cost him five times as much, and we would obligate the Government for three of them, and let him take the other two.

The CHAIRMAN. This was during the early period of the war?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; during and before. I took over aviation about the 1st of March, 1917; but they had been going on the same way under my predecessor.

The CHAIRMAN. This has nothing to do with the recommendation that was made in 1913, has it?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; but I will explain that when I take up the regular subject of that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral McKEAN. But that shows what Operations had done, and that is an illustration; and they had spent \$7,900,000 in the districts, taking over patrol vessels, and so on. Those vessels had to be

inspected and evaluated by boards, and their spending \$8,000,000 in that time on these little craft shows that they were pretty busy.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say, "in the district"?

Admiral McKEAN. No; in the districts; in all the districts. They were mostly in the third and—

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said, "the district."

Admiral McKEAN. No; in all the districts.

The memorandum last referred to is as follows:

S.

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 2, 1917.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

In compliance with your memorandum of May 31, 1917, I submit the following summary of the work in the office of Naval Operations since the declaration of war.

OPERATIONS.

On April 1 all naval vessels were mobilized and immediate steps taken to fit them for war service as fast as their crews for full commissioning could be supplied. All naval districts were mobilized and their skeleton organizations are being filled as rapidly as personnel becomes available.

The Coast Guard, transferred to the Navy, have been operated by the Navy Department and all vessels belonging to that service have been repaired and refitted.

German refugee ships have been seized in cooperation with the Treasury Department, and the interned German vessels have been taken over for naval service and are being rapidly put in shape for active service. Refugee German vessels in Samoa, Honolulu, and Porto Rico are being towed to the United States for overhaul and fitting out for service.

There has been organized and put in operation a patrol force with the Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Capt. H. B. Wilson, which patrols the offshore waters of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Eastport, Me., to the Rio Grande. Suitable vessels of this force are held in readiness to operate against enemy raiders that may be reported in the North Atlantic.

There has been established in European waters a destroyer force under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, and 28 destroyers have been dispatched abroad for this service, together with two destroyer tenders. Two supply ships, under destroyer escort, have been dispatched to France, carrying cargoes of much needed material for that country.

By agreement with the allied powers definite areas of patrol in the North Atlantic and off the east coast of Brazil have been taken over by the United States Navy and a scout force has been despatched to cover the area assigned our forces in the South Atlantic, under the command of Admiral W. B. Caperton.

There has been established in the Pacific a patrol of the Pacific coast, including Mexico and Central America as far south as Panama Canal, under Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam.

There has been organized a force of small craft designated for patrol service in waters adjacent to the coast of France, and Capt. W. B. Fletcher has been placed in command of the first contingent of this force, which will complete its fitting out in a few days and start for its field of operations.

There has been organized a system of convoy service under general charge of Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, in readiness for the convoy of any troops which may be despatched to France.

In addition to the foregoing armed guards have been or are in process of being placed on all vessels, about 150 in number, plying between the United States and Europe, and the Atlantic Fleet has been given the duty of training the crews or the armed guards of merchantmen and transports.

The organization of the several forces, the regulations for convoy service, the instructions for the operation of merchant vessels supplied with armed guards, and war instructions for United States merchant vessels have all been prepared and issued by the Planning Section of the Office of Operations.

A board, of which Capt. Pratt of the Office of Operations, is chairman, has been appointed to consider plans and devices connected with submarine warfare, and is in almost daily session and conference with the research committee of the Council of National Defense.

Definite and effective steps have been taken toward the organization of machinery to take over the control of the routing of all merchant vessels leaving United States ports. At present this function is being exercised by representatives of the British Admiralty stationed in our ports.

Preparation and distribution of various publications and ciphers for use in communication between merchant vessels and men-of-war of the United States and of the allied powers is well advanced. The communication office has been greatly enlarged to meet the demands of the increased work brought about by the state of war, the taking over all radio service, and the establishment of the censorship over cables. It is contemplated to establish a service of officer-messengers for the distribution of secret orders, confidential publications, and ciphers.

NAVAL DISTRICTS.

The work of the naval districts has been extremely active, especially in districts 1 to 5, inclusive, because of their greater strategic importance and because of the great trans-Atlantic traffic passing to and from the ports within their limits. The sixth, seventh, and eighth naval districts are filling up their organization, but are not developed to the same extent. Those districts on the Pacific coast and in Hawaii have not yet been fully organized. Defensive sea areas have been declared and have been enforced in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Cape Henry, Hampton Roads, and Charleston as fast as the number of patrol boats become available efficiently to enforce control over the areas. Other areas will be enforced as the organizations grow.

Six hundred and twelve small vessels have been inspected and found suitable for naval use. One hundred and fifty-two have been taken into the naval service and assigned to scout patrol service and as mine sweepers. One hundred and thirty-eight have been ordered taken over but have not yet been delivered. Those accepted are now actively at work patrolling and mine sweeping or are being fitted out as rapidly as possible for work. All the small craft acquired by the naval district commandants have been manned by enrollment of Naval Reserves within the districts, and the personnel by active employment are rapidly being trained and accustomed to the line of work which the defense of the district demands. Mine sweeping is being carried out at Boston, New York, Delaware Bay and in the Chesapeake.

The obligations under the emergency appropriation of \$115,000,000 incurred in equipping the naval districts is indicated in the attached table.

OPERATIONS ON SHORE.

The Naval Government of the Virgin Islands of the United States has been established under the governorship of Rear Admiral J. H. Oliver, and steps have been taken to supply at least a partial land defense of the islands by mounting eight 5-inch guns distributed between the Islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix. Steps have been taken having in view the establishment of quarantine services, medical research services, and agricultural services in the islands.

Affairs in the Island of Haiti, involving the peace of the Republic of Santo Domingo and Haiti, have progressed satisfactorily, and the authority of the established Governments of these Republics has been maintained. In the two Republics there are now forces of marines aggregating 2,000. In Santo Domingo a guardo nacional under the military governor and under the direction of United States marines has been formed and is undergoing a course of training while in the Island of Haiti and the gendarmerie is reported to be in a very efficient condition. A small coast guard service has been established in Haiti and vessels repaired in ports of the United States assigned to this service have recently been delivered under United States naval escort.

In addition, there have been employed in the disturbed districts of Cuba, caused by the recent revolution in that country, a varying force of marines for the protection of American interests there. There are at present about 450 marines maintained in the island. An information service throughout the island has been organized.

We have maintained constantly in Mexican ports and along the coast, a patrol by our vessels, giving especial interest to the port of Tampico in the vicinity of which are vast oil fields constituting a large and important source of the world's supply of oil. From two to four vessels have been maintained continuously at this port.

MATERIAL.

The vast work of equipping and repairing the fleet has brought upon our various navy yards and shore establishments demands which have taxed their utmost capacity. Not only has it been necessary to complete the overhaul and repairs of our regular

naval vessels, but repairs to the seized German merchant vessels, and the fitting out and equipping of ships taken over for service have multiplied the work required to be done.

Repair work on battleships left unfinished before the movement of the fleet south has been taken up and practically all naval vessels have been made materially ready and put in service. The fitting out of vessels for distant service is nearly completed, 15 German ships badly damaged by their crews before seizure by this Government are being fitted out for naval purposes and eight German ships are being repaired for the Shipping Board.

AERONAUTICS.

The naval aeronautics program was considerably accelerated upon the severance of diplomatic relations February 3, 1917, and the present program of naval aeronautic expansion may be considered to have begun on that date.

Enrollments in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps were begun under definite standards supplied to commandants of the various naval districts, and arrangements for accelerating the training of personnel at Pensacola and for establishing various other schools of training were made. There are five such schools now in operation.

Contracts were authorized for such aircraft as could be turned out for the Navy by July 1, including in this number 16 coastal dirigibles, and contracts are being made for additional aircraft as fast as they can be accepted by the manufacturers. Two hundred and eight aircraft have been ordered, but not yet delivered. There are under construction at Pensacola 12 temporary hangars, a dirigible shed, and a large hydrogen plant.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic Cognizance, sites for coastal air stations were examined and selected, and complete plans for the development of such stations were drawn up. Money for the acquisition of these stations is not available, but is included in an appropriation now pending. One site, however, has been obtained through permission of the use of land from the City of New York, and the construction of an air station there is now under way.

An allotment for the emergency fund of \$3,000,000 was made to aeronautics. Of this sum \$1,025,000 has been obligated and the expenditure of a further sum for the purchase of aircraft equipment costing approximately \$1,244,000 has been authorized. The balance of approximately \$731,000 remains available.

W. S. BENSON.

EXPENDITURES FOR PATROL VESSELS, MINE SWEEPERS, ETC., IN NAVAL DISTRICT.

[Referred to in page 3.]

Vessels taken over:

| | |
|------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Patrols..... | \$1,821,808 |
| Sweepers..... | 3,064,260 |
| Vessels ordered taken over..... | 1,555,001 |
| Vessels taken over by special board..... | 1,475,500 |
| Total..... | 7,916,629 |

I have here a report from the Bureau of Yards and Docks which shows what they were doing in hospital buildings, Marine Corps, aviation stations, and miscellaneous yard improvements, ordnance plants, dry docks, storage facilities, etc., and what had been done between the declaration of war and the date of the report, June 4, 1917.

In this connection I wish to submit a table that is, I think, illuminating. This is on the work of the Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations.

For yards and docks and shore stations their appropriation for 1916 was \$4,500,000; in 1917 it was \$11,000,000; in 1918—that is the fiscal year that I speak of—it was \$103,000,000; in 1919 it was \$119,000,000. That is their own appropriations.

In addition, they expended for building for other bureaus and from the allotments of other bureau's appropriations, in the fiscal year 1916 only \$42,000; in the year 1917, \$32,700,000; in the fiscal year 1918, \$77,000,000; and in the fiscal year 1919, \$17,000,000.

Now, there is a fair illustration of the activities and about their ratio of increase in the shore stations, bases, aviation stations, etc., the material and land activities.

(The memorandum last referred to, together with the table referred to, are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

T.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS,
Washington, D. C., June 4, 1917.

Confidential.

From: Bureau of Yards and Docks.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Work in progress under the bureau and its activities since the declaration of war.

Reference: Department's letter of May 31, 1917.

1. The following statement describes briefly the work of the bureau:

SHIPBUILDING.

Covered by \$18,000,000 appropriation and specific appropriation of \$1,000,000 for a structural shop at Norfolk, Va., making a total of \$19,000,000. Work under Bureau of Yards and Docks approximates \$16,000,000, distributed as follows:

Portsmouth, N. H.: \$350,000. All work is now under way mainly by yard labor. Yard will be equipped to build submarines with seven boats on ways at one time.

Boston, Mass.: \$50,000. This includes only work of a minor nature practically completed.

New York, N. Y.: \$2,500,000. This includes new ways for new type battleship and a new structural shop. Contract for part of the work has been let. Completion of project dependent on the transfer of storage facilities to new building now under construction. Extension machine shop specific appropriation \$400,000 nearly ready for advertisement.

Philadelphia, Pa.: \$5,500,000. This includes ways for the construction of one battle cruiser and one battleship. It includes new structural shop, new foundry, new machine shop, fitting out pier, 350 feet long-ton fitting-out crane, new power plant, two building ships with overhead crane runways, galvanizing plant, together with the necessary distributing circuits, road, pavements, etc. Yard has now one small ways.

Contracts have been let for all shops and part of the power plant equipment; also crane runways and building slips. Plans for the power plant building, fitting out pier, and fitting out crane are nearly completed. The remainder of the power plant equipment is either under advertisement or will be advertised shortly.

Norfolk, Va.: \$5,225,000 including \$1,000,000 specific appropriation for structural shop. When completed there will be provided one ways for the construction of a battle cruiser. At the present time the yard has a destroyer ways.

This includes a new structural shop, foundry, machine shop, new power plant, shipbuilding, slip with overhead crane runway, fitting out slip, together with the necessary power distributing systems, railroad tracks, streets, pavements, sewers, etc. The structural shop is nearly completed, contracts having been awarded for the machine shop, foundry, building slip and crane runway, and for part of the power plant equipment. Accessory work is under way by yard labor and is progressing satisfactorily. Plans and specifications for the water front improvement, power plant building, additional power plant equipment, and other accessories, are well advanced and will be advertised or contracted for shortly.

Charleston, S. C.: \$400,000. With the torpedo destroyer ways which were constructed previously at the yard, the expenditure of this money will provide for 4 ways for destroyers, so that 4 vessels can be laid down at one time. The work includes, besides the 3 additional destroyer ways, a pattern shop, extension to the existing machine shop, public works building, a machinist mates' school to release space now occupied by same in machine shop, and miscellaneous distributing lines, railroad tracks, streets, etc. More than half of this work is now under active construction by the yard, plans for the remainder being practically complete and work will be started or contracted for by the yard shortly. Cranes for the additional shipbuilding ways have been placed under contract.

Mare Island, Calif.: \$500,000. The department has just authorized the expenditure of this amount at the Mare Island yard, which will include the extending and widen-

of the present slip to take care of the new type battleship, and minor changes and extensions to existing structures, additional railroad tracks, and street work, and the slipping of the machine-shop extension, which was provided for from funds of last year. This machine shop is under contract, and construction work is actively under way.

Puget Sound, Wash.: \$1,500,000. This will provide ways for the construction of a battleship and one scout cruiser. The construction of the building slip is under advertisement, contract for the shipbuilding cranes has been entered into. The remainder of the work to be carried out includes extensions to existing buildings, remodeling buildings, additional distributing systems, railroad tracks, paving, etc. The majority of this work will be undertaken by the yard, and in most cases work has either been started or is about to commence.

Improvements to central power plants and distributing systems: The appropriation for the fiscal year of 1918 provides approximately \$2,400,000 for power plants for various yards and stations. In addition to this the urgent deficiency bill will provide \$750,000 more. Approximately \$850,000 from the \$18,000,000 appropriation will be devoted to the power plants at Philadelphia and Norfolk, making a total for power plant construction of approximately \$4,000,000.

The principal work is at Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Washington. At Philadelphia and Norfolk entire new power plants are being provided of large capacity to provide for the demand caused by the development of these yards. At the Washington yard the plant is being more than doubled to take care of the new gun shop and the additional facilities included in the expansion of the ordnance plant. The remainder of the funds will be expended in extending the power-plant facilities at the other yards to take care of the greatly increased activities on account of the development of these yards by reason of the war, and also in providing emergency connections to commercial points.

WORK FOR THE BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY.

Work is under way for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery on temporary hospitals and dispensaries and on permanent extensions to the supply depots at Mare Island and New York, aggregating \$2,700,000. All this construction is being defrayed by annual appropriations or from funds to be provided from the urgent deficiency bill.

Emergency-hospital construction: The work in progress contemplates the construction of temporary hospitals, with total capacity of 2,700 beds, at the following locations: Portsmouth, N. H.; Newport, R. I.; New York, N. Y.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Norfolk, Va.; Charleston, S. C.; Key West, Fla.; Pensacola, Fla.; New Orleans, La.; Great Lakes, Ill.; Mare Island, Calif.; and Puget Sound, Wash.

This temporary construction aggregates \$1,500,000. Two-thirds of this construction has already been awarded and is under construction. The remainder will be awarded under contract within 10 days to three weeks.

Extension of medical supply depots: The urgent deficiency will provide for permanent extension to the medical supply depots at Mare Island, Calif., and New York, N. Y., estimated to cost \$350,000. A sketch layout has been made and the work will be started as soon as the deficiency bill passes.

Dispensaries, etc.: Buildings are under construction at Charleston, Newport, and Philadelphia. A sterilizing plant is being erected at Boston, and repairs and alterations are being made at various hospital reservations, together with a training school for hospital corps men at San Francisco. The value of the work is approximately \$1,000,000.

Contagious units: Contagious units are under construction at Newport, R. I., Portsmouth, N. H., Great Lakes, Ill., and Norfolk, Va., aggregating \$103,000. The work is well advanced.

SUBMARINE BASES.

New London, Conn.: \$1,250,000. This work is well under way and should be completed under contract within a few weeks. The general layout for the station has been decided upon. The work contemplates a complete base for training the personnel, as well as for basing approximately 10 boats.

Philadelphia, Pa.: Work has been started on a shop for overhauling batteries on submarines, which will include as a part of its equipment motor-generator sets for charging batteries.

Other bases: The urgent deficiency bill provides \$1,500,000 for equipping certain bases to charge submarines. The general requirements for the various yards have been worked out, and work will be in active prosecution soon after the deficiency bill passes.

AVIATION STATIONS.

Allotments have been made or requested from "Aviation" aggregating \$2,000,000. There is also being utilized for aviation development at Pensacola, an appropriation of \$420,000 for repairs on account of hurricanes, and also \$235,000 from "Engineering" for a hydrogen plant, making a total for aviation stations of approximately \$2,600,000. Work is being carried out mainly at Pensacola, for which approximately \$750,000 has been allotted, and at eight coastal stations.

Coastal stations: Eight of these stations are contemplated, but the sites for only two stations have been definitely determined. Contracts for the steelwork for the dirigible hangars have been entered into; also contracts for the erection of these hangars, providing of aeroplane hangars and miscellaneous other work for fitting up stations at two places—Rockaway Beach and Montauk Point. Plans are well under way for the other stations, and work will be proceeded with as soon as the locations are determined.

Pensacola, Fla.: The work at Pensacola includes a dirigible hangar, 9 permanent sea plane hangars, erection shop, 8 wooden hangars, bulkhead, dirigible shed, aeroplane piers and miscellaneous additional facilities. In addition to this, permanent piers for large vessels, additional power plant equipment, and general station improvements are being provided out of the \$420,000 appropriation to repair the hurricane damage. With the exception of the permanent pier, all projects are either under construction or have been recently contracted for.

In addition, a hydrogen gas plant, to be charged to "Engineering", and to cost \$235,000, has been contracted for and is well under way.

MARINE CORPS WORK.

Permanent construction: The work in hand for the Marine Corps approximates \$2,700,000. This includes \$200,000 in the urgent deficiency bill for additional storage facilities at the quartermaster's depot, Philadelphia. The major items include the following:

Peking, China: Barracks and miscellaneous equipment, \$60,000. Plans and specifications are ready for advertisement.

Philadelphia, Pa.: Additional barracks, advance base storage, and extension to clothing depot, approximately \$850,000. Preliminary plans for the barracks and clothing depot have been completed and the final plans are under way. Plans for the advance base storehouse are nearly ready for advertisement. The necessary steps are being taken to secure land for the Marine Corps depot in the city.

Miscellaneous minor work is in progress at Guam, Mare Island, Norfolk, Port Royal, Tutuila, and Winthrop.

San Diego: \$600,000 is available for construction of Marine Corps base. Test piles and borings are being taken on the proposed site and steps are under way toward purchase of the land and the securing of adjacent tidelands from the city. Active work on plans has not been started.

MISCELLANEOUS YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Various improvements of more or less minor nature, aggregating \$3,000,000 are in progress at the various yards and stations. In general, the majority of this work is either under contract or advertisement. Major items are as follows:

Mare Island: Floating crane. Work on superstructure well advanced. Material for pontoon purchased and contract for fabrication about to be awarded.

Lighting facilities: \$200,000. This is applicable to all yards. In general, different amounts have been allotted and work is being proceeded with by yard labor.

Boston: Chain shop extension, \$60,000. This is under construction by yard labor.

Newport: Power plant, \$315,000. Plans and specifications have been started and early advertisement is expected. Seamen gunners' quarters and sea wall, \$140,000, under contract.

New Orleans: Extension of wharf, \$30,000, under construction by yard labor. Storage shed, \$40,000, under contract.

New York: Dredging, \$125,000, under contract.

Philadelphia: Fifty-ton locomotive crane, \$100,000, under contract.

TEMPORARY BARRACKS, MARINE CORPS.

Port Royal, S. C.: A contract has been awarded for temporary barracks at the Marine Corps Recruiting Depot at Port Royal, S. C., and this work is well advanced and in a great measure is completed.

Quantico, Va.: Construction has been started on a camp at this place to accommodate at least 10,000 men, and preliminary work is well advanced.

DRY DOCKS.

Two dry docks of maximum size are under construction at Philadelphia and Norfolk. These docks, when completed, will take the largest vessel which can go through the Panama Canal. Work on both dry docks is well under way and steps are being taken to secure their completion at the earliest possible date. Cost \$7,000,000.

WASHINGTON ORDNANCE PLANT.

A contract has been let and work is well under way for a gun shop of large capacity, to cost \$1,000,000; also shrinkage pit, \$250,000, power plant improvements described under power plant heading, \$770,000, and improvements and changes in existing shops amounting to \$212,000. All this work, with the exception of the two smaller shops, is under construction. Plans and specifications for the remaining jobs will be ready for advertisement shortly.

Studies are being made and report is nearly prepared covering permanent extensions to the Washington Navy Yard to provide increased facilities for the manufacture of torpedoes and other ordnance. This will include greatly increased storage facilities, a very large machine shop, extension to the foundry, optical shop, and other improvements which will probably aggregate \$4,000,000.

GENERAL STORAGE FACILITIES.

Permanent construction: For permanent structures \$3,523,000 has been allotted from the emergency fund, which with the \$1,000,000 provided for under specific appropriations, makes a total of approximately \$4,500,000. There are included in this program permanent storehouses for Boston, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Mare Island, Puget Sound, Charleston, New York, and also at New York a building for provisions and clothing. Construction work is well under way at New York on both projects and it is expected that they will be completed in the late fall. Contract for the work at Philadelphia has been awarded. The storehouse at Boston is under advertisement, and plans and specifications for the other work are nearly completed.

Temporary construction: Temporary and emergency storehouses, aggregating approximately \$400,000, are now being authorized out of the emergency appropriation. Work is under way at all stations where allotments have been made. The individual projects at each yard are in general under \$50,000.

ORDNANCE AMMUNITION STORAGE.

Approximately \$1,500,000 has been allotted from the emergency fund, the emergency deficiency bill contains \$3,000,000, and the appropriation act for the fiscal year of 1918 provides \$1,000,000, making a total available from all sources for these purposes \$5,500,000.

These projects are distributed between 16 stations. Minor projects amounting to approximately \$120,000 are now under construction by yard labor. This work is well underway, and in some cases has been completed.

At the present time work under contract or advertised amounts to nearly \$3,000,000. Standard plans and specifications have been prepared for the buildings to be provided for out of the remainder of the funds available. It is expected that all of this work will be advertised within three weeks. These structures provide storage for powder, shells, torpedoes, and mines.

WEIGHT HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES.

There has been allotted from the emergency fund for this purpose approximately \$1,070,000. This amount is entirely obligated for equipment at the various yards and stations. A large part of this equipment has already been delivered and the remainder will be available shortly.

NAVAL ACADEMY IMPROVEMENTS.

The naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year of 1918 provides approximately \$2,500,000 for extension to Bancroft Hall and improvements to the power plant, and the urgent deficiency bill provides \$300,000 for extension to Isherwood Hall. Bids will be opened on Bancroft Hall and Isherwood Hall on the 1st of July. Part of the power plant equipment has already been contracted for and the remainder of the work is well in hand.

NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

PROJECTILE AND ARMOR PLANTS.

Work is progressing on the plans for the projectile plant, but very little has been done on the plans for the armor plant. Survey of the site is now in progress.

EXPERIMENTAL LABORATORIES.

No work has been done on this project.

JAMESTOWN PROJECT.

Tentative studies have been made of this project and it will be possible to start work as soon as funds are provided in the urgent deficiency bill.

TEMPORARY BARRACKS—NAVY.

It seems probable that the need for camps for training enlisted men of the Navy may easily aggregate over 50,000 men, requiring an expenditure of over \$7,000,000.

At the present time contracts have been let and construction is well under way, and in some cases nearly completed, for camps to accommodate approximately 5,000 men each, at Philadelphia, Charleston, S. C., Mare Island, and Puget Sound.

Great Lakes, Ill.: Work has already been started on a camp which may develop so as to accommodate 20,000 men. This particular location will require extensive equipment and structures to provide for water supply, sewage disposal, etc.

Newport, R. I.: Contract has been entered into and work is under way for housing 2,000 men; extensive developments of the stations to care for 10,000 men eventually are being developed and plans are well under way.

Pensacola, Fla.: Plans have been completed for camp of 1,000 men and contract will be made shortly. This camp is designed so as to be expanded to accommodate 2,000 men.

Miscellaneous: Tentative studies are in progress for possible additional camps at other places.

RADIO STATIONS FOR BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING.

Radio work in progress aggregates \$600,000 and includes three 600-foot towers at Porto Rico, one 500-foot tower at Radio, Va., and one 200-foot tower at Norfolk, Va.

The work covers miscellaneous buildings for various radio stations located from Portland, Me., to Alaska, covering approximately 29 separate buildings. In addition, there are minor changes and improvements at the same stations.

Of the main projects the radio towers at Porto Rico, aggregating \$250,000, contract has been awarded. Plans are in preparation for the new towers at Radio, Va., and these will be out in a few weeks. Of the entire project, over two-thirds of the work is under active construction under contract, or advertised. The remaining work will be out within a month.

FUEL OIL INSTALLATION.

The work in progress under various appropriations including \$1,500,000 in deficiency bill for reserve fuel oil storage in Chesapeake Bay, aggregates \$3,500,000.

Contracts amounting to approximately \$400,000 have been entered into for work at Guantanamo.

Work at Melville, Puget Sound, San Diego, Mare Island, and Pearl Harbor, aggregating \$1,500,000, will be advertised within the next few weeks. The fuel oil reservoir at Pearl Harbor, aggregating \$100,000, is now under construction by yard labor.

PARSONS, Acting.

EXHIBIT T-1.

Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations.

| | 1916 | 1917 | 1918 | 1919 |
|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Maintenance, yards and docks..... | \$1,647,496.00 | \$2,206,000.00 | \$14,288,000.00 | \$16,500,000.00 |
| Contingent, yards and docks..... | 50,000.00 | 50,000.00 | 4,090,000.00 | 350,000.00 |
| Emergency expenses..... | | | | 4,750,000.00 |
| Navy yards, public works: | | | | |
| Portsmouth, N. H..... | | 3,000.00 | 134,000.00 | 480,000.00 |
| Boston, Mass..... | 25,000.00 | 64,500.00 | 256,500.00 | 1,895,000.00 |
| New York, N. Y..... | 135,000.00 | 108,900.00 | 1,219,000.00 | 1,250,000.00 |
| Philadelphia, Pa..... | 55,000.00 | 713,000.00 | 1,420,000.00 | 2,435,000.00 |
| Washington, D. C..... | 145,000.00 | 616,000.00 | 6,728,000.00 | 1,983,600.00 |
| Norfolk, Va..... | 130,000.00 | 1,242,000.00 | 2,400,000.00 | 4,306,508.69 |
| Charleston, S. C..... | 95,000.00 | 196,000.00 | 257,000.00 | 1,650,000.00 |
| Mare Island, Calif..... | 65,000.00 | 384,000.00 | 605,000.00 | 2,850,000.00 |
| Pensacola, Fla..... | 15,000.00 | | | |
| Puget Sound, Wash..... | 60,000.00 | 18,000.00 | 670,500.00 | 1,025,000.00 |
| Naval stations: | | | | |
| Key West, Fla..... | 5,000.00 | | | 1,025,000.00 |
| New Orleans, La..... | | 150,000.00 | 60,000.00 | 450,000.00 |
| Guam, M. I..... | | 1,000.00 | 60,000.00 | 100,000.00 |
| Pearl Harbor, T. H..... | | 700,000.00 | 1,036,500.00 | 119,275.00 |
| Tutuila, Samoa..... | | 4,000.00 | 40,000.00 | 50,000.00 |
| Guantanamo, Cuba..... | | | 34,000.00 | 200,000.00 |
| Naval training station, Great Lakes (buildings)..... | | | | 922,500.00 |
| Naval aeronautic station, Pensacola, Fla..... | | 420,000.00 | 245,000.00 | 100,000.00 |
| Naval operating base, Hampton Roads, Va..... | | | 3,155,072.25 | 4,174,556.68 |
| Submarine base, New London, Conn..... | | | 1,340,000.00 | 1,224,407.64 |
| Torpedo station, Newport, R. I. (buildings)..... | | 141,000.00 | 47,000.00 | 1,150,000.00 |
| Torpedo station, Keyport, Wash..... | | 11,000.00 | 16,000.00 | |
| Naval proving ground, Indianhead, Md..... | 158,380.00 | 106,000.00 | 150,000.00 | 1,010,000.00 |
| Naval training station, California (buildings)..... | 16,000.00 | 32,475.00 | 25,000.00 | 120,000.00 |
| Naval training station, Rhode Island (buildings)..... | | | 33,000.00 | 390,000.00 |
| Naval coal depot, Melville Station, R. I..... | | 35,000.00 | | |
| Naval magazines: | | | | |
| New England coast..... | | 6,300.00 | 106,000.00 | 30,000.00 |
| New York Harbor..... | | 5,000.00 | 50,000.00 | 18,000.00 |
| Dover, N. J..... | | 10,000.00 | 100,000.00 | 18,000.00 |
| Fort Mifflin, Pa..... | 64,000.00 | 5,000.00 | 142,700.00 | 360,000.00 |
| Norfolk, Va..... | 30,000.00 | 78,000.00 | 117,000.00 | |
| Charleston, S. C..... | | | 120,000.00 | |
| Mare Island, Calif..... | | 3,000.00 | 16,000.00 | |
| Puget Sound, Wash..... | 58,000.00 | 7,000.00 | 49,600.00 | |
| Kauai, Hawaii..... | | 5,000.00 | | |
| Fort Lafayette..... | | | | 26,000.00 |
| Buildings and grounds, Naval Academy..... | | 70,000.00 | 1,615,000.00 | 4,055,000.00 |
| Depots for coal..... | 500,000.00 | 500,000.00 | 2,500,000.00 | 1,072,500.00 |
| Repairs and preservation at navy yards..... | 1,097,436.00 | 1,414,000.00 | 6,225,000.00 | 4,750,000.00 |
| Naval hospitals: | | | | |
| Portsmouth, N. H..... | | | 20,000.00 | 331.29 |
| Chelsea, Mass..... | | 14,700.00 | | |
| Newport, R. I..... | | 18,000.00 | | |
| New York, N. Y..... | 15,000.00 | 10,000.00 | | |
| Mare Island, Calif..... | | 15,000.00 | | |
| Canacao, P. I..... | | 3,600.00 | | |
| Great Lakes, Ill..... | | | 20,000.00 | |
| Torpedo storage facilities, Navy..... | | | | 250,000.00 |
| Marine barracks: | | | | |
| Island of Guam..... | | 10,000.00 | | |
| Philadelphia, Pa..... | | | 280,000.00 | |
| Norfolk, Va..... | | | 25,700.00 | |
| Mare Island, Calif..... | | | 55,000.00 | |
| San Diego, Calif..... | | | 600,000.00 | 1,500,000.00 |
| Pekin, China..... | | | 62,000.00 | 110,000.00 |
| Puget Sound, Wash..... | 200,000.00 | | | 475,000.00 |
| Marine recruiting station, Port Royal, S. C..... | | 15,000.00 | 49,500.00 | 320,000.00 |
| Marine Corps rifle range, Winthrop, Md..... | | | 10,000.00 | |
| Commission on additional navy yards and stations..... | | 10,000.00 | 4,985.80 | |
| Experimental and research laboratory..... | | 1,000,000.00 | 500,000.00 | |
| Guns and munitions storage at navy yards and stations..... | | 280,400.00 | | |
| Land for naval base, San Diego, Calif..... | | 250,000.00 | | |
| Hospitals and medical supply depots..... | | | 6,100,000.00 | 15,495,000.00 |

Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations—Continued.

| | 1916 | 1917 | 1918 | 1919 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Lighting facilities, navy yards and stations..... | | | \$200,000.00 | |
| Ordnance storage..... | | | 3,000,000.00 | |
| Power plants and distributing systems, navy yards and stations..... | | | 4,250,000.00 | |
| Reimbursements, property damaged, Indianhead, Md..... | | | 755.01 | |
| Quarters for marine guards at naval magazines..... | | | 100,000.00 | |
| Submarine facilities, navy yards and stations..... | | | 1,500,000.00 | |
| Handling appliances at navy yards..... | | | 450,000.00 | |
| Improvement at ordnance stations..... | | | 4,750,000.00 | \$1,727,000.00 |
| Marine railways at navy yards..... | | | 375,000.00 | |
| Naval training camps..... | | | 29,000,000.00 | 29,810,807.61 |
| Temporary storage facilities, Navy..... | | | 1,500,000.00 | 4,200,000.00 |
| Purchase of dry dock, Boston, Mass..... | | | | 4,560,000.00 |
| Naval air station, Cape May, N. J. (purchase of land)..... | | | 150,000.00 | |
| Land for naval warehouses, South Brooklyn, N. Y..... | | | 560,000.00 | 99,065.90 |
| Temporary naval prison..... | | | 200,000.00 | |
| Naval fuel depot, San Diego, Calif..... | | | | 175,000.00 |
| Total..... | \$4,556,312.00 | \$10,930,875.00 | 103,112,813.06 | 119,512,572.81 |
| ALLOTMENTS FROM OTHER BUREAUS. | | | | |
| Secretary's office: | | | | |
| Improving and equipping navy yards for the construction of ships..... | | 15,475,117.00 | 11,050,000.00 | 138,800.29 |
| Aviation, Navy..... | | 6,982,500.00 | 25,004,200.42 | 8,173,781.00 |
| Naval emergency fund..... | | 6,657,000.00 | 17,111,742.00 | 3,207,238.41 |
| Bureau of Navigation: | | | | |
| Aviation, Navy (navigation allotment)..... | | | 1,559,959.17 | |
| Naval emergency fund (navigation allotment)..... | | | 141,080.00 | 2,100.00 |
| Arming and equipping Naval Militia..... | | 65,822.65 | 236,003.80 | |
| Schools or camps of instruction..... | | | | 266,397.73 |
| Recreation of enlisted men..... | | | | 3,500.00 |
| Gunnery and engineering exercises..... | | 10,000.00 | | |
| Instruments and supplies..... | | | 36,000.00 | |
| Naval Home, Philadelphia..... | | | 1,688.50 | 2,497.50 |
| Bureau of Ordnance: | | | | |
| Ordnance and ordnance stores..... | | | 656,505.82 | 1,258,112.26 |
| Armor plant, Navy..... | | 88,700.00 | 7,352,400.00 | 37,500.00 |
| Navy mine depot..... | | | 2,000,000.00 | 117,500.00 |
| Increase of the Navy..... | | | 1,160,000.00 | 212,037.65 |
| Navy Gun Factory..... | | 67,500.00 | 10,820.00 | 73,537.08 |
| Reserve ordnance supplies..... | | 350,000.00 | 12,000.00 | |
| Projectile plant, Navy..... | | 910,000.00 | | 7,000.00 |
| National security and defense..... | | | | 168,000.00 |
| Bureau of Steam Engineering: | | | | |
| Aviation, Navy (engineering allotment)..... | | | 2,583,082.00 | |
| Naval emergency fund (engineering allotment)..... | | | 55,836.02 | 66,257.00 |
| Engineering..... | | 48,950.00 | 1,927,431.72 | 1,740,900.00 |
| High-power radio stations..... | | 23,090.30 | 374,794.23 | |
| Bureau of Medicine and Surgery: | | | | |
| Contingent..... | | 89,273.42 | 418,896.66 | 44,160.00 |
| Care of hospital patients..... | | 14,000.00 | 427,686.52 | 16,825.55 |
| Naval hospital fund..... | | 27,086.00 | 47,585.54 | 35,299.82 |
| Bureau of Supplies and Accounts: | | | | |
| Maintenance, Supplies and Accounts..... | | 12,100.00 | 143,000.00 | 58,700.00 |
| Fuel and transportation..... | | 4,600.00 | 2,041,413.73 | 449,076.14 |
| Bureau of Construction and Repair: | | | | |
| Construction and Repair..... | | 3,500.00 | 99,400.00 | 82,326.24 |
| Marine Corps: | | | | |
| Maintenance, Marine Corps..... | 42,120.00 | 1,928,436.26 | 2,980,000.00 | 1,089,673.01 |
| Total allotments from other bureaus..... | 42,120.00 | 32,757,675.63 | 77,431,536.13 | 17,251,219.66 |
| Grand total..... | 4,598,432.00 | 43,687,550.63 | 180,543,349.19 | 136,763,792.49 |

miral McKEAN. That finishes the policy lines and the reports of the separate subjects that have been referred to in the testimony of other witnesses, and I have tried to give data, tabulated, showing the actual figures covering in each case 1917, 1918, and 1919. First is the dreadnoughts.

The testimony of the commander in chief covers this question very completely, showing that the winter training in 1916-17 was more important than the immediate overhaul of these ships; that as conditions permitted and the necessity arose they were from time to time sent to the yards and put in condition and kept in condition for service.

able showing the repair period is attached; every time the ship is at a navy yard, the length of time she was there, and also the miles that each vessel steamed during each of these three years, as to her final condition and fitness to move, etc., is a pretty good guide.

The table last referred to is as follows:)

| vessel. | Days at navy yard for overhaul during— | | | Total miles steamed— | | |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|----------|
| | 1917 | 1918 | 1919 | 1917 | 1918 | 1919 |
| g | Jan. 9; Jan. 27 to Feb. 3. | May 9 to 16..... | Jan. 5 to Feb. 1; July 1 to 17; Oct. 1 to Dec. 31. | 17,701.24 | 17,172.6 | 17,096.0 |
| | May 28 to Oct. 9. | Jan. 1 to 24; July 21 to Aug. 19. | June 16 to 19; July 9 to Dec. 31. | 11,709.2 | 20,532.9 | 37,081.6 |
| | Aug. 22 to Sept. 26; Oct. 4 to Dec. 5. | Jan. 19 to Feb. 12. | | 14,037.7 | 14,499.7 | 5,772.0 |
| vania..... | Jan. 9; May 14 to 19; May 31 to July 20. | | May 1 to 16..... | 9,818.7 | 21,296.1 | 21,737.0 |
| as..... | Jan. 27 to Feb. 5; Mar. 29 to June 10; Oct. 29 to Dec. 31. | Jan. 1 to Mar. 10. | Apr. 14 to May 6; July 30 to Dec. 31. | 15,609.3 | 17,169.9 | 15,293.0 |
| rk..... | Jan. 27 to Feb. 3; May 6 to 9. | Oct. 16 to 19..... | June 19 to Dec. 15. | 20,158.4 | 18,346.0 | 22,292.4 |
| | Mar. 29 to Apr. 24; May 28 to 31; July 6 to 11; Nov. 1 to Dec. 31. | July 29 to 31..... | June 15 to Dec. 31. | 14,800.1 | 19,426.7 | 11,529.2 |
| a..... | Mar. 27 to Apr. 3. | Jan. 31 to Mar. 31; Dec. 22 to 31. | Mar. 4 to 12; Mar. 31 to Apr. 7; Apr. 26 to July 7. | 19,534.9 | 17,430.1 | 14,619.0 |
| e..... | Jan. 1 to 15; May 22 to 15; Dec. 15 to 31. | Nov. 14 to Dec. 31. | Jan. 4 to Feb. 1; Apr. 23 to 28; Sept. 19 to Dec. 31. | 17,695.8 | 17,009.5 | 20,660.8 |
| | Jan. 1 to Apr. 3; Oct. 27 to Dec. 7. | Aug. 11 to Sept. 30. | Jan. 23 to 27; June 30 to Dec. 31. | 8,793.3 | 23,027.4 | 19,006.0 |
| s..... | Jan. 10 to Feb. 1; Oct. 27 to Dec. 7; Dec. 15 to 31..... | Mar. 26..... | Jan. 4 to Feb. 1; June 30 to Dec. 31; Sept. 19 to Dec. 31. | 17,699.8 | 17,009.5 | 20,660.8 |
| pt..... | | Jan. 1 to Mar. 10; May 4 to July 28; Oct. 13 to 14. | Jan. 1 to 31; Feb. 28 to Mar. 4; Sept. 22 to 28. | | 10,435.5 | 16,556.9 |
| vico..... | | May 29 to Aug. 15; Nov. 3 to Dec. 13. | Jan. 1 to 15; Mar. 1 to July 1. | | 2,681.31 | 17,571.3 |

In this connection the attention of the committee is called to the shortage of dry docks at the beginning of the war; that the following docks have been added since that time: One 1,000-foot dock at Norfolk, Va., completed; two 650-foot docks at Norfolk, Va., completed; one 1,100-foot dock at Boston, purchased; one 1,100-foot dock at Philadelphia, building; one 1,100-foot dock at Pearl Harbor, completed; one 1,000-foot dock, private, San Francisco, completed—that is a private dock, and we obligated the Navy Department to use it each year up to the \$50,000, or hire it and pay them that amount of money each year, to get them to undertake it. So that we are five big docks better off and two small docks better off than we were before the war, and that was one of the greatest reasons of delay in providing ships. For instance, at one time at the New York yard we had the *Texas* in the big dock and the *Olympia* in another dock and a transport in another dock, all of them under repair to their bottoms, and we could not send any more ships to that yard; and even when we wanted to send ships to a yard we were up against the docking question first. The shortage of docks is our weakest point, both from a naval and commercial point of view. For maintaining the present fleet, and much more for the new additions to the fleet now building, we need a number of additional docks on both coasts.

The CHAIRMAN. We will need still more docks now?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir; you do, on both coasts.

Now, as to the old battleships; that is, predreadnoughts or old battleships, referred to in Admiral Grant's testimony. In addition to the general statements of policy as to ships in reserve, and the older type of ships previously submitted to the committee, there is attached hereto a table showing the number of days at navy yards for overhaul of each of these 24 old battleships during the years 1917, 1918, and 1919. This table also shows the mileage steamed in each of these years, gives the date of assignment to transport duty and the date this duty was completed; and also number of troops carried by each of the ships. This table is submitted to show that, while these old ships varied in their date of building, from the *Indiana* in 1893 to the *Michigan*, first commissioned in 1910, where the oldest was 27 years old and the newest was 7 years from date of first commissioning when the war was commenced. Under "mileage steamed" it shows that, while old and out of date, they had been kept and were then in condition to do a large amount of cruising.

This data is to be taken in connection with the average under peace conditions, when, as I have found by previous investigations, each ship averaged one-third of her time in navy yards under repair, and the average cruising of a battleship in the fleet was about 10,000 miles per year. That was the normal peace cruising. Now, when you consider that under the rules of the game of most nations about one-half of these ships would have been junked and sold—scrapped—before we went into the war, they did pretty well. Here is 32,000 miles that the *Nebraska* steamed, for instance. The *Georgia* steamed 35,000 miles in 1919. And they carried troops, anywhere from 500 up to, on one trip that the *Virginia* made, 5,800. Their efficiency was fairly measured by their age and how long they had been in the reserve.

The *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Iowa* we have since expensed—that is, stricken them from the list—and there will be new ships named in their places.

here are numbers of others that in my opinion have no military use any more. But we had to do pretty nearly as much work on them. We would not do any alterations. We had to do more repairs relatively on old ships than on new; they cost us more for repair and more time and money at navy yards. But without those repairs we could not have trained the personnel we trained during the war at all; and Admiral Grant, in spite of his complaints about his ships, if he did not hammer the people and the material both to the very near their limit in training, I never saw it done. The table last referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

TABLE V.

| Name of vessel. | Days at yard for overhaul. | | | Date of assignment of transport duty. | Date of completion of transport duty. | Number of troops carried. |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------|-----------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | a 1917 | b 1918 | c 1919 | | | |
| Albatross | 237 | | 90 | Nov. 2, 1918 | June 30, 1919 | 578 |
| Albatross | 19 | | 56 | | | |
| Albatross | 141 | 16 | 101 | Jan. 20, 1919 | June 20, 1919 | 4,796 |
| Albatross | 30 | 34 | 14 | | | |
| Albatross | 43 | 34 | 268 | | | |
| Albatross | | 55 | 203 | Dec. 28, 1918 | May 28, 1919 | 4,678 |
| Albatross | 90 | | 27 | Dec. 31, 1918 | June 23, 1919 | 4,530 |
| Albatross | 30 | | 42 | Mar. 19, 1919 | July 28, 1919 | 3,278 |
| Albatross | 94 | 17 | 132 | Apr. 12, 1919 | do | 3,968 |
| Hampshire | 107 | 54 | 235 | Dec. 31, 1918 | June 22, 1919 | 4,900 |
| Albatross | 121 | | | | | |
| Albatross | | 47 | 205 | Sept. 19, 1918 | June 18, 1919 | 4,717 |
| Albatross | 90 | 10 | | | | |
| Albatross | 115 | 26 | | | | |
| Albatross | 180 | 30 | 51 | Oct. 17, 1918 | June 27, 1918 | 7,486 |
| Albatross | | | | | | |
| Albatross | 47 | | | | | |
| Albatross | 90 | 14 | 16 | Sept. 30, 1918 | June 20, 1919 | 5,809 |
| Albatross | | | | | | |
| Albatross | 33 | 99 | 11 | | | |
| Albatross | | 47 | 120 | Dec. 6, 1918 | July 4, 1919 | 5,303 |
| Albatross | 25 | 9 | 6 | Jan. 17, 1919 | June 22, 1919 | 4,861 |
| Albatross | 32 | 95 | 28 | Jan. 28, 1919 | Apr. 26, 1919 | 1,052 |
| Albatross | 20 | 41 | 40 | Feb. 18, 1919 | July 27, 1919 | 4,501 |

| Name of vessel. | Total distance steamed. | | | Midshipman's cruise. | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | a 1917 | b 1918 | c 1919 | a 1917 | b 1918 | c 1919 |
| | Miles. | Miles. | Miles. | | | |
| Albatross | 7,397.6 | 16,609 | 31,332.1 | | June 7 to Sept. 1 | |
| Albatross | 9,350.9 | 12,295.3 | 14,978.9 | | June 7 to Aug. 29 | |
| Albatross | 6,647.4 | 20,407 | 34,653.3 | | | |
| Albatross | 15,401.9 | 14,311.2 | 8,176.3 | | | |
| Albatross | 8,171.2 | 21,652.3 | 14,440.2 | | | |
| Jersey | 8,661 | 19,354.9 | 30,355 | | | |
| Albatross | 8,205.6 | 23,443 | 32,255 | | | |
| Albatross | 11,810.6 | 23,856.46 | 8,887.43 | | June 6 to Aug. 29 | |
| Albatross | 12,813.46 | 15,492.5 | 21,513.6 | | June 6 to Aug. 28 | |
| Hampshire | 10,444.7 | 27,747.9 | 26,718 | | | |
| Albatross | 22,237.3 | 18,855.3 | 14,719.4 | | June 8 to Aug. 29 | June to Aug. 27. |
| Albatross | 11,506.3 | 26,790.1 | 27,470.9 | | | |
| Albatross | 12,518.3 | 16,624.2 | 11,668 | | | June to Aug. 27. |
| Albatross | 12,445.7 | 21,701 | 9,002.9 | | | |
| Albatross | 5,418.5 | 26,760 | 28,822 | | June to Aug. 28 | |
| Albatross | | 4,750 | | | | |
| Albatross | 12,947.5 | 17,664.8 | 15,235.9 | | | May 28 to Aug. 27. |
| Albatross | 7,002 | 26,848 | 35,479 | | | |
| Albatross | 10,508.6 | 16,124 | 14,513 | | | May to Aug. 28. |
| Albatross | 5,941 | 9,912.98 | 24,991.6 | | | |
| Albatross | 13,390.2 | 18,959.6 | 32,926.6 | | | |
| Albatross | 16,864.8 | 13,546.4 | 27,877.1 | | | |
| Albatross | 19,554.9 | 17,420.1 | 14,019 | | | |
| Albatross | 16,274.1 | 17,225.6 | 26,717.2 | | | |

Admiral McKEAN. The next subject is submarines.

Admiral Grant's testimony shows the details of the submarine situation before and during the early part of the war.

It shows that the department appreciated the situation and its unsatisfactory condition, and sent Admiral Grant to find out what the trouble was and to advise it, the department, how to correct it.

Admiral Grant saw all the difficulties and recommended various cures for the various troubles, in most cases calling for the scrapping of the engines in the boats on hand.

The CHAIRMAN. When was it that Admiral Grant was sent on this duty?

Admiral McKEAN. The spring of 1915, just before I went to Operations, I think. No, it must have been the latter part of May or June, because Admiral Benson went in as Chief of Operations here, and he took office on May 11.

There were no substitutes for the engines. The Bureau of Steam Engineering had sent officers abroad to study all types of foreign engines and was trying to secure and produce the best, with very poor success.

Our early types had gas engines that were pretty nearly suicide. They were trying to develop an internal-combustion type of engine based on the Diesel, but our people were not up to it. But they did send officers abroad and had them learning all they could. They were buying sample engines where they could, and it was a case of development, and we were behind, the same as we were in airplane engines later.

It was necessary that we use the old craft for training officers and men to man the new, so that all sorts of alterations and repairs were made from time to time in an effort to keep them operating.

That is, in the troubles that Admiral Grant had, he brought them to our attention and we did everything we could.

The navy yards were devoting a large amount of time, money, and labor to the subs, but we did not give up all of the navy-yard facilities to this class as Admiral Grant would have liked at that time, and as later, when his job had changed, and therefore his point of view, he wanted to put his whole battleship force No. 1, 24 ships, into the yard to the exclusion of everything else - even submarines. That was later, when his job changed. We compromised, as is usually necessary in meeting opposing demands.

The department had to consider all classes and their relative importance in the plans made to carry out our mission.

Each officer responsible for each of the jobs saw his job magnified relatively by its immediate proximity - some of them failed entirely to see the other jobs at all. Now, that is not a criticism. I would not give a hoot for a naval officer who did not think his job was the biggest one in the Navy. If he did not think that - except one higher up that he was working for - it was the biggest job around, and that he had the best division or the best ship, and so on, I would get another officer right away who did think that, because that is the only way. The man with the enthusiasm behind the job is the only one that gets the work out of it.

Had we listened only to Sims, and we did listen to him hardest, it would have been all destroyers. Had we listened only to Gleaves, it would have been cruisers and transports. Had we listened only

to Cone, the whole Navy and Navy Department would have been in the air. Had we listened to Fullam only, the navy yards and appropriations would have been devoted to his old armored cruisers. Had we listened to Grant only, it would all have been subs at one time and old battleships at another.

Admiral Grant was right in his demands for the larger sub, as the war proved. I took a compromise position in those hearings between Grant and what was the official, departmental, view. I was wrong; I believe that the department was wrong. The department's view was based on shore stations and the operation therefrom, more or less limiting the submarine to defensive uses. Our coast is such and the depth of water that the smaller submarine for purely defensive work is probably the more efficient. But Grant insisted that the larger would do the fleet work and could also do the inshore work. The department wanted to limit the larger ones to the development of a type and prove its efficiency before it gave large orders. Grant was willing to gamble on the big one right from the start.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as the future is concerned, you believe we should now build large submarines?

Admiral McKEAN. We have little ones enough to last us for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. But we will need large ones?

Admiral McKEAN. We will need large ones. Admiral Grant analyzed the material difficulties, but even more important, trained the personnel, officers and men, so that they, in spite of the defective material he describes, succeeded in doing effective work against the enemy from December 1, 1917, to November 1, 1918.

I submit herewith a table in this connection, marked "X."

(The table referred to is here printed in full as follows:)

TABLE X.—Submarine division 5, performances from Dec. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918.

| | AL-1. | AL-2. | AL-3. | AL-4. | AL-9. | AL-10. | AL-11. |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| Number of days at sea..... | 115.9 | 125.4 | 134.0 | 90.2 | 108.0 | 136.6 | 106.2 |
| Number of days on patrol..... | 76.5 | 83.0 | 89.0 | 60.0 | 62.0 | 95.0 | 78 |
| Miles on surface..... | 12,072.3 | 17,562.3 | 12,093.8 | 10,871.6 | 12,251.8 | 15,617.3 | 13,000 |
| Miles submerged..... | 2,353.0 | 1,879.0 | 3,120.0 | 2,126.0 | 2,058.6 | 2,891.8 | 1,999.5 |
| Hours submerged..... | 1,245.4 | 1,163.1 | 1,669.2 | 1,285.1 | 954.8 | 1,794.5 | 1,597.5 |
| Hours charging batteries (starboard)..... | 265.6 | 343.6 | 368.0 | 207.1 | 214.7 | 287.7 | 227.6 |
| Hours charging batteries (port)..... | 312.2 | 306.1 | 332.0 | 237.4 | 181.3 | 275.9 | 227.3 |
| Fuel used, gallons..... | 50,413 | 66,076 | 55,373 | 42,216 | 52,008 | 58,749 | 57,545 |
| Lubricating oil used, gallons ¹ .. | 12,956 | 15,379 | 12,767 | 10,944 | 16,084 | 19,765 | 13,272 |
| Exercise torpedo runs..... | 12 | 10 | 11 | 14 | 8 | 15 | 12 |
| Torpedoes lost..... | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | |
| Torpedoes wrecked..... | | 1 | | | 1 | | |
| Number times enemy sighted... | 3 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Times enemy attacked with torpedoes..... | 1 | | | 2 | | | 1 |
| Number torpedoes expended... | 4 | | | 5 | | | 2 |

¹ 3.78 gallons fuel to 1 gallon oil.

Admiral McKEAN. That trouble book or black book of Admiral Grant's I used to hate to see come into the office, because he had you nailed every time. He trained the personnel. That was the big one. He trained the officers and the men in a way that our submarine people had never been trained before. He got those people ready at that station in New London, out of his school, to take over the subs as they came in, and we had a good deal better submarine force

through Admiral Grant's tackling of submarine training than we could have had without it; but he used to make me very uncomfortable, frequently.

In my opinion, Admiral Grant is absolutely correct in stating that the fundamental cause of our submarine difficulties and failures is that we have permitted the contractors to dictate more or less completely our submarine design instead of doing the designing ourselves, developing standard types, proving them, and then having them built according to specifications drawn up by the department to meet the military use it proposes to make of them.

As you know, we have two companies that have patents, and their types originally were very different. As a matter of fact, all submarines look alike a good deal, now, and I think that we should have before this been doing our own designing. The fundamental reason we have not—and I think this same thing is true with regard to other things, with regard to many other desirable improvements of the same character—is that they will be impossible until the Congress gives the various bureaus much larger drafting forces here in Washington.

I think that is one of the most important material aids we can get. We now build ships the large-scale plans for which are made here in Washington. The plan is sent to a lot of contractors and builders, the navy yards, etc., and their designing and drafting forces work out all the details. Now, although they are sister ships absolutely, intended to do the same thing, when they come out they are twins, but one of them may be a blonde and the other a brunette, just the same, because the two designing forces have worked them out in a different way; and officers and men who are familiar with one can not go to another and handle her and her machinery as they should be able to do in duplicate ships. The only way I can see to get that is for the department to do its own complete designing, run off the blue prints and details, and send them to the contractors, and then you will get two ships that are duplicates, and not that just look alike; and your spare parts of one will fit the other. It will reduce the number of spares you have to keep in store; it will reduce the cost materially; but it will increase the number of people in Washington. But I believe it is real economy and real efficiency.

Now, to show that the submarine might have been worse, at least, Capt. Pratt submitted this performance of submarine division 5. I am perfectly willing to admit that that surprised me as much as it did you; but the personnel factor in submarines, like everything else, is a good 65 per cent anyhow, and with our personnel we had there, trained by Grant, they could make anything go.

The next subject is the German ships converted into Army transports. As the committee will recall, shortly after we entered the war we seized a number of German ships which had been interned in our ports. Among these were 16 large, fast passenger ships, commencing with the *Vaterland*, afterwards renamed the *Leviathan*. These ships were, at first, turned over to the Shipping Board, but early in July, 1917, 16 of them were, by Executive order, transferred to the Navy for equipment and operation as Army transports, and although the Hun had done his best, or worst, within his engineering ability, to disable these ships so that they could not possibly be made of any use to us during the war, they were each and every one completely repaired and the ' in commission with

months from the date they were turned over to the Navy. The engineering problems solved in overcoming the damage done by the Hun were solved by naval officers. The work was done either in navy yards or in private yards according to naval plans and under naval inspection and supervision, and these vessels were utilized from the beginning and until the last of our troops were returned in the transportation of soldiers and were a very large factor in the transportation to France of 2,000,000 soldiers and their safe return to their homes.

This particular case is cited because it was naturally an entirely unexpected job of repair work, entirely out of the usual line, and was, in addition to our own fleet, work whose demands upon our limited yard facilities were already excessive.

I submit herewith a table giving the name of the vessel, the date of transfer to the Navy Department, the date of completion of repairs, the date of the first sailing, and the date of the arrival in the United States on the last voyage, with the number of troops carried over, and the number of troops brought back.

(The table last referred to, together with attached memorandum, is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

Y and 2-Y.

| Name of vessel. | Date of transfer to Navy Department. | Date of completion of repairs. ¹ | Date of first sailing. | Date of arrival in United States on last voyage. | Number of troops carried over. | Number of troops brought back |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| America..... | Aug. 7, 1917 | | Oct. 31, 1917 | Sept. 15, 1919 | 39,768 | 45,625 |
| Mercury..... | Aug. 3, 1917 | | Jan. 4, 1918 |do..... | 18,542 | 20,871 |
| Covington ² | July 28, 1917 | | Oct. 19, 1917 |do..... | 21,628 | |
| Huron..... | May 24, 1917 | | Sept. 8, 1917 | Aug. 23, 1919 | 20,871 | 20,584 |
| George Washington.. | Sept. 6, 1917 | | Dec. 4, 1917 | Aug. 26, 1919 | 48,373 | 34,114 |
| Aeolus..... | Aug. 4, 1917 | | Nov. 27, 1917 | Sept. 5, 1919 | 24,770 | 22,088 |
| Powhatan..... | Aug. 16, 1917 | | Nov. 12, 1917 | Aug. 23, 1919 | 14,613 | 15,333 |
| Agamemnon..... | Aug. 21, 1917 | | Oct. 31, 1917 | Aug. 18, 1919 | 36,097 | 41,174 |
| Madawaska..... | Aug. 27, 1917 | | Nov. 12, 1919 | Aug. 23, 1919 | 17,931 | 16,975 |
| Mount Vernon..... | July 28, 1917 | | Oct. 31, 1917 | Sept. 11, 1919 | 33,692 | 42,740 |
| Antigone..... | Sept. 5, 1917 | | Dec. 15, 1917 | Sept. 15, 1919 | 16,526 | 22,168 |
| President Grant..... | Aug. 2, 1917 | | Dec. 26, 1917 | Sept. 22, 1919 | 39,974 | 37,100 |
| President Lincoln ³ .. | July 25, 1917 | | Oct. 18, 1917 |do..... | 20,143 | |
| Pocahontas..... |do..... | | Dec. 14, 1917 | Oct. 31, 1919 | 20,503 | 20,880 |
| Susquehanna..... | Sept. 5, 1917 | |do..... | Aug. 27, 1919 | 18,345 | 15,507 |
| Leviathan..... | July 25, 1917 | | Dec. 17, 1917 | Sept. 8, 1919 | 98,804 | 93,782 |

¹ Vessel sailed on first voyage within a week from date of completion of repairs.

² Sunk July 1, 1918.

³ Sunk May 13, 1918.

MEMORANDUM—TRANSPORTS—EX-GERMAN.

When these ships were seized by the United States authorities, all records, scraps of paper, etc., found on board were carefully collected and translated. On one ship the following memorandum in German was found: "Commended wrecking engines January 31, 1917." It is to be noted that this is the day before the notice by Germany that she would on February 1, 1917, resume unrestricted submarine warfare.

It is to be noted that the principal parts of the machinery that were attacked were the main engines and that the broken parts were practically all of cast iron. The intentions of the Germans were evidently to keep these vessels out of service for from 12 to 18 months, believing that every broken cylinder, etc., would require renewal before the vessels could again operate. They evidently didn't know that cast iron could be successfully welded. Their plans were not to completely wreck the ships, but to damage the machinery to such an extent that they could not be placed in service for from 12 to 18 months, believing that new cylinders, etc., would have to be installed. I have reliable information to the effect that arrangements had been made in Germany to manufacture new ones, and have them ready for installation at the end of the war, which was planned to win in from 6 to 8 months by means

of their unrestricted submarine warfare. They were confident that England would be isolated and starved out by that time.

Submarine warfare, as practiced by the Germans, had, it must be admitted, greatly reduced shipping on the sea, and if the war were to be carried on to a successful conclusion, ships had to be immediately placed in service to supply the allied armies with their enormous necessities and also to transport our own Army and its vast equipment and supplies to the front. Hence, the vital necessity of getting these ex-German and ex-Austrian vessels into service at the earliest possible moment.

The vessels taken over by the United States, as stated above, were 104 German and 8 Austrian. In addition to these 112 vessels, 4 were obtained from Cuba, that country having declared war on Germany. Cuba had no facilities for repairing these vessels and they were consequently given to the United States. In order that you may realize what these vessels meant to the United States I will state that they aggregated 635,656 gross tons.

Upon the seizure of the vessels by the United States customs' officials, they were turned over to the United States Shipping Board, which board had, as you know, been organized for the purpose of handling all new merchant shipping under the United States flag.

The Shipping Board, after thorough inspections of the vessels, decided that all broken parts should be renewed, which, by the way, was in accord with the usual commercial practices and also with the requirements laid down by marine underwriters.

Considering the number of the ships and the vast quantity of damaged machinery, together with the fact that all plans, drawings, and records had been destroyed, it can be readily seen what an undertaking this would have been and the time it would have taken, especially at a period when the world was calling for more shipping, and the Allies were calling for men and supplies.

In this connection, attention must be invited to the fact that our Atlantic coast navy yards and private shipyards were already congested with work on vessels to meet the deficiencies caused by submarine warfare, and the building of destroyers for use in driving the German submarine off the sea.

The Navy Department speedily realizing that the larger ex-German passenger ships must be one of our chief factors in placing our Army on French soil, their quick repair became a matter of the greatest national, or I might say, international interest.

It was decided that the time required to build new machinery was prohibitive, and as the Navy was not bound by previous practices, nor by the rules and regulations laid down by marine underwriters, these larger passenger ships were turned over to the Navy for repair and operation.

The Bureau of Steam Engineering, Navy Department, after a thorough investigation of the subject, decided that it was not necessary to build new machinery and directed that broken parts be repaired by electric welding, patching, etc., thereby saving time, which was the vital factor, and at the same time avoiding congestion of foundry and machine work, as would be necessary with new castings, in the navy yards and private plants.

This decision, so far-reaching in its application and so fraught with danger to the professional reputations of the persons directly concerned in carrying out this work, was made in the face of opposition by engine builders and marine underwriters, but with such confidence in the ultimate result as left no room for doubt of its success.

1. U. S. S. *Leviathan*, ex-*Vaterland*.
2. U. S. S. *George Washington*, ex-*George Washington*.
3. U. S. S. *America*, ex-*America*.
4. U. S. S. *Agamemnon*, ex-*Kaiser Wilhelm II*.
5. U. S. S. *Mount Vernon*, ex-*Kronprinzessin Cecile*.
6. U. S. S. *President Lincoln*, ex-*President Lincoln*.
7. U. S. S. *President Grant*, ex-*President Grant*.
8. U. S. S. *Covington*, ex-*Cincinnati*.
9. U. S. S. *Aetna*, ex-*Grosser Kurfurst*.
10. U. S. S. *Mercury*, ex-*Barbarossa*.
11. U. S. S. *Pocahontas*, ex-*Princess Irene*.
12. U. S. S. *Princess Matoika*, ex-*Princess Alice*.
13. U. S. S. *Huron*, ex-*Frederich der Grosse*.
14. U. S. S. *Powhatan*, ex-*Hamburg*.
15. U. S. S. *Susquehanna*, ex-*Rhein*.
16. U. S. S. *Antigone*, ex-*Neckar*.
17. U. S. S. *De Kalb*, ex-*Prinz Eitel Frederick*.
18. U. S. S. *Von Steuben*, ex-*Kronprinz Wilhelm*.
19. U. S. S. *Madawaska*, ex-*Koenig Wilhelm II*.
20. U. S. S. *Martha Washington*, ex-*Martha Washington* (Austrian).

In order to show what importance the Secretary of the Navy attached to this work, I will quote from his annual report for the fiscal year 1918.

I have entered upon so full a statement of this case because I think it stands out as one of the greatest engineering achievements of the period. The perpetrators of this sabotage were confident that they had damaged the machinery of ships beyond repair, which fact is evidenced by a memorandum, in which each case is carefully noted, followed by the significant remark "Can not be repaired," and the speedy rehabilitation is a splendid triumph of American ingenuity and an evidence of American engineering accomplishment that is deserving of the highest commendation. The restoration of these magnificent ships to service reflects the greatest credit upon the naval officers concerned and upon the officers and employees of the welding and engineering companies who carried out the work. It is an illustration of the part played in winning the war by the men who handled the electric torch or who fashioned and secured mechanical patches to these damaged cylinders. Without these ships, we could not have transported our troops to France as rapidly as was done.

JANUARY 8, 1918.

Repairs, alterations, and fitting out of German vessels—Repairs and alterations.

| German name. | Renamed. | Hull. | Machinery. | Total. |
|------------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|
| Vaterland..... | Leviathan..... | \$959,596.98 | \$317,261.84 | \$1,276,858.82 |
| President Lincoln..... | | 148,017.92 | 67,486.56 | 215,504.48 |
| Cincinnati..... | Covington..... | 383,051.42 | 182,264.13 | 575,315.55 |
| Koenig Wilhelm II..... | Madawaska..... | 446,006.94 | 129,786.81 | 575,793.75 |
| Kr. Prin. Cecilia..... | Mount Vernon..... | 392,197.14 | 269,013.05 | 661,210.19 |
| Grosser Kurfurst..... | Aeolus..... | 521,722.21 | 177,226.95 | 698,949.16 |
| Princess Irene..... | Pocahontas..... | 97,696.15 | 151,707.71 | 249,403.86 |
| Neckar..... | Antigone..... | 212,658.15 | 163,536.57 | 376,194.72 |
| Amerika..... | America..... | 420,764.43 | 142,383.89 | 563,148.32 |
| President Grant..... | (Same)..... | 149,196.78 | 90,525.33 | 239,722.11 |
| Hamburg..... | Powhatan..... | 731,184.08 | 259,616.82 | 990,800.90 |
| George Washington..... | (Same)..... | 27,954.25 | 19,310.04 | 47,264.29 |
| Kaiser Wilhelm II..... | Agamemnon..... | 87,036.20 | 119,697.68 | 206,733.88 |
| Fredk. der Grosse..... | Huron..... | 138,209.30 | 115,164.57 | 253,373.87 |
| Barbarossa..... | Mercury..... | 79,621.27 | 62,885.21 | 142,506.48 |
| Rhein..... | Susquehanna..... | 220,886.17 | 148,469.85 | 369,356.02 |
| | | 5,015,799.39 | 2,416,437.01 | 7,432,236.40 |

Cost of cutting and electric welding German vessels.


| | |
|------------------------|-------------|
| Leviathan..... | \$42,856.20 |
| President Lincoln..... | 15,759.50 |
| Covington..... | 21,476.39 |
| Madawaska..... | 40,634.91 |
| Mount Vernon..... | 3,405.07 |
| Aeolus..... | 33,228.36 |
| Pocahontas..... | 19,683.30 |
| Antigone..... | 6,560.00 |
| America..... | 12,199.21 |
| President Grant..... | 26,386.33 |
| Powhatan..... | 3,892.35 |
| George Washington..... | 41,810.00 |
| Agamemnon..... | 24,530.00 |
| Huron..... | 25,122.33 |
| Mercury..... | 61,303.50 |
| Susquehanna..... | 1,712.75 |
| | 380,560.20 |

Complete data of all of the German and Austrian vessels taken over by the United States is on file in the Navy Department.

Admiral McKEAN. It will be noted that two of these ships were sunk on the return trip. The attached memorandum from the Bureau of Steam Engineering covers more or less the details of cost, etc., of conversion of those ships and their adaptation to troop transport work.

(Thereupon at 12.45 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 29, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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